Talk:The Phenomenology of Spirit/Archive 1

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This article, while it has some good stuff in it, also seems highly problematic to me. For one thing, it has a bunch of colloquial and rambling writing in it. More importantly, it's discussion of the Phenomenology of Mind is almost exclusively about the master-slave relationship, which in my copy is 4 pages out of a 564-page book!!!!! Anyone who read this would get a very distorted, fragmented idea of the Phenomenology, even of what the basic point of it is -- and the preface, which is one of Hegel's most important works and which sets out his whole idea of philosophy and his philosophy, is not discussed or summarized at all. We are going to have to do a lot of work on this article!!!! Jeremy J. Shapiro 08:27, 10 September 2005 (UTC)

Without sources and references, I suggest taking out the entire "alternative interpretation" of the Phenomenology, since it is not really clear, its importance is not explained, and it is longer than the summary of Hegel's Phenomenology. Jeremy J. Shapiro 19:47, 19 September 2005 (UTC)

I've added a table of contents. While a table of contents doesn't give the reader alot of insight into Hegel's thought, it at least alows the reader to see the breadth of material covered in the Phenomenology and how Hegel systematically organizes his treatment of them in one work. This should perhaps be "prettyed up" and worked over (with possible chapter descriptions?) --Malcolm

Fantastic contribution! Thanks so much. I have been intending to write something about the preface, which is arguably the most important piece and now exists in two decent, commented English translations, to which I will also add references soon. Your addition of this table of contents makes me think that there might be some point in putting the table of contents of Hegel's Encyclopedia in the Hegel article, for the same reason you give here, i.e. it gives at least some view of his system as a whole. Jeremy J. Shapiro 04:11, 23 September 2005 (UTC)

Section removed and stored here

I took out the whole following section and moved it here for storage. It has too many problems in its current form, especially lack of sources for the view represented here, and sloppy writing in the last paragraph.

<<<<Other interpreters believe the phenomenology of spirit is an argument that there are many paths through which one's consciousness can obtain freedom, which for Hegel is-self contained existence; meaning you think and act for your self or you become an educated individual living in a liberal society (one that allows your thoughts and actions to be realized). The goal of history was the development of "States", meaning mental, physical, and political, that gradually became more and more free. It is argued that Hegel simply used the master and slave relationship as an illustration of a dialectical movement that would end with the slave becoming more self-conscious and to some extent educated. The slave becomes more familiar with the natural world than the master because of the requirement of labouring, manipulating the environment, and using tools and to some extent science to better his/her life (this influenced and anticipated Marxist thinking).

This would occur despite the irony that the master was originally a freer being, with the slave's actions and consciousness being dominated by his or her desires. Hence, the contradictions of the relationship amazingly produce a positive content or result, a synthesis, a new form of consciousness, a new whole. Most importantly, it demonstrates the movement of spirit, the act of spirit becoming something greater. Another example would be Napoleon. Hegel saw Napoleon's passions and desires as advancing history. Despite Napoleon's greed and great sins he was doing the work of spirit.

The main point of this alternate view is that seeing Hegel's philosophy with any absolutes such as Hegel "believed" something specific about human nature (other than human passion and actions doing the work of Spirit), is in direct contradiction to his philosophies pragmatism. How humanity evolved was massively encompassing, almost impossibly unknowable and unpredicatable. This is why Hegel made no claim to prediciting the future but instead focused on history (His "Philosophy of history") and argued to be a culmination of present human understanding (notice the difference from Marx!). This also reveals his influence on both the philisophical schools of pragmatism and existentialism! This is also why it is so difficult to criticize Hegel, as his philosophy can be the starting point for almost any modern philisophical position including that of almost any religion! Even Marx, whose goal was to criticize Hegel's philosophy into obscurity, admits to using Hegelian thinking (perhaps inverted) as the foundation for his arguments. The only way to defeat Hegel's position for Marx, was to turn it around; hence, humanities goal is not driven by spirit and forms of consciousness but by human action (practical human activity) and the material world! The direct opposite of Hegel! Perhaps Hegel's work is not one of the most understood philosophies (particularly his phenomenology of spirit) but it is definetly one of the most influential.>>>>

    Jeremy J. Shapiro 05:00, 23 September 2005 (UTC)

Puzzles, Codes, and Secret Language

It is amusing to see J.N. Findlay's "analysis" that is appended to the Oxford University Press edition. Instead of being an analysis, it is a restatement, in clear language, of the text, which is very poorly expressed. Every paragraph in the text requires that an editor provide some sort of sense and meaning. But, then, we all know that the text's obscurity is a result of its profound depth.Lestrade 14:10, 1 December 2006 (UTC)Lestrade

Obscure, seemingly senseless texts have often generated a class of interpreters. In old times, the Old Testament and Mishnah resulted in Biblical scholars. They were the priests who explained the writings to the ignorant masses. The Vedas in India had the same effect. In recent centuries, secular texts such as Hegel's have provided employment and social respectability for thousands of professors. Academics have to thank Hegel for their livelihoods. Is there a way to emphasize this caste system in the Wiki article without seeming to be iconoclastic?Lestrade (talk) 16:35, 5 April 2008 (UTC)Lestrade

Yes — find a reliable source which expresses your views and cite it. But of course you know this, having been at Wikipedia for a long time. You are just heaping yet more pointless contempt on a dead person that for some reason you have fixated on. — goethean ॐ 21:36, 5 April 2008 (UTC)

Working on the introduction

I have put in a first draft of a summary of the Introduction to the PoS (different from the Preface). I recognize it's too long and will be working on cutting it down to encyclopedic size.Aldrichio 21:24, 18 March 2007 (UTC)

Reception

I added a "criticism" section, which includes Schopenhauer's scathing critique of the work. Nonetheless, I would prefer it if someone embedded this in a more complete "reception" section, including more comments from a variety of sources.

Appreciate the contribution, but of course somebody watered down your criticism section in typical Hegelian fashion. Nonsense word soup that sounds authoritative. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.184.139.121 (talk) 03:54, 24 July 2016 (UTC)

Improved introduction

I worked on this improved introduction. Please tell me what those of you browsing the Talk page think and I'll change it if no one objects.

Hegel's work Phänomenologie des Geistes (1807) is one of Hegel's most important and most obscure philosophical works. Translated as Phenomenology of Spirit or Phenomenology of Mind due to the dual meaning latent in the German word Geist, it formed the basis of Hegel's later philosophy and marked a significant development in German idealism. Focusing on topics in metaphysics, epistemology, physics, ethics, theory of knowledge, philosophy of history, religion, perception, consciousness, and political philosophy, the Phenomenology is where Hegel develops his concepts of dialectic (including the Master-slave dialectic), absolute idealism, ethical life, and sublation. The book had profound impact in Western philosophy, and "has been influenced the development of existentialism, communism, fascism, death of God theology, and historicist nihilism."

Due to its obscure nature and the many works by Hegel that followed its publication, even the structure or core theme of the book itself remains contested. Some interpret the work as a Bildungsroman that follows the progression of its protagonist, Spirit, through the history of consciousness, while others read it as a "self-conscious reflective account" that a society must give of itself in order to understand itself and therefore become reflective. Martin Heidegger saw it as the foundation of a larger "System of Science" that Hegel sought to develop, while Alexandre Kojève saw it as akin to a "Platonic Dialogue, [in which] the auditor (who in this case is a historian-philosopher of philosophy) discovers the absolute truth as the result of the implicit or tacit 'discussion' between the great Systems of history." It has even been called "a philosophical rollercoaster ... with no more rhyme or reason for any particular transition than that it struck Hegel that such a transition might be fun or illuminating."

Staeiou (talk) 21:26, 18 March 2008 (UTC)

One tiny suggested correction: including both "epistemology" and "theory of knowledge" is redundant, no? After all, they link to the same page. --bntrpy (talk) 17:21, 1 October 2008 (UTC)

References

Geist and its phenomenology

Since the title of the work relates to the appearance of Geist, it would seem that the Wikipedia article should precisely define this word. Instead, we are told that it could mean either Spirit or Mind. Some readers might even mistake Geist for Soul. There is also the danger of Hegel's Geist being confused with Being. Spinoza's God (Deus) or Nature might be understood as Geist. Kant's thing–in–itself or Noumenon could be mistaken for it. Other readers might think that it is Fichte's Ego which posits both itself and the whole external world. Schelling's One or his Absolute could possible be wrongly taken for Hegel's Geist. The whole Wikipedia article is supposed to be an explanation of how this spirit or mind appears to itself. One would think that, in reading a book whose original title is Phänomenologie des Geistes, a person would want to know more about this Geist, the phenomenology of which is being described as the purpose of the book. If I didn't know better, I would think that Geist is some kind of ghostly, abstract, ambiguous concept that has no sensible reference. Can anyone provide a clear, unambiguous definition or explanation of Geist and how it externally manifests itself? Since Hegel was so concerned with history, it might be well to include a few sentences about the serious consideration of Hegel's Geist in the 21st century. What is the phenomenological status of Geist today? Has it finally completed its development and achieved a purely conceptual consciousness of itself? Or did its development culminate in 1807 in Berlin with Hegel's book? Is Geist still developing dialectically and showing itself to itself? Hegel was considered to be the major philosopher of the nineteenth century and is very frequently mentioned in intellectual and academic discussions even today. Therefore, he should be taken seriously enough to have an understandable, straightforward definition of his words included in this article. Spirit or mind? Actively developing and appearing to itself?Lestrade (talk) 16:49, 28 May 2008 (UTC)Lestrade

Holy Spirit

From a Christian theological perspective, Hegel's essay makes some rather near references to what is known as the Holy Spirit (Spirit of God / God the Spirit). This link has some interesting insight which could be used as material for research into possible Christian influences in hegelian thought. [1] ADM (talk) 08:55, 28 November 2008 (UTC)

In order to do so, it would be important to finally decide whether Hegel's Geist is translated as Spirit or Mind. Is there a citation referring to a final decision regarding this difficult question? One would think that Hegel's context would provide a clue, but the profound obscurity of his writings seems to have been an impediment.Lestrade (talk) 18:54, 1 March 2011 (UTC)Lestrade

I don't think that there should be a final translation of geist as spirit or mind because from my understanding you need both english words to represent what Hegel is getting at. For example, in Kalkavage's book, he sometimes translates geist as both mind and spirit, and I think that's appropriate. Evanharmon (talk) 07:16, 9 May 2012 (UTC)

Ambiguity and equivocalness are "appropriate" and desirable? Yes, if there is no desire to communicate. Why would there be no desire to communicate? There are several answers to this question. However, they are in the non-philosophical (non-logical) area of psychological motivation.Lestrade (talk) 19:00, 24 October 2012 (UTC)Lestrade

Taking a look

Now that the rational Spirit has had 202 years of historical experience since the publication of Hegel's book, what is its current stage of self–consciousness? It has progressed and developed through many stations on the way to pure knowledge, including world wars, as well as a European Holocaust. Since the Spirit now appears in a later, more comprehensive, more integrated form, we observers should be able to be more conscious of our advanced stage of becoming. The article should mention whether Hegel's doctrine of the rational Spirit's progress has been validated by history?Lestrade (talk) 16:16, 31 August 2009 (UTC)Lestrade

Spirit Identified

"Spirit’s mental side is totally nonsupernatural, although Hegel (in order to hide his atheism)"
"Toward this end, Hegel occasionally refers to Spirit as God, but God is merely a metaphor."
"The most important of these individual minds is that of Hegel."
The sheer arrogance of including sentences like these without providing sources is astonishing. The article would be better off not existing than in its joke of a current state. I'm sorry, but I'm not knowledgeable enough to do the article justice. However, neither was the original author. 14.200.69.146 (talk) 00:36, 1 November 2013 (UTC)

The three sentences you quote (from the second paragraph under the “Spirit Identified” heading) were included “without providing sources”? Surely you jest. True, in order not to interrupt the description of Spirit with a long digression, I deferred discussion of my sources until the next (third) paragraph, but the sources are there. I quote Kaufmann, Findlay, Tucker, and Solomon (and I could quote others), all of whom declare that Hegel was an atheist. Can you understand that, if Hegel was an atheist, Spirit’s mental side (Mind) must be “totally nonsupernatural”? Much later, under the “Absolute Knowledge” heading, I quote Heinrich Heine, a former student of Hegel. The quotation: “I learned from Hegel that it was not the dear God who lived in heaven that was God, as my grandmother supposed, but I myself here on earth.” When Heine says God is “I myself,” he is saying that Hegel’s “God” is humanity. I’ll move that quotation up beside the others to bolster the third paragraph’s documentation. And I’ll add a quotation from Hyppolite.

Next you say that my “God is merely a metaphor” statement is undocumented. Surely you know what metaphor is. A metaphor is a statement that is meant figuratively rather than literally and that characterizes one person or thing as another person or thing: “She was a tigress at staff meetings.” So if, as I document, Hegel is an atheist, his references to “God” cannot be taken literally and must therefore be figurative or metaphorical. But my documentation goes beyond that deduction. I quote Findlay: “Hegel often speaks the language of a metaphysical theology, but such language, it is plain,is a mere concession to the pictorial mode of religious expression. As a philosopher, Hegel believes in no God and no Absolute.” Findlay is saying that Hegel does not literally mean “God” but is instead simply using religious language (“the pictorial mode of religious expression”). In other words, “God” is being used metaphorically, not literally. I also quote Kaufmann, who says that Hegel’s trying-to-sound-religious language “should have caused no misunderstanding had it not been for Hegel’s occasional references to God.” Can’t you understand what Kaufmann is saying? He is saying that Hegel’s references to God caused misunderstanding: some readers and interpreters experienced “misunderstanding” when they took “God”literally as meaning that Spirit was the supernatural being of theism. Tucker, like Solomon and Kaufman and Heine and various other interpreters – how many references do you need to be satisfied? – identifies Spirit as man, or humanity. And Solomon plainly says in the quoted passage that Hegel’s thought is “atheism.” No documentation?

The “Absolute Knowledge” heading, later in the article, has additional documentation of Hegel’s atheism and of the fact that Spirit/God is humanity. This documentation belongs with “Absolute Knowledge” and cannot be moved to the “Spirit Identified” location. But it’s in the article.

The first paragraph under “Structure of Phenomenology” documents Solomon’s explanation of why Hegel needed to conceal his atheism. Did you expect Hegel, who is trying to hide his atheism by using the obscurantist language for which he is famous, to come right out and say that Spirit is humanity, hence nonsupernatural? If Hegel wanted to destroy his academic career, he would not occasionally refer to Spirit as God so as to make people think he was a believer.

You also challenge “the most important of these individual minds is that of Hegel.” Good grief! Hegel, the author of Phenomenology of Spirit, is the first person to undergo “self-realization,” the realization that the true God is humanity. This realization transforms Spirit into Absolute Spirit. It should be obvious that Hegel’s mind, part of Spirit’s mind, is where Spirit’s self-realization occurs, and that this fact makes Hegel’s mind the most important of Spirit’s individual human minds, which collectively constitute Spirit’s Mind. But I’ll add the following quotation from Tucker: “Hegel . . . conceived himself as the particular man in whom God [Spirit] – the absolute self – finally achieves full actualization.” Tucker says that this act of self-realization is “man’s self-recognition as the divine being [God].” When self-realization occurs, man becomes God; theology’s God is dead.

In a separate same-date email to me, which you sign Omnipaedista (you should also sign your “Talk” contributions), you say: “Please stop adding original research or material that is not backed by reliable sources. Wheat . . . is not a reliable source regarding Hegelian studies. Several edits of yours will have to be reverted.” To prove your point, you attach a short biography of Wheat from an encyclopedia. The biography reveals the following facts: (1) Wheat has a PhD from Harvard, (2) he had two PhD fields, namely, political economy (economics) and government (political science), (3) he is a professional economist, and (4) he is the author of several scholarly books – eight according to Amazon.com.

This makes him unreliable? PhDs from Harvard are as good as they come. Hegel is not just a philosopher but a political commentator and historian, and his thought is taught in political theory courses in political science departments. George Sabine, who has written a lengthy textbook chapter on Hegel, is a political scientist. Meanwhile, the article deals with Hegelian-Marxian dialectics, where Marx is more of an economist (and studied in economics departments) than a historian. You may believe that only philosophers are qualified to write about Hegel but, if so, you are simply revealing an unfounded personal prejudice. Or is it the fact that Wheat is not a college professor that bothers you? Perhaps you could write a few words defending this strange belief of yours.

Having said that the article lacks sources, you threaten to delete some sources. Is this to prove your point that the article lacks sources? At present, the article has 61 endnotes, almost all of which I provided. I doubt that you will find many Wikipedia articles that are this thoroughly documented. The article on the book Moby Dick, by comparison, has 51 endnotes. The article on Jane Eyre has only 17. (But, I must confess, the article on To Kill a Mockingbird has 146!)

As for your assertion that the article contains original research, your statement is untrue. Everything in it can be found in the extensive literature on Hegel. And, by the way, I am not responsible for the possibly original way the material is organized. For the most part, I used headings provided by earlier contributors, most of which headings had nothing under them.Atticusattor (talk) 02:08, 3 December 2013 (UTC)

(outdent) 14.200.69.146 is not me. I never edit talk-pages anonymously.

"PhDs from Harvard are as good as they come." This is a really poor argument. A source is not considered reliable just because its author holds a PhD, let alone a PhD that is irrelevant to the subject area in question. The issue will have to be sorted out here. --Omnipaedista (talk) 03:04, 8 December 2013 (UTC)

"PhDs from Harvard are as good as they come" was not my argument; it was a comment on your assertion that Wheat's biography showed him to be an unreliable source. Why did you choose to conceal the real arguments contained in my reply to your email?

In your original email to me, you chose to ignore most of the 66 references in the article (almost all of which came from me). I cited 20 different sources, including many quotations from Phenomenology of Spirit. Now you are, in effect, pretending that I have just one authority, Wheat. You arbitrarily say he is “unqualified” to write about Hegel. Even if that were true – it isn’t – that leaves 19 other sources and many other references.

Now let’s look at Wheat. In your original email to me you attached an encyclopedia article about Wheat. The article revealed that (1) he has a PhD from Harvard, (2) he had two doctoral fields, namely, political science and economics, (3) he was a professional economist, and (4) he is the author of several scholarly books – eight according to Amazon.com. I pointed out, first, that Phd’s from Harvard are as good as they come. That is not my argument; it is a refutation of your lame argument. Second, I pointed out that Hegel and dialectics are not exclusively in the domain of philosophy. Hegel is an important figure in political theory (political science department) and a background figure in Marxian economics (economics department). Third, I said that dialectics, the focus of Wheat's analysis, is far more closely allied with economics (Marxian dialectical materialism) than with philosophy. (I could have added that Hegel is also a historian, as is Marx.) And I pointed to Wheat’s eight scholarly books as further evidence of his ability to perform research. I also asked you whether you really believed that a person must be either a college professor or a philosophy major to be capable of understanding and explaining Hegel. No answer.

You now come back and attempt to hide almost all of the issues by pretending that Wheat’s only qualification is his PhD, which you implicitly characterize as irrelevant. More to the point, you implicitly – not explicitly but implicitly – assert that one must be either a college professor or a philosopher, or both, to be capable of understanding and writing about Hegel. I asked you to defend this position, which I characterized as “strange,” but you are unwilling to do so.

The truth is, any intellectually qualified person with a demonstrated knowledge of how to perform research (e.g., doctoral dissertation research and research on several books, including some outside of his/her professional field) can do the research necessary to write in a field other than one in which the person was educated. Albert Schweitzer, who was trained in theology and medicine, not history, wrote what many consider to be one of the two most accurate (along with Goguel’s) life-of-Jesus books. (Neither book is about theology or medicine.) Charles Murray, co-author of The Bell Curve, an extremely well documented (but politically incorrect) book on race and IQ, is a political scientist, whereas the book’s field is psychology. Norman Levitt, co-author of Higher Superstition, a well received book about nonsense written by incompetent but politically motivated college professors, is a professor of mathematics, whereas the book has almost nothing to do with mathematics. The important thing is that the writer must have a good mind, must be capable of doing research, and must understand his subject matter. I would say that, with his many examples, Wheat has displayed a better understanding of both Hegel and Hegelian dialectics than you or than any preceding Hegel interpreter. Moreover, his exposition of Hegel’s atheism and the motives behind Hegel’s concealment of it agrees with what many other interpreters have concluded – but with which you implicitly disagree. Just as important, Wheat isn't my only authority.

Meanwhile, I asked you to defend your strange thesis that only philosophers or only professors or only professors of philosophy are qualified to write about Hegel. Tell me why a political scientist like George Sabine can’t understand Hegel. Tell me why an economist can’t understand dialectics and shouldn’t write about dialectics. Also, given that Hegel wrote extensively about history, why couldn’t a historian write about Hegel? Why couldn’t a professor of English who had a side interest in Hegel and an ability to do literary research write about Hegel? Stop pretending that a PhD degree is the only issue.

And what about the many other references I cite? Why do you pretend that I have only one reference, an author you arbitrarily cast aside as unreliable because he is neither a philosopher nor a college professor? What about the other references? What about the many direct quotations from Hegel?Atticusattor (talk) 06:04, 9 December 2013 (UTC)

I can also cite counter-examples. Bernal has a PhD in history, however his historical book Black Athena is widely considered an unreliable historical source. Machan holds a PhD in philosophy and is a professor emeritus in the department of philosophy at Auburn University, however his Objectivist-inspired work on Aristotle is not authoritative in Aristotelian studies; so it is no surprise that his books are not cited in Wikipedia articles about Aristotelian philosophy. My point is that we should not give undue weight to marginal views (WP:UNDUE, WP:RS/AC). See also my comments here; I have noticed that you systematically violate WP:INTEGRITY and WP:SYNTH. --Omnipaedista (talk) 06:09, 17 December 2013 (UTC)

"Undue weight to marginal views" was not your point. Your point, implicit but nevertheless clear, was that only a person trained in philosophy is qualified to write about philosophy, and about Hegel in particular. I gave two examples of people writing outside their fields who provided excellent analyses of their topics. Your two "counter-examples" -- people writing in their own field of expertise, philosophy, who performed poorly -- fail to support (in fact they weaken) your thesis that only philosophers are qualified to critique philosophy. Meanwhile, let me give another example of someone doing a good job of writing outside his field, philosophy in this case. Robert Pippin, a professor at the University of Chicago who has written books about Hegel, has also written two excellent books of film criticism. These include his latest book, Fatalism in American Film Noir. If your notion that people writing outside their own fields is correct, Pippin's two film books can't be trusted.Atticusattor (talk) 00:02, 31 December 2013 (UTC)

"Undue weight to marginal views" is exactly my point. And you keep ignoring it. Please stop making baseless assumptions about what I did or did not say (I was quite clear on your talk page a month ago: "Wheat (2012) [i.e., this book] is not a reliable source regarding Hegelian studies"). And please give a reasoning for your edits with reference to Wikipedia policy. This page is not a forum where you can add your speculation or discuss about who is qualified to theorize about philosophy and who is not. Do you actually know what "academic consensus" means? --Omnipaedista (talk) 07:22, 1 January 2014 (UTC)

---

I have read this article in 2013 and was shocked. It feels like you are back in USSR times. In 2013 this article was marxist propaganda. Please do not include any marxist misinterpretation of Hegel. in 2014 this article looks much better. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 78.60.205.2 (talk) 13:54, 1 June 2014 (UTC)

needs editing

1. "Regardless of (ongoing) academic controversy regarding the significance of a unique dialectical method in Hegel's writings, it is true, as Professor Howard Kainz (1996) affirms, that there are "thousands of triads" in Hegel's writings. Importantly, instead of using the famous terminology that originated with Kant and was elaborated by J. G. Fichte, Hegel used an entirely different and more accurate terminology for dialectical (or as Hegel called them, 'speculative') triads." — Preceding unsigned comment added by Ditc (talk • contribs) 05:54, 5 June 2014 (UTC)

2. Within: Hegelian dialectic "When one looks for these terms in his writings, one finds so many occurrences that it may become clear that Hegel employed the Kantian using a different terminology." -> the Kantian what? It is very unclear to me, more so when read in context.

Unhappy consciousness

The article unhappy consciousness was tagged with a WP:PROD by Parrotz1461. It was indeed unsourced for several years with uncertain stand-alone notability. Seeing that the concept isn't very well developed here, a merge seemed sensible, but I don't care to add someone else's unsourced text. As the concept does come from this title, though, I've redirected it here and have included the text it contained below, collapsed, should anyone more comfortable with Hegel want to review it, incorporate it, and/or add sources. Also pinging Lucaas, who created the page to begin with back in 2006 (though it doesn't look like he's been around much lately). — Rhododendrites ^talk \\ 14:21, 17 November 2015 (UTC)

Unhappy consciousness article text

For Hegel the unhappy consciousness (German: das unglückliche Bewußtsein) is associated with a stage in the history of the development of the freedom of self-consciousness. This stage of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit follows after the phase of the master-slave consciousness. The three phases are: Stoicism, followed by scepticism or cynicism, followed by the ascetic unhappy consciousness. Stoicism, epicureanism and hedonism For Hegel the resolution of the master slave dialectic in stoicism, hedonism and epicureanism is not lasting. The period in history Hegel associates with this is from the time of Alexander the Great on through the times of the Roman Empire. This Roman Stoicism is for Hegel something of a false resolution of the master-slave dialectic, it emphasises only the freedom of thought. In the Stoic's distancing of himself from the world of desires, of pain and pleasure he achieves a freedom of conscience, but that he ignores the concrete reality is apparent in the unsatisfactory resolution of the master slave dialectic. He is ignoring the reality of the dissatisfaction apparent for both master and slave. Scepticism and cynicism For Hegel history shows stoicism is replaced by scepticism and cynicism. Here again the complete disbelief in society, rather than the reasoned and calculated disbelief of the stoic, eventually leads to a dissolution of oneself. The comedy of the cynic that is directed against society, eventually begins to turn against the comedian. The idea of goodness is seen as completely foreign to mankind. The unhappy consciousness In this externalisation of the good from human affairs we see forming what Hegel calls the unhappy consciousness. This, Hegel associates with much of the early Christian era when people turned away from the world through ascetic and monastic life and prayer. Of course, for Hegel, each of these stages is an attainment, the achievement of the unhappy consciousness is the truth of the will, which has been trained and nurtured though the ascetic life. The contradictions in the unhappy consciousness are given some resolution in the person of Jesus Christ. Here the temporal and eternal are combined and held up toward a higher plane wherein life now posits an afterlife. Yet it remains an unhappy consciousness since all goodness is alienated in God or in the afterlife.

Let's try to make this article easier to read to outsiders

An example of the difficult writing style:

Now, because the systematic statement of the mind’s experience embraces merely its ways of appearing, it may well seem that the advance from that to the science of ultimate truth in the form of truth is merely negative; and we might readily be content to dispense with the negative process as something altogether false, and might ask to be taken straight to the truth at once: why meddle with what is false at all?

I can't make any sense of it. BrianPansky (talk) 04:25, 10 April 2016 (UTC)

Here's more, and I have to wonder if this whole paragraph is supposed to be an actual quote of Hegel:

Evil and falsehood are indeed not so bad as the devil, for in the form of the devil they get the length of being particular subjects; qua false and evil they are merely universals, though they have a nature of their own with reference to one another.

Seriously, what is going on in this paragraph, an essay for someone's school project? BrianPansky (talk) 04:33, 10 April 2016 (UTC)

Ah! I found out that it is actually a quote from the preface of the book. What's it doing here outside of the preface section? And why isn't it formatted as a quote? I'll fix that. BrianPansky (talk) 04:52, 10 April 2016 (UTC)

Hegel is rather arguing for the relevance of the phenomenology of spirit and it's necessity: and also replying to the romantic claim that science should start with the truth absolutely . If the phenomenology is an "exposition of how knowledge makes its appearance" (76) it does not deal with what is important "its proper subject~matter, viz. the actual cognition of what truly is"(73). The demand might be levelled that what is offered therein is appearance and not real knowledge. Thus why should one bother with appearance which is ultimately negative and thus false and "might ask to be taken straight to the truth at once". This relates to the next quote which discusses the nature of the negative, and that " true' and 'false' must no longer be used where such otherness has been annulled"(39) Διοτιμα (talk) 04:04, 13 August 2017 (UTC)

Popper and the open society!

We seriosly need to add something regarding Poppers view on Phenomenology? — Preceding unsigned comment added by 194.255.43.142 (talk) 07:20, 29 September 2016 (UTC)

Derrida on Hegel’s Preface

Derrida in the “outwork “ of his Dissemination (mostly from page 9-28) speaks of the Phenomenology’s preface. In It, he offers an analysis of the text that can be presented with an appended analysis. Is anyone familiar with it and what is their take on it

Hegel: In the case of a philosophical work, however, such an explanation seems nor only superfluous but, in view of the nature of the subject-matter, even inappropriate and misleading . . . this would give rise to the incongruity that along with the employment of such a method its inability to grasp the truth would also be demonstrated

Derrida: This preface to a philosophical text thus explains to us that, for a philosophical text as such, a preface is neither useful nor even possible

Analysis : The fact that there is a philosophical preface shows that it is possible. But Hegel’s point was not its utility nor possibility; but rather its ability or inability thereof “to grasp the truth”. A preface is “superfluous or even inappropriate ” since its elemental milieu in being limited to stating aims – results and relations cannot be “accepted as the way in which to expound philosophical truth”. It is misleading for it not only obscures truth in its question of relation but it can also be no “more than a device for evading the real issue [die Sache selbst] , a way of creating an impression of hard work and serious commitment to the problem, while actually sparing oneself both”. But it is also relevant if and only if it is recognized for what it is to wit no “more than the mere beginnings of cognition’ and should not be “allowed to pass for actual cognition”. This means that it may be used point to out the " rough idea of it [the matter at issue], [and] at the same time taking the opportunity to get rid of certain habits of thought which impede philosophical cognition” This brings to mind the lament at the end of the preface to the Difference Between Fichte's & Schelling's Philosophy: “It is a fault in them that they are general reflections, but they are occasioned by the fact that presupposition, principles, and such like forms still adorn the entrance to philosophy with their cobwebs. So, up to a point it is still necessary to deal with them until the day comes when from beginning to end it is philosophy itself whose voice will be heard”(83)

Hegel:Also, since philosophy moves essentially in the element of universality, which includes within itself the particular, it might seem that here more than in any of the other sciences the subject-matter or thing itself, even in its complete nature, were expressed in the aim and the final results, the execution being by contrast really the unessential factor

Derrida: This gossipy small talk of history reduces the thing itself (here the concept, the meaning of thought in the act of thinking itself and producing itself in the element of universality) to the form of a particular, finite object…..

Analysis: Philosophy also has particular objects, it is only how it deals with them that is different : A lack of an “ability to presuppose both its objects as immediately endorsed by representation of them and an acknowledged method of knowing, which would determine its starting-point and progression”(Encyclopedia s1). The point here was that the preface forces cognition to look for aims and results only, making the execution of the aim to the results which is a key constitution of philosophy “really the unessential factor”. Also, “the thing itself here” would be the coming to be of science and not “ the concept, the meaning of thought in the act of thinking itself and producing itself in the element of universality” which is logic’s purview.

Hegel: The inner necessity that knowing should be Science lies in its nature, and only the systematic exposition of philosophy itself provides it. But the external necessity, so far as it is grasped in a general way, setting aside accidental matters of person and motivation, is the same as the inner, or in other words it lies in the shape in which time sets forth the sequential existence of its moments.

Derrida : Hegel identifies its external necessity, the necessity that rakes time into account as the existence (Dasein) of the concept. Bur it is at first only a question of the necessity of time as a universal form of sensibility.

Analysis: Hegel is now Kant? ; offering transcendental  “necessity of time as a universal form of sensibility”……..  The matter under discussion was to show an equality betwixt philosophy as it has developed in its pure logical form and its external history .  This was placed beautifully in the smaller logic at § 14 that “The same development of thinking that is portrayed in the history of philosophy is also portrayed in philosophy itself,only freed from its historical externality, purely in the element of thinking” . From this equality, showing that philosophy in its external historical position or sequential

existence of its moments” has led to a demand of making philosophy a science is equal to offering a pure logical one. Thus “To show that now is the time for philosophy to be raised to the status of a Science would therefore be the only true justification of any effort that has this aim, for to do so would demonstrate the necessity of the aim”

Hegel: The exposition to be given in the present work is therefore the first part of Science . .. The element of immediate existence is therefore what distinguishes this part of Science from the others(35) . . . Spirit prepares for itself in it, is the element of [ true] knowing. In this element the moments of Spirit now spread themselves out in that form of simplicity which knows its object as its own self. They no longer fall apart into the antithesis of being and knowing, but remain in the simple oneness of knowing ; they are the True in the form of the True, and their difference is only the difference of content. Their movement, which organizes itself in this element into a whole, is Logic or speculative philosophy”(38).

Derrida: Shall it be said-this is the traditional problem -that the entire Phenomenology of Spirit is in fact a preface introducing the Logic?

Analysis: ........... Sokal affair

Analysis: — Preceding unsigned comment added by Διοτιμα (talk • contribs) 22:28, 16 August 2017 (UTC)

J. N. Findlay's Foreword

Claim :

"The Phenomenology of Spirit . . . is a work seen by Hegel as a necessary forepiece to his philosophical system (as later set forth in the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline of 1817, 1827, and 1830). . . that can be dropped and discarded once the student has advanced ... to the properly philosophical point of view"

Analysis: A grossly perverted amalgamation of different Hegelian systems. Hegelian systems (and not system) can be temporalized into the Frankfurt, Jena,Phenomenology and the encyclopedia systems. The phenomenology is the first part of the phenomenology system. In the encyclopedia system, which starts (absolutely) with logic, the phenomenology is no more than a subsection to a subsection. Encyclopedia > 1.Science of logic 2.Philosophy of Nature 3.Philosophy of Spirit >

   »A.Subjective spirit
         »»a. Anthropology
         »»b. Phenomenology

Thus, the above should have in the very least read "forepiece to his [1807 (phenomenology)] philosophical system. As the Preface to the greater logic notes "a second part was intended to follow the first part of the System of Science that contains the Phenomenology". The phenomenology is the first part to be followed by the Science of logic. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Διοτιμα (talk • contribs) 21:32, 22 February 2018 (UTC)

The Title of the book.

The Article’s lead ought to reflect the problematic nature of the book's titles. This question dates back to Karl Friedrich Bachmann’s 1835 Anti-Hegel; and is still an issue, like in the work of Otto Pöggeler Die Komposition der Phänomenologie des Geistes just name a few. This in itself is not a pedantic historical pen-pushing, for the subtitle informs not only the content, but the form or how it unfolds.

Claimi:

The book's working title, which also appeared in the first edition, was Science of the Experience of Consciousness.

This is quite misleading,As Werner Marx,alluding to Otto Pöggeler notes,the very title was “retained only through an error on the bookbinder’s part”. Terry Pinkard also notes that not only did Hegel change the title of the book, but “Even the order in which he made those changes remains disputed among scholars today….” Hence it can be maintained with some certainty that System of Science: First Part: The Phenomenology of Spirit is the title whilst the suffixed subtitle or “working title” varies “ from “Science of the Experience of Consciousness” and “Science of the Phenomenology of Spirit. Even the much beloved abbreviated Phenomenology, as Martin Heidegger notes “became the definitive title for the work only after it was used in the complete edition of Hegel's works, published by his friends from 1832 onward, following immediately after his death”. As he further argues, “Rather, the complete title of the work initially read: System of Science: Part One, Science of the Experience of Consciousness. The subtitle Science of the Experience of Consciousness was then turned into Science of the Phenomenology of Spirit, out of which grew the abbreviated and familiar title Phenomenology of Spirit” — Preceding unsigned comment added by Διοτιμα (talk • contribs) 06:14, 6 July 2018 (UTC)