Talk:South China Sea Arbitration

ITN Nomination

This article was nominated to be featured on the Main Page as part of the "In the news" section on July 12, 2016. The nomination was closed due to significant ongoing content disputes and allegations of non-NPOV editing.

Requested move 1 December 2023

The following is a closed discussion of a requested move. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made in a new section on the talk page. Editors desiring to contest the closing decision should consider a move review after discussing it on the closer's talk page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

The result of the move request was: Moved (non-admin closure) BegbertBiggs (talk) 16:06, 8 December 2023 (UTC)

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Philippines v. China → South China Sea Arbitration – As per WP:COMMONNAME, the PCA case has been commonly referred to virtually by most news outlets as the South China Sea arbitration case/ruling or variations of thereof and not Philippines vs. China which does not really tell much about the scope of the case. Hariboneagle927 (talk) 11:34, 1 December 2023 (UTC)

• Comment I feel this should contain Philippines and China in the title somewhere, so combine both titles together: Philippines v. China South China Sea Arbitration; it would also not confuse the currently confusable title, with sports events. -- 65.92.247.90 (talk) 13:10, 1 December 2023 (UTC)

• Support. I find the "v." most troublesome. I think for many readers, this will not be a common construct in the context of international disputes. South China Sea Arbitration helps make both the type of proceeding and the subject matter of the dispute more clear. JArthur1984 (talk) 16:06, 1 December 2023 (UTC)
• Support. Descriptive title as with the titling of the Island of Palmas Case article. Wtmitchell (talk) (earlier Boracay Bill) 01:26, 2 December 2023 (UTC)
• Comment There has been no other arbitration case involving the South China Sea dispute, so I think retaining China and Philippines somewhere in the title is unecessary.Hariboneagle927 (talk) 12:15, 2 December 2023 (UTC)
• Support Although it is most often correct to use the name of a legal case this is not ideal in this situation here because the topic of this dispute of this is larger and goes on for decades. Jorahm (talk) 19:05, 3 December 2023 (UTC)

The discussion above is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

Compromised B class

I noted this B class article with sources to match had been modified in a potentially non neutral manner by an unregistered single editor who has been very active last 48 hours of multiple topics they appear to feel strongly about and others have reacted to. Reversion of most of the edits to this page was done manually so apologies if mistakes were introduced. ChaseKiwi (talk) 23:55, 17 June 2024 (UTC)

I also had to add back in a section that was deleted for no reason which was a non neutral "silent" edit buried in multiple other edits over a short period. ChaseKiwi (talk) 00:00, 18 June 2024 (UTC)

Play on words???

The lead section asserts, parenthetically, (the phrase is a play-on-words referencing the nine-dash line; Chinese uses the same word for "bit" and "dash"). I thought to change "same word" to "same symbol" but, not being literate in Chinese, I checked Google Translate, which asserts otherwise (see [1] and [2]). This needs a second look. Wtmitchell (talk) (earlier Boracay Bill) 00:02, 21 September 2024 (UTC)

China's Claims

FYI all, the sentence in contention is this, which is actually mistaken, based on the evidence below: "The tribunal's rulings do not apply to China's sovereignty claims over the islands and maritime features in South China Sea." -Object404 (talk) 00:02, 29 September 2024 (UTC)

These are China's claims in the South China sea. The PCA arbitration has an effect on these claims.

• September 15, 2024, Statement from the Chinese Embassy in Manila:

China’s sovereignty and rights and interests in the South China Sea have been established in the long course of history, and are solidly grounded in history and the law. China is the first to have discovered, named, and explored and exploited Nanhai Zhudao (the South China Sea Islands) and relevant waters, and the first to have exercised sovereignty and jurisdiction over them continuously, peacefully and effectively, thus establishing territorial sovereignty and relevant rights and interests in the South China Sea. After World War II, China recovered and resumed the exercise of sovereignty over Nanhai Zhudao, which had been illegally occupied by Japan during its war of aggression against China. To strengthen the administration over Nanhai Zhudao, the Chinese government officially published Nan Hai Zhu Dao Wei Zhi Tu (Location Map of the South China Sea Islands) on which the dotted line is marked as early as February 1948..."

• 2016 statement of the State Council of the People's Republic of China:

III. Based on the practice of the Chinese People and the Chinese government in the long course of history and the position consistently upheld by successive Chinese governments, and in accordance with national law and international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, China has territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests in the South China Sea, including, inter alia:

i. China has sovereignty over Nanhai Zhudao, consisting of Dongsha Qundao, Xisha Qundao, Zhongsha Qundao and Nansha Qundao;

ii. China has internal waters, territorial sea and contiguous zone, based on Nanhai Zhudao;

iii. China has exclusive economic zone and continental shelf, based on Nanhai Zhudao;

iv. China has historic rights in the South China Sea.

The above positions are consistent with relevant international law and practice.

-Object404 (talk) 21:07, 28 September 2024 (UTC)

This is merely editor synth. Our article cites four sources to the contrary here see sources for: "On 12 July 2016, the arbitral tribunal ruled in favor of the Philippines on most of its submissions. It clarified that while it would not "rule on any question of sovereignty ... and would not delimit any maritime boundary" JArthur1984 (talk) 21:15, 28 September 2024 (UTC)

I am quoting multiple Chinese state sources on their claims. (the FB link is from the Chinese Embassy in the Philippines, and is WP:RS) See items III.i., ii., iii. and iv. above. The PCA ruling has an effect on these claims. China does not have an EEZ and continental shelf in a number of these features as they have been determined to be just rocks and low-tide elevations by the PCA, and not islands. The PCA also ruled that China's "historic rights" have no legal basis. Correct? -Object404 (talk) 21:30, 28 September 2024 (UTC)

"just rocks and low-tide elevations" -> Because of this, these Nanhai Zhudao features do not generate territorial seas or EEZs according to the PCA ruling. -Object404 (talk) 21:33, 28 September 2024 (UTC)

I think your confusion results from not understanding the issue of sovereignty, which you are confusing with a broader range of arguments. The sentence you are disagreeing with is focused on the issue of sovereignty. It is absolutely clear, in the result of the arbitration and in our article, that the Philippines won on most of its claims. But the arbitration did not decide the sovereignty issue. It was not before the arbitration. The arbitrators did not have jurisdiction to decide issues of sovereignty. This is why China contended publicly that the Philippines was really bringing sovereignty claims disguised as other kinds of claims. If the arbitrators agreed that they were ruling on sovereignty, they would have to reject the case. Although China did not participate (it knew a loss was very likely if it did participate), this sort of position (among others) is why it had the hearing on jurisdiction. The arbitrators rejected the jurisdiction argument and concluded the merits. See the Frances Yaping Wang source which is already in the article and has good discussion on this.

I can see you like primary sources (we try to avoid these when we can however), so note the following from the arbitration award:

- The use of maps "by the Tribunal is not intended to endorse any State’s position with respect to matters of land sovereignty or maritime boundaries."

- "The Convention, however, does not address the sovereignty of States over land territory. Accordingly, this Tribunal has not been asked to, and does not purport to, make any ruling as to which State enjoys sovereignty over any land territory in the South China Sea, in particular with respect to the disputes concerning sovereignty over the Spratly Islands or Scarborough Shoal. None of the Tribunal’s decisions in this Award are dependent on a finding of sovereignty, nor should anything in this Award be understood to imply a view with respect to questions of land sovereignty"

- "which State enjoys sovereignty over any land territory in the South China Sea, in particular with respect to the disputes concerning sovereignty over the Spratly Islands or Scarborough Shoal. None of the Tribunal’s decisions in this Award are dependent on a finding of sovereignty, nor should anything in this Award be understood to imply a view with respect to questions of land sovereignty"

We could go on and on. That's only through page 6 of the award. JArthur1984 (talk) 22:10, 28 September 2024 (UTC)

Again, the jurisdiction issue is why Philippines stated that it "does not seek in this arbitration a determination of which Party enjoys sovereignty over the islands claimed by both of them. Nor does it request a delimitation of any maritime 3 Notification and Statement of Claim of the Republic of the Philippines, 22 January 2013, para. 6 (Annex 1). The South China Sea Arbitration Award of 12 July 2016 12 boundaries." JArthur1984 (talk) 22:14, 28 September 2024 (UTC)

Let's backtrack a bit, okay.

1) China has claims on sovereignty which are outlined above.

2) These claims of sovereignty are based on Nanhai Zhudao's generation of EEZs, territorial seas, etc etc.

3) The PCA ruled that a large lot of Nanhai Zhudao's features are just rocks and low-tide elevation, and thus do not generate EEZs or territorial waters on their own.

4) Ergo, the PCA ruling has affected China's claims of sovereignty. Correct?

5) Bonus: The PCA has invalidated China's historical claims as basis for claiming many of these features as having no legal basis.

Thanks.

-22:21, 28 September 2024 (UTC) Object404 (talk) 22:21, 28 September 2024 (UTC)

This is why I mentioned Synth early and tried to refocus you on the sources supporting the specific sentence you’re trying to remove. This line of thinking is synth that does nothing to support your edit. JArthur1984 (talk) 23:19, 28 September 2024 (UTC)

This source satisfies the above:

"No Islands in the Spratlys

While these aspects of the ruling garnered headlines, the boldest implications flow from the judges’ opinion that none of the maritime features in the Spratly Islands are entitled to maritime zones beyond twelve nautical miles. UNCLOS accords the full suite of maritime jurisdiction privileges (territorial sea, EEZ, and continental shelf rights) to islands. Rocks, however, are only entitled to twelve nautical miles of territorial sea, and freestanding low-tide elevations have no jurisdictional entitlement at all.

The tribunal ruled that the Spratly Islands are not islands in the legal sense, but rather, rocks or low-tide elevations. This includes the aptly named Mischief Reef, a submerged feature that China has occupied since 1995; it is one of seven features upon which Beijing has heaped thousands of tons of sand and concrete since the case was lodged in 2013. Although Mischief Reef now accommodates a military-grade runway and port facilities, the ruling is unambiguous that it falls within the Philippine EEZ. This means China is in a state of unlawful occupation."

The PCA ruling *has* affected China's sovereignty claims in the SCS. The sentence in question is erroneous.

-Object404 (talk) 23:31, 28 September 2024 (UTC)

You are citing supports the accuracy of the sentence in the article. It states: "Unlike previous territorial disputes put before the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea or International Court of Justice in The Hague, this tribunal did not adjudicate on sovereignty. (The bold is mine, not in the article). JArthur1984 (talk) 00:10, 29 September 2024 (UTC)

The PCA ruling did not adjudicate on sovereignty per se, but the ruling DID apply and clarify the state of some of China's sovereignty claims as having no legal basis, as per above. -Object404 (talk) 01:28, 29 September 2024 (UTC)

Does that mean your disagreement is not the whole sentence you removed but the word "apply" specifically? Do you want to change "apply to" to "adjudicate"? We can see if the other editor whose edit I agreed with weighs in, but changing "apply to" to "adjudicate" is acceptable to me. JArthur1984 (talk) 01:43, 29 September 2024 (UTC)

No. The entire sentence is quite misleading. The PCA ruled that in multiple instances, China had "no legal basis" (do a word search for "legal basis" in the ruling PDF) "for any entitlement by China to maritime zones" in X areas of the SCS, and this runs completely counter to China's sovereignty claims of:

"i. China has sovereignty over Nanhai Zhudao, consisting of Dongsha Qundao, Xisha Qundao, Zhongsha Qundao and Nansha Qundao;

ii. China has internal waters, territorial sea and contiguous zone, based on Nanhai Zhudao;

iii. China has exclusive economic zone and continental shelf, based on Nanhai Zhudao;

iv. China has historic rights in the South China Sea."

For example, the ruling states: "The Tribunal has already held (see paragraphs 277 to 278 above) that there is no legal basis for any Chinese historic rights, or sovereign rights and jurisdiction beyond those provided for in the Convention, in the waters of the South China Sea encompassed by the ‘nine-dash line’." This overturns China's sovereignty claims above.

The logic that the sentence in question evokes is flawed and misleading, so let's just remove it and leave the previous sentence which is in the ruling there instead: "It declared its position on the award that "nothing in this Award should be understood to comment in any way on China’s historic claim to the islands of the South China Sea".".

-Object404 (talk) 03:10, 29 September 2024 (UTC)

Maybe we're also misunderstanding things here. "nothing in this Award should be understood to comment in any way on China’s historic claim to the islands of the South China Sea" -> In the case of the arbitral decision, "Island" has a specific legal meaning (as opposed to rocks and low-tide elevations). Maybe the PCA ruling does not comment on what it has defined as islands? It has, however, made decisions on features it has defined as not islands? -Object404 (talk) 03:31, 29 September 2024 (UTC)

The tribunal only considered maritime areas (the sea areas) for its rulings. It did not and would not rule on any territorial sovereignty claims in South China Sea. STSC (talk) 07:50, 29 September 2024 (UTC)

My point is that the 2016 tribunal had ruled that certain features were only rocks and low-tide elevations and not islands, the result of which a number of China's claims above were invalidated as having no legal basis. Hence, the sentence in question, "The tribunal's rulings do not apply to China's sovereignty claims over the islands and maritime features in South China Sea.", is actually quite misleading. -Object404 (talk) 09:44, 29 September 2024 (UTC)

Their rulings only concern with the issues of EEZ around the "rocks". Please note that the Philippines also claims sovereignty over these "rocks" in Spratly Islands. STSC (talk) 11:45, 29 September 2024 (UTC)

Incorrect. The arbitral ruling also touches on multiple points, some which are listed below. See a summary here.

• China’s maritime entitlements in the South China Sea may not extend beyond those permitted by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
• China’s claims to sovereign rights jurisdiction within the “nine-dash line” that exceed its entitlements under UNCLOS are invalid
• Mischief Reef, Second Thomas Shoal, and Subi Reef are low-tide elevations
• Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal are part of the EEZ and continental shelf of the Philippines -> China does not have EEZ & continental shelf in areas of the Spratlys that lie within the Philippine EEZ accoridng to the ruling, as opposed to China's documented claims above of "China has exclusive economic zone and continental shelf, based on Nanhai Zhudao;"
• China has unlawfully interfered with the Philippines’s exercise of sovereign rights over its EEZ and continental shelf
• China has unlawfully failed to prevent its nationals and vessels from exploiting the living resources in the EEZ of the Philippines
• China has unlawfully prevented Philippine fishermen from pursuing their livelihoods by interfering with traditional fishing activities at Scarborough Shoal
• China has violated its obligations under the UNCLOS to protect and preserve the marine environment at Scarborough Shoal, Second Thomas Shoal, Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Gaven Reef, Johnson Reef, Hughes Reef and Subi Reef
• China’s occupation of and construction activities on Mischief Reef violate UNCLOS provisions concerning artificial islands and structures. Beijing’s duties to protect and preserve marine environment and constitute unlawful acts of attempted appropriation
• China has breached its obligations under the UNCLOS by operating its law enforcement vessels in a dangerous manner in the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal

-Object404 (talk) 12:30, 29 September 2024 (UTC)

Can we backtrack just a little bit? The ruling indeed does not talk about who owns which land features (i.e., which state has sovereignty over islands and rocks), but the ruling does rule on whether some features (e.g., those that have been declared as low-tide elevations) can actually generate sovereign territory (i.e., territorial sea) or allow sovereign rights (i.e., EEZ). Since some features are declared as low-tide elevations, they generate neither territorial sea nor EEZ and therefore affect sovereignty claims made by various states. To give an example, Second Thomas Shoal is claimed (as part of their sovereignty) by a few countries (CN, TW, PH, VN) but because the ruling said that this feature is a low-tide elevation, the surrounding water automatically falls under the Philippines' EEZ being less than 200 nmi from Palawan and no other countries' baselines. (BTW, I'm not sure if the bits of land that sticks out at low tide can be claimed as "land territory", but the water certainly cannot be claimed as territorial sea.). —seav (talk) 17:21, 29 September 2024 (UTC)

The tribunal's rulings are rather silly. Every individual "rock" does not have EEZ but some lawyers of international law pointed out that if the whole group of Spratly Islands were considered as one territory then it might have its own territorial sea and EEZ. STSC (talk) 23:55, 29 September 2024 (UTC)

Do you have a link or ref to the "some lawyers of international law"? I'd like to read their take. —seav (talk) 02:29, 30 September 2024 (UTC)

If you do a search on Google you may just find some related articles on this issue. STSC (talk) 04:57, 30 September 2024 (UTC)

One more point, the rulings did not actually rule on any issue about territorial sovereignty. STSC (talk) 05:11, 30 September 2024 (UTC)

Sure, the 2016 ruling did not decide which state has sovereignty over land territory, but it definitely did have an effect on whether portions of maritime territories with the Spratlys area could actually be subject to any of those state's sovereignty. By a careful reading of the ruling, it did gave the Philippines sovereign rights as EEZ to much of the waters (outside of the 12 nmi buffer surrounding islands and rocks). As an example, the ruling explicitly says that Mischief Reef is inside the Philippines' EEZ despite China illegally reclaiming land on it. —seav (talk) 06:18, 30 September 2024 (UTC)

The Philippines' entitlement to EEZ is never a doubt. We have a dispute in hand because of the overlapping of the EEZ and the sovereignty claims from other countries. STSC (talk) 06:44, 30 September 2024 (UTC)

Completely incorrect! If you read the award, it says there are no EEZ overlaps with certain features, that's why they were declared by the award to be part of the Philippines' EEZs.

For example:

694. From these conclusions, it follows that there exists no legal basis for any entitlement by China to maritime zones in the area of Mischief Reef, Second Thomas Shoal, the GSEC101 block, Area 3, Area 4, or the SC58 block. There is thus no situation of overlapping entitlements that would call for the application of Articles 15, 74, or 83 to delimit the overlap and no possible basis for the application of the exception to jurisdiction in Article 298(1)(a)(i).

1025. The Tribunal has now found, however, that Mischief Reef is a low-tide elevation and not a rock or fully entitled island (see paragraphs 374 to 378 above) and, as such, generates no entitlement to maritime zones of its own. The Tribunal has also found that none of the high-tide features in the Spratly Islands is a fully entitled island for the purposes of Article 121 of the Convention (see paragraphs 473 to 647 above). From these conclusions, it follows that there exists no legal basis for any entitlement by China to maritime zones in the area of Mischief Reef and no situation of overlapping entitlements that would call for the application of Articles 15, 74, or 83 to delimit the overlap. Mischief Reef is necessarily a low-tide elevation located within the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines.

1153. As set out above, the Tribunal has now found that Second Thomas Shoal is a low-tide elevation (see paragraphs 379 to 381) and, as such, generates no entitlement to maritime zones of its own. The Tribunal has also found that none of the high-tide features in the Spratly Islands is a fully entitled island for the purposes of Article 121 of the Convention (see paragraphs 473 to 647 above). The Tribunal has also found that there are no high-tide features within 12 nautical miles of Second Thomas Shoal (see paragraph 632 above). From these conclusions, it follows that there exists no legal basis for any entitlement by China to maritime zones in the area of Second Thomas Shoal. There is as a result no situation of overlapping entitlements that would call for the application of Articles 15, 74, or 83 to delimit the overlap. Nor is there any need to address sovereignty over Second Thomas Shoal before the Tribunal may consider China’s actions there. Second Thomas Shoal is a low-tide elevation located within the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines.

The award has clearly affected and has implications that apply on China's sovereignty claims, contrary to your insertion in the article: "Its position reaffirms that the tribunal's rulings do not apply to China's territorial sovereignty claims over the islands and maritime features in South China Sea, and the award would not make any implication in China's sovereignty claims."

Your statement needs amending. -Object404 (talk) 08:22, 30 September 2024 (UTC)

(China is claiming these features). They have been declared by the award to be part of the Philippines' EEZs.

The award also says:

(8) China has unlawfully interfered with the enjoyment and exercise of the sovereign rights of the Philippines with respect to the living and non-living resources of its exclusive economic zone and continental shelf; (9) China has unlawfully failed to prevent its nationals and vessels from exploiting the living resources in the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines; (10) China has unlawfully prevented Philippine fishermen from pursuing their livelihoods by interfering with traditional fishing activities at Scarborough Shoal; (11) China has violated its obligations under the Convention to protect and preserve the marine environment at Scarborough Shoal, Second Thomas Shoal, Cuarteron Reef,

-Object404 (talk) 08:26, 30 September 2024 (UTC)

Do you know the Philippines still occupies many "rocks" in Spratly Islands and claims these "rocks" as their territories. STSC (talk) 10:35, 30 September 2024 (UTC)

According to UNCLOS, which China is a signatory to, the Philippines is perfectly within its rights to occupy these for portions under EEZ of the Philippines. From what I understand, parties to UNCLOS have agreed to jurisdiction on "the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures" to EEZ owners as the coastal states. -Object404 (talk) Object404 (talk) 11:28, 30 September 2024 (UTC)

The EEZ only covers the seas. As per WP:NOTFORUM, I shall stop wasting my time here. STSC (talk) 16:40, 30 September 2024 (UTC)

Hey, I'm the one who's backing up my statements here with citations, so WP:NOTFORUM does not apply here. Where are yours? -Object404 (talk) 20:42, 30 September 2024 (UTC)

STSC, see Article 56(1)(b) here. As this is about the Philippine EEZ, I read that to say that the Philippines has jurisdiction with regard to, "the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures; [etc.]". Wtmitchell (talk) (earlier Boracay Bill) 22:59, 30 September 2024 (UTC)

Wtmitchell, I know about that part of the EEZ provisions; the installation of artificial islands is another matter. I meant this: the EEZ covers "the natural resources of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil". STSC (talk) 04:18, 3 October 2024 (UTC)