Talk:Operation Barbarossa/Archive 1

Archive 1

Archive 2

Archive 3

→

Archive 5

This article could use more beef in terms of Barbarossa's failures. I think the ever worsening relationships between Hitler and the general staff, the difficulty of communication and the differences between political and military goals were something that had a profound impact on how the war went. I think Alan Clark's Barbarossa (ISBN: 0304358649) is the best account i've read of the friction in the top echelons of german command.

---

Why have you returned the note about the cartoon to this page. It has very little to do with Operation Barbarossa and everything to do with the Molotov-Ribbetrop Pact, where it is also noted. It could also be attached to the Nazi - Soviet invasion of Poland or the Soviet invasion of the Baltic states, but I see no reason for it to be in this article. - SimonP 01:00, August 2, 2005 (UTC)

---

Should all of the last half of this article be here. It's always been my impression that Barbarossa was merely the opening campaign against the USSR, and not the entire war up until Stalingrad. I think the last four or five paragraphs should be moved to the article on the eastern front in WWII. - SimonP

---

Before Barbarossa, the Germans and the Russians were allies, having signed an unexpected treaty shortly before the German invasion of Poland.

This wasn't anyting like "unexpected" and it wasn't German but German and Soviet invasion. --Taw

I do think the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact can be described as unexpected. The Soviets only began thinking of allying themselves with the Germans after Munich, and the treaty took the English and French completely by suprise as they had long counted on a Soviet alliance against Hitler. - SimonP

---

Right at the beginning of the article it needs to be stated, that Germany was aware of Soviet Union's plan to attack Germany. When Hitler found that out, he right away took the offensive and cought the Soviet Army in offensive position, therefore surprised them. Soviet Union had appr 30,000 tanks , Germany 6 or 9,000?, something like that.

Viktor Suworow , (book Ice-Breaker) and book "Der Tag M" (M=Mobilizing Day) proved that the Soviet Army under Stalin was ready to attack. Suworow recently inspected many documents. He was trained in Soviet Army at Suworow Officer School in Kaliningrad and at Officer College Kiev.

Further down in the article it needs to be stated , that the main reason, for bogging down the German army, was weather, the rains and early winter . user:H.J.

... or poor strategic planning of overfamed German military celebrities for which Russian climate and geography were surprise even after the same lesson of Napoleon? Mikkalai 21:55, 14 Apr 2004 (UTC)

...and of Charles XII of Sweden. --Ruhrjung 22:02, 14 Apr 2004 (UTC)

The vast majority of historians still believe the USSR was taken by suprise by Barbarossa. There is no evidence Hitler's attack as a preemptive strike to prevent an impending war. With the opeing of archives after the fall of the Soviet Union it has only become more clear that Stalin was shocked by the attack and the Russian armies unprepared, even if many in the NKVD were fairly certain an attack was imminent. - SimonP

There are only two possible explanations why Hitler attacked Russia. (a) He feared that they will attack him, and decided to do it first, or (b) he was total idiot. I think in reality it was a mixture of two :)

Which resembles the situation with regard to recent events in Iraq. Preemtive strikes they were (believed to be) never-the-less.

--Ruhrjung 22:04, 14 Apr 2004 (UTC)

The reason for Stalin's shock could be quite different as pointed out by Viktor Suvorov. I believe the Icebreaker does deserve a note Gene s 11:11, 3 Jun 2004 (UTC)

---

I think it needs to be pointed out that the Germans were bogged down by the weather at Moscow mainly because they first took a detour southward earlier in the campaign. Hitler ordered Army Group Center southward to conquer the Ukraine in a pincer operation instead of taking Moscow earlier in the campaign. I believe that several of Hitler's generals, including Guderian, argued against this. By the time they returned towards the push to Moscow, the muds and then the snows had stopped the advance. -- Egern

The detour, as well as (Causasus campain) was a correct decision: to gain resources (and cut Russia off resources). Taking the capital means nothing in modern war. Mikkalai 19:22, 7 Jan 2005 (UTC)

...except in a psychological sense. But I agree with Mikkalai. The Wehrmacht would have been bogged down by the Russian weather anywhere when that time came. The reason for the failure was an overestimation of own strength and an underestimation of the enemy's preparedness to fight, which can also be argued with regard to Britain (...and more recently in Ira^H^H^H ...oooops ;->). But as there exists a plethora of different theories, I think we as far as possible would strive to attribute different explanations of why the operation failed to the respective advocates of these explanations. --Ruhrjung 20:33, Jan 7, 2005 (UTC)

I cannot disagree with you (especially about Ir^H^H), but don't you think that this kind of argument has no place in a serious text? Thinking about it, for every battle lost by an attacker it is 100% safe to say that the loser underestimated the winner and/or overestimated himself (unless it is known that the attack was desperate (knowing bad odds) or thoughtless (hoping for odds)). What are other general-purpose explanations? Mikkalai 21:53, 7 Jan 2005 (UTC)

Well... for different reasons, people are often preoccupied by the question "Why did X win and not Y" at Jena, at Waterloo, etc, etc. Since people really do discuss different alternative explanations, I think Wikipedia can't avoid it. The matter is not "if" but "how" to discuss it. (I don't wish to discuss it in this article, I just don't see how it can be avoided, given the nature of Wikipedia. I've not proposed any changes to the text, only tried to argue against Wikipedia taking the stance to agree Guderian et consortes, as proposed by by User:Egern.) As it stands, I think the current version of the first paragraphs is reasonably good. --Ruhrjung 22:29, Jan 7, 2005 (UTC)

---

BBC article you gave (http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/war/wwtwo/countdown/countdown_1.shtml) contains at least one important mistake - in April 1939 Inagresion Pact between Germany and Poland was cancelled by Germans, so no way could Hitler be "bound by an agreement he signed with Poland in January 1934". --Taw

official German announcement

On my computer, in mp3 audio format, I possess the official German announcement of the attack on the Soviet Union. The announcement is made by Josef Goebbels, who reads an address from Adolf Hitler. If I can find a website to host this file, would a link to this file be considered relevant enough to add to the "Links" section? Yours sincerely and respectfully, --Cormac Canales 08:58, 21 Aug 2004 (UTC)

Certainly, it would be quite appropiate here. — Monedula 09:29, 21 Aug 2004 (UTC)

That sounds important enough to upload directly to the Wikipedia I'd say. Oberiko 12:47, 21 Aug 2004 (UTC)

Of course, this mp3 belongs to the article! May this mp3 be GFDL-licensed? If yes, it definitely would be better to upload it to Wikipedia! Dr Bug  (Volodymyr V. Medeiko) 12:58, 21 Aug 2004 (UTC)

I am not an expert on the international copyright law, but it seems safe to assume that this recording don't have a copyright, i.e. it's public domain (not GFDL) in the same way as laws don't have copyrights. Goebbels might have held the copyright because it was his performance, but even that's unlikely since he was acting as a public official. Encoding the speech to a new medium is not covered by copyright laws. Gene s 11:54, 23 Aug 2004 (UTC)

The speach itself is not copyrighted, but this specific .mp3 can be. It's like the Encyclopaedia Britannica 1913 is not copyrighted, but its modern reprints are. Dr Bug  (Volodymyr V. Medeiko) 12:02, 23 Aug 2004 (UTC)

The copyright law protects only creative works.  Simple copying is not creative, so it does not create copyright.  Therefore, converting a record to mp3 does not change its legal status. Monedula 12:11, 23 Aug 2004 (UTC)

I am not sure you are correct on copyright status of modern reprints of EB1913. Can you provide any links? I am quite certain the copyright does not cover the exact reprint. It may cover something else, added to the modern reprint. It's impossible to extend the copyright by simply republishing a copy. Gene s 12:26, 23 Aug 2004 (UTC)

I am uncertain where we stand in regards to the legality of this file. In any case, here is a link to where it can be downloaded: http://home.ripway.com/2004-1/57781/JosephGoebbels-FeldzugInRussland(22.Juni1941).mp3 [The file size is 630828 bytes (630kb)]. If a message appears that the download is not working, I assure you nothing is wrong with the link. My host only allows a certain amount of downloads for a free account during a 24-hour block. If I surpass this amount, all downloads are frozen for 24 hours. Simply re-try the link after one day. I can also produce the text of this radio announcement in it's original German and translated into English, if the need arises. Stay in contact. --Cormac Canales 01:38, 14 Sep 2004 (UTC)

Entry contradicts itself?

First section (German preparations) has this paragraph:

"Stalin's own bloodthirsty reputation made the Soviet Union a tempting target for the Nazis. During the late 1930s, Stalin had killed millions of people during the Great Purge, including large numbers of competent and experienced military officers and strategists, effectively leaving the Red Army weakened and leaderless. The Nazis often emphasized the brutality of the Soviet regime when targeting the "inferior" Slavs in their propaganda."

While at the end (causes for the Soviet defeat) we have:

"However, all this caused a shift in Soviet propaganda attitudes. Whereas in prewar years it stated that Soviet army was very strong, already in the fall of 1941 it began to tell people that Soviet army had been weak, that there had not been enough time to prepare for war, that the German attack had come as a surprise etc. All this continues to be preached in Russia's schools today (with the extra embellishment that Stalin's purges of 1930s have destroyed the best officers). At the same time, almost everything concerning the Soviet army in 1939–1941 remain secret even today, many years after the war is over."

So did Stalin's actions during the Great Purge leave the Soviet army without good officers or not?

jagripino

Opinions differ.  Some say that indeed the Great Purge has killed the best officers.  Others think that, quite contrary, the Great Purge has eliminated the unloyal and the incompetent.  See Viktor Suvorov's book "Очищение" ("The Cleansing"). — Monedula 15:23, 2 Oct 2004 (UTC)

What Jagripino here sees as a problem is in my view one of the compelling strengths of a Wikipedia, that tries to present attributed opinions rather than a selected version of many alternative truths. The wordings can of course be improved, but there is absolutely no reason for us (Wikipedia) to make a choise in the text of which theory to believe in. --Johan Magnus 16:21, 4 Oct 2004 (UTC)

Still, it does seem a bit confusing. Perhaps it'd be best to leave discussion of the effects within the article Great Purge and only make a passing reference to it here. (With the amount of officers taken out though, it does seem pretty difficult to believe that it wouldn't have caused some mass confusion though). Oberiko 16:47, 4 Oct 2004 (UTC)

I have no problems with the contradicting views on the effects of the Great Purge on Operation Barbarossa. If both theories are supporter/disputed, pointing both POVs should be done on the article alongside with a link to the Great Purge entry. Jagripino 16:09, 5 Oct 2004 (UTC)

---

terrible loss of life, and miserable conditions for Russians and Germans alike. <---POV Lirath Q. Pynnor

Really permafrost?

A comment: In the article it says: "Drilling into the solid permafrost was impossible, and tents couldn’t even be staked into the ground." I am afraid the permafrost is not found anywhere along the front line. A sole exception could be the very north, next to Finland and Norway. I guess the writer meant an ordinary frozen ground which thaws completele in spring, as opposed to the "real" permafrost.

Thank you for the comment, the article has been corrected. Wikipedia is an open encyclopaedia which anybody can edit. If you spot more inaccuracies, we will be grateful if you correct them by clicking the "edit this page" at the top of the window. Just leaving a comment, like you did, is appreciated, too :) Zocky 10:39, 10 Jan 2005 (UTC)

I am wondering how I could have missed this "drilling impossible". This is total nonsense. Of course, it is impossible to do it with bare hands. But I happen to be a ski tourist in my youth. I can assure you, there is no big deal to put up a tent. Once we were camping at -40 deg. Celsius.

And again, Russians had to dig into the very same ground, didn't they? Mikkalai 20:01, 10 Jan 2005 (UTC)

"Scorched earth" was actually German's approach, to debase the guerillas, not Russians'. Mikkalai 20:10, 10 Jan 2005 (UTC)

Next; this is sooo naive:

Thick scrub dotted the landscape, and Russian troops, usually on cavalry, used this to sneak up on Germans and open fire, unnoticed.

ROTFLMAO. Sneaky bastards these Russians.

I am removing the whole this silly paragraph. The only possible way it can be in a serious article is as an exact quotation from some German general looking for each and every excuse to drive the blame off his ass. Mikkalai 20:06, 10 Jan 2005 (UTC)

Where's the beef?

This article seems to lack any description of what actually happened. It goes from preparations to tangential matters (Siege of Leningrad, the Continuation War) to analysis with only a couple of paragraphs about the greatest military engagement in history! No order of battle. No names of commanders. No mention of the encirclements at Bialystok and Minsk. Nothing about the Baltic states. Nothing about the Soviet counter-offensives at Gomel and Korosten. What about the reinforcement of the Smolensk pocket? The battle of West Ukraine and the encirclement at Uman? The siege of Odessa? Gdr 10:22, 2005 Mar 22 (UTC)

Some people have got too much of that kind of history already. You, who obviously have not, are free to fix the shortcoming! :-) /Tuomas 10:43, 22 Mar 2005 (UTC)

I don't see why we need the book "Stalin's War of Extermination" listed in "further reading". For one thing, the book is in German; for another, it's essentially recommending to the reader a blatantly fascist source. Everyking 09:56, 12 Jun 2005 (UTC)

Hand grenades

The statement about hand-grenades being the only operational weapons in the winter, is ambiguous with reference to being able to "pull the pin".

German hand-grenades ("potato-mashers") did not have pins, rather, the soldier unscrewed the bottom and pulled a string that ran through the wooden handle and was attached to a fuse that triggered the grenade after a few seconds delay.

L. Fernandes, Jun. 21, 2005

Incorrect Mention of Stalingrad as objective

I removed the mention of Stalingrad as an objective of Barbarossa, as it was not decided by the Germans that they should attempt to take it until much later (by Hitler at a conference, on 23 of June 1942). Sources are from Antony Beevor's Stalingrad:

"During the conference [that is, the conference on June 1 1942 for Heeresgruppe Sud’s summer offensive], Hitler hardly mentioned Stalingrad. As far as his generals were concerned, it was little more than a name on the map. His obsession was with the oilfields of the Caucasus. ‘If we don’t take Maikop and Grozny, I must put an end to the war’."

Later, on 23rd of June:

"Hitler, having ignored the strategic rationale on which the whole plan had been based, now increased its objectives at a stroke. Sixth army would now take and occupy Stalingrad. He was no longer content with the original idea of just advancing to the Volga and destroying the arms factories."

I ask, how could Stalingrad possibly be considered an objective of Barbarossa if it wasn't even initially an objective of Operation Blau (Army Group South's 1942 Summer Offensive)?

Good point! :o) Indeed the goals of Operation Barbarossa were very optimistic: it was intended to reach the line Archangelsk - Gorki - Stalingrad (or "the Volga") in the autumn of 1941. Of course these bold aspirations were based on the assumption that most organised resistance would have collapsed by then. I fear Hitler was not only suffering from delusions of grandeur but also deluded himself with a presumed Russian inferiority. But then he simply didn't have good intelligence about the strength of the Red Army. In 1942 planning was much more realistic and the scope of the offensive was limited to the severely diminished fighting power of the German army — though still not taking into account the possibility of an enormous growth of Soviet tank production despite the destruction of one of the major tank production centres: Stalingrad.

However, if you think Stalingrad is too far: Baku is even farther! (and yes: the aim was to secure the whole of the Caucasus :o)

--MWAK 10:16, 6 August 2005 (UTC)

-I'm afraid that simply isn't true, Stalingrad was not considered as a target prior to 23 June 1942 and certainly not explicitedly stated as so. I have already provided evidence to support this contention, now if you want me to believe otherwise you will have to provide some too.

Fuhrer Directive No.21, which states the ultimate objective as "to establish a defence line against Asiatic Russia from a line running from the Volga River to Archangel', and to which you seem to refer, does not constitute in any way evidence that Stalingrad was considered a target.

I find this a very puzzling statement. Of course, it's difficult to prove a negative fact: indeed from the evidence you gave it doesn't follow your claim is true — it isn't even an indication of such unless you make the (understandable) mistake to assume that the goals of 1941 couldn't possibly be more ambitious than those of 1942. As you say, the Fuehrerweisung indicates the Volga as the consolidation line. It should be emphazised that this line was to be reached before November 1941. As Stalingrad is west of that line it was thus intended to occupy that city during the execution of Operation Barbarossa. And this implies it was an operational target. The logic seems impeccable! However it might be that you simply want to make clear that conquering Stalingrad was in 1941 not, so to say, a target in itself, a strategic wair aim and a motive for reaching so far east. I have to agree it was at best a minor one. But then the text in the article didn't say it was. It simply used the city as a geographical indicator.

--MWAK 16:28, 10 August 2005 (UTC)

American Lend Lease?

I'm not suggesting that Russia's victory should be credited to the United States, but even Zhukov credits the American Lend Lease policies as helping the Soviets overcome their logistical problems.

"Operation Barbarossa" only refers to the events of 1941.--MWAK 08:27, 12 October 2005 (UTC)

reasons of SU defeats in summer'41

You're overestimating purges' effect. As recently (late 80s) opened archives show, only ~30000 officers were permanently purged, out of ~205000 available in 1937. Of course there were not enough officers, but Red Army size was doubled during 1937-1941. Highest officer's average education has greatly increased after the cleansing, and some poor commanders removed (Blucher, Yakir, Tukhachevsky, Uborevich, etc.).

Page with tables and references (in russian) http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/Parliament/7231/army.htm

Yes, but the higher the rank, the worse the ratio gets. Weeding out the older officers decreased common sense and experience. Would that be fully compensated by the nominal length of formal education? And "permanently" means they were never readmitted? So that those still in disgrace on 22 June are not among the 30,000 you mention? Stalin often valued and rewarded the courage of those who dared to contradict him, but the general atmosphere after the purges was one of fear and docility.--MWAK 12:24, 19 October 2005 (UTC)

---

"Causes of initial Soviet defeats" section is an utter nonsense. "Soviet armed forces, in contrast, lacked leadership, training, and readiness." - excuse me? Didn't they just fought Winter War in very, very difficult climate?

Yes, and the consensus view of the Red Army's performance in that campaign reinforces the view that the Army lacked readiness, that the standard of training in many units was poor, and that leadership, at least in many units, was poor. By the way, the Wehrmacht drew this conclusion. The US Army also drew this conclusion, estimating at the time of the German invasion that the Red Army would collapse within six weeks. Study of the Winter War, at least the first phase when the Soviets were attacking on a broad front, tends to lead anyone to that conclusion.

Reds attacked in polar winter, sometimes at more than -40 degrees celsius, in near-polar-night conditions, against heavily fortified Mannerheim line - and they broke through it! If this is not combat readiness, I don't know what is. I doubt that _any_ other army of that time could perform similarly.

Sorry to burst the bubble, but during the initial assault against Mannerheim line there was only average -1 - -6 Celsius with 0 -5 cm snow cover at Karelian Isthmus from November 30 to December 24, when temperature started to drop fast. And again at February 11, when the successful breakthrough against the Mannerheim line was started, the temperature was -20 Celsius, and varied from -10 to -24 during the next week after which it rose to zero for the rest of the month. So Soviets didn't attack during the most intense cold of late December and January, but Finns did at Suomussalmi and Ladoga Karelia. And that "heavily fortified" Mannerheim line consisted less concrete than modern concert hall. (f.ex. Helsinki Opera House) :-) --Whiskey 22:25, 27 December 2005 (UTC)

That's correct. The majority of the fortifications were actually constructed of logs and earth. Very stout but not concrete.

Add to that natural obstacles - rocky terrain covered by forests, swamps hidden by snow cover. IIRC Finland is exact opposite to, say, Ukrainian plains. Let's compare that to French defense lines which Germans breached through. IIRC there weren't anything comparable. Maginot line was simply flanked. I need to check that "-1..-6 Celsius in Karelia in nov-dec" claim. Was that year unusually warm?

A long time December average at Viipuri is -5.0 Celsius according to Finnish Meteorological Institute statistics. December 1939 average was -6.8 Celsius, but the colder period started from Christmas. --Whiskey 21:02, 31 December 2005 (UTC)

You are repeating those fantasies by Suvorov about "swamps hidden by snow cover". The lakes did freeze. They were even used as aerodromes.--Achp ru 11:04, 29 December 2005 (UTC)

Lakes froze to the point of being used as aerodromes in -1..-6 Celsius? Are you kidding?

Not me, Mannerheim is.

The second offensive was more successful because the Soviets attacked on a much narrower front; to the extent that they should have known to do that in the first place, the original point (poor state of training and leadership) is supported. DMorpheus 15:32, 28 December 2005 (UTC)

Are you saying that Red Army did learn something in that war and became practiced in offensive and breaching defense?

Of course they did! The war prompted recalling purged officers and initiated reorganization of the army which was still ongoing when Germany attacked. It has been claimed that without Winter War prompting Soviet deficiencies and the corrective actions STAVKA did, Hitler would have succeeded. --Whiskey 21:02, 31 December 2005 (UTC)

At the very same time Germans were planning to attack France (Poland was defeated by the end of September 1939), but generals convinced Hitler that their army cannot attack in autumn, and then, winter. Even March (a March in France, not Finland!) was too cold. Germans attacked France thru Denmark and Norway in _April_. Which army was more able, German or Red Army?

Germans "attacked France through Denmark and Norway" ???? They must have had a shortage of maps. DMorpheus 15:32, 28 December 2005 (UTC)

Check Norwegian_Campaign article. If you do not regard this as the start of real (non-phony) war on Western front, then Battle_of_France article says that war started on 10 May.

The other thing to keep in mind here is that leadership, training, and readiness are comparative. The Wehrmacht was the most highly trained, ready, and probably best-led force in the world in June 1941. They had just finished off a series of very successful campaigns, particularly against the French. Any Army facing them had to take this into account. It was not like the US Civil War, when, as Lincoln said "You are all green alike". One side was very green; the other wasn't. DMorpheus 17:08, 21 December 2005 (UTC)

Germans had severe problems waging war in _Moscow_ winter, which is warm and well-illuminated in comparison to Finnish one. Who, again, was more trained, ready, and best-led force? Germans with their pitiful three thousand of all-gasoline light tanks against 24000 enemy tanks (~950 of which were heavy tanks with diesel engines (KV-1)), with lack of winter clothing, with generals who do not even know that there are hundreds of kilomenters of bad roads and also that there are cold winters in Russia? This does not make sense.

You're correct that the Germans made severe mistakes. Thankfully their errors were bigger than the Soviets' errors. DMorpheus 15:32, 28 December 2005 (UTC)

"Much of their planning assumed that no war would take place before 1942" - yes, this is why paratroopers were at the very border, and what paratrooper are good for, except for an offensive? "Also, a significant part of the Soviet Army was concentrated at the Western Soviet border" - and excuse me, what it was doing there at the border, if not preparing for attacking Germans?!

May I point out that both the Polish and French Armies were poised at their respective borders prior to the German invasions, but neither contemplated any offensive action. Therefore, having a large force at the border cannot be taken as evidence of offensive intent. Review of their procurement and reorganization plans show clearly that the USSR was preparing for war, but certainly not in 1941. DMorpheus 17:08, 21 December 2005 (UTC)

Paratroopers were at the border, with their parachutes in border forests, and which were evacuated as a valuable assets under enemy machine gun fire in the first hours of war. Parachutes cannot wait in such conditions for 1942 to come, they will simply rot from wetness. And another thing. No commander in USSR could give order to deploy paratroopers to the border by his own will (well, unless he wants to be court-martialed and shot by NKVD). Since this was happening not in one spot, but was typical, then orders to prepare for invasion in summer of 1941 must be given from the very top.

The difference from French is that Red Army wasn't just "at the border". It was at the very border, literally within 10-30 kilometers of it, in final stages of preparation for invasion.

The overwhelming consensus of professional historians is opposed to this point. I believe you used the word "nonsense" above; it applies here. DMorpheus 22:32, 22 December 2005 (UTC)

21 jun 1941: 22nd army is arriving from the Ural to the Belorus. Significant part of it consists of conscripted 'zeks' (Gulag inmates). Just think for how long it makes sense for armed criminals to be kept outside of labor camps? Until 1942?! 22 jun: 22nd army ordered to prepare for defense and counterattacks. Commander of 186th infantry division of 62nd corpus of 22nd army general-lieutenant N.I.Birukov has 13000 soldiers, 144 field guns, 154 mortars, 16 forging tanks, 558 machine guns, etc. He has everything needed for war, except maps of Belorus. Why? The only one map he somehow manages to obtain is taken from him by commander of his corpus, general-major I.P.Karmanov. Why? Because Karmanov had no map either. Because Karmanov, and many other generals, were supplied with everything needed to wage war NOT in Belorus, but in Poland, Romania, Germany.

Ok, maybe Soviets were so stupid that they had guns, but no maps? No so. According to General-lieutenant Kudryavtsev, retreating Soviets destroyed ~200 railroad cars of topographic maps. With ~1 million maps per car, it amounts to 200 million maps. General-lieuthenant Losev gives other figures: around 100 million maps lost or destroyed. But exact number is not that important. The question is - why they were destroyed instead of being used? Because maps of Germany are totally useless in defence of Moscow.

Son of Stalin, Jakob Dzhugashvili, was in the army, under Moscow, in 7th mechanized corpus under command of general-mayor V.I.Vinogradov. Corpus was fully armed and staffed. 25 jun 1941 corpus was in Western Belorus. I guess everybody will agree with me that it is physically impossible to load 1031 tanks, 358 field guns and mortars, 266 armored cars and 36080 soldiers in rail cars, move them from under Moscow to western Belorus, and unload there, all in three days. It must have started moving there well before 22 jun. Why? To wait there for 1942?

Soviets had 5 corps of paratroopers (I don't know exact English term), each consisted of 3 brigades, had separate tank battalion (50 tanks), artillery division, and more than 10 000 men. _All five_ corps, more than 50 000 of paratroopers, were close to the Western border at the end of May:

1st: general-major M.A.Usenko, Kiev military district

2nd: general-major F.M.Kharitonov, Kharkov military district

3rd: general-major V.A.Glazunov, Odessa

4th: general-major A.S.Zhadov, Pukhovichi

5th: general-major I.S.Bezugliy, Daugavpils

General-colonel A.I.Rodimtsev was in command of 5th brigade (3th corp). According to him, these units were fully equipped and manned. They were moved even closer to the border in the last month. For example, on 22 jun 1941 general-major Zhadov ordered his subordinates to organize emergency evacuation of precious equipment (thousands of parachutes for his 4th corp) which were kept on that day in the forest just _one kilometer_ to the east of the Berezina river (an USSR border)! Equipment was evacuated under German fire. Do you have a plausible theory what Zhadov's troops were doing there?

Troop movements could temporarily leave guns in one train and their ammunition in another, unit commanders could be separated from their units while they are being moved by the railroad etc. Stalin correctly estimated that Hitler cannot win the war, and _incorrectly_ assumed that Hitler will not start the war he cannot win. Germans struck Red Army amassed at the very border, crowded in railroad cars, with planes in hundreds and their fuel stockpiled on border airstrips... Everyone knows what followed.

"The decision not to dig in the infantry divisions proved disastrous" - now, the question is, in which case army would NOT dig in? If it is going to attack!

Because the Red Army's pre-war doctrine so stressed offensive operations that defensive operations were not extensively taught or trained. That was a very good reason why it was a cause of the initial defeats. DMorpheus 17:08, 21 December 2005 (UTC)

And why offensive operations were stressed? Because army (and the whole nation which was effectively at war footing already) was trained and equipped exactly for this - for the conquest of Europe. Even after horrendous 1941 and tens of millions of soldiers lost, remains of Red Army did conquer half of Europe.

"aviation units had their aircraft parked in closely-bunched neat rows, rather than dispersed as they would have been under normal wartime procedure, thereby making easy targets for German ground-attack aircraft in the first days of the conflict." - a 'normal procedure' of packing hundreds of aircraft on border airfields? Isn't it CRYING of imminent invasion? (I infer they were on border because otherwise Germans would have some difficulty reaching, say, Moscow or Kiew airfields, no?)

No, parked aircraft are generally dispersed in wartime unless your air superiority is so complete there is no fear of enemy attack. It is not a sign of imminent offensive action; it's a sign of peacetime readiness levels. See Pearl Harbor for a similar situation. Or compare it to the Battle of Britain - both sides were engaged in very high-intensity air combat, both sides dispersed parked aircraft.

Where were German aircraft 21 jun 1941? Were they "dispersed"? I highly doubt so. I will risk guessing that they were _crowded on the border airstrips with USSR_, with tons of ammunition and fuel nearby. Do you see the similarity? Both armies were readied for surprise attack. Germans struck first.

A small aside - in English it is spelled "Kiev" DMorpheus 17:08, 21 December 2005 (UTC)

"Initially the Red Army was fooled by a complete overestimation of its own capabilties" - sure,

This is a major leadership failure, is it not? DMorpheus 17:08, 21 December 2005 (UTC)

My "sure" was a sarcastic one. I meant that it is simply untrue. It was not "fooled by a complete overestimation", because it did not "overestimate" it's strength. Reds had 7 tanks to every German one, the article also says "the number of artillery pieces and aircraft was also heavily in the Soviets' favor", human resources was also on the Russia side, Germany was critically dependent on Romanian oil and Norwegian ore, while USSR had plenty of both on it's own territory, etc, etc, etc... Simply put, Germany was not superior to USSR in anything and Stalin rightly concluded that it cannot possibly win.

but "Red Army ... could field about 24,000 tanks against the German 3,350", more than 7 to 1 ratio, and Red's tanks were better than German's... "A lack of spare parts and trucks ensured a logistical collapse" - interesting, how did those tanks moved around just before the war?

It is well established that the state of maintenance in Red Army tank units at the time of the German invasion was very poor. See Zaloga, Milsom, or Glantz. It is also well-established that many units lost all combat effectiveness due to logisitcal collapse. Tanks without fuel or ammo are useless. Artillery that cannot be moved to firing positions, cannot be supplied with ammo, and cannot communicate with the troops being supported is useless. See especially Glantz's "Stumbling Colossus" for an excellent description of the sad state of the Red Army on June 22, 1941. DMorpheus 17:08, 21 December 2005 (UTC)

I agree here. This was the result of army being in the last weeks of mobilization, army whose commander was 100.00% sure that Germans would not attack, because that would be a suicide (and it _was_ a suicide, as we all know now).

"As we all know now" - that's the point. We after the event do know in what that event actually resulted. They before the event could not know, they only could suppose. And their suppositions about the outcome of the event were unrelated to their own suppositions about the chances of the event. Why? Simply because the other part's suppositions might be completely different. Every reasonable person before the event, even those who really thought that "that would be a suicide", would not consider that a reason for thinking "that Germans would not attack". Just because there's no logical relation between the two clauses.--Achp ru 12:03, 28 December 2005 (UTC)

Yes, you are right. However, I was not disputing this. I was trying to say that not only Suvorov says that Hitler couldn't win, this 'hypothesis' also was tested in practice and was found true. Thus if Stalin really thought that Hitler cannot win, he was right. It is plausible to suppose that Stalin drew incorrect conclusion that Hitlen will not attack. Note that in this paragraph I do not talk about factual basis, I only check that this theory is logically sound.

It is not. There are too many "if"s and much is "plausible". Don't forget also that in foreign policies and military conflicts the sides usually have to deal with incompplete and inexact information (and in most cases, with misinformation) about their rivals.

I think you're both right. Structurally the state of readiness of the Red Army was low and training, logistics and leadership ranged from poor to mediocre.

After the 1941, this is what Stalin wanted everyone, including both Soviet and Allied nations, to think. He didn't want to be perceived as would-be aggressor. Reading your comments, I see that apparently he succeeded...

Nevertheless by its size alone it was a very powerful force. Its potential was to be used for an offensive and indeed the disposition of the forces at the western border reflected the intention to take over the initiative almost immediately after a German attack. If this attack took the Soviets by surprise it was by the operational tempo and the ability to keep the exact date a secret until just before the offensive was launched, not by the fact that it happened at all. The Soviet strategy was based on the premise there would be ample warning to mobilise the second echelon early enough for a coordinated campaign together with the first echelon. On 22 June the second echelon was just beginning to move. For a pre-emptive attack? Or just to be sure? We simply don't know. It is fun to speculate though, as the literature shows :o).

On the subject of tank maintenance: the point is that an army in retreat gradually loses most of its tanks. No doubt almost every single German tank also broke down at some point during the campaign. But it could be salvaged.

--MWAK 20:30, 21 December 2005 (UTC)

POV about Suvorov

I think that this is a rather POVish statement:

An alternative explanation is given by Viktor Suvorov in his book Icebreaker, where Suvorov depicts the war as being intentionally facilitated by Stalin. This claim is strongly disputed and is generally considered to be without any factual basis. Many quotes in Suvorov's books proved to have been falsified.

No question it is disputed, because it depicts Soviet Union to be almost as bad as Germans. Communists and Russian chauvinists are outraged by this alternative view and will do whatever they can to discredit it, possibly including doing falsified counter-research (not an unusual thing to do for Communists, I'd say). Can we allow Wikipedia reader to draw his/her own conclusions instead of feeding him/her with generally considered POV?

Not only "Communists and Russian chauvinists" are outraged, but every truth-loving and Hitler-hating person is.

I wonder how hate to Hitler is relevant. Where Suvorov says anything good about Hitler? Suvorov ridicules Hitler a lot in his book "Suicide", thus your assertion that Suvorov has pro-nazi attitude is not true. I suspect that you mostly don't like Suvorov's anti-USSR and anti-Stalin attitude. Am I right?

Suvorov's "research" is really falsified (not an unusual thing to do for "anti-Communists", I'd say). If you search the Internet for it, you can easily find a lot of contradictions between Suvorov's fantasies and real documents, newspapers and books he "quoted". Suvorov exploits USSR's wrong image and its defeat in propaganda war in order to earn money by lies (not an unusual thing to do for "anti-Communists", I'd say). --Achp ru 12:23, 27 December 2005 (UTC)

This is your POV. I do not propose depicting Suvorov's ideas as ultimate truth, I merely suggest removing any POV (either pro-Suvorov or anti-Suvorov) from the article, letting reader to draw his own conclusions. As for "wrong image of USSR", well... I'm not surprized about that, I see that "ru" in your user name.

I would suggest all the Suvorov-related content be deleted from the article. The leading historians of the conflict consider it nonsense and we waste an enormous amount of time with it. Much like the evolution vs creationism debate in US schools, there is no "controversy" and putting it in the article may lead a non-specialist reader to believe there is. It would be equally productive to debate whether the earth is flat. DMorpheus 17:14, 27 December 2005 (UTC)

It's not up to you to decide. It's encyclopedia, not your own book. BTW, at least half of "leading historians" are from ex-USSR and have vested interest in squashing Suvorov flat. -- Anonymous

You're right. Retired US Army officers like David Glantz were really born in the USSR, just like British historian Richard Overy.

I meant Gabriel Gorodetsky, Makhmut Gareyev, Dmitri Volkogonov, etc. For example of the typical Russian "critique" read Vasily Chobitok at http://armor.kiev.ua/Tanks/WWII/rizun/index.php. Mostly name calling and stalinist hysteria. "rizun (sic) can't be trusted because he is a traitor". -- Anonymous

Of course, the author seems very much rightly annoyed by the fact that Suvorov's fantasies have gained so many attentions despite their total liefulness. He is sincere and does not try to hide his annoyance and anger. However, you do lie when you tell his analysis "mostly name calling and Stalinist hysteria". By the way, the author never even mentioned Stalin. You do lie when you allege author's having said that "rizun can't be trusted because he is a traitor". Nowhere did the author say something like that. Instead, he analysed what Suvorov had invented about Soviet armours. And that analysis is the basis for his rightful anger against Suvorov.

That is not a citation, it's a general reason why Suvorov is so strongly attacked by ex-USSR "historians". Some even write that literally. Example (http://armor.kiev.ua/army/hist/shuler.shtml): "Но вот только вы г-н Резун не имеете права ни говорить, ни писать 'мы', 'наш народ', 'наша история', 'наша армия', 'наши солдаты'. Вы предали этот народ еще в 78-м, предали его армию, предали его историю. Это я имею право говорить - 'мы', 'наш народ', 'наша история', 'наша армия', 'наши солдаты', я имею право ругать или хвалить полководцев страны, я имею право давать оценки, но не вы! Это потому, что всю жизнь я был со своей страной, со своим народом, делил с ним все что было хорошего и плохого, служил и работал для него, пока вы охаивали нашу страну, своих сослуживцев и даже своего отца-фронтовика. Вы же сбежали в 'прекрасное далёко' и сбежали не потому, что вам угрожала опасность, а из шкурных соображений." Nice, eh?

Yes, nice. That's the truth. The autor states that Suvorov has no moral right to attribute himself to the peoples of the Soviet Union (which he does by frequently using the words "we", "us" and "our") because he is traitor. Nowhere in this citation is stated that Suvorov may not be trusted because he is a traitor.

Let's look at Chobitok, a 'rightly angered' critic. Suvorov: "В 1936 году серийные танки БТ форсировали по дну почти под водой глубокие реки. В конце XX века не все танки вероятных противников Советского Союза имеют такую способность." Chobitok: "Да??!! Почти под водой? А может быть почти по воздуху или почти под землей? Разъясняю, в 1936 году танки БТ-5 преодолевали брод глубиной 0.85 м, БТ-7 - 1.2 м". Apparently, Chobitok thinks that tank crossing a river with practically just a turret above the water level is not "almost under the water". What a horrendous lie on Suvorov's part! This liar and traitor doesn't even deserve to be called by the name, let's call him rizun (with small 'r', that's not a typo)  ;) ;)

"Almost under the water" is just a speculation. It is specially intended to make impression on those who know nothing about armour. Is Suvorov wished to be objective (which he wasn't), he would have written exact figeres: "BT-5 could wade brooks 0.85 m deep, BT-7 could wade brooks 1.2 m deep" comparing these figures to contemporary foreign tanks.

Imagine a person who knows nothing about computers (well, he/she has just heard of them, like most of us have just heard of tanks). Suvorov, his eyes wide open and shining with admiration, might depict to that person the superiority of Soviet computer industry: "In 1986, DVK-4 and ES-1842 computers were equpped with displays which could afford almost full-colour images! In the beginning of XXI century not every computer of USSR's potential enemies has such a capability!" (Formally, 16 colours may be taken for "almost full-colour", and manframes are still often equipped with b&w screens; so the sentence may be considered formally true.)

Suvorov: "В 1938 году на танках БТ начали устанавливать дизельные двигатели. Остальной мир начнет это делать через 10-20 лет." Chobitok: "Неправда два раза. С ходу могу сказать, что в то время, как минимум, дизели стояли на японских танках, а во время войны дизели ставились американцами на Шерманы. Кроме того, дизели на серийных БТ стали ставить с декабря 1939 года, а не в 1938 г." What a traitor. Obviously bought by american dirty money.

And the last one - you even failed to notice that the author is not Russian.--Achp ru 10:15, 29 December 2005 (UTC)

He's Ukrainian. This is irrelevant.

Certainly. He is a member of Russian Mafia and the bloody KGB, isn't he?

But, because I support your logic, I am going to go edit all the chemistry articles to add the alchemist POV just to be fair and balanced. Then I will move on to the flat-earth POV, which has been sadly neglected, and maybe after that I'll have to decide between holocaust-denial, evolution-denial and gravity-denial. After all, people should decide for themselves. Let's not let reality intrude. DMorpheus 10:25, 28 December 2005 (UTC)

I've found a constructive criticism at http://www.geocities.com/suvcomments/books.htm (warning! beware of phishing attack! --Achp ru 09:35, 29 December 2005 (UTC)), where people are looking for factual errors and are supplying corrections. Sure, there are errors, but most of them are not that serious. Example (see ib16.htm): Suvorov says than 6th, 9th and 10th "attack" (ударные) armies were twice as strong as "normal" army, they had 2 mechanized, one cavalry and 3 infantry corps. Readers correct that: 6th and 10th armies had only 2 infantry corps. I'd say this does not change picture much. -- Anonymous

Another example: ib23.htm ("Why Stain deployed fronts?" and commentary) has lots of reader's corrections, which provide independent research showing that (while Suvorov is exagerrating it somewhat) in spring-summer of 1941 significant part of "peacetime" military district commanding staff really was reassigned to armies which were being relocated to West at the time, leaving some Eastern military districts stripped of commanding staff and forces. -- Anonymous

About "leading historians" credibility. When I was kid, I did read Zhukov memoirs. He says that Red Army had _less_ tanks that Germans. This is a deliberate lie, right? -- Anonymous

I suggest we leave it, as a reference to possible offensive planning (in this case Suvorov- the most widely known) by Stalin isnt impossible. Ksenon 18:22, 27 December 2005 (UTC)

I don't know why we bother adding such a ridiculous source. At most we should like to a sepaarate entry on the phoney controversy. DMorpheus 10:25, 28 December 2005 (UTC)

Offense and agression are quite different things. Well known is Vasilevskiy's memo, in which he suggests developing a plan for preventive strike against mobilized and deployed German troops. It is not exactly known whether the plan was accepted, most likely not. However, it has no common with Suvorov's writings.

This proves nothing. Soviets always planned to perform strong offensive operations, but only after eneny's attack (on paper). Otherwise we should assume that USSR did not attack Finland. It was just responding to border provocation. We should assume that USSR never occupied Afghanistan, it was just helping Afghan government on it's request. Do you know that USSR was the most peaceful, friendly, and all-around nice and progressive country? No? What a glaring omission, obviously you were not taught in USSR's high school...

Any reasonable army always plans offensives. Only by offensives (and counter-offensives) can an army gain the initiative. Initiative is vital for winning a war. The Soviets dared not to want to lose the war, and that is why the army planned offensives. Like the Germans, the English, the Americans, the Finns, the Polish, or whichever army you like.

The attack on Finland is a bad example for you. Actually, before November 1939, the Red Army had virtually no plans for the Finnish sector. It is very strange, because Finland's attitude to USSR was hostile, in 1918-1922 Finland attacked Russia several times; but that's how it was. In November 1939 a plan for invading Finland was prepared with a frantic haste.

Interesting. According to Soviet naval archives in every picture of enemy since 1935, three countries were always there: Germany, Poland and Finland. Also from the same archive there are directives from 1937 which describe naval support in an attack to Finland. (Army archives hasn't been opened yet...) Also Meretskov was ordered at June 1939 by Stalin to create new, "leaner", plan against Finland to replace the original Shaposhnikov plan. (Source: Meretskov's and Vasiljevsk's memoirs.) --Whiskey 21:23, 31 December 2005 (UTC)

As for Afghanistan, you're just right, even though you didn't want to. USSR never occupied Afghanistan. "Helping Afghan government on it's request" was, of course, was no more than an excuse. The Soviet Union sought its own interest in Afghanistan. However, the Soviet Army did not occupy the country.

Your "sarcastic" sentences about the Soviet Union are pointless. The Soviet Union was not ideal, neither it was totally evil. Compared to the USA-led bloc, it was very peaceful simply because it could not afford militancy. It was moderately progressive; neither absolutely advanced, nor absolutely backward. Nice? It depends. The tastes differ.

Gasoline freezing?

I am not sure this new edit is valid. In the winter of 1941-42 a majority of Soviet tanks still has gasoline engines also. Only the latest versions (the T-34s and KVs basically) had diesels. So this cannot be a reason the Germans had difficulties.DMorpheus 21:04, 13 December 2005 (UTC)

The Germans were dependent on truck transport, the Red Army could use rail transport. The severe cold had very asymmetrical effects.--MWAK 20:30, 21 December 2005 (UTC)

Sorry, not quite correct. The Germans grabbed a HUGE amount of Soviet trains. mikka (t) 22:46, 21 December 2005 (UTC)

I think its more complex than that. Both sides had trucks, horses, and trains for transport.

Both sides' trucks were largely gasoline-powered. The Soviet trucks (in this era, no modern US lend-lease trucks were available) were elderly but simple designs. The German trucks were a mix of German, Italian, French, and other types, creating a maintenance nightmare. It's ridiculous how many different truck types they had. Hard to say which side was worse off since neither Army had really good cross-country trucks such as the US had. I think it's fair to say both Armies were roadbound with their wheeled supply vehicles.

The 600,000 German horses were not well-suited to the climate and died in large numbers. Offsetting this, they captured large numbers of the smaller Russian horses. I am not sure how many horses each side had by Dec 1941.

Trains - both sides were heavily dependent on trains. One big difference was that the Germans were hampered by the gauge change at the old (1939) Polish-Soviet border. But by autumn they had double-tracked a lot of the right of way. The Soviets did not have this problem, but they did have a shortage of locomotives. IIRC they only made a dozen or so locos in the entire war period, and the US supply of them hadn't started yet in 1941.

"They made a dozen locos" in four years? I find it hard to believe.

Hard to believe, but documented. That's why the US supply of somehting like 1800 locos in Lend-Lease is so important. DMorpheus 18:17, 23 December 2005 (UTC)

Not dozen, a little bit more. Steam engine numbers are: 914 in 1940, 708 in 1941, only 9 in 1942, 43 in 1943, 32 in 1944, and only 8 in 1945. No electric or diesel engines were produced during the wartime. --Achp ru 11:35, 27 December 2005 (UTC)

Why do you think the gauge change was at the old Polish-Soviet border? After annexation of Western parts of Byelorussia and Ukraine, the gauge was changed very quickly, for there was no reason to preserve Stephenson gauge there. --Achp ru 11:48, 27 December 2005 (UTC)

There's no question the weather had a highly asymmetric effect, but not for all the reasons stated in the article. I suggest this whole gasoline issue be omitted since it contributes more confusion than clarity. DMorpheus 20:04, 22 December 2005 (UTC)

"Causes of initial Soviet defeats"?

Quotes from article:
modern tanks only accounted for 7.2% of the total Soviet tank park (or 1861 T-34 and KV-1 tanks

Guys you will make me die of laugh. "Only" 1861 T-34 and KV-1? This is more than Pz-II, Pz-III and Pz-IV combined (1226 + 98 + 211 = 1535)!

Let me also remind you that Pz-I was parody on a tank (two 7.62 mm machine guns, no gun - that's why I didn't count it, but if you prefer, I will - along with nearly 10 thousand Sovied T-26 light tanks...thats why 7.2% is true - not because there were few heavy tanks, but because there were insane amounts of light ones! - but I digress),

Pz-II is 9.5-ton machine with 29 mm gun, Pz-III is 22 tons, 37 mm gun, and Pz-IV is 23 tons, 75 mm gun, whereas KV-1 is 45-ton with 76 mm gun, T-34 is 26-ton with 76 mm gun! And wait for KV-2 specs...

In my book, it's Germans who look pitiful in comparison, not Soviets. Think about less insane explanation please.

The Soviet armed forces, in contrast, lacked leadership, training, and readiness.

Isn't Winter War a good training?

No, Winter war was NOT a good training, since it was different type of war. Also, Soviet commanders did not really learn anything in Winter War, they could simply rely on numbers and much better quality of equipment to win it, without bothering to use any sophisticated or effective tactics. Attack came at a time when new organizations and promising, but untested, weapons were just beginning to trickle into operational units.

So, ~200 monster 52-ton KV-2's with 152mm gun were "just beginning to trickle"? ~600 45-ton KV-1's were "just beginning to trickle"? They were in production since 1939 - and Germans had nothing even close to these!

a large part of the Soviet Army in Europe was concentrated along the new western Soviet border in former Polish territory, which lacked significant defences... The initial tactical errors of the Soviets in the first few weeks of the Axis offensive proved catastrophic.

Now this sounds closer to truth. Soviet forces were amassed at the border. That's why they were destroyed.

Without tanks and lacking sufficient motorisation

Again old myths

195.212.29.179 07:35, 2 April 2007 (UTC)

You've raised some good points (not 100% accurate but close enough for argument's sake). The number of KV and T-34 tanks is indeed non-trivial. However, these types were not in production from 1939 - nto that that matters much to the point you're making. The Pzkw-II had a 20mm gun, not 29mm. Many (most?) of the Pzkw-III in June 1941 had short 50mm guns, not 37mm. Again though that is not critical to the point you're making. Even the lighter Soviet tanks could knock out the German tanks. The reasons for inital Soviet defeats are related to readiness and training, not equipment. Soviet equipment in June 1941 was pretty good. Some of it was excellent. The training was awful and readiness was worse. This was a classic case of an Army that looked good on paper but not in reality. DMorpheus 14:53, 2 April 2007 (UTC)

Tanks and planes can be so totally destroyed in a few first days only if they are all close to the frontline. Thus you assert that Soviets put nearly all their tanks, and all their planes - note! ~10000 planes! - on the West border, including freshly conquered Poland, - and then just sat there, waiting to be slaughtered? No training? No readiness? No defensive preparations? Why? Do you think Stalin was an imbecile? 88.102.92.202 15:24, 2 April 2007 (UTC)

I haven't asserted that at all. But, not to oversimplify - yes, Stalin was an imbecile in some ways. DMorpheus 15:32, 2 April 2007 (UTC)

I'd rather think that Stalin wasn't idiot at all (idiots didn't survive ruthless struggle for power inside Communist Party's higher echelons), and he had a reason to have so much of military power amassed at the border. What this reason could be, is left as an excercise for the reader. 195.212.29.163 08:38, 30 April 2007 (UTC)

Soviet numbers are definetely wrong

Why the hell does in the box stand: estimated soviet strength: 2.6mil; does noone here know that the Germans made about ->3 million<- prisoners of war in the first months (before December); the soviet numbers were much higher. Noone can deny this. I`ll edit it, when i have found some serious sources. Flosi 02:27, 18 October 2006 (UTC)

lol at Hitler and all the Germans that stayed behind

Taking on the Soviet Union! lol, you dumb bastards!

-G

   at the time, few of those guys cared much about any smart alec's laughs ...

It's all the Italians fault. They attacked Greece, and Germany had to the help Italians out of that misery. Because of that, Hitler lost a few weeks. The invasion of the Soviet Union started too late. Germany could have won the war against the SU, if they had occupied Moscow.

So, right is: lol at Mussollini and all the Italians that stayed behind

Taking on Greece! lol, you dumb bastards! —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 217.255.1.100 (talk) 20:28, 25 January 2007 (UTC).

A section/article for Soviet assault plans

Russian original of Zhukov's proposal (May 15, 1941): [1]

The notes for the future article on the theme (I've included mostly planning, so the article does not reflect actual troops concentration etc). Constanz - Talk 16:58, 4 February 2006 (UTC)

Soviet genocide

Theres absolutely no stated plans to wipe out the urban populations of the soviet Union. At Nuremberg it was stated and put on record, seemingly substantiated with Von Dem Bach-zelewskis admittance of. Which he rescinded years later in front of a German court. His excuse was that he was in a survival mode, only worried about saving his own hide. There also a quote by Goering that seems to posit a declaration of this intention. But, only as it was taken out of context. As you read it in full, he clearly states that the Russian campaign could result in the starvation of several million people. Not that they were going to invade Russia and kill everyone.

Well, you also removed the pasage about enslaving the Russian population. I suppose you agree in putting that back? As regards the starvation, things are very simple. Farmers produce a certain food surplus. Urban populations can only exist by eating that surplus. The Germans planned to move the surplus out of the occupied territory (apart from the amount the five million resident Germans and allies would eat). Therefore the urban populations would have ceased to exist. And the Germans knew that full well, not caring because this process was favouring their enslavement plans. So I'll put that part back too. And people don't just lie in court. They often lie in books also, after having succumbed to the evil side of their nature, which is very strong in any human being. Many revisionists use Stalin as an easy excuse to justify not becoming aware of their own moral degradation...--MWAK 10:09, 17 January 2006 (UTC)

Cause of Delay of the start of Barbarossa

The cause of the delay differs from what I have read. I read that the cause of the delay was the Balkan campaign (though I do not remember where I read that), not the squabbles over strategy as stated in this article. Andries 19:28, 18 January 2006 (UTC)

The Balkans campaign did not delay Barbarossa, although it has often been cited as a cause in older sources. It has sometimes been further claimed that this delay was responsible for the German loss. Not so. Even given the start date, the Germans had plenty of time to make it to Moscow had they moved, say, at Napoleon's pace. They didn't, for a whole bunch of reasons. DMorpheus 20:41, 18 January 2006 (UTC)

If the Balkans campaign is often cited as a cause of the delay then this must be stated in the article as per Wikipedia:NPOV policy, unless of course, this is now a totally discredited view. Andries 20:53, 18 January 2006 (UTC)

I'd say it's an obsolete viewpoint. I admit I have no reference for that handy at the moment but I could dig up a few. I believe it's an artifact of the immediate postwar era and has since been discredited. DMorpheus 21:07, 18 January 2006 (UTC)

I agree that it is obsolate. But as it is presented in older, standard, books about Barbarossa, it still surfaces in discussion every now and then. I propose that it would be presented here like: "The Balkan campaign was often given in older books as a reason why Barbarossa started so late, but newer research has discredited the view." Because otherwise every now and then someone comes and resurfaces the claim. --Whiskey 22:53, 18 January 2006 (UTC)

I agree that this competing view should be treated. In general in Wikipedia, popular misconceptions should be treated, I believe. I have no idea whether this is obsolete, regarded as obsolete by a minority, or still widely accepted. If somebody have sources then this would be great. thanks. Andries 23:01, 18 January 2006 (UTC)

OK, if we do add this then we should also make it clear that the delay, regardless of its cause, did not matter. The US Army's view (linked on the page already) is: "Napoleon's Grand Army, which crossed the Russian frontier at Kovno on 23 June 1812, arrived at Moscow in early September after halting at Vitebsk for 15 days.[23] In 1941, the German troops were marching and fighting at a rate of 15 miles a day, with every seventh day set aside for rest; at that rate the mass of Army Group Center would have arrived before Moscow in mid-August, six to eight six weeks before the autumn rains. (These rates of advance were routinely achieved by German foot and horse-drawn units in the race to the Marne in 1914, and in Russia in 1941 up to the point that Hitler stopped the forward movement of the armies.) The mobile formations could and did achieve prodigious rates of advance which easily supported the generalstab's timetable. Even with a start in late June, the arithmetic easily supports a decisive campaign against European Russia in summer 1941. "

Thus neither the weather, nor the Balkans campaign, nor the "impossibility" of the campaign should be given as reasons for the eventual failure of the German invasion.

DMorpheus 19:59, 25 January 2006 (UTC)

Thanks for your comments, but the US army view on the cause of the failure of Barbarossa is only one view on the matter. Other views in reputable sources assert that the delay caused by the Balkan campaign contributed to the failure of Barbaross and hence these views should be treated here too in a neutral Wikipedia:NPOV way. Andries 21:32, 25 January 2006 (UTC)

'Neutral' and 'accurate' are two different things. Some context is necessary here. For many years myths have been perpetuated about this subject. Surely we should present the most accurate current scholarship possible, to the extent our abilities allow us to do so. While I personally think the whole issue should be left alone, if it is included it should be written in such a way that a non-specialist reader can evaluate the evidence and draw a supportable conclusion. In this spirit, I don't think the US Army's viewpoint should be so easily dismissed - it is rather more reputable than some other sources. They know a thing or two about logistics. DMorpheus 01:17, 2 February 2006 (UTC)

I never meant to say that the view of the US Army should be dismissed, but even if popular, but now obsolete and debunked theories have been told about Barbarossa then they should be treated here, otherwise semi-knowledgeable readers, like myself, remained confused and uninformed. I cannot write myself about this, because I do not know up-to-date scholarship on this subject. Andries 17:43, 4

February 2006 (UTC) Well, I wouldn't see the US Army as the most qualified source on that. If you look at the number of divisions on the Russian border prior to Barbarossa it is the case that in March, April, May it was at about 120, and went up to about 150 in June. Many divisions that participated in the Balkans campaign were designated to participate in Barbarossa as well. Kleist Panzergroup participated in the Balkans campaign and in Barbarossa. So, it wasn't available for a possible Barbarossa in May, because it just finished the Balkans campaign. It surely might been possible to started Barbarossa anyway, but it is fact that some division couldn't participate in it, which did in June. I wouldn't go so far to say that it changed the outcome, but it surely was a cause for the delay. --Lucius1976 12:20, 19 March 2006 (UTC)

OK, there are two points here: One, did the Balkans campaign cause a delay in the opening of Barbarossa? Two, if it did, did it matter to the outcome?

On the first question, we need to see some data. The fact that some units were not available in May may be compelling, but only if we can show that, had they been available, the offensive would have been launched earlier. I haven't seen anything that shows that.

On the second question, the opinion of professional military officers must certainly be given weight, especially those who have studied the logistics of other campaigns. DMorpheus 17:46, 21 March 2006 (UTC)

Moving off-topic section on Finland

The following text on Finland and the Continuation War is not part of Operation Barbarossa. I'm moving it here until I merge anything unique into the existing entry for those events

StephenMacmanus 08:01, 20 January 2006 (UTC)

Well, the German divisions on Finnish soil were surely part of Barbarossa and not part of the so called "Continuation War". --Lucius1976 12:38, 19 March 2006 (UTC)

Pre-emptive Soviet attack on Finland

Relative strengths of Finnish, German and Soviet troops at the start of the Continuation War in June 1941.

After the attempted Soviet invasion of Finland, that was fended off in the Winter War November 30 1939 – March 12 1940, the ensuing German invasion of Denmark and Norway, and then the Soviet annexation of Balticum, Finland and Sweden were enclosed by German-held territory in the south, west and north, and Soviet territory in the east. Soviet policies vis-à-vis Finland during the months following the Moscow Peace enhanced a Finnish perception of being seriously threatened by a continued Soviet invasion as soon as the international situation allowed. The Kremlin had also expressed an emphatic veto against a defensive union between Sweden and Finland. Hence the Finns saw no alternative but to improve the relations with Nazi Germany: first of all trying to obtain munition that the Third Reich had withheld on transfer to Finland, and later to buy badly needed munitions directly from Nazi Germany. In return, the Germans requested rights to transit troops between Norway and Germany over Finnish territory, which the Finns greeted as a balance to the transit rights that Soviet Union had pressured after the Moscow Peace, but also as a sign of hope that Nazi Germany would not once again sell out Finland to the Soviet Union. There was also a domestic opinion arguing that the previous policy geared at the League of Nations and the ideologically akin democracies had been put to the test during the Winter War — and failed. That opinion gained in popularity, that argued for Finland's choice no longer being between association with democratic peers and submission under dictatorial empires, but at least temporarily had to be the lesser evil of the Soviet and German dictatorships. A German hegemony appeared much less of a threat against the national survival of Finland than a Soviet occupation.

At the time of Operation Barbarossa, Finland's defence forces were mobilized and reinforced by five German divisions stationed in the north, allowing Finland to deploy 13 of her 16 divisions along the new border in the south, where a Soviet attack was deemed most likely and also most dangerous, well balancing the seven Red Army divisions stationed in the newly won parts of Finnish Karelia. Despite a Finnish declaration of neutrality, Finnish naval forces had participated in mining of the Gulf of Finland. The Luftwaffe was also granted permission to land in Finland when returning from missions against Soviet targets.

On June 25, Soviet air forces bombed half-a-dozen towns in Finland, thus commencing the Soviet-Finnish Continuation War (June 25, 1941 – September 5, 1944). This attack is often given as an example of a preemptive attack: If a military conflict with Finland was deemed unavoidable, it might have been advantageous for the Soviet Union to gain initiative on that front.

On June 28 joint Finno-German forces advanced over Finland's northernmost border in direction of Murmansk. The mission was however badly prepared, and stalled halfway. From southern Finland, a purely Finnish offensive on July 10 was more successful, and resulted ultimately in almost three years of occupation of East Karelia.

Pre-emptive strike.... hmmm

Actually, the Soviet Air Force began attacking Finnish warships at 6:05 A.M. on 22 June 1941, hours before the Red Army had got orders to resist the German assault along the entire demarcation line in Poland. Two hours later also the Hangö batteries opened fire without the Finnish troops having made any move. [2] The author of the passage, mr Nordling refers to Hjalmar Procopé, Fällande dom som friar (Stockholm: Fahlcrantz & Gumælius 1946), p.121 as his source. Is it really clear that Finland had already made decision to enter the war (before June 22), or was this decision rather a result of Soviet strike? --Constanz - Talk 11:53, 15 July 2006 (UTC)

Finns had definitely made the decision. Those responsible for the decision were later on trial at the war-responsibility trials in Finland. -- Petri Krohn 18:54, 15 July 2006 (UTC)

Reference please as well. BTW, this trial is now regarded a show trial.--Constanz - Talk 11:31, 16 July 2006 (UTC)

"show trial"? An interesting point of view. You are welcome to discuss it at Talk:War-responsibility trials in Finland. The Finnish critisism of the trials has traditionally been based on the fact that they were an example of ex post facto law, not on the basis of the evidence presented or a calmed partiality of the court. -- Petri Krohn 15:30, 16 July 2006 (UTC)

Not only on that, but also to the fact that Allied Control Commission presented a list of acceptable convictions to Paasikivi after the pre-decision of the court was presented which would have released Kivimäki and given only a small sentence to Tanner. Paasikivi contacted members of the court and pressured them to give wanted convictions. Only four members of the court resisted this pressure. And it was a show trial, even Paasikivi admitted it: Political necessity in a new political situation.

And due to way how the law regarding these trials were written, they excluded military leadership totally, especially Mannerheim and Heinrichs, who were more instrumental in negotiations with Germany than any in political leadership, so your assessment that those responsible were indicted is not correct.

For the decision, it could be said that military had made the decision but political structure was dragging their feets and setting conditions to Finnish participation. --Whiskey 22:51, 16 July 2006 (UTC)

(Moved discussion to Talk:War-responsibility trials in Finland -- Petri Krohn 10:50, 17 July 2006 (UTC))

Tank classification

This content is questionable: "As for the question of the qualitative relationship of military equipment of sides, each power had its own system of classification of armored equipment. In the Red Army the tanks were classified according to the combat mass. In Wehrmacht there was their own classification of tanks based on the caliber of tank gun. Thus, the straight comparison of sides, as this usually occurs in the historiography, is impossible (Meltyukhov 2000: 483-4). Viktor Suvorov has suggested using American classification of armament for the comparison. According to this, all tanks up to 20 tons are considered light tanks, up to 40 tons - average tanks, and from 40 tons on - heavy tanks. Taking into account the difference in the layout of tank in the USSR and Germany, he reached the conclusion that all German tanks were light tanks (Suvorov 1995: 408—432)." Throughout wikipedia and in tank literature in general, the tanks available in 1941 are routinely classified as light, medium, heavy, cruiser, etc. in a very consistent manner - that is, there is a generally-accepted classification for most tanks. The notion that we can draw arbitrary lines at 20 tons or 40 tons is ridiculous. It is useful only if a certain POV is being pushed. Look at any ten sources on the Panzer IV, for example, as see how many call it a light tank. DMorpheus 01:17, 2 February 2006 (UTC)

It may very well be POV (as previous ideas of 'obsolete' Soviet tanks etc were POV of Soviet myth creators). I would emphasise, it is not my personal POV, but mr. Meltyukhov's (yes, he admitted this classification is closer to Soviets')

Nevertheless, the same author explains: “The comparison of tactical-technical data of Soviet and German tanks show that the German technology had no essential superiority. Some parameters were better in the tanks the enemy had, while still others - in Soviet tanks. High speed and best passability made it possible to use the Soviet "obsolete" tanks for dealing with the German on the equal. The motion of war fare in 1941 showed that if the Soviet "obsolete" tanks approximately corresponded to German technology, then T -34 and KB substantially exceeded all types of the tanks Wehrmacht had.”

And Meltyukhov has presented table, in which all the major characteristics are compared. Please see table 57 (p.484) in his [3] (Meltyukhov's sources according to footnote 1534 -- РГАСПИ. Ф.71. Оп.25. Д.4134. Л.1—8; Hahn F. Waffen und Gecheimwaffen des deutschen Heeres. Bd.2. S,2H—212.)

I think the table would suit in the article; its rather detailed though. Constanz - Talk 12:58, 2 February 2006 (UTC)

Issue of British Invasion

"The Red Army was the largest in the world: this menace had to be removed before the British Isles could be invaded." It is commonly believed that since the Battle of Britain and the canceled invasion of Britain in the Summer of 1940 caused a stalemate on the Western Front, Hitler decided to go ahead for the ultimate task, in the invasion of Russia. Perhaps Britain WAS next, but Russia came AFTER an attempt at subdueing the British failed. Just my opinion in the end, but many books would back that up. Jmlk17 10:04, 14 February 2006 (UTC)

Good edit, thanks for doing it. DMorpheus 18:39, 14 February 2006 (UTC)

They never was a serious plan of invasion before the French defeat. Even than HItler believed that he could come with Britain to some sort of accomodation. Only after realizing that the won't a invasion was considered. Either as pressure or as a real invasion. --Lucius1976 12:37, 19 March 2006 (UTC)

The Graphs dont match

The big blu graph says 2.6 million Soviets and 3.2 Million Germans but then if you scroll down you see that another graph says 3.3 million Soviets and 4.3 Million Axis so things should be changed (Deng 15:17, 15 March 2006 (UTC))

Changed what way? It needs some work, doesn't it? Let us not hurry with such estimations. As 3.3 million Soviets and 4.3 Million Axis is sourced, this one looks as more reliable, doesn't it? --Constanz - Talk 16:18, 16 March 2006 (UTC)

I have no clue of what you are yapping about but the graphs should be changed so that they match. (Deng 19:17, 16 March 2006 (UTC))

If my graph is sourced and the author is reliable, then I'm not going to change it by request of a certain editor with obvious pro-Soviet bias. I pointed out before that the figures that you of course like more are not sourced, we do not know which source do these come from. --Constanz - Talk 08:10, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

Look these 2 graphs dont match

Operation Barbarossa
Part of World War II, Eastern Front
Original German plan
Date June 22 1941 - December 1941 Location Belarus, Ukraine, Western Russia. Result Tactical German Victory; Strategic Stalemate
Belligerents
Germany	Soviet Union
Commanders and leaders
Adolf Hitler	Josef Stalin
Strength
~ 3,200,000	~ 2,600,000
Casualties and losses
unknown	unknown

	Red Army	German Army (inc allies)	Ratio
Divisions	190	166	1.1 : 1
Personnel	3,289,851	4,306,800	1 : 1.3
Guns and mortars	59,787	42,601	1.4 : 1
Tanks (incl assault guns)	15,687	4171	3.8 : 1
Aircraft	10,743	4846	2.2 : 1

BOTH ARE FOUND ON THIS PAGE AND THEY DO NOT MATCH SO STOP YOUR PERSONAL ATTACKS AND WAKE UP IN REALITY THEY DONT MATCH DO YOU UNDERSTAND THEY DO NOT MATCH (Deng 18:31, 17 March 2006 (UTC))

What then? As i've said, my source is available for everyone [4] (table 47 there in Russian). Why shouldn't we believe this graph (Meltyukhov's sources according to footnotes 1519, 1520 etc)? To dispute it, pls show alternative version, and pls not from pre-1990s time. Until you've no proof for your claim -- Mund halten und weiter dienen!--Constanz - Talk 14:20, 21 March 2006 (UTC)

Look there are diffrent graphs in this article and none of the match as you can clearly see. There are 2 diffrent sets of numbers and both sets cant be right. So someone needs to find out which numbers are right and change the other graph is that both match. In this specific article as can been seen in the graphs that are in this article one graph the big one in blue says Germany 3.2 million and SU 2.6 million but the small one also found in this article says 4.3 million axis and 3.3 million SU and both cant be right so find out which of the sets are correct and change it so that the graphs match. (Deng 01:05, 22 March 2006 (UTC))

I personally think Meltyukhov is reliable, as his research work (yr 2000) is one of the newest and comprehensive; new information and finds by different Russian historians have been taken into account. DMorpheus noted on Eastern front talk page that ratios are similar to those presented in previous (Western) works.--Constanz - Talk 11:39, 23 March 2006 (UTC)

Yes, but the problem is Meltyukhov is not available in english. Hopefully it will be soon, but until then it is very difficult for the rest of us to reply on this source. The V.A. Nevezhin article (Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Dec 1995) has no statistics although it is helpful in other areas. DMorpheus 13:42, 23 March 2006 (UTC)

Let someone then draw the alternative graph and let's discuss it here. --Constanz - Talk 14:33, 23 March 2006 (UTC)

Yes let us discuss how my pointing out that the 2 graphs dont match is pro-Soviet bias explain to me how pointing out that 2 graphs in the same article show 2 diffrent things is pro soviet bias let us discuss that. (Deng 01:28, 25 March 2006 (UTC))

I claimed that your previous edition to Eastern Front (World War II) (here [5] it is obvious exaggeration, extremism and nonsense) is biased and that's why I gave the link as well. --Constanz - Talk 08:33, 25 March 2006 (UTC)

No no you claim that me posting that 2 diffrent graphs in the same article is pro soviet bias this is ofcurse a personal attack on me. Showing that 2 graphs in the same article show 2 diffrent things can in no way be pro soviet bias but your comment shows that you have no intrest in makeing a correct article the only thing you want to do is attack me and make articles that contradict each other so stop with your personal attacks on me or I will report you . And I say it again showing that 2 graphs in the same article show 2 diffrent things is in no way pro soviet bias do you understand?

And you still havent explained how postin that 2 graphs show 2 diffrent things in the same article is pro svoiet bias explain it to me that when I say 2 graphs in the same article show 2 diffrent things is pro svoiet bias. Also let us never forget that I have proven you wrong time and time again and when I do you just stop replying for example when I proved that the axis produced more raw materials then the Soivets with real sources and real numbers what did you do--> you did nothing and then after a few weeks you say; oooh well i dont want to waste time running around in libraries. This ofcurse proves that the only reason you are in wiki is to attack me and make as many as possible articles contradict each other.

(Deng 15:55, 25 March 2006 (UTC))

There was no stalemate

Stalmate = A situation in which further action is blocked; a deadlock.

There was no stalemate, the offensive on 5 of december cant be called a stalemate

A victory means that there are no opponents on the victors country?

So then according to you the Soviets lost the battle of stalingrad they also lost according to you the battle of Kursk.

There was no Victory for the axis they failed to achive their objectives, which were.

The ultimate strategic goal of the Germans was to subjugate the European portion of the Soviet Union. The initial attack (by German forces and those of her allies, including Finland, Romania, Hungary, and Slovakia) would seek to encircle the bulk of the Red Army in Belarus (in the northwestern portion of the Soviet Union), and capture three key cities - Leningrad (the birthplace of Soviet Communism), Moscow (the seat of power) and Kiev (capital of Ukraine, with its riches of wheat and grain, and also gateway to the oil-rich Caucasus region).

The eventual goal would be a 3000 mile long line from Archangel in the north to Astrakhan in the south, with all ruled by up to 100 million settlers from Germany, the Netherlands and Scandinavia. Geographically, the eastern boundary would fall along the Volga River and the Ural Mountains.

And looking at the goals you can see there was no Victory and the fact that The Soviets counter attacked on the 5th of december proves that there was no stalemate.

And most importantly there is a section that describes the failure of the operation in this article there wouldnt need to be such a topic if the axis hadent failed. Also Wiki wouldnt exist if the axis hadent failed.

(Deng 03:13, 29 March 2006 (UTC))

I agree with Deng....you can't call Barbarossa an Axis victory. Hitler tried to conquer the Soviet Union in 1941....and failed. Therefore, its not a victory. By the end of 1941, the Soviets where on the offensive.....so the Barbarossa invasion at best was an indecisive result, with the Germans trying again in 1942. One could also argue that by stopping the initial invasion of the Germans, the Soviets won the opening campaign. From then on, the Germans were in big trouble. -- Drogo Underburrow 11:14, 29 March 2006 (UTC)

Agree also. There's no question the German offensive plan failed to gain its objectives. It's a Soviet defensive success, although I would hesitate to call it a 'victory' since they lost virtually their entire pre-war Army and so much territory and civilian population. What this really points out is the trouble with using simplistic terms such as 'victory' for such a huge operation. We need to find another word. DMorpheus 12:25, 29 March 2006 (UTC)

That's why I didn't change the result to say a Russian victory, but changed it to "no victory for either side" until we can figure out a better way of saying it. I wanted to call it a Soviet victory, but .....the Soviets got blasted so badly....I figured some editors wouldn't like it. Perhaps the negative statement "German defeat" is most appropriate. The Soviets didn't "win"....but the Germans failed. Furthermore, they were never again strong enough to attack along the entire Eastern Front at the same time. What do you say? Drogo Underburrow 12:41, 29 March 2006 (UTC)

I really don't know what word to use; it's complex. Maybe "see below" or something like that in the campaign box, then a paragraph similar to what has been written here explaining the outcome? This just doesn't lend itself to a simple one or two-word statement. DMorpheus 14:33, 29 March 2006 (UTC)

I just added the term "See Article" to the campaign box as a placeholder until we can develop a better term. User Kurt Leyman has reverted the page a number of times today to show it as a 'tactical german victory'. I am not tied to the term "See Article" but I suggest we leave some neutral term there until we can come up with something better. DMorpheus 17:44, 29 March 2006 (UTC)

I like DMorpheus "see article" because just as DMorpheus says it is a complex matter and needs a complex explanation so "see article" is the best solution to this specific problem. (Deng 22:26, 29 March 2006 (UTC))

Tactical victory

Barbarossa was German tactical victory. If it was not, by that logic the Battle of Jutland ect was not a tactical victory either.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_jutland

Germans did not achieve their goals in neither operation, but inflicted much higher losses to opposing side.

That is an odd definition of 'tactical victory'. Most armies will define victory as accomplishing your mission, period. In a defensive operation, tactical victory consists of preventing the enemy from accomplishing his mission. It's got nothing to do with losses on either side. Heck, by that definition, you might as well claim the Germans won WW2 - after all, they inflicted more casualties than they took. In the USA, the Federal forces lost more men in our Civil War than the Confederacy. But the Confederates decisively lost the war. These examples simply point out the absurdity of using losses as the sole or primary measure.

Also, 'tactical' considerations are not paramount. The strategic level is far more important than the tactical level. I don't know enough about Jutland to comment on your example, but there are other examples. At Dien Bien Phu, France inflicted more casualties on the Viet Minh than they themselves took, yet no one claims it was a French victory. They failed to prevent enemy offensive success. That's all that mattered. The fact that they won a lot of firefights on the tactical level didn't prevent a strategic loss.

You are also ignoring the operational level, which lies between the tactical and the strategic.

In the case of Barbarossa, as several editors have pointed out, the Germans failed to gain any of their strategic objectives. The Soviet armed forces and government survived and denied the Germans success. Thus on the strategic level the Germans lost and the USSR 'won'. On the operational level, generally the Germans won the major battles. On the tactical level, again they tended to prevail in most actions (not all, but the pattern is clear). It is precisely in the inability of the German armed forces to translate tactical and operational success into strategic success that a major historical question lies. DMorpheus 15:01, 30 March 2006 (UTC)

I would add that Barbarossa ended with a "tactical defeat" for the Germans... when the Soviets pushed them back in December and went on the counteroffensive. Drogo Underburrow 15:09, 30 March 2006 (UTC)

Tactical implies short-term; strategic implies long-term. The Germans advanced hundreds of miles into enemy territory: surely that is a short-term victory? I propose we make it "Tactical Axis victory; strategic Soviet victory". 140.142.174.27 16:40, 30 March 2006 (UTC)

1215 Hours 1 April, 2006

The great unwashed and unread!

Both of you are seriously confused about the terms "tactical" and "strategic."

I suggest that you take the time to read Jomini, Clausewitz, Motlke, etc. (Hint: They are experts on strategy and tactics.)

Best of Luck! Philippsbourg

Hmm

"the Germans failed to gain any of their strategic objectives"

Germans had several strategic targets which they managed to capture. Smolensk ect.

"by that definition"

That is not my defination. I only pointing out (not claiming that it's a defination) that Soviet Union had suffered massive losses during Barbarossa, losses that can't be compared with German losses, in case someone would be thinking about "Soviet victory".

"yet no one claims it was a French victory"

No, to my knowledge no one has done so, but it is not the same with Barbarossa.

"tactical defeat for the Germans."

Hardly. Strategic defeat? Yes.

OK, if you agree it was a German strategic defeat, kindly stop putting "German tactical victory" in the campaign box. It would also be very helpful for all of us if you would sign your posts. Thanks. DMorpheus 15:28, 30 March 2006 (UTC)

See my comment above: "Tactical Axis victory; strategic Soviet victory" (or "strategic Axis defeat"). BTW I'm User:laddiebuck but this computer doesn't like cookies. 140.142.174.27 16:41, 30 March 2006 (UTC)

I agree, it was a German strategic defeat. That makes three of us, a majority. Drogo Underburrow 02:51, 31 March 2006 (UTC)

I'm also of the opinion that it was a strategical defeat: remember that german aim of the operation barbarossa was to deliver a decisive blow against the red army and to defeat/destroy it for once and for all. As we know, they failed to do this. All in all, many have claimed that this 'stalemate' by december 1941 actually meant strategically inevitable defeat for germany.--Constanz - Talk 07:07, 31 March 2006 (UTC)

I think not.

"OK, if you agree it was a German strategic defeat, OK, if you agree it was a German strategic defeat,"

Yes, I agree that the battle was a Strategic Soviet victory, but not that the operation was not a Tactical German victory.

"kindly stop putting "German tactical victory" in the campaign box."

No, and Soviet Strategic victory is mentioned.

Tactical Axis victory; Strategic Soviet victory

If anyone would agree with this result being mentioned in the article, please post. Or discuss if you do not. For I would certainly classify going hundreds of miles into enemy territory, forcing them to move their industry east and capturing key cities (not to mention the Ukraine's huge supply of grain) as a "tactical victory". Sure, the Germans failed to capture Leningrad and Stalingrad, and did not cause the Soviet Union to collapse. Yet they were only pushed back beyond the Soviet borders in 1944, and the campaign was quite popular in Germany. laddiebuck 05:29, 3 April 2006 (UTC)

You are in the minority on this issue, so leave the majority opinion in the article while its discussed here. I would not call achieving those things you mentioned as any kind of victory; its not any kind of victory to strike first and bloody someone's nose, after which they beat you to a pulp and then burn your house down and enslave not only your children, but your children's children. Cheers :-) Drogo Underburrow 05:47, 3 April 2006 (UTC)

Don't play games here. There was a certain huge strategic goal of the operation (you don't know which one?) set wit lots of boasting to be achieved in 2-3 months. The goal was not achieved. Period. `'mikka (t) 05:51, 3 April 2006 (UTC)

Individual battles...say, the 1941 Kiev pocket....were tactical German victories. The Barbarossa Campaign as a whole was a strategic defeat, period. Not a "Tactical Axis victory; Strategic Soviet victory" Drogo Underburrow 06:00, 3 April 2006 (UTC)

I feel that "strategic defeat" conveys an entirely different view of the actual outcome. Operation Barbarossa ended in Dec '41, yet the Germans were not repulsed until 1944, and as I argued previously, inflicted huge human and economical damage on the USSR. Thus I feel that "Tactical Axis victory" is a perfectly justified addendum to the outcome. 128.95.15.78 01:28, 4 April 2006 (UTC)

I also feel the need to add "Tactical Axis victory", as the outcome of the whole war wasn't decided until Kursk. Of course we could compare the outcome only to how it was planned, but previous writer is correct that if it is omitted, it doesn't present correct picture at the end of 1941. --Whiskey 08:31, 4 April 2006 (UTC)

Could we please discuss this further? laddiebuck 01:55, 6 April 2006 (UTC)

And another point... If we put here only "Strategic Soviet Victory", then it will create a number of problems in other articles. F.ex. the Winter War could be described "Strategic Finnish Victory", as Soviets failed to achieve their objectives. Not that I'd have warm feeling with that modification, but it doesn't present the correct picture of the outcome. --Whiskey 07:25, 6 April 2006 (UTC)

So shall we make the addendum in default of any other comments? laddiebuck 02:23, 7 April 2006 (UTC)

No you shouldn't. Only two people feel the way you do, while several feel that the invasion was not any sort of Axis victory, none, nada, zip. Drogo Underburrow 02:27, 7 April 2006 (UTC)

Well, then at least respond to the posts. BTW, "feel" doesn't enter into it, since Wikipedia aims to be factually accurate, this is a purely historical and/or semantic argument. laddiebuck 17:44, 7 April 2006 (UTC)

Tactical victory

The battle was tactical Axis victory.

"There was a certain huge strategic goal of the operation.... The goal was not achieved."

...which is exactly the why it was not strategic Axis victory...

The question has been answered many times if you would have bothered to look you will see that (Deng 10:27, 3 April 2006 (UTC))

If you expect everyone here to agree with you then you are terribly wrong.

Learn to sign your posts and it seems that the majority agrees with what is stated and if you would have bothered to read what other people say then you would have noticed that (Deng 14:27, 3 April 2006 (UTC))

battlebox numbers

Something was the table: soviet strength is equal to losses. If someone is going to put any number, please cite sources or be reverted. `'mikka (t) 06:12, 10 April 2006 (UTC)

Axis tactical victory

I've made the case in previous sections that this needs to be changed. The duration of the campaign was June-Dec '41, during which the Soviet Union launched not a single successful counterattack. During June-December '41, the USSR was routed, and that is very hard to dispute. If you look at articles such as Attack on Pearl Harbor (which also failed its strategic objective of destroying aircraft carriers and delivering a "crippling blow") or the Winter War article (the Soviet campaign failed its strategic objectives), you will see that the "Result" field always consistently describes the immediate outcome of the battle with respect to position gained. It does not measure how the battle turned out relative to the attacker's expectations, nor whether the grounds gained were later reversed. For further examples, see Operation Compass (reversed by Rommel in '41-'42), Operation Market Garden (the Germans were eventually defeated, right?), Battle of Dunkirk (ambiguous), Battle of Crete (it was "very costly" for the Germans, just like Barbarossa), Battle of the Philippines (1941-42) (counterattacks retook it in '44, so it must have been a Japanese failure, right?), Battle of Normandy (the Allies failed to capture Caen on D-Day, so it was clearly a defeat for them, right?), or the Toropets-Kholm Operation (the Soviets did not achieve their strategic objectives, so label that a failure too?). I think I've made my point adequately. laddiebuck 19:39, 20 April 2006 (UTC)

Note also please, that Operation Barbarossa is not the entire Eastern Front (World War II); they are different in scope. Barbarossa is only June-December '41, so the eventual outcome does not apply to it. laddiebuck 19:45, 20 April 2006 (UTC)

After December 5, 1941 the Germans were retreating. It seems a funny kind of victory to me where you are going backwards. Drogo Underburrow 19:54, 20 April 2006 (UTC)

Conversely, it seems a funny kind of defeat to me where you gain 300-400 miles of land in a few months. I know that they were retreating in '41, but that wasn't decisive as you seem to imply. The battle wavered on, with each side taking the offensive, and not until November '42 were any real permanent victories achieved on the Soviet side. Barbarossa ends in Dec '41. (If you want to change the date on that, that could be an alternative solution, although I prefer that much less.) laddiebuck 19:58, 20 April 2006 (UTC) (References at Eastern Front). laddiebuck 20:01, 20 April 2006 (UTC)

laddiebuck, I think you're actually making a much more important point, which is that these campaign boxes oversimplify a sometimes complex issue. Some of the examples you cite are for relatively short battles/campaigns, or are (deliberate, I know) oversimplifications of complex actions. Since I've been working on Market/Garden, I'll pick on that one. In a short battle it is pretty easy to assess a clear cut winner and loser; I don't expect a lot of reverts on that one. But in a six-month campaign with the scope and complexity of Barbarossa, it's another ball game. There's some discussion of this up above. I would say the number of reverts on this issue confirms, in part, this notion. Rather than revert this endlessly we should consider a different campaign box for such large operations. DMorpheus 19:59, 20 April 2006 (UTC)

DMorpheus -- I'm not qualified to assess that situation. But that seems to me to be a large undertaking, require something like a WikiProject to complete. In principle, I agree that some other method of indicating results must be undertaken, maybe something like (Next Battle in Campaign), similar in style to "Successor/Predecessor" for Prime Ministers, etc. laddiebuck 20:02, 20 April 2006 (UTC)

1. Who says when Barbarossa ended?. 2. The campaign box in this case is not adhereing to the NPOV rule. Proof: we are arguing over who is right and wrong, instead of presenting the sides of the issue as given by published secondary sources. Drogo Underburrow 20:09, 20 April 2006 (UTC)

Well, disputing the duration of Barbarossa is an entirely separate issue. As it stands, the duration June-December 1941 given implies a German victory for that period of time. If it is found that secondary sources describe Barbarossa as lasting for a longer period of time, then naturally the outcome needs to be modified as well. As I'm saying, that is a separate issue, and please change it first before modifying the outcome, because naturally the outcome is directly a function of knowing what period of time we're talking about. laddiebuck 20:20, 20 April 2006 (UTC)

By the way, this is why I proposed "Axis tactical victory; Soviet strategic victory" as a compromise earlier on in this thread, which was rejected. laddiebuck 20:20, 20 April 2006 (UTC)

Barbarossa wasn't any kind of victory. Nobody won. However, the Germans did fail to reach all their objectives, so it is accurate to call it a "German strategic defeat" and let it go at that. I don't see why you insist on this "tactical victory" stuff. Its jargon. Nobody knows what it means, except you; you have your own pet definition for it, which is why other people won't accept it. Nobody cares that the Germans gained lots of ground and killed lots of people. That isn't victory, since the Russians at the end of the campaign had more people, and more ground, and were on the offensive. I'll repeat, its not a victory to punch someone in the nose, if they then smash you to pulp. Drogo Underburrow 22:45, 20 April 2006 (UTC)

Well, "tactical victory" is not my term, if you look at the pages I linked to, several have that term in their Results boxes. It's not as if I'm tyring to push my own private terminology. laddiebuck 14:51, 21 April 2006 (UTC)

The scope of the operation was strategic, hence the overall evaluation "tactical victory" is simply inapplicable here. It was not, like, Battle of Shittown (Geroicheskaya Oborona Mukhosranska). It is widely recognized that Barbarossa flopped, flunked, went down the drain, so these attempts to get just a tiny bit of victory here are quite ridiculous. Also, I find this duscussion quite strange. Where are any respectable sources that say about any kind of overall victory of Barbarossa? Am I smelling original research here? `'mikka (t) 23:04, 20 April 2006 (UTC)

As for the duration of the operation, it ended precisely because it fizzled. `'mikka (t) 23:14, 20 April 2006 (UTC)

No, I am not trying anything like original research. In high school (in Hungary, circa '99), I learned that Barbarossa was a German victory. Now whether that evaluation was correct or incorrect, the fact is, the only way to settle this dispute is to cite sources. So will you cite your "widely recognized" sources? (Naturally, if you do, I won't argue the point.) And thanks for reverting my edits without doing so. laddiebuck 00:20, 21 April 2006 (UTC)

As for textbooks from 1990-ish times in post-Communist states, I will not say a word and only laugh sadly. No matter what harm brought Soviet Union to Hunrary, Ukraine, Egypt, etc., historical revisionism, especially done in haste, is sad thing. `'mikka (t) 00:58, 21 April 2006 (UTC)

You don't seem to realize how much progress can be made in only 10 years. The Soviet regime fell in '89, and Hungary overtly turned violently anti-Communist, as it had covertly been. If you look at textbooks used today (and in '99, when I studied), you will realize that in they are very objective, and frequently more objective than textbooks produced in the West, as Western history has its own (admittedly much smaller) share of historical revisionism. laddiebuck 01:13, 21 April 2006 (UTC)

Sources: it was your obligation in the first place to provide sources when you changed what was written before you. However in this particular case the table (and the article summary) should match article text. The first thing I saw when opening the page was section title: "Causes of the failure of Operation Barbarossa". So, if you want the word "victory" in the table, you better replace the section with "Causes of the victory of Operation Barbarossa", and thenn we shall talk. `'mikka (t) 00:58, 21 April 2006 (UTC)

OK, I'll research the matter more before editing again. laddiebuck 01:13, 21 April 2006 (UTC)

What other languages think

I checked the foreign-language Wikipedia articles on Barbarossa -- not research, obviously, but interesting nonetheless. I've sorted the viewpoints based ont the number of languages supporting them. I was unable to determine the gist of the articles in 3 languages.

Treats Barbarossa as the entire '41-'45 conflict: (hence unambiguous Axis defeat <`'mikka (t) 16:28, 5 May 2006 (UTC)>)

• de
• fi
• nl (starred article)
• pt
• sv
• pl: Cleanup tag. Does not mention outcome mentions that it was German defeat (section title: "Reasons of german defeat")<`'mikka (t) 16:33, 5 May 2006 (UTC)>, just dwells on the fact that the Eastern Front was doomed for the Axis, and that that was already evident in Barbarossa.

Unambiguous Soviet victory:

• hr
• en
• es
• it

Axis tactical victory; strategic stalemate:

• fr (in as many words)
• ro (in as many words)
• ja (no "results" box, but that is the gist of the "Results" section)

Unambiguous Axis victory: (cautious phrasing: "although German actions during the operation may be evaluated as victorious, these victories were insufficient to break Soviets" <`'mikka (t) 16:28, 5 May 2006 (UTC)>)

• cs

Misc:

• da: Currently the article is marked as having quality issues.
• id: Stub. (seems to equate Barbarossa and the entire Eastern Front)

Can't tell:

• he
• no
• th

The diversity of opinions on the subject makes it clear that the matter is not as clear-cut as some try to present it. It seems that most just lump the whole thing together with the Eastern Front. In any case at least 5 other languages are against labeling the result as a clear Soviet victory. Anyways, tell me what you think (or send me to hell already). laddiebuck 01:55, 24 April 2006 (UTC)

Not so much diversity as you are trying to pretend. `'mikka (t) 16:28, 5 May 2006 (UTC)

German heavy tanks

"With regards to German counterparts, as Viktor Suvorov claims, preliminary designs of first German heavy tank date back to May 26, 1941(!)[1" Umm, this seems kinda unconnected to anything in the article. I don't see its' relevance here - and any case it's incorrect, since there were several German heavy tank projects before that date. --Mikoyan21 08:53, 2 May 2006 (UTC)

It may look irrelevant, but as for it's incorrect, since there were several German heavy tank projects before that date pls bring source as well (also, I wanted to remind you already a while ago to take a glance at WP:No original research and WP:WWIN#Wikipedia_is_not_a_soapbox -- without sources for one's interesting claims, a doubt of violating these rules may arise). --Constanz - Talk 13:58, 2 May 2006 (UTC)

Whilst Hitler indeed did not officially order Tiger until May 26th 1941, both Henschel and Porsche had already started development of which was to become Tiger much earlier - Henschel projects date back to 1937. Also, Germans were developing NbFz-series before the war, five were built and some saw action in 1940-41, although the tank did not enter mass production. See details at AchtungPanzer.com. So whilst Tiger itself was not ordered until May 1941, the design itself already existed and was not even first German heavy tank project. I propose that above sentence is modified to be more accurate - and I don't see why Suvorov needs to be mentioned at all there. --Mikoyan21 17:45, 2 May 2006 (UTC)

"Very modern Soviet doctrine"

Can anyone extrapolate? As far as I remember, it was "the doctrine of small actions" or something like that. --Theocide 15:47, 5 May 2006 (UTC)

The english translation I have seen of the term is "Deep Battle" , but since I do not read Russian I can't comment on whether that is a good translation. The doctrine was formulated in the early 1930s and formalized in the 1936 field regulations. DMorpheus 16:06, 5 May 2006 (UTC)

Numbers

There is no way that the invadeing army was 5.5 million. Because there were only 3.2 million germans and that would mean that 2.2 million were axis allies which is impossible. To see that there were only 3.2 million germans go here http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/Chew/CHEW.asp

And you will see this

"Hitler's plans also miscarried before the onset of severe winter weather; he was so confident of a lightning victory that he did not prepare for even the possibility of winter warfare in Russia. Yet his eastern army suffered more than 734,000 casualties (about 23 percent of its average strength of 3,200,000 troops"

So the number 5.5 million must be wrong (Deng 18:12, 5 May 2006 (UTC))

Krivosheev gives an estimation of 4.6 mln german troops + 0.9 mln Axis allies. He says that German 4.6 mln were: 119 infantry and cavalry divisions, 33 motorized and panzer divisions and two brigades.

The Axis allied had 29 divisions and 16 brigades.--Theocide 15:03, 6 May 2006 (UTC)

Well now someone changed the numbers again an ip adress. But if you can support the 5.5 million and source it I see no problem with it. Now since someone changed the axis number to the old number I will change to Soviet number to the old number and if you want to change them both it is fine as long as you can source it. (Deng 17:27, 6 May 2006 (UTC))

Germans had hardly more than 3 million men see e.g http://history.acusd.edu/gen/WW2timeline/BARBAROS.HTML --Constanz - Talk 11:54, 11 May 2006 (UTC)

This is either a very flawed interpretation of Clark, or Clark is completely outdated (never read him) for some of the most popular wrong cliches are there - Russians are given the overall number of tanks while Germans - only the number of tanks on the Eastern front; 10 to 1 estimation of losses; failure to count the number of division on Soviet-japanese border (the author of the page seems to claim that ALL divisions were relocated from Siveria to fight for Moscow), etc. One mistake or fake after another. And I seriously advise you to stop reading Web-pages. --Theocide 11:48, 29 May 2006 (UTC)

... and I seriosuly advise you to note other people's sources, which all seem to give 3.2 million. --Constanz - Talk 14:35, 30 May 2006 (UTC)

Dont use internet links as sources anyone can make an internet page. Such pages that you link to can be made by anyone and they have no burden of proof in any way what so ever. And dont forget to mention the axis allies and not just talk about the germans (Deng 20:18, 11 May 2006 (UTC))

Alan Clark and his book are probably not 'no-one.' I think one might look up the numbers by mr Glatz, the hailed historian of the west.--Constanz - Talk 13:15, 13 May 2006 (UTC)

John Erickson in "The road to Stalingrad" -page 142- -line 15- -word 2- puts the number at 3.2 million Germans but dosent give any number for the axis allies. Stop useing internet pages as references they have no burden of proof what so ever. (Deng 14:40, 13 May 2006 (UTC))

Len Deighton's translation into Russian mentions 3.2 million as well. The original is probably Blood, Tears and Folly: An Objective Look at World War II ISBN: 071266226X. The official Russian table is something that hardly a serious historian takes seriously; let us remind you that the official Russian history taught in schools tells us that the Baltic states freewillingly 'joined' the USSR in 1941 etc. I really wouldn't realy on these sources.--Constanz - Talk 09:07, 29 May 2006 (UTC)

Are you a "serious historian"? I don't think so. Serious historians study Russian sources and numbers given by modern Russian authors with extreme interest - latest research on GULAG, for example. Also, what you are trying to "remind" Superdeng of, is false. You are either a liar, or a cheap blabber. Russian history does NOT teach in schools that the Baltic states freely joined the USSR. And it never did since the crumble of the Soviet Union. You are deliberately mixing Soviet historiography with Russian historiographty. Thus what you would or wouldn not rely on is completely irrelevant, since you seem not to have a clue on the subject. --Theocide 11:48, 29 May 2006 (UTC)

As for seriousness, you know as well as I do, that different Russian historians have presented radically different thesis on this respect, as well as alleged intentions of the Soiviet side. And the fact is, that Western historians do not seem to repeat the high German and low Soviet numbers. --Constanz - Talk 14:33, 30 May 2006 (UTC)

Why are you mixing in Russia??? The source I gave was from a british professor and he states the size of the GERMAN force, he got the numbers from the german archives not from the Russian or any russian source, also the link above is to an american military study who also looked at the german numbers of the german forces and both of these, the study and the book by the professor, give a number of 3.2 million germans. (Deng 17:24, 31 May 2006 (UTC))

I think I was emphasising that many sources give 3.2 mil Germans (plus allies?) at front instead of 5.5 mil offered by the official source cited.--Constanz - Talk 07:25, 2 June 2006 (UTC)

Wrong accusations by User:Theocide

You are a liar, User:Theocide, not me. According to a study I recently read (Magnus Ilmjärv, Hääletu alistumine, (Silent Submission), Tallinn, Argo, 2004, ISBN 9949415047 ) a lot of the Russian official historians DO teach such nonsense. Mr. Ilmjärv cites book by Vilnis Sipils (Tayny diplomaticheskiye, Kanun velikoy otechestvennoy 1939-41. Moskva, 1997, c.242) which says: In mid-July 1940 elections took place. In that way Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, being taken away from Russia as a result of military intervention, joined her again, by the will of the peoples. Also cited: 'Noveyshaya istoriya otechestva. XX vek. Uchebnik dlya vuzov. V dvuh tomah. T.2. Pod red. doktora istoricheskih nauk, proffessora A.F.Kiselyova, doktora i.n., prof. E.M.Shchagina. Moskva, 1998, s. 111. This nice students' book teaches us that the so-called treaty of military bases forced by the USSR to the 3 Baltic states was a free step taken by the latter ones, concluded in order to guarantee their security, their boundaries. The annexation of the Baltic states was said to have taken place as a result of inner developments in these countries (whichm, consequently, led to 'socialist revolutions'). According to authors of this book, the July elections were free, no occupation ever existed, and the representatives of 3 states decided to join USSR. Other books represeting similar views: S.V.Chernichenko. Teoriya Mezhdunarodnaya prava, t.II. M.1999, s. 72-79 and also: 'Mezdunarodnoye publichnoye pravo. Uchebnik [students' book!]. Izdaniye vtoroye, pererabotannoe i dopolnennoye. M. 2001.

Fortunately, other views are present (e.g Meltyukhov depicts the same subject differently), M.Semiryaga's book (Tainy stalinskoy diplomatiy 1939-41. Vyshaya shkola [for universities/colleges] Moskva, 1992, s.226) reflects a bit more objective view, even condemning the occupation (but somehow not condemning the ultimatum and threatening by force in 1940). --Constanz - Talk 14:22, 30 May 2006 (UTC)

Reichskommissariates

I'm curious about the discrepancy between the Reichskommissariates listed in this article and the ones under Reichskommissariates (see also Alfred Rosenberg) - in particular this article shows Turkestan as one of the Reichkommissariates planned, but that is missing from the article dealing specifically with the Reichkommissariates. Does anybody have any sources to check to determine which article is correct? ThreeBlindMice 22:56, 12 May 2006 (UTC)

Link to Battle of Khalkhin Gol

(Moved from User talk:Petri Krohn -- Petri Krohn 17:11, 12 June 2006 (UTC))

I am not sure why you are linking the reinforcement of the Moscow armies with the Battle of Khalkin-Gol article. The Manchurian battle took place in 1939 and has no real connection to the defense of Moscow in Dec 1941. Whether the units involved were the same divisions or not, it seems to me that it merely leads the reader to a dead-end that is not particularly relevant. Is there some reason I am not seeing for including this in the article? DMorpheus 16:52, 12 June 2006 (UTC)

I added a wikilink to Battle of Khalkhin Gol from the text fresh divisions from Siberia in connection to the Battle of Moscow. The reasons why this is relevant are mainly covered in the section Influence on World War II. Quoting from the chapter:

"It was the first victory for the famed Soviet general Georgy Zhukov. The battle experience gained by the Siberian army was put to good use in December 1941 outside Moscow, under the command of Zhukov, when Siberian divisions spearheaded the first successful Soviet counteroffensive against the German invasion of 1941."

1. This was the same Siberian army.
2. It was commanded by the wery same Georgy Zhukov.
3. This battle, in addition to the neutrality pact, guaranteed that the troops were available to be moved west to the defence of Moscow, without fear of an attack by Japan.

-- Petri Krohn 17:11, 12 June 2006 (UTC)

I don't wish to get in an edit back-and-forth here, but those are rather thin reasons aren't they? The German forces attacking Moscow were "the same army" that defeated France; they were commanded by the very same officers; the rapid defeat of the French freed these armies to attack the USSR. Yet we do not link to the Battle of France, with good reason.

DMorpheus 17:19, 12 June 2006 (UTC)

Winner

On the info box, I'd classify this as a tactical Axis Pyrical[sp?] victory & Strategic Axis defeat. The Axis powers gained a lot of ground during this operation which is tactical. But it was also (especally in the November & December portions of this operation) too costly for the Axis in terms of casulaties and as such is pyrical[sp?]. (The ancient quote "One more such victory, and we are ruined" comes to mind.) From a strategic standpoint, this was very much a major strategic defeat for the Axis, starting with the date it commenced (Around time of Summer Solistance instead of Spring and also a failure to get Japan to at the very least launch a feint into Russian Siberia at the same time. Jon 14:07, 22 June 2006 (UTC)

I think the word you are looking for is 'pyrrhic'. This issue has been debated at length in the discussion page. The fact that the operation was a strategic disaster for both sides makes any tactical-level assessment nearly irrelevant. Since the Axis did not achieve their strategic objectives, it must be classified as a defeat for them. DMorpheus 18:31, 22 June 2006 (UTC)

Just a note

-- just a note - the explanation of an inadequate logistical system is open for debate. Once the battle of Smolensk was completed the rail head was well past Minsk. The German General Staff of Army Group Center did not report any lack. In the middle of July 1941 they halted at Smolensk to refit and resupply. If they had jumped of in early August they may well have reached Moscow because the Soviet units before them had been savaged badly and the defense system in front of Moscow had not been developed. Instead the Germans developed the Kiev pocket to assist Army Group South. However the distance to Kiev from Smolensk is more than the distance to Moscow, and the Germans accomplished that move with ease. Therefore if they had the logistics to drive to Kiev, they had the logistics to drive to Moscow and quite probably could have captured it. But then what? The winter would have still come and the Germans would have been that much further East away from their supplies, so taking Moscow may not have done much good. The Tzar didn't collapse when Moscow fell, and it is open to debate that the Communists would have. Organizing the counter offensive might have been more of a problem, but it would have come. Plus with all those Far East reserves around, who knows what a street battle in Moscow would have been like. added by ip 69.179.181.79

Dont add such bad explanations. It is bad for many reasons, not only does it ignore that the flanks would have been way open it assumes to much. Ever heard of Stalingrad what do you think the Battle of Moscow would have been. (88.191.22.62 23:18, 22 June 2006 (UTC))

Please don't attack other editors, 88.191.22.62. Be civil. As to the merits of the argument, it has some validity. US Army studies show that the Wehrmacht had the time to make it to Moscow well before winter if they had merely traveled at the same pace as napoleon. A huge open German flank wouldn't matter much if there are no mobile, well-supplied Soviet forces to mount a counteroffensive. For example, in August 1944 the US 12th Army Group had a massive open southern flank - and it didn't matter, because there was nothing there. This very decision (the turn south) may have saved the Red Army. This is not just amateur speculation or original research.

DMorpheus 23:57, 22 June 2006 (UTC)

No biased article names

Official policy is to avoid propaganda names as article titles. Ooperation Barbarossa is clearly one side's planning. Although I know that it is specifically mentioned in the guidelines that this is an exception, I see no reason for it to be one.2_of_8 04:24, 12 July 2006 (UTC)

The three potential objections seem to be:

1. Biased names such as X massacre or Y slaughter. This is not the case here.
2. The lack of geographic or historical context in the name. Operation Barbarossa is specifically cited as an example of an exception to this potential problem.
3. An operational name encouraging a focus on only one side's operations. From some previous readings and a quick scan of the article today, it seems to be well balanced, and not suffering such a problem.

So what exactly is the nature of the objection? What title would you propose? —Michael Z. 2006-07-07 00:28 Z

Actually, I'm not sure what the nature of the objection is. I must have made this while sleeping or something. Apologies 2_of_8 04:24, 12 July 2006 (UTC)

A new table added

I added a table on 1941/39 Red army comparison. Divisons calculated was in original 'Дивизии расчетные' - not very sure about the translation.--Constanz - Talk 10:32, 22 July 2006 (UTC)

Axis partners

The article records the participation of Italy, Slovakia, etc but I can't find info about their deployment. Folks at 137 20:27, 7 September 2006 (UTC)

Commanders listed in "infobox" ...

...have been changed several times recently, and do not make sense for me. OK, there are Stalin and Hitler. There are also Antonescu and Mannerheim. But if Italy, Slovakia and Hungary are listed just above, why their respective leaders not mentioned? Then, who was Zhukov on the 22nd of June, 1941? Right, the Chief of General Staff. So why his German counterpart isn't here? Mannstein commanded a Panzer corps at the time, didn't he? What he's doing here? Should we list all commanders of Soviet and German armies? Sorry, guys, it's a mess now.—Barbatus 04:12, 24 September 2006 (UTC)

Replaced Mannstein with Brauchitsch. Mannerheim I added because Finnish army at north was all the time at his command not simply expeditionary force loaned to germans. Antonescu i added because as far as i remember at earlier part of barbarossa Romanian forces acted quite independently at south, also of Germany's allies Romania sent most troops to eastern front.(Staberinde 16:52, 24 September 2006 (UTC))

Why Brauchitsch and not Keitel then? The latter was higher in the hierarchy, wasn't he? ... I'd suggest to leave only the real supreme commanders: Stalin on the Soviet side, and Hitler on the German; if memory serves me, Rumanian troops were subordinated to German command (though Finnish troops, probably, were not).—Barbatus 17:24, 24 September 2006 (UTC)

Interesting, seems that i was wrong about Romanians(atleast first source what i found showed so). My apologizes i will remove Antonescu immidiately. I reverted manstein to Brauchitsch as then i first saw this article he was there behind hitler(haven't made any other changes about german and soviet generals myselfly). But you may be right. That would leave Hitler and Mannerheim to axis and Stalin to soviets. Agree? (Staberinde 17:55, 24 September 2006 (UTC))

Sure.—Barbatus 18:23, 24 September 2006 (UTC)

Done.—Barbatus 18:26, 24 September 2006 (UTC)

The Winner, still

The previous discussion in this talk page quite much agreed that it shouldn't be strategic axis defeat, so I wonder why it is. :The article only is about "Date: June 22, 1941 - December 1941". To that point, Battle of Moscow nor Stalingrad were not lost. Strategic Axis defeat is quite ridiculous, and it should be changed immediatly. Though it's sure that edit war is going to come, unfortunately.. --Pudeo

German offensive on Moscow completely came to a halt by November. Check your sources.

--Theocide 18:47, 9 October 2006 (UTC)

So you want it as axis victory? And by the way the Axis were no where near Stalingrad in 41, and the axis never even entered Moscow. It was Axis deafeat because operation barbarossa ended the second the Soviets started the counter attack on the 5th of december. You dont win by haveing the enemy counter attack you and explode you 100-250km away. And this is the agreed upon version if you read the talk page. Weedro 19:58, 8 October 2006 (UTC)

I now that about Stalingrad, and it was not my point. Soviet victory doesn't really describe the situation at the end of 1941; the war was far from decided who will win. Blowing Soviet lines 100-500km away isn't a Soviet victory either; I prefered German tactical victory, even stalemate would describe it better. --Pudeo

It dosent say Soviet victory it says "Strategic Axis defeat" This has all been discussed before and stalemate is just plain wrong. Lokqs 20:01, 11 October 2006 (UTC)

June 1941; figure

There are still two different tables, I looked up the 'official figures' - the author hadnn't apparantly bothered himself to give any sources for the figures (unlike the author of the table I added). In fact, I only managed to see some Soviet era books, incl infamous Zhukov memoirs, as Kirosheyev's sources (but not for the table concerned). So I think I'll remove these 'official figures' as unfounded. As already mentioned, someone could add a table by Glantz, Overy or a guys of the kind, if counter to Meltyukhov is needed. Constanz - Talk 08:41, 23 November 2006 (UTC)

Supposed to start in April 1941

In a history course, I've heard that Hitler planned to do the operation in April 1941 instead, because of how fast he defeated France. I've heard also that the operation was delayed because of the invasion of Greece by Mussolini's troops before. Hitler had send troops to help Mussolini in Greece which was a failure by locals.--JForget 17:53, 23 November 2006 (UTC) I'm mentionning this as I don't see the Greece operation and the April 1941 planned date of the Barbarossa mission--JForget 17:53, 23 November 2006

I'm not sure how well-established that is...and regardless, as discussed above, it is unclear how significant it would be. Usually (not always, and perhaps not today) this idea is brought out in the context of the "General winter" argument. If the Nazis had merely moved at the same pace as Napoleon in 1812, they could have reached Moscow long before winter. That they failed to is due to some combination of Red Army resistance and German ineptitude. But it wasn't the weather. DMorpheus 17:58, 23 November 2006 (UTC)

Well, it was the mud :o). The question is of course not whether you could possibly move an army to Moscow, but whether you could keep it so well supplied over that distance that it could fight and win. Logistic requirements were rather different in 1941 from those in 1812 ;o).--MWAK 11:54, 11 December 2006 (UTC)

As were the means to meet those requirements. Mud is neutral. ;) DMorpheus 18:36, 11 December 2006 (UTC)

Your statement is profoundly inaccurate. Mud, as well as the weather that brings the conditions that cause it, can bring tactical advantage to one side or the other. Usually poor weather benefits the defender more than the attacker. 14thArmored 2000 Hours 11 December 2006

Of course it "can bring tactical advantage to one side or the other". That's exactly what I was saying, and have said long ago on this page. Weather, all by itself, doesn't favor anyone. It favors the side that is prepared to use it to their advantage, or, put another way, punishes the side that is not prepared. DMorpheus 19:55, 11 December 2006 (UTC)

No sir. It is not what you were saying. You said that mud was neutral on the battlefield. It is not, and you should admit your error instead of trying to avoid the fact that you made it. You are also wrong about the weather not favoring anyone. Weather conditions can by default, favor one side or the other without any particular planning or preparation at the tactical or operational levels of warfare. Your comments show a distressing lack of understanding about the factors that influence and affect battlefield tactics. 14thArmored 2001 Hours 11 December 2006

... And, of course, it is a good excuse for those who failed to include weather conditions in their planning. Плохому танцору ... --Barbatus 20:08, 11 December 2006 (UTC)

Oddly enough, those who think that beginning of the campaign in April would have improved Hitler's chances, usually have no clue when the roads in western Russia dry after a Spring thaw, slush and mire.--Barbatus 18:27, 11 December 2006 (UTC)

Indeed. The Germans were not prepared to keep moving over Soviet 'roads'. The Red Army's latest-generation tanks were, but not their trucks. Still, this is a fault of planning, not kudos to mud. DMorpheus 18:36, 11 December 2006 (UTC)

Yup. There's a recently published book, Mud: A Military History by a certain C.E. Wood (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2006, ISBN 1-57488-984-2). I've seen his presentation of the book on the BookTV, where he mentioned in passing that Germans failed to capture Moscow of course due to bad weather. Still, the book might be informative.--Barbatus 19:33, 11 December 2006 (UTC)

Causes of the failure of Operation Barbarossa - Additionnal info

Apparently, when the Soviets blocked the Nazis in Stalingrad, they've removed all factories in the area and moved it to Serbia in order to rearmed themselves after rebuilding the factories and mills for their military production. Due the resistance of the troops in Stalingrad, the Soviets had several months to increased their military power in which they've suprised the Nazis afterwards.--JForget 18:00, 23 November 2006 (UTC)

The Battle of Stalingrad took place a full year after Operation Barbarossa. Many Soviet factories were evacuated eastwards, but not the ones at Stalingrad, which continued to operate on the very eve of the battle. Indeed, Stalingrad-produced T-34s were for a short period the only new T-34s reaching the Red Army. DMorpheus 18:09, 23 November 2006 (UTC)

Thanks for that, we should notice also that the army wasn't quite ready at the start especially because of Stalin's complete dismantling of its army in the 1930's (1936 I think). In my notes, it doesn't make any mention of factories in Stalingrad been moved (of course of the battle) so you've pretty much confirm my thoughts. --JForget 18:37, 23 November 2006 (UTC)

"Complete dismantling"? Where did you hear such nonsense? Have you ever seen a single book on the development of the Soviet armed forces? Also, I think you might check you geography textbooks and refresh your memory on where Serbia is located and which way Soviet factories were evacuated.--Barbatus 23:51, 23 November 2006 (UTC)

Probably meant "Siberia". BTW, I also thought that some Stalingrad factories continued to operate until they were overrun, producing tanks that were immediately used. Is this true or not? Folks at 137 19:46, 26 November 2006 (UTC)

But of course it meant "Siberia"! My point is, how even a supposedly educated person (and I believe JForget is educated, just take a look at his (her?) user page), can be so ... er ... inaccurate and — how should I put it? ... I don't know how to say it nicely! ... — to utter something like "complete dismantling" of the Soviet army in the 1930's!!! As Russians say, "слышал звон ...". As for the factories in Stalingrad, I believe you can find useful information here, if not in the article itself, then in recommended books and links.--Barbatus 18:15, 27 November 2006 (UTC)

Diesel and gasoline

Doesn't diesel have a higher freezing point than gasoline? This refers to the weather section.141.211.222.191 20:45, 9 December 2006 (UTC)

Yes, a lot higher. But a lot depends on the quality of the diesel, and whether it has additives (kerosene or something more sophisticated) to 'winterize' it. Gasoline will still burn at very, very low temperatures. I'm not an engineer but I think the problems have to do with fuel tank venting, resulting moisture in fuel tanks and freezing/waxing in the fuel lines - not, strictly speaking, actual frozen fuel. Maybe an editor who is more versed in this can clarify. DMorpheus 19:44, 11 December 2006 (UTC)

I will be more than happy to clarify for you. The technical aspects of utilizing diesel instead of gasoline are irrelevant in the context of the article unless you can provide reasonable evidence that the Soviets suffered undue problems with their diesel powered vehicles. 14thArmored 2007, 11 December 2006

I don't think anyone's saying they did: simply that the statement that diesel was less problematic than gasoline could do with a little expansion. (It being against received wisdom and all.) Tre1234 00:36, 15 March 2007 (UTC)

Vandalism?

"Operation Barbabvgvvgbbvgbgvrossa lasted from June 1941 to December 1941, the Eastern Front lasted from June 1941 to May 1945 when the Soviets took Berlin." Seems clear to me.

Drive on Moscow

In this section it is said the Vyazma Pocket took 663 000 prisoners, I'm pretty sure it is far from the truth they took maximum 350000 - 400000 prisoners, or maybe less. Anyway I'm curious what are the sources for this, and if there's no sources, it should be corrected. I'm not correcting it, because I'm not an english native speaker

I got it from the PBS Documentary Series, Battlefield: The Battle of Russia. Mercenary2k 04:53, 28 March 2007 (UTC)

Not certain what the Vyazma pocket is, but if it is Kiev area then the number 663 comes from German numbers which are all MALES between 16-60, the number of captured soldiers was 450 and out of those 180 broke out. Wheelsnake 11:34, 25 April 2007 (UTC)

Italy? Map?

Italy is listed as a participant. While they did declare war on the USSR I don't think they sent any units until 1942. Also the map is wrong - it shows the main force of Army Group Center attacking toward the lower Dneiper. Plus it shows Army Group North's main advance as running south of Pskov which I think the main thrust was more along the coast. It also shows the Finnish drive to Lake Onega as about the size of a German army group drive, which is pretty misleading. Herostratus 07:24, 27 April 2007 (UTC)

You're right about Italy. But that isn't Army Group Centre, it's Army Group South :o). AGN's main effort was indeed south of Lake Peipus, towards the Luga.--MWAK 09:07, 17 May 2007 (UTC)

Needs cleanup

This article is, quite frankly, a bit of a mess. Lots of repetition, contradictory statements, waffling, and failure to emphasize key points. It could really do with a cleanup. I'm not going to bother adding it to the cleanup list though, that's already far too long and a cleanup of this article probably requires some specialized interest in the field. I wouldn't mind having a crack at it myself but I have other priorities at the moment. Gatoclass 07:37, 17 May 2007 (UTC)

You're right. I would have done it myself if, I hadn't despaired of reconciling the revisionist and traditional versions of events.--MWAK 09:07, 17 May 2007 (UTC)

Soviet tank reorganization

Regarding the question of how far Soviet tank reorganization had progressed by June 1941. I'm quoting from The Russian Front by James F Dunnigan (Arms & Armour Press, 1978), page 82:

In mid-1940, after observing the German victories in Poland, the Low Countries and France, the Soviet High Command had begun to reinstitute tank divisions and mechanized corps. By 1941 the Soviet Army had accumulated 39 Armoured Divisions, but by and large these were still not grouped in independent corps or armies, but were distributed evenly throughout the Army in close support of the infantry troops. Furthermore, in the haste to obtain a large number of armoured formations as quickly as possible, few were fully equipped. The reorganization had not been completed when war broke out, and the Red Army faced the Germans with incomplete and unready armoured formations.

Again on page 88, it says that after the experience of the Russo-Finnish war, when the Finns had beaten off Russia's "pseudo-combined arms army", the Russians stripped their light tank battalions out of their infantry divisions and started reorganizing them into specialized mechanized units. But when the Germans invaded in June '41 (quote) the Russians were right in the middle of their reorganization.

I've included this info in the appropriate section. Gatoclass 16:47, 17 May 2007 (UTC)

Yes, but "in close support of infantry troops" doesn't mean they were still in organic tank battalions! Furthermore the book you refer to, very informative as it was for its day, should now be considered to be completely outdated. Apart from the fact that most details it gives about Soviet armour are today known to be simply false (the production numbers e.g.), it still works with the simplistic contrast between a supposed German armour doctrine prescribing that all armour should be concentrated in armoured divisions and a supposed "Allied" doctrine to use them for "infantry support". In fact there was no such German doctrine — for organisational reasons it was in 1940 convenient for the Germans to have almost all of their tracked AFVs in Panzerdivisionen, but neither before nor after was this the case — and how vague and misleading the "infantry support" notion is, is shown by precisely the fact that the huge mechanised corps can still be interpreted as being subservient to infantry, although they each had an organic strength (be it never attained) larger than an entire German Panzerarmee!

Another point is that "in the middle of their organisation" does not imply that the tanks hadn't been transferred. It again is a vague term indicating (now no doubt correctly) that the coherence and operational training of the new units was still far from perfect. That they weren't fully equipped yet is true, but this was caused by a simple insuffiency of numbers; even the enormous Soviet tank fleet was unable to meet the demand: the Corps were too large.--MWAK 04:35, 18 May 2007 (UTC)

Yes, but "in close support of infantry troops" doesn't mean they were still in organic tank battalions!

No, of course not, but I haven't said that in my actual edit. This is what I wrote:

Also, prior to the war, the Soviets had dispersed their tanks to infantry divisions for infantry support, but after their experiences in the Winter War and their observation of German Blitzkreig tactics against France, had begun to emulate the Germans and organize their armoured assets into large, fully mechanized divisions and corps. This reorganization however was only part way through by the dawn of Barbarossa.

- I don't think that contradicts any of the points you have made here.

I must say, though, that I find your claim that the Germans only put their armour into large units "for organizational reasons" rather astonishing. I concede that I'm hardly an expert on the development of the German "Blitzkreig" doctrine, but it was far in advance of anything the allies had, and by the time of Barbarossa in 1941 the concept of massed armour for "schwerpunkt" and deep envelopment by large, independent mobile forces was well advanced. Gatoclass 07:46, 18 May 2007 (UTC)

Well, at the time of Barbarossa that doctrine had become accepted wisdom in Germany less than a year earlier — and those allies as there were or would be were hurrying to imitate it. The concept of course had been around ever since Fuller formulated it in WW1 :o). I didn't claim the formation of armoured divisions was merely organisationally motivated; but the abandonment of their infantry support armoured units and cavalry armoured units in 1939 certainly was. The reason that in May 1940 almost all German tracked AFVs (most infantry divisions had armoured car reconnaissance platoons) could be only found in the Panzerdivisionen was not some conviction that that would be the only place they belonged, as is shown by the simple fact that at the same time they were making considerable efforts to create in the future many infantry support units and provide each infantry division with its own organic company. That these would be equipped with self-propelled guns instead of "real" tanks was of course again a matter of convenience. They did what everyone did: assign the low-quality vehicles to the infantry divisions and limit the good stuff to the armoured divisions.

I must admit that my remark about the organic tank battalions was made with your earlier edit in mind ;o).--MWAK 13:34, 18 May 2007 (UTC)

"Obsolescence isn't the issue"

DMorpheus has deleted the statement that "over 90% of Russian tanks were obsolete" on the grounds that "Obsolescence wasn't the issue and isn't true of "90%" of the Soviet tank force." Let's just take a look at what other Wikipedia pages have to say about the Russian tank types of 1941:

T-27

The T-27 saw active service in the Soviet republics of Central Asia during the 1930s, where the tankettes were used in campaigns against rebellious native peoples. However, they fairly quickly became obsolete due to the introduction of more advanced tanks...By the end of the 1930s the T-27 was relegated primarily to training use with some being used as tractors to tow field guns...2,157 T-27s remained in service by January 1941 and some took part in the initial stages of the Great Patriotic War (World War II) later that year. The last recorded combat use of the T-27 was in the Battle of Moscow in December 1941.

T-26

Success and failure in the Spanish Civil War, where it served as the most widely used tank, ultimately played a major role in influencing the Soviet doctrine of tank warfare in the late 1930s; later in its service the T-26's obsolescence contributed to some of the major Soviet defeats during the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941....The T-26 formed the backbone of the Red Army's tank force during the first months of the German invasion of the Soviet Union during the Second World War. The Red Army was equipped with 10,268 T-26 tanks of all models on June 1, 1941

T-38

The T-38's limitations were recognized, and it would have been replaced by the T-40, but the outbreak of the Second World War meant that only a few T-40s were produced...It did not do well in the early stages of World War II, and large numbers were captured by the Germans during Operation Barbarossa. The T-38 was rarely seen in direct combat after 1941 and mostly relegated to other roles such as artillery tractor...Around 1,500 T-38s were built.

BT series

The Fast Tank was a series of Soviet 'cavalry tanks' which were produced in large numbers between 1932 and 1941...The Red Army planned to replace the BT series with the T-34 and had just begun doing so when the German invasion (Operation Barbarossa) took place. Production: BT-5: 1,884 BT-7: 5,328 BT-8: 706

T-28

Although the T-28 was rightly considered ineffective by 1941, it is worth remembering that when the Red Army was fielding the first T-28s in 1933, the French Army was still largely equipped with the FT-17, and the Wehrmacht had no tanks at all.

T-35

Most of the T-35 tanks still operational at the time of Operation Barbarossa were lost due to mechanical failure rather than enemy action...In June of 1940, the question was raised whether to withdraw the T-35s from frontline service, with the option to either convert them to heavy self propelled artillery, or to assign them to the various military academies...During Operation Barbarossa, ninety percent of the T-35s lost by the 67th and 68th Tank Regiments were lost not to enemy action but through either mechanical failure or because they were abandoned and destroyed by their crews...Due to its high cost, the production run of the T-35 ended at just sixty-one tanks.

Now, count 'em

T-27 2,157

T-26 10,268

T-38 1,500

BT 5 1,884

BT-7: 5,328

BT-8: 706

T-28 No production figure

T-35 61

Total: 21,904+ obsolete tanks. How many modern tanks does that leave the Soviets in June of 1941 exactly? Gatoclass 14:02, 18 May 2007 (UTC)

That is an elaborate but simplistic argument. Consult some other non-wikipedia references and a very different judgment may emerge. The myth that most Soviet tanks were obsolete and this this was a major contributor to initial Soviet defeats is not tenable. Other much more fundamental issues produced the defeat. I stand by my edit. DMorpheus 15:06, 18 May 2007 (UTC)

Yes but my edit didn't claim it was "a major contributor" to initial Soviet defeats. I was just stating a fact - that most Soviet tanks were obsolete (or obsolescent) at the start of the campaign. And while it may not have been a major contributor, I don't think you can argue that it was not a contributing factor. How would the Nazi invasion have gone had the Soviets been equipped with 20,000 KV-1's? Gatoclass 16:08, 18 May 2007 (UTC)

Probably about the same, but we'll never know. DMorpheus 21:11, 18 May 2007 (UTC)

I feel it has to be admitted that the majority of Soviet tanks was obsolescent (limited in their usefulness because of not having kept up with technological advances) — but they weren't obsolete (so outdated that they were nearly useless). By the same citeria the majority of German tanks deployed was obsolescent also. Those German tanks uparmoured or newly produced with 50-60 mm armour plating were very difficult to destroy by the standard Soviet 45 mm tank gun. The PzKpfw IIIs and PzKpfw 38 (t)s had a far better mechanical reliability than the T-26. A PzKpfw III with 50 mm armour and 50 mm gun was a clearly superior tank to the older Soviet types — but still outnumbered by the T-34s and KVs. It's very hard to quantify but the effect of tank obsolescence was probably relatively minor. Units equipped with the T-34 fared little better.--MWAK 15:39, 18 May 2007 (UTC)

Relatively minor, perhaps, however it was still a contributing factor, and it provides a sense of the relatively quality of the machines themselves (as opposed to all the other other factors), so I see no good reason why it should be excised from the narrative. Gatoclass 16:08, 18 May 2007 (UTC)

"Although in many histories of the war, the Soviet tanks of the period have often been derided as obsolete junk, nothing could be further from the truth. The vast bulk of the Red Army's tanks were cannon-armed BT and T-26 which were certainly comperable to the German Pz Kpfw I and Pz Kpfw II in firepower and mobility. [snip] The weakness of the Soviet mechanized corps lay not in the design of their equipment, but rather in its poor mechanical state, the inadequate training of their crews, and the abysmal quality of Soviet military leadership in the first monmths of the war."

Zaloga and Grandsen, 1984, in sources, p. 126. Emphasis mine.

Glantz, in Stumbling Colossus, attributes the Soviet losses largely to poor maintenance, disorganization, poor readiness, lack of supporting arms, and poor leadership - not to obsolete equipment. Indeed on p. 119 he writes: "In general terms, despite these organizational, structural, and equipment problems, in addition to being more numerous, both the old and the new model Soviet tanks were clearly superior to their German counterparts......the older model Soviet tanks could defeat any existing German tank. ...even the 45mm guns on Soviet light tanks could defeat all German armor except the PzKpfw IV."

Glantz is not an armor technical specialist, and commits some errors, but he is one of the leading western historians of the Eastern Front.

Essentially, your argument is that any Soviet tank that was not a T-34 or KV was obsolete. OK, going with that logic, all German tanks, all British tanks, etc were obsolete too - none was even close to a T-34 technically. But that is an overly-broad definition of 'obsolete' and not particularly helpful to understanding the campaign. As I said, I stand by the edit. DMorpheus 21:09, 18 May 2007 (UTC)

Obsolete doesn't mean "junk". Heritage dictionary gives two definitions:

1. No longer in use: an obsolete word.

2. Outmoded in design, style, or construction

The Soviet tanks described above were obviously still in use, they were just "outmoded in design" - their limitations had been recognized by the Soviets, production had already ceased on most of them, and was being wound down in favour of superior models in regards to the rest. Gatoclass 08:56, 19 May 2007 (UTC)

Oh, and BTW, Glantz is wrong to say that the older model Soviet tanks were "superior to their German counterparts". He has made the common mistake of looking at the armament of these tanks and concluding they must have been better. Unfortunately, there are a lot more factors that go into usefulness than just armament. Virtually all the Soviet tanks of 1941 had weak armour - the T-26 had only 15-16mm armour max. The BT series had only 13mm max. Even the puny 20mm gun of the Pz II could penetrate 22mm of armour at 500 yards. The Panzer II had 30mm armour max, double that of the T-26 and BT. The Panzer III, which was the Germans MBT by 1941, had 30-60mm of armour, a superior 5cm gun, better gun sights, and not to be underestimated, a three man turret with a dedicated commander.

The Russian tanks were also unreliable. The Germans actually tried using captured T-26's for a while, but soon abandoned the effort because of their unreliability. Gatoclass 09:35, 19 May 2007 (UTC)

Within a military context "obsolete" is too stark a word to describe the Soviet tanks. The aircraft, yes. The tanks, no. Again, remember that by the same criteria two-thirds of the German tanks were "obsolete" as well. Yet we would feel uneasy about by sentences like "Despite attacking with an armoured force largely consisting of obsolete tanks, the Germans gained great victories". Perhaps it's more accurate to lay the emphasis on the fact that the Red Army was behind in its modernisation programme, and avoid terms that carry the danger of caricature.

As regards the relative value of the tanks, Glantz simply meant that they were superior to the PzKpfw I, II, 35 (t) and 38 (t), ("Light Tanks") in which he is mostly correct. When evaluating the armour thickness, don't forget the effect of sloped armour; nevertheless it's indeed true the PzKpfw II posed a serious danger to the older Soviet models.--MWAK 09:56, 19 May 2007 (UTC)

Well, I have to disagree. As I've said above, "obsolete" simply means "outmoded in design", which the Soviet tanks of the pre-war era plainly were. This is also true of both the Pz I and II of course, but they did not make up the bulk of German armour for the invasion. By 1941 the Germans had 1440 Pz III and 550 Pz IV's at their disposal, which were both a class above the great bulk of Russian armour, while the Panzer II was at least competitive with it. And since the Germans used their armour en masse, they could usually be confident of having a bigger dog in the fight, at least until they started to run into T-34's and KV-1's.

The problem is that if one doesn't mention the obsolescence of the vast bulk of Russian armour, it gives the impression that the Germans defeated a force six times larger on skill alone. And this is not the case. The Germans were assisted by the fact that most of the Russian armour was not all that good. And that factor needs at least a mention somewhere in the article. Gatoclass 10:54, 19 May 2007 (UTC)

I mean no disrespect, but unless you have a published source to back you, opinions and disagreement are original research. It doesn't matter what you or I think about this issue; what matters is the published sources. If you want to disregard those I've cited, you can't simply sweep aside professional historians; you need to make your case by citing some others, and then we'll put that sourced disagreement in the article.

You wrote "...the Germans defeated a force six times larger on skill alone..." That is indeed very close to the case. They had vastly better training, better leadership, better experience, better organization, tip-top readiness. The Red Army was in the midst of a leadership crisis, slowly recovering from the purges, with abysmal maintenance, appalling readiness, poor training standards, etc. In short, yes, the Germans had a lot more skill. That was their major advantage over all their opponents in the first half of the war, and that's one of the reasons why time was not on their side. The longer the Red Army fought the more skilled it became. In 1991 the US-led coalition defeated a larger Iraqi force with a very low level of friendly casualties. Afterwards, Schwartzkopf was quoted saying that if the two sides had traded all their equipment before the campaign it would not have mattered. If the skill levels are unbalanced enough, as in 1991 and 1941, all the cool hardware in the world doesn't make much difference. I am not saying it makes no difference at all, but compared to the other factors it was a tiny issue.

Regards, DMorpheus 12:44, 19 May 2007 (UTC)

I mean no disrespect, but unless you have a published source to back you, opinions and disagreement are original research - DMorpheus

"In addition, the Red Army was undergoing a major upgrading of equipment. However, that new equipment was only coming into the system slowly and would have little impact on the 1941 campaign. Among the new developments was the T-34 tank. It was just being fielded, in very small numbers, at the outbreak of the war. In addition, there were the KV-1 and KV-2, also just coming into the inventory. The Red Army had more tanks than any other army in the world but they were either obsolete or, in the case of the T-34, KV-1 and KV-2, few in number (1,800 modern tanks)". - "The Russian Front", JF Dunnigan, A&AP 1978).

Additionally, neither of your sources actually say the Russian tanks were not obsolete. Zaloga only says they weren't "obsolete junk", but that is a very different statement from simply saying they weren't obsolete. Glantz ventures the opinion that they were "clearly superior to their German counterparts" by which he is presumably referring to the obsolete machines in the German armoury. So neither statement constitutes a denial that the Russian machines were in fact obsolete. So if the onus in regards to "original research" is on anyone, it's on you to demonstrate that Dunnigan's statement is false.

I am not saying it makes no difference at all, but compared to the other factors it was a tiny issue - DMorpheus

Yes, but that is just your opinion. The fact that the overwhelming bulk of Russian tanks were obsolete was certainly a factor in the early German success. Perhaps not the decisive factor, but then, what was? It was a large combination of factors that gave the Germans their advantage, and the obsolescence of Russian armour, while clearly not the most important factor, is part of the overall picture. Gatoclass 13:49, 19 May 2007 (UTC)

OK, I can see we're not going to make progress. Zaloga (1984) has already refuted Dunnigan's (1978) point. Zaloga is easily the most respected researcher on Soviet armor in the west today. Glantz is probably the most respected western historian of the Eastern Front and he denies the point you are making also. Dunnigan himself says the new equipment made little difference, so that strongly suggests some other factor (i.e., not equipment quality) was at work here. But if you want to put Dunnigan's content in the article, along with Zaloga's and Glantz's very clear refutations, feel free. Space costs nothing. DMorpheus 14:27, 19 May 2007

(UTC)

Fine, but what do you expect me to say exactly? That they were "obsolete but still serviceable?". This gets back to my central point - that the problem is your misconception of the meaning of the word "obsolete". It does not mean junk. It simply means, outmoded in design. So if I say the equipment was "obsolete but still serviceable" I am essentially employing a redundancy, since the great majority of people will already understand that "obsolete" doesn't mean "useless".

What I might be prepared to agree upon is to include a footnote with Zaloga's and Glantz's comments, if you so insist (although, as Zaloga himself indicates, his view is a dissenting one). But I don't think their views warrant a place in the main text, that level of detail just doesn't belong there. Gatoclass 05:07, 21 May 2007 (UTC)

On second thoughts, I've decided your point can be included in the main text without too much disruption after all. So I've included both a note in the main text and a footnote to both Zaloga and Glantz. But since you didn't actually give the title of Zaloga's book, could you please add the appropriate info to the footnote? Thanks, Gatoclass 05:36, 21 May 2007 (UTC)

Oh, and just out of interest - further research reveals that the 45mm main gun of the T-26 and BT-7 couldn't penetrate the 50mm frontal armour of the Pz III or IV at any range. The 5cm main gun of the Panzer III, and the 7.5cm (short-barrelled) gun of the Pz IV, by contrast, could comfortably penetrate the frontal armour of either Soviet tank at a range of two kilometres.

So how anyone could argue these Soviet tanks weren't hopelessly obsolete by June 1941 is beyond me. Gatoclass 07:53, 21 May 2007 (UTC)

Your recent edit is not exactly a fair statement of what has been discussed here and does not fairly represent the sources. DMorpheus 13:43, 21 May 2007 (UTC)

I wasn't entirely happy with my edits tonight either, but I'm afraid I'm too tired to give it another go right now. Maybe tomorrow. Gatoclass 15:06, 21 May 2007 (UTC)

The 45mm gun on the BT and T-26 could penetrate the side armor of the Pzkw-III out to 1,000 meters range. In June 1941, only the most recent Pzkw-II ausf Js (produced only since March 1941) had 50mm armor on the front. Older ausf H's had extra bolt-on armor. Neither had side armor in excess of 30mm and most of it was vertical. Likewise the Pzkw-IVs available in June-Dec 1941 mostly had 30mm side armor. DMorpheus 14:10, 21 May 2007 (UTC)

Ah, but then the PzKpfw III Ausf E in May 1940 couldn't penetrate the armour of the SOMUA S35 at any range, whereas the S35's 47 mm gun could penetrate the 30 mm armour of the PzKpfw III at 800 m at least. So the German tanks were hopelessly obsolete during Fall Gelb? Things are perhaps not quite so simple. In any case only a minority of German tanks deployed were PzKpfw IIIs (816 on 22 June) and IVs (439) and some of these hadn't been uparmoured or were still fitted with the 37 mm gun (259 of the latter on 22 June, so there were on the entire front just 557 tanks with 50 - 60 mm armour and 50 mm gun — remember that the 75 mm Long 24 was not a dedicated anti-tank weapon, due to its low muzzle velocity). German tanks were also much more vulnerable at their sides. The main point is however that the obsoleteness regarding the arms-armour race wasn't as "hopeless" as it would seem, as it could easily have been remedied by introducing more advanced ammunition and uparmouring the hulls (just as the Germans did); programmes to this effect were ongoing. So the Soviet tanks fought indeed at a distinct disadvantage, but not because they were of a fundamentally obsolete type, but because their modernisation programme lagged behind.--MWAK 14:39, 21 May 2007 (UTC)

Yes, but when you say these Soviet tanks fought at a "distinct disadvantage" you are essentially agreeing with me :)

And I'm afraid they were fundamentally obsolete. The T-34 and KV series essentially made everything fielded in '41 obsolete, because those designs forced the Germans to upgun to the long barrelled 7.5cm, which in turn meant that everything the Soviets had that wasn't a T-34 or KV was scrap metal. Gatoclass 15:06, 21 May 2007 (UTC)

But then they became only obsolete in 1942 :o).--MWAK 17:07, 21 May 2007 (UTC)

I'm sorry, but this is a truly absurd conversation. The vast majority of Soviet tanks in 1941 were self-evidently obsolete. Most of them had already ceased production, and of those that hadn't, production was already winding down in favour of the T-34.

If you guys are so sure you are correct, then I think it's time to take your arguments over to the other pages on Wiki devoted to Soviet tanks of the era, such as the T-26 page where it says (I quote):

There were actually only 17,000 tanks available at the time [of Barbarrossa], meaning several of the new mechanized corps were under-strength, and the sheer majority of these were obsolete designs, including over 10,000 T-26 tanks.[60]...However, the whole 4th Army was composed of 520 tanks, all of which were the obsolete T-26, compared to its authorized strength of 1,031 newer medium tanks.[62] This problem was universal throughout the Red Army's available armour. This fact played a crucial role in the defeats of the Red Army in 1941 at the hands of the German Armed Forces.[63]

- That is in addition to all the other places in the article where it mentions the machine's obsolescence. Note also that the T-26 was not only the most numerous, but also effectively the best of the older Soviet designs, since it had more armour protection than the second most numerous type, the BT (with a paltry 13mm which was barely enough to stop machine gun bullets). Gatoclass 11:11, 22 May 2007 (UTC)

You're correct that is is absurd. On the one had you have Zaloga, who is a professional weapons system consultant and author of dozens of books on military equipment and campaigns, along with Glantz, a retired US Army Colonel, professional military historian and founder/editor of the Journal of Slavic Military Studies. On the other hand you have you and Dunnigan from 1978. DMorpheus 12:48, 22 May 2007 (UTC)

Yes, except that as I've already pointed out, neither Zaloga nor Glantz deny that the majority of Soviet tanks were obsolete. Zaloga only says they were not obsolete junk, which is a very different statement. Unfortunately, you seem to be having trouble comprehending the very obvious difference. Apart from which, Zaloga's statement only confirms the generally low opinion that historians have of the older Soviet models, I quote: "in many histories of the war, the Soviet tanks of the period have often been derided as obsolete junk". That statement actually supports my position, not yours, but again you seem oblivious to the fact.

And in any case, what does Zaloga finally have to say about these Soviet types? He says they are, quote "certainly comparable to the German Pz Kpfw I and Pz Kpfw II in firepower and mobility". A statement I would readily agree with. But it's not exactly a ringing endorsement of the qualities of the Russian machines, is it, given that the Pz I and II were themselves well and truly obsolete by 1941 (and indeed, never even intended as MBT's).

As for Glantz, he says that "both the old and the new model Soviet tanks were clearly superior to their German counterparts", but he surely must have meant respective counterparts because nobody with the slightest acquaintance with the subject could argue that the T-26 or BT-7 were "clearly superior" to the Pz III and IV. In which case I could again readily agree that Glantz's position is at least defensible. But again, I also have to point out that it's not the same as saying the T-26 and BT-7 were not obsolete. It's simply saying that the Russians' obsolete tanks were better than the Germans' obsolete tanks. Which they may well have been. But that doesn't alter the fact that all of these types were obsolete by 1941 - as the prior Russian decision to discontinue production of these types clearly demonstrates. Gatoclass 14:12, 22 May 2007 (UTC)

Again there is that ambiguity about the word "obsolete". It is unwise of the T-26 article to follow some literature in this respect, especially when these writings are either apologetic ("we lost but only because we had to fight with junk") or accusatory ("such an inferior system of government was incapable of equipping its forces") in tone, as much that is written of any war often is. The problem with the T-26 — and which made it a far worse tank than the BT-7; the slightly heavier armour wasn't that relevant — was its low mobility and reliability, making it unsuited for larger armoured formations fighting a mobile campaign.--MWAK 13:17, 22 May 2007 (UTC)

Okay, look, I admit I clouded the waters somewhat by taking up the relative merits of these machines in order to add weight to my argument. But that really isn't the point. The point is the meaning of the word obsolete. And this is what I have been trying to explain. I wish you guys would go and open a decent dictionary, because then perhaps we wouldn't be having this argument. But let me give it another try.

It's like this. When you go to a car yard, you might have two cars to choose from - this year's model and last year's. Last year's model is obsolete - even though it plainly still does everything this year's model does. It's obsolete because it is no longer in production - or else has been superceded in production by a newer type.

That's the point I'm trying to make. That's all that "obsolete" means. It doesn't mean useless. It doesn't mean junk. Fundamentally, it just means a superceded model. Above and beyond that, there is also the obvious presumption which goes along with it that this year's model represents some sort of improvement over last year's, but that is a very long way from the presumption that last year's model is equivalent in usefulness to a pile of scrap. But that is what DMorpheus, and to a lesser extent you MWAK, appear to believe it means. And I'm afraid you are just plain mistaken. Gatoclass 14:29, 22 May 2007 (UTC)

You're right: the meaning of "obsolete" is what really counts. But that meaning is clearly not so easy to ascertain as you now suggest. Your own example proves this, for in this you only use the criterion "being in production". You could define "obsolete" this way, but then most "modern" tank types should be classified as "obsolete tanks". Yet it is quite uncommon to read that e.g. the Challenger 1 is described as an obsolete tank. This is because in a military context considerations of effectiveness are much more relevant than those of fashion; if what was wrong with the T-26 and BT-series was merely that they had been superseded, it would hardly be worthwile to mention it. "Obsolete" carries too many negative connotations to be unambiguous; "obsolescent" is more accurate. Within Wikipedia we should of course avoid making a choice and give the two sides of the debate.

Regarding the situation in 1941: in a way it's of course true that the appearance of the T-34 made all other tanks obsolete, as a radically superior new tank generation was being introduced. But this is interesting for the context of general tank development in WW2, not so much for the course of events in 1941, that was hardly influenced by it. And again I'd like to emphasize that the more modern German types were only a minority of their operational tank force: the BT-7 was "superior in mobility and firepower" to 85% of German tanks present in theatre.--MWAK 07:48, 23 May 2007 (UTC)

But that meaning is clearly not so easy to ascertain as you now suggest - MWAK

You're right about that. I was just trying to demonstrate that "obsolete" is not necessarily synonymous at all with "pile of junk".

When it comes to weapon systems, "obsolete" usually refers to weapon systems that are well and truly out of date. Obsolescent refers to machines that are on the way out.

Let me put it this way. There is a significant technological gap between the T-26/BT series and the Panzer III. The gap is in relation to main gun, armour thickness, three man turret and radio. These are important advances that put the Soviet machines at a significant disadvantage. Likewise, there is a significant tech gap between a Panzer III and a T-34. In this case, the gap is main gun, armour and mobility, although the Pz III maintains advantages in its three man turret and radio.

The Pz III is effectively one generation behind the T-34. Likewise, the BT series and T-26 are a generation behind the Pz III. This is why Panzer III's are generally referred to at this time as obsolescent (because they are one generation behind the latest) and the BT and T-26 as obsolete (because they are a couple of generations behind).

As far as the Challenger I, it would depend on how competitive it is with more modern tanks. If there's a significance difference it could probably be described as obsolescent, but if the differences between it and the latest technology are relatively minor (the law of diminishing returns applies after all) then it might still be regarded as more-or-less state of the art. Gatoclass 10:15, 25 May 2007 (UTC)

Well, it is perhaps very useful to apply the concept of the generational cycle. The PzKpfw III was indeed a generation behind the T-34. But it wasn't itself a generation ahead of the older Soviet tanks. It was behind because as a total package it was no longer efficient to update it to remain useful as a turreted AFV. The chassis was too small. However the BT-series and even the T-26 still had enough development potential. Radio, APCR ammunition and appliqué armour would have sufficed to upgrade them effectively. An armour of 40 mm would have frontally protected them against 85% of German tanks and allowed them to approach the later PzKpfw III models within the lethal range of 45 mm APCR ammunition. Their two-men turret was a drawback — but apparently not a fatal one, as the earlier versions of the T-34 also had one! Again the conclusion must be that if the Soviets had started their modification programme 18 months earlier, technological imbalance would not have been a major issue. So: obscolescent, yes; obsolete, no :o).