Talk:Siege of Fort St. Philip (1815)

"Largest American City"

New Orleans may have been the largest city in the South, but it was definitely not the largest American city in 1815. The New Orleans article shows an 1810 census population of over 17,000, while Boston had over 33,000, Philadelphia had over 53,000 and New York City had over 119,000. I'm removing that phrase.Konchevnik81 (talk) 02:52, 13 January 2013 (UTC)

By comparison, 'By the time Mobile was included in the Mississippi Territory in 1813, the population had dwindled to roughly 300 people' according to the wiki article about that city. Keith H99 (talk) 16:28, 17 July 2024 (UTC)

British "fleet"

There was a British fleet in North American waters, but it was nowhere near here. The vessels involved were very small, so small that they are not even fifth or sixth rate. If this was the "British fleet", they would not have fared so well at Trafalgar. Keith H99 (talk) 14:37, 1 April 2017 (UTC)

It is not so straightforward in determining the ships that comprised Cochrane's fleet in the Gulf Coast. Fortunately, a great number of them are mentioned, given the crews were entitled to a bounty for the Battle of Lake Borgne, this being announced several years later. The London Gazette of July 1821 lists the following vessels:

All five of the small vessels that were present during the mortar bombardment of the Fort by the British
Name, description, burthen tonnage
Aetna, Bomb vessel (sloop), 368
Volcano, Bomb vessel (sloop), 340
Herald, Sloop, 429 38⁄94
Thistle, Brig, 186 39⁄94
Pigmy, Schooner, 196 73⁄94

The frigate that was too big to sail up the Mississippi is there too
Name, description, burthen tonnage
Nymphe, Frigate, 1087 9⁄94

The following Royal Navy troopships are on the list
Name, description, burthen tonnage
Gorgon, Hospital ship, 896 54⁄94
Dictator, 3rd rate en flute, 1379
Diomede, armed Troop Ship, 1107 25⁄94
Alceste, Frigate en flute, 1097 71⁄94
Belle Poule, Frigate en flute, 1076 64⁄94
Hydra, Frigate en flute, 1024 59⁄94
Bucephalus, Frigate en flute, 975 61⁄94
Fox, armed Troop Ship, 696 85⁄94
Dover, Frigate en flute, 692
Thames, Frigate en flute, 661 27⁄94

The following eighteen warships are on the list
Name, description, burthen tonnage
Tonnant, 3rd rate ship of the line, 2281 3 ⁄94
Norge, 3rd rate ship of the line, 1960 39⁄94
Asia, 3rd rate ship of the line, 1763
Royal Oak, 3rd rate ship of the line, 1759
Ramillies, 3rd rate ship of the line, 1677 17⁄94
Bedford, 3rd rate ship of the line, 1606
Armide, Frigate, 1104 30⁄94
Weser, Frigate, 1087 10⁄94
Cydnus, Frigate, 1078 82⁄94
Trave, Frigate, 1069 26⁄94
Seahorse, Frigate, 999 43⁄94
Carron, Sloop, 459 2⁄94
Sophie, Brig-sloop, 387 40⁄94
Anaconda, Brig-sloop, 383 91⁄94
Meteor, Bomb vessel (sloop), 365 32⁄94
Calliope, Brig-sloop, 236 14⁄94
Shelburne, Schooner, 230
Borer, Brig, 183 84⁄94

There is no source for the civilian transports chartered as troopships that were within Cochrane's fleet.

Given that the heaviest vessel, in burthern tonnage, to attack the fort was a shallow draft sloop not exceeding 430 tons, and that a frigate not exceeding 1090 tons was unable to navigate upstream, it appears highly unlikely that the British could have sailed their fleet up the Mississippi. Had this been the case, I would have expected this threat to have been mentioned in greater detail in Roosevelt's writings on the Naval actions of the War of 1812.Keith H99 (talk) 16:24, 18 December 2021 (UTC)

Departure of the British

The last sentence in the siege section makes for interesting reading. An isolated boat would have had trouble communicating with others further away. In this instance, the technology of the day was over-ridden, presumably by the medium of time travel or extra-sensory perception. Not only did they find out news that Cochrane's fleet did not know, in respect of the battle, but also this created such a shockwave that the whole of the Royal Navy left North American waters that day. There are sources that say otherwise. Keith H99 (talk) 20:08, 2 December 2021 (UTC)

Not neutral and lacking in sources

I've re-read this a few times, I've looked at some sources, and the article lacks source-based plausibility in many areas.

It is stated this is an American victory, but I cannot see how this is anything other than an inconclusive engagement.

The article starts off to mention that the battle was

between a sizable British naval fleet[1] attempting to sail the Mississippi River by force in order to provide reinforcements[2] to British forces already attacking New Orleans as part of the Louisiana Campaign, and the single[3] American garrison of Fort St. Philip guarded by a far numerically-inferior force[4].

1. There were three minor vessels, and two bomb vessels, the latter are used for attacking fortifications. The three vessels had 18, 12 and 10 guns respectively. If, using the philosophy of the current article, these constitute a fleet, it causes a problem. Webster's defines a fleet as

a large formation of warships - the largest formation in any navy - controlled by one leader.

Given that the U.S.S. Constitution had 54 guns, it makes it bigger than the aforementioned "fleet". So, there would be a need to have a new word to describe any time that the Constitution is in the company of another ship. Or, you look at the facts, and you use a term other than fleet that is a more accurate collective noun to describe several boats, flotilla probably being the most suitable term here.

2. The aforementioned "fleet" is providing reinforcements. There is no mention of reinforcements in the sources, quite the reverse. There were limited opportunities to use the bomb vessels around New Orleans, so it would certainly make sense to use them against the nearest fortification as a distraction.

3. It would appear that a swathe of the local male population had sworn an oath of chastity and were about to commence a term in a monastery when war broke out, so they joined the US Army instead.

4. If this was a land-based battle, it would make sense for an attacking force to be numerically superior. There is no evidence whatsoever that there was that great a difference between the two. Were that the case, I would have expected there to have been an order from the British to capture the fort, and for a significant amphibious force to have been landed. Instead, it would make sense that the fort was engaged to tie down the enemy as a distraction, and for the bomb vessels to be doing something more meaningful.

The article hobbles along

With Major Walter H. Overton in command of the American forces, and Admiral Cochrane leading the British,[5] the siege of Fort St. Philip began at 12:00 am on January 9, 1815 when the Royal Navy[6] approached the fort

5. Cochrane was not here. He was with a fleet of ships off Cat Island (Mississippi). He writes on January 18 that he has not received a report as to how the diversion has gone.

6. The Royal Navy in its entirety did not turn up, only five vessels did

With regard to the "fleet", there is the following unsourced statement

The vessels provided armed longboats, armed barges, launches, and armed gigs.

It would appear that Lake Borgne was being fought once more. Major Overton's eyewitness account refers to 'two barges'. There is nothing to indicate any more.

Two of the fort's batteries fired a salvo, hitting at least one of the longboats; this quickly forced the British to abandon their effort[7] but not before the British learned of the American artillery strength on the riverside of the fort. St. Philip's riverside strength forced the larger UK vessels to stay out of range. Enabling the British only to fire their broadsides at great distances, around 3,960 yards from the American positions.[8]

7. This did not force 'the British to abandon their effort' as they were around for days to come.

8. This poorly worded bastardisation of Overton's account is incorrect. How can a pair of unarmed row boats fire a broadside?

on January 19, 1815 the British abandoned their attempt to destroy the fort by sailing away to find an alternate waterway to New Orleans[9]. After learning of the British defeat at the city,[10] the Royal Navy[11] canceled their cruise to reinforce their already defeated army.[12]

9. I am confused. I am being told they are to find an alternative waterway to New Orleans. I thought they had the different purpose of bringing reinforcements?

10. From January 9 to January 19, the British vessels have been alone in the Mississippi. Cochrane confirms that he has heard nothing from them. Where is the proof they learned of the outcome of the battle, and on that basis alone they disengaged?

11. Based upon the above, the entirety of the Royal Navy left North America, apparently. This is not true. The two bomb vessels, HMS Aetna and HMS Volcano were moored off Mobile Sound in February 1815.

12. The "fleet" was going to provide reinforcements, of whom there is no evidence of these being in this five vessel "fleet", so the question is what happened to the reinforcements after this?

The siege of Fort St. Philip ended with an American victory due to the British failure to pass the fort in order to reinforce the British army[13] at New Orleans. The siege provided Andrew Jackson with valuable time to re-deploy his forces[14] for another possible British invasion.[15] British casualties are unknown, but one bomb vessel and several small boats were damaged.[16]

13. It's this old chestnut again. The British had a goal of passing the fort, in order to reinforce the British Army, which of course id not documented. This "fleet" has an admiral that wasn't there, reinforcements that weren't there, and the size and quantity of the vessels suggests it was not a fleet.

14. If a fort is being bombarded for a week, how exactly does this have any material impact on Jackson's operations elsewhere.

15. This is a loaded word. An invasion is not something that is done on a weekly basis. An "attack", yes, but another "invasion" is implausible.

16. Speculation and no source. These mythical several small boats seem to eclipse the actual number of vessels with a fixed armament.

The article in part suggests this was a Battle of Midway type engagement that changed the course of the war. The general lack of sources indicates that the article is a lot of wishful thinking, else there would be a lot more primary source material on this engagement than there currently is. Given that history is written by the victors, based on the latter statement I'd see this as an inconclusive engagement that few people saw fit to document at the time it occurred. Keith H99 (talk) 10:28, 3 December 2021 (UTC)

Major Overton's eyewitness account

Some interesting chunks from his eyewitness account

I erected small magazines in different parts of the garrison, that if one blew up I could resort to another; built covers for my men to secure them from the explosion of the shells, and removed the combustible matter within the works...

On the first of this present month I received the information that the enemy intended passing this fort to co-operate with their land forces in the subjugation of Louisiana, and the destruction of New Orleans...

They anchored two and one quarter miles below [the fort]... To my great mortification I found they were without the effective range of my shot, as many subsequent experiments proved....The only thing to be regretted [by ending the 10 day battle] is that the enemy was too timid to give us an opportunity of destroying him...

On the 17th in the evening our heavy mortar was said to be in readiness. I ordered... to open a fire, which was done with great effect, as the enemy from that moment became disordered, and at daylight on the 18th commenced their retreat......

An informative account of the ten day engagement Keith H99 (talk) 10:01, 14 December 2021 (UTC)

Strength of the fort's garrison

From Latour

'The garrison was composed of the following companies, viz

2 Field and Staff
64 Captain Wollstonecraft's Artillery
50 Murray's Artillery
3 Detachment of captain Walsh's Artillery
78 Captain Broutin's 7th regt. Infantry
85 Waides's 7th Infantry
54 Lagan's Louisiana Volunteers
30 Listeau's Free men of Colour
--
366 soldiers.'

40 sailors from gunboat no. 65

In all, there were two companies of infantry from the 7th Infantry. Keith H99 (talk) 13:14, 25 December 2021 (UTC) :reformatted Keith H99 (talk) 13:15, 25 December 2021 (UTC)

Outcome of the siege - inconclusive, or a victory

@MarkMcCain (talk · contribs)

Removing a source, which appears in three other locations in the article, is not good practice, unless there is a better source.

Similarly, for something as fundamental as the outcome, there is more brevity to the argument if a historian who can be considered a reliable source is quoted. To my mind, Roosevelt was highly dismissive of the affair. The website that you have quoted contains inaccuracies about the engagement.

If you are able to find accounts by identifiable historians, who could be considered as reliable sources, then please do take the time to add these. Keith H99 (talk) 16:28, 30 December 2022 (UTC)

Reliable sources are defined as those with a good reputation and a solid editorial process. Blogs, tabloid journalism, and sponsored content are not to be used. Peer-reviewed industry journals can be used where appropriate.Keith H99 (talk) 10:36, 2 January 2023 (UTC)

Remini's perspectives

In 1977, Chapter 18, pg 288, he had the following viewpoint.

Admiral Cochrane, rather belatedly, attempted to run his fleet past Fort St. Philip on the lower Mississippi. It was a foolish and pathetic gesture; if the operation made any sense at all, it needed to be executed in conjunction with the general attack on the Rodriguez Canal. Instead the bombardment by Cochrane's ships began on January 9

His 1999 publication has a conspiracy theory, pg 168, Chapter 8, without sources to back this up

Admiral Cochrane, Admiral Edward Codrington, the fleet captain, Colonel John Burgoyne (the illegitimate son of General John Burgoyne)... also felt that if the fleet could sail unopposed up the Mississippi it could bombard New Orleans with a hundred or more cannon and guns of various sizes and land troops behind Jackson's lines. The only real obstacle to the plan was Fort St. Philip at Plaquemine[sic]

The vessels that were small enough to cross the sandbar did not muster 'a hundred or more cannon', though.

A change of viewpoint, but one lacking in supporting evidence that had come to light at some point between 1977 and 1999. Keith H99 (talk) 13:29, 3 November 2024 (UTC)