Talk:Tiger-class cruiser/Archive 1

Archive 1

Guided Missile Cruisers?

The Tiger class were never Guided Missile Cruisers, they were firstly Light Cruisers then after modernisation Helicopter Cruisers.

If there are no objections I'll modify the text after a few days220.110.178.109 (talk) 01:47, 27 January 2009 (UTC)

In fact after conversion to carry Sea Kings two of the 3/70 mounts were replaced by two Seacat GWS quad launchers and this in the late 1960s and 1970s saw them classified as guided missile cruisers in JFS and Other British reference books. Absurd as it may be reclassifying the Tigers. In some ways Seacat was just a rocket.— Preceding unsigned comment added by 210.48.175.44 (talk) 02:35, 23 June 2018

Lead, NPOV and spelling and grammatical mistakes

The lead of the article is way too long and contains technical content which doesn't belong there. It should be drastiocally shortened and the technical specifications and other info should be moved to the article ittself. -- fdewaele, 11 September 2013, 9:04 CET

The anonymous editor who is continually changing the article is doing very sloppy work. It looks copy paste + many spelling and punctuation mistakes. Plus several sentences are clearly NPOV. I'll try to clean it up a bit. -- fdewaele, 12 September 2013, 13:36 CET.

Many of the RN articles of the cold war era, partially ed by me RM- Auck) , like the Tiger cruisers, is a work on progress, which many past navy men, experts and enthusiast, progressively, improve and edit, in the spirit of wikipedia. The current article is relevant and deserves space, considering the the Tigers, like the Alaska Large cruisers and Vanguard, deserve study as they wasted vast resources. I am a first and second draft man, not a final polishing sub or setter. Much new information on the Tigers evolution has come into the public domain under the 30 year rule and work by naval architects and scholars such as Brown and Freidman. I note the message to me by Beta. But I have done quite a lot of journalism on naval matters, particularly in opposition to the RAN Collins class subs. As a commentator I argued for smaller more professional,disciplined and competent RNZN and RNZAF with the Leanders being replaced with OPVs like what eventually came in the Dutch Holland class, ( I described the concept as an 1800 ton Hecore, with a crew of 50 in the 1980s).. It is anger about, public disorder among naval crews that drove strong opposition to the Anzac frigates and even nuclear ship visits.— Preceding unsigned comment added by 125.237.106.47 (talk) 02:18, 20 September 2013

Please understand that no matter what your experience or ancestry you may claim, edits to wikipedia have to follow strict guidelines, and editors have to follow behavioural standards. Statements you made regarding fdewaele (and it is fdewaele and not 'CET' - as I explained on your talk page) are unacceptable as per our no personal attacks policy. As far as illiteracy goes, that too is not a helpful argument to make, you yourself make several errors in your posts. But be that as it may, it should not preclude useful discussion of some of the issues here, as long as they are corrected before, or as soon as possible after, they make it into the article. Similarly what you write must be from a neutral point of view. It sounds like you have some strong opinions, but these cannot be allowed to colour what you write in articles. This is not the place to rail against recruiting standards, and you cannot logically make such assumptions about other editors. Benea (talk) 02:42, 20 September 2013 (UTC)

1:600 Airfix Kit

The 1:600 Airfix Kit was and has always been of the Tiger. See https://www.scalemates.com/kits/222244-airfix-f301s-h-m-s-tiger

Also the last reboxing was with the Daring kit in 2002. See https://www.scalemates.com/kits/222392-airfix-04213-hms-tiger-and-hms-daring

— Preceding unsigned comment added by Dora Domino (talk • contribs) 10:46, 15 July 2017 (UTC)

NPOV

I agree entirely with Benea. Neither Wikipedia articles or Talk pages are suitable places to air grievances about New Zealand political matters. Furthermore, expressing opinions like this one "My view is the NZ armed forces ratings have no right express opinions on policy ..." are way, way over the top. In a democracy, even Servicemen have votes and an absolute inviolable right to express an opinion. To deny that right is to assert that democracy is an undesirable form of government. I have no doubt that there are NZ naval ratings with levels of intelligence that will exceed mine, Benea's or any other editor of these pages. Out of uniform, they have an absolute right to express an opinion.

The article itself is heavily larded with personal opinion, poorly written and researched. In particular, sections on the conversion of the Tiger class to helicopter carriers is wrong in numerous respects with no effort made to show how changing strategic and tactical requirements required the British to find new solutions to ASW, while operating under severe financial restraints.

In fact, Naval Staff studies had shown in 1960 that Britain's aging and small strike carriers were too small to operate increasingly larger and heavier naval aircraft such as the Buccaneer and the Phantom in balanced, mixed strike groups. In short, their carriers were too small to accommodate the numbers required while also needing to accommodate up to 12 organic ASW helicopters for self-defence. With strike carriers, size really does matter, with the US Forrestals considered the optimum size. However, Navy studies showed that adoption of Forrestal-sized carriers was impractical in Britain's existing naval dockyards without major and expensive infrastructure upgrades; and Britain couldn't afford such expenditure.

One solution was to increase strike group size on smaller carriers by removing the 12 organic ASW helicopters, and redeploying these on dedicated escort ships of sufficient size to operate approx 12 sonar-dunking Wessex and later Sea Kings. These were too large for deployment aboard frigates and destroyers, and there were economic and manpower savings if deployed aboard larger, cruiser-sized ships. The smaller helicopters embarked on frigates and destroyers had no dunking sonar or submarine search capability and were no more than simple weapons-carriers, dependent on the escort ship's sonar. There were better, containerized, all-weather, always-available, instant-response weapons-carriers for small escorts such as ASROC and the Australian Ikara.

In manpower terms, a single weapon-carrying helicopter with no dunking sonar or submarine search capability embarked on a destroyer or frigate required a full set of spanners and maintenance crews, (firemen, airframe techs, engine techs, avionics techs, weapon techs and air traffic controllers. Yet that same crew deployed on a larger vessel, an escort cruiser, could service four or more helicopters; a better use of scarce skilled labour, and manning levels were a big issue at that time as the article does mention.

Naval Staff studies showed that the Escort Cruiser concept that led to the Tiger class conversions and later to HMS Invincible (CAH 01) wasn't a replacement for the strike carriers Ark Royal, Eagle, Hermes and Victorious, but an ADDITION to them (and the cancelled replacement CVA 01). So in the projected task force there would be the strike-optimized CVA 01, a CAH Escort Cruiser optimised for ASW, and several smaller escorts of the Type 82 destroyer variety and some frigates. That's why the Type 82 area-air-defence destroyers didn't have a flight deck or embarked ASW helicopters. Type 82 ASW weapon fit was to be ASROC (fired from a missile launcher common to air-defence missiles), or the Ikara ASW missile.

There was another important issue. Royal Navy ASW tactical doctrine was for the use of nuclear antisubmarine weapons to provide an assured destruction capability against deep-diving nuclear subs. Only helicopter-delivered Nuclear Depth Bombs (NDBs) could provide the assured kill ratio required. These were routinely deployed at sea in the Tiger class, the later Invincible class and some smaller vessels. Official documents released after the Falklands War disclosed that up to 40% of the UK stockpile were deployed aboard Invincible and Hermes, and these remained outside Falklands territorial waters to avoid breaking treaty obligations. The Tiger class, with their inherited gun ammo deep storage were well-suited for storage of nuclear weapons at sea. Indeed, there is one recorded example of a minor accident when a weapon was dropped and damaged aboard Tiger in 1974.

There were other issues too. A cruiser-sized vessel was capable of some independent deployment short of full fleet operations. At 10,000 to 20,000 tons it was large enough and had sufficient endurance for independent global deployment. It also could carry the heavier gun armament thought necessary for independent operations and naval gunfire support to landed troops. But the rationale for the escort cruiser came principally from a desire to free up strike carrier deck and hangar space for larger strike groups and their aircraft.

That led to the interim adoption of the Tiger class conversion into a hybrid helicopter ASW cruiser armed with nuclear depth bombs, pending construction of the dedicated CAH 01 - 03 cruisers, that grew in size to approximately 20,000 tons. These ships were intended as dedicated ASW assets; and were never envisaged as fixed-wing aircraft carriers. That came later, and deserves an article in it's own right.

The Naval Staff studies of 1960 are now published and in the public domain under the 30-year rule and are listed in the National Archives as:

ADM 1/27685:      The Case for the Helicopter Carrier Escort Cruiser.

ADM 1/28592:      Conversion of Tiger class cruisers to carry helicopters.

ADM 1/29053:      The Escort Cruiser Programme: Tiger class conversions.

DEFE 4/142/5:     The Escort Cruiser.

DEFE 5/121/480: The Escort Cruiser, - notes by the 1st Sea Lord.

DEFE 4/270/4:     CAH 01.

Operation Corporate The Falklands War: MoD account of nuclear weapons deployment.

I hope this helps editors in the reconstruction that this article so badly needs. George.Hutchinson (talk) 17:34, 24 March 2014 (UTC)

I have to respond to these lines of attack. In recent years serving RNZN and RNZAF ratings have contacted the media in an attempt to advance their cause, with little understanding of either the issue or their own service hierarcy. There understanding is usually about 2%. The first outrageous example was during the debate and introduction of the new OPV, Otago class which with a new design was inevitably protracted and problem plagued. On a TV light current affairs with a noted host, Ms Judith Kirk.

incidentally the wife of a serving RNZAF officer.The programme chose to take and encourage live calls from RNZN ratings who disapproved of the proposed mission of the new OPVs and wanted more frigates, so they could enjoy perks of overseas travel, port vists and exercises with the larger navies. My promotion of that sort of OPV was that they would play a actual traditional naval patrol and blockade role in operations like Market time or in controlling foodstocks from the Southern Ocean in a future conflict,the prime role of the design was to test, the OPV as platform for operational use of Seasprite and NH90 sized helicopters in surface or A/S warfare . Ms Kirk and the talkback, was an entirely outrageous intervention by uniformed personel in an important defence issue, on which they hd no legal right to comment. While the RNZN as taken action against many junior ranks making comment in the media about the strict hierarchy and the 'navy class system' requiring close attention to higher ranks requirements when serving naval staff and officers, has resulted in rapid dismissal this has not been the result of, somewhat approved interventions by uninformed ratings. Another outrageous and particularly stupid example was the deceptive campaign to save the Skyhawks by the later Act Party, Minister of Defence; Heather Roy,essentially a hard left disarmer, of the sort famed, for the line "they should have to run a cakestore or raffle to pay for the next bombers as nurses do". I reject the assertion my articles are loaded with personal opinion and settling scores, (that is nore a characteristic of the RNZN own Naval Museum, articles on the RNZN ships- Nb to their supporters you can not use these to replace mine- that is not allowed on Wikipedia and there are copyright laws) which are selective and unhesitant to put the boot into disliked and discredited officers. The former RNZN frigate Captain Ian Bradley has long been a non person as far as the RNZN is occurred and no western navy erases it great frigate captains faster that the RNZN victims of accusations of too much drink or female company. I am well aware the the driving doctrine of the RN since the mid 1960s that it is a second line nuclear deterrent force and all the frigates, destroyers and anti submarine cruisers (inc Tigers) were justified as part of the second line nuclear deterrent.The helicopter conversion was clearly mainly intended to justify a medium GFS, traditional cruiser and flagship capability and the nuclear capability was clearly only secondary and for show. First as a New Zealander it isn't really possible for me to present the nuclear justification argument particulary for the cruisers and UK,. Secondly the doctrine of reliance on nuclear defence inevitably eroded conventional capabliities, and left gaps such as in close in multiple AA and CIWS that made the RN vulnerable to defeat even by a third rate power like Argentina. Thirdly the UK Labour Government from 1964 to 1979 made only the pretense of ever being prepared to use nuclear weapons of even a tactical sort and the fitting of RN frigates and destroyers with nulcear wiring proceeded slowly and the DPB were carried as little as possible. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 210.48.175.44 (talk) 22:19, 6 February 2018 (UTC)

wrong spelling

"During the Falklands War, the BelGaRno's ability to efficient" - it is General BelGRano! 80.151.9.187 (talk) —Preceding undated comment added 11:17, 18 March 2019 (UTC)

All Over The Place

The article is *extremely* hard to read. Large chunks of extremely dense text plus poor sentence construction; in addition, problems with sticking to a theme inside sections.

It also wanders way off topic down ratholes about subsystems and ancillary usages in other ships of the time, or engaging but ultimately irrelevant discussion of politics, naval strategies, etc.

In general, the article needs a severe tightening of focus, and a chopping out of much of the extraneous discussions about policy, contemporary alternatives, etc. I'd recommend that about a third of the article content get dumped - most of the political commentary and background can be summarized in about a mid-sized paragraph -- and the rest severely reorganized into much smaller, tighter focused sections which stick to one topic. Trims2u (talk) 00:19, 14 June 2016 (UTC)

Iv'e taken to editing, this rather dubious critic, who has no real Wiki identiy, or record. The point about the Tiger class, is there was never any real justification for the class, and at every stage of their continued existence, construction and modification, the reasons, were,, largely political and to avoid other more effective naval options, such as building other types of cruisers, helicopter carriers or aircraft carriers of modifying such vessels as gun or missile platforms or anti submarine helicopter carriers. The Tigers represent a huge waste of money and their roles could have been performed by furthur modest refitting of other existing cruisers or light fleet carriers and modified County class GMDs would have been much more silent and effective in carrying anti submarine helicopters. The issues of post war Royal Navy history aren't so much technical of financial as political and the desire of both major parties to downsize the defence budget and the RN and reduce the Navy as a powerful independent tool, with effective surface and AA guns, usable tactical nuclear weapons and viable air helicopter and aircraft platforms. The Tigers fitted the bill as something that looked impressive to ratings and the public but the official justification for their completion, that we interim AA flak ships until the County GMDs were completed in 62/3, is as laughable as the idea that they were suitable nuclear or conventionally armed vessels for A/S with or without helicopters. I don't deny that the article needs some tighter, editing and finishing, but the Tigers are essentially a scandal and diversion and a major topic in the postwar decline of the UK and RN.— Preceding unsigned comment added by 210.246.45.220 (talk) 00:54, 17 June 2016‎ as edited by — Preceding unsigned comment added by 202.154.158.185 (talk)

The issue with the Tiger class is all about Politics, and many of the critics inc, Mr Hutchinson think it should be more about politics, as he makes the 'strawman' case, that the Tiger conversion was necessary to clear space in the strike carriers for more fighters and to provide a effective a/s platform which with a armoured magazine provided, a secure deterent platform for nuclear depth charges. In fact the Tigers were not scrapped in 1964, because Dennis Healey could not scrap both them and the carriers, simultaneosly (D. Healey. My Life)The quality and safety of the Sea Vixens and Scimitars, provided little real defence or deterent and any value ended with the end of the Confrontation in 1966, the year with the RN decided Ikara would not be nuclear armed. Recent naval scholarship has increasingly confirmed that new strike carriers had remarkably little support after WW2 on either side of the house. Churchill was definitely not a navalist post war, and A. Seldon. Churchill Indian Summer 1951-55. (1981) confirms the navy was the third force to Winston, with the RAF predominant and Ministerial and official appointments, all made to ensure the Navy case was never effectively presented. While the recent book by Christopher Bell implies partly, the relentless attacks and speeches in cabinet and committee by Winston Churchill, were of an old man over influence by staff, RAF, MOD,in law against the Navy-this was not the case. Churchil viewed the age of the big warship over, and viewed new carriers and the Buccanears as too risky, and after all against the Cuban Marxist army in Angola, in 1970-74 and the first Gulf War, no attempt was made to sent the Buccanears down low level flight pathes against serious AA and in the Indian/ Pakistan war of 1971, old RN twin 40mm, 37mm etc was enough to keep the IN Canberas and Mirages too high to take out the main Pakisan oil refineries. Recent work by Ian Spelling and Gjert Lage Dyndal, confirms the weakness of the RN case for CVA01 and the strength of the RAF Island hopping case and shows Mountbattens case and presentation was dishonest- changed position of Australia-bunkum etc. The RN acceptance of the P1154 Mach figher option was a dishonest manoevrere to get initial approval by the Tory govt of CVA01- they were certain it would never fly. The Hobb books are junior officer nonsense and very biased. In 1961-64 the RN had ony 3 small strike carriers available with Eagle refitting and Ark never reliable. The nuclear strike capability or conventional deterrent by a small numberof Scimitrs, Vixens of Mk 1 Bucaneers would have to be regarded as incredible and likely to have proven non existant if actually tested, just like the RAF bombers alleged ability to take 106 Soviet targets on Le Mays 1962 SIOP plan — Preceding unsigned comment added by 210.48.175.44 (talk • contribs) 01:28, 20 June 2018 (UTC)

Unfortunately, 5 years later, the article quality is still pretty bad. It suffers quite a bit from the "Wall of Text" phenomena, and doesn't group information well. At least a half-dozen smaller headings are appropriate, including at least one dedicated solely to political considerations. Compare this article to something like the Zumwalt-class destroyer (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zumwalt-class_destroyer) — a ship line that has lots of similar commentary to it — to see the big difference that proper article organization can make to information clarity. As it sits, right now, the article is barely useful. — Preceding unInsert non-formatted text heresigned comment added by Trims2u (talk • contribs) 11:56, 25 March 2021 (UTC)

"All Over The Place" - Agreed & I've had a go but would appreciate help :D Steve Bowen (talk) 16:29, 26 September 2021 (UTC)

All one can do is keep plugging away at the convoluted sentences, strip jargon and format refs. That's the approach I take. GraemeLeggett (talk) 19:24, 26 September 2021 (UTC)

Still a polemic against the Tigers?

It strikes me that the tone still comes across as loaded eg expressions such as "failed Tigers". GraemeLeggett (talk) 10:43, 20 December 2020 (UTC).

No. I am not writing polemics against the Tigers, Royalist or Sea Slug or anything else. The Royalist article could in fact be much more strongly referenced in conventional terms, but there are obvious reasons for not doing so and the guidance of professional diplomats ( pre Key/Goff 2008) re the Royalist other than on Suez, Phipps and the Confrontation would be welcomed). In terms of the Tiger class ( tarted up Fiji's) they were obviously useless as early 1944, and should never have advanced after that. The 21C war office view that they useful as their old gun armoured magazines provided secure storage for NDB simply shows that The RN had ceased to be a serious Navy as far as the UK Mod and Labour Government were concerned in 1965. In the cold war post 1962 a sig proportion of destroyers, frigates needed nuclear tactical standoff Ikara and a sub launched equivalent as well as conventional helicopter dropped NDB. There has never been any other reliable immediate response to fast moving SSN. I have never opposed nuclear tactical a/s weapons as last resort, widely carried. I have always opposed nuclear power except for SSNs SSNs are of course the capital ships today and aircraft carriers more obsolete than battleships and even a modern different Zumwalt. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 101.98.49.10 (talk) 00:31, 19 November 2021 (UTC)

15 August edit on escort cruisers reverted

I reverted this text as ungrammatical/hard to follow/badly formatted (ie the usual)

"There were financial pressures in the RN due to the cost of the planned CVA-01 aircraft carriers and the Escort Cruisers which had been intended since 1960 to replace the obsolete gun armed Tiger cruiser and last four of the ten planned County-class destroyers with 7 new cruisers which in April 1960 were first presented by the RN Controller and DCNS as in effect 6000 ton modified County class DDG (a design with 85O tons armament allowance) with 3/70 or 4.5 guns, Seacat and 4-6 Wessex a/s or commando carriers) and upgraded later in the year from Destroyer to cruiser standards with extra armour, protection, stores and workshops raising light weight to 9000 tons. The escort cruisers were intended to lead extra task groups East of Suez and also operate as single units without aircraft carrier support. With only a limited number of aircraft carriers only 3/4 and 2 operational and the available carriers in the early 196Os the small Hermes, Victorious and Centaur (not able to include a a/s squadron of Wessex, Gannet or Sea King in their 24/25 aircraft hangar space) the larger fleet Eagle and Ark Royal in Long term reconstruction and the min realistic RN new 35,OOO ton (1954) carrier for building in 1958-63 having been rejected,it was seen as essential to retain powerful independent cruiser capability which also partly depended on the new Sea Dart missile and nuclear warhead versions of the Ikara missile, Blueslug and Seaslug for nuclear capability in the first and later escort cruisers for deterence against submarine, warships, ports and aircraft. The programme would be funded by cancelling or delaying DDG 7-10 and a proposed transfer of the surface GFS force 2/3 Tiger cruisers,HMS Belfast, T41 frigates, Ca and dc Daring destroyers to 'operational reserve' and and scrapping HMS Swiftsure , ironically it had been intended to complete it to the same pattern as would be used for conversion of the Tigers in 1965-72 . However 1962-3 decisions to greatly reduce UK naval and tactical nuclear arms and prioritise SSBNs, SSNs and the proposed CVA01 meant the Escort cruisers would have to be Tiger class interim conversions, until they were replaced by the Invincible command cruisers (there was also division over whether the Escort cruisers would be small helicopter carrier cruisers or developed Type 82 missile cruisers for operation East of Suez). Though the Escort cruisers were deferred, the requirement remained and conversion of the Tigers was identified as the quickest solution in 1963. Conversion into helicopter carriers carrying Westland Wessex helicopters for Royal Marine Commando or anti-submarine work East of Suez was approved on 24 January 1964 "

While I can knock the text into shape each time, I don't have access to all sources to check references. Can someone check Hobbs? GraemeLeggett (talk) 11:14, 15 August 2022 (UTC)

The IP author hasn't got the name of Hobbs' book correct - its "The British Carrier Strike Fleet after 1945" GraemeLeggett (talk) 11:29, 15 August 2022 (UTC)

I've looked up the first couple of cites and Hobbs does not back up what is being claimed against it - i.e. it does not talk about 7 new cruisers, it does not mention transferring destroyers to operational reserve. This level of carelessness means that the editor's ability to correctly source edits cannot be trusted. Fundamentally this appears to be a WP:CIR case.Nigel Ish (talk) 17:27, 15 August 2022 (UTC)

Thanks for checking that. The IP may have knowledge of these things and have the sources but not providing them in accordance with Wikipedia's requirements is indistinguishable from not having either. GraemeLeggett (talk) 19:01, 15 August 2022 (UTC)

No I reject this distortion. The point is that by early 1960 the Tigers were obviously basically useless and causing great political trouble for the Navy. They were too old when rebuilt for the first time in 1955-1961 and the turrets far too large and manpower intensive. The first completed HMS Tiger commisioned in March 1959 had a more conventional hydraulic gunnery system and in some ways worked passably but the 6 inch turrets usually jammed after 30 seconds firing and the twin 3 inch 70 calibre AA guns were also very unreliable. The nature of the Tigers turrets intended for quick bursts of AA fire to take aircraft or missiles in a few second bursts but not suitable for sustained firing was quite unsuitable for the sustained GFS duties which the British Arrmy and Marines envisaged the Tiger could provide. Cruisers and Destroyers in the Korean or Vietnam war were expected to provide continuous gunfire support possibly for hours or days and in that capability HMS Belfast excelled. The Tigers USN model HMS Worchester or even the small cruiser HMS Juneau managed a few critical bursts of fire in support of the Inchon landing and other critical battlefields but rapidly withdrew in favour of sustainable fire provided by HMS Belfast and Jamaica. The comments by RN contributors and from UK Hansard on HMS Tiger cover these isuses which among numerous other things rendered the Tigers a useless embarassment, which required replacement, new cruiser orders, in 1960-1 ( the escort cruiser issue occurs in 1960 due to the Tiger and County class capability and vulnerability issues, and dependence on 3 small aircraft carriers, in the operational fleet. HMS Lion reconstruction should never have started because of poor condition of boilers and turbines in 1955 and should have been stopped in early 1960. Admiral Twiss, flagship HMS Ceylon a shock sale ( to the USN, RN and Twiss to Peru ar rhe time , was adequate to fill Lions service in 1960-65. HMS Blake commissioned in 3/1961 using higher performance electric turrets which were a maintenance nightmare and required large numbers of electricians like the Seaslug system on the County class DDGs </ref>. UK Hansard 1963 & 64. RN estimates debates and questions </ref> which was also obsolete and an extreme danger to its crews. As I was saying as the RN task force made its slow measured way towards the Falklands in 3/4 1982 , my comment was it woud not be a cakewalk for the RN indeed it could be likened to the German Fleets death ride out of Kiel as the fleet had no real air protection other than the 5 Sea Dart and and Seawolf fitted ships and their defence could easily be saturated. The County class DDGs Seaslug and Seacat missiles were obsolesent and ineffective ,. The beam riding missile was only really effective at high level subsonic targets 3 to 6 miles out from the ship and the catch and collect Seacats were also not picked up, by radio command optical or radar guidance to a quarter mile out from the DDG/ cruiser and were useful only within a target box of about 0.9 miles high and 3 miles out. The claim they had some surface capability which was used to justify Seacats, introduction ignores the fact that a 2.5 mile range bofors anti sub rocket launcher, would have been far more effective way of hitting FPB or surfaced submarines, than Seacat. Nevertheleess in 1982 I was saying that if a first group County DDG Seaslug magazine was hit it wolud be like, Krakatoa going off and if the group 2 County DDG in this case Glamorgan or Antrim were hit the ship would go up like Halifax in 1917. it was probably unfortunate, I made the comments in Waimate CC teabreak in front of quite prominent national level local government officials and the former CDS and CAS, UK, Sam Elworthy was only 20 miles awsy and to some extent I appeared to be share the same driver. Elworthy was apparently a motor racing enthusiast anbd patron of the the Thai GP driver Bira and the 1955 special Jaguar D types for Le Mans were a military UK government effort. During that 6 mont spell in Waimate myd river sometimes took as little as 18 minutes to cover the peak hour 30 miles(50km) from Timaru to Waimate, the 7 miles from Timaru to Pareora resembling, Clermont Ferrand. On one occasion we were actualy pursued by former Lotus & McLaren Mechanic Alan McCall in a Porshce 911 and I have to say from the 3 mile point arpund Normanby to Makikhi he lost 2 minutes, and we had just pulled, into Makihi garage. McCall arrived and ran toward the Mitshibushi sports car and said, " I thought you were dead", On another occasion we went through Makikihi at 170km.

So the issue in the Tiger article is about the need to order cruiser replacements for the Tigers and the last 4 scheduled County class DDG in 1960-1 due to the capability and manning problems crated by the Tigers and County DDGs and the fact in 1960-64 only three small aircraft carriers Centaur, Victorious and Hermes are available to the fleet and while the Sandys defence review in 1957 decided to continue the RN carrier strike force it did constitute an obligation to atually order new carriers and the MOD Carrington suggested 1 42,000 ton carrier might be the limit Hobbs books on the RN carrier force rather distort the issue in that any viable carrier and the aircraft carriers proposed by the RN in the 1950s had a a reat deal of armour, internal subdivison and underwater protection ( barrier layers) and size much more directly related to the cost and the UK Teasury also viewed a larger hull meant it would be required to pay for more equipmen to fill it.

The actual escort carriers envisaged in 1960-1 would in reality probably have been either a modified County DDG design without Seaslug retaining the two twin 4.5 turrets and Seacat and fit in 6-8 Wessex with say an expansion of the existing hangar to accomodate 2 Wessex and a hangar lift to a larger and lower flight deck than envisaged in Vosper Thornycrofts 1977 proposed refit as as Helicopter carrier for Egypt in 1977. A much higher hangar to accomodate Sea King and Wessex height could be created by placing the hangar floor much lower than the former Seaslug missile magazine/ hangar by moving the low deck, Operation room and palatial Admirals & staff accomodation suite, a shocking luxury extravagance in the eyes of USN Bureau of Ships who visited HMS Devonshire at Philidelphia on its maiden Trans Atlantic deploymnet , elsewhere a smaller crew would have been required without Seaslug and a similar design expanded to Tiger/ Colony class dimensions with armour portection, steam turbine only propulsion of say 40,000 to 60,000 shp and possibly the US Tartar misisle which the RAN wanted on its own proposal and was actually favoured by the RN staff but was not wanted for RN frigates or destroyers or cruisers by FSL Mountbatten or the Admiralty as the cost woud jepordise the proposed CVA01 project. 202.36.254.250 (talk) 07:26, 12 September 2022 (UTC)

The escort cruisers were intended as replacement for the , scheduled county class DDG 7-10 and the 3 Tigers. ' Chief of Staff Plan, 'Strategy for the Sixties' called for a fleet strength of 7 cruisers ,. I am basing my interpretation and synthesis on a lifetime srudy of these cruiser and RN issues and a general view that rhe RN of the 1950s and 1960s was far less interested in amphibious support than modern defence writers like Spelling et all conclude. RN/UK records and legends for the Mountbatten period have heavily weeded as have rhe research libraries od NZ, nb the NZ National Library and Archives in Wellington and rhe Auckland Universty library which until a year ago had a massive collection of secondary published sources on NZ,Aus,UK and USSR, Russian Naval and Defence matters. One of my problems is thar mosr of this material is no longer available, accesible or in existence as NZ and its research libraries are under total deconstruction. In terms of the allegation that the ship cuts envisaged and derailed by Hobb did nor include transfering destroyers to operational reserve, the specific cuts and transfers planned to finance, Escort cruisers, changed weekly partly in relation to the estimated specifications and cost of the changed cruisers. In the RN in 1957-1983 reserve, operational reserve, standby and operatinal were highly fluid concepts, not only policy wise but in the actual classification as a frigate or destroyers . Hobbs details the Ca class destroyers for disposal, they had just been modernised and served to 1966-72 and the fate of the Dc Daring destroyers was equally fluid. My own view is the Type 41, for transfer to operational reserve in 1960 by the RN Navy Board, but not placed in the sandby squadron to 1974-7 could e be classified as 'utility destroyers' and were, unofficially by the RN, just as the County class DDgs were cruisers in the Janes Fighting ships classification system in the 1970s and 1980s. JFS of course took the liberty of using Navy and MOD figures of warships range, displacemnet and armament system without adjustment ro a standard scale on estimated or actual fuel reserve allowance to guarantee quoted range figs, calculating real range on a consistent time period out of dock. The Type 41 is in fact a utility version of the unbuilt but ordered G class destroyer and 1947 A1 destroyer as cited in ,ref> Brown. Reconstuction of the RN (2012) ,</ref> 202.36.254.250 (talk) 07:27, 13 September 2022 (UTC)

Key in your comment is "I am basing my interpretation and synthesis on a lifetime srudy of these cruiser and RN issues and a general view that rhe RN of the 1950s and 1960s was far less interested in amphibious support than modern defence writers like Spelling et all conclude".

That is the damning phrase there. WP:SYNTH says "Do not combine material from multiple sources to reach or imply a conclusion not explicitly stated by any source". An unpublished unverifiable opinion is not a Reliable Source. GraemeLeggett (talk) 11:15, 13 September 2022 (UTC)

It is not possible to begin to write about a broad naval topic like the 'Tiger class cruisers' without having a comprehensive synthesis of the political and naval context and a mathematical synthesis of the weapn systems and the targets of the aircraft, missiles, warships and submarines of the time, as a start point for analysis of the issue. This is particularly true of the 1940-1980 period od British History and Naval History and the cold war as much of the key naval records, ship legends has been cleaned and weeded befor release undr freedom of information laws, lost, tampered with or witheld for Nationa security ir oersonal privacy reasons. Key figures in the formatiom of British Naval amd Foreign policy, FSL and CDS Earl Mountbatten amd keu Atlee and Foreign Officer advisor Guy Burgess. Mountbatten snd Burgess and after their death amd exposure, British Matiomal Interest means a very incomplete official and published record exists about the Tiger cruisers period in naval history exists in Britain. Some of gaps are fillable by Canadian, Australian and NZ records. A fairly comprehensive multi discipline synthesis is therefore required before anyone can ven begin to approach the Tiger cruiser issue with any idea, which published data and official opinion is of any way amd worthy of inclusion.

There is am accepted assumption and myth that the WW2 modernised Dido cruisers were suprseded by the automatic computrised Tiger gun cruisers which were then superseded by missile armed county class GMD as missiles it is simplu asserted could engage targets beyond 8-10 mile max of medium gun AA and claims that Sea Slug had a 70-90 percent success or kill record. Now if tje writr compares the known test performance of HMS Royalist Mk 37 5.25 gun system GD2 with the Tigers GD3 systems when they sometimes worked on exercises with the known hard data of the actual missile test range performance form Girdle Ness, Woomera and numerous test fires from County GMD on the RN missile ramges off Wales, just by followimg the Royalist performance as spublised with the exercise perfomance of tje Tiger cruisers agaimst Target drones amd then that of Sea Slug amd tje County GMD without any new opinion or unpublised editorial comment, in most cases I do not consider you would be breaching Wikipedia conventions or rules or the gneral UK and Commonwealth nations specific laws agaimst sythesis on journalistic or writer commentary on defence topics.

There are other issues the huge money wasted on both the Tiger cruisers, obsolete on commissioning and there immediate replacements the Seaslug County class GMD, estimated at 70 million pounds ( assume cf 3 billion pund s todays values) on the Development of Seaslug up to 1959 alone without the ocnstruction costs of the 8 County GMD cruisers om . Wikipedia articles in the form I comtributed as the effective IP editor om these matters in their substantial form first in 2011-2014 and built up om NZ National Archives and National Library RNZN and NZ Railways ( less well weeded papers re Treasury and NZ Foriegn Policy atitted to 1951 Waterfront md Mine Industrial strikes amd megotioms with Treasury amd World Bank ( Robert McNamra) papers,logs data and clerly published ( what is published or exempt by speciast expertise self publicatiom by RNZN frigate Cpts is particularly difficut to defime im NZ cas) material and numerous piblised amd human sources could also be construed as published by their inclusion in wikipedia and its derivatives, in the long established, leadimg UK amd World general, Encyclopedia, etc and numerous publised books. The wikipedia aricles amd their, reuse constitutes publication in itself without doubt.

The idea that the current NZ government, RNZN amd UK Government can simply rewrite history by redaction and reducing wikipedia to a low level encyclopeida suitable as unchallenging amd indisputable to low level intellects and basic grade RNZN, RN and NZ Police recruits and constituents in the Papakura amd North Shore, East Coast Bays, Rodney electorate on the basis there was mo Russian threat to the UK, NZ or Australia in 1952, 1982 or 2002 just as the NZ and Australian foreign policy is also shaped by the assertion that NZ and Australia were threatened by Japanese invasion in 1942 or a concerted Kreigsmarine attack on commmrce and trade in the Tasman. The adress by the recent head of CIA Counter Intelligence Dr M. J Sulick publised om 27/3/2014 to the 'Institue of World Politics' and MJ Sulick, ' American Spies' confirms statememts of Reagans Navy Secretary John Lehman that espionage by the Walker spy rimg meant that the Russians from 1968-1985 had replicated US naval encypters amd were breaking all USN Naval traffic from 1968-1985 in real time, including SSN amd SSBN in continuous communication (at least potentially at all hours except im Soviet waters) by global UHF, which all USN , Nato and RNZN/ RAN warships converted to early 1960s. In Sulick opinion communication intercept gave the USSR war winning potential and in John Lehmans opinion the US and its cities faced horrific loss of naval vessels and cities. Andrew Lownes books amd speeches on Guy Burgess , ' Stalins Englisman account the damage by the leading foreign policy advsior of the UK Government in 1947-50 on much foreign policy and trade defence amd foreign policy towards China. NZ Communist Rewi Alley] 1951 phamphlets go so far as to envisage a MZ split between a Soviet occupied North Island and a US contolled South Islamd with the rapid expansion of the Soviet plammed invasion of South Korea to New Zealand. 202.36.254.250 (talk) 04:38, 15 September 2022 (UTC)

References

Allowance has to be made for common sense. it should he obvious I am 65 and suffering from extreme vision problems an do not have the finance to constantly update glasses and computers and given my age and the fact mya cademic career finished in 2007 and my last paid commnetary pieces on defence issues for NBR and the Press were in 1996-98 and last book rview on R. Shesol. RFK in the NZIIA was in 2000 and the previous review on C. Blairs book on reassesment of the potential threat of the Kreigsmarien T23 in about 1998, I could hardly be expected to be update on modern computerised editing. My intial cooments on the talk page are always only intended as a rough commentary and guide to sources relevant to stopping he deconstruction of the article generally. The most important point I am actually making this week is the relevanat debate over the Tiger cruisers fate was in 1960-1 and the Escort cruiser debate belongs in what should be in an enlarge section about that time of the Tiger cruisers highly bebated enty to service not in the conversion section covring the 1964 on period where the escort cruiser issue is only really relevant in terms of the shapping of what became the Invincible class post 1967.— Preceding unsigned comment added by 202.36.254.250 (talk) 04:02, 14 September 2022 (UTC)

Other citation issues

I see in this and related articles that Brown and Moore. Rebuilding the Royal Navy: Warship Design since 1945. has publication dates all over the place from 2003 to 2013. Is there a definitive first publication date? GraemeLeggett (talk) 18:59, 24 April 2023 (UTC)

• The hardback edition was published by Chatham Publishing in 2003, ISBN: 1-86176-222-4 or 978-1861762221 (I have a copy of this). This is sometimes described as published by Pen & Sword Books, but has the same publishing date.

• The US Naval Institute hardback edition was published in 2004, ISBN: 1591147050 or 978-1591147053. My understanding is that this was identical to the British edition, except for a different publisher name and logo, and a different ISBN (but I have not checked this). All the books in this series were published in hardback by both publishers with the USNI edition having a publishing date one year later.

• The paperback reprint edition was published by Seaforth Publishing in 2012, ISBN: 1848321503 or 978-1848321502

-- Toddy1 (talk) 19:49, 24 April 2023 (UTC)

Some of the citations to Rebuilding the Royal Navy: Warship Design since 1945 specify e-book numbering. That might mean the Amazon Kindle edition, which was a copy of the 2012 paperback edition. I have used Kindle - pagination is inconsistent, it depends on magnification, screen size, and other stuff. With paper books, what is on (for example) page 5 is always the same; that is only approximately true with Kindle books. Kindle page numbers are not necessarily done the same way on different books. For books where I have compared Kindle page numbers with paper page numbers - they are different. Seaforth Publishing is part of Pen & Sword Books, and they sell both Kindle and "ePub" versions of this book.^{Pen & Sword Books website} I have never seen a Pen & Sword Books "ePub" book, so I have no idea how pagination works on them.-- Toddy1 (talk) 20:04, 24 April 2023 (UTC)

Thanks. In the case of the ebooks where numbering is 'variable' then a reference to a chapter could stand in lieu of page numbers for getting the reader to the right point.GraemeLeggett (talk) 07:24, 25 April 2023 (UTC)

​ Do you have a preferred order for the references section?-- Toddy1 (talk) 18:10, 25 April 2023 (UTC)

Alphabetical by first author is usual, if that's what you're asking. My recent additions have probably not been to spec in that regards. GraemeLeggett (talk) 18:28, 25 April 2023 (UTC)

What book is meant by the citation to Friedman (2002)

There is a citation to Friedman (2002) pp (notes) 371–375. It is given for the statement: The RAN ships would have been re-armed with twin 5.25-inch (133 mm) gun turrets^[8] or triple 5.25-inch turrets., which has a footnote saying that triple 5.25-inch turrets were "a 1942 design option for RAN cruisers".

I wondered if Friedman (2002), might mean "Friedman, Norman (2010). British Cruisers: Two World Wars and After".

• Evidence in favour: pages 371-375 are end-notes pages that talk about the armament of cruisers, including the Tiger-class, and also mention 5.25-inch guns and Dido-class cruisers (the Dido-class were cruisers with 5.25-inch guns).
• Evidence against: I cannot see anything that explicitly states that 5.25-inch turrets were a 1942 design option for RAN cruisers.

-- Toddy1 (talk) 09:54, 26 April 2023 (UTC)

Note that footnote [8] is discussed at "Citation to Gill (1968) p470-472" above.-- Toddy1 (talk) 09:57, 26 April 2023 (UTC)

Raven and Roberts

I'd hazard a guess that British Cruisers of World War Two by Alan Raven and John Roberts is meant. It's a reference listed on the Minotaur-class cruiser article. GraemeLeggett (talk) 17:59, 26 April 2023 (UTC)

This whole effort to discredit the original article and editor and by implications his qualification and competence is bullshit and crap, really playing on the meaning of phases like 'nearly superseded' the Tiger class. Technically it was a mistake saying the N2 design superseded the Tiger class in June 1943, at that point the planning of a third flight of 4 turret enlarged Dido were cancelled, in favour of N2 or a 3 turret Turret 5.25 Dido. However N2 been vetoed by First Lord Andrew Cunningham in February 1944, and it was actually the Neptune class which superseded the Tiger class, till Feb 1946 as work had effectively stopped on the hulls that became Blake and Tiger in 1961 and 1959 and while Defence/ Lion while very much under construction at Scotts in 1943 as the lead Tiger does not seem to have been much advanced in 1944-45 other than being launched. In terms of Hawke I still hold to the evidence pointing o their being two HMS Hawke's and HMS Hawke in its original Tiger class version being broken about March 1945 like one of the hulls at the time known as Bellepron and the power train split and used as the machinery of 4 light fleet carriers.

In terms of the 5.25 armament proposed for the RAN Tigers the point is that in say 2016-2018 I extensively read the full hard copies of Gill, two volumes, Stevens RAN WW2 and Murfin in the NZ National Library in Molesworth St, Wellington, NZ (it is unclear whether the hardcopies still exist their and whether the transcribed PDF cassette copy will be complete and accurate. The real point is that the 5.25 armament was only one option and appears to have been favoured, if the cruisers were completed in wartime, but the point is the Mk 24 turrets under construction at Elswick were, Not being supplied to Australia which suggests they were being built for the Neptune class. In reading the hard copy version of the Australian texts at the time my own suspicion was first that the RAN expectation was that in early and mid 1944 there was no expectation that HMS Vanguard would advance beyond launching and therefore its Mk 2 power rammed 5.25 turrets would be available and secondly that the hulls that became Lion, Tiger and Blake were almost certainly too far constricted to allow the fitting fo a fourth X turret 5.25 on the centerline hull as one of the fundamental differences of the 64 feet Minotaur/Tigers is the much greater subdivision and protection built into that area of the hull which would have preclued a fourth large centerline turret being restored. So Australia was in fact being offered a particularly rum deal with the 2 Tiger deal which Churchill was right on all accounts on offering gratis, but the Treasury and UK Atlee government determination to demand full cost payment indicating a second class relationship compared with Australia. Somewhat less demeaning of course that Robert McNamara's statement on the Vietnam War in the 'Fog of War'. None of our allies supported us in Vietnam, UK, France and Germany. refused. It was very noticeable during the Falklands war that in the past the USN had supplied Argentina with equipment equal in the Trackers, Sea Kings and Neptune P2, supplied to the RAN prior to the 1974 Church Admendment restricting arms sales to Argentina which actually was a major factor in the RN surviving the Falklands war. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 202.36.254.250 (talk) 03:00, 27 April 2023 (UTC) edited by 202.36.254.250 at 23:03–06, 27 April 2023‎ (UTC)

That doesn't have anything to do with this section. GraemeLeggett (talk) 05:59, 27 April 2023 (UTC)

Citation to Gill (1968) p470-472

The article has the following:

Despite the opposition of Australian shipbuilders and the Royal Australian Air Force, the Australian prime minister John Curtin agreed (on 18–21 May 1944, while visiting the UK) to the transfer of new RN ships, provided sufficient RAN crews were available to man them. Had the ships entered Australian service, they would have operated as part of British Pacific Fleet carrier groups. The RAN ships would have been re-armed with twin 5.25-inch (133 mm) gun turrets

This is the chapter (in pdf format) containing p470-472. The only bit of the above that is supported by the the source would be something like:

When the Australian prime minister, John Curtin, was in London in May 1944, the British prime minister, Winston Churchill, offered to turn over one or more Tiger-class cruisers (ship's company 850) and a Colossus-class light fleet carrier (ship's company 700, plus Naval Air Arm 800) to to Australian Navy, if the Australian government could provide the personnel to man them. But Australia did not have the manpower available, and in June 1945 the Australian War Cabinet decided not to proceed with this offer as a war project.

The stuff about arming the cruisers with 5.25-in guns in not in that chapter of Gill. Nor is the opposition of Australian shipbuilders and the Royal Australian Air Force. Page 471 talks about how the Chief of the Australian Naval Staff, Admiral Royle, made a submission to the Australian Advisory War Council saying that for an increase of 4,000-5,000 strength, the Australian Navy could "man one aircraft carrier, or or two more cruisers, and six destroyers, if these ships could be made available by the United Kingdom". So clearly the Royal Navy's offer (made through Churchill) was in response to that.

References

• Gill, G. H. (1968), The Royal Australian Navy, 1942-1945, Australia in the War of 1939–1945, Series 2 (Navy), vol. II, Canberra: Australian War Memorial

-- Toddy1 (talk) 19:42, 25 April 2023 (UTC)

​ From a reader's point of view, chapter URLs would be useful - but I have no idea whether they work with sfn templates. There is of course the usual problem that the citation only partially supports what it has been cited for.

It is also hard to see that any of this is particularly relevant to an article on the ships completed in the late 1950s to a different design than they were laid down as. Presumably if at some time between May 1944 and June 1945 the Australians had asked for the cruisers, they would have been given cruisers that were near completion.-- Toddy1 (talk) 19:48, 25 April 2023 (UTC)

I agree, have removed Gill where it doesn't support claims. GraemeLeggett (talk) 11:42, 26 April 2023 (UTC)

The Royal Australian Navy in World War II edited by David Stevens

The Royal Australian Navy in World War II (1996) edited by David Stevens is also cited. Pages 14-15 of the second edition (2005) are relevant to the transfer of ships to Australia (if Australia could man them). Page 15 says that in February 1945 the Australian Defence Committee recommended that the proposal should go ahead (with an increase in naval recruiting to match), but at that stage the British said that the ships must be paid for, and gave as a reason the "hard-nosed Australian approach to financial questions in other areas, particularly over wheat and facilities for the British Pacific Fleet." So it did not happen. It is not clear from the text whether the £9 million cost is just for the ships, or for the ships and their running cost (including the increase in manning).

There is another "citation" to Stevens, but there is no page number :(

Goldrick, James (2005). "Chapter 1, Australian Naval Policy 1939–45". In Stevens, David (ed.). The Royal Australian Navy in World War II (2 ed.). Crows Nest, New South Wales: Allen & Unwin. pp. 14–15. ISBN 978-1741141849. -- Toddy1 (talk) 10:10, 27 April 2023 (UTC)

The replacement for the Dido-class cruiser

I have reverted the addition of a chunk of text about the N2 design, which was the planned replacement for the Dido-class cruiser. The chunk of text, can be seen here. I do not understand why it is relevant. And even if it were relevant, this article has enough problems with text that is not really supported by the citations without adding some more with the same problems.-- Toddy1 (talk) 06:22, 2 May 2023 (UTC)

@202.36.254.250: I understand that Memo ADM 167/127, 11 April 1946 means a memorandum dated 11 April 1946 in Public Record Office (a.k.a. National Archives) file reference ADM 167/127 Board Minutes and Memoranda, dated 1946.^[1] This can be found at Kew. Have you seen it in real life?

But what is Naval Encyclopedia (Web) 'Neptune Cruisers'?-- Toddy1 (talk) 06:31, 2 May 2023 (UTC)

@202.36.254.250:, if you are so interested in the N2 design and the decisions surrounding it, why not write an article about it at Draft:N2 cruiser. Please have the books you use to hand when you write it; doing it that way makes it easier to cite the right book/page for the each fact.-- Toddy1 (talk) 08:22, 2 May 2023 (UTC)

Dubious citation to Warship 1996

The article has the following sentence:

The whole class, which was constructed with a tight, cramped, and near impossible to modernise citadel, was nearly superseded by the completely redesigned N2 8500-ton 1944 cruiser, within the same 555 ft × 64 ft (169 m × 20 m) box of the Colony/Minotaur design, which was approved by the Admiralty Board on 16 July 1943.

References

There was a page numbers requested tag on the Warship 1996 citation, so I checked it. Pages 78 and 83 are the pages being cited, but they support something similar but not the text they are cited for. Page 78 says that the Dido-class were considered as an alternative to improved Fiji-class. Page 83 says that the Board approved the N2 design (replacement for Dido-class) on 25 June 1943.-- Toddy1 (talk) 05:40, 24 April 2023 (UTC)

Given the number of commas in that sentence, I think it's probably a conjunction of two or more thoughts. Is it relevant to the development of the Tiger and if so is it properly citable to make sense in context? GraemeLeggett (talk) 13:43, 24 April 2023 (UTC)

The other citation is to:

• Freidman, N. (2012), British Cruisers: Two World Wars and After, Barnsley: Seaforth, ISBN 9781848320789

Based on the ISBN, I think that should be corrected to:

• Friedman, N. (2010), British Cruisers: Two World Wars and After, Barnsley: Seaforth, ISBN 9781848320789

There is only two citations to "Friedman (2012)" [sic] - one of these was the one backing up that citation - the other citations to the book have the correct 2010 date.

Friedman (2010) page 261 says: "The N2 design received the Board Stamp on 16 July 1943..." As for the rest of the stuff, it is not supported by the citations given.-- Toddy1 (talk) 14:21, 24 April 2023 (UTC)

I have corrected the spelling of "Friedman" to the spelling used in his books (i.e. Friedman, not Freidman). I have corrected the 2012 dates.-- Toddy1 (talk) 14:30, 24 April 2023 (UTC)

The main source in relation to N2 is of course the 1996 article in Warship by G. Moore, p 78 to 94 which should be taken in its entirety as the reference. The decision for the N2 as a more affordable design has to be seen in the context of the post war requirements in which affordability and manpower availability costs were the crucial issue. At the end of WW2 and in the immediate aftermath the RN Towns and Colony class were essentially all rebuilt with lock and follow 274 radar control LADCTs for the main armament, HMS Jamaica and HMS Belfast had two 274/ LADCTs and AIO ( Action Information Offices ) which combined with the fitting of many radar screens in the bridge and ops rooms area, meant post war cruiser operation was very different, from late WW2, 1944-5. The more constricted space made, already tight cruisers like the Colony class hopelessly cramped and by 1948-51 it became apparent the Colony class and the incomplete Tigers hulls were unsuitable for reconstruction. Manning could be allowed for only 1/3. MK 23 main 6 inch Turret, a Mk 23 turret required 90 crew, and and weighed 340 tons. It should have been obvious by 1944 that the Neptune/ Colony and 1943 Tiger requiring 1000 to 1350 men to operate in wartime conditions would have to be replaced by modern cruisers with more modern automated gunnery systems. Postwar a fully manned and armed N2 should have required only 470 crew. fully Christopher Bell in Churchill and the RN (2013) p 303 that by late October 1943 naval planning for Churchill and the naval staff really focus on post war requirements in relation to major warships with manpower issues the priority and cost and realistic completion dates also critical . The lower priority for modern cruisers is reflected on the decision to give two to Canada, and effectively transfer two more to the RAN. Even though the deal did not proceed, work effectively stopped on them for the next 18 months ( presumably waiting for payment from Australia. The fact that some of the best RN cruisers nb HMS Liverpool ( the second group of the towns were possibly the best RN cruisers and NZ is in some ways indirectly responsible for the loss of HMS Gloucester and HMS Manchester) did not really reenter service during WW2 although its reconstruction was completed in the IS by late 1943, reflects the RN staff lack of priority for the 9000 ton intermediate cruisers at the time. The RN Staff and Admirals decision to go with N2 reflects the fact in their view by the second half of 1943 the Kreigsmarine surface fleet was largely destroyed or neutralised . There was less need for six inch cruisers with the USN in the war and building large numbers of cruisers for the Pacific war and the fact new 6 inch cruisers and in particular, new turrets would not be completed with the span of the war. The N2 design with full DP centreline armament and no need for secondary AA turrets (which six inch gun cruisers required in the 4.5/4/3 inch range). The smaller turrets consuming less crew and space effectively allowed the doubling of armour, range and space for the crew although at the expense of settling 27/28 knot speed. Automated 5.25 turrets reduced turret manning from 85/90 to 25/0 and by exchanging 3/MK 23 turrets (Crew 270) and 4 inch Mk 19 twins (65 circa) or 6 Mk 4.5 (270 crew) for just four twin 5.25 turrets which even in the RP 10/ RP 20 Royalist model means a reduction in the main turret crew on a wartime Swiftsure/ Tiger of 1944 from 335 to 240; or 610 in a Neptune (1945) to probably a 100 in an automated 4 turret Mk 3 5.25 or fitting semi manual loaded four turret US 5 inch Mk 38 or twin 5/54 ordered for Junea/Atlanta MK 4 in 1945 or 4 MK 20 4.7RN balance by 2 Dutch Bofors 4.7 turrets and 2 UK ? RN 4.7 would offter less than a hundred for a four turret designa ndit was the Dutch Bofors destroyer mount used by the Dutch and Sweedish that the RN favoured as an imnported alternative if no UK mount was available. And of course the power rammed 5.25 used in Vanguard actually worked giving essentially 36rpm on two channels in a 4 turret cruiser mount as did the electric prototype on HMS Diadem in 1944. A fully automatice 5.25 Dido turret firing 12rpm form each gun or 24 rpm per turret or 48rpm on each channel, a load rate of 1 shell = 1 charge each 5 seconds into each gun should not have resulted in anysort of excessive stress load onthe gunnery or automating loading systems. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 202.36.254.250 (talk) 04:32, 4 May 2023 (UTC)
edited by 130.216.69.50 02:16, 5 May 2023 (UTC)
edited by 202.36.254.250 05:15, 5 May 2023 (UTC)

Citations to: "Standard of Power" and "Mountbatten: the Official biography"

1. P. Zeigler. Mountbatten: the Official biography London (2001)
2. van der Vat, Dan (2001), Standard of Power, Hutchinson, ISBN 0091801214
3. The Royal Navy in the Twentieth Century, London: Pilmco, 2001, ISBN 9781842122969

@GraemeLeggett: In this edit, you deleted the isbn and Google books link from (3). They belong with (1). You added "The Royal Navy in the Twentieth Century" to (2). That suggests to me that (2) and (3) were meant to be one citation, and somehow the two citations got muddled into three.-- Toddy1 (talk) 11:48, 27 April 2023 (UTC)

I have fixed these.^[2] But could not have done it if you had not spotted the errors you fixed.-- Toddy1 (talk) 12:14, 27 April 2023 (UTC)

Yes of course 2/3 are the same book and source, but the comment on the critical decision on the RN building plans and to go ahead with the Tigers is equally based on 'A. Seldon. Churchill Indian Summer. The Conservative Government 1951-55 (2010)' which devotes massive space to the evolution of Churchill's cabinet discussion on the naval programme in 1954 and his relations with the naval staff, navy and defence minsiter CDS and CNS. Churchills second government was mainly about Defence, the Navy and RAF as far as the PM was involved and while demanding and not strictly a naval source I consider Seldon the best source on these matters. Mountbatten is unrealiable and self serving on everything but I would think the popular Naval History of Gove and its repackaging in Redford. RN since 1900 are fairly consistent with Seldon's view but superficial. Such citations to Seldon, Gove et al have frequently been removed and vandalised presumably by my many opponents, detractors and enemies in the services and NZ National Party. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 130.216.68.112 (talk) 00:37, 1 May 2023 (UTC)

Thank you. I have added the book to the list of references, and looked at versions in the article history to see if I can find the citations to Seldon's 1981 book.

• 20:49, 4 January 2020 by 58.84.227.187. A text search does not show "Seldon" or "Indian Summer".
• 02:29, 5 February 2019 by 103.23.19.57. A text search does not show "Seldon" or "Indian Summer". But it shows that the citation to Friedman for the 5.25-in guns was "N. Freidman. British Cruisers WW2 & After. Seaforth. Barnsley. pp(notes)371–375" - whoever changed that to "Friedman (2002) pp (notes) 371–375" should have typed "2010" not "2002" (which is a major weakness of that type of referencing).
• 02:14, 23 June 2016 by 210.48.175.44. A text search does not show "Seldon" or "Indian Summer".

@130.216.68.112: Maybe you could find an old version of the article that contains a citation to Seldon? If you can, please give us a URL to that version and a time/date for it.-- Toddy1 (talk) 07:10, 1 May 2023 (UTC)

"frequently been removed and vandalised presumably by my many opponents, detractors and enemies in the services and NZ National Party" - that's flying close to Wikipedia:Casting aspersions. GraemeLeggett (talk) 07:21, 1 May 2023 (UTC)

@130.216.68.112: by the popular Naval History of Gove do you mean a book by (1) Eric J. Grove or (2) Philip D. Grove (possibly with Mark J. Grove), or (3) a book whose author's family name genuinely is Gove? And incidentally, do you know the title of the book you mean? (If you are not certain, please say so.)-- Toddy1 (talk) 07:24, 1 May 2023 (UTC)

@130.216.68.112: by its repackaging in Redford do you mean a book by Duncan Redford? Do you know the title of the book?-- Toddy1 (talk) 07:24, 1 May 2023 (UTC)

Duncan Redford; Philip D. Grove (2019). The Royal Navy: A History Since 1900. Bloomsbury. ISBN 9781350143241. looks likely. GraemeLeggett (talk) 09:40, 1 May 2023 (UTC)

Or a 2014 version published under I. B. Tauris imprint ISBN 9781780767826 described here GraemeLeggett (talk) 09:45, 1 May 2023 (UTC)

Seldon's book has two sentences relevant to the Tiger-class.-- Toddy1 (talk) 10:23, 14 May 2023 (UTC)

Deletion of irrelevant poorly-sourced stuff about Australia buying Tiger-class cruisers

I have now read the relevant portions of David Day's The Politics of War: Australia at War, 1939-45 (2003), which of course never mentions what type of cruiser might have been transferred or sold to Australia. The topic of Admiral Guy Royle's attempt to get an aircraft carrier group transferred to the Australian Navy in 1944-45 would be a valid topic for an article. But it is not particularly relevant to the Tiger-class cruisers that served in the Royal Navy in the 1960s and 70s. It is true that some (but not all) books that talk about Admiral Royle's proposal refer to the cruiser element as Tiger-class, but they are talking about one of the sub-classes of the 1943 Minotaur-class. The proposal did not go through, so we do not know which cruisers would have been transferred - which would have depended on when it was approved (if it had been), and when the Royal Australian Navy could have manned them. There were a lot of problems with the proposal, and these mainly involved internal Australian Government politics and to a lesser extent its relationship with the British. One problem in 1945 was whether the group would have served with existing Australian ships (what Australia wanted) or as part of the British Pacific Fleet (what the British wanted). As far as I can tell, none of the cited sources support the suggestion than cruisers transferred to Australia would have had a different armament that British cruisers of the same class.-- Toddy1 (talk) 10:16, 14 May 2023 (UTC)

I brought a little bit of what was taken out back in and it's now a standalone sentence (or two). Having read Gill it's weak sauce as to how firm the committment was. Am editing it again. GraemeLeggett (talk) 16:23, 14 May 2023 (UTC)

Regarding: In June 1945 the Australian government cancelled payments for Defence and Blake on the grounds that neither ship was ready and that it had insufficient crews for the cruisers because it was also acquiring British aircraft carriers and destroyers. Pages 589-591 of David Day's The Politics of War: Australia at War, 1939-45 (2003) deal with May 1944. So I have deleted this sentence again.-- Toddy1 (talk) 06:53, 15 May 2023 (UTC)

Good work.GraemeLeggett (talk) 07:33, 15 May 2023 (UTC)

References