Talk:Simulated reality hypothesis/Archive 3

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Splitting the article

I think that the neutrality of this article can be argued. Perhaps the inormation in this article can be transfered to another article that actually has to do with ethics in Simualted Reality. This article tells only very little about the science and development of Simulated Reality.

I think it's less a case of neutrality and more a case of the article being to vague in intent. An article on "simulated reality" as a concept can include anything about simulated reality, I suppose, but thats a LOT of stuff to cover. I think it would be good to use this page as kind of a jumping off point to other relevant articles. This article can explain the concept, then in the see also section, or wherever, it can link to other articles, such as "simulated reality in philosophy", or "simulated reality in fiction", and so forth.

Of course, the "science" of simulated reality doesn't yet exist (for us/as far as we know), so one may only include so much on the science and technology aspect of simulated realities. Also, the various philosophical issues are vitally important to the topic of simulated reality. Such basic questions as "Does it make a difference if we're in a simulated reality right now?" speak to the relevance of the article itself, do they not? --Agondie 10:35, 1 June 2006 (UTC)

I don't think it is necessary to define a "simulated reality" as one that would be impossible to tell from the real thing. Virtual realities are simulated realities, just very crude ones at the moment. A simulated reality can go from being obviously fake to something that fools almost everyone except perhaps the one(s) who created it. -- 24.98.104.230

I think this is a good argument for splitting this article in to several articles. When I came here, I was looking for info on the Nick Bostrom simulation argument, and had not considered how many other, only vaguely related things the term itself can apply too.

Computational load=

About "The simulation argument, due to the philosopher Nick Bostrom,", has no philosopher pointed that the requirement of computers for simulation is based only in that, in "reality", we need computers to simulate things. In a real simulation, the hardware can be totally different and based in another laws than the ones running in the simulation.

It seemed clear to me when I read about simulations. I'd be surprised if I am the first to find about it. -- Error

Can simulations change logic itself?

Indeed, that's regularly suggested. We could write a computer model in which 1+1=3, and then run it to see how that universe would work...likewise every fundamental truth of our universe is called into question by the simulation argument. This is a possible solution to the Prime Mover problem, as in the "real" universe the laws may be such that one can explain the origin of everything without fallacy. Kaz 19:49, 25 January 2006 (UTC)

Of course we can't write a simulation where 1+1 is really three. We can write simulations where simulated people believe it is, and possible where physics behaves in something like that way -- if you bring two similar objects together, a third one springs into existence. But 1+1=3 is a mathematical/logical truth, not a physical or psychological one. Likewise, if the Prime Mover is a genuinely logical problem, it won't be solved by a simulation. And if it isn't genuinely logical we can simply dispense with the need for the hypothesis of a PM in this universe, whether it is a real universe or not. The claim that this universe is being simulated makes no difference either way.1Z 18:11, 10 January 2007 (UTC)1Z

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The claim (see Kaz above) that every fundamental truth of our universe must be dispensed with if we are to allow for the possibility of simulations is a tricky one. When making this claim, one needs to be careful not to confuse empirical truths about our universe with the basics of logic itself. A different set of physics laws bears far different implications than A = ~A. Even the most basic laws of physics must be discovered, and once they are, they become basic, accepted assumptions. The basic rules of logic, on the other hand, are self-evident. There need be no assumption. I as a rational being cognize in a particular (rational) way, one which involes the principle of identity (A = A), as an easy example. If this kind of basic truth were to change if I were placed in a different simulation, it's difficult to see how.

Assuming:

(a) that I only experience any reality I might happen to be in, simulation or not,

and

(b) that I exist,

it follows that

(c) whatever is self evidently true to my intellect, such as A = A, will be true in any reality I (or a rational being like me) might find myself.

As for (a), a "simulation" itself assumes the dichotomy between self and the universe, for if it is possible that the universe is a simulation, then all theories in which my own existence is one with the universe may be ruled out. This is especially true if we allow the possiblity of multiple concurrent simulations, or simulations within simulations. Monism is impossible if "the universe" is not the only one. (Of course, monism in an infinitely great sense is still possible, but the simulation I'm in will never be as real as me, which brings us to (b).) That I exist (b), is a very modest claim, I imagine. I'm able to experience my reality, simulation or whatever it might be, so I have experiences. I also clearly have thoughts. Since surely I exist in some form or another (and not just as a simulation or a dream, since I don't fancy Pac Man knows he's a video game or that my friends in my dreams know they're dreams), and since surely I'm separate from my reality, whatever is self evidently true to me will remain true regardless of the simulation I'm in.

Some fundamental truths really are just that. Others, like the laws of physics, rest on empirical assumptions which need not be true of other realities. For these reasons, I find it difficult to accept the possibility that logic itself might be different in a simulation "above" ours, or any other reality/simulation. --Agondie 10:35, 1 June 2006 (UTC)

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I disagree that the rules of logic are self evident no matter what your "true" reality is. The rules of logic are indeed based on assumptions of fact, namely that A is a binary variable. If in fact we are in a simulation then it is possible that questions such as is the sky blue could in fact have multi-state answers, in which both conditions are true. --sumguysr 12:44, 10 April 2007 (UTC)

Have multi-state answers because the sky is different, or because truth is different? 1Z 00:55, 11 April 2007 (UTC)

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I'm not sure that it was Neuromancer that featured the simulated reality, the "Aleph". I think it was Mona Lisa Overdrive.

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I think the simulation argument is somewhat misrepresented - really it says either we will not reach a stage where we can run simulations, or if we do we won't be interested in running them, or we're probably in a simulation. He doesn't try to argue for the falsity of the first two hypotheses. Ledge 10:25, 19 Aug 2003 (UTC)

List

Hey, does someone want to go through the list of literature and films and make sure they're all in the right category? I split the ones I recognized, but there were definately a few I didn't, so if anyone notices one in the wrong category, please fix it! Thanks. -Seth Mahoney 20:27, Jun 14, 2004 (UTC)

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A question:

Would not the fact that an observer in the double slit experiment colapses the wave to a particle not be evidence that some form of compression takes place in all data, including reality? So to say that some functions of a simulation exist because they result from things inherent to the real world. Or to put it in a vastly simple way, when you look at certian things, they look at you. The question is does it take sentience in order to truely observe something, is there something which sentience is linked to which can actively change reality?

You didn't sign your question. Yes, it's been proposed, by myself and others, that the lack of determinism in the quantum model of the universe could be circumstantial evidence of our being in a simulation; the reason events don't occur unless they become relevant to interaction with some other important event is that this allows the simulator to "throw away" nonessential data, and that the lack of a specific position for particles, or the existence of particles at all (as with interference pattern experiments in light) could be a form of data compression. Kaz 19:49, 25 January 2006 (UTC)

Firstly it is not a fact that consciousness causes collapse. It is a contentious theory.

Secondly, the argument assumes that the computer we are being simulated by has similar limitations to the ones we are familiar with. However, we cannot make that judgement from within the simulation. If simulations can change mathematical and logical truth, as Kaz unusually claims, they can easily change computer engineering. And even if Kaz is wrong about that, and logical truths are the same in all universes, we still cannot be confident about what kind of computer we are being simulated on1Z 18:18, 10 January 2007 (UTC)

I don't know, if a tree falls in the woods and no-one's around, does it make a sound? WikiSlasher 12:23, 25 June 2006 (UTC)

From reading a book, "Programming the Universe" by Seth Lloyd, a quantum mechanics professor at MIT, then only computer that can simulate the universe is a quantum computer the size of the universe. This computer would model the universe perfectly and would be indistinguishable from the 'real' universe. Thus there is no difference between a true simulation of the law of physics and the 'real' universe.

Omega Computer and infinite recursive Simulated Realities

One thing that always bothered me is the computing power required to run a meaningfull simulation. One explanation is that the containing universe is vastly more complex and that our simplified universe can be runned on computers that may cost the same as a cellphone(of course in the context of their universe). The problem comes in when WE want to run a meaningfull simulation. Even the game of life would be limited to trillions of cells on the fastest super computers. Okay so you say moore's law, even if we convert all the mass in the solar system with processors that have almost theoretical energy per computation efficiency, you run your gazzillion cell game of life simulation and seeds it randomly, even if intelligent "life" arises all you will see is well... a mass of boiling cells...not much of a "zoo factor" which is after all the main reason for running the simulation in the first place, you want to see something interesting, novel and new. So you up the complexity which means more processing power, so you convert the galaxy which you can't... The problem with parallel computers is the communication delay between nodes, the speed of light limit. Even if you add more computers the effect will be less and less. Even if we slow down our own perception by allocating more resources to the simulation, there is the little problem of the sun running out of fuel, you can end up literally slowing down your perception and thought processes so much that the universe starts dying around you. So when the simulation is to simple it is boring and when it is too complex it is impossible to implement. That is frankly why I think the more complex universe argument does not wash, the beings in that universe themselves would also be vastly more complex and more intelligent, which means we will be the equivalent to the game of live, extremely boring.

One way that negates all that is if you can find a way to access an infinite pool of processing resources. Now the only way that we currently know of is Prof. Tipler's Omega Computer hypothesis. In the omega computer a person as complex(or simple) as ourselves can run a perfect simulation of the universe. Of course it is assumed that the GUT(Great unifying theory) will be ancient knowledge. This will enable the person to run the universe with perfect and accurate rules. This means that the simulated universe will ultimately collapse into it's own omega computer which means some person in that computer... you get the idea a infinite recursion of omega computers in the master process. This has the implication that the model universe will never reach the halting state(the final moment of the Crunch a point of no volume) but will exponentially demand more processing resources. This will be like trying to reach the speed of light you have to use more energy as your mass increases, but only tends towards lightspeed even if you use infinite energy for acceleration. Even if a fraction of persons decide to run a simulation, there will be infinite amount of universe simulations because a fraction of infinity is still infinity. This of course applies to all the omega computers and universe simulations down the chain. The master omega computer does not mind, the OS just keep on allocating resources from an infinite pool to an infinite amount of processes that exponentially demands more resources.

So my conclusion is that the simulation argument by Bostrom is right only if Tipler is right or you can access an infinite amount of processing power(only Tipler has currently shown how this may be possible). In this case we are almost certainly in a simulation, but this does not realy matter or have any implication, even the master or "real" universe has been reduced to an omega computer.

The GUT itself will be fundamentally complex, thus while complex processes can emerge from interacting simple processes the GUT itself will be irreducible complex. The GUT will under some instances and circumstances like the Crunch recurse into infinitely more complex loops and calculations.--Alma-Tadema 17:07, 25 February 2006 (UTC)

It seems you assume that the reality "above" ours shares the same physical aspects as our universe (e.g. a sun, the same forms of power and processing). Tipler's thoughts, if they are based on empirical truths about our universe, may only be applied to our universe. To extrapolate to other realities is necessarily speculation.--Agondie 11:38, 1 June 2006 (UTC)

Yes, I adressed it in paragraph 1, obviously the reality above ours will have to be more complex and that there is a chance that more complex beings don't want to consume their time with us "more simple things".

Of course the "other realities" will be in our own reality, we are talking about simulations here. There is only one master reality that contains many simulations, that can be viewed as sub realities.--Alma-Tadema 18:07, 12 June 2006 (UTC)

The simulated universe need not run in realtime, either. Our universe could be chugging along on somebody's Apple ][ and we'd never know the difference. Let's just hope they've got the thing on a UPS. :)Txinviolet 22:24, 19 December 2006 (UTC)

I'm a little late on this--Where's the evidence of other realities? This is crazy! "It's none of our business what goes on beyond our borders" Scorpionman 21:28, 6 January 2007 (UTC)

Simulated reality in fiction - in video games

Some of these don't seem like they should be put here, after all what do FF7/10 have to do with "simulated reality"? I don't see how it relates to the definition of simulated reality as described in the article. Perhaps someone would like to elaborate, otherwise some things are gonna get scrapped. WikiSlasher 06:39, 19 August 2006 (UTC)

Actually don't answer that I haven't finished either game. --WikiSlasher 02:05, 19 December 2006 (UTC)

PBS show and others had stories in the mid 80's about 'simulated reality'

I remember a PBS show from the 1980's that mentioned a philosopher who believed we are in a simulated reality and that we wake up after the game is over.

Then when is the game over? Scorpionman 18:25, 6 January 2007 (UTC)

Was/were

Recently, an edit was made to the sentence

Also, what would happen if the human, which grew up to accept the simulated reality, was brought out of the simulation?

to change it to

Also, what would happen if the human, which grew up to accept the simulated reality, were brought out of the simulation?

Was/were was always something where I often didn't know what was right, so if anyone wants to answer that'd be nice. WikiSlasher 10:06, 11 September 2006 (UTC)

Was was correct. Were, not so much. There is a singular/plural aspect to was/were, and the alterer did not apparently appreciate that fact. I cannot say that "the human were brought out", I can say that the humans were brought out, or that the human was brought out. Aragond 08:09, 5 October 2006 (UTC)

That makes sense. --WikiSlasher 11:44, 5 October 2006 (UTC)

AFAIK, in a past tense if clause, you have to use were. "If I were a rich man, la la la la la la la la la la la la la."88.247.169.45

It is more correct to use "were" in a past tense clause when the action is desired or conditional ("if"), and this should be used in formal writing; however, "was" is generally considered correct and acceptable in more casual forms of writing and in conversation. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 58.179.26.213 (talk) 11:04, 16 March 2007 (UTC).

See subjunctive mood. Were is the correct tense to use in this context. Tony Fleet --88.106.158.3 10:43, 18 March 2007 (UTC)

Matrix assumption

It seems the writers of this article, or at least some of the sections, are assuming that these "simulations" are in fact sensory simulations performed on real people rather than true simulations which don't exist in physical reality. I read a little stuff on Bostrom's website, and I think what he had in mind was a true mathematical simulation.

For instance, we determine the equations governing the firing of neurons in the brain (we've already done some work on this, see the Hodgkin-Huxley Equations). We design a computer simulation of a brain consisting of billions of neurons (let's assume we have all the memory we need) organized like a human brain, and simulate their firings. Theoretically, this computer simulation should produce the same results as actual human thought. It could therefore be argued that this simulation, run on an ordinary electronic digital computer processor, is in fact conscious. No actual human hooked up to anything. I think something like this should be explained in the article so readers are not making the "Matrix assumption" of an actual human having sensory input fed into his brain, which I think is a completely unnecessary assumption.

Also, I think in light of this, the point made my Neurodivergent in the section "It's not necessary for the simulation to occur" above has not been properly addressed, in that his detractors have missed the point. He is simply extending the argument I just made to say the same simulation (which resulted in consciousness) could be done with pencil and paper, and speculating on what that might mean. Mbarbier 02:49, 16 November 2006 (UTC)

Yep yep. I addressed this in the article's new first topic, "Types of Simulation", which describes the three main categories of simulation (of which the Matrix is the "videogame" variety).Txinviolet 22:26, 19 December 2006 (UTC)

Bostrom

I think the piece is improving as we include other thinkers who laid the groundwork. As much as I enjoy reading Nick's materials the early pioneers are not modern philosophers. It's good that someone has written a thought experiment, but it seems like some of the editors are treating Bostrom like he was the father of the simulation argument -- which he was not.

I would like to see this become less of an advertisement for his articles and more an overview of how we got to this point. And I'm happy to see that some of you have taken the time to research the topic and include the groundbreaking work of early thinkers.

Watching The Matrix and then writing a paper is not nearly as impressive as coming to that conclusion all on your own. Without any technology to point you in that direction, which is precisely what the early philosophers were able to do.

Right, how did we come to that conclusion? Why would the advanced society let us think that? Wouldn't they not want us to know? Scorpionman 18:27, 6 January 2007 (UTC)

Editing suggestion

I recommend that editors who may disagree with a point that is debatable include their alernative view rather than removing it competely. I've done this where I recognize a plausible alternative explanation. When you simply remove it that rubs people the wrong way.

It comes across as "this is my baby". And that results in a lot of negative feelings when we're all interested in the same topic. And that means people who would otherwise invest a lot of energy will simply go place it on the web without having to get into a test of wills.

If we work together in a cordial manner this could lead to something interesting. However, if we treat it like our personal online sandbox it will lead to disinterest and ultimately a lot of extra editing.

Just my two cents.

NEW ADDITION

I would like to propose the addition of an explanation of an idea that I haven't seen on this page yet described like this. Here it is in a nutshell:

• The mathematical workload that must be surmounted to generate a reality as rich and complex as say, for example ours, is huge. However, the peak workload variable (not how much computing power it would take per se, but how much content must be generated for all minds connected and the resolution in which it is expressed) in terms of total minds connected to or interacting with a simulated world like ours isn't too hard to conceive, at least for me. The answer lies in the maximum number of people (it doesn't matter if they are real or simulated within the simulation in this argument) that will be involved. How many minds out of the total are focused on activities that would require a great deal of resolution to bring into the fold of the simulation? The answer again is population. As in an everyday computer system, not each and every process (or simulated experience) will task the cpu 100% in ways that are going to interrupt the desired effect. How many people are there on the earth? How many people can be engaged in activities that require continuous 100% observation or exposure to their effects or behaviors? Is it concieveable that free will, or for that matter opportunity itself, is associated or could be asscociated with available "cpu cycles", that is, the direct connection with more people working or exposed to events that require computational power that is beyond everyday activities?

In this suggested addition, I'm proposing a kind of heirarchy of activies that describe the complexity which would require more mathematical workload and less mathematical workload to establish content and build an experience. Before I get into that, please let me know what you think. Will my ideas fit into the premise of this page and if so, in what capacity?

RESPONSE TO NEW ADDITION SUGGESTION

“The mathematical workload that must be surmounted to generate a reality as rich and complex as say, for example ours, is huge.”

I don’t know if the computational workload is as insurmountable as it seems. After all, the entire world you perceive (100% of it) is a simulation and not the real thing. Your brain doesn’t hear or see anything. Instead, electrical signals are sent to the neurons which then translate the data and construct an artificial representation.

Information is edited out. And that’s why we don’t see ultraviolet light and microwaves.

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At best the article is confused here. It clearly states that our brains filter out UV and microwave information. This is nonsense -- our eyes aren't sensitive to those frequencies and so there's no information to filter. See the article on Cone Cells if you're confused about this. - SteveH

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I am not confused. I will try to amend the article1Z 18:08, 8 February 2007 (UTC)

We experience the world at 24 frames per second, which is very slow when compared to what a super computer is capable of rendering. Even off the shelf graphics processors can render 175 fps.

Assuming computer technology continues to advance at its current rate, then around the year 2066 a personal computer within the price range of the common man will be able to generate the number of frames you experience in your entire life (60 billion) in approximately 60 seconds.

If you’re impatient then your entire life could flash before your eyes in less than 1 second in the year 2080. That’s just 73 years from now – many people alive today will live to see those kinds of computing speeds assuming we don’t wipe ourselves out before then. But if this is a simulation then there is little to fear.

But what about everybody else?

That will require a little more patience. In about the year 2196 a computer within the economic reach of the common man will be able to generate a lifetime of frames for a population three times the current world population in less than 1 second.

That’s only 189 year from now and it assumes in the future we’re not pooling together millions of chips before that date to perform the exact same task. This also presumes we need everything to happen in exactly 1 second. It’s conceivable that we could have things happen in minutes or even hours like in current simulations. In fact, we might even be sharing the resources now which would explain our need for “sleep”.

This reduces the processor load by at least 20% since we no longer need the system to keep track of every detail. Instead lower resolution goobledeygook (aka dreams) can be rendered which allows other players who are “awake” to experience higher resolution simulations.

It’s my assumption that we’re most likely not a million years in the future, but more than likely a shorter distance in the future. Which explains our fascination with this time – a time before simulations. A time when we actually had to live out everything in “real time”. Instead of an entire lifetime of experience in a few seconds, minutes, or hours.

Today there are a small number of simulations so a few simulations get all of the players. In the future we can assume there will be many simulations and perhaps a relatively small number of players compared to the number of perceived inhabitants.

Not every single person needs to be real – just enough to make it seem real. And for humans that number is probably 150-500 people. If that many people are in the game or if that many people generated with enough detail to fool you then it should seem like the real world.

Count the number of people who you know and interact with on a regular basis. It’s probably not even close to 500.

This world is rendering at trillions of frames per second based on our calculations, which would place us at least 100 years in the future if this is a representation of the recent past. We made the calculations based on the known size of the galaxy, planck length, and planck time. Of course, if the galaxy is not a true representation and this simulation is not of the recent past then the calculations could be dramatically off. In which case we could be millions of years in the future.

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How do you know we aren't in the past experiencing a simulation of the future? In fact, how do you know it's a simulation at all? In fact, how do you know that I'm not a machine trying to fool you? Perhaps I'm one of the Simulators, cruelly fooling all you miserable little simulated creatures into thinking that you're real enough to be thinking up all of this! You've seen too much! Stop snooping into stuff that isn't your business! Scorpionman 21:23, 6 January 2007 (UTC)

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Part of the fun is not knowing for sure. When you realize you're in a dream you can be fooled by your brain by waking up in your bedroom only to wake up again. This happens to some people. Simply discussing it doesn't change the fact that the simulation could be designed to factor in our own experimentation to determine if it's live or Memorex.

However, since we're able to have a lively discussion about it I highly doubt the simulators (if they exist) are too worried about us. Even if we subjectively feel it's a simulation 99.99% of the population will disagree.

Most people think their dreams are real until they wake up. So in that sense we're predisposed to believe the world of make believe is reality.

-Lord Volton, III, of house Florian.

Computational power req'd to simulate universe

I realize I'm a little late to the debate on the computational power required to simulate the universe. I find the debate amusing since a single brain in our reality is capable of simulating the world that some are debating is too computationally intensive to mimic.

A single brain does it. It's not a futuristic computer making use of quantum mechanics or femtotechnology. It's one brain running fairly slow, through massivelly parallel, neurons.

Perhaps because we don't relish the idea of this being a simulation we spend time trying to talk ourselves out of being able to simualate the universe. And to be honest this isn't a full "universe" simulation since all of us are still on or near the planet Earth.

I think the brain's simulation of the universe leaves a fair bit to be desired over the real thing, especially if you are talking about dreams. By most observations, the universe's scope and level of consistency far outstrip the brain's capabilities. -Fennec (はさばくのきつね) 05:29, 3 January 2007 (UTC)

response to Fennec

I agree with you Fennec, but we're always limited by our brain's capabilities. No matter how much information may or may not be there -- I can only experience up to the limit of my brain. In fact, all of the potential information that is purportedly there must also be condensed into my brain's reality limits.

Which means that we can fake it. I don't know for a fact that subatomic particles exists since I can never actually see them. I just see a machine that gives me a read out that verifies their existence, but always at my brains limit.

And that is why it's not that difficult to mimic our reality from a computational standpoint. We just fake everything beneath the perception level of our eyes and ears, so when you look into a microscope your eyes see molecules, etc. And when the new machine is created that is supposed to measure quarks it does its job and I only see a printout.

When you look there we render it. When you're not looking there is nothing there. The observer effect that is discussed in this article is a great mechanism to achieve this goal and conserve processesing power.

The basic idea is that we're never creating anything smaller than what can be observed by our natural senses. If this world is using such a system then we're just buying into the fiction that these super tiny items exist in the simulated sense (i.e., being rendered to that level of detail). However, they could still obey whatever rules of physics are being employed even if they're not being rendered down to that level of specificity. -Lord Volton

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This is the leader of the advanced society you're all talking about. I just would like to tell you that you have indeed been living in a simulation, and nothing you see is real. BTW, what exactly fuels a computer simulation anyway? Electrons and photons. Since we don't know that those exist, then they can't fuel a simulation, therefore a simulation can't exist! Scorpionman 18:23, 6 January 2007 (UTC)

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Proof

Guys...This article talks as if we are for sure living in a simulated reality. Where's the proof of this? If we are living in one, why are we thinking that we are? How do you know for sure that we're living in one? You can't, if we are, frankly the society that's doing it would have made sure that we can't find out that we're in a simulation. Scorpionman 18:42, 6 January 2007 (UTC)

Besides, whoever's running this simulation sure is doing a pretty poor job! Global warming, disease, wars, famine, death, destruction, and doom! Sure isn't something a good programmer would do, unless he's a sadist! Perhaps if I ask him, he'll simulate snow! We haven't had any for months and it's winter already! I'll bet he's just trying to drive me nuts... —The preceding unsigned comment was added by Scorpionman (talk • contribs) 21:19, 6 January 2007 (UTC).

I do agree the article seems to be a bit biased and seems to present the subject as if we were infact living in a simulated reality. Although I'm not sure we should jump to the conclusion that if we were hypothetically living in a simulated reality that the owners/creators of the reality wouldn't want us to know about it. For all we know they could want us to figure it out. Or for all we know they don't care at all about what we think or speculate about. --Dr. WTF 01:05, 10 January 2007 (UTC)

About global warming, disasters and such, if the universe was simulated planent earth wouldent nessisarly be the center of attention. When someone makes a 3d computer model, they arnt aware of each individual polygon that makes up the 3d object. The milky way galaxy might just be one small particle in some giant simulated being that is the focus of the simulation.

response to Proof

Your reaction is understandable. And the simulation argument is a theory.

If you spend some time analyzing this world from the perspective of a simulation programmer you may come to a different conclusion. Of course the first simulations would be fantasy based where you're the knight in shining armour. That is exactly how things work in the simulated worlds we create in the gaming industry right now.

I'm sure in a universe of simulated worlds fantasy simulations are very popular, assuming simulated worlds exist. But after being simulated as the knight, pro basketball player, and rich billionaire millions of times it would get old.

And then we'd start to create open ended simulations where the characters are given more freedom. After all, how much fun is poker if you can read the opposing players cards? That's not much of a challenge.

This world is a challenging world by comparison, and therefore the people who would come to such a world would no doubt have worn out the early, no-brainer simulations where everything goes their way and they live out a fantasy.

Alternatively, this could be a historical simulation based on actual events. And if that is the case then there would be a need to simulate both the good and the bad. That doesn't mean that the bad things are happening to sentient beings, since the people who die or suffer an inordinate amount could be non-player characters -- but we cannot tell the difference since we assume everyone is real.

On a more practical level there are examples in our world. We play football for fun and a lot of pain can result: broken legs, torn ligaments, and even death. But that doesn't stop us from playing simply because there is the potential for negative and often painful results. The same is true in other sports: boxing, hockey, etc.

There are a lot of possibilities to explain suffering and sorrow and our motivations to live in worlds where there is death and tragedy. Others have mentioned that if we're immortal then there would probably be no topic more fascinating than living a finite existence.

-Lord Volton, III, of House Florian.

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Yeah, I guess so. That's not really evidence though. Scorpionman 04:07, 7 January 2007 (UTC)

_________

You remind of a running debate I have with a character in my dream. I tell him it's a dream and he says, "Prove it!"

I tell him the only way to prove it is to wake up. But since he's just part of my imagination (a simulant) it still will not prove it for him.

Your request is very similar. The only way to prove you're in a simulation is to get out of it or for something to happen that makes it obvious to you that it's a simulation. This is asking the simulation to do you a favor rather than getting your hands dirty and figuring it our for yourself.

You want a miracle. To be shown beyond any shadow of doubt that it's a simulation. Another short cut is for evidence that it's real and not a simulation.

Wouldn't we all love it if we could simply get the answer without understanding what the question is in the first place? But that's not how this place was designed. It would be quite a weak simulation if simply complaining was the only requirement to unraveling the mystery.

Even if it's not a simulation. The world doesn't work that way. So we're stuck asking questions and analyzing the clues.

That said, there are a lot of red flags leading us down potential paths: everything is made of 99.99% nothing and its gravitational fields that keep us from falling through the floor, the fact that when we try to isolate tiny particles it effects their measurement (similar to games), etc.

The entire article gives a person a good starting point for their own journey of discovery. Whether it's a simulation or not.

But so what if this is a simulation? It doesn't mean it's not an interesting place worthy of further investigation. Someone or something obviously went to a lot of trouble to create it.

If it turns out to be a simulation then the next question is why.

Why this period in history? What's so fascinating about the here and now.

-Lord Volton, III, of House Florian.

This site is for information... not convertion, this article IS bias.

Occam's razor & Dreams

This discussion is now on Talk:Simulated_reality/Archive_2.

religious parallels

I hate to rain on anyone's parade, but the material on Mormonism seems like a sneaky way to insert the Mormon plan of salvation. I'm wondering if it should be reworded to be more general and less a promotion of the Mormon view in particular, since hundreds if not thousands of religious groups could lay a similar claim and make the section 1,000 pages long.

I have no problem with religious parallels, but this one seems to be a veiled attempt to promote the LDS church. Perhaps more to the point, the Mormon church DOES NOT believe this world is a simulation.

It should be deleted. It's just not relevant. And the article is too long.1Z 02:53, 21 January 2007 (UTC)

Ideas for shortening the page

1 Delete the Mormonism

2 Create a "Simulated reality (fiction)" page for the link farm.

3 Some of the other stuff (esp. "other issues") could be tightened.

4.Yes, I know I've added a lot!1Z 03:00, 21 January 2007 (UTC)

Digital Physics and Cellular Automata and the Church-Turing thesis are fascinating, but I think there needs to be some more work done relating them to the simulation hypothesis more directly. The entire universe being a giant computer simulation is interesting, but I think readers may end up being confused since there isn't a strong connection yet. You might be able to consolidate these two into one section as well.

They relate to computability, which is an important evidence, and they relate to the idea that the universe is a computer, or is being run on a computer (if not to the idea that it it a simulation *of* anything).1Z 11:26, 21 January 2007 (UTC)

I think you need to make that more clear. I don't question its relevance just whether the reader will be able to understand how it all relates to the simulation hypothesis. Since the Church-Turing thesis is mentioned in the first section you could probably explain it in the first secton and combine the two sections.

I suggest editing down the "Is the universe a computer" section to 4-5 concise paragraphs. The entire section is way too long and gets into some confusing details that are loosely related to the simulation hypothesis and directly related to whether the universe is a computer. That can be stated in a paragraph and then 2-3 paragraphs spent on the major topics that relate to it. I'll give you the first crack at it.

Computability of Physics

I have a few comments on this section, the first being that it seems a little technical. If there is a way to simplify the concepts so that those who are not science majors can understand the underlying principles that would make it a lot more accessible. The other question I have is whether an uncomputable problem is a critical issue.

Of course it is. If our reality is uncomputable, it is not being computer-simulated.

Assuming there is something in the 'true' reality that is uncomputable that doesn't mean we cannot approximate.

It doesn't mean we can't build simulations within our reality. But that is not the Simulation Hypothesis; the SH is that our reality is simulated. It is a fact,not a hypothesis, that we can build simulations in our reality.

In the simulated environments we create today we're not even coming close to computing the real thing. The trucks, houses, and streets are not the computational equivalent of what we see in our world.

And how would I know if the chair I am sitting on is a computational equivalent of a spatially real chair if this were a simulation?

By looking for uncomputable physics in it. However, that only answers the question in the negative.

I don't think it really eliminates the simulation hypothesis. It only states that a spatially equivalent simulation could not be created if designers were interested in creating a spatially equivalent environment

The SH is the claim that we are in a simulation

-- which may not be the case here since none of us exist in subatomic space or are capable of seeing atoms interact with our naked eyes -- we take it on faith that all of the things that are supposed to be happening at the atomic level and below are in fact happening when we're not watching.

And even when we are watching we don't see that atoms we just see a visual representation and take it on faith that the visual representation being viewed in the macro world means they exist spatially in the micro world. That is a far cry from proving they actually exist spatially.

Even if hypercomputational physics is "in the eye of the beholder", it is still hypercomputation! 1Z 19:33, 22 January 2007 (UTC)

So it seems that "faking it" could be just as good as the real thing from a computational perspective.

-Lord Volton, III, of House Florian.

Computability of Physics, cont'd.

The computability of physics is an interesting topic, no doubt about it. But there still needs to be a smooth connection as to why it's relevant to the simulation hypothesis. It reads like someone has done an awful lot of research on this topic and knows it inside and out. And that is fantastic, but it seems like it's being forced into the simulation hypothesis.

Maybe if there were a short 1 paragraph overview of how this could be relevant to the simulation hypothesis

There is:

"A closely related claim to the Simulation Hypothesis is the claim that the universe actually is a computer, or at least that physics is computable. If the "physics is computable" claim, in particular, can be shown to be false, a class of simulation arguments, those involving virtual people and conventional computers, is decisively refuted. However, these arguments do not have the power to prove the simulation hypothesis."

I could point out that there is a great deal of vague, waffly material in the article. I am not going to cut this section before "the Mormon plan of salvation" goes! The importance of thissection is that it makes really rigorous arguments (the only other section that does gets close to doing so is the one one Bostrom) Everything else in the article amount to "maybe". 1Z 12:32, 23 January 2007 (UTC)

and then a link to the fuller discussion of it. It seems like it veers off topic and starts to focus on why computability of physics is interesting irrespective of the simulation hypothesis. And that is why I think it needs to be rewritten with a focus on how it's relevant to the simulation hypothesis -- rather than getting lost in a deeper discussion of the computability of physics -- which I think is better analyzed on a page dedicated to that topic.

-Lord Volton, III, of House Florian.

This issue is NOT loosely related to SR, it in fact has the power to disprove SR! I suspect that is your real problem. I put it into the middle of the article for a reason: it naturally follows on from the discussion of physics. (Heisenberg principle etc). Likewise "computationalism" shoudlbe near the top, since many versions of SR make no sense if computationalism is false (it needs to come before Bostrom, for instance).

Your editing decisions do not seem to be guided by any desire to present a balanced and comprehensible article, they seem to be propelled by a desire to put the stuff you agree with near the top of the article and the stuff you don't like at the bottom.

I am going to move most of the computability stuff to a separate page. For one thing, that seems to be the only way to prevent vandalism.1Z 01:11, 24 January 2007 (UTC)

My issue is that it's trying to cover way too much ground and may be confusing to readers trying to make the connection to SR. I agree with you that it should be a separate page with perhaps a brief synopsis and link on the SR page. You've done this successfully before and I thought it turned out nicely. That will allow you to go into greater detail and flesh out a lot of the issues other editors have brought up. Lordvolton 20:35, 12 February 2007 (UTC)

You still haven't explained your reluctance to shorten the page in any other way.1Z 22:11, 12 February 2007 (UTC)

I fail to see how our ability, or lack thereof, to compute our own reality within our own reality has any impact on the simulated reality theory. After all, I can't run World of Warcraft (to use a well known example) within WoW, but that doesn't mean that WoW isn't a simulation. If the reality "above" ours is even one level more complex (If, hypothetically, our "smallest part" is the atom, and the "smallest part" of the reality simulating ours is the string) things can be simulated within it that cannot be simulated within our own universe because the inhabitants of the reality above ours can build more complex computers that may follow laws of physics that are fundamentally different from ours. If, for example, the speed of light is much faster in the reality above ours the inhabitants of this reality could build computers that would appear to be prescient to us. (As long as they were interacting directly with our simulation, that is.) (68.189.173.185 01:01, 17 February 2007 (UTC))

Shortening the article --seprating fiction

The article is still slightly to long. His Lordship permitting, I will separate out the fictional stuff, because:

1. It is particularly likely to grow.
2. It think it is attracting vandals to the page (along with the spam)
3. It will make the remaining material seem more serious.1Z 02:39, 24 January 2007 (UTC)

Sounds good... I think the new version is looking pretty nice. We might want to consider building an alternate page to cover some of the other material you had -- if one doesn't already exist. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by Lordvolton (talk • contribs) 22:47, 24 January 2007 (UTC).

I have created a page Computational universe theory 1Z 23:32, 24 January 2007 (UTC)

I'll check it out. On that note, I pasted your computationalism overview onto the computationalism page. You may want to add some more material to the computationalism page since your overview was quite a bit more thorough than the single sentence that was there previously. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by Lordvolton (talk • contribs) 04:55, 25 January 2007 (UTC).

Computability of physics

I have pulled out a number of irrelevant objections form this section. There is a difference between criticising something and just missing the point.

"This refutation is, however, itself refuted by the realization that a simulation of reality of sufficient sophistication as to be indistinguishable to human senses from reality would not need to calculate "real physics." It would merely require the simulation of physics sufficient to fool human senses and instruments".

This objection is written "as though" the Simulation Hypothesis is the hypothesis that it is possible for us to build a simulation in our universe. It is not: as stated in the article, it is the hypothesis that we are already in a simulation. The physics of our universe contains far more than is necessary to fool human senses, so this objection is inapplicable.

"More directly, it can be refuted by the fact that a simulation of physics that falls far short of simulating "real physics" may well be impossible to predict computationally from within the system, while, in fact, being trivial to compute from without".

This objection confuses theoretical computability with engineering issues. What a TM can compute is independent of the underlying physics.

"A small, random/pseudorandom element added to certain calculations would be simple to implement, but would make it almost if not completely impossible to predict physical phenomena accurately from within the simulation".

That is irrelevant to the computability issue as defined.

"Furthermore, our knowledge of what constitutes "real physics" is derived solely from the observation of physical properties which by their very nature would be dictated by the system simulating them."

if it is being simulated. But we can tell form inside a simulation what a TM can and can't do.

"Such a system may operate under physical laws that are radically different from those being simulated. For example, many video games simulate physics that are intentionally different from reality, either for ease of play or for dramatic effect".

Irrelevant. If the physics we see cannot be simulated by a TM it is not being simulated by a TM -- end of story.1Z 01:47, 27 January 2007 (UTC)

Alternative

The http://www.simulism.org wiki is a dedicated wiki to this subject; we could take the topic over there, clean it up, and make this wikipedia page a structured summary. --82.176.237.8 08:55, 4 February 2007 (UTC)

Not a bad idea, but the page is locked at the moment (due to the colbot) 1Z 16:15, 4 February 2007 (UTC)

Perhaps a copy could be ported over there, but the primary article should remain here. No disrespect to whoever created the simulism page.

Remain here in its full, rambling glory, your Lordship? 1Z 16:00, 6 February 2007 (UTC)

Your comment reminds me of the song, and the double entendre is not missed, "Lord, I was born a ramblin' man." And yes, it should remain here. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by Lordvolton (talk • contribs) 23:55, 6 February 2007 (UTC).

Small Question

This isn't too important, but i was curious as to how Metal Gear Soilid 3 made it into simulated realities, the game was placed in the 1960's away from such technology and there's an obscure (though slightly humorous) reference to virtual reality in Metal Gear Solid 2 4.154.65.183 21:55, 6 February 2007 (UTC)

I don't think anyone has actually gone through all of the games very carefully. We should probably do that. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by Lordvolton (talk • contribs) 23:57, 6 February 2007 (UTC).

Frank Tipler's Omega Point

I think there is a separate page for his theory on wikipedia. If so, perhaps a link is more appropriate than spelling out his theory in great detail if another page is already devoted to it. If so, we can eliminate it and instead have a link to reduce the length of the overall article.

Where there are separate pages already dedicated to a topic that cover an issue fairly well we should consider either eliminating them or placing three or four of them into a short section with links.

There are a few sections that look like they're condensed versions of other wikipedia pages on the topic. We want to avoid making this a mini-encyclopedia of other topics. Those topics are better linked and included in the "see also" section.Lordvolton 07:40, 8 February 2007 (UTC)

It is not spelt out in great detail. it is summarised and related to the other material on the page.

There is nothing wrong with the min-encylopedia approach. I can think other pages which give overviews in this way.

As before, you are applying wikipedia's rules in reverse -- trying to remove verifiable material from reputable sources in favour of unsourced and OR material. 1Z 12:40, 8 February 2007 (UTC)

Lots of the material is interesting, but if there is an entire wikipedia page already dedicated to it -- then simply saying "click here" for more information is better than trying to pull massive amounts of information from other pages. It's redundant and makes the article long and rambling, as you point out.Lordvolton 14:36, 8 February 2007 (UTC)

What makes the article long and rambling is inconsequential OR like the "religious argument for simulation".1Z 14:53, 8 February 2007 (UTC)

I'm not a big fan of the religious material either, but I do understand that there could be theological explanations for a simulated reality. And the topic of how religion would play out in a simulated reality is an interesting one. Perhaps we could break that into a separate page, "Theological implications of a simulated reality".Lordvolton 22:41, 11 February 2007 (UTC)

Positive feedback

I don't know where this article is going, but the ride is very interesting. For all whom have worked on this article, keep up the good work. Oicumayberight 23:00, 14 February 2007 (UTC)

About Reality

This article seems to focus mosly on a simulated universe were humans and earth are the center of focus and are manipulated by the observers. Lets suppose this is in fact a simulated universe, and at that a very detailed one with each subatomic particle mapped out. If the simulation was set up and run without interference, things like humans, earth, the sun and such wouldent have been planned out, but rather have happend randomly. Consider someone splashing a bucket of paint against a wall. He diden't plan out each detail of the splatter, he simply gave the paint momentum and allowed physics to do the rest. If the simulation wored that way, the creators might not even have looked closely enough to see our small planet. Even things like how stars work might not have been predicted when the simulation was started.

Then again, the creator might have made the universe 10 minutes ago carefully creating every detail, including fictional memories in our minds of living 10 minutes ago. Since this theory of a simulated universe has been around for more then 10 minutes, that would imply that the creator had the strange sense of humor to create a world containing people arguing about weather or not the universe was simulated!

Another thing about the article is it assumes the universe is made up of differnt "objects" such as people or planets. The article seems to sugest that these objects can simply be dragged droped deleted and copied like the text on this page. If we again assume the simulation is detailed to the subatomic level, problems arise. If you are going to "delete" a person, do his clothes get deleted along with him? What about the air in his lungs or the pebbles stuck to the bottom of his shoes? Would hair clippings from his last haircut that are sitting in some garbage can get deleted? A nut and a bolt lying next to eachother are considerd seperate objects, but a car containing many seperate nuts and bolts is considerd a single object.

Yes a simulated universe could be only complicated enough to create an illusion of realism. And the simulation could be centerd around the human race. But the posibility that humans are the main focus dosen't deserve most of the attention. After all, this assumtion is mosly fuled by mankinds large ego and our difficulty comprehending the vastness of existance. I don't know if our reality is confined inside a simulation, but if it is I wouldn't assume planet earth is the main attraction.

Anyone know if theres a crackpot theory wiki? --74.38.99.188 02:22, 17 February 2007 (UTC)

They probably won't suit your purpose, but here and here are a pair of crackpot wikis. And there's always the Uncyclopedia ... --Plumbago 09:47, 17 February 2007 (UTC)

There is some mention in the article of non-human explanations (i.e., aliens). I am not sure that it's biased against other explanations, but for the sake of brevity each possible explanation cannot be examined at great length. Lordvolton 02:19, 18 February 2007 (UTC)

Simulated Reality & Relativity

Reading through all the material, I can't see that anyone has explored the constraints imposed on simulated reality by relativity, in particular, time dilation effects. This has some serious implications for a would-be simulation programmer. For example, if we are to take the normal reading of the twins papradox, where one twin stays at home, and the other twin nips off to Proxima Centauri, and returns, depending upon the speed that is travelled, one twin can end up with a journey time of a year, and the other, who has stayed at home has passed ten years. This means that we now have two minds in the same simulation at the same point who have experienced different time rates. This is fine, if the consciousness is intrinsic to the simulation, but not if the consciousness is extrinsic (e.g. brain in a vat). An extrinsic consciousness has an external reference frame, which could (and probably would) include an objective way of measuring time. Thsi means that when the twins meet together after the journey, one is effectively 10 years further on in the simulation than the other.

A programmer would be faced with two choices in this situation: either to make time slow down for the travelling twin, but then this defeats the whole notion of time-dilation; the twin would notice, and declare that relativity is a sham. On the other hand, and this is the more alarming prospect, we now have a situation where two brains in vats are experiencing different times in the same simulation. One of these is in the future of the other one, and therefore poterntially knows his actions before the other has acted. This effectively removes any notion of free will.

There are other issues, too. The whole idea of a simulated reality is based on a misunderstanding of our current 'reality'. It seems to assume that our experience of time is of a common, universal framework, where time passes at the same rate for all, and it is possible to think about what someone else is doing now in another part of the world. Relativity destroys this notion.

The only way a relativistic simulation could function is if each consciouness was intrinsic to the simulation, i.e. there were no brains in vats. That way, the programming could, in effect have the minds experiencing time at different rates, and no one would be any the wiser. Unfortunately, this now presents a slightly different problem. Looking at this simulation from outside, we now do not have a universal simulation, in which minds happen to inhabit, we have lots of separate solipsistic simulations, one for each mind, and 'reality' is constructed for each one of them separately, so that they can react with one another in a consistent manner. This seems to me a pretty good description of what most people regard as 'reality'. The world that I see is a construction of my brain based on sensory perceptions. It may or may not (probably does not) have very many features in common with anyone else.

Once we accept that is the way that the simulation must function, if it contains conscious minds, there are some very profound philosophical, ethical and moral problems to be countered, if we ever start to simulate in this manner.

--TonyFleet 06:28, 24 February 2007 (UTC)

Interesting thoughts.

If I were creating a simulation I would just fake it. Why waste resources on time dilation when it can just be simulated in a sufficiently fast simulation. I would simply freeze the simulant and then place them in the future without the effects of aging, etc. That gets around the ridiculous amount of time and energy required to create the real thing -- when the person would never be able to tell the difference. And that is what I would do with all sub-atomic particles as well -- no need to really create them -- just fake it.

This can be done right now in video games. You have a character with his twin and he jumps into a rocket and he comes back and everybody is old and their storylines are 50 years in the future. Since they didn't interact with the twin that whole thread of the simulation can be done without a hitch.

Although we're still investigating whether we're in a simulation -- the speculation by some physicists that a black hole erupts when you get too small would also be a useful trick to employ when creating a simulation. This is a great way to deal with the overly curious participants.

Lordvolton 23:26, 26 February 2007 (UTC)

But the point is you cannot fake your way out of this. The denial of simultaneity due to relativity means that different people will experience events in different orders. Some will see event A before event B, some will see B before A; there is no universal world-view, although there are some arguments that causally connected events must be seen universally in that order (see Ben-Yami, 2006, Causality and Temporal Order in Special Relativity, Br.Jounal for Phil of Science, vol 57. no 3,). If you only have to simulate one mind, one point of view, you might just get away with faking it, but you cannot do this unless every mind is in its own simulation - every person sees the world uniquely. That is the whole point. We do not have a 'future' to place them into, as someone's future is someone else's past - at the same 'moment' in the outer reality.--TonyFleet 00:25, 27 February 2007 (UTC)

Sure I can. Why? Because the stories unfold separately for both viewers. Since you cannot interact with people in YOUR past you're just viewing a movie from a design perspective. And then you can come up all kinds of theories to explain it. That is very easy to do.

If the present, past, and future are rendered prior to your entry into the simulation then all you're doing is effecting the mesh (i.e., the shape of the simulation as effected by time). And you'll never get outside of "time" because they all exist at the same time from a design perspective. You can change the shape of the mesh but you cannot do anything outside of it. So this method also allows people to view things from different perspectives and at different times -- since time is only a construct. Imagine it as a big game board where all the pieces are preset before your arrive and then two players do something at different points on the board, effecting the other preset pieces. It doesn't matter that one does it on the left side and the other on the right side -- since it effects the entire board at the same time. If you wanted a consistent history that appears to move forward then you would just prevent actions such as doing anything in your apparent past. You can move the blue pieces but not the red pieces.

Lordvolton 20:23, 27 February 2007 (UTC)

... and therefore you have effectively destroyed free will. QED. The point is not that it can't be done, but in doing it, you have rendered the simulants mere bots. The moral, legal and ethical implications of imprisoning conscious entities in such scenario would be untenable. No civilised society would allow it to happen. --TonyFleet 21:36, 27 February 2007 (UTC)

Simulated Time

First of all, I wish to change the title of the 'Subjective Time' section to 'Simulated Time'. In it, I wish to insert a section on how time might be dealt with in simulations, to include some of the objections above.

Suggested text: <new text>

A simulated reality might deal with the passage of time in two ways: In the first case, each mind would experience the passage of time at the same rate, which may or may not be the same rate as the outer reality; in the second, the passage of time could be different for each mind within the simulation. Currently-exisitng simulations are based on computers which have a central clock, and it is natural to assume a 'central', common time. However, with massively parallel computing this need not be the case.

One of the consequences of the theory of Special Relativity, is that it prohibits the notion of simultaneity. Therefore any simulation which included relativistic physics as part of the simulation would, therefore need to be of the second type.

<already-exisitng text> - A brain-computer interface simulated reality may be required to progress at a rate that is near realtime; that is, time within it may be required to pass at approximately the same rate as the outer reality which contains it. This might be the case because the players are interacting with the simulation using brains which still reside in the outer reality. Therefore, if the simulation were to run faster or slower, those brains could notice because they were not contained with it. </already exisitng text>

The consequence of this would be that a brain-computer interfaced simulation could not in principle simulate relativity effectively.

</new text>

I think the rest of this section needs tidying up, by splitting the material into two: one which looks at 'simulations with an objective time frame', and one which looks at 'simulations with subjective time frames'.

--TonyFleet 07:08, 24 February 2007 (UTC)

In a massively parallel simulation I don't think I would monkey with time as we know it. If I had enough processing power I would simulate the entire world from beginning to end and then place participants into the world, so that the future is rendered in semi-permeable detail that is effected by the actions of the participants.

Imagine inserting a person into a movie you've already seen and exists from start to finish in holographic 3D. And the only places that "exist" are what is in the frames. The constituent elements of those frames can be moved anywhere within the frame you like, but never off frame (i.e., you can't go faster than the speed of light). As others have written, time as "frames" may be what we're already dealing with in our own world.

In an Earth simulation I would simulate actual history as close as possible. And then allow the participants to see how their interactions effect the world. So in this sense time would be one big mesh that just changes shape rather than constantly simulating every moment in real time. It's the difference between having to create from scratch a legoland world one lego at a time and being given a pre-determined box of legos that I can manipulate into various shapes.

This would save a lot of processing power and still be quite enjoyable. Since there would be a nearly infinite number of configurations. But in situations where participants are not active the simulation would require very little in the way of system resources.

Lordvolton 23:42, 26 February 2007 (UTC)

Time in a simulation is crucial. There are at least four different types of Time to be considered, and they are possibly all different (but may not be). Objective External Time (OET) is the objectively measurable time in the outer reality, assuming that the computer is located in one place. If it's a massively distributed computer where the speed of light is a factor, there may actually be huge variations in OET across the simulation substrate. Objective Internal Time (OIT) is the clock rate at which the simulation appears to progress. Unfortunately this is the issue; with relativity, there is no such thing as a universal OIT (uOIT), only lots if individual OITs, one for each simulant - an Individual OIT (iOIT). Each simulant will also have their own Subjective Internal Time (SIT), the rate at which time appears to pass for them within the simulation, and just as in real life, this will be different for each simulant, depending upon what they are doing. Finally, if thsi is a brain-computer interface, there is also the possibility that a simulant has a Subjective External Time (SET), due to the fact that they have a physical presence in the external reality. Itis in intersting speculation whether SIT and SET will coincide; my guess would be that unless you started tampering with the external brain big-time, that SIT and SET would be the same; however there is absolutely no guarantee that however you mucked about with the simulation you could ever get SET to match iOIT.

Now, here's the problem. Relativity denies a universal 'standard' framework for time and space. A program as you describe reinstates it, but it cannot work, even in principle. You are assuming that you can fudge the time issue by fooling the simulants. Ok, you might try that, but you only affect the SIT. You still have to deal with the more knotty issue of the iOIT, and the unique order of events as seen by each individual. Every person will see the world differently. In Einstein's theory, this feat is achieved by positing a four dimensional space time which can be seen from outside, thus encapsulating the whole of history along with all of space. If use this approach, you can only do so if everything is fully pre-determined down to the last detail, and there is effectively no free will whatsoever. In fact, there would be no point to simulating anything, as you would have already worked out the whole of history before you started the simulation. However, the whole problem is intractable as you would need the equivalent of a simulation to work out what would happen in the simulation before you simulated it.

As I said, it causes massive issues.--TonyFleet 01:07, 27 February 2007 (UTC)

I don't think time is that big of an issue if we're talking about systems that are capable of simulating all of human history in a nanosecond in what you term OET. In a couple of hundred OIT years we'll be able to do it within 1 second ourselves. At these processing speeds time is a very minor issue. Because everything moves at a crawl by comparison. Time is relevant when a lot of resources are taken up over time. This could effect the practicality of creating a simulation if it took 1 billion OET years to simulate. Time within a simulation that takes a nanosecond to create is small potatoes. We make a big deal about it because from OIT & SIT it seems like a monumental problem.

I'm not saying time isn't an issue internally. It certainly is otherwise there wouldn't be natural limiters. You can only go so fast and break elements down so small. And that probably has a lot to do with utility. In an experiencial simulation you wouldn't need to monkey around with going too fast or see things Infinitesimally small -- since the point would be things other than trying to figure out how the things works. That is why the efficient solution is to fake it. That said, people may still wonder and the fact that we're writing about this is testament to that -- assuming of course this is a simulation which we're still investigating.

Lordvolton 20:38, 27 February 2007 (UTC)

Going back to my original comments about time, you will notice that in discussing it, you have fallen into my terminology for discussing the various different types of time. I don't doubt that we can do stuff in nanoseconds, millenia hence. The point is that no matter how short or how long these periods are, they are qualitatively different. Your use of the terminology demonstrates this. I feel vindicated and will start to change the time article. I would appreciate some discussion on whether in fact all of these are actually distinct, rather than how long they might be. Thanks --TonyFleet 22:18, 27 February 2007 (UTC)