Talk:South Africa and weapons of mass destruction

Strange

SA's nuclear program must have gone on for far longer than the article states. The american humorist Tom Lehrer was even writing songs about th south african nuclear bombs in the mid sixties, it was public knowledge to the degree that he even toured and printed LP audio albums with songs from live concerts with people laughing at his joke "south africa" wants two a-bombs, thats right, one for the blacks and one for the whites" in his now famous song "Who's Next" Recording date: September 10th 1967 (by then his songs were well known, so the south african nuclear program must have been commonplace public knowledge, even though I'm sure the powers that be, pretended they were doing just fine in keeping it a secret. Nunamiut (talk) 18:50, 2 September 2009 (UTC)

You're assuming too much from the whimsical lyrics of a song. By 1967 the S.African government had not even begun preliminary research into nuclear weapons as it was still at the earliest stages of trying to establish an indigenous uranium enrichment capability. No doubt some people would have been intelligent enough to see South Africa's progress in nuclear research and its strategic situation and conclude that a covert nuclear weapons program was at least a likely eventuality, but at the time no such program existed. Impi (talk) 11:06, 16 September 2010 (UTC)

2005 discussions

I do not think South Africa really destroyed their nuclear weapons. If they did, what was the main reason for them to do so? User:152.106.240.139

You have to understand it in context. The process of dismantling Apartheid was begun by the National Party under F.W. de Klerk from 1990 onwards, with an eye to a full democratic election in 1994. Even in 1990, the party's leadership knew that the general elections would almost certainly lead to a group like the ANC taking power, and they regarded the potential ownership of nuclear weapons by the ANC as something that was rather undesirable. The primary reason for this (said to have been reinforced by American and European pressure) was that the ANC had received a lot of support from rogue states such as Iran, as well as having close ties with some extremely dodgy groups, and they would therefore feel an obligation to repay these groups and states once they assumed power. It was felt that if the ANC inherited the nuclear weapons program along with the sophisticated ICBM program, they would not hesitate to export the technology and/or equipment to states like Iran. As for whether they actually did dismantle the weapons, it needs to be pointed out (as the article does) that the SA govt invited the IAEA to inspect all its nuclear activities and sites, and that the IAEA has since praised this as the most open and complete inspection they have ever been able to undertake. For example, during the diplomatic rounds that preceded the Iraq War, South Africa's complete transparency and full assistance during the 1993-1994 inspections were held up as examples of what Iraq was NOT doing. Considering the thoroughness of the IAEA inspection, it's impossible that South Africa was able to retain nuclear weapons. Impi 08:35, 20 August 2005 (UTC)

Thats rather interesting, I never new that the SA gov. was so open about it, but I did know that they disarmed. What if they hid a nuke down a mine shaft for a rainy day? Pure conjecture of course! Banes 04:24, 31 October 2005 (UTC)

Well, the way the IAEA gets around that is to account for the nuclear weapons material. For example, if the records show that a certain amount of uranium and nuclear weapons parts were manufactured, and they realise they can't account for some of it, they get suspicious. It's also pretty hard to fudge up all the documentation and keep everybody involved quiet, because somebody will always talk. After all, to store a nuke underground would require the construction of a fairly decent underground chamber in order to keep its condition as stable as possible, and it would need to be guarded 24/7. Considering how many people would theoretically be involved in the construction of the chamber, in moving the weapon, and in guarding it, I think it's pretty certain that somebody would have talked by now. In addition to that, a single nuke isn't all that useful, for a real rainy day deterrent, you need at least two or three. The reason for this is that we only have one delivery method for a nuke, the Cheetah D. If we did have a nuke, and got into trouble, we would need to threaten to use it to get our attackers off our backs. However, a single fighter aircraft is not that hard to shoot down, and is therefore less of a deterrent. Aside from this, you need insurance for the period after you use the bomb, otherwise you'll just be invaded. So with three nukes you can use one, and say: "I have more, don't come any further!".

This is all conjecture of course, ultimately it would make no sense for SA to use a nuke, as it would bring rapid retribution, possibly in nuclear form as well. Besides, the IAEA inspection was thorough, and the NP REALLY didn't want the ANC to gain control of a nuke, so rest assured, we don't have any more of them. Impi 10:02, 31 October 2005 (UTC)

I don't think SA retained a nuclear weapon, but the Vela Incident does call into the question the amount of openness to the IAEA. If it was a nuclear test, it is likely SA didn't disclose something someone knew? If it was an Isreali test (more likley than SA test), it is likely there was some SA logistic support or knowledge, that could have been disclosed to the IAEA. -- Rwendland 12:55, 31 October 2005 (UTC)

There is a chance that South Africa didn't dismantle ALL thier weapons, and it wouldn't be suprising if they didn't. The reason why is that South Africa has a long history of independence from the rest of the world, and thus developed thier own weapons.many of thier scientists to this day STILL manufacture heavy weaponry, such as tanks, cruise missles, etc. and beside, how many times throughout history has a major government organization said that something was undercontrol and taken care of when it wasn't? in fact, we don't know the extent of where the investigators were allowed, whether they were bribed, (a far reach really, though), and number of other factors. in Iraq for example, investigators had restricted movement. the same could theoretically be the same for South Africa. 71.132.148.122 19:35, 20 August 2006 (UTC)

There would be very little reason for South Africa to maintain nuclear weapons these days, and high consequences if they were detected. One can posit endless conspiracy theories but without any good reasons to think otherwise it seems like a waste of time to take any of them seriously. --Fastfission 20:01, 20 August 2006 (UTC)

There are many conspirisies with regards to SA Nukes, chances are non of them are true, the most viable one though is that any sophiticated weapons would have been shiped to Israel as they took part in our program, any advanced weapons would be able to be linked to them and thus be undesirable, maby a conspirisies/Speculation section should be added as long as people can gice facts as to how a conspirosiy is possible —Preceding unsigned comment added by Scottykira (talk • contribs) 11:55, 15 September 2010 (UTC)

Then I will delete the citation needed tag108.28.93.11 (talk) 19:42, 8 March 2013 (UTC)

The strategic threat

In the context of the developing strategic threat - during the latter 70s and into the 80s - the possibility that Soviet-sponsored and directly-supported conventional invasion of e.g Namibia/SudWesAfrika via Oshikango/Ovamboland and/or Walvisbaai, and/or Transvaal/Natal via Maputo was real. Viz the 60,000 Cuban combat troops inserted into Angola during the mid-80s..... The expectation was that these would be supported by Soviet long range bombers striking with stand-off weapons at strategic targets in the RSA, such as LMB/AFB Grootfontein ( Ovamboland ), LMB/AFB Waterkloof ( Pretoria ), SAN Simonstown, vulnerable logistic supply rail/road links, and concentrations of SADF forces. Such long range bombers could operate from only a few large and well-defended base facilities in sub-saharan Africa, such as Luanda in Angola, and few of the SAAFs tactical aircraft could reach that far and survive. A strategic weapon was required to destroy such bases and deny their strategic support and interdiction facilities to Soviet surrogate forces.

The belief that South Africa developed only half-a-dozen quite crude nuclear devices is mistaken. A sophisticated 'deep penetration' delivery system was well-developed, sharing technologies and testing with Israel. Some of this technology has found its way elsewhere via the Pakistani rogue nuclear engineer Dr. Abdul Khan, lining quite a few ANC pockets in the process.

Do bear in mind that 'a viable weapons system needs not only a viable means of production, but also a viable means of delivery.' South Africa had that in its ageing but capable Canberras and Buccaneers, as well as the Cheetah D. -- NeueSoutie 13:07, 11 September 2006 (UTC)

Points well made, followed by good edit to article.Phase4 21:34, 11 September 2006 (UTC)

theres alot of unsupported speculation on this page. I would like to see more citations. purefreak 16:06, 19 September 2007 (UTC)

Speculation is, I think, allowed on the talk page. Reliable sources and good citations are definitely required on the article page.Phase4 15:27, 19 September 2007 (UTC)

The weapon and delivery

I read that the weapon weighted about 1 metric ton (1000kg) was 65cm in diameter and 180 in lenght, and also that it was in fact buccaneers that were the only aircraft modified to deliver it. And not canberra as claimed here.

http://www.isis-online.org/publications/southafrica/ir0594.html —Preceding unsigned comment added by 62.248.159.240 (talk) 10:27, 6 September 2007 (UTC)

At the December 2012 conference "The Historical Dimensions of South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program," a presenter used this image in a powerpoint presentation: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:South_African_nuclear_bomb_casings.jpg. Another conference attendee with direct personal knowledge of the design of South Africa's nuclear bombs pointed out that the photo was not in fact of South Africa's nuclear bombs. South Africa's nuclear bombs looked different from the bomb casings in the photo. A third conference participant who had been professionally involved, as a South African government official, in South Africa's WMD programs suggested that the casings depicted in the photo above may instead have been for chemical or biological weapons. 205.201.242.126 (talk) 18:37, 12 April 2013 (UTC)

Its correct. The fameous "pictures of south african nuclear weapon" isn´t a nuke. Its something else. The real nuke would have looked more like a modern cruise missile, like South African´s Raptor missile. Intresting read: / Pandapod1 (talk) 08:08, 2 November 2016 (UTC)

References

Nitpicking/ clarigying

In the line about changing from Somchem to Pelindaba, Somchem is/was a weapons/chemical company and Pelindaba a place. Maybe tidy up 41.241.25.210 (talk) 08:45, 10 December 2008 (UTC)

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AEC and AEB

The article makes reference to an "AEB" and "AEC", without bothering to give the full name. I assume what was meant was the "Atomic Energy Board" and "Atomic Energy Corporation". It's not always clear if the correct term is given at any given spot, as sometimes it's not clear what time period is discussed. The article links to the disambig pages AEB and AEC, which in turn have no relevant content. We don't seem to have an article on the AEB/AEC. There's also no indication to the reader that the AEB ultimately turned into the AEC (as I understand it). I'm hoping somebody more familiar with the topic will fix this up. --Rob (talk) 08:36, 14 April 2009 (UTC)

• I've qualified those acronyms and removed the links as there are no relevant articles. I'm not sure how the AEB and the AEC co-existed, but the sources do mention them independently. onebravemonkey 08:33, 28 April 2009 (UTC)

The Weapon

Ive been studying this subject for years but never seen a single picture of the weapon, one would be great to have on the article, but i guess they arent available. Also, if so i wonder why? Whats the big secret? Maybe it was "licenced" from a western design? US, UK or French one? Anybody any ideas? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 91.154.204.152 (talk) 00:27, 11 July 2009 (UTC)

Photos of actual nuclear weapons (not just the casings) aren't all that common for most designs, not only the South African ones. I suppose its possible that clear pictures may be considered a proliferation risk, which is why the IAEA chose to release only photos of the casings and of parts of the facilities such as the vaults but not of the tooling for instance. It's also possible that, due to the extremely high security of South Africa's program, there were simply no photos taken before the weapons were dismantled. In fact, the only photos that seem to exist in the public domain of the program were all taken by IAEA inspectors and others after the bombs had been dismantled, the program ended and inspections had begun. Impi (talk) 11:06, 16 September 2010 (UTC)

other countries who helped South Africa's nuclear program

Yes we all know of rumors of Israeli work with South Africa's WMD program, but they were not the only country to do so. Like for example http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61698/nicolas-van-de-walle/south-africas-weapons-of-mass-destruction http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/rsa/nuke/stumpf.htm Tallicfan20 (talk) 08:14, 4 August 2009 (UTC)

Aimed at who?

I am curious if it was ever established who, exactly, the SA gov't intended its nuclear arsenal to be used against. None of its neighbors (as far as I know) ever came close to nuclear capability, and, if my understanding of the history is correct, the Apartheid government always viewed its main enemies as internal rather than external. Were there any plans to use tactical nukes in the event of a black rebellion that couldn't be otherwise controlled? --Jfruh (talk) 01:01, 22 September 2009 (UTC)

You can't use tactical nukes against an enemy who is fully dispersed among your own people. The kill radius of a tactical nuke that size was about the same as the kill radius of a Hiroshima bomb - i.e. city-sized. The urban black population of South Africa in the 1980's (i.e. your potential revolutionaries) lived in very close proximity to their white neighbours - for example you can't nuke Soweto without seriously damaging the rest of Johannesburg, and delivering radioactive fallout to the entire Witwatersrand area. The small nuclear arsenal was designed to be used against a potential Cuban invasion force backed by Eastern Bloc air support - exactly what they were facing in Angola and exactly what was trying to invade Namibia. It was largely intended as a deterrent - e.g. "If the USA doesn't intervene to back down the Communists then we will nuke them and start World War 3" - also known by the slogan "We won't go down alone". In the actual event the Soviet empire collapsed before the invasion of Namibia, the Cubans had to go home, and the threat passed. The nukes were sold to the USA for destruction, South Africa was able to transition peacefully to multi-racial democracy, and the South African Communists are now big capitalists who compete to flaunt their bling. ¬¬¬¬

It is a complete misconception that South Africa's main enemies were considered to be within, much as there had always been the fear of what the consequences of a regime switch would have been. The SADF (South African Defence Force) was only ever used to prop up the SAPS (South African Police Service) who was responsible for internal law and order, which included suppressing violent and often criminal uprisings by the Black majority (the world has by now forgotten about "necklaces" - car tyres put around the necks of perceived enemies of the ANC, filled with petrol and set on fire). South Africa's main enemy had always been communism and as a secondary concern was its ability to align the internal Black majority, who would have walked off the edge of a cliff just to get rid of the Apartheid government (as the rest of Africa did to get rid of the Brits). This explains why De Klerk could start serious negotiations with the ANC only after the collapse of the the Soviet Union - had South Africa switched to a Black "democracy" before this it would have ended up a communist mess under Russion control and a complete breadbasket in line with the rest of Africa. South Africa lost a few hundred soldiers over the years in Angola against the Cubans and their Russian advisors and this certainly had very little if anything to do with the internal strive - it was all about an obsession to fight Communism in the first place. Being a Christian coutry added to this desire, considering the persecution of Christians by Russia in their own country at the time. This is the reason (white) South Africans put up being the skunks of the world for so many years: it was always a choice between this and becoming unwilling citizens of a communist regime under direct control of Russia. Charity always starts at home and to have had a choice between local misery and international condemnation was never difficult, much as it led to the inhuman and often criminal suppression of its own citizens' democratic rights by the Apartheid regime. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 203.45.3.70 (talk) 04:43, 15 October 2009 (UTC)

SA's nukes were entirley of a detriment nature, they could use it as a barganing chip and to scare agression off, i do not think they ever planned to use them —Preceding unsigned comment added by Scottykira (talk • contribs) 12:00, 15 September 2010 (UTC)

Waldo Stumpf is on record stating that South Africa had a three-phase nuclear deterrent strategy which did not include the offensive use of the weapon:[1]

Phase 1: Strategic uncertainty in which the nuclear deterrent capability will not be acknowledged or denied.

Phase 2: Should South African territory be threatened, for example, by the Warsaw Pact countries through the surrogate Cuban forces in Angola, covert acknowledgement to certain international powers, e.g. the USA, would be contemplated.

Phase 3: Should this partial disclosure of South Africa's capability not bring about international intervention to remove the threat, public acknowledgement or demonstration by an underground test of South Africa's capability, would be considered.

There is no evidence to suggest that it was ever intended for internal use. Indeed, that would not make much sense, due to the fact that South Africa's black townships were all located very close to the main white population centres. Impi (talk) 11:06, 16 September 2010 (UTC)

Intended targets

The article is missing the essential information about where and at who the weapons were intended to be targeted. Would it have been against concentrations of Eastern block troops in Angola in the event of an Eastern Bloc invasion of South Africa/SWA? Against strategic ports or airbases in Angola, or even against strategic targets in Cuba or the Warsaw pact countries? — Preceding unsigned comment added by 77.102.254.132 (talk) 22:01, 10 January 2013 (UTC)

Reactor Development

By 1974 a facility that was separate but close to the main campus of the Atomic Energy Board was in operation. The facility consisted of offices and a "hall" referred to as the A Saal (A hall) to test components. This facility came under the heading "Reactor Development". Simulation models written in FORTRAN for an IBM computer had already been developed in 1974 in these offices. The research units to enrich uranium and to develop a nuclear device were kept separate - those on the enrichment program had no idea what the staff working in "Reactor Development" where doing and those working in "Reactor Development" had no details of the enrichment programme. Staff in "Reactor Development" where sworn to secrecy for 20 years, and were told that the project was for peaceful purposes.

I have no sources to cite to back this up. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 122.59.104.31 09:18, 2 October 2016 (UTC)

Vela

There is basically no evidence that Vela was a nuclear explosion. South Africa did not test any of its nuclear weapons. The article gives far too much weight to the conspiracy theory that Vela was a nuclear explosion. Even if it had been an explosion, it would have been an Israeli bomb, not a South African one.203.80.61.102 (talk) 03:32, 12 September 2017 (UTC)

Who were the scientists?

Basic information to add to this article: who were the scientists in charge of the South African nuclear program? Were any of them former Nazis from the Third Reich? 173.88.246.138 (talk) 23:30, 8 May 2021 (UTC)