Talk:Philosophical presentism

Presentism today

The only philosopher I know who endorses this view is Mark Hinchliff. He has an article or two available through Jstor.

I am not sure where you get this information. If you think that, then you have not been doing much reading of any of the philosophies of time across the world: in India (Dharmakirti, etc.), France (Deleuze, etc.), America (WIlliam Craig, Quentin Smith's degree presentism, etc.), and so on. Atomist 03:46, 11 May 2006 (UTC)atomist

There are several modern philosophers that defends presentism. Arthur Prior, Alvin Plantinga, Dean Zimmerman, William Lane Craig, Craig Bourne, Thomas Crisp and Roderick Chísholm. Quentin Smiths degree presentism should not be confused with presentism. Smiths theory think of existence as coming in degrees. It is usefull to consider the use of "exist" as univocal between eternalists, presentist and growing blockers. Hinchliff is also a presentist.

I have a complaint about the article and that is that it confusses arguments against presentism and stating the view.

/RickardV 2006-11-04

No offense, but this article is rambling and, after the first two paragraphs, has little to do with presentism. What I suggest: paragraph 1 - define presentism. paragraph 2 - debate between presentists and eternalists. paragraph 3 - history of presentism. paragraph 4 - a survey of those who defend presentism, what motivates them, and how they argue for it. 4.79.138.205 04:30, 9 December 2006 (UTC)bradley

I like the proposal. I think the article would look something like the article on mereological essentialism. I don't right now have the time to write the pice on presentism. But if someone is willing?

--RickardV 18:38, 9 December 2006 (UTC)

The whole section on "Philosophical Objections" seems to be either wrong or badly explained (the "Presentists can respond to this objection [...]"-part is especially bad (partially a strawman argument?)).

Okay "Marie Curie discovered polonium". According to presentism the event of her discovery does not exist.

And then it doesn't really make a point with that build-up. It just states that it violates that truths require truth-makers.

But what's the *exact* truth we are talking about?

The truth cannot be "Polonium exists" because it was discovered, not invented (just stating the obvious here, no surprises).

Maybe a truth like "We believe that Polonium exists"? In the present the discovery doesn't exist (any more). But that doesn't matter in regards to the truth we are talking about. We are constantly reproducing the results of that discovery (text books and memory). The truth of our belief is caused by presently existing influence of the past. So no contradiction there.

So yeah, today we take it on faith that Polonium exists (and when in doubt we can repeat the experiment - which will tell us that it does - and then we have to take *that* result on faith).

That might be surprising.

Even Even Marie Curie, after she finished the experiment, did take it on faith that polonium existed - her belief wasn't caused by the objective reality of her experiment, but by her memory of making it.

This is even independent of the whole presentism vs. eternalism discussion (even if the past objectively exists... that we are currently aware that polonium exists is not a direct result of a past truth-maker, but on us believing a fact about the past).

This seems to be a basic flaw in truth maker theory. It does not seem to be aware of *any* problems related to perception vs. reality.

At least in examples like this

Or any, to be honest... even the one stated on its own wiki entry is nonsense.

"I perceive a green tree" is said to be true if we have absolute knowledge of the existence of a "green tree".

It is said to be false if we have absolute knowledge of the non-existence of said "green tree".

This is already badly phrased. Whether your *perception* of a tree is true does not depend on whether the tree exists, but just on whether you actually perceive it.

And on top of that we have the problem that to determine truth we need to have absolute knowledge about reality, so that theory seems to not be super worthwhile.

TLDR: An objection needs to be very precise in phrasing the truth it is talking about. This one is not.

--2A02:810B:C63F:DF78:7912:4535:FADE:7303 (talk) 22:27, 21 April 2022 (UTC)

Hello and thanks for bringing up this issue. It seems to me that you misunderstand the example with Marie Curie. The question is not whether Polonium exists or what beliefs Marie Curie had. The point is that the proposition "Marie Curie discovered Polonium" is true but presentists have problems in giving an account for why it is true because they deny that the corresponding event of discovery exists. Whether Polonium itself exists or not is besides the point. From what I can tell, you seem to disagree with truth-maker theory in general. But this is not a flaw of the present article. Phlsph7 (talk) 05:17, 22 April 2022 (UTC)

No, that's the point. If the truth is "Marie Curie discovered Polonium", then it is (almost) unprovable today (independent of presentism vs. eternalism). "We believe that Marie Curie discovered Polonium" however has plenty of truth-makers today.

Sloppy language causes problems in philosophy. If you attempt to describe the objection in a concise way I believe it will disappear.

I think truth-maker theory has the benefit of being able to do math if you accept(!) certain truths. The example is especially pointless since to show the truth of "Marie Curie discovered Polonium" (now assuming eternalism) you have to accept that she existed and did that experiment - so in effect you didn't demonstrate that this statement is true. It is circular reasoning.

Those are flaws that are so obvious that using this theory as an objection is weird. At that point you might as well mention what flat earthers think. Which brings me back to my very first sentence ("The whole section on "Philosophical Objections" seems to be either wrong or badly explained").

--2A02:810B:C63F:DF78:59D2:B087:9B47:FA24 (talk) 09:37, 22 April 2022 (UTC)

This section attempts to summarize the academic discourse on the subject. The arguments you present are not directed at the section but at the academic discourse, specifically at how truth-maker theorists criticize presentism. For a similar formulation of the example, with Marie Curie, see here and here. Wikipedia is not the right place to criticize the theories presented in the academic discourse: this falls under Wikipedia:No original research. Phlsph7 (talk) 16:30, 22 April 2022 (UTC)

buddhism?

Buddhists cannot be said to be presentists per se as they do not hold that any perceived object is actually real, past present or future. At least some schools of buddhism teach that perceptions are delusions of awareness unrelated to ultimate reality which is devoid of any rational descriptions or apprehensions. Experiences are facts, beliefs about them are mental fictionsJiohdi (talk) 14:27, 24 April 2008 (UTC)

Please read the link to the Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics before making comments/placing tags

There have been tags put on this page asking for expert input etc. Presentism in the philosophy of time is not described perfectly by the article but it is not so bad as to need tags to say it is inexpert. Before placing tags to undermine the article please read around the subject. Such tags should definitely be accompanied by a proper discussion on this talk page explaining why they have been placed, otherwise they are just malevolent. Geometer 20:06, 26 September 2006 (UTC)

Relativity

I made a minor change, from the claim that presentism is probably incompatible with relativity to the claim that it is probably incompatible with relativity in conjunction with certain relatively uncontroversial philosophical claims. I don't think anyone would seriously suggest that there is an incompatability purely between the two theses: one at least needs claims such as 'what exists is not relative to a reference frame' etc.

there is no incompatibility with relativity as the observer, existing in the present, observes not the events themselves from any still existant past but the photons or other sensory data that is also in the present. The adjustments for travel time allowing the observer to calculate the events origin point in spacetime does not change the fact that his observation is happening only in the present and that in that same present the event he is witnessing is no longer occurring but has occurred and has moved on...which he can guestimate by experience.Jiohdi (talk) 18:14, 22 April 2008 (UTC)

Why is presentism thought to be incompatible with Lorentzian relativity? William Lane Craig and Thomas Crisp have both done work to show the consistency of the two. The article should be edited to say that presentism is probably incompatible with Einsteinian relativity, but compatible with Lorentzian and neo-Lorentzian relativity.

The article links "the modern theory of relativity" to the page on Einstein's theories commonly known by that name (and which are Lorentz Invariant) and also links to the "relativity of simultaneity" so clearly it is not referring to Lorentz's aether-based theory which used Galilean Relativity and in which simultaneity is absolute. Presentism is perceived to be in conflict with Einstein's theories because the "present", as it would be depicted within spacetime, would be a "plane" moving through the "volume" (actually a 3D surface moving through a 4D manifold). The normal to that plane would then identify a unique "preferred axis" corresponding to Newton's Absolute Time which of course is incompatible with relativity. Objects whose worldlines are not parallel to that normal then exhibit phenomenological behaviour which again is not compatible with the modern formulation of physical laws but strongly implies the need for an aether-based alternative or something closely equivalent, and that approach has yet to be successfully reconciled as an alternative theory of gravitation. While the section on the conflict with Relativity could perhaps benefit from some clarification, it is not wrong. George Dishman (talk) 20:39, 8 September 2010 (UTC)

I think we should add to the part about relativity some rebuttals for the presentist viewpoint, just to be fair. Some presentists may opt for a lorentzian interpretation of relatviity (Craig), or look to quantum gravity for a preferred frame (Monton) or even assume in a possibly ad hoc manner that a hidden present exists beyond our empirical observation of it (Cameron?). The merits of these individual views I won't judge here, but at least we should add a paragraph of what a presentist would respond to these objections.

In addition, I think we should make a separate section for relativity, and other possible sections. The article is too crowded as it is, and should be organized like the eternalism page.99.234.145.34 (talk) 21:07, 24 April 2012 (UTC)

Is this right?

If presentism means what I think it means, it makes sense to assume it is wrong, because if you're wrong, it can't cause any problems without a future to cause them in. There is no point in arguing for presentism, because an argument takes time to express, or even to contemplate. Without a future, you will never finish. Does it mean what I think it means? Also, wouldn't it be contradictory with both theories of relativity, along with most, if not all, other physical theories, just because they involve time? — Daniel 03:43, 7 July 2007 (UTC)

If I understand you correct, you believe that presentism is self-referentially incoherent - as I am aware of the litterture on presentism no one has suggested that. Some believe presentism has trouble explaining some causal relation (not causes that are simultanious, if such exists). Craig Bourne discusses some of these points. Maybe you are confusing the existence of only the presence and the existece of no time at all or the view that if there is only one instance of time, there can´t be any change, and events are changes? But one definition of change is that a change of truthvalues and that is someting that presentism defends. The proposition "Socrates was poisoned", change truthvalue by the passage of time. --RickardV 08:50, 8 July 2007 (UTC)

those of us who live in the eternal now have no problem speaking of the past-- personal or collective memories, and the future, which is potentials, probabilities and likely events based on experience. As to taking TIME to express. Our view of time is that it is mind made concept invented to catalogue experiences. Time is a measure of changes in non-linear events by means of comparison to linear or cyclical events... these events happen only in the present moment, but thanks to memory and anticipations we can project them no differently than those who believe the past and future exist, the main difference is that those who believe the past and future exist have not one bit of evidence to support such a notion. Everyone to my understanding experiences the world as I do, here and now along with memories and anticipations which are also existing here and now for those who perceive them. I have yet to meet anyone who had the slightest shred of evidence that the past continues to exist outside of presently existing data about itJiohdi (talk) 18:40, 22 April 2008 (UTC)

Hulse and Taylor won the Nobel Prize for their observations that support the Relativistic model of the binary pulsar system in which the orbits are changing due to the the removal of energy by gravitational waves, ripples in spacetime. The argument then is that, if ripples in time itself can carry energy through space, time cannot be merely a mental abstraction from motion. That supports the "4D manifold" interpretation of relativity and hence perdurantism though not necessarily eternalism which I think you conflate in your comment. While you and I may disagree on that evidence, your statement is far from the NPOV intended by Wikipedia.

George Dishman (talk) 20:56, 8 September 2010 (UTC)

recent edits

clarity of concept is primary. the older version is very misleading.

firstly it is a faith, in that there is no way to demonstrate that only the present exists, as the only evidence we have is our own mental perceptions which contain past present and future all at the same time.

2ndly, presentism is a statement relating to the true nature of reality which no one can know, and so this needs to be clarified in that objects can be mental or physical or other.

while I have faith in the concept of presentism, I find there is no way to prove I am right.Jiohdi (talk) 18:54, 25 April 2008 (UTC)

Presentism is no more "faith" than most philosphical positions. What is or is not knowable is itself subject to debate, your opinion on the subject is just POV.

1Z (talk) 19:38, 26 April 2008 (UTC)

It is not standard to refer to philosophical positions as "faith". E-prime has nothing to do with wikipedia's standards. The orignal article was clear. 1Z (talk) 19:41, 26 April 2008 (UTC)

Error in definitions

There is a serious error on the definition of presentism offered in this article on presentism. The article states "Presentism is the belief that the 'A Series' is fundamental and that B Series facts can be explained or reduced to A series facts". That isn't what presentism is, although presentism does require that. Presentism is the view that only the present exists. Many people believe that the 'A Series' is fundamental, but are not presentists. For example, C.D. Broad.

76.235.72.169 (talk) —Preceding undated comment was added at 00:09, 4 September 2008 (UTC)

There is another error. Presentism is a belief about what things exist. No presentist would say that 'only the present exists.' Certainly I exist, but I am not "the present." Rather, presentism says that only present things exist. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 129.74.229.52 (talk) 18:18, 11 December 2008 (UTC)

I agree with the above posters, but I would add that presentism does not entail the truth of the A-Theory. Presentism and the B-Theory can both be true if the world is instantaneous or frozen in time. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 67.177.117.116 (talk) 06:21, 29 May 2009 (UTC)

Broken Link:http://www.nd.edu/~mrea/Online%20Papers/Four%20Dimensionalism.pdf

This link is broken: Four Dimensionalism. M.C.Rea. The Oxford Handbook for Metaphysics. Describes Presentism and how four dimensionalism contradicts it. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 41.72.103.95 (talk) 19:12, 7 October 2012 (UTC)

copyedit November 2016

I did a bit of copyedit on the article and removed the maintenance template. Here are my notes:

1. I thought there was some ambiguity in the sentence, Other early presentist philosophers include the Indian Buddhist tradition. Does this mean, (a) other early presentist philosophers include those of the Indian Buddhist tradition, or (b) other early presentist philosophers include the Indian Buddhist tradition in presentist philosophy? Or does it mean something else entirely?
2. There is a quote, Ultimately, real is only the present moment. Would it be alright to insert [ity] immediately after "real"?
3. In modern theory of relativity feels a bit awkward to me, with modifiers before and after theory. Would it be possible to change that to: In modern relativity theory? Or would that have other issues?

Please post any comments here, thanks! – Reidgreg (talk) 23:35, 22 November 2016 (UTC)

Abstract of added ref. to lead sentence

What is Presentism? Daniel Deasy Noûs 51 (2):378-397 (2017) Authors

Daniel Deasy University College Dublin Abstract Different versions of the A-theory of time are traditionally defined in terms of whether everything is present, or whether there are also past and future things. In this paper I argue that the traditional way of defining A-theories should be abandoned. I focus on the traditional definition of presentism, according to which always, everything is present. First, I argue that there are good reasons to reject all the most plausible interpretations of the predicate ‘is present’ as it appears in the traditional definition of presentism. It follows that there are also good reasons to reject the most plausible interpretations of the traditional definitions of the other A-theories. I then argue that there is a better way of defining the A-theories, in terms of the question of whether existence has a beginning and an end. Finally, I argue that what goes for the traditional definition of presentism goes for the traditional definition of its modal analogue actualism, according to which necessarily, everything is actual : there are good reasons to reject the traditional definition of actualism in favour of a definition in terms of contingent existence..Arnlodg (talk) 17:21, 23 November 2019 (UTC)

References

Abstract of added ref. to Self-evident, 2nd paragraph

What am I? Descartes’s Various Conceptions of Self Colin Chamberlain Journal of Modern Philosophy (forthcoming) Authors

Colin Chamberlain Temple University Abstract In the Meditations and related texts from the early 1640s, Descartes argues that the self can be correctly considered as either a mind or a human being, and that the self’s properties vary accordingly. For example, the self is simple considered as a mind, whereas the self is composite considered as a human being. Someone might object that it is unclear how merely considering the self in different ways blocks the conclusion that a single subject of predication—the self—is both simple and composite, which is contradictory. In response to this objection, this paper develops a reading of Descartes’s various ways of considering the self. I argue that the best reading of Descartes’s qualified claims about the self, i.e. about the self qua mind or the self qua human being, ultimately presupposes an account of the unqualified self, that is, of the self simpliciter. I argue that the self simpliciter is not a mind, and that it is not a human being either. This result might suggest the pessimistic conclusion that Descartes’s view of the self is simply incoherent. To avoid this result, I introduce a new metaphysical account of the Cartesian self. On my view, the self is individuated by a unified mental life. The self is constituted by the beings that jointly produce this mental life, and derives its unity from it..Arnlodg (talk) 16:43, 26 November 2019 (UTC)

References