Talk:Operation Goodwood/Archive 1

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as pojnted out. the loss ratio of tanks meant attritionaly it was a ver y suucsesful operation. much more than it is generaly given credit. given the strenthg of the german resistance.

Especialy as the germans took 15,000 or so infantry casulties themselves. it's not normal to have the defender taking more casulties than the attacker. (Rich tea man)

This article makes Goodwood appear much more successful than it was. Since the Second Army's mission was not accomplished, it's hard to see how it can possibly be described as anything other than a failure, albeit a failure with the positive side-effect of continuing the German focus on the eastern flank. The statement that Goodwood made Cobra more likely to succeed is true, but on its own Goodwood was a German defensive success. DMorpheus 17:27, 22 November 2005 (UTC)

Reading part of von Kluge's letter to Hitler, the Germans themselves thought they could not survive many such "defensive successes". Throughout the war, German troops, dug-in and organised, showed themselves to be brave and intelligent fighters - this is what all Allied commanders from Tunisia to the Hurtgen Forest found. Normandy was an attritional battle, Goodwood just one phase of this. Montgomery's real problem was his relationships with fellow commanders and his need to play a PR game. Folks at 137 13:09, 24 January 2006 (UTC)

Perhaps we could then best describe this as a Pyrrhic victory for the Germans then? Oberiko 23:13, 24 January 2006 (UTC)

My sense, based largely on Colonel D'Este's work, is that it wasn't a 'phyrric victory' at all. It was, fundamentally, a lousy plan with many details poorly thought out and poorly executed. The Germans achieved a defensive success without even having to redeploy any major reserves. So on the tactical level it was a German success. On the strategic level, of course the Germans were playing a game they could not win, but that assessment has little to do with Goodwood itself. I think the article as it stands is quite good in explaining this. DMorpheus 15:03, 25 January 2006 (UTC)

The whole article could do with some proper referencing. There are two levels that need sorting out: what were the strtegic objectives (Montgomery)? How was the battle conducted (Dempsey)? It should be remembered that Montgomery had the same relation to Goodwood as he had to Cobra. The original plan was for the left side of the Battle of Normandy to be attritional, not a 'breakthrough'. Is there any verifiable evidence that this was discarded?MAG1 17:55, 6 June 2006 (UTC)

You've raised important but difficult points. Reading D'Este (Decision in Normandy) or Eisenhower's Lieutenants, the evidence shows that under the original plan Montgomery in fact intended to break out in the east using the 2nd Army. D'Este in particular does a good job showing how Montgomery's later statements made it appear that he had intended a "pivoting" operation in the east with a breakout in the west. D'Este shows this was improvisation (and there's nothing wrong with that, by the way - this is not intended as criticism of Montgomery). Eisenhower's Lieutenants provides a lot of evidence to support this also. For example, from D-Day onwards the buildup of armored units was front-loaded for 2nd Army but not 1st Army.

The strategic objectives would be quite difficult to sort out due to the irregular communications with SHAEF. The operations orders to 2nd Army do not agree with the messages sent to Eisenhower's HQ.

You are absolutely correct to remind us that Montgomery was in command of all ground units, not just 2nd Army; US 1st Army was a part of 21st Army Group at the time. Perhaps in deference to national politics, Montgomery did allow Bradley on a much longer leash than Dempsey, but the formal relationship was identical.

Of course all this is why folks like us have been arguing about this for 60 years ! ;)

I think some of you should realise that Decision in Normandy is not the best source available for anything to do with the Anglo-Canadian operations in Normandy due to the bais within the book (not to mention all the errors and being outdated in parts). However D'Este appears to bring up some good points here and there.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 19:48, 3 June 2008 (UTC)

Why? Because you assert it? The only reasonable approach is to consider all the reliable sources; where they disagree, summarize the disagreement. We've been down this road before.

Regards, DMorpheus (talk) 19:51, 3 June 2008 (UTC)

Because i assert it? Nope, it when the source contains an entire chapter highlighting all the faults of the Anglo-Canadians and then a single footnote telling readers for a critique of the American forces they should look elsewhere. In patricular, Chapter 16 and footnote 1 on page 297.

As for errors, the book when compared to other sources is full of them from mislabeling units to casualty information.

As for being outdated, more detailed examinations from more recent dates for example of the battle of Villers-Bocage by authors such as Dan Taylor show that D'Este versions of events is outdated and inaccurate in most places.

Hence why i call it so and i why i advise caution when using it as a definate source.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 20:28, 3 June 2008 (UTC)

Oberiko mental problems

Dont listen this guy. He have serious mental problems and traumas with world war 2 articles. The first german victory he see in an infobox means for him German Phyrric Victory. So oberiko is better to increase your medication or finish reading the article. Germany lost 100 tanks, but U.S 400. Thats means that the pyrric victory was Allied. But it was neither a victory.Germany stopped the Operation, soo..... Whats your point???

Please review your facts. Goodwood was an Anglo-Canadian effort - no US ground involvement. The German success was that the British attack was held. The Allied success was that SS forces intended to be used against the US were committed in the "wrong" place and kept there. Many Allied troops committed in Normandy were green, ie inexperienced, whereas the Germans were politically committed, skilled and defenders in defensive heaven. It was a slogging match.Folks at 137 15:23, 18 July 2006 (UTC)

Hmm.. thats sounds rare. try to read at the article of Operation Cobra there is a line in wich indicates what iam saying. take a look.

Ok - Goodwood is described as "... British Breakout Attempt: Goodwood". It's mentioned because of its impact on the German deployment and thus on the success of Cobra. Folks at 137 06:52, 19 July 2006 (UTC)

You are valorating Operation Goodwwod because you know the clear results of Operation Cobra. The operation itself was bad, cobra solved the problem.

Objectives

I have been doing some reading, and it may have been improvised, but they all agree that Goodwood was not intended to be a breakthrough: the important things were to secure Caen and ensure that the German forces were committed. Furthermore, Cobra and Goodwood were coordinated, it was not some sort of race to a breakout. I have changed the article accordingly. MAG1 17:37, 22 July 2006 (UTC)

Not all sources agree, as you and I have discussed previously. Caen was not secured. The Germans stayed where they were already. They had little choice about committing most of their armor to the eastern flank. No unit moved out of the US 1st Army front to the British 2nd Army front because of Goodwood. DMorpheus 15:53, 25 July 2006 (UTC)

Hi, nice to hear from you again. I am not being argumentative for the sake of it, but I have been doing some reading (and my ideas are changing: the improvisational nature of the campaign is much clearer to me now). On the objectives thing, lots of proper histories come to a conclusion that a breakthrough was the fundamental objective of the battle. The suggestion that rang truest for me was that Dempsey was keen on a breakthrough, but Montgomery was sceptical and saw it as having the more limited objectives (hence the scaling back of operation objectives in the days before the battle, and his instructions to Dempsey to suck in more German armies).

Operations Atlantic and Goodwood resulted in the ejection of the Germans from Caen and the capture and occupation of the high ground to the south overlooking the city. You would not have wanted to buy property there, but that sounds a pretty large increase in security to me.

Before the battle there were uncommitted German divisions in Normandy. As a result of the operation these armies were committed to the east of the theatre.

MAG1 19:48, 25 July 2006 (UTC)

Tracked down D'Este today, and though I have not been able to read it fully, he seems to say the same thing viz. Dempsey was optimistically hoping for a breakthrough; Montgomery would have welcomed this, but his realistic aims were to consolidate the position around Caen and draw in the German reserves; however, for his own purposes he misled SHAEF by communicating the optimism upwards. MAG1 17:19, 27 July 2006 (UTC)

Would it help to post part of Montgomery's July 15th directive that sets out the intentions of Goodwood both for VIII Corps and II Canadian Corps? It might put paid to doubts about the operation's goals and the breakout controversy. BobFish 20:23, 24 October 2006 (UTC)

Information Needed

German casualties, as it stands i believe the captured figure is probably spot on or as close as can be but none of the sources i have seem to give a figure out for how many dead and wounded the German Army and Waffen SS took.

Anyone have this inforamtion from a reliable source?--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 19:44, 3 June 2008 (UTC)

holding area

At this stage in the Battle of Normandy, General Bernard Montgomery had adapted his plans so that an attritional battle would be fought in the eastern end of the bridgehead, mostly by the British and Canadians, which would allow a breakout in the west by American forces. For this to work, it was necessary to draw in the remaining uncommitted German reserves to the east and secure the position in the east by seizing the Caen area, especially the Bourguebus Ridge to the south.

- open para from planning section --EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 18:12, 22 June 2008 (UTC)

Planning flaws

Doesn't it make more sense for the planning flaws section to be prior to the execution section? The main point of that section was that the biggest problems 2nd Army would face were already apparent at the planning stage. In the logic of the narrative it might be better to present this at the beginning rather than the end. Regards, DMorpheus (talk) 13:03, 15 July 2008 (UTC)

The way i was looking at it, the article should first show what happened (i.e. background info, planning info, what happened etc) followed up by the critque. Several other articles use this same sort of layout (Operation Varsity comes to mind). To me that makes sence as the information on what happened is not interrupted.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 13:40, 15 July 2008 (UTC)

I thought that this was one of the better articles about a notoriously controversial subject. Well done those men! I was a little concerned though about the 'planning flaws'. If the purpose of the operation was to perpetuate the deception that the breakout was intended at the East end of the bridgehead and at the same time economise on infantry then criticism of the separation of tanks and infantry is illogical. Wasn't it the case that the tanks were explicitly intended to be a substitute? If the tank write offs amounted to 140 against 100 German then Goodwood was a great success tactically and strategically. Its apparent operational failure thus becomes part of the deception of the Germans (and the Bomber Barons). They think they've brought off a fine defensive success when they've lost 100 tanks in a decoy operation. Keith-264 (talk) 15:13, 16 August 2008 (UTC)

It is not establlished historical consensus that the battle was a deception. There's a school of thought that says it was essentially a high-level deception and another that says it was a genuine breakout attempt. Roberts (GOC 11th AD) was vociferous complaining about the separation of armor and infantry and almost any source on this will cite the poor engineer prep, poor handling of tactical surprise, and poor artillery planning as problems. The tank loss figures you're citing aren't consensus either. Regards, DMorpheus (talk) 17:53, 16 August 2008 (UTC)

The British tank loss figures cited are the most modern, researched by Sandhurst for a line of books released a few years back covering the Normandy campaign. To quote Dr Simon Trew (Deputy Head of Department of Sandhursts Department of War Studies and Dr Stephen Badsey (ex lecture at Sandhurst and now works at the University of Wolverhampton):

"The first estimates of Allied losses for Operation Goodwood appeared horrific....493 tanks. Numerous tanks had indeed been lost but usually their crews survived, and more than half of all tanks abandoned on 18 July were later recovered or repaired. ..... After much investigation, estimates of tank losses for VIII Corps settled at 197 on 18 July, 99 more on 19 July and 18 on 20 July for a total of 314, of which 140 were completely destroyed, plus another 20 or so tanks in the flanking Corps." - Battle zone Normandy: Battle for Caen, pp. 97-99.

One should be able to provide one of the early estimates once one has finished reading the VIII Corps official history printed in 1945, then be able to show a comparison within the article.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 20:55, 16 August 2008 (UTC)

Erm, did my reply to Morpheus land on this page??Keith-264 (talk) 20:21, 16 August 2008 (UTC)

I would like to ask, the british tank losses written (140 compl. destoryed) are the tanklosses of the Canadian 2nd Corps and the British 1st Corps inclued in the numbers? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 90.224.185.71 (talk) 15:24, 5 October 2008 (UTC)

Other then your initial post and those two above just this one there is no other posts from yourself here.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 11:44, 18 August 2008 (UTC)

Thanks, I'll have another go. 'When I read d'Este I had the impression that he endorsed the western breakout thesis. I'll have to have another look.' I'm interested in operational analysis but haven't found much on Normandy apart from John Buckley and S A Hart - any suggestions? I'm particularly interested in Epsom. Is there a better place than this to inquire with Wiki regulars? I'd like to know what aficionados think of Normandy as an object lesson in ermattungsstrategie. Ta Keith-264 (talk) 15:59, 19 August 2008 (UTC)

Best place to talk shop and get book recomendations might be places like the Axis History Forum in paticular the 'WW2 in Western Europe & the Atlantic' section.

So far from my reading the operation reminds me of Goodwood, expect they just flipped the axis of attack.

I dont recall seeing any operation analysis of Epsom (in the same light as Harts book on 21st AG) however you will find several books covering the subject which following the narative should give some conclusions etc on the fighting i.e. VIII Corps own official history (after the narative of the days fighting they sum up the days events), 'The Struggle For Europe' by Wilmot, 'Decision in Normandy' no doubt and 'Battle Zone Normandy: Operation Epsom'.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 16:24, 19 August 2008 (UTC)

'Battle Zone Normandy: Operation Epsom'; is this Lloyd Clark's effort? A serviceable narrative but he sits on the highest fence in France in his conclusions. I've got Wilmot; VIII Corps history might help. I've had a look at Axis History Forum but like the rest I don't think it's for me. Oh dear I may have to write it myself. Thanks for answering Enigma1990.

Canadian Official History

For those so inclined, the Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War by C.P. Stacey is now available online in pdf form. Volume II "The Victory Campaign" deals with NW Europe. It is up for download at the Directorate of History and Heritage website, part of the Department of National Defence. It discusses some of the details raised on this page in detail, albeit from a Canadian perspective. If nothing else, it is a hard reference once can use, and has the advantage of being available to all for free and thus a common point of reference.139.48.25.61 (talk) 21:40, 19 August 2008 (UTC)

Its Volume III actually. [Link to book]. What use it can provide for Operation Goodwood i dont know but cheers for the heads up.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 09:56, 20 August 2008 (UTC)

Structure

Is there any chance to move the info from the "Planning flaws" section to the other sections? Besides it is quite unreferenced, the text should flow, not be structured on points. Also, the Operation Atlantic section should be also disbanded and the info moved to a better place. The lead also has to be improved and the refs moved from it. What other reccomandations for its structure do you have? --Eurocopter (talk) 23:06, 31 October 2008 (UTC)

I do think that one or two of the refs should stay in the lead due to some of the claims made. Casualty information needs to be rejiggled - but i can sort that out in like 10 minutes when i get some time, hopefully this weekend.

I think the planning flaws, as you have said be restructed, but into a proper analysis akin to Epsom.

A quick look over the article and one cannot see any other major issues - maybe rename some of the section titles. Seems like we just need to mostly expand on what there is, information and referance wise.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 00:20, 1 November 2008 (UTC)

Hmmmm, 'planning flaws' is a bit pov isn't it? I had a look in Wilmot and he describes it as akin to Epsom but with far fewer infantry casualties and a substantial capture of tactically valuable ground. Looked at like that the result doesn't seem to be a failure, more a rather more efficient attrition operation. Keith-264 (talk) 10:27, 1 November 2008 (UTC)

The sources i used for the result state basically the same thing - massive strategic victory just went pretty wrong on the tactical level - i wouldnt think you could win a big success from messed up planning.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 12:05, 1 November 2008 (UTC)

That's the point, from what I can see, the 'flaws' were determined by the decision to attack there at all - the rivers, minefields, impossibility of surprise... Why go to all this trouble if the intent was to capture Falaise? Surely the gig took place despite these constraints and was a larger version of operations like Jupiter, Greenline and Pomegranate? As usual I find the attrition intent far more convincing than breakthrough, though I think that Monty was right to bamboozle the Air Heads. Although I view Epsom as possibly Monty's finest hour, conning Tedder might top it. Perhaps it is better to call it 'The Goodwood-Cobra Operation'.Keith-264 (talk) 12:34, 1 November 2008 (UTC)

Wasnt Greenline a prelim attack for Goodwood by XXX Corps near Nill 112? As for Pomegranate - never heard of it.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 15:06, 1 November 2008 (UTC)

Yes, the smaller operations don't get much press but I found this http://59div.morssweb.com/?frontpage . I think there's a bit in Saunders 'Hill 112'.Keith-264 (talk) 15:12, 1 November 2008 (UTC)

The section was entitled "planning flaws" because the planning for this operation was poor on many levels. I admit the section title is POV. However, some of the commanders *at the time* were highly critical of the plan.

The flaws are not *all* inherent in the decision to attack on that site, although *some* of them are. No attack site is perfect. The point is how these issue were dealt with. Take the minefields, for example. The fact that the location wasn't entirely known is an example of poor engineer reconnaissance. The way they were gapped was simply muddled thinking. In an effort to preserve tactical surprise, few gaps were made. But tactical surprise had already been lost so there was no reason not to create more, wider gaps. This would have eased the traffic control problems. The water obstacles were inadquately bridged. This in turn constrained how many units could cross the LOD - and the solution to *that* was terrible. The British lost their combined-arms team all by themselves without the germans lifting a finger. Had 11th AD had their SP artillery with them, *or* had FAC support, they might have engaged the german AT guns effectively. 11th AD was tasked with missions that should have gone to followup units - which didn't get into action early enough due to traffic control problems created by...british minefields and poor bridging. Roberts was critical of these decisions before the attack started and he was right. Regards, DMorpheus (talk) 16:53, 2 November 2008 (UTC)

They well might be facts, but having a single section dedicated to simply pointing out all the flaws the British made is POV - where is the section for the German flaws? This information should be wrote into a proper neutral anyalisis. Which we shall aim to do.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 17:38, 2 November 2008 (UTC)

While Morphy has a point about what look like unforced errors isn't it the case that they were less important because the gig was intended to have its effect without a big commitment of infantry. 'Breaking up the all-arms team' might equally be put as 'supplementing the all-arms team with strategic bombers'. How much opposition to the river and minefield crossing were the Germans able to muster? Anyway, Buckley points out that 'Although most attention on Goodwood focuses on the dificulties of 18th July, on subsequent days elements of 11th Armoured Division were able to carry out a highly effective combined arms action to capture the Bourguebus Ridge, in particular Bras and Hubert-Folie.' (p. 102) Roberts may well have been critical but was he aware of the wider need for a spectacular at the east end? Is the river and minefield crossing not reminiscent of the 100 mile Channel crossing due to end at Caen a few weeks earlier? FAC? Wasn't this diminished by RAF preciousness about control? Keith-264 (talk) 21:30, 2 November 2008 (UTC)

On P.362 footnote 2 Wilmot has: 'This considerable advance was made at a fraction of the cost which would have been incurred if a conventional infantry attack had been launched'. He gives VIII corps casualties as 521 on the 18th and 499 on the 19th. 1 Corps; 651 on the 18th and 541 on the 19th. 1 Corps losses for the attack on Caen 3,817 in three days. On P.364 he states that 2nd Pz div's withdrawal into reserve south of St Lo was cancelled as was 116th Pz Div's deployment west of St Lo, both sent south of Caen plus part of 9thSS which had een put of the line at Aunay. Terry Copp's 'cost-benefit analysis' springs to mind.Keith-264 (talk) 08:26, 3 November 2008 (UTC)

Jackson notes that there was 580 tanks on 2nd Army fronts prior to Goodwood and 68 infantry battalions compared to 240 tanks and 78 infantry battalions facing the Americans. On the 20th, the final day of Goodwood, 190 tanks and 82 infantry battalions were facing the Americans while there was 720 tanks and 71 infantry battalions on 2nd Army's front. 5 days later when Cobra was launched 190 tanks and 85 infantry battalions facing the Americans while there was now 750 tanks and 92 infantry battalions facing the Anglo-Canadians.

The move from the American front to the British is only half a panzer division but the stats show exactlly where the reinforcements were being fed in.

For the major brakeout attack, which was Cobra, these stats help show the true victory that was won with Goodwood.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 10:21, 3 November 2008 (UTC)

You are saying because Goodwood may have gotten the Germans to move 50 tanks (that's the equivalent of one battalion) out of US 1st Army sector that it was a success? That's a bit underwhelming.

Ignore the evidence all you want - the evidence clearly shows, that even if a handful of tanks was moved from the American sector, the reinforcements were fed in facing the Anglo-British Army Group i.e. the increase of nearly 200 tanks and 24 additional infantry battalions were position on the wrong sector thanks to Goodwood.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 20:36, 3 November 2008 (UTC)

There's not much question Goodwood contributed to Cobra. That is an entirely separate question from whether the operation itself was well conducted. The Germans didn't oppose the river or minefield crossing - part of my point was they didn't need to contribute much to an already badly constrained British advance. Should they have thrown in a few artillery rounds to mess things up further? Possibly. At that point the British FA could still contribute to the battle. Once the Orne was crossed the British artillery was essentialy out of the fight; the Infantry wasn't there; German guns could fire with impunity. This is why combined arms mattered. DMorpheus (talk) 16:58, 3 November 2008 (UTC)

But more to you than Dempsey and Monty. They weren't stupid, the Orne bridgehead had been rejected earlier for the practical reasons listed in these discussions. What changed? Wider issues are all I can think of. Considering that the 'three Armd div' attack turned out to be mostly the 11th on the first day, who was kidding who? 7th Amd look suspiciously like they'd decided it was a 'not on' gig. Could the real significance of this offensive be 'Atlantic'? ***50 tanks - as a % of those confrontng the westenders is...?*** Buckley gives approx 175 tanks facing 1st US and about 525 at the eastend on 20th Jul and about 625/150 on the 25th (graph p. 122).Keith-264 (talk) 17:13, 3 November 2008 (UTC)

Let's not forget Roberts who was openly and highly critical of the decision to cross the Orne only with the tanks, leaving most infantry and all artillery behind.

You are absolutley right that the first day was almst completely an 11th AD battle.

Considering all Armies at least consider moving reserve elements when under atatck, wouldn't it be remarkable if *no* reserve elements had been moved as a result of Goodwood? I.e., it is not a measure of success, merely a normal reaction to any attack. The fact is the Germans were able to stop this attack without doing much reserve movement at all.

I suspect what changed is 2nd Army was running out of ideas and infantry, but had an abundance of tanks and knew they could afford to lose a lot of them. DMorpheus (talk) 17:22, 3 November 2008 (UTC)

I doubt that the infantry shortage has been discounted as a motive for the 'unorthodox' nature of the plan for it's a motif for all 21st AG operations. Roberts spoke up but also piped down so I don't find that creditable. Tank deployment included the 116th Pz so those moved from the west need to be contrasted with the intent to reinforce there. Surely the need to pave the way for Cobra overrode any tactical objections to a having a go east of the Orne despite the cost. Consider also Kluge's reaction to Goodwood, evidently he didn't think it was a failure.Keith-264 (talk) 18:27, 3 November 2008 (UTC)

temp hold area

Infantry and tanks wait to advance at the start of Operation Goodwood, 18 July 1944.

Welsh Soldiers in action near Cagny 19 July 1944.

Medics during Operation Goodwood, 18 July 1944.

For use in the last section of the article:

"Due to delays in seizing the planned jumping-off points, and also because Montgomery had told Bradley that he did not have to hurry, Operation Cobra did not begin until 25 July."

The delay in Cobra was also partially due to the weather; the bombers needed clear bombing weather so the decision to time the attack was delegated to the air farce. Regards, DMorpheus (talk) 00:11, 15 November 2008 (UTC)

"== Operation Atlantic == II Canadian Corps launched Operation Atlantic simultaneously with Goodwood, would provide support in achieving their objectives on the flank of Goodwood, including the capture of the eastern-bank of the Orne River. However, an attack on Verrières Ridge resulted in extremely heavy casualties for the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division, and positional warfare along the foot of the ridge (including the later Operation Spring) ensued until August 8."

Nonsensical sentence?

"The artillery was given three tasks, for the two hours before Goodwood was to be launched: to engage German anti tank positions, artillery positions and then finally to provide 11th Armoured Division, 3rd Infantry Division and the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division with a rolling barrage."

By definition, a rolling barrage moves forward as the assault troops move forward, i.e., *after* they cross the line of departure. Therefore, it is impossible to carry out this fire mission two hours before Goodwood was launched. Also, if the artillery prep fire is happening, the operation has indeed been launched. The assault force just hasn't crossed the LOD yet. Finally, the grammar is a little weak.

Semantically this whole section might better be put thusly:

"The artillery was given two missions in the opening phase. Prior to the assault, the artillery attacked German anti tank and field artillery positions. During the initial assault, it provided 11th Armoured Division, 3rd Infantry Division and the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division with a rolling barrage."

regards, DMorpheus (talk) 20:11, 14 November 2008 (UTC)

I hashed up summing up what Jackson provided us with. Your ce of it is much more accurate to his original intent and i have added a slightly modified version of it to the article.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 20:17, 14 November 2008 (UTC)

Must we have 'mission'? Gunners aren't missionaries. Can't we have '...had two tasks...' Must we have 'artillery attacked'? Guns are inanimate, can we have '...the artillery bombarded...'Keith-264 (talk) 20:43, 14 November 2008 (UTC)

'Mission' would be the usual military term, as in 'fire mission'. 'Task' is OK - I can live with it - but mission is more to the point IMHO. Gunners are soldiers and soldiers are given *missions* to accomplish. 'Artillery' is a branch of service and yes, it can be said to 'attack'. 'Fire upon' would work as well. 'Bombarded' is a more technical term that is frequently misused. 'sought to suppress' would probably be the most precise usage but I haven't seen the original fire mission orders so who knows exactly what they were told to do. Regards, DMorpheus (talk) 21:15, 14 November 2008 (UTC)

Are you American by any chance Morphy?Keith-264 (talk) 21:24, 14 November 2008 (UTC)

re: Arty orders, Jackson tells us:

Phase 1: all guns available to fire an anti-tank counter battery programme on all located positions.

Phase 2: all guns to fire a counter battery programme

Phase 3: 11th Arm to be supported by a rolling barrage, "barrages and concentrations" to preceed the 2nd and 3rd Inf advance.Counter battery fire to contuine as long as needed during the armour advance while other regiments are to be on call and fire when called for.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 21:35, 14 November 2008 (UTC)

OK, so suppression of enemy batteries was the mission in phases I and II. Rolling barrage was only in support of 11AD, which makes sense because they were the main element actually making an assault. We should make another slight adjustment (pun intended) to this sentence. DMorpheus (talk) 21:40, 14 November 2008 (UTC)

I initially felt the need to sum up the events due to the size the section was goriwng to but stuff that philosophy now :)

Ok so something like this:

"The artillery was given two tasks in the opening phase. Prior to the assault, the artillery was to supress German anti tank and field artillery positions. During the initial assault, it was to provide the 11th Armoured Division with a rolling barrage while also providing artillery support to the attacks being launched by 3rd Infantry and the 2nd Canadian Infantry Divisions. Additional artillery units were to be prepared to fire on targets as requested[86]"

?--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 21:46, 14 November 2008 (UTC)Suits meKeith-264 (talk) 21:54, 14 November 2008 (UTC)

Okey-dokey; thanks DMorpheus (talk) 00:09, 15 November 2008 (UTC)

missing info

The sources i have seem to miss a key piece of information when talking about the planned attac; that the armoured brigades were going to advance alone with there Motor battalions and that there infantry brigades were to advance seperatly and with additional orders. Anyone have a source or quote which provide this information that could be tacked onto the relevent section of the article?--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 20:07, 15 November 2008 (UTC)

'It is also questionable whether it would not have been better to use the infantry brigade and armoured reconnaissance regiment of 11th Armoured Division to back up the armour, instead of committing them at the outset to the clearing of Cuverville and Demouville'. Ellis p. 352Keith-264 (talk) 22:43, 15 November 2008 (UTC) Although I can't find a reference it implies in the text that the separation was cause more by delays in the infantry achieving their objectives as the Germans recovered from the bombing.Keith-264 (talk) 22:53, 15 November 2008 (UTC)

Cant believed i missed that, cheers--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 15:06, 16 November 2008 (UTC)

'Before the operation began he [Roberts] remonstrated with O'Connor that this ought to be ... the 51st Highland Division .... O'Connor refused to budge.' Decision in Normandy, Carlo D'Este; pp 373-374.Keith-264 (talk) 12:56, 16 November 2008 (UTC)

Enigma, does reference no 71 (^ Reynolds (2002), p. 44) have a contemporary reference? —Preceding unsigned comment added by Keith-264 (talk • contribs) 13:58, 16 November 2008 (UTC)

Yep ive just added the new referances in. It is Reynolds Book on II SS Panzer Corps.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 15:05, 16 November 2008 (UTC)

D'Este goes on at some length that Goodwood was to be without prejudice to the retention of the defensive flank in the East which is why 11th AD got the job of capturing the villages rather than 51st ID and that Roberts didn't know the details until afterwards and that then he thought that this was excessive. Your point from Reynolds that there was a fear that the Germans would try an armoured counter-attack against Goodwood fits with this. It also invites a question - were the Germans finally coming to terms with Allied defensive firepower? Is why they didn't risk a repulse like Epsom but kept the bulk of their long-range anti-tank firepower on Bourguebus Ridge?Keith-264 (talk) 16:07, 16 November 2008 (UTC)

Attack date & air support?

Blumenson says Goodwood was originally planned for the 17th and that this was delayed to the 18th. Are there any other sources to confirm this? The idea was that Goodwood and Cobra had to happen on different days because both required US air support. DMorpheus (talk) 19:24, 2 March 2009 (UTC)

Am chocker block with uni work at the momment but i will have a nose through my sources this week. I think ive seen something simlar to this.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 19:26, 2 March 2009 (UTC)

I see it was over 1,000 US aircraft in use for Goodwood, including over 500 heavies, again according to Blumenson. DMorpheus (talk) 03:35, 3 March 2009 (UTC)

See the note in the planning section; the breakdown for US Air support, as well as the RAF numbers, is given there citing the VIII Corps history.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 09:41, 3 March 2009 (UTC)

Right, I am not really adding anything other than a second source on this fact. Regards, DMorpheus (talk) 14:37, 3 March 2009 (UTC)

Coolio. What are the precise figures Blumenson quotes for the US bombers?--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 15:00, 3 March 2009 (UTC)

Footnote 27

Has '49th' instead of 59th (Staffordshire) Inf Div. Does anyone know how to amend it?Keith-264 (talk) 17:54, 10 March 2009 (UTC)

typo - fixed.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 19:11, 10 March 2009 (UTC)

Ta mate.Keith-264 (talk) 22:51, 10 March 2009 (UTC)

Photos

The photos in this essay look marvellous - pristine in some cases. Are there any more?Keith-264 (talk) 16:48, 26 March 2009 (UTC)

There is a wealth of photos on the IWM website and i plan to pull more and more that are revelent to the article i.e. a photo of Cromwell tanks forming up and of the bailey bridges; everything is going to be illustrated :)--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 17:32, 26 March 2009 (UTC)

Planning analysis

A Sherman Firefly crosses 'Euston Bridge' over the Orne as it moves up to the start line for Operation 'Goodwood', 18 July 1944.

The Allied attack had several serious flaws,[from which point of view, manoeuvre warfare or siege warfare?] which were apparent in the planning stage:

• To mount the attack all three armoured divisions had to cross two water obstacles and a minefield prior to crossing the start line[Since this was known long before Goodwood was mooted, could it be that the gig was done despite it for strategic reasons?]. The Orne River and the Caen Canal ran laterally across the British front, directly in the path of the armoured divisions. Only six small bridges were available to move over 8,000 vehicles, including tanks, artillery, motorised infantry, engineers and support vehicles such as ammunition and fuel supply vehicles, medical units and so forth. It was obvious that a traffic control problem would ensue. Dempsey's proposed solution was disastrous—he directed his Corps Commander (O'Connor) to move the tanks ahead[would a different order have speeded the advance?], leaving behind everything else including the infantry, engineers, artillery etc until all the tanks were across. Thus the British combined-arms team[Weren't the British deliberately trying to protect infantry by relying on tanks and heavy bombers?] was broken up before the Germans fired a shot. Having crossed the bridges, a British minefield laid only days before by the 51st Highland Division had to be traversed. The minefield was a mix of antitank and antipersonnel mines. This obstacle could have been overcome by strong engineer support prior to the battle. However, because the Germans had the minefield under observation from the steelworks, a mineclearing operation would have alerted them to the attack. In the event, several one-tank wide gaps were cleared in the minefield at night. It was known that this would further constrain the movement of Corps vehicles.
• The issue of tactical surprise was mishandled. Moving the armoured units to their attack positions too early, or gapping the minefield too early, would alert the Germans to the attack as the British positions could be clearly viewed from the high land to the south of Caen. In hindsight, it is apparent that the armour moved too late: the hundreds of tanks were horribly slowed by the bottle-neck of the bridges and minefield[This can hardly have escaped notice beforehand. Isn't this one of the better reasons for believing that Goodwood was intended to bluff more than The popinjays at SHAEF?]. Again, to preserve surprise, artillery units were not moved forward to support the attack. However, Ultra decrypts of German signals, as well as the Second Army's own intelligence estimates, revealed that by 15 July the Germans were well aware of the time and place of the attack and were reinforcing their defenses[Doesn't this measn that Goodwood was succeeding before it started?]. At this point, since tactical surprise had been lost, the minefields could have been more thoroughly cleared and units moved up into attack positions without ill effects—but this was not done.
• The 11th Armoured Division was overburdened. Although the lead unit in the attack, the Division was also given the mission of clearing the front-line villages of Cuverville and Demouville. These should have been bypassed by the lead units and left for following units—virtually a standard tactic in any army[not threatened by a chronic shortage of infantry] by 1944. Instead, while the Division's armoured regiments attacked Bourguébus Ridge, the infantry battalions were clearing villages behind them. This slowed down both attacks and further broke up combined-arms integrity[Again, doesn't this suggest that the infantry were separated to protect them as the most vulnerable and depleted part of 2nd Army? What about the second day?].
• Artillery units were left west of the Orne, placing the main German defensive position on Bourguébus Ridge out of their range. Coordination between field artillery and tanks was poor. Dempsey appears to have relied on the initial air bombardment by RAF Bomber Command to stun or disrupt the defenders[This was consistent with ORS2's conclusions after the Charnwood bombing].
• The terrain was difficult—the area was filled with small villages, each of which had a small German garrison of infantry, armour and artillery connected by tunnels. The area was thus divided into a series of strongpoints overlooking the intended Allied line of advance. The high ground of the Bourguébus Ridge, with numerous dug-in German heavy weapons, overlooked a clear field of fire into the path of the intended advance. These defences were the strongest and deepest in Normandy[Which was also obvious to the attackers. Logic suggests that it also means that the defences elsewhere such as around St Lo-Periers were weaker than they could have been despite the move of the remains of PzLehr and 2ndSSPz to the US front]. [Is there a cost-benefit analysis of Goodwood and Atlantic? Wouldn't one show that a big chunk was bitten out of the German line and held at relatively low cost in infantry in an area which the Germans were least willing to concede ground? Didn't the 'peculiar' array of the attack make it easier for VIII Corps to move to Caumont in a rush for Bluecoat?]

Aren't any of the historians and writers on Goodwood impressed by the staging of the attack at all, given the terrain and the value the Germans gave it and the resources they were willing to commit to keep it? Surely there's someone who sees through all the post-hoc flummery about 'all-arms integration'? Hmmm, plenty of questions but where do we find the answers?Keith-264 (talk) 15:09, 26 April 2009 (UTC) Another question, was there an area of the British-Canadian front that wasn't attacked during the battle?Keith-264 (talk) 15:15, 26 April 2009 (UTC)

I pretty sure that from Goodwood minus 5 to July 20 practically every section of Second Army's front saw some action. Tbh i think the above, which i pulled out of the article, is mostly crap - for example the quip about how enough wasnt done to remove mines. The Royal Engineers were over burdened during the run up to Goodwood as one can see in the info in the Allied prep section; building bridges, roads and clearing the minefield. It took 5 full days, during daylight hours, and with no one shooting at them to clear the minefields but whoever wrote the above expected more from them!!!

Most of the section was taken from Blumenson, D'Este and Weigley, and most of it is completely valid. Regards, DMorpheus (talk) 18:57, 27 April 2009 (UTC)

Yea but its not; its bais and needs evening out. As for the mines even D'Este admits it took 5 days in broad day light to clear the minefield.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 19:16, 27 April 2009 (UTC)

Valid as far as it goes. The point is that there are historians comparable to the transatlantics who view Goodwood differently. Even Wilmot says that Goodwood was relatively cheap in Allied lives.Keith-264 (talk) 19:22, 27 April 2009 (UTC)

"Yea but its not; its bais and needs evening out. As for the mines even D'Este admits it took 5 days in broad day light to clear the minefield.--" Right, you are merely reinforcing the original point that the planning was poor. Regards, DMorpheus (talk) 20:17, 27 April 2009 (UTC)

How is that proofing that Goodwood was poorly planned? They cut enough holes through the minefields in the timetable they had with the resources they had while the rest of the engineers were constructing roads and bridges to support the operation... Considering all the problems with having to launch an operation out of the Orne bridgehead D'Este claims it was the only logical choice to attack from when Epsom was launched - seems hes never happy.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 20:57, 27 April 2009 (UTC)

It is useless to attempt to argue with ideologues. Regards, DMorpheus (talk) 02:03, 28 April 2009 (UTC)

Who's arguing? ...first cast out the beam out of thine own eye; and then shalt thou see clearly to cast out the mote out of thy brother's eye.Keith-264 (talk) 06:33, 28 April 2009 (UTC)

Daglish

I read 'Over the Battlefield' recently and after that I find I can't support the idea that Goodwood was a three armoured division offensive at all. 11th Armoured's armoured brigade seems to have done most of the advancing on the first day and its infantry brigade a lot of consolidating and masking (Perch with knobs on?). Guards Armoured's armoured brigade joined in in the afternoon and 7th Armoured was out to lunch until the evening. There was an armoured melee at the far end of the armoured advance (which had less effect on the advance than the traffic jams near the Orne) in which the Germans inflicted and suffered a lot of tank losses (relatively) but didn't alter the situation more than locally. Combined arms attacks over the next couple of days wrung the dregs out of the firepower unleashed by the Allies on 18th July. The most heavily defended portion of the Normandy front (and the world?) had a big chunk bitten out of it relatively cheaply. If the intent was a break out like Cobra achieved this is a substantial result compared to its chances but if it was a limited liability attack then it achieved a pretty big success. Are there any sources/thoughts about the realism of this assessment?Keith-264 (talk) 12:19, 2 July 2009 (UTC)

You started well. It was a single-division attack, but not deliberately. See the 'poor planning' discussion above. Between the lateral water obstacles, minefields, lack of bridging, lack of minefield gapping and poor decisionmaking with regards to traffic control, 11th AD shouldered the whole load the first day. Up until your "If the intent..." sentence, your assessment agrees with D'Este, but not after.

DMorpheus (talk) 13:22, 2 July 2009 (UTC)

Thanks; it all seems to depend on an opinion of what the intent was. If my summary has similarities with D'Este it's strictly accidental:0). As for the 'poor' planning, then intent has a bearing on that if you agree with the view that it was a limited liability attack - the work was to be done by the bombardment rather than fighting by ground troops so traffic jams (which were endemic to Anglo-Canadian methods) would not be a surprise, merely much worse given the terrain (presumably why a bigger attack out of the Orne bridgehead was squelched earlier in the campaign). Looked at like this the result was pretty impressive considering the difficulties. Surely the glaring thing is the Germans' [material] inability to expolit these constraints before the attack?Keith-264 (talk) 13:44, 2 July 2009 (UTC)

DMorpheus i would have to say the way Second Army overcame the problems to launch the operation is possibly near miraculous! 3 Armoured Divisions were moved east-west across the north-south supply lines without effecting operations and then the every available engineer was put on the job to knock bridges up, improve roads and clear up to 20 gaps in the minefields all within a few days. Even of you think they made a cock up following that you have to give them their dues.

While the holding of a firm base seems to be a feature of all operations launched in case of a reversal and in this case there was the possible mass armoured counterattack (which Trew iirc describes as nothing one would expect from the Germans but just a head long tank charge – sort of gives me the impression of some sort of Napoleonic battlefield with the cavalry charging one another … but with tanks!) by I SS Panzer Corps and 21st Panzer I don’t fully understand why more elements of the 51st Infantry were not utilised.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 14:33, 2 July 2009 (UTC)

I don't even know what you mean by a 'limited liability attack' so I neither agree nor disagree. I do think it is clear that the Army commander's intention was to deploy three armored divisions into the breach, and he was unable to do so due to the factors we've both mentioned. People like to talk about glamorous things like tank firepower and forget that boring things like MP traffic control, minefield clearing, having artillery FOs in place and so forth is pretty damned important too.

I also think that due to the well-documented irregularities in 21st Army Group communications with SHAEF, we may never know what the intent of Goodwood was.

The terrain constraints to which you refer (lateral water obstacles, minefields, few bridges) would be a defensive asset to the British, just as they were to the Germans. They'd have been dumb to attack there unless the sector was held by a very, very weak unit. Nothing 'glaring' about that.

This is not the place to give anyone 'their dues' or slam them. Those are all personal opinions. Our role is to write good articles for an encyclopedia, not to make sure the British Army appears to have a perfect record. I believe this battle was a royal cluster fuck from planning through execution. Strategically it paid dividends by continuing the (almost inevitable anyway) German focus on the eastern flank of the lodgment area. But other options were available. Of course my personal opinion doesn't matter, all that matters is what the sources say. Most of them are not particularly complimentary to the British Army for this operation. Regards, DMorpheus (talk) 15:17, 2 July 2009 (UTC)

"we may never know what the intent of Goodwood was."

However we do the intent of the plan, all we have to do is read the orders given out to the men; they talk of a limited attack and writing down the German armour. It doesnt get much more complicated than that.

"I believe this battle was a royal cluster fuck from planning through execution."

The planning seems bob on; they moved the units they needed, they constructed the bridges they needed, they improved the roads needed, they cleared gaps in the minefield, they organised massive aerial bombardments and laid down indeapth arty fireplans to support all 3 attacks: Goodwood (armoured and the infantry attacks) and Atlantic. Not to mention all the other bits and bobs. So where was the bad plan? It just seems they factored out the German reaction time on the ridge and the bombs missing some key points but saying that the armour was on the ridge with time to spare iirc.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 15:48, 2 July 2009 (UTC)

Hmmmm, "Our role is to write good articles for an encyclopedia, not to make sure the British Army appears to have a perfect record." I quite agree. I have inferred elsewhere that you're twenty years out of date in your historiography so I don't mind you having a punt about my intentions. As it happens, the idea that the British army (an organisation I hold in contempt for its contemporary crimes in Iraq and Afghanistan) could organise a pi$$ up in a brothel is one that I find so bizarre it's breathtaking. Your sources may rubbish Goodwood perhaps but since the 'yah boo!' era wiser counsels have emerged. Since the Wiki articles on the Anglo-Canadian efforts at the east end seem in pretty good shape I look forward to similar scrutiny of the westenders. If you're right about pro-British army bias, that should smoke it out. I wager you'll be pleasantly surprised. Apropos, do you have a bibliography for 1st US Army operations in Normandy?Keith-264 (talk) 16:37, 2 July 2009 (UTC)

"we may never know what the intent of Goodwood was."

However we do the intent of the plan, all we have to do is read the orders given out to the men; they talk of a limited attack and writing down the German armour. It doesnt get much more complicated than that.''

It is vastly more complicated that that. The orders to the units do not match the intentions sent to SHAEF. Maybe that was a simple omission in the signals section of the Army Group, or maybe that was deliberate deception on someone's part, or maybe something else. One thing for sure it was not simple.

"I believe this battle was a royal cluster fuck from planning through execution."

The planning seems bob on; they moved the units they needed, they constructed the bridges they needed, they improved the roads needed, they cleared gaps in the minefield, they organised massive aerial bombardments and laid down indeapth arty fireplans to support all 3 attacks: Goodwood (armoured and the infantry attacks) and Atlantic. Not to mention all the other bits and bobs. So where was the bad plan? It just seems they factored out the German reaction time on the ridge and the bombs missing some key points but saying that the armour was on the ridge with time to spare iirc.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 15:48, 2 July 2009 (UTC)''

Personal opinions which are mostly contradicted by the facts, many of which are already in the article. Your opinion is there were enough bridges; mine is that there weren't; the facts are that there was a massive traffic jam, which was anticipated, but then handled very badly; two of the three divisions could not participate the first day because they hadn't a means to cross the water obstacles in front of them. How you can conclude from that that there were enough bridges is entirely beyond my limited ability to understand.

Insufficient gaps in the minefield contributed to this problem.

The 11th AD operated largely without artillery fire support once they crossed the line of departure. That's because.....they didn't have enough bridges to move the SP artillery across, even though it was available. Artillery is the best way of knocking out towed AT guns such as those encountered later in the day. You'd think that old lesson from Africa would have been thoroughly pounded into Montgomery's Army, but I guess not.

No doubt about it, it was a brilliant plan. DMorpheus (talk) 16:59, 2 July 2009 (UTC)

the Wiki articles on the Anglo-Canadian efforts at the east end seem in pretty good shape I think some of them are downright laughable in their inaccuracy but I haven't got the energy to correct them any more. My bad, maybe someone else will step in. DMorpheus (talk) 17:01, 2 July 2009 (UTC)

That's a shame. Reading your corrections to egregious claims/legends/myths on Wiki pages is one of the things that got me interested in the gig. As for the plan, well, why don't you compare it with other plans and their execution? It's a bit more constructive than being a grumpy old fart.Keith-264 (talk) 18:18, 2 July 2009 (UTC)

'Traffic jam' - too much traffic trying to get in, too little traffic getting out or both? Weren't the railway embankments more of an obstruction than the river and canal?Keith-264 (talk) 18:18, 2 July 2009 (UTC)

"entirely beyond my limited ability to understand." Which i think here is the problem, you dont seem to want to understand or read more up to date works - or at least that is what it seems. "Personal opinions which are mostly contradicted by the facts, many of which are already in the article." The facts that are the article are the ones i have just quoted to you - my opinion is that it seems they did a bob on job planning the show. " Your opinion is there were enough bridges; mine is that there weren't; the facts are that there was a massive traffic jam, which was anticipated, but then handled very badly; two of the three divisions could not participate the first day because they hadn't a means to cross the water obstacles in front of them." They all crossed the first day - Guards were engaged around Cagny and the 7ths vanguard got into the brawl as well, what are you on about? If the armoured brigades were in action on the first day, regardless of traffic, it seems they had enough bridges - sure they could have done with more but were was the engineer support? It was taxed out, thats were it was.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 18:36, 2 July 2009 (UTC)

Strength and Casualties

the strength section is only irratating. no german division was at normal strength. numbers would be better i guess. casualties, i always read 5.500 british casualties. And the german article ( very well researched ) says 109 german tanks lost, this article says at maximum 100 german tanks... -- HROThomas (talk) 22:57, 27 July 2009 (UTC)

Very well researched in as so much that there is not one inline citation in the whole article? Hmmm yea.

I suggest insead of bringing opinion to the discussion you should bring some facts, supported by reliable sources. You cannot have always read 5,500 Allied casualies if sources do not even agree with the figures cited now - hence mulitple figures shown. As for the tank losses, the information provided in the article comes from several historians with one claiming he arrives at his figure of 75 from German sources.

You can be irratated all you want by the fact the number of divisions involved are shown but truth be known no formation is at normal strength after it has been in combat. Some of the British formations had already lost thousands of men plus there was a manpower shortage slowning down the number of replacements resulting in canablisation of formations by the end of the campaign to return other formations to normal strength. At any rate, do you have a figure, supported by reliable sources that inform us how many men the Germans had defending the ridges and facing VIII Corps?--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 00:08, 28 July 2009 (UTC)

hm the strength section should show the reader a comparision of the armies involved. when for example there were 50.000 germans and 5.000 british but both in 5 divisions than its unclever to write 5 divison. because its irratating for the reader. and iam no expert BUT your casualties show 4800 from the british corps but what is with II canadian and the articel is well researched the user witch wrote it does great work and "has" many featured articles -- HROThomas (talk) 03:32, 28 July 2009 (UTC)

II Canadian Corps did not take part in Operation Goodwood, it would be erroneous to include their losses here. Likewise it would be erroneous to show I and VIII Corps losses in the Operation Atlantic article.

How do you know it is irratating for all readers? It is a fact that at least 7 divisions and 2 heavy tank battalions were deployed in this area while the British deployed 5 divisions for the operation; there is also a comparison of tank strengths - unless we have specific details on the total strength of both forces this is the best we can do.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 14:18, 28 July 2009 (UTC)

some of the german divisions are also mentioned in the article of operation atlantic. now we have two operations at the same time and both include the same german division. thats the problem with counting divisions... . but i dont find proper numbers so mabye there is no better way. -- HROThomas (talk) 18:33, 28 July 2009 (UTC)

You do realise that armoured and infantry divisions are not static formations, they are able to move around. They can also be split up into there regiments/brigades so it could be entirely possible for them to be involved in both operations. However the ones currently mentioned did take an active role in this battle. Without a realiable source indicating the numbers of men involved the way it is now at least gives the read an idea.

"the articel is well researched the user witch wrote it does great work and "has" many featured articles" How do you know it is well researched and accurate when there is nothing there to be able to check on i.e. inline citations. You have already noted how he has erronously merged Atlantic and Goodwood together.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 03:36, 29 July 2009 (UTC)

the problem is, when there are 2 operations and both have an infobox with a strenght section, than its irratating when both include the same divisions. BECAUSE everybody thinks than there were 12 german divisions but only 6 were present. when in atlantic 1 regiment of one division fought and in goodwood another one , than WRITE REGIMENTS and not division!!! when u dont know exactly witch division took part than write UNKNOWN . by the way the german articles says the same like this but shorter and more in context. the article is a featured one since 3 years and the english is a copy of the german ^^ -- HROThomas (talk) 18:02, 29 July 2009 (UTC)

Couple of things, first off the Battle for Caen article is not a direct copy of the German one; there are numerous differences and to be honest i can already spot inaccuracies in the German one - no Polish troops took part in the battle; excluding bomber support, what American forces took part in the battles around Caen? How was Bluecoat a part of the battles for Caen? How was Cobra a part of the battle of Caen? How were the battles for Falaise i.e. Totalize (not Totalise) and Tractable parts of the fighting for Caen? And finally the Falaise pocket...

Goodwood has received more attention than the Atlantic article, as far as i am concerned the information - if you like it or not - is accurate and supported by source material. The Atlantic article has a long way to go and the information in the infobox will be updated accordingly. If you have a problem with the information displayed in the Atlantic article take it up there, this is not the place.

i didnt compare the complete article , i saw the english one looks like the german, if they translated every word is somthing else. the german article got its featured status in JAnuar 2006 at this time the english was a stub so iam very sure many was translated. now the german and english are very similar . i dont know if poles participated. i only said the article is good, because i read him and never saw problems or contradicting informations. my advantage is that i read both english and german articles, so i can compare and add something. the article of goodwood says that canadian troops advanced without mentioning atlantic. by the way the detailed bombing is interessting the german lacks this informations, 6000 tonnes bombs... -- HROThomas (talk) 19:19, 29 July 2009 (UTC)

if u could read german u would see that all the operations u mentioned are used for the context. the whole battle of cean article is very complex. polish troops participated in operation totalise -- HROThomas (talk) 19:22, 29 July 2009 (UTC)

the german article takes all operations until 15 autumn and the english until 6 autumn thats the different. -- HROThomas (talk) 19:25, 29 July 2009 (UTC)

Which is the point - the battle for Caen ended well before that date.

"the article of goodwood says that canadian troops advanced without mentioning atlantic." If you are referring to this article, Atlantic is mentioned a number of times throughout and the Canadian kickoff is specified as being part of Atlantic: "The rolling barrage signalling the start of Operation Atlantic started at 08:15 hours. The Canadian infantry and tanks crossed their start line at 08:35 hours"--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 19:40, 29 July 2009 (UTC)

iam not sure if there is an offcial time frame for "battle of cean" , totalise and other operation where in the near of caen. but i didnt wrote the article. by the way the author made the pictures which is used by all other articles too. -- HROThomas (talk) 19:56, 29 July 2009 (UTC)

Being near to the town doesnt make them parts of the operation to take the town thou. For example Totalize and Tractable are sometimes referred to as the battles for Falaise. --EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 20:25, 29 July 2009 (UTC)

Strenght section

hi, i will edit the infobox especially the Strenght. i will explain why

• the sense of the strenght section is to compare the strength of the opponents. the reader should get a fast overview over the situation. this means menpower and important equipment like tanks. at the time goodwood happend german divisions were battered over many battles, they got no replacements so they were understrenght, i hope its obivous that comparing the strenghts with counting divisions is not possible when the divisions or regiments or whatever have totally diffenrent menpowers.
• the reader is no expert so its impossible for him to know that the units have diffenrent strenghts.
• to support my opinion i checked other important wars like world war 1, napoleonic wars, world war 2 (rest) , vietnam war. german-french war (1871) or midage wars, in different languags: frech, english, german, and spanish . these wars include hundreds of battles . nearly all of this DONT uses this method here . i found no examples for this. when strenght is unknown the strenght is roughly estimated or unknown. thats the evidence that this article uses a totally uncommon method
• that this uncommon! method is useless in this situation, is obvious when we know that allied/german units werent equall
• the problem with misleading the reader. a reader which is not a expert in world war 2 battles especially western front 44/45 (95% of the readers ) will always!!!! think 3 divisions against 3 divisions means partiy. thats a fact... . so the infobox doenst inform the reader it does the opposite !
• the infoboxes of goodwood and atlantic ( both on the same time ) include the same divisions. that means that some of the understrenght divisions were mentioned 2 times making the comparison of strenght absurd...
• when i see the order of battle of goodwood i see the 12 SS only with 1 panzerregiment and 2 grenadier battlions. this units in understrengt means only a half division or less. when one Prg and 2 GrBttlions are in goodwood only one understrenght regiment grenadierregiment was able to take part one Atlantic. thas LESS than a british infantry brigade. but its mentioned as full division. that means this uncommon method brings so muc errors to the reader ... —Preceding unsigned comment added by 85.176.152.98 (talk) 18:01, 14 October 2009 (UTC)

i guess i proved that the uncommon method in fact is useless and misplaced here and we should use the common method which was used by hundreds of other editors who didnt edit normandy operation but all the other battles i will wait while, than i will put the manpower of the british corps in the box and unknown men for germans with a link that german divisions were understrenght, so the reader is possible to estimate if he wants. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 85.176.152.98 (talk) 17:09, 14 October 2009 (UTC)

To put it simpley your opinion is not wanted - nor is mine. What is wanted is facts, facts supported by evidence; if you have that edit away otherwise your edits will be reverted and i will request moderation.

What currently is in the infobox are facts per published reliable sources that identify at least a good idea of the relevent strengths. To argue that the German divisions were understrength ignores the points that British formations were not 100% either - although most likley more reinforced than their German counterparts.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 17:27, 14 October 2009 (UTC)

this is not YOUR page , the opinion of hundreds of editors and 1000 battle infoboxes superceed your opinion. the common method will be introduced here. u can bring moderation i will bring 2000 battles and . and the simple math which shows how moronic it it is to compare strenghts wit counting divisions ( in normandy )...

i brought already facts. U NOT

your normandy articles say always that german divisons were reduced to 300 men at the end of normandy but even in the latter operations u mention them as full divisions....

u are fighting against the common method.

First off you say i think i own this article and then you claim i lay ownership to the other Normandy articles. Quite funny, please read Wikipedia:Ownership of articles; i have no problem with you editing these articles (or any other article), as long as they do not include falsities or information you have essentially made up. If you have information that shows how many men the Germans had command of and in this battlezone, with a source then by all means add it.

However that brings me to my next point, also in regards to opinion. Although you claim so my opinion is embedded in this article, and others, it is however nowhere to be seen; Additionally in regards to you presenting facts, pease see Wikipedia:Reliable sources, Wikipedia:Verifiability, and Wikipedia:No original research. You will note everything i have added to these articles is referenced and links to reliable published sources that cite this information.

There is also a final set of guidelines, which unfortualy at the moment, i cannot remember the name of; but the general jist is, just because its like that on another article is not proof or evidence it should be like that in this article.

Enjoy--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 18:09, 14 October 2009 (UTC)

it doenst madder if it sourced, its misplaced , is this so hard to understand? we will improve the article with correct british numbers( u have quite accurate numbers i guess) and unknown german men with the link to the understrenght issue... . all the other article do this . PLEEEAAASSEEEE face it . its not my idea . it normal on wiki...

i know that there is no ownership of articles but i think u hope there is one ....

Please see above comments and links to articles.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 18:09, 14 October 2009 (UTC)

ok we take the cited figures for british strenght and put them in the box ... thats more accurate then counting the british divisions... —Preceding unsigned comment added by 85.176.152.98 (talk) 18:11, 14 October 2009 (UTC)

... and the Germans?--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 18:15, 14 October 2009 (UTC)

do we know the german strenght? i guess no. option 1 unknown ( with link to the text with explanation of the problem . option 2 writing similiar —Preceding unsigned comment added by 85.176.152.98 (talk) 18:21, 14 October 2009 (UTC)

So by your own admission, you want to replace an imperfect figure with one that doesnt help at all...--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 18:24, 14 October 2009 (UTC)

its not only imperfect its wrong. it counts divisions which only have one regiments. thats not imperfect thats wrong. the best option would be writing unknown( because the numbers are unknown) that what wiki does since many years in every battle. we can link the unknonw to order of battle we can link the unknown to a sentence like: blabla 10 divisions took part 2 of them incomplete some of them understrenght) , that would be truth and the most accurate figure of strenght... —Preceding unsigned comment added by 85.176.152.98 (talk) 18:28, 14 October 2009 (UTC)

u can look Operation_Goodwood_order_of_battle all british formations attack with standart units.

You seem to be missing two points. One, linking to the order of battle instead is essentially doing the same job as the infobox does now - it would be redundant; on top of which i cant actually see a division with just one regiment (12th SS is missing one regiment, from orders of battle alone that appears to be the most understrength).

Two, as you have already noted orders of battles do not show how many men were involved and how many men compised these units. So the contuined comment about the British is also redundant, as the orders of battle does not show if each of these battalions were at 100%. Am not making the point that the British divisions were as worn down as the German ones were, you just keep raising an invalid point.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 18:54, 14 October 2009 (UTC)

i made a list why we should change it. understrenght means that a regiment is not on sollstärke . when a regiment is missing this means only elements of this division took part. I SAID linking to order of battle maybe and explain the problem of understrenght german units. the order of battle doesnt show that the british were at 100% the allied politics of replacement does...........

u are missing my points. you are picking my words and try to amke them false , i wrote a long list of undisputable reason to change and u are not facing it...........

counting division doesnt COMPARE STRENGTH....

i try to give possiblities to solve this problem u not...

maybe we should search some neutral admins to solve the problem, ok ? i will bring my arguements you yours. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 85.176.152.98 (talk) 19:12, 14 October 2009 (UTC)

3rd infantry division

anyone knows the menpower of 3rd infantry division (british) ? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 188.192.121.123 (talk) 04:34, 15 October 2009 (UTC)

On paper it would be around 18,000 men; in actuality not known - i dont believe i have seen anything in my sources. Rifle strength - the actual fighting power of the division would be much much less than 18k however.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 14:53, 7 May 2010 (UTC)

Copyedit

Underway (finally!). EyeSerene^talk 11:02, 1 September 2010 (UTC)

Allied planning and preparation

• 1st para states Cobra was planned for 18 July; 3rd para states "The two operations were planned to commence on 18 July, two days before the planned start of Operation Cobra." Can we resolve this inconsistency?

  Trew notes that the operation was to start on 18 July - "if St-Lo had veeb captured". On p 89 je notes that cobra had now been delayed until 24 July. In further sources i have read this is why Spring was launched.

  Hastings supports that (kinda - he explicitly mentions the later delays due to the weather and implies Cobra's start was dependent on St-Lo's capture, which wasn't until the 18th). I hadn't noticed before but he also goes into some detail about Monty's biographer's claims that it was Monty who came up with the concept for Cobra. He writes: "If this assertion arouses ire among the ghosts of the First Army, it is also true that, after the event, Americans were too eager to write into history that COBRA was expected from the outset to lead inexorably to Lorient, Le Mans and Argentan, and that from its launching the rest of the campaign was preordained ... What took place was that First Army launched an offensive that worked, assisted by the absence of the best of most of von Kluge's army". (pp. 293-294). Worth adding into the Cobra article? I don't know that we really went into the "who planned it" controversy in any detail. EyeSerene^talk 15:47, 3 September 2010 (UTC)

  PS: do you have a page ref for Trew's first note? EyeSerene^talk 16:10, 3 September 2010 (UTC)

• "The order was also presented in the United Kingdom..." Do we know to whom? Would something vague like "planning staff" be supportable?

  I cant see a particular named (and shamed?) in Jackson, Trew, or Wilmot. There are several others sources i could check however i do not have the time right now due to uni (cant skive off in work either since the books are here at home!) so i look further into this one in a few weeks time - i will try and answer any other questions however.EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 18:51, 1 September 2010 (UTC)

• Moved from the article for now: "VIII Corps stood at a strength of 61,808 men and 759 tanks." (it doesn't really belong where it was but might hopefully fit in somewhere else)

"While Montgomery's Army commanders planned two "colossal cracks", COBRA (the final product of his M. 505 and LUCKY STRIKE B) and GOODWOOD, other operations proceeded." (Roger Cirillo 'The MARKET GARDEN Campaign: Allied Operational Command in Northwest Europe, 1944', p.100 [2001]). Fn168, p.100, reads "M510, 10-7-44, 1.2; Leigh Mallory Diary, 14 June; Montgomery Log, 12 July, notes that the two plans coming to fruition were the long-term result of discussions and orders. This was especially true for COBRA; Dempsey Diary, 10-12 July. The GOODWOOD variant, offering a double blow, was proposed by Dempsey on the 12th based on the post-Caen situation, and after discussing variants with his commanders.

P.130, "COBRA. like GOODWOOD, would be launched following an extensive air preparation. Monty considered the two plans inseparable as he submitted a single request for air for them both." fn191.

P.130, fn 221, "LC, Papers of General George S. Patton [hereafter referred to as Patton Diary), July 7.1944; Hamilton, A Master of the Battlefield, 699. Patton was briefed by Bradley on what was LUCKY STRIKE B. Characteristically, Patton considered the idea broached to him by Bradley in discussion as an "American idea." M. 505 had outlined the concept in June; Bradley would have also been aware of the plan due to work done at First Army. Bradley, on 29 June, wrote Montgomery concerning the wide sweep to the west south of Paris: -I feel that this is entirely feasible due to the fact that he [the enemy] has placed so much of his strength in front of Dempsey". Note this idea percolated at the time the Americans were believed to be capable of launching a breakout in the west on 3 July. Bradley needed three more weeks to reach his start line, for what was then called COBRA.

Cirillo is convinced that Cobra was as Monty as Goodwood.Keith-264 (talk) 18:21, 3 September 2010 (UTC)

Hastings notes that Monty's original proposal was, town-for-town, what became Cobra, and says something along the lines of "to call Cobra the 'planned breakout offensive' was to pretend that First Army hadn't already been trying to breakout for weeks" (from memory so not word-for-word). We're really going to have to get to grips with this idea for an overarching "Controversy" article at some point :) EyeSerene^talk 10:20, 4 September 2010 (UTC)

I asked someone on another site if there were sources on 1st Army dealing with the period from the capture of Cherbourg to the capture of St Lo, something along the lines of the operational analyses we have now for the Anglo-Canadians but sadly not, only gleanings from divisional histories, memoirs and the US OH, "For the Americans.... the best recent studies are Balkoski's two volumes on OMAHA and UTAH... Harry Yeide's trilogy on the Separate Tank Battalions, Tank Destroyer Battalions and the Mechanized Cavalry, Colonel Michael Reardon's Victory at Mortain is indispensible and Carafano's After D-Day is good but too concise. Major General Reynold's Eagles and Bulldogs is wrongly overlooked and is close to being a masterpiece, much better IMHO than his almost hagiographic studies of the I and II SS-Panzerkorps. An oldie but goodie is still Cross-Channel Attack, while Blumenson's anemic Breakout and Pursuit pales a bit by comparison.Keith-264 (talk) 15:06, 4 September 2010 (UTC)

Always a good thing to get one in on the yanks! Seems they tried to gloss over the nasty bits and lay the blame on Caen! hah :)

Excellent material though for the Goodwood anyalsis section and the forever mentioned and one day, god willing, created controversy article!--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 16:30, 9 November 2010 (UTC)

18 July

• "On the flank, the 3rd Infantry had a successful day, capturing all of their objectives except Troarn." Is this the 3rd Infantry Division (or Brigade or...)?

  Yes its the division.--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 16:14, 9 November 2010 (UTC)

• "What had been conceived as an attack towards the Bourguébus Ridge by three armoured divisions had now became an unsupported advance by two tank regiments, out of sight of one other, against heavy German fire." Originally said "two tank battalions" but I changed this to regiments to match the rest of the text. Is this correct though?

  That would be correct; the units are essentially battalions but should be referred to as regiments due to their cavalry heritage (as far as am aware).

  The tank wing of the British army is just as confusing as the infantry. For example the 7th Hussars is just that, the “7th Regiment of Hussars” if you will and not a battalion of a “hussars regiment” whereas the 1st, 2nd, 3rd RTR, for example, are all technically battalions of Royal Tank Regiment akin to the 1/7th Queens infantry unit.EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 16:14, 9 November 2010 (UTC)

Yes, battalion was a term the US army would have used.Keith-264 (talk) 16:18, 9 November 2010 (UTC)

Interesting, didn't know that. So the US "Combat Command" concept for their armoured units would have been equivalent to what? The British Armoured Brigade? EyeSerene^talk 08:27, 10 November 2010 (UTC)

I havent looked too much into them but from the bits and bobs ive heard they remind of how the British divisions started acting during and post Normandy. Although thats just an uneducated impression thus far.EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 13:04, 10 November 2010 (UTC)

I don't know much about it either, though I believe the US divided their armoured divs into three Combat Commands (A, B and C) that were able to act pretty much independently and included additional infantry and support troops as required. Thinking about it I guess that's closer in concept to the British brigade group.

Re the copyedit, I still have the lead and analysis sections to do, but if it's okay I'll hold off on them until you've worked your magic. Unfortunately all my books are boxed up and in storage (ready for a house move that fell through), so although I know the dreaded Hastings has quite a bit on Goodwood, esp. the Monty controversy, I don't know when I'll be able to get at it. EyeSerene^talk 14:30, 10 November 2010 (UTC)

What made me think of the system the British divisions adopted during Normandy and beyond was mention on a documentary I saw a few weeks, that mentioned a fourth combat command/reserve. But the comparison with the brigade group concept does seem to fit what the snippets I have read about in the past; the whole idea seems rather flexible with three armoured battlegroups roaming around.EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 15:01, 10 November 2010 (UTC)

I've just finished RichTO90's book on the Bulge and it states that a US armoured div had CCA, CCB and CCR (R for 'reserve') but that R tended to be treated as a third CC. There were similar attachments to British units but these tended to be battalions of things (cavalry [= Br Reconnaisance regt], Tank Destroyers, artillery etc)Keith-264 (talk) 17:20, 10 November 2010 (UTC)

Heh, you're right Keith. I've just discovered we have an article on it at Combat command. Apparently CCR was renamed to CCC after the war in the fifties. It makes the comparison to a Brigade/Regimental group so we were about right :) EyeSerene^talk 21:14, 10 November 2010 (UTC)

Aftermath

Does anyone have any material on what the Germans made of Goodwood, at the moment it seems a bit lop sided with post war argument rather than contemporary findings.Keith-264 (talk) 15:01, 13 September 2010 (UTC)

Hi Keith,

I am hoping to start working again on the article next week; my own sources are already identified in the biography and I will be using them for the conclusion/analysis etc. What I have read thus far though (more importantly what I can remember off the top of my head!) it all seems to be mainly focused on what the British did wrong, what could have been done better and what the operation actually achieved. So yes anything anyone has on the German POV would be very welcomed either into the article now or just on the talk page to help me incorporate into my text as I write it up?EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 16:22, 9 November 2010 (UTC)

Good news. I notice from your comments that the German views seem to be operational level which perhaps to be expected. Done yer exams? Keith-264 (talk) 08:42, 10 November 2010 (UTC)

Yep, they seem to have went well ... now back to writing essays >.<--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 13:00, 10 November 2010 (UTC)

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=54&t=921&start=30 this thread is a very good description of Goodwood in terms of what it achieved rather than polemic.Keith-264 (talk) 09:04, 11 November 2010 (UTC)

Excellent find! Although the problem for us is that its not a published secondary source so we cant use it (wish if there was one it was noted as i would slap that info into the article right now)? Would we be able to use it in the external links section?

I’ve always wanted to see what impact the operation had on the Germans, pretty impressive tally. When one steps back, stops looking for the “win/loss” aspect and of ground took, the impression gained is that each time a colossal crack was launched it was a disaster for the Germans facing it; the cracks worn down, stretched out and destroyed whatever was in front of them ensuring the Germans never held the initiative. With that said and done the “small” scale operations launched to tie down forces, which lacked the support given to the cracks, seem to be the ones that suffer out of proportion to what was inflicted i.e. the battles for Hill 112, what happened to the Canadian Black Watch etcEnigmaMcmxc (talk) 12:32, 11 November 2010 (UTC)

The value of it for us is in RichTO90's exposition of quantitative information and his sources. Looking at his post again I was intrigued at the British tank loss of 36% against a German loss of 26%. Considering that the British were attacking, the Germans were ready and the British had tanks lacking in anti-tank firepower a third to a quarter loss rate isn't that bad, in fact it looks pretty good. Since the tanks were used in lieu of infantry a better criterion of success wuld be in infantry preservation by the Anglo-Canadians which seems to be what R was driving at.Keith-264 (talk) 13:07, 11 November 2010 (UTC)

Notice as well that the Germans did best in encounter battles (eg Verrieres Ridge) where the Allied advantages of firepower were slimmest but then lost more heavily when counter-attacking consolidated positions. Monty's bite-and-hold attacks seem a logical response to the Germans giving up the mobile battle so soon after D-Day and going to ground.Keith-264 (talk) 13:07, 11 November 2010 (UTC)

Oh yes i have seen it before! Although granted I pumped my head full of slave trade figures, Greek pots and 20th century politics hence the memory lapse :P Interesting reading through the topic again, spats and varying off topic subjects mixed in with the US-UK split. Looking at the subject in much more detail over the past 2 ½ years I have to say am firmly entrenched on the British side of the controversy!

I note that while Rich’s figures of total knocked includes those in long term repair where Simon Trew places actual knocked out at half of that figure; granted Trew does not elaborate on how long the damaged tanks were in for repair. I have seen other posts were he has given the break down of tanks per division by the end of the week it seems Goodwood barely effected the divisions in terms of tanks and manpower hence it seems the battle is surrounded by massive hyperbole. I feel that some historians overemphasise the losses suffered by 3rd Infantry and those during Atlantic to attempt to downplay the success VIII Corps achieved.EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 14:17, 11 November 2010 (UTC)

It's an interesting and well-thought out analysis. I'm firmly convinced that the perceived failure of Goodwood was originally down to Monty's mismanagement of his PR; if he hadn't played up the operation to SHAEF and then neglected to tell them he'd rewritten its objectives, it would have been accepted that the operation largely achieved what it was intended to achieve. It's a shame that he manufactured so much ammunition for his enemies.

Re article development, are we going to expand further on the capture of the rest of Caen? It seems odd that we've spent so many articles focusing on just that, then we basically toss it off in a single sentence when it finally happens. EyeSerene^talk 09:00, 12 November 2010 (UTC)

When working through the events of 18 July I felt the need to show that Atlantic was kicked off roughly at the same time as Goodwood but from then on focus on Goodwood solely. Since we have two separate articles discussing the two interlinked yet somewhat separate operations the final fall of Caen could, IMO, be passed off in a few lines; the Atlantic article going into full detail. Although whatever analysis we find that discusses how Goodwood resulted in the fall of Caen will no doubt be included ;) EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 12:10, 12 November 2010 (UTC)

Your approach is undoubtedly right, but we haven't actually mentioned Caen's final capture anywhere outside the Analysis section. The Atlantic article doesn't mention it either. I get the impression that the southern part of Caen fell basically because it had been outflanked and, no longer relevant to their position, was pretty much abandoned by the Germans. Its capture doesn't seem to have been a direct objective of either Goodwood or Atlantic but was basically a by-product. However, I don't recall seeing much information on this anywhere in stuff I've read. EyeSerene^talk 12:27, 12 November 2010 (UTC)

My understanding of Atlantic is that one Can div pushed out of the Orne bridgehead on the flank of VIII Corps pushing south through the southern sections of Caen while another Can div attacked directly from the city from newly laid bridges; both events seem, going off memory, pretty good without much heavy fighting. It seems a little overshaddowed by the attack south into the German main line that went, to throw in an understatment, a little wrong.

Am sure we can expand on all these aspects though? I plan, once my latest assignment is out the way to get back to grips with the article expanding everything past the 18 July section so any suggestions are greatly welcomed; more info on Atlantic and the fall of the southern outskirts then?--EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 13:04, 12 November 2010 (UTC)

Yes, perhaps my use of "abandoned" was a little strong - they were ejected, but by then Caen itself had become mostly irrelevant anyway and I don't recall reading about much hard fighting in the city. Your plan sounds good to me though :) EyeSerene^talk 13:11, 12 November 2010 (UTC)

Just re-reading through the article I see what you are getting at, all previous Second Army operations had specifically been designed at taking Caen then we have this one that avoids all mention of the subject. The orders show the change in priority for Monty and co, Caen had lost its significance (going out on my own it seems the only real point to Atlantic was to secure Goodwoods flank, provide a further bridgehead over the river, form a continuous front with XII and XXX on their flank and attempt to take the high ground as jumping off point for other units to advance on Falaise – the rest of Caen being an obstacle rather than a goal); ill have to double check sources to see if anyone gets to grips with that bit rather than focusing on the breakout/breakin/diversion etc argument.EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 13:33, 12 November 2010 (UTC)

You've put it better than I did - it seems incongruous, taking the series of articles as a whole, that when Caen finally falls to the Allies we treat it as an afterthought. An explanation along the lines you've set out - maybe in the Planning section - as to why there was this change of emphasis might be nice, but I suspect it might be difficult to source. EyeSerene^talk 17:02, 12 November 2010 (UTC)

Capturing the suburbs on the south bank greatly expanded the bridgehead and deprived the Germans of several roads at their junctions in Caen. This was an operational success. "the attack south into the German main line that went, to throw in an understatment, a little wrong." Yes! This is important - it had the character of an encounter battle (Remember that when the local high commanders had discussed the situation around the time of Epsom, Geyr had suggested that a withdrawal would increase German opportunities to inflict reverses on the Allies in encounter battles) and a battle where much of the Allied superiority in airpower and artillery firepower had diminished due to the rapid movement of the front line and the changeable weather. Much of the Allied success in Normandy was negative in that Monty didn't give the Germans the chance to pull off the sort of riposte they were so adept at. Some of the Canadians got caught out towards the end of Atlantic but this needs to be considered in context - inexperience and the relationship between each Allied operation. Bad news for the Canadians after the 19th-20th was good news for Cobra, because the forces that did it couldn't be in two places. Any German temptation to send more forces west after the remnants of PzLehr and 2ndSSPz was squelched until it was too late. Cobra was the first (and last) American corps-sized attack with lavish firepower and an echeloned attack force but this was because such a move wasn't feasible until they were on ground similar to the eastend of the bridgehead. In this respect the preliminary operations to capture St Lo and the St Lo-Periers road were the same as those to advance beyond Caen.Keith-264 (talk) 14:38, 12 November 2010 (UTC)

Speaking of the the US preliminary operations, a St Lo article probably ought to be on our Normandy to-do list as well... EyeSerene^talk 17:02, 12 November 2010 (UTC)