Talk:State continuity of the Baltic states/Archive 1

Archive 1

Archive 2

Title and synthesis

Is there any RS grouping these cases together under this title? I searched the ECHR for "cases on occupation of baltic states" and found none, could anyone direct me in the right place? I have placed the appropriate tags, but surely will look into ways to fix it if no one adequately addresses the issue. (Igny (talk) 00:14, 7 March 2010 (UTC))

Split this list of cases with a POV-title into individual cases

To eliminate POV-title and SYNTH issues, I suggest to split the article into individual cases. Since the current article is POV-titled synthesis, I suggest to delete it. (Igny (talk) 23:29, 10 March 2010 (UTC)) I created a draft of one of the cases here. (Igny (talk) 01:16, 11 March 2010 (UTC))

There is no Synth here. Please read for example Rislakki, Jukka (2008). he case for Latvia: disinformation campaigns against a small nation. Rodopi. p. 156. ISBN 9042024240. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help). You might be right that the title may be reflecting the POV of the European Court of Human Rights though. What is it exactly you'd like to do about it? I'm open to suggestions.--Termer (talk) 21:57, 4 April 2010 (UTC)

I thought I made it clear that my suggestion was to split the article into case articles, see the split tag. (Igny (talk) 20:07, 5 April 2010 (UTC))

There is no need to do that, the source given above speaks explicitly about the cases of the European Court of Human Rights where the occupation of Baltic states has been under discussion. And that's what this article is about.--Termer (talk) 03:19, 8 April 2010 (UTC)

PS. Thanks for adding such a punch of colorful tags to the top of this article. This really draws attention to this article and makes it stand out.--Termer (talk) 03:53, 8 April 2010 (UTC)

Stimson Doctrine&Welles Declaration

What's going on? The only reason anybody can talk about the legal continuity of the Baltic states is due to the Stimson Doctrine applied to the Occupation of the Baltic States by the Welles Declaration. Why such a fundamental fact about the subject got removed from the lede?--Termer (talk) 04:43, 15 April 2010 (UTC)

Stimson Doctrine is "just" international reaction, and "just" one side of a coin ("Ex injuria jus non oritur" and non "de jure"). The reality was much more complex. Peltimikko (talk) 05:04, 15 April 2010 (UTC)

There are two options really. Either to move all opinions and seemingly relevant and "fundamental" "facts" into the lede, or to keep the lede as concise as possible. I prefer the latter. (Igny (talk) 05:06, 15 April 2010 (UTC))

The reality was more complex? one side of the coin? where exactly this comes from? In the current form article has turned into an essay, please make it encyclopedic by listing facts only.--Termer (talk) 05:12, 15 April 2010 (UTC)

"encyclopedic" =/= "listing facts only". (Igny (talk) 05:18, 15 April 2010 (UTC))

Facts include opinions in case it's clearly pointed out who says so? Please familiarize yourselves with the subject instead of using abstract claims in the lede like "is a complex concept". According to whom this is a "complex concept" and why exactly? "...has two competing maxims", according to whom?

Historical dictionary of Estonia By Toivo Miljan available online spells out the whole 'complexity' very clearly, the continuity of the Baltic states is based on the US nonrecognition policy. The fact is if the Wells declaration wasn't there, the non-recognition policy was based on, nobody could have talked about the "legal continuity of the Baltic states" in 1991 and after.--Termer (talk) 05:34, 15 April 2010 (UTC)

PS. one of the most comprehensive studies published on the subject would be Diplomats Without a Country: Baltic Diplomacy, International Law, and the Cold War by James T. McHugh , James S. Pacy--Termer (talk) 05:38, 15 April 2010 (UTC)

I can suggest reading State Continuity and its Consequences: The Case of the Baltic States by PETER VAN ELSUWEGE and references therein. (Igny (talk) 06:01, 15 April 2010 (UTC))

PETER VAN ELSUWEGE

— On the basis of the fundamental law principle of ex injuria non oritur jus, no legal benefit can be derived from an illegal act. Thus, legally speaking, the Soviet Union had no sovereign rights over the territory of the Baltic states. Even though the Soviet Union occupied these countries, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania continued to exist as subjects of international law. This continuity was recognized by most Western powers and reflected in their state practice. For instance, the diplomatic and consular missions of the Baltic republics in the United States continued their activities and enjoyed all diplomatic privileges on an equal footing with all other foreign representatives. Such an attitude of absolute and uncompromising non- recognition of the annexation of the Baltic states, based on a principle of international law, took precedence over the factual situation. The Baltic diplomats and consuls were representatives of sending states that, in fact, no longer existed as independent republics. The basic attitude of non-recognition was therefore confronted with its unavoidable limitation: it cannot be upheld ad infinitum.5 According to another principle of international law, that of ex factis jus oritur, a violation of international law should be regarded as legal once evidence of permanence is present. Marek argues that an application of this latter principle must not be presumed or admitted ‘except in the very last resort, when the normative pressure of facts has reached its summit and all reasonable chance of a restitutio ad integrum6 has disappeared for as long a period of time as can reasonably be assessed’.7 Hence, the question was whether the Baltic states, which had been subject to foreign occupation for a period of fifty years, fell into this category.

So why doesn't the article/lede say than that "Marek argues..." like the source you provided explains? All those legal nuances and theories are interesting of course and deserve their place in the article. It doesn't explain why the fats from where exactly the non recognition policy-legal continuity originates from was removed from the lede? It originated from the policy of the US that was based the Stimson Doctrine&Welles Declaration&Executive Order 8484, and the US as the leader of the Western Block, such policy was followed by its allies. What is so complex about it?--Termer (talk) 06:26, 15 April 2010 (UTC)

Because there are arguments for (like Marek's) as well as against. Lede does not have to bloated by listing all these arguments, opinions, claims, or instances of recognition or non-recognition. (Igny (talk) 12:59, 15 April 2010 (UTC))

I would like to remind everyone that this article is a work in progress. If you, Termer, or others refuse to contribute, at least try not to disrupt any progress made here. And I would like to invite editors to constructively contribute here, and, of course, thank Peltimikko for valuable contributions. (Igny (talk) 14:32, 15 April 2010 (UTC))

Refuse to contribute? All my edits that spelled out what is this subject all about were reverted the minute I turned around and the text was replaced with confusing and misleading statements that as I can see have been sourced to someone's opinions but have been represented as facts by itself. --Termer (talk) 04:34, 16 April 2010 (UTC)

PS. The article reads like a some kind of Baltic POV piece: "Claims of the Baltic states to state continuity", "International reactions to the claims of the Baltic states" etc instead of laying out the facts from where the whole state continuity originates from?--Termer (talk) 07:38, 17 April 2010 (UTC)

A word "claim" as legal term. (see headings in Ineta Ziemele's book "State Continuity And Nationality: Baltic States And Russia") Peltimikko (talk) 14:56, 17 April 2010 (UTC)

Don't see any improvements, I've already pointed out that Ziemele's opinions are probably valuable to this article but they can't be states as facts by itself. Please fix it or let me do it without reverting my edits. So far it reads like WP:Weasel--Termer (talk) 06:05, 23 April 2010 (UTC)

Re:So far it reads like WP:Weasel-- No it does not. (Igny (talk) 06:16, 23 April 2010 (UTC))

To some of the above: neo-Soviet occupation deniers incurred new losses in European Court this year. First Kononov vs Latvia, which caused rage in Kremlin (verifyable information), just now 45 Russian military occupiers losing their pension claims. I feel like contributing, after doing some reading.Bete (talk) 23:32, 4 November 2010 (UTC)

To do

Just in case, here is what I am currently collecting data on (slowly but surely)

• Timeline (possibly need a section on that)
• Effect on bilateral and multilateral treaties, status of old Soviet-Baltic treaties
• restitutio ad integrum and border issues
• effect on citizenship laws and Russian minorities and human rights
• POV from internal Soviet law (constitution)
• political versus legal aspects

(Igny (talk) 02:03, 16 April 2010 (UTC))

Some of these issues have their own their article such as Estonian nationality law etc. Not too much information here. Let's stay inside "State continuity" as there are more issues to come. And furthermore, I would be very careful adding views of Russian Federation. The Soviet law and practises could be added to understand the Baltic state continuity or non-continuity. Peltimikko (talk) 03:18, 16 April 2010 (UTC)

I think modern Russian views are only relevant here because Russia considers old treaties like Treaty of Tartu void exactly because old states ceased to exist when incorporated to Soviet Union, according to Russia. And when defending such a view, Russia called many decisions or declarations by the Baltic states or third parties about illegality of annexation "politicized", whatever it means. But Soviet constitution is very relevant here: according to it, "restoration of sovereignty" by republics was illegal, and only their secession due to the right of self determination was allowed at the time. (Igny (talk) 23:34, 16 April 2010 (UTC))

The Soviet Union recognised the Baltic independence on 6 September 1991. Right or wrong? The Russian Ferederation is the predecessor of the Soviet Union? Peltimikko (talk) 14:51, 17 April 2010 (UTC)

Baltic independence yes. What's about state continuity? I believe that according to Russia, Baltic states are the same as Ukraine, that is new, 20 year old states, rather than 90 year old states, right?(Igny (talk) 15:20, 17 April 2010 (UTC))

The Baltic states had multiple diplomatic relations and they were members of multiple international organisatios before 1940 annexation. Ukraine did not have such recognition before 1991. So, the "case Ukraine" is quite clear, but the state continuity with the Baltic states is more complex. Peltimikko (talk) 15:47, 17 April 2010 (UTC)

I agree, I am just talking about Russia's position on this matter. Have they recognized the state continuity yet? For example, Elsewege did not say so explicitly, but it implied so when talking about the Tartu treaty. (Igny (talk) 15:57, 17 April 2010 (UTC))

factual accuracy dispute.

since the article pretends like the subject, the State continuity of the Baltic states is a some sort of a "claim of the Baltic states" and due to my edits referring to the facts about the origin of the state continuity get reverted, and replaced with abstract weaseling, the article goes under factual accuracy dispute. Please do not remove the tag again and again like you've done thus far until the dispute has been resolved and a consensus has been reached on the talk page. Thanks!--Termer (talk) 05:49, 24 April 2010 (UTC)

Lead section provides an accessible overview of the article, and the lead reflects the body text. Please, check and edit body text instead if you find fact errors. Peltimikko (talk) 06:28, 24 April 2010 (UTC)

The body has other problems, at first we should attempt to fix the lede so that it would make sense to an average reader. Above I've laid out the points several times, also pointed out the problems in the lede with appropriate tags several times, it should be straight forward. So please fix it or let me do it instead of reverting my edits. Thanks!--Termer (talk) 07:43, 24 April 2010 (UTC)

POV

I have applied a POV tag to this article, please do not remove it until the issues are resolved. This article is terribly POVed. the entire first sections, those that have not been moved from the original article Occupation of the Baltic states, are derived entirely from one single book by Ziemele. Somebody else said that it reads like a some kind of Baltic POV piece: "Claims of the Baltic states to state continuity", "International reactions to the claims of the Baltic states", and I agree.

There is a big gap in this article because it ignores the origin and development of the concept of state continuity (which also has been applied to post-colonial states in Africa and Asia), and which came before any claim made in 1991. As someone said above, the concept originated from the policy of the USA based the Stimson Doctrine and Welles Declaration and Executive Order 8484. To show how flawed this article really is, the discussion of these events from 1940 appear in the section "International reactions to the claims of the Baltic states", as if the actions of 1940 is a reaction to the "Claims of the Baltic states" of 1991!!!

There needs to be a section that discusses the origin and development of the concept of state continuity in international law and it should come before the section "Claims of the Baltic states to state continuity", because these claims came in 1991 and are based upon the developments before 1991. IMHO, the section "Claims of the Baltic states to state continuity" should really be in an "Aftermath" article, since these claims were post 1991. ISerovian (talk) 00:21, 26 April 2010 (UTC)

Re: "To show how flawed this article really is..." I don't see why did you claim that the Baltic claims came in 1991, because from 1940 the embassies of the Baltic states pretended to represent their de facto non-existent but de jure recognized (by some western countries) governments. The question of continuity (recognition of pre-war Baltic passports, of the Baltic diplomats' status, etc.) existed even before 1991. With regards to "the concept of state continuity (which also has been applied to post-colonial states in Africa and Asia)", please, provide examples (with sources).--Paul Siebert (talk) 01:58, 26 April 2010 (UTC)

You are not seriously defending this article's POV that Baltic diplomats in the 1940's claimed legal continuity of the post-1991 Baltic states, and this forced the USA in 1940 to respond to this claim by invoking the Stimson Doctrine, making the Welles Declaration and issuing Executive Order 8484? This is what this article presently claims and you are seriously supporting this? It the tail really wagging the dog here?

The Baltic diplomats may have, as you say, "pretended" to represent the last legitimate government of the Baltics, but that is what they claimed in 1940, nothing more. Their hope in 1940 was that independence would be restored at the end of the war, they had no idea that it would take 50 years. In hindsight we can say that the presence of these diplomats helped the claim of state continuity, but they where not the instigator of that claim, it was the USA.

The USA wasn't reacting to these Baltic diplomats, but these diplomats reacting to US policy. The USA at any time, with a stroke of the pen, could have shut those legations down, it could have returned the Baltic assets to the Soviet Union, and deported Baltic nationals as Soviet citizens, but it did not. Instead, it was US policy that allowed these legations to remain open, it was US policy that froze Baltic assets and denied them to the Soviet Union but allowed these Baltic legations to draw on those assets to fund their activities, it was US policy that refused to recognise Balts as Soviet citizens. It was the USA's policy of non-recognition of the Soviet annexation and recognition of the legal standing of these Baltic diplomats in representing the pre-war republics that gave rise to the principle of legal continuity.

This non-recognition of the annexation, and thus by way of corollary legal continuity, was a conscious policy choice of the USA, developed during the Roosevelt and Truman administrations, and consistantly maintained today, as exemplified by Barack Obama's co-sponsorship of a unanimously passed United States resolution on the 90th anniversary of the Latvian Republic in 2008.

In the 1940's there were two concepts competing within the US administration in formulating its stance towards the Soviet Union. The first was called the "Yalta axiom", a pragmatic realpolitik approach that regarded the SU as a super-power with a legitimate concern to consolidate its security. The second concept was the "Riga axiom", where the SU was viewed as a country persuing world revolution that denied any possibility for peaceful co-existance and therefore military containment was the only option. Needless to say the second concept came to dominate US thinking an the end of WW2 and during the Cold War. It is interesting to note that the two prime architects of the "Riga axiom", George Kennan and Charles Bohlen, both served as US diplomats in Tallinn and Riga during the 1920's.

So in a nutshell, the continued US non-recognition of the Soviet annexation was an artifact of the Cold War. The claim of legal continuity of the Baltic states in 1991 was the outcome of that Cold War. As in any war, there are winners and losers, the Soviet Union lost, the USA won and the Baltic states could claim legal continity in 1991. For further reading see the book "The Baltic question during the Cold War" By John Hiden, Vahur Made, David J. Smith[1]

This article has deep POV issues that need to be rectified. ISerovian (talk) 00:10, 27 April 2010 (UTC)

Merely for encyclopedic purposes, for an article on state continuity, the concept of state continuity is primary. All the causes or consequences are secondary. I think you confused this to a chicken v. an egg issue, it is not. This article focuses on legal concept first, then on political aspects second, giving fair coverage to POVs from all sides. And you may be surprised but in any war there are more than one side, and per NPOV policy Wikipedia does not have to support one side at the expense of the other. It did give enough credit to USA policy in the body, so I am not sure what exactly you want, do you want "all hail the USA!" in capital letter in the lead?

So, in fact, even this article, which is still work in progress, is more NPOV than you and your cabal think. (Igny (talk) 01:16, 27 April 2010 (UTC))

I agree with almost everything ISerovian has pointed out. Just that I wouldn't call it POV, the article is just factually incorrect and misleading in the current form. Again, please do not remove the factual accuracy dispute tag until the issues have been resolved. Thanks! --Termer (talk) 02:28, 5 June 2010 (UTC)

what "cabal"? You mean the people that are a little alarmed at what appears to be pro-soviet editors distorting many of the historical articles? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.28.22.13 (talk) 10:43, 22 June 2010 (UTC)

Middle of two doctrines

Well. Seems I am in a middle of two doctrines - Soviet/Russian and Baltics. And I am affraid they both are very un-academic. (And with no western academic background.) Anyway, I partly give up and edit only some minor fixes. Hopefully, time will give more academic views of this question. There are few books but our wikipedians are not willing to accept those. The situations remains me the Contination War, with decades of "separate war" doctrine in Finland until 1990s. Peltimikko (talk) 11:41, 1 August 2010 (UTC)

If you disagree with some changes made, you should clearly explain, what do you reject in those edits, instead of just generally complaining of an unacademic approach. There was also another aspect, why your revert was unacceptable: you removed a cn-tag from a very dubious statement (Switzerland recognizing the annexation).Miacek and his crime-fighting dog (t) 11:47, 1 August 2010 (UTC)

Currently the lede is too long and contains a lot of superfluous material giving a huge undue weight to one side of the dispute. I will work on shortening it in the next few days. (Igny (talk) 01:23, 19 August 2010 (UTC))

Balance in the lede

Currently the lede is balanced, because all the main points in Baltic arguments has been countered with Russian counter-arguments. And it is not bloated with superfluous details of who when and where stated their opinion about the matter. For those details, there are main sections down the article. (Igny (talk) 14:05, 21 August 2010 (UTC))

Let us refrain from the argumentation line of 'Baltic POV' vs 'Russia's POV'. The first POV is clearly the majority POV, supported by scholars, incl. legal experts and international organizations. The latter POV consists of nothing more than (not very convincing) attempts at whitewashing the Soviet foreign policies. These views are not equally valid. Russia's viewpoint is definitely relevant, but it's not supported by independent observers. Hence, there's no need at all to present in the lead “all the main points in Baltic arguments [...] countered with Russian counter-arguments”. Btw, a good overview of the Russian historiography on that matter is available here, I've been planning to integrate the info into the articles but I won't be jealous, if you overtake me here. Miacek and his crime-fighting dog (t) 14:26, 21 August 2010 (UTC)

No, this is not a scholar debate over semantics. First and furthermost, this is a specific politically charged dispute with two specific opponents. And with very specific consequences for both sides. So POVs of these sides are the most relevant here. The fact that some external observers take one side is also relevant, but not as much, and their impartiality remains under question, so it would still be Baltic v. Russian POV. (Igny (talk) 16:57, 21 August 2010 (UTC))

Or if you prefer to think about the Baltic states as pawns in a bigger game again, then it would still be the US versus Russia debate. Nonetheless the current position of the Russian government is more important for the lede than various interpretations of events in Soviet and Western historiography. (Igny (talk) 17:07, 21 August 2010 (UTC))

To Miacek. They went to court with their "partizans" and fairy-tailish "war heroes". The court kicked their butt, exposing them as butchers and killers they are. There's no POVs left anymore after one goes to court on own free will. The whole point of it to assume one recognizes the court as impartial and it doesn't matter anymore what decision it takes if it's final.Bete (talk) 23:50, 4 November 2010 (UTC)

Kalev Ots and the Nõmme government?

Something just happened that I am not sure is for the benefit of Wikipedia: The article Kalev Ots was deleted after Wikipedia:Articles for deletion/Kalev Ots (2nd nomination). The article (search for it in Google cache or deletopedia) presents an important point-of-view on the legal continuity. I do not know if Kalev Ots and the Nõmme government are notable – any more than the Estonian Government in Exile was in its time. I do however believe that his point-of-view should be presented in this article. -- Petri Krohn (talk) 02:37, 25 August 2010 (UTC)

factual accuracy disputed

Sorry to see that the article has turned into nonsense once again. So it's factual accuracy is disputed once again. Please read the relevant threads above, there's no reason to repeat everything all over again.--Termer (talk) 01:49, 14 September 2010 (UTC)

• Claims of the Baltic states to state continuity? Who exactly claims what? Regarding the Baltic states than it's written into their constitutions, never heard before that constitutions are written to claim something on wikipedia. But that's not even the point. The article completely bypasses the simple fact that all there is to it: the legal continuity of the Baltic states is based on the Stimson Doctrine applied to the Occupation of the Baltic States by the Welles Declaration [2]. The fact including several sources have been boldly removed [3] from the article with insulting comments rv by books do not add original research. The sourced material has been replaced with a text taken completely out of context representing one individual opinion, someone called Ineta Ziemele. In case Ineta Ziemele thinks this is a complex concept, fine, no problem. Please feel free t dedicate a section to her theories instead of making it look like someones opinions are facts.--Termer (talk) 02:15, 14 September 2010 (UTC)
  • the article says: In part, this position relies on the Stimson Doctrine applied to the Occupation of the Baltic States by the Welles Declaration. What part, what does it mean exactly? The fact is, if there wasn't Stimson Doctrine applied to the Occupation of the Baltic States by the Welles Declaration none of this State continuity of the Baltic states would have ever existed. Since the article completely misses such an important bottom line, in the current state it has been rewritten to confuse and mislead the reader.--Termer (talk) 02:26, 14 September 2010 (UTC)

Re the Stimson Doctrine or the Welles Declaration. These two documents had relation to the US foreign policy, and by no means did they establish any new international law. Do you imply that the legal status of one one independent state can be determined based on the unilateral decision of the another state? --Paul Siebert (talk) 03:46, 14 September 2010 (UTC)

The USA was (and still is) a superpower, are you seriously suggesting that the Stimson Doctrine or the Welles Declaration had no influence on the development of international law? --Martin (talk) 08:46, 14 September 2010 (UTC)

Wow, this is such a classic example of a straw man that I regret that WP can not be a source for its own articles. Otherwise, I would put this argument of yours right into the examples of straw man. (Igny (talk) 03:49, 3 October 2010 (UTC))

Actually, Ineta Ziemele is not writing "complex concept". This is a sort of orginal research (by me), but the sentence gives a reader a big picture at first. Secondly, the concept "Russia vs. Baltic states" is not a very good start, as this is more concept of international laws and agreements. Peltimikko (talk) 07:43, 14 September 2010 (UTC)

Could someone please explain to me if it is a matter of attributing this particular sentence to someone, or just a matter of phrasing it less awkwardly? (Igny (talk) 04:34, 3 October 2010 (UTC))

I've reapplied the tag, the original issues are unresolved. --Martin (talk) 05:28, 3 October 2010 (UTC)

Major rewrite

I've started a major rewrite of this, due to the concerns expressed on this page. There is a lot more to do, but I expect to complete it in the next week or so. --Martin (talk) 10:18, 2 October 2010 (UTC)

Please, don't. (Igny (talk) 03:46, 3 October 2010 (UTC))

I don't appreciate your wholesale blind revert, I spent a lot of time reading and compiling sources. It is not very constructive of you, I am quite disappointed, I had expected better. The version you reverted to has some serious factual errors, as well as being a structual mess. Therefore I have reapplied some tags. --Martin (talk) 05:26, 3 October 2010 (UTC)

Moved sections

I've moved some sections about without adding or removing any text, so as to give the article some logical structure. And I've also split the section "Claims of the Baltic states to state continuity" into two sections, one called "Historical background" and the other called "Baltic states assert state continuity" for logical structure. Again no text has been added or deleted. --Martin (talk) 19:56, 25 December 2010 (UTC)

Recognition/non-recognition

I noticed this section has been written primarily based on the 1960 survey prepared by the West German Foreign Ministry. This source is outdated and, taking into account that the Baltic issue was used as a tool during teh Cold War, neutrality of this source is disputable. Thus, the survey placed the countries that expressed no position on the Baltic issue, or had no diplomatic relation with the USSR as whole into a category "De jure non-recognition" (which is not automatically true). As a result, the stated that didn't recognise the annexation both de jure and de-facto (USA), the states that recognised it de facto but not de jure (UK), the states that expressed no position on that account at all (Chile) appeared to be combined in the same category. That is misleading, because it mix the states that openly expressed their opinion and claimed that they are not going to recognise the annexation with the states that simply didn't bother to pay attention to this issue as unimportant.
In connection to that, I propose to use more recent and neutral source (the Malksoo's monograph) as the base, and, accordingly, to create four categories ("non-recognition de jure and de facto", "non-recognition de jure and recognition de facto", "recognition both de jure and de facto" and "no position").--Paul Siebert (talk) 16:09, 14 January 2011 (UTC)

You mean something like here? (Igny (talk) 00:35, 15 January 2011 (UTC))

Yes, although the NATO members should be listed explicitly (the wording is misleading, because some of them did recognise annexation). In addition, in this list the "No official relations with Baltic states", and "States that had no diplomatic relations with the USSR by 1960" are listed among the states that did not recognise the annexation de jure, in other words, among the states that did not supported this annexation. In actuality, these states simply ignored this issue (probably, as non-important for them), so they neither supported nor opposed the annexation. Tn actuality, the states that did not recognise the annexation de jure are those states that explicitly declared they refused to do so; for instance, Great Britain declared that it recognised the annexation de facto but did not recognise it de jure, the US declared they do not recognise annexation both de jure and de facto. However, the states that did not expressed their position because they didn't want to do so, or had no possibility (since they had no diplomatic relation with the USSR) should be listed among those who abstained in this "vote".--Paul Siebert (talk) 00:55, 15 January 2011 (UTC)

The 1960 survey was the only comprehensive survey available, listing countries with "No official relations with Baltic states" under non-recognition is the published view taken by the West German Foreign Ministry. Arguing against this classification is engaging in OR in the absence of any other published survey. That said, there is a later survey by R. Pullat in his paper "The Restoration of the Independence of Estonia" published the 1991 edition of The Finnish Yearbook of International Law on page 529. Unfortunately I don't have access to that yearbook. If you can access it, could you email me a copy? --Martin (talk) 01:30, 15 January 2011 (UTC)

Since many reliable sources recognise that the recognition of the Baltic States was a highly politicized issue, to use the official source directly connected with the foreign ministry of one of the major Soviet adversary would be against neutrality. In addition, the source is outdated. Malksoo's classification is more neutral in my opinion.

Re Pullat, I failed to find the online version of this article. I also was unable to find this article in the catalogue of my university library.--Paul Siebert (talk) 02:10, 15 January 2011 (UTC)

Well the German foreign ministry source is used and adapted by the author Kristina Spohr Readman in her chapter of John Hiden's book[4], so presumably her adaption was peer reviewed. According to the online catalogue my university library does have paper copies of The Finnish Yearbook of International Law, but it is not clear to me if they have the 1991 edition. I'll have to visit the library in the next few days to check. --Martin (talk) 04:54, 15 January 2011 (UTC)

You still haven't explained what problems do you see with the Malksoo's classification ((i) de jure and de facto non-recognition, (ii) de jure non-recognition, de facto recognition, (iii) de jure and de facto recognition, (iv) no diplomatic relations/no decision). One more point. For most states that had to make the decision on recognition/non-recognition, this decision was connected with the faith of the property or citizens of the Baltic states that left on their territories after annexation of the Baltic states by the USSR. Since majority of states in the world simply didn't face this issue, they simply ignored this issue. Therefore, I doubt they automatically fall into the category "no recognition".--Paul Siebert (talk) 06:13, 15 January 2011 (UTC)

Firstly Spohr Readman has only two groups: De jure non-recognition and De jure recognition. Secondly, in terms of the topic of the article being state continuity, only de jure recognition/non-recognition has significance from an legal perspective. Thirdly, while Mälksoo does classify as you say, it is to give further detail, but in his conclusions on page 135 he notes: "the fact remains that an important number of Western States formally refused to recognise the Soviet incorporation of the Baltic States, right up to the restoration of their independence in 1991. According to one estimate, by the end of the 1980s, approximately fifty States had not recognized the incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union". Under the de jure recognition/non-recognition classification listed in the article, there are listed at present only 39 states. Further bifurcating the classification scheme as suggested would tend to obfuscate the conclusions of Spohr Readman, Mälksoo and others. --Martin (talk) 08:35, 15 January 2011 (UTC)

Since we are listing adversaries of the USSR in the Cold war, why we are not listing their allies, like Polland and the rest of Eastern Europe, etc? (Igny (talk) 14:23, 15 January 2011 (UTC))

Because authors like Spohr Readman, Mälksoo and others don't list them in their studies of non-recognition as it relates to the topic of state continuity, i.e they probably don't see it as relevant to the topic. --Martin (talk) 18:36, 15 January 2011 (UTC)

Surely they are directly relevant as states from the very same region. It goes without saying that the Warsaw Pact countries fully supported the Soviet version of the story, which is the Baltic states joined voluntarily. Therefore there was nothing to recognise. Let us not forget that the Communist ideology had no regard for the Hague Conventions. It would be good to discuss in the article, provided sources, of course (which at least I have not come across so far). --Jaan Pärn (talk) 19:01, 15 January 2011 (UTC)

Indeed as you say USSR and the her allies were of the opinion that "the Baltic states joined voluntarily. Therefore there was nothing to recognise". By not relevant I mean in the context of international law and continuity, I've not seen any author mention the viewpoint of the Warsaw pact countries in relation to that in any published study, adding such information would be crossing into WP:OR territory. --Martin (talk) 19:13, 15 January 2011 (UTC)

That's correct. --Jaan Pärn (talk) 19:43, 15 January 2011 (UTC)

Rewrite the list in prose

I suggest replace the list as misleading and rewrite it in prose. Some thing to the tune of

According to 1960 report, such an such countries had not recognized Baltic incoropration de jure. Most of adversaries of USSR in Cold war ( see members of NATO) refused to recognize it de jure at all with exception of..., although some states recognized it de-facto.

Most of USSR allies (see Warsaw pact) had such and such position...(ref needed).

Most of other states did not express their position either way.

In 1991 upon of secession of the Baltic states from the USSR such and such countries recognized them as the same, and such and such states recognized them anew.

What do you think? (Igny (talk) 16:33, 15 January 2011 (UTC))

No objections against rewriting in prose. As long as the current information stays and the added statements are from neutral reputable sources. --Jaan Pärn (talk) 18:04, 15 January 2011 (UTC)

I would object because a list is more succinct, and since the information is published why not include it. --Martin (talk) 18:49, 15 January 2011 (UTC)

Countries listed under "No policy"

On another point, I'm not sure I agree with including countries that had no diplomatic relations in a separate section, given that Spohr Readman lists them in the non-recognition camp, and Mälksoo infers in his concluding remarks that he does too. Note that many of these countries that did not have any diplomatic relations with the USSR did in fact have diplomatic relations with the pre-war republics. Therefore having no such relations or policy with regard to the USSR would mean these countries were in the de-jure non-recognition camp, as Spohr Readman and others conclude. --Martin (talk) 18:49, 15 January 2011 (UTC)

Strongly disagree. Need to check on what Mälksoo says but definiteley there were countries that even had no idea the Baltic states ever existed. And placing Cuba in the anti-Soviet camp? We cannot label every country that made no statement about the issue "no de jure recognition" because that's too strong. --Jaan Pärn (talk) 19:09, 15 January 2011 (UTC)

Spohr Readman clearly states that here and Mälksoo implies agreement in his conclusions on page 135: "the fact remains that an important number of Western States formally refused to recognise the Soviet incorporation of the Baltic States, right up to the restoration of their independence in 1991. According to one estimate, by the end of the 1980s, approximately fifty States had not recognized the incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union". If we can find that estimate he refers to (R. Pullat "The Restoration of the Independence of Estonia" published the 1991 edition of The Finnish Yearbook of International Law, p529) that would probably resolve the matter. --Martin (talk) 19:18, 15 January 2011 (UTC)

What does a "De jure non-recognition, no diplomatic relations" policy even mean? Countries that recognised the legal continuity of the Baltic states but banned their embassies and passports? Don't you think what you are proposing is kind of schizophrenic? If you can find sourced policy statements from governments either explicitly recognising the legal continuity of the Baltic states, their embassies or passports, go ahead and add them to the relevant list. --Jaan Pärn (talk) 19:27, 15 January 2011 (UTC)

I'm not proposing anything other than what published sources say. It is Spohr Readman who is making the classification in Hiden's peer review book. If you think that is schizophrenic, take it up with her or John Hiden. "No diplomatic relations" means no relations with either the USSR or the respective Baltic Soviet Republics, clearly a case of non-recognition. I'm not going to start engaging in original research and find sourced policy statements from governments. --Martin (talk) 19:34, 15 January 2011 (UTC)

What you are proposing is exactly OR. Readman has only two classes whereas you have coined a third one. Maybe we should take a few steps back first, and agree which classification to use. --Jaan Pärn (talk) 19:40, 15 January 2011 (UTC)

No, I originally had two categories de jure non recognition/de jure recognition [5] per Spohr Readman's source, you split that into four "De jure and de facto non-recognition", "De jure non-recognition, de facto recognition", "De jure recognition", "No policy". I merely returned "No policy" (which really should be called "No diplomatic relations" because that is what the cited ref says and besides not having diplomatic relations is a policy choice) under "de jure non recognition" per this source.

I agree we should step back and agree which classification to use. Given that the topic is state continuity, that classification that is relevant to that topic ought to be used. A simple two category classification of de jure non recognition/de jure recognition is most relevant to international law and state continuity, but by all means if you want further granularity within those two, that is okay. --Martin (talk) 19:51, 15 January 2011 (UTC)

Put another way, we have a group of nations that gave de jure recognition either explicitly by declaration or implicitly through establishing diplomatic relations after the fact but not making any reservation; and the other group did not give de jure recognition either explicitly by declaration or implicitly through not establishing diplomatic relations. --Martin (talk) 20:27, 15 January 2011 (UTC)

Readman's classification involves only 34 countries, Hiio's involves practically all of the world's nations. Readman is flawed in claiming Finland had no relations with the Soviet Union (?) and that Cuba had an anti-Soviet non-recognition policy which it certainly did not. Hiio's classification is clear for even a novice and there is nothing granular about the classes as the difference between de facto and de jure recognitions is crucial here, whereas Readman overly simplifies the matter. Besides, Hiio works in the same workgroups with Mälksoo so Hiio's article was probably peer-reviewed by Mälksoo. I cannot see anything wrong with Hiio's classification while I see the flaws in Readman's work. --Jaan Pärn (talk) 20:36, 15 January 2011 (UTC)

"Hiio's involves practically all of the world's nations", where does he do that? I have Hiio's chapter in "Estonia 1940-1945" open in front of me, on page 198 he lists only 34. Readman states (as does Hiio) that Finland has no final decision on recognition. No where does Readman state Cuba has "an anti-Soviet non-recognition policy", she states Cuba had no final decision on recognition (you think the USSR wasn't pressuring Cuba to make such a decision?) --Martin (talk) 20:51, 15 January 2011 (UTC)

A lack of policy is not a non-recognition policy. That's where Readman goes wrong. --Jaan Pärn (talk) 20:35, 15 January 2011 (UTC)

It's a bit more complicated. When a sovereign state splits, its diplomatic inheritance often applies to both, e.g., European country A and African colony B split; colony becomes independent; if A recognized state C then B also recognizes state C even if it makes no official statement in that regard. I'll have to dust off some sources for this one; regardless, it's just interesting unless a reputable source makes the specific connection. PЄTЄRS J VЄСRUМВА ►TALK 21:23, 15 January 2011 (UTC)

Indeed. No where does Readman state these countries had a "lack of policy", she states that either they had no final decision or no diplomatic relations with the USSR. How can we know if these countries did not actively consider this and decided not to make a final decision or even to establish relations as a matter of policy. We simply cannot assert Readman is wrong. The bottom line is that there are two broad classifications relevant to international law and state continuity: those countries that gave de jure recognition and those that did not. Those countries that did not make a final decision or had no diplomatic relations still did not give de jure recognition. For a contemporary example look at Abkazia and South Ossetia, Russia has been encouraging Belarus to recognise these states with huge financial and other inducements, Belarus responds by saying they will consider the matter but have no final decision yet, continually postponing it time after time[6]. Making no final decision is a way of not giving de jure recognition without explicitly having to do so. --Martin (talk) 21:59, 15 January 2011 (UTC)

The major problem with "no de jure recognition" classification is that the author implicitly assumes that every state in the world was supposed to express its opinion on the Baltic issue, so the lack of recognition automatically meant the objection against the annexation. This is not automatically true, because most countries simply had no reason to express their opinion on that account. Many states had no diplomatic relations with the Baltic states before WWII (or even with the USSR), had no Baltic embassies on their territories, didn't faced the problem with peoples having Baltic passports, etc. Therefore, the fact that these states didn't take any steps to recognise/non-recognise the annexation just meant they had no need to do that, thereby giving no additional weight to neither continuity or non-continuity hypotheses. Therefore, it should be moved to a separate category. Let me also point out that, since WP:NOR policy refers only to the main article namespace, I, anticipating possible accusation in OR, remind to everyone that I do not propose to add this conclusion to the main article. However, this my conclusion demonstrates that more weight should be given to the Malksoo's classification than to the current one (just "de jure recognition/non-recognition) as less Balto-centric and more neutral.
Re Belarus. This analogy is not correct. Russia explicitly requested Belarus to recognise Abkhasia and South Ossetia, and Belarussian silence meant that it already expressed its position. However, if, e.g. Chilie, which had no diplomatic relations even with the USSR (and was pretty comfortable with that) expressed no position on the Baltic issue, that, most probably, meant they simply had no business in this remote (from their point of view) part of the world, so they had no need to do recognise/non-recognise the annexation.--Paul Siebert (talk) 05:30, 16 January 2011 (UTC)

No, the author Readman does not "implicitly assumes that every state in the world was supposed to express its opinion on the Baltic issue" as you claim, she only mentions eleven: Afghanistan, Cuba, Dominica, Ethiopia, Finland, Iran, Liberia, Nicaragua, Peru, Taiwan, South Africa. In 2003 Mälksoo wrote his classifications and of a "fourth group of states were 'eloquently silent' on the matter, giving only Finland as an example of this group (page 122). In 2008 Readman provides her classification and identifies ten countries in addition to Finland and lists them as being in the de jure non-recogition camp. Since Readman authored her work five years after Mälksoo, hers is the more recent scholarship. I am absolute astonished that people here can simply dismiss Readman as wrong citing work published five years before hers as "recent research"[7], and even entirely deleting it as irrelevant[8]. I am astonished with your claim that Readman's work is somehow more "Balto-centric and less neutral", given that she is a lecturer in International History at the London School of Economics specialising in the international affairs of Germany and the Cold War. --Martin (talk) 10:01, 16 January 2011 (UTC)

No use getting all emotional here. Readman's work is an adaption of a report published in 1960 by the German government, which at the time was a clearly partisan source. And even if we regarded the adaption as original research, it does not outdate Hiio and Mälksoo in any way, especially as she does not even make an argument in regard of Hiio and Mälksoo. The main argument is, however, that her classification is overly simplified and has flaws, like claiming Finland had "no official relations" with the Soviet Union or placing Cuba into the active non-recognition camp, which is rather tendentious. As we seem to have two competing classifications, we should pick the one that describes the complication of the situation in the most comprehensive and neutral way, and can be applied to all the countries of the world. --Jaan Pärn (talk) 10:45, 16 January 2011 (UTC)

Agreed with Jaan. With regard to "eloquent silence" of Swedish, I do not think it should be placed in the category "de jure recognition", because it would contradict to what Mälksoo says, although turning over to the USSR Baltic embassies and bank assets transferred to Sweden for safekeepingis a clear demonstration of recognition de facto.

I support the last Jaan's/Igny's edit, which essentially restored the older scheme, although I still insist on addition of one more category. Let me demonstrate it using Britain and, e.g. Ecuador. Britain, which had diplomatic relations with both the USSR and the Baltic states, and was deeply involved in European political affairs, declared in (off the top of my head) 1946 that it did recognise the Soviet installed Baltic governments de facto, but that it did not recognise them de jure, it was clearly and openly declared position on the state continuity issue. By contrast, Ecuador, that had virtually no relations to the European policy, and even had no diplomatic relations with the USSR, simply ignored the issue, expressing no position on that account. Is it correct to put the UK and Ecuador in the same category? I think, it isn't.

--Paul Siebert (talk) 17:19, 16 January 2011 (UTC)

Jaan I'm still waiting for you to provide a cite to Hiio to back your claim that his work "involves practically all of the world's nations". Can you do this please as I am interested in locating it and reading.

This contention that Readman's research is some how unreliable because the source was from the Auswärtige Amt and thus it is a partisan source is not credible. So all scholarship that studies original sources from both sides of the Cold War era is flawed? Firstly we do not know to what degree Readman adapted this data or whether her simple two pole classification was her construct related to her original research as a scholar of German international relations during the Cold War. Secondly Auswärtige Amt survey was an internal survey to assist the German government to come to a decision about its own position on the Baltic states, not for public consumption, so unless the German government was deluding itself the notion that its original study was bias because of the Cold War is not credible.

You cannot just cherry pick sources to suit yourself, if you do not accept Readman's classification of some countries as de-jure non-recognition, then how can you accept Readman's classification of Austria, Argentina, Bolivia and Japan as belonging to the de jure recognition group? You cannot reject a portion of Readman's classification but accept another portion in absence of any other supporting source. Therefore I have removed these countries from the list since you guys think Readman's German sources are unreliable and she is wrong, even though it was peer reviewed by scholars John Hiden, Vahur Made and David J. Smith. --Martin (talk) 20:02, 16 January 2011 (UTC)

The cite is Hiio's chapter itself, where he states in terms of the occupation of the Baltic states, the nations of the world form four groups. --Jaan Pärn (talk) 07:21, 17 January 2011 (UTC)

Well, firstly, the current dispute is not over Readman's classification vs my own (or Jaan's own) classification. In actuality we discuss two alternative classifications published in reliable sources. Secondly, noone questions Readman's reliability, however, I don't see how using the facts from the Readman's list for expansion of the Mälksoo's classification constitutes cherry picking or synthesis, because by doing that we did not advance any position that was not explicitly stated in this source. We do not reject Readman's data and Readman's conclusions about each particular country, but we prefer to organise it according to the scheme proposed by another scholar. By no means can it be considered as synthesis. If you disagree with that, please post a question on the NOR noticeboard about a possibility to combine several listson the same topics, which are made by different scholars and published in different reliable sources, into a single list. I am 100% sure the answer will be that that is allowed.--Paul Siebert (talk) 22:59, 16 January 2011 (UTC)

German and Soviet rule

The lede mix German and Soviet rule, which is absolutely incorrect. German rule was pure occupation, and no source question the fact that German occupation, as well as any occupation, had no relation to the state continuity issue.--Paul Siebert (talk) 00:59, 15 January 2011 (UTC)

Well, no, actually, the Soviet position is that Germany occupied sovereign territory of the USSR (Baltic states discontinuous) while reputable scholarship indicates Germany occupied Soviet-occupied territory, i.e., swapped one occupant for another of sovereign states (Baltic states continuous). That both Germany and the USSR are mentioned is wholly appropriate. PЄTЄRS J VЄСRUМВА ►TALK 21:08, 15 January 2011 (UTC)

Cannot agree. The sources do not discuss German occupation in a context of Baltic state continuity, because the issue is obvious: no matter what administration existed in the Baltic states before the German invasion, whether these states were a part of the USSR, or they were illegally occupied/annexed, German occupation had no additional effect on the legal status of these territories. Only the period of Soviet dominance is a subject of the dispute. Therefore the mention of German rule is misleading, because it creates a wrong impression that that issue is also a subject of debates.--Paul Siebert (talk) 05:38, 16 January 2011 (UTC)

This article is not just about the debates. It is about the state continuity of the Baltic states during 1940-1991, which involved both Soviet and German occupations. --Jaan Pärn (talk) 07:44, 16 January 2011 (UTC)

The article is primarily about the debates, concretely, whether the formation of the Baltic states in 1990s was a result of secession from the USSR, or of re-creation of the states that de facto (although, according to some sources, not de jure) ceased to exist in 1940. As the first lede's paragraph states:

"State continuity of the Baltic states refers to their sovereignty while under German and Soviet rule from 1940 to 1991. The competing maxims of ex injuria jus non oritur and ex factis jus oritur in international law, along with other legal and political considerations, have fueled a fundamental confrontation between the Baltic and Russian theses on continuity of the Baltic states and its related consequences.

With regard to German occupation, I doubt this event per se "have fueled any fundamental confrontation between the Baltic and Russian theses": both sides believe that the Germans were occupants, their rule was temporary and had no relation to the continuity issue.

In addition, let me remind you that the article about the period of dependence of the Baltic states already exists, so, if this article is supposed just to discuss the history of the Baltic states in 1940-90, it is simply redundant.--Paul Siebert (talk) 16:55, 16 January 2011 (UTC)

If 'sovereignity' and 'history' are the same thing, then yes. Otherwise, no. --Jaan Pärn (talk) 17:25, 16 January 2011 (UTC)

I can read and I can underline as well: "State continuity of the Baltic states refers to their sovereignty while under German and Soviet rule from 1940 to 1991. The competing maxims of ex injuria jus non oritur and ex factis jus oritur in international law, along with other legal and political considerations, have fueled a fundamental confrontation between the Baltic and Russian theses on continuity of the Baltic statesand its related consequences." --Jaan Pärn (talk) 17:26, 16 January 2011 (UTC)

Then the lede should be modified to adequately reflect what the article says. I checked the article. Germany is mentioned only in a context of German occupation of Austria and Czechoslovakia, Baltic waffen SS and Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. No legal issues connected with German occupation of the Baltic states are discussed in this article.--Paul Siebert (talk) 17:31, 16 January 2011 (UTC)

Then the article needs to expand on the USSR considering the Nazi occupation one of Soviet territory, the Baltics, that of Baltic territory. This would, for example, affect subsequent demands (or impositions) of reparations, etc. If Soviet territory, the USSR could later exact reparations from Germany for its invasion of the Baltics; if not Soviet territory, then not. PЄTЄRS J VЄСRUМВА ►TALK 23:56, 16 January 2011 (UTC)

Please, correct me if I am wrong, but the article's narrative revolves around the question of the Baltic states' continuity vs their re-creation vs secession from the USSR, which still has no absolutely unequivocal answer in terms of those times' international laws. However, if that is not the case, and the German occupation is also a subject of scholarly debates, then some reliable sources have to exist that present a detailed analysis of the German occupation issue in a context of the Baltic states' continuity. Please, provide the sources that discuss that. Let me also point out that the way to discuss this issue proposed by you looks rather artificial and hardly reflects what the reliable sources available for me tell.--Paul Siebert (talk) 00:12, 17 January 2011 (UTC)

The article also includes consequences of continuous or not. The obvious one is the Baltic states, being continuous, being entitled to reparations from the Soviet Union and/or its legal successor—which Russia explicitly chose to be. As I indicated, the other is whether or not there were any discussions of reparations directly after WWII on the part of the USSR regarding the Baltics. I am only suggesting that as long as we have this article, we should take the opportunity to be thorough. Regarding the German presence, I've run across scholarship discussing sovereignty (preserved or not) of German-occupied territory; a contrast of the Baltic case versus Czechoslovakia et al. would be informative (based on reliable sources, of course). PЄTЄRS J VЄСRUМВА ►TALK 01:05, 17 January 2011 (UTC)

Re reparations. Which reparations do you mean? There were no war between the USSR and the Baltic states, the USSR was not defeated. Of course, Russia can recognise that during the Soviet rule the Baltic states sustained some damage, and, as an act of the good will, may decide to try to compensate them, at least partially (taking into account Soviet investments into the Baltic economy, and Russian own damage during almost 70 years or Ukrainian-Georgian rule :-)). However, this issue has so tangential relation to the article's subject that I am seriously afraid of the sanctions per WP:SOAP.--Paul Siebert (talk) 03:37, 3 February 2011 (UTC)

I really don't see what your fear of WP:SOAP sanctions is. Let's not play the USSR invested in Latvia and made it a better place card, that is WP:SOAP. PЄTЄRS J V ►TALK 15:03, 7 February 2011 (UTC)

Lede

Since Martin did not bother to initiate a discussion before or after he made a substantial edit to the lede of this article, I feel obliged to start the discussion by explaining why I reverted them. First of all, the changes did not add any value to the lede, nothing new was added. Instead, a few important and sourced points were deleted to shift accents away from legitimate and significant issues raised in discussion of this topic. Moreover, MArtin introduced a factual inaccuracy that the Baltic states remained independent between their loss of independence in 1940 and regaining independence in 1990. Writing "lede update" in the summary of the edit or justifying the edit by the recent comment by Prof. Malksoo was also rather misleading, because Martin's edits were merely a revert to this 5 month old version, which was running borderline afoul of tendentious editing.

I would like to hear now Martin's justification for his edits to the lede, and why he thinks something was improved by that. (Igny (talk) 01:33, 3 February 2011 (UTC))

@Igny, Seems to me the old version contained more information and more sources while yours, Igny, tendentiously purports it's extremely complicated and mainly between Russia and the Baltics, when it is Russia versus pretty much world opinion now that we don't have the Warsaw Pact countries rubber-stamping Soviet pronouncements. Yours is the WP:TEND edit.

I suggest you cite specific clauses, not allege inaccuracies and tendentious editing with no specifics. This sort of vapid accusatory chiding does not advance the article. I suggest you start again. PЄTЄRS J VЄСRUМВА ►TALK 02:12, 3 February 2011 (UTC)

Number of sources is a meaningless criterion. If needed, I can also flood the lede with sources behind every statement. (Igny (talk) 02:36, 3 February 2011 (UTC))

Re while yours, Igny, tendentiously purports it's extremely complicated and mainly between Russia and the Baltics, That the lede is mine is a false statement. The current version of the lede was a result of combined efforts of myself and Peltimikko to write the lede in most neutral way possible without giving too much weight to any of the POVs, while disclosing most important aspects of the topic in question. As it is in full accordance to the sources cited, I am not sure what you mean by "purported". And it never claims that the issue is limited to Baltic and Russia, it merely is focused on the political and legal consequences which mainly affect Baltic and Russia only. (Igny (talk) 02:48, 3 February 2011 (UTC))

The problem is that in giving equal weight to the POVs, you are in fact attributing undue weight to one of the POVs, because the predominant (not just merely dominant) position, recognised by the majority of states internationally, in the courts and in the academic community, is that the Baltic states retained de jure continuity. --Martin (talk) 05:47, 3 February 2011 (UTC)

In regard to Igny's claim of "factual inaccuracy" in the lede, the text was almost quoted verbatim (I should have put it in quotes): "which held that de jure, Estonia remained an independent state under illegal occupation throughout the period 1940-91", written by the Balt Davids Johann Smithicius. I guess TFD will now chime in with the comment that the writer is an extreme right-wing ethnic nationalist.... --Martin (talk) 06:01, 3 February 2011 (UTC)

Re:the text was almost quoted verbatim. First of all, that raises certain questions with regards to what criteria you use when you pick your sources and with regard to quality of your sources. Secondly, I am surprised that an experienced editor like yourself needs lecturing on the fact that extravagant and extreme statements need some serious verification per WP:FRINGE, and they in any case do not belong to the lede. (Igny (talk) 00:04, 4 February 2011 (UTC))

?? What on earth are you talking about? I provided a cite to published source directly verifying the statement. I hardly think anyone seriously believes Professor Smith is fringe. --Martin (talk) 05:35, 4 February 2011 (UTC)

Please pay attention. I just applied the only WP policy which applies to the extravagant claims. I never said Smith was fringe. (Igny (talk) 12:11, 4 February 2011 (UTC))

Well then you do not know your policy. It is WP:REDFLAG that you are probably thinking of. However this text is backed by the highest quality source, a widely published professor who is the head of the Department of Central and East European Studies at Glasgow University and published in a peer reviewed book. Since you never claimed Smith was fringe, I don't see what your problem is with his viewpoint. --Martin (talk) 20:37, 4 February 2011 (UTC)

Re:Since you never claimed Smith was fringe, I don't see what your problem is with his viewpoint.. That is the same problem which you had with viewpoints of Prof. Simonyan. Do you see me placing his viewpoints in the lede of the WP articles? (Igny (talk) 02:41, 7 February 2011 (UTC))

The difference between Prof. Simonyan and Prof. Smith is that Smith's work is widely cited by others[9], while nobody cites Simonyan's work[10]. --Martin (talk) 08:46, 7 February 2011 (UTC)

Spain

According to The Baltic question during the Cold War, Spain gave neither de facto nor de jure recognition to the occupation until Franco died and Spain became democratic, when diplomatic relations without reservation were established with the USSR. Therefore, if we are speaking explicitly in the timeframe prior to 1977, would it not make sense for Spain to be included with the US, Ireland, and the Vatican, provided we make a note that this position was reversed? We include Australia under two different categories even though recognition was granted for a very short period of time, so why can we not have the same for Spain, whose non-recognition lasted for decades? Perhaps we can use the Franco-era flag to differentiate? ~~ Lothar von Richthofen (talk) 17:20, 5 February 2011 (UTC)

Do you mean the page 65 of this book? If yes, the Spanish position had no relation to the Baltic states issue, it was the opposition in general to the idea of territorial integrity of the European states in their present borders because of the Gibraltar issue.--Paul Siebert (talk) 05:11, 6 February 2011 (UTC)

The citation says page 120. I lack this book, so I am assuming good faith from whoever added it. Since you seem to have this book, you may cross-check the citation. ~~ Lothar von Richthofen (talk) 15:42, 6 February 2011 (UTC)

That is a good point. A Franco-era flag would make that even more clear. --Martin (talk) 19:54, 5 February 2011 (UTC)

I still wonder where we are to put the members of Warsaw pact in these lists... (Igny (talk) 20:30, 5 February 2011 (UTC))

I have not seen any scholarly source that discusses state continuity of the Baltic states mentioning the stance of the Warsaw pact countries, so adding them would probably be WP:OR. --Martin (talk) 02:08, 6 February 2011 (UTC)

It is perfectly clear that the Warsaw Pact states were fully with the Soviet Union's view, which was the Baltic States applied for membership in the Soviet Union. --Jaan Pärn (talk) 20:19, 7 February 2011 (UTC)

Now that we have finished eating the fish that Igny so kindly served us, does anyone care to weigh in on the matter of Spain? ~~ Lothar von Richthofen (talk) 22:19, 9 February 2011 (UTC)

Do you have something to specify on the matter? --Jaan Pärn (talk) 07:02, 10 February 2011 (UTC)

I guess the question is that given we have Australia listed in both the ""De jure non-recognition, de facto recognition" and "De jure recognition" sections, might not Spain be treated in a similar way? --Martin (talk) 08:27, 10 February 2011 (UTC)

The sources mention Spain only under de jure recognition as the country had no concrete non-recognition policy before that. --Jaan Pärn (talk) 12:31, 10 February 2011 (UTC)

So why do you want to treat Spain and the Warsaw pact members differently? What is so special about Spain? (Igny (talk) 03:37, 12 February 2011 (UTC))

My question was based on the sources given. One source describes a non-recognition policy up to 1977 (AGF on the citation), the other describes a change to recognition after 1977. As such, I believe it should be included in both sections, like Australia. Find a source describing the relevant policies Warsaw Pact members and then bring up the matter. Otherwise, don't distract from the topic at hand. ~~ Lothar von Richthofen (talk) 16:43, 12 February 2011 (UTC)

As the sources say, Spain, Australia, and the Warsaw Pact countries had all different recognition policies. To be more precise, the Warsaw Pact countries had no recognition policy at all. Correct me if I am wrong but the sources do not list Spain under the category of countries with a non-recognition policy whereas they do list Australia. --Jaan Pärn (talk) 21:08, 12 February 2011 (UTC)

If the citation given is correct, page 120 of The Baltic question during the Cold War states that Spain gave neither de facto nor de jure recognition to the occupation until 1977, when diplomatic relations without reservation were established with the USSR. As I have said several times before, I do not have this book and am assuming good faith from the user who added this information (diff), so if you have the book and would like to cross-check, that'd be nice. ~~ Lothar von Richthofen (talk) 22:44, 12 February 2011 (UTC)

I guess then it would be correct to add it under de facto non-recognising countries until 1977. --Jaan Pärn (talk) 23:10, 12 February 2011 (UTC)

Implications of visits

Do the sources cited specifically state that visits by dignitary X imply recognition (de facto or de jure)? That seems a rather poor standard . PЄTЄRS J V ►TALK 15:07, 7 February 2011 (UTC)

Yes they do. --Jaan Pärn (talk) 20:15, 7 February 2011 (UTC)

Mälksoo states on page 122 that the Shah of Iran's visit in 1974 and the Indian Prime Minister in 1981 to Tallinn implied recognition, but he doesn't state whether the implied recognition was de facto or de jure. Given that de jure recognition would require some kind of written declaration of explicit recignition, then at most this implied recognition would be de facto. --Martin (talk) 20:28, 7 February 2011 (UTC)

Well, there is a large gulf between not saying anything officially and implication of any kind of recognition. At best, consenting to being escorted by Soviet state authorities while on Baltic territory acknowledges—which is different from recognizes—Soviet control. PЄTЄRS J V ►TALK 14:28, 9 February 2011 (UTC)

I am kind of bothered by your tries to outsmart the experts in the History Commission. Let me break the news gently: your attempts are not too convincing. --Jaan Pärn (talk) 15:44, 9 February 2011 (UTC)

In the case of Australia, the Australian ambassador's visiting Tallinn was taken to be an execution of de jure recognition under Whitlam. But that was one in a series of events which made the intent of the act clear and which was confirmed by Australian authorities. Indicating a visit implies de jure recognition in the absence of any other official statement is a low hurdle. PЄTЄRS J V ►TALK 19:07, 16 April 2011 (UTC)

I.e., De facto is one thing, but de jure cannot be accorded based on implications. BTW, I am not so smart as to outsmart experts, but a professor did write back to me once that they would be making a correction I pointed out in their next edition. Critical thinking is neither disputing (conversation elsewhere) nor second-guessing (conversation here). PЄTЄRS J V ►TALK 14:47, 17 April 2011 (UTC)

Sources

Has anyone read the full Ziemele source? The publisher's summary indicates the source is about citizenship issues in the context of continuity, not about the topic of continuity per se. PЄTЄRS J V ►TALK 18:51, 16 April 2011 (UTC)

Also, the Soviet Union has never contended that ex factis jus oritur applies in any way to the Baltic States; and so contentions that it somehow applies and is in "competition" with other considerations is inappropriate in postulating that as a factor in competing Baltic vs. Russian "theses." PЄTЄRS J V ►TALK 18:57, 16 April 2011 (UTC)

I have a copy of Ziemele's book and three of the four main chapters are indeed devoted to the nationality and citizenship issue. The one section on state issues is in fact a comparison of the respective post-soviet trajectories of statehood by Russia and the Baltic states. Russia asserts itself to be the successor state of the USSR, while the Baltic states assert itself to be the restoration of the pre-war republics. So you are right that there is no discussion in the book regarding "competing Baltic vs. Russian thesis" and Russia has never contended that ex factis jus oritur applies to the Baltic States, since Russia contends that the Baltic states were not forcefully incorporated into the USSR but joined voluntarily thus ex factis jus oritur is inapplicable since that maxim is generally used in the context of forceful incorporation.

It is true that in international law ex factis jus oritur and ex injuria jus non oritur are competing maxims, but it is not the "fundamental confrontation between the Baltic and Russian theses on continuity of the Baltic states" that this article states, but rather it is related to how third party states choose to recognise the independence of the Baltic states. The majority recognised the independence as a restoration thus the principle of ex injuria jus non oritur won out over ex factis jus oritur. I tried to fix this in the past but my edits have been disruptively reverted by Igny many times, but since he seems to have been blocked I will attempt to fix this again. --Martin (talk) 21:25, 16 April 2011 (UTC)

Of course this restoration could not be a complete restoration, restitutio in integrum, due to the length of time of the Soviet occupation certain realities became established, such as the large post-war settler population, and Ziemele's book deals primarily with this aspect. --Martin (talk) 21:45, 16 April 2011 (UTC)

It seems to me also that a a fair number of de jure recognitions were in the absence of Baltic "exception" clauses of post-war establishments of diplomatic relations, that is, both sides avoided the issue, so recognition by omission. That might be a useful distinction. PЄTЄRS J V ►TALK 00:50, 17 April 2011 (UTC)

Also, on the whole ex factis jus oritur, where that would appear to play is, for example, in the ability for those who had "legally" obtain possession of their home/property during the Soviet era to claim it and for the legal (pre-war) owners to be compensated. But only if there were no compensation whatsoever would it actually be a case of ex factis jus oritur. PЄTЄRS J V ►TALK 14:51, 17 April 2011 (UTC)

That's the crux of it. That fact that the respective Baltic states were able to claim legal title to their pre-war diplomatic properties, gold reserves and other assets and have that property restituted to them is another piece of evidence that ex injuria jus non oritur is a fact of established practice, not just opinion as Igny would image. That in some cases it was impossible to restore property restitutio in integrum, e.g. the property was demolished or sold during the occupation period, the Baltic states were instead paid monetary compensation. --Martin (talk) 03:25, 18 April 2011 (UTC)

It is not up to editors to weigh evidence and form their own conclusions but to determine how reliable sources interpret them. TFD (talk) 03:31, 18 April 2011 (UTC)

I am glad that you have finally come around to that view. If you need access to any source, let me know, I have full access to most academic journals. --Martin (talk) 10:44, 18 April 2011 (UTC)

That was my first posting to this talk page and I have never edited this article. TFD (talk) 13:11, 18 April 2011 (UTC)

You have been fully involved the discussion in the parent article Occupation of the Baltic states of which this is a sub-article. --Martin (talk) 21:23, 18 April 2011 (UTC)

Baltic states assert state continuity section

Does it only seam to me or the phrase “However, this never took place” should really be removed from the Baltic states assert state continuity section? --Glebchik (talk) 05:36, 18 April 2011 (UTC)

Yes, that phase does seem odd given the preceding sentence states that the declaration On the Restoration of Independence of the Republic of Latvia was in fact adopted on 4 May 1990. I've removed that text. --Martin (talk) 10:47, 18 April 2011 (UTC)

factual accuracy is disputed

Just came by to see how is it going with this..and found since the article lede still pretends like the subject matter is about some dispute between Russia and Baltic states, I see no reason to remove the tag. Also, some opinions in the lede have still been presented like facts. So the whole idea of this lede in the current form is simply mislead the reader.--Termer (talk) 03:40, 17 February 2011 (UTC)

PS. To refresh everybody's memory, I think this comment by ISerovian on 27 April 2010 nailed the issues here.--Termer (talk) 03:53, 17 February 2011 (UTC)

Thanks for reminding, I have almost forgot. How is our friend ISerovian doing? (Igny (talk) 04:00, 17 February 2011 (UTC))

I disagree with edits (like this) which state certain claims as facts (as in Thus the Baltic states continued to exist as subjects of international law). (Igny (talk) 12:12, 16 April 2011 (UTC))

It is only Russia that insists on state discontinuity (as indicated in reputable sources). Nor is this some Latvia/Estonia/Lithuania spat. PЄTЄRS J V ►TALK 18:51, 16 April 2011 (UTC)

The article has been significantly improved, and I have no such concerns any more, so I'll remove the 'factual accuracy' tag I've added back then.--Termer (talk) 17:35, 30 April 2011 (UTC)

POV

I do not have time to fix the article, so I tagged it for now. I would advise certain editor to undo their recent removal of sourced material from the lede. (Igny (talk) 02:49, 1 May 2011 (UTC))

Your edit comment when placing the tag was "Recent edits are nothing but advancing one POV at expense of the other". Please explain, with cites to reliable sources, what this other POV is. --Martin (talk) 03:31, 1 May 2011 (UTC)

What happened to that other "legal maxim"?(Igny (talk) 15:22, 1 May 2011 (UTC)

See my comment on my version of the lead. PЄTЄRS J V ►TALK 23:15, 1 May 2011 (UTC)

Lead

I took a pass through the article lead so that it stuck to what sources said and also fairly summarized the manner largely by which de jure recognition of the incorporation was granted.

IMHO the rest of the article needs major work to separate what Russia says from what everyone else says (courts, commissions, scholars,...). Even in the lead, Russian pronouncements were inappropriately buried as "Others contend..." etc., as if there are "others" other than Russia. PЄTЄRS J V ►TALK 12:59, 18 April 2011 (UTC)

So, before we get more "it's all opinion, Baltics versus Russia, all opinions should be represented equally," и т.д., и т.д., и т.д.: If there is any country which existed before WWII which had diplomatic relations with any of the Baltic states which, since the fall of the Soviet Union, has explicitly chosen to establish relations with one of those states completely anew, declaring all treaties, covenants, agreements with the "prior" state null and void, in no instance reinstating any such prior treaties, covenants, agreements, please source appropriately. PЄTЄRS J V ►TALK 13:10, 18 April 2011 (UTC)

You are correct in that official Russia is alone in the world in taking the opposing position. As far as I can tell from my reading, this position that the Baltic states freely joined is mainly derived from a desire to avoid liability for compensation claims rather than any real factual basis. --Martin (talk) 21:21, 18 April 2011 (UTC)

Well, it's telling that official Russia's denouncements end with (my paraphrase) "and therefore we owe them nothing, not even donkeys' ears." PЄTЄRS J V ►TALK 21:27, 18 April 2011 (UTC)

As Patrick Dumberry states in his monograph State succession to international responsibility: "The question whether the break-up of the USSR should be regarded as a case of State dissolution or rather a series of successions is also controversial. The only non-controversial point is that the three Baltic states are regarded not as new states (and not as successor states of the USSR) but as identical to the three Baltic states that existed before their 1940 illegal annexation by the USSR"[11]. I'm amazed that seemingly rational people, particularly it seems those of the left persuasion, continue to give credence to the Soviet "Myth of 1939–40" which has apparently been co-opted by Russian nationalists in order to avoid their international responsibilities. --Martin (talk) 23:38, 18 April 2011 (UTC)

Regarding the restoration of the prior lead, "The competing maxims of ex injuria jus non oritur and ex factis jus oritur in international law," with regard to Russia and the Baltics is totally incorrect, there is no such competition as Russia maintains the Baltics joined legally. The maxims related only to third parties. I would request we restore the prior lead, I was careful to separate the Soviet/Russian viewpoint from the positions taken by third parties. PЄTЄRS J V ►TALK 23:13, 1 May 2011 (UTC)

Re is totally incorrect, That is your personal contention which has no basis here because you totally forgot to rely on scholarly publications when you contended that. (Igny (talk) 23:38, 1 May 2011 (UTC))

Given Ziemele's credentials, unless you can quote me a passage in entirety in the source which states so, the conflict on sovereignty as it specifically relates to Baltic states' authorities versus Russian authorities cannot, by its very nature, be based on the conflict of ex injuria jus non oritur versus ex factis jus oritur and I would not expect her to contend so. Nor would I Van Elsuwege. How third parties viewed recognizing the Baltic states as still sovereign or not during occupation or continuous after is related to the competing maxims, but to third parties only. The Baltics contend they never joined legally. However, as Russia contends they joined legally, there is no conflict between the Baltics and Russia over one maxim versus the other, the conflict is whether the "maxim" ex factis justis jus oritur applies to the contention that the Baltic states willingly and legally surrendered their sovereignty to the USSR. PЄTЄRS J V ►TALK 00:19, 2 May 2011 (UTC)

You misunderstand the Latin term ex factis jus oritur. Never no one claimed that it means someone did something willingly or non-willingly. It merely means that de-facto loss of independence for 50 years could be enough for loss of the continuity. After something was de-facto accepted long enough it stops being illegal regardless of whether that was ever accepted de jure. One of the questions which arise from this conflict is whether the period of 50 years long enough or not. (Igny (talk) 01:06, 2 May 2011 (UTC))

The sources state that ex factis jus oritur only applies when any possibility of restoration is fully extinguished. For ex injuria jus non oritur, the case of Alsace-Lorraine has been cited despite 47 years of German control; ex factis jus oritur has been cited in the case of Georgia's incorporation into the Soviet Union in the 1920's, which lasted 70 years, so there is no continuity with the present Georguian state and the pre-SU state. In the case of the Baltic states sources I have read state that 50 years wasn't long enough, and the EU, the USA and others have explicitly acknowledged this and have recognised state continuity. Given that International law is the practice and regulation of international relations, their recognition carries great weight. --Martin (talk) 02:08, 2 May 2011 (UTC)

That is a good step forward, bring it forward in a proper place in the article if you find a source claiming all these are relevant to the Baltic case. Unfortunately it still does not give you a right to remove the well sourced and very relevant statements from the lede. (Igny (talk) 02:43, 2 May 2011 (UTC))

I think all those lawyering opinions ex injuria jus non oritur, ex factis jus oritur etc should be kept out of this article. Wikpeia is not a courthouse and should be written to an average reader. Lets keep it in on focus what this subject is about. It's about the US politics during the Cold war. And not about some dispute between Russia and Baltic states, since Russia lost the Cold war, it can dispute all it wants as it is also clearly spelled out in the article--Termer (talk) 05:08, 2 May 2011 (UTC)

I think you are at the wrong place. This article is about state continuity of the Baltic states not about US position with regard to the Baltic states. (Igny (talk) 05:10, 2 May 2011 (UTC))

The state continuity of the Baltic states only exists because of the "US position with regard to the Baltic states". In case I need to remind what the probems are with the current revision of the article lede, this comment by ISerovian on 27 April 2010 nailed the issues.

--Termer (talk) 05:19, 2 May 2011 (UTC)

@Igny, all: apologies for needing more coffee. What I meant to say was a so-called maxim "ex justis jus oritur" meaning everything was done based upon a foundation of legality. As I originally stated, neither (actual) maxim applies to what the Soviets/Russians contend is "history." PЄTЄRS J V ►TALK 14:46, 2 May 2011 (UTC)

@Termer: there are two separate items at work here. Per ISerovian, non-recognition of annexation and recognition of continuity by the U.S. and others was a choice. That it was a convenient choice to show resistance to Soviet oppression is a Cold War artifact is one matter, however, let us not forget that it was that oppression that started the Cold War. Let's not credit non-recognition of annexation to the symptom of that annexation and other Soviet actions. The other item is that regardless of these symptoms, non-recognition of Baltic annexation set a precedent in international law which continues today. PЄTЄRS J V ►TALK 14:53, 2 May 2011 (UTC)

I suggest to avoid double standards. Form one hand, many Central European user accuse Western powers in betrayal of the interests of small nations by abandonment of the policy of self-determination; from another hand, you claim that the concern about Soviet oppression started the Cold War. I believe, both these POVs are just local POVs, because the policy of major Western powers during this period pursued not the goal to promote someone's self-determination, but to protect their own spheres of influence, and their own colonies: for instance, Britain simultaneously supported "forest brothers" in the Baltic countries, and conducted a full scale colonial war in her Asian possession Malaya. Can you expect the genuine support of the principle of self-determination from a colonial power? Of course, the primary purpose of the support of the forest brothers was their struggle against the Soviets, whereas similar national-liberation movement in Malaya (who were the British valuable allies during WWII, btw) had been ruthlessly suppressed.--Paul Siebert (talk) 16:03, 2 May 2011 (UTC)

Peter, you are right in some sense here. A number of scholars argue that this maxim, although certainly relevant, does not apply to the Baltic case, and they provide various arguments why. However it still remains relevant to this case, and the debate about how applicable these maxims are certainly belongs to the article, and the mention of their intrinsic conflict belongs to the summary of the article. (Igny (talk) 21:47, 2 May 2011 (UTC))

While obviously these two legal maxims have a place in the article, the lede gives undue weight to this intrinsic conflict between the maxims which has been settled through the acceptance of ex injuria jus non oritur and with it state continuity by majority of countries, including the member states of the EU and others. This is totally absent from the lede and as it stands provides a misleading summary of the topic. --Martin (talk) 23:52, 2 May 2011 (UTC)

Re:the lede gives undue weight to this intrinsic conflict between the maxims. You are wrong. (Igny (talk) 00:07, 3 May 2011 (UTC))

I am wrong because? --Martin (talk) 00:11, 3 May 2011 (UTC)

What do you want to hear in response here? (Igny (talk) 00:16, 3 May 2011 (UTC))

Umm, a reasoned argument to back your phrase "You are wrong". --Martin (talk) 00:38, 3 May 2011 (UTC)

Still waiting for an explanation..... --Martin (talk) 02:43, 3 May 2011 (UTC)

I have an awkward feeling of being repetitive, but it is not an undue weight to provide a brief summary in the lede for all the things relevant to topic, and existence of a controversial debate is rather relevant for the topic, don't you think? If there were not a controversy in this topic, no one would be interested in this topic altogether if we would not be having this discussion here now. ([User:Igny|Igny]] (talk) 10:19, 3 May 2011 (UTC))

But there is no controversy between the two and the acceptance of state continuity is mainstream according to Peter Van Elsuwege in his monograph From Soviet republics to EU member states: a legal and political assessment of the Baltic states' accession to the EU. Russia may be the dissenting voice, but that is of no consequence to the international order. As Patrick Dumberry states in his monograph State succession to international responsibility: "The question whether the break-up of the USSR should be regarded as a case of State dissolution or rather a series of successions is also controversial. The only non-controversial point is that the three Baltic states are regarded not as new states (and not as successor states of the USSR) but as identical to the three Baltic states that existed before their 1940 illegal annexation by the USSR"[12]. --Martin (talk) 11:44, 3 May 2011 (UTC)

Igny it is not an undue weight to provide a brief summary in the lede for all the things relevant to topic

I'm confused. If all things relevant to topic should be included, why are the legal acts like Executive Order 8484 &Welles Declaration, Stimson Doctrine taken by the US leading to the "State continuity of the Baltic states" and being the direct cause of it constantly removed from the lede?--Termer (talk) 14:06, 3 May 2011 (UTC)

Re Termer, I hope that if you read the current version of the lede, that would clarify your confusion.

Re Martin, I know that some scholars resolve the controversy by applying certain reasoning, and deduction etc. The fact that the controversy is considered resolved by some scholars is important. But their very attempts to resolve the controversy makes it even more notable. It is not flat versus round Earth controversy, where one theory is considered fringe and thus removed from scientific articles due to weight concerns. Here this controversy is prominent and it is still debated among scholars. I am not trying to push one theory over another, I am trying to underscore the very existence of the debate here. As all scholars who build the case for the state continuity are trying to address the issue of 50 years de-facto acceptance of the annexation, the lede of this article can not ignore that either. (Igny (talk) 20:43, 3 May 2011 (UTC))

Let's be specific. Let's define controversy as "sharp and clear differences in fundamental viewpoints among reputable expert scholars in the field of international law." Are you stating that there is controversy regarding the Baltic states and their being continuous? And if so, who are these scholars, exactly? PЄTЄRS J V ►TALK 21:23, 3 May 2011 (UTC)

Well, as the statement is sourced, all you have to do is to read the article. In fact, you can read all the articles on the Baltic state continuity and if you can, please point to a scholar who ignored the 50 years of de-facto "dependence" and merely relied on the de jure argument. (Igny (talk) 21:44, 3 May 2011 (UTC))

If you read the sources used for the statement "fundamental confrontation between the Baltic and Russian theses on continuity of the Baltic states and its related consequences", it relates to opposition of the Russian government to thesis of state continuity, not of confrontation amongst scholars. As the sources state, the main stream view upholds continuity and Russia is alone in contesting it. Cite one scholar who dissents that the continuity of the Baltic states is not widely accepted. Thus the lede gives too much weight to the Russian government position. Even Russian academics hostile to the citizenship policies of the Baltic states agree with the continuity thesis is valid. --Martin (talk) 23:50, 3 May 2011 (UTC)

The fact that both maxims apply to the Baltic case is supported by the RS and has literally nothing to do with the Russian government position. I failed to find anything about this maxim on the official Russian sites. The fact that there is a confrontation between Russian and Baltic POVs is also supported by the RS and also very relevant to this article. (Igny (talk) 00:58, 4 May 2011 (UTC))

I am just relating to you what sources referenced for that passage say, the the confrontation is essentially between the POV of the Russian state and the respective Baltic countries.--Martin (talk) 01:14, 4 May 2011 (UTC)

I would say, the dichotomy exists not only between the Russian vs Western viewpoints, but also between "legalistic" and "realistic" POVs. In connection to that, it would be useful to use the recent book edited by John Hiden, Vahur Made, David J. Smith (The Baltic Question during the Cold War. (2009) Routledge), which, despite being cited in the article, is used somewhat selectively. These authors note that the fate of the Baltic states became a question of relations between the superpowers, therefore, to the focus on just on purely legal is "striking", and, by the way, use the terms "occupation and annexation", "re-establishment of independence", etc.

Let me also point out that we need to avoid the projection of the present-days knowledge on the past. Yes, majority of present-days sources speak about "restoration of independence" and about "non-recognition of annexation/occupation". However, even God cannot cancel the events that occurred in the past: most Cold War sources spoke about these states as parts of the USSR, and the actions of most Western government demonstrate that they de facto recognised the annexation. For instance, British, French and West German government did not give a status of formally recognised diplomats to the personnel of the Baltic missions in exile, they acceded to some Soviet economic demands, etc. All of that should be duly covered in the article.--Paul Siebert (talk) 00:13, 4 May 2011 (UTC)

Paul, can can we focus on one issue at a time, in this case the lede. What you say is very interesting and can be added to the body at some point as background but this article is about the aspects of continuity as it relates to today's Baltic states which is in essence a legal issue, not the issues of the past Cold War era (BTW I have a copy of The Baltic Question during the Cold War). --Martin (talk) 00:27, 4 May 2011 (UTC)

Well, the sentence:

" This continuity has been recognised by most Western powers and is reflected in their state practice."

is somewhat ambiguous. I would say, "this continuity has been recognised after the Baltic states re-gained their independence", because during 1940-91 most states de-facto did not recognised it.

I also fixed the problem with the first sentence; I believe the edit summary is self-explanatory.--Paul Siebert (talk) 00:49, 4 May 2011 (UTC)

The phrase ""this continuity has been recognised after the Baltic states re-gained their independence"" isn't quite accurate, since the concept of continuity is tied up the witholding of de jure recognition. It probably be more accurate to state ""the restoration of the Baltic states as identical to the three Baltic states that existed before 1940 has been recognised"" Regarding legalistic/realistic dichotomy, this has essentially merged in post-Soviet Baltic states, where the mainstream international suppport of ex injuria jus non oritur over ex factis jus oritur via the Stimson Doctrine has resulted in the international acceptance of the post-Soviet Baltic thesis of state continuity, which as a consequence has led to the restoration of the pre-Soviet constitutional order, resulting in the re-instatement of the pre-Soviet citizenship, which has resulted in the fact-on-the-ground of mass statelessness and undetermined citizenship for a large segment of the population. In other words, the adoption of the "legalistic" thesis has resulted in the "realistic" fact of "undetermined citizenship", so continuity is both de jure and de facto in today's Baltic states. --Martin (talk) 00:59, 4 May 2011 (UTC)

RE: (Igny 20:43, 3 May 2011 (UTC))[13] Are you referring to In part, this position relies on the Stimson Doctrine applied to the Occupation of the Baltic States by the Welles Declaration? It's the tail wagging the hound again. which part? This "part" talk is misleading since the only reason Baltic states were able to maintain their state continuity was due to the legal acts taken by the US government. But the article lede pretends like it's some minor issue. --Termer (talk) 06:13, 4 May 2011 (UTC)

Re Termer: I am sorry it is not major enough to be the first sentence of this article, if that is what you want.

Re M and V. Basically our content dispute boils down to the following. Most scholars basically argue that while Russia's legal position is not without merit, it can be ignored because.... What you want the lede to say is Russia's position can be ignored, period, and you argue behind the curtain that all mainstream scholars say it can be ignored, find me a scholar who says otherwise, and if you find one, he is not mainstream. (Igny (talk) 10:10, 4 May 2011 (UTC))

@Igny: There would appear to be a difference between what scholarly sources write and what you and I (for example) say they write. The Russian position is what it is, however, as it is based on the totally discredited lie that the Baltic states joined the USSR willingly, from a legal standpoint it can be ignored. Moreover, Russia has already signed documents referring to the occupation of the Baltic states. @Paul, your personal contention that it is a (a) Baltic-Russian thing and a (b) legal-practical thing is (a) completely false, as no one supports the Russian position, ergo it is neither a Cold War discrediting Russia thing and an (b) issue that has nothing to do with state continuity. "Practical" was Latvia, for example, allowing people who had "legally" under the USSR settled into housing which had been forcibly taken from its prior owners to claim their residence with the original owners being compensated. The discrediting of the Russian position is utter and complete. Do not conflate "Russia says the Baltic states were part of the USSR" (argument based on no invasion, legally joining) with "State X [e.g., Australia under Whitlam] says the Baltic states were part of the USSR" (ex factis jus oritur) as supporting the Russian position. They are entirely unrelated. PЄTЄRS J V ►TALK 11:07, 4 May 2011 (UTC)

@Igny, I think your characterisation of my position is inaccurate. In the version you object to[14], Russia's position is stated clearly in the lede, so you cannot claim Russia's position can be ignored, period. In fact the text related to the Russian position is largely identical between the two versions. The difference between your preferred version and the one you object to is precisely the explanation of the mainstream viewpoint of the basis of state continuity. In other words, it appears that you object to the presentation of the viewpoint that is held by the absolute majority of nations. --Martin (talk) 11:23, 4 May 2011 (UTC)

RE: Igny, I'm still confused: the reason State continuity of the Baltic states exists over the period 1940-1991 is not major enough to be the first sentence of this article? The reason something exists seems major enough. Who says it needs to be the first sentence? I'm talking about a clear explanation in the lede what exactly is up with this instead of currently it confuses the reader with punch of opinionated legal mambo-jambo.--Termer (talk) 14:09, 4 May 2011 (UTC)

Re Termer. It is not the last sentence of the lede now, are you happy? (Igny (talk) 02:35, 5 May 2011 (UTC))

Re Martin. See [15] (Igny (talk) 01:46, 5 May 2011 (UTC))

Igny, I have a copy of this book and will post a full extract later today showing the full context. --Martin (talk) 01:52, 5 May 2011 (UTC)

I have a copy of the book in Russian. I am not sure what context you are looking for here, but the term "annexation" is even more accepted by the Western nation than "occupation". (Igny (talk) 01:56, 5 May 2011 (UTC))

From the Elsuwege(2003)

Soviet representatives always took the view that the question of Baltic independence was an internal constitutional issue without international dimensions.11 This point of view reflected the official position that the Baltic states had agreed to the entry of Soviet armed forces in 1939 and 1940, and that, with their incorporation into the Soviet Union, these countries lost their status under international law. Accordingly, the Baltic declarations of in- dependence were considered to be illegal because they violated the constitution of the Soviet Union.12 Article 72 of this constitution assigned each union republic a right to secede. According to Moscow, Baltic independence could only be envisaged on the basis of this provision and should therefore be seen as secession rather than solely as the restoration of independence.

Why are you saying that this does not support the fact that according to USSR, following its internal laws and constitution, the secession took place rather than restoration of independence? (Igny (talk) 03:28, 5 May 2011 (UTC))

Because in this passage of Elsuwege is only stating that Moscow outlined the requirements of secession. On the very next sentence from the one you quote:

On 3 April 1990 theUSSR Supreme Soviet laid down the modalities for starting the process of secession. The requirement that two-thirds of the permanent residents of a given republic should approve secession by referendum and that final approval remained dependent on the full Soviet parliament after a five-year transition period clearly revealed a strategy for impeding Baltic independence.

The Baltic states did not follow Moscow's prescription. --Martin (talk) 03:40, 5 May 2011 (UTC)