Wikipedia

Talk:Palestinian return to Israel/Archive 1

< Talk:Palestinian return to Israel
Archive 1


There are a few points that look rather confusing right now:

1. Was the infiltration aided by Arab governments? 2. Did the Arabs try to prevent infiltration? 3. What was the reasons for infiltration? 4. Was the infiltrators armed?

My sources say 1 = no, 2 = yes, 3 = "social and economic", 4 = no.

The Israeli government put all the blame for the infiltrations on the Arabs. The official line was that Palestinian infiltration was aided by the Arab governments. They saw it as a form of guerilla warfare aimed to destroy the infant Jewish state, Israel was therefore an innocent victim of Arab provocation.

The Israel view was a false one. There were no evidence that the Arabs aided the infiltration nor that it was an organised effort from the Arab side. When Aryeh Eilan, an official in the Israeli Foreign Ministry, asked Yehoshafat Harkabi for proof complicity he answered that "no proof could be given because no proof existed."

Source? Moreover, It is a fact that the Egyptian fedayeen were government-sponsored.
The fedayeen was formed in 1955. We need to define a year interval for this article since the infiltration varied a lot. Source is (The Iron Wall p.93, Shlaim) which I think I included.
The fedayeen was formed in 1954 (Morris, 270), and almost immediately became a major problem.

Harkabi added that "having personally made a detailed study of the whole phenomenon of infiltration, he had arrived at the conclusion that Jordanians and especially the [Arab] Legion were doing their best to prevent infiltration, which was a natural, decentralized and sporadic movement." To this Eilan responded "If Jordanian complicity is a lie, we have to keep lying. If there is no proofs, we have to fabricate them." (The Iron Wall p.93, Shlaim)

What's the point of this quote (made decades later)? It is perfectly apparent that the Jordanian side has a responsibility to block the border, a responsibility that it didn't fulfill.
After Qibya, the Arab legion closed the border, and there were no infiltrations. Why coudln't it do the same before?
You don't think many refugees were scared that they would be "qibyaed"? Btw, the infiltrations continued in a lesser and more militant scale. I haven't found anything saying that the Arab Legion managed to curb all infiltrations nor that they tried harder after Qibya.
Your tendency to quote only the sources that aid you in proving the point is amusing. "Following the operation more Arab Legion battalions were deployed along the Israel-Jordan line to block infiltration (and to deter further IDF assaults)... there was a sharp decrease in infiltration." (Morris, 279).

Glubb Pasha, the British officer who commanded the Jordan Arab Legion at the time, repeated several times that "the Arab Legion was doing its level best to maintain a peaceful border with Israel." (A Soldier with the Arabs 1957, Glubb and "Violence of the Jordan-Israel Border: A Jordan View," Foreign Affairs, 32, no.4, 1954)

Ditto.
Ditto?
The same. If the Jordan Legion was doing the best, why it didn't deploy at the border?

Secret Jordan documents captured during the war in June 1967 prove that Glubb's version is the correct one and Israel's is false. These documents reveal that the Jordan civil and military authorities did everything they could to prevent infiltration. For example, on 27 February 1952, the minister of defence wrote to the prime minister to demand drastic steps to prevent infiltration.

Ditto. --Uri
--BL

All right, here's my take on it. We do one paragraph at a time. 1st paragraph: --~~

Arab governmental responsibility

The Israeli government at times accused the Arab governments of supporting and sponsoring the infiltrations, as a means to bring about the collapse of the recently created state, which would make Israel the victim of Arab provocation.

The Egyptian formal adoption of the Fedayeen in 1954 seems to support this claim; moreover, Israel points out that after its retaliatory operations, the Arab military forces were often able block the border, significantly decreasing the number of infiltrations. The non-prevention of armed infiltration (even of non-governmental forces) over an agreed border is widely considered an act of war; Israel therefore argues that the Arab non-prevention was in effect akin to a declaration of war.

Arabs, on the other hand, deny that the support for infiltration was an official government policy for much of the time-period. They quote, for instance, the Israeli historian and reserve general, Yehoshafat Harkabi , who concluded:

"... having personally made a detailed study of the whole phenomenon of infiltration, he had arrived at the conclusion that Jordanians and especially the [Arab] Legion were doing their best to prevent infiltration, which was a natural, decentralized and sporadic movement." (The Iron Wall p.93, Shlaim)

Moreover, they claim that at least some the Israeli government's accusations were fabricated, basing on a quote of Harkabi's interview with an alleged Israeli official at that time, Aryeh Eilan:

"If Jordanian complicity is a lie, we have to keep lying. If there is no proofs, we have to fabricate them" (Ibid)

Glubb Pasha, the British officer who commanded the Jordan Arab Legion at the time, wrote that

"the Arab Legion was doing its level best to maintain a peaceful border with Israel". (A Soldier with the Arabs 1957, Glubb and "Violence of the Jordan-Israel Border: A Jordan View", Foreign Affairs, 32, no.4, 1954)

They also mention a number of documents captured by Israel during the Six-Day War, such as a letter from the minister of defence wrote to the prime minister demanding drastic steps to prevent infiltration, dated 27 February 1952. Therefore, it seems that while the Israeli accusations of direct complicity are unfounded, the Arab governments have not done far enough to guarantee the security of Israel's borders. Morris (p. 270) concludes that:

... "the Arab authorities operated with insufficient vigor and means. Often infiltrators and local civil and military authorities collaborated. Many of the latter turned a blind eye in return for bribes, especially the men of the Jordanian National Guard."

So far so good?

Now how should I edit and expand it? This happened 50 years ago and is a so small and with so little political value that I think we should be able to agree. --BL

Well, the version that I wrote seems much more NPOV to me than what you proposed. Don't you have any comments (changes)? --Uri

Arab governmental responsibility

The Israeli government at accused the Arab governments of supporting and sponsoring the infiltrations, as a means to bring about the collapse of the recently created state, which would make Israel the victim of Arab provocation.

removed "at times"
Ok

The Egyptian formal adoption of the Fedayeen in 1954 seems to support this claim;

no as there is a huge difference between the Fedayeen, which made their fist move in August 1955, and the regular infiltrations.
"During 1954-56 however, the Egyptian military intelligence in Gaza sent infiltrators called fedayeen..." (Moris, p. 270)

moreover, Israel points out that after its retaliatory operations, the Arab military forces were often able block the border, significantly decreasing the number of infiltrations.

Not quite, more Arab military forces in the area was only one of the reasons.
I re-word: "Arab military deployment and other measures..."

The non-prevention of armed infiltration (even of non-governmental forces) over an agreed border is widely considered an act of war; Israel therefore argues that the Arab non-prevention was in effect an act of war on behalf of the Arab

That the Arab authorities, especially the Syrian and the Jordan, tried to prevent the infiltration is well documented. The armed infiltration was a very small part of all infiltrations. And all Israeli retaliatory strikes was definitely acts of war.
Yes, but the retaliatory strikes followed the infiltrations. One cannot declare a war that was already started :-).

governments. Morris (p. 270) concludes that:

... "the Arab authorities operated with insufficient vigor and means. Often infiltrators and local civil and military authorities collaborated. Many of the latter turned a blind eye in return for bribes, especially the men of the Jordanian National Guard."
Here Morris contradicts Shlaim
Hmmm, well so there's a contradiction. But the fact is that the actions of the Jordanian government do not pass the test of the result, meaning infiltrations did take place. So Morris is entitled to his position.

Arabs, on the other hand, deny that the support for infiltration was an official government policy for much of the time-period. They quote, for instance, the Israeli historian and reserve general, Yehoshafat Harkabi , who concluded:

"... having personally made a detailed study of the whole phenomenon of infiltration, he had arrived at the conclusion that Jordanians and especially the [Arab] Legion were doing their best to prevent infiltration, which was a natural, decentralized and sporadic movement." (The Iron Wall p.93, Shlaim)

Moreover, they claim that at least some the Israeli government's accusations were fabricated, basing on a quote of Harkabi's interview with an alleged

They rather didn't understand Israels claim. The Israelis never supported their claims with evidence of collaboration.
I'll change the wording

Israeli official at that time, Aryeh Eilan:

"If Jordanian complicity is a lie, we have to keep lying. If there is no proofs, we have to fabricate them" (Ibid)

Glubb Pasha, the British officer who commanded the Jordan Arab Legion at the time, wrote that

"the Arab Legion was doing its level best to maintain a peaceful border with Israel". (A Soldier with the Arabs 1957, Glubb and "Violence of the Jordan-Israel Border: A Jordan View", Foreign Affairs, 32, no.4, 1954)

They also mention a number of documents captured by Israel during the Six-Day War, such as a letter from the minister of defence wrote to the prime minister demanding drastic steps to prevent infiltration, dated 27 February 1952. Therefore, it seems that while the Israeli accusations of direct complicity are unfounded, the Arab governments have not done far enough to guarantee the security of Israel's borders. Morris (p. 270) concludes that:

... "the Arab authorities operated with insufficient vigor and means. Often infiltrators and local civil and military authorities collaborated. Many of the latter turned a blind eye in return for bribes, especially the men of the Jordanian National Guard."

So far so good?

Its very decent but can definitely be polished.
Ok, an updated version. Is it better?

Arab governmental responsibility

The Israeli government has accused the Arab governments of supporting and sponsoring the infiltrations, as a means to bring about the collapse of the recently created state, which would make Israel the victim of Arab provocation.

The Egyptian formal adoption of the Fedayeen in 1954 seems to support this claim; moreover, Israel points out that after its retaliatory operations, the Arab countries managed to significantly decrease the number of infiltrations by deploying on the borders and by other measures. The non-prevention of armed infiltration (even of non-governmental forces) over an agreed border is widely considered an act of war; Israel therefore argues that the Arab non-prevention was in effect akin to a declaration of war.

Arabs, on the other hand, deny that the support for infiltration was an official government policy for much of the time-period. They quote, for instance, the Israeli historian and reserve general, Yehoshafat Harkabi , who concluded:

"... having personally made a detailed study of the whole phenomenon of infiltration, he had arrived at the conclusion that Jordanians and especially the [Arab] Legion were doing their best to prevent infiltration, which was a natural, decentralized and sporadic movement." (The Iron Wall p.93, Shlaim)

Moreover, they claim that at least some of the Israeli accusations were simply unfounded, basing on a quote of Harkabi's interview with an alleged Israeli official at that time, Aryeh Eilan:

"If Jordanian complicity is a lie, we have to keep lying. If there is no proofs, we have to fabricate them" (Ibid)

Glubb Pasha, the British officer who commanded the Jordan Arab Legion at the time, wrote that

"the Arab Legion was doing its level best to maintain a peaceful border with Israel". (A Soldier with the Arabs 1957, Glubb and "Violence of the Jordan-Israel Border: A Jordan View", Foreign Affairs, 32, no.4, 1954)

They also mention a number of documents captured by Israel during the Six-Day War, such as a letter from the minister of defence wrote to the prime minister demanding drastic steps to prevent infiltration, dated 27 February 1952. Therefore, it seems that while the Israeli accusations of direct complicity are unfounded, the Arab governments have not done far enough to guarantee the security of Israel's borders. Morris (p. 270) concludes that:

... "the Arab authorities operated with insufficient vigor and means. Often infiltrators and local civil and military authorities collaborated. Many of the latter turned a blind eye in return for bribes, especially the men of the Jordanian National Guard."

Updated it more

Arab Governmental responsibility

The Israeli government has accused the Arab governments of supporting and sponsoring the infiltrations, as a means to bring about the collapse of the recently created state, which would make Israel the victim of Arab provocation.

The Egyptian formal adoption of the Fedayeen in 1954 seems to support this claim; moreover, Israel points out that after its retaliatory operations, the Arab countries managed to significantly decrease the number of infiltrations by deploying on the borders and by other measures. The non-prevention of armed infiltration (even of non-governmental forces) over an agreed border is widely considered an act of war; therefore Israel argued that their retaliatory strikes, which were acts of war, was justified.

Israels neighbours had different means to control the infiltrations, Lebanon transferred refugees farther north to Tyre and Beirut, the Syrian authorities kept a strict control over their tiny border with Israel and infiltrations from there was rare. The Jordanians who had the longest and widest border with Israel had the biggest problem controlling the infiltration. Many civilians lived close to the border on both sides of it. Most infiltrations came from Jordan and most retaliatory strikes was executed there.

The Arabs, on the other hand, denied support for infiltration and did not understand the Israeli accusations. King Hussein, who took over the thrown in Jordan in May 1953, was very puzzled by the violence of Israel's response to minor incursions over the armistice line. Shlaim (p. 85) writes in an interview with King Hussein of Jordan:

"His puzzlement was all the greater given that the Jordanian authorities had been doing everything that they could 'to prevent infiltration and to prevent access to Israel.'"

They also quote, for instance, the Israeli historian and reserve general, Yehoshafat Harkabi , who concluded:

"... having personally made a detailed study of the whole phenomenon of infiltration, he had arrived at the conclusion that Jordanians and especially the [Arab] Legion were doing their best to prevent infiltration, which was a natural, decentralized and sporadic movement." (The Iron Wall p.93, Shlaim) Moreover, they claim that at least some of the Israeli accusations were simply unfounded, basing on a quote of Harkabi's interview with an alleged Israeli official at that time, Aryeh Eilan:

"If Jordanian complicity is a lie, we have to keep lying. If there is no proofs, we have to fabricate them" (Ibid) Glubb Pasha, the British officer who commanded the Jordan Arab Legion at the time, wrote that

"the Arab Legion was doing its level best to maintain a peaceful border with Israel". (A Soldier with the Arabs 1957, Glubb and "Violence of the Jordan-Israel Border: A Jordan View", Foreign Affairs, 32, no.4, 1954) They also mention a number of documents captured by Israel during the Six-Day War , such as a letter from the minister of defence wrote to the prime minister demanding drastic steps to prevent infiltration, dated 27 February 1952. Therefore, it seems that while the Israeli accusations of direct complicity are unfounded, the Arab governments didn't do enough to guarantee the security of Israel's borders. Morris (p. 270) concludes that:

... "the Arab authorities operated with insufficient vigor and means. Often infiltrators and local civil and military authorities collaborated. Many of the latter turned a blind eye in return for bribes, especially the men of the Jordanian National Guard." It seemed that while on the higher level, the Arab governments showed full cooperation with Israel and the MAC, their policeman and local guards were not always keen about protecting the border.

Yet another version. Is it acceptible now? --Uri

Arab Governmental responsibility

The Israeli government has accused the Arab governments of supporting and sponsoring the infiltrations, as a means to bring about the collapse of the recently created state, which would make Israel the victim of Arab provocation.

The Egyptian formal adoption of the Fedayeen in 1954 seems to support this claim; moreover, Israel points out that after its retaliatory operations, the Arab countries managed to significantly decrease the number of infiltrations by deploying on the borders and by other measures. The non-prevention of armed infiltration (even of non-governmental forces) over an agreed border is widely considered an act of war; therefore Israel argued that their retaliatory strikes, which were acts of war, was justified.

Israel's neighbours had different means to control the infiltrations: Lebanon transferred refugees farther north to Tyre and Beirut, the Syrian authorities kept a strict control over their 50 kilometer-long border with Israel and infiltrations from there was rare. The Jordanians, on the other hand, had the longest border with Israel. Many civilians lived close to the border on both sides of it. According to the Jordanians, this made preventing all infiltrations an impossible task. Most infiltrations came from Jordan and most retaliatory strikes was executed into it.

The Arabs, on the other hand, denied support for infiltration and did not understand the Israeli accusations. King Hussein, who took over the thrown in Jordan in May 1953, was very puzzled by the violence of Israel's response to minor incursions over the armistice line. Shlaim (p. 85) writes in an interview with King Hussein of Jordan:

"His puzzlement was all the greater given that the Jordanian authorities had been doing everything that they could 'to prevent infiltration and to prevent access to Israel.'"

Shlaim writes that the Israeli historian and reserve general, Yehoshafat Harkabi supported this position:

"... having personally made a detailed study of the whole phenomenon of infiltration, he had arrived at the conclusion that Jordanians and especially the [Arab] Legion were doing their best to prevent infiltration, which was a natural, decentralized and sporadic movement." (The Iron Wall p.93, Shlaim)

He proceeds by saying that the Israeli claims were unfounded, basing on an interview with an individual named Aryeh Eilan, who is described as an official in the Israeli Ministry of Exterior:

"If Jordanian complicity is a lie, we have to keep lying. If there is no proofs, we have to fabricate them"

Glubb Pasha, the British officer who commanded the Jordan Arab Legion at the time, wrote that

"the Arab Legion was doing its level best to maintain a peaceful border with Israel". (A Soldier with the Arabs 1957, Glubb and Violence of the Jordan-Israel Border: A Jordanian View, Foreign Affairs, 32, no.4, 1954)

A number of documents captured by Israel during the Six-Day War were publicized, such as a letter from the minister of defence wrote to the prime minister demanding drastic steps to prevent infiltration, dated 27 February 1952.

Therefore, it seems that while the Israeli accusations of direct complicity are unfounded, and on on the higher level, the Arab governments showed full cooperation with Israel and the Mixed Armstice Committee, their policeman and local guards were not always keen about protecting the border, and the Arab governments either lacked the will or the ability to force them to do that. Morris (p. 270) concludes that:

... "the Arab authorities operated with insufficient vigor and means. Often infiltrators and local civil and military authorities collaborated. Many of the latter turned a blind eye in return for bribes, especially the men of the Jordanian National Guard."

There are some sequence of tenses wrong, badly worded sentences and stuff like that. But the content seems right. Put it in somewhere --BL

To Elian (who has removed a part of a sentence from this page). The loss of property is quite real (and substancial; moreover most of it did not belong to Palestinians earlier. Please argument your removal. -Uri 20:28 Oct 7, 2002 (UTC)

I put already a statement on top of the page (custom of german wikipedia).:

taken from the article. reasons: the question of stolen property is not as clear as it seems - how many "infiltrators" just tried to recover in their view "their" stolen property by the Israeli law about the disposition of abandoned property from 1948? What do the UN-resolutions say about this property? Without stating clearly that Israeli government confiscated before this "infiltration" the whole property of more than 500 000 refugees (an also very substantial loss of property, isn't it?) this article gives the reader a very misleading impression. Moreover "terrorized" is not a neutral term. I`d propose a clear split in one part where the armed infiltration and their attacks on Israelis is described and one, where the unarmed try of people to return to their homes (and their occasionally being shot by the Israeli army ) is described. --Elian 00:33 Oct 7, 2002 (UTC)

Palestinian infiltration was a phenomenon of mass crossing by Palestinians of Israel's borders in the years 1949-1956. Most of the infiltrators were refugees, willing to return to their homes prior to the war ...

I am not comfortable with the term "infiltration" in the opening sentence. Returning to one's home is not what comes to my mind when I think of an infiltrator. Maybe a soldier going behind enemy lines. --Ed Poor

From article:

To Israel, the infiltration was a large problem. Although not a large part of the infiltrators, the armed guerillas had left hundreds of Israeli civilians dead, as well as inflicted a considerable loss of property. The infiltration, which was usually carried out at night by desperate people, terrorized the Jewish civilians, some of whom lived in former Arab areas. Moreover, while most of the infiltrators didn't come with the intention to kill, many of them did steal property.

The part which I put in bold was removed by Elian. --Ed Poor

General remark: infiltration seems to me - as a non-native english speaker - to be a very derogative term for the phenomenon of people just trying to go "home". I‘d propose to look for a more neutral term - what about "palestinian influx"? I just did a google search about "infiltration" and it this to be used only by heavily biased (palestinian and Israeli for each other) websites. --Elian 00:33 Oct 7, 2002 (UTC)

The phenomenon of infiltration was mostly not about people going home (which was done by people in the first years), but people stealing and otherwise terrorizing Jews out of principle. Note, by the way, that Israel started with harsh enforcement measures only years after the war. As to the term "Palestinian infiltration", it is used by numerous unbiased sources, and frankly I don't see a particular problem with it. In any case, I don't think it is neutral to deny that the terrorization of the Israelis did take place. --Uri
How do you combine this with During the 1949-1956 period 90% of the infiltrators were motivated by social or economic concerns. (Benny Morris, Israel's Border Wars 1993). However, a minority were militants, who organized armed attacks on Israeli civilians. Between 2,700-5,000 infiltrators were killed in the period 1949-1956, the great majority of them unarmed. (Ibid 412-416) ? The objection I raise doesn't go against the fact of the armed attacks, but against the formulation of the paragraph which I regard as biased. I think we should avoid the term "terrorization" as it's not encyclopedia-style. The most important fact (the dead civilians) is still in the article, so the reader can jugde for himself. If you really insist, reinsert the "loss of property", however, I still consider it as inedequate to speak of "considerable" loss of property in regard to the much greater loss of property which preceded the infiltration. Or what do you think?

For the title - it remains Newspeak, but we can leave it. --Elian

Terrorization is effectively scaring the population (deliberately or non-deliberately). This goal was achieved to a very great extent. Just look at the Israeli newspapers of that time, they convey the miserable mood perfectly.
The loss of property is a measuarable amount of Israel's GDP, which is significant, especially considering the fact that it was done deliberately. Also, "two wrongs don't make a right". You should be free to enumerate the Palestinian property lost in the exodus in the appropriate article. --Uri

next issue: "therefore Israel argued that their retaliatory strikes, which were also acts of war, were justified" just one question: retaliatory strikes against military targets or attacks on civilians? I just wonder if you can justify attacks on civilians as an act of war and if Israel really did so... --Elian

It depends how one defines "justification". In the Middle East, any sort of offence justifies a response. This doesn't correlate at all with the legal norms found elsewhere, but in the Israeli-Arab dynamic this is definitely a form of justification, albeit a bloody one. --Uri



Infiltration is a colored word. It implies a devious intent. Why then don't Israelis refer to Illegal Jewish migration to Palestine in the mid-forties as 'Jewish Infiltration'.

I would have a great deal of evidence in my favor in saying that the casting of Palestinians as devious is consistent with a 'racist' point of view, if not a deliberate agenda to unequally represent facts.

-Sv

Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Palestinian_return_to_Israel/Archive_1&oldid=744299536"