Talk:United Nations Security Council Resolution 242/Archive 3

Archive 1

Archive 2

Archive 3

Archive 4

Archive 5

→

Archive 8

Range of views

I think the current article needs reworking as it is hard to comprehend, not very informative and poorly structured. However, given the controversy surrounding the resolution's interpretation there is a problem achieving enough stability to make attempting to impose a real structure worthwhile, even with ample citations. One way to overcome this may be to structure the article in a way that actively accommodates a diverse range of views. Stability could be further enhanced if, all else being equal, more controversial issues are kept away from the lede until a consensus developes. That way the casual reader is presented with a stable version of what is not controversial, and hopefully over time the areas of consensus will grow and the lede evolve as the information in the subheadings expands and becomes more stable. I have no idea whether such an approach would work or whether anyone will go for it, but I think its worth a try. I am going to start with a new lede that moves away from merely quoting the text of the resolution and skirts the main area's of controversy (as I see them) but is not so neutral as to lack any substance. A lot will depend on whether this is seen to be an acceptable start. Hopefully if there are objections these can be discussed here. The intention is to quickly add more background and have all the major viewpoints fairly represented in the article in a chronological / logical order, starting with acceptances and the Jarring Mission. WP:BB - Steve157 (talk) 13:53, 18 November 2009 (UTC)

You deleted the reference to the inadmissibility principle in the preamble again. Regarding the JCPA material: Dore Gold, Ruth Lapidoth, and Yehuda Blum were members of the Israeli mission to the United Nations. I don't mind inclusion of their published political viewpoints, so long as the article also includes the opposing viewpoints published by mainstream legal scholars, the Security Council, General Assembly, and ICJ on the “inadmissibility of territory by war” and the “legitimacy” of the actions taken by the Israeli government and its representatives in their attempts to change the status of the occupied Arab territories and East Jerusalem. That is a non-negotiable aspect of the WP:NPOV policy.

Prof. Lapidoth cited a press conference and clarification in which the Secretary General misstated the facts when he said that the resolution was "non-binding". In a subsequent published account, the Secretary explained that situation. He said that his spokesman had made things worse by issuing the clarification which said the resolution was not enforceable. When the Secretary submitted the matter to the UN Legal Advisor, the response was a memo, "the bottom line of which read, in capital letters: NO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION CAN BE DESCRIBED AS UNENFORCEABLE." The Secretary said "I got the message." [1] That is a significant published viewpoint that Lapidoth didn't mention in her analysis. Press conferences aren't juridically dispositive, so she was really only commenting on appearances, not on matters of legal substance: "Thus it would seem that the resolution was a mere recommendation". She mentioned the ICJ decision in the Namibia case in a footnote, and said "It is true that in 1971 the International Court of Justice (ICJ) decided that a resolution taken in accordance with Chapter VI can also be a binding decision".

On page 7 of her 'Security Council Resolution 242 at twenty-five‎' Prof. Lapidoth spelled out the need to determine in each case whether the Security Council is exercising its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. That is one of the stated purposes of the Repertoire Of The Practice Of The Security Council and the Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs. Both of those documents cite resolution 242 as an example of an occasion when the Security Council was exercising those responsibilities and acting on behalf of the members in accordance with article 24 of the Charter. They say the Security Council was making dispositive decisions of a preliminary nature in the preamble of the resolution with regard to the principles that would "govern" an acceptable settlement. The impact of jus cogens norms on Security Council resolutions has been reiterated by Paul De Waart, John Dugard, Enrico Milano, Stefan Talmon, Giuliana Capaldo, Alexander Orakhelashvili, David Schweigman, Erika De Wet, and Jeremy Farrall.

Chapter 5 of the Repertoire Of The Practice Of The Security Council for the years 1966-1968 says that a subsidiary organ, The Special Representative in the Middle East, and its terms of reference were established in pursuance with resolution 242. The Security Council stipulated the principles that would govern an acceptable settlement and delegated its responsibility for efforts to achieve a settlement to that subsidiary organ. [2] The UN Chronicle, for June 1, 1991 carried an article "Jarring retires as Special Representative to Middle East" which said that "Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar on 21 March designated Edouard Brunner of Switzerland as Special Representative to the Middle East, in accordance with Security Council resolution 242 (1967), adopted by the Council on 22 November 1967. Mr. Brunner succeeds Gunnar Jarring, who has served in that capacity since 1967." The member states, including Israel, have paid assessments that were levied for the salary, expenses, and pensions of the subsidiary UN organ that was created by this resolution. The UN has continued to give legal effect to resolution 242 by posting individuals to that position ever since. That can hardly be described as a mere recommendation.

I suggest that you present any disputes that you have to the Moderation Committee. harlan (talk) 22:23, 19 November 2009 (UTC)

I really don't understand why you think the inadmissibility principle is the most important feature of this resolution. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 00:07, 20 November 2009 (UTC)

The article is supposed to reflect the significant published viewpoints about the topic. Lord Caradon offered a self-evident explanation in his chapter of the Georgetown Symposium pamphlet on 242, when he said that it was "the overriding principle". I've provided citations to a host of other authorities on international law that have published their own explanations regarding the impact of peremptory norms on the interpretation and application of United Nations Security Council Resolution 242. Those essays are very easy to comprehend.

The resolution required the termination of all claims or states of belligerency. A number of those published sources explain that Article 52 and 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties precludes any negotiated settlement obtained through the use of force or the threat of force - or one that violates any peremptory norm. John Dugard consulted on a recent study which noted that "the ultimate status and boundaries will require negotiation between the parties, according to Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The same study also said that Article 7 and 47 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which address ‘special agreements’ between local authorities and the occupying power, and Article 8, concerning ‘special agreements’ that can adversely affect the rights of protected persons precludes any change in status of the territory obtained through an agreement concluded during a state of belligerent occupation. [3] harlan (talk) 02:31, 20 November 2009 (UTC)

The article is supposed to be about resolution 242, not the history and application of the inadmissibility principle, which is alluded to once in the preamble. You seem to want to make it the main issue of this article. That's not going to happen. You are of course welcome to write a whole article about the inadmissibility principle and link to it from here. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 13:31, 20 November 2009 (UTC)

(outdent) There already is an article on Peremptory norms, but material about this resolution doesn't belong there. I'd be happy to open an ARBCOM ticket to request clarification of the general sanctions. I'm pretty certain that they permit any editor to add material to this encyclopedia article that represents the published majority viewpoint of the international community without having to engage in a long drawn-out political struggle or getting harassed. Most states and legal scholars have supported UN calls for non-recognition based on the legal norms set out in the preamble of this resolution, so it is a central issue. For quite a while now, I've just been trying to get that fact mentioned in the article.

The following material pertains to resolution 242:

• The memo of the UN Legal Advisor dealt specifically with the question of enforcing this resolution "in a nutshell". It explained that "NO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION CAN BE DESCRIBED AS UNENFORCEABLE." It appears in the Secretary General's memoirs under the heading "Resolution 242" [4]
• On page 113, of John Dugard's 'Recognition and the United Nations' he said that the UN Security Council had based its call for non-recognition of Israeli sovereignty over East Jerusalem on UN Security Council resolution 242.
• The 1996 Declaration made by the Council of Ministers of the European Union regarding the annexation of East Jerusalem provides an example of the rule of non-recognition in state practice. The ministers reaffirmed the policy that: "East Jerusalem is subject to the principles set out in Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, notably the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force, and is therefore not under Israeli sovereignty." [5]
• Attempts to circumvent a peremptory norm are beyond the powers (Ultra vires) of the UN. The juridical organs, including the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and scholars like Alexander Orakhelashvili, Hans-Paul Gasser, T.D. Gill have explained that the treaty-based character of the Security Council’s powers are limited by peremptory norms and subject to judicial review. That means that when the terms of a resolution are vague, they must be construed as requiring an outcome that is consistent with jus cogens principles. Orakhelashvili used the refugee clause of resolution 242 and the Rome Statute as an illustration.

All of that satisfies the policy for inclusion regarding notability, verifiability, and etc. and it belongs here in the appropriate sections on the preamble, interpretation, refugees, and etc. Readers won't have any trouble understanding the everyday language used in the EU policy statement. It discusses both the notability and the applicability of the principles spelled out in the preamble of this resolution. It also proves the preamble has substantial real-world legal consequences. Readers expect to find that sort of information in this article, and should NOT have to look somewhere else to find it or wade through a lot of WP:Coatrack argumentation which implies that the majority view it as non-operative or non-binding.

The inclusion of a reference to a peremptory norm in resolution 242 is an example of an instance where the maxim Expressio unius est exclusio alterius applies. There is no accepted rule of English grammar regarding the absence of a definite article ("the"), but Orakhelashvili, Michael Lynk, et al. explain that peremptory norms always have preemptory effects that impact the interpretation and application of Security Council resolutions. That is why Caradon called it "the overriding principle". One of the major subsections under the "Applicable Law" heading in the Wall case was "Illegality of any territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force". That analysis included a discussion of resolution 242 and its corollary in customary international law.

On a number of occasions the members of the General Assembly have adopted resolutions by more than the two-thirds vote required for important questions. Those resolutions reiterate and reaffirm "all relevant United Nations resolutions which emphasize that the acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible under the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law and that Israel must withdraw unconditionally from all the occupied Palestinian and other Arab territories, including Jerusalem", e.g. [6]. Specialists in legal theory have introduced arguments and counter-arguments as to whether such resolutions are international law in themselves or simply evidence of world community consensus as to the existence of an international law, e.g. W. T. Mallison, Jr. and S. V. Mallison, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Winter, 1973), pp. 64-78. In either case the General Assembly declaration represents the majority viewpoint regarding the obligations imposed by the UN Charter and principles of international law. The reader should be informed about that. The viewpoints expressed by CAMERA and many of the individuals quoted in the article misrepresent the prevailing viewpoint of the UN member states on this issue.

The Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs and the Practice and Repertoire of the Security Council are official legal publications regarding the rules of procedure and decisions that have been adopted by the UN Organization. [7] [8] They say the decision of 22 November 1967, resolution 242 (1967), preamble, regarding the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war is both "a call for compliance with the purposes and principles of Article 2 of the UN Charter" and an "enunciation or affirmation of principles governing the settlement". They also say the decision was made: (1) while the Security Council was acting on behalf of all the members in accordance with Article 24 of the Charter [9]; and (2) while it was fulfilling its responsibilities for maintenance of international peace and security [10] In the Namibia case, the ICJ said that when the Council is exercising its responsibility for maintenance of international peace and security, the preambular declarations contained in Chapter VI resolutions regarding matters of law and obligations under the Charter become binding on members in accordance with the terms of article 24. Judge Higgins cited that ruling in support of the ICJ's call for non-recognition in the Wall Case.

I've provided you with a very thorough good faith explanation in response to your WP:BRD requests on the legislated rules of non-recognition that have been adopted by the international community and the UN organization. I've demonstrated that it is relevant to the topic of this article. It has been discussed in connection with this resolution by mainstream scholars in many books, textbooks, journal articles, and court decisions. I suggest that you present your case (whatever it is) to the Moderation Committee. WP:UNDUE doesn't support the removal of sourced neutral statements that represent published mainstream viewpoints of authorities like Michael Lynk, Paul De Waart, John Dugard, Enrico Milano, Stefan Talmon, Giuliana Capaldo, David Schweigman, Erika De Wet, Boleslaw Boczek, Jeremy Farrall, Yoram Dinstein and the primary UN organs speaking for themselves in the official UN legal publications. Here is an example where you did that after a WP:BRD discussion [11] Please observe the sanctions and avoid disruptive edits. harlan (talk) 22:14, 21 November 2009 (UTC)

For the nth time. Nobody says the inadmissibility principle doesn't exist or is not mentioned in 242. What we're saying is that you are not going to make this article mainly about the one aspect of the resolution that tickles your political fancy.

Go open an ARBCOM ticket. They might ask why you're not trying some other WP:DR. I think we know why. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 14:28, 22 November 2009 (UTC)

You haven't commented on the material about non-recognition in the section above that I proposed to add to the article. One paragraph about a central issue (the overriding principle) that was addressed by this resolution and the actions taken by the Security Council as a consequence isn't "a fancy". WP:NPOV requires the inclusion of all significant views that have been published by reliable sources. That is non-negotiable and expected of all articles and all editors. So far all you've said is WP:IDONTLIKEIT.

I don't need clarification on the sanctions. Any editor can add reliably sourced material to this article if it is pertinent to the subject. There is guidance from ARBCOM which says "Wikipedia is a reference work. Use of the site for political struggle accompanied by harassment of opponents is extremely disruptive." and "It is disruptive to remove statements that are sourced reliably, written in a neutral narrative, and pertain to the subject at hand." [12]

You objected to an irrelevant comment made by Thomas Grant and used that as a pretext to remove all of the material and citations from a half dozen other authors on the non-recognition regimes that were a direct result of 242. You've never explained why that other material wasn't suitable for inclusion in this article. Those non-recognition measures were adopted by a majority vote of the respective organs, and have been discussed in dozens of peer-reviewed publications edited by top experts in the fields of law and political science. You have ignored repeated requests to submit your case, whatever it is, for dispute resolution by the Moderation Committee. Deleting material that represents the majority viewpoint on the topic at hand, refusing to offer an explanation, while declining offers to submit the matter for moderation is simply disruptive. I'm going to go ahead and incorporate the items I proposed above. harlan (talk) 18:36, 22 November 2009 (UTC)

I have explained myself several times. Allow me to repeat. An article about UNSC 242 is not the place for an in-depth analysis of the inadmissibility principle in international law. Even if you source it 15 times, this is not the place for it. A couple of paragraphs and a pointer to relevant article should be enough.

I removed your material about "regimes of non-recognition in the UN" because your sources not only did not support it, they contradicted it. Anyway, following your own argument, non-recognition does not draw its force from 242 but from peremptory norms and the UN charter, so again this would not be the place for an in-depth analysis of that either. Once more, a couple of paragraphs noting that Israel's annexation of some of the territory that 242 talks about is not recognized would be appropriate.

If I understand BRD correctly, you are the one who should submit his case to dispute resolution. Feel free to do so. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 22:33, 22 November 2009 (UTC)

Harlan I note that in describing your three major views you predicate them all on the assumption that the language of the resolution is indefinite. Surely you accept that there are established interpretations that regard the wording as clear?

Lynk bases much of his analysis on this indefinite language assumption concluding that the authentic meaning of Resolution 242 can only be determined by treating it as if it were a legally binding treaty, which it obviously isn't, and applying the interpretative principles in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The starting point of that analysis is nevertheless instructive:

"The actual terms and wording of a resolution are the logical starting point in the determination of its meaning. If a clear and unambiguous meaning can be derived, then the interpretative quest stops there."

Quite. Helpfully Cardon removed all doubt on this question in his closing statements to the Security Council moments before 242 was passed, S-PV1382:

61..."I am sure that it will be recognized by us all that it is only the resolution that will bind us, and we regard its wording as clear."

So much for Lynk's resort to the Vienna Convention. Caradon also points to the underlying weakness in Lynk's whole approach in the same closing statement:

59. "Thirdly, I would say that the draft resolution is a balanced whole. To add to it or to detract from it would destroy the balance and also destroy the wide measure of agreement we have achieved together. It must be considered as a whole and as it stands."

Despite Lynk criticising others for failing to consider the resolution as a whole, it is clear that the shoe is entirely on the other foot. Referencing Caradon's statement at 59 above Lynk conveniently takes it to be: "a plain reference to the link between the inadmissibility principle and the withdrawal provision." as if two statements making up around 8% of the text somehow constitute the whole of the resolution. Lynk thereby completely overlooks the explicit linkage in the text of the resolution, which McHugo now accepts, between withdrawal and peace within secure and recognised boundaries (see below).

Lynk's conclusion is that only a complete withdrawal interpretation has a solid foundation in law, because anything less would constitute the acquisition of territory by force. But this overlooks the fact that one can only acquire territory by force outside ones own legitimate boundaries. Since in 1967 Israel had never had such boundaries or indeed any boundaries that its neighbours were willing to recognise, the demand by Israel's neighbours that Israel be required to the return 'their land' begs the question how they can expect the return of their land if they are unwilling to agree the boundaries to it. For 242 to require that Israel withdraw to the armistice lines without recognition of its right to exist or agreement on its boundaries is to perpetuate the stalemate of belligerent armistice that led to the outbreak of war in the first place. 242 makes it abundantly clear that the UN Charter (which you believe UN resolutions cannot contradict) requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace within secure and recognised boundaries. Thus it is obvious that Israel's withdrawal should take place to secure and recognised boundaries defined under peace agreements terminating all claims or states of belligerency. The suggestion that an Israeli withdrawal to freely agreed secure and recognised boundaries would constitute an acquisition of territory by force is unsustainable as even McHugo, whose headline 'all territories' position is the same as Lynk's, quietly concedes by allowing the validity of a 'some territories' interpretation provided the boundaries are freely agreed:

"The 1947 armistice lines were far from ideal for the security of Israel and its neighbours. But an adjustment to these lines can only happen by an agreement of the parties in order to achieve secure and recognised frontiers.12 This writer believes that an interpretation of the Resolution in this way removes any doubt or ambiguity from the withdrawal phrase, and enables the Resolution to appear as a clear, internally consistent whole which is free from any illegalities."

Thus the presumption in your 3rd major view that anything other than a full withdrawal would result in the acquisition of territory by war isn't even supported by McHugo who you quote in your Preamble section. He also disagrees that the that the language of the resolution is indefinite, and in fact supports the position I have taken all along in believing that the language is clear in its requirement for a withdrawal to secure and recognised boundaries determined by agreement:

"If the analysis presented above is correct, there is no need to refer to the debates in the Security Council which led to the unanimous adoption of the Resolution as an aid to interpretation. An attempt to use the debates and earlier drafts to interpret the Resolution should only take place if the Resolution is unclear."

Yes McHugo still claims the overriding importance of the inadmissibility principle but it is now clear that the only effect of this claim is to require that secure and recognised boundaries are agreed not imposed(McHugo p88):

"The negotiations which the Resolution envisages are to be conducted on a footing of equality and on the basis of the rights of the Parties under international law. They have as one of their principal objects the establishment of secure and recognised boundaries for Israel and its neighbours, but this is subject to an overriding principle that the acquisition of territory by war is inadmissible. Therefore, no territory may change hands other than through a negotiated agreement."

But that was already clear from the notion that only borders recognised by the parties could be secure. So despite what he says the effect of the inadmissibility principle on the withdrawal phrase is merely complementary and a normal part of interpreting the resolution as a whole.

Last but not least I must address your repeated attempts to construe all references to the inadmissibility principle as if they relate to 242. The record here is clear and imho irrefutable. If 242 had dealt with preserving the status of Jerusalem, which is the subject of numerous subsequent resolutions such as S/RES's 252, 267, 271, 298, 465, 476 and 478 why do none of these resolutions bother to recall S/RES 242? Allow me to labour this point because you completely ignored it last time I made it:

S/RES/252 states:

Recalling General Assembly resolutions 2253 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967 and 2254 (ES-V) of 14 July 1967

S/RES/267 states:

Recalling its resolution 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968 and the earlier General Assembly resolutions 2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V) of 4 and 14 July 1967, respectively, concerning measures and actions by Israel affecting the status of the City of Jerusalem,

S/RES/271 states:

Recalling its resolutions 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968 and 267 (1969) of 3 July 1969 and the earlier General Assembly resolutions 2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V) of 4 and 14 July 1967, respectively, concerning measures and action by Israel affecting the status of the City of Jerusalem,

Reaffirming the established principle that acquisition of territory by military conquest is inadmissible,

1. Reaffirms its resolutions 252 (1968) and 267 (1969);

Had 242 dealt with this issue it seems inconceivable that it would not have been repeatedly recalled in subsequent resolutions along with the resolutions that actually were relevant. Of course people can attempt to retrospectively infer a connection nearly 30 years later as the European Union Council of ministers do in your reference. But what do they actually say. If you look closely it is merely that East Jerusalem is subject to the inadmissibility principle and is not therefore viewed by the EU as sovereign Israeli territory, and, that the inadmissibility principle is stated in 242. But what it doesn't explicitly say is that the inadmissibility principle is stated in 242 in relation to preserving the status of E. Jerusalem prior to any settlement, because 242 isn't about that.

Similarly your claim that 'the legal norms set out in the preamble to this resolution' relate to the ' “legitimacy” of the actions taken by the Israeli government and its representatives in their attempts to change the status of the occupied Arab territories and East Jerusalem' isn't supported by what McHugo says about the structure of the resolution(p85):

"The Resolution divides into three parts. The first three paragraphs (those beginning with the words “Expressing” and “Emphasising”) form the first part. They are general in nature and unnumbered. They are “preambles”, provisions which are accepted as part of the context for determining the meaning of the operative provisions which follow, including the determination of their object and purpose."

Harlan which of the operative provisions which follow in 242 have anything to do with the issues you repeatedly raise in relation to the legitimacy of the actions taken by the Israeli government to change the status of the occupied territories? The answer is none. All the provisions I can see deal with the principles for acheiving a just and lasting peace by ending the occupation not preserving it. Please could you at least engage with the possibility that since 242 deals with ending the occupation, the issues about preserving it which you endlessly insist must predominate are actually quite peripheral to this resolution? - Steve157 (talk) 02:54, 24 November 2009 (UTC)

Steve, you'd make a terrible lawyer. The sources I cited above speak for themselves, and they meet the |Burden of Evidence for inclusion in the article. Once again:

• I didn't coach the EU Ministers and their legal interpretation is quite correct: "East Jerusalem is SUBJECT TO THE PRINCIPLES set out in Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, NOTABLY the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force, and is THEREFORE not under Israeli sovereignty." [13]
• Page 113, of John Dugard's 'Recognition and the United Nations' says that the UN Security Council also based its call for non-recognition of Israeli sovereignty over East Jerusalem on UN Security Council resolution 242.
• The General Assembly recalled "ALL relevant United Nations Resolutions which EMPHASIZE that the acquisition of territory by force is INADMISSIBLE under the CHARTER of the United Nations AND THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW and that Israel MUST WITHDRAW UNCONDITIONALLY FROM ALL THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN AND OTHER ARAB TERRITORIES, INCLUDING JERUSALEM" [14].
• General Assembly resolution ES-10/14, 8 December 2003 and the ICJ Advisory Opinion both cited resolution 242 as a relevant resolution. ES-10/24 and the Opinion both cited THE ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW on the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force.
• The ICJ stated in its Judgment that THE PRINCIPLES as to the use of force incorporated in the UN Charter reflect CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW and that the same is true of its corollary entailing THE ILLEGALITY OF TERRITORIAL ACQUISITION RESULTING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE.

Golda Meir said that as she saw it, there was no such thing as a secure boundary - only security. US National Archives, box 2071, 11 January 1971: cable from Yost, USUN to the Secretary of State.

Yoram Dinstein said that when the use of force became illicit under international law, legal scholars began to argue that a treaty obtained under duress should be considered invalid. Article 52 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that a treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations. See: War, Aggression, and Self-Defense, 3rd ed. Yoram Dinstein, Cambridge University Press, 2001, ISBN: 0521797586, page 37. Justice Weeramantry of the International Court of Justice said in the Lockerbie case that “the history of the United Nations ... corroborates the view that a limitation on the plenitude of the Security Council’s power is that those powers must be exercised in accordance with the well-established principles of international law.” McHugo and Lynk are saying that Israel has to withdraw, and then negotiate any "mutually agreed" border alterations. The HSRC study that I cited earlier explained all of that. Israel can't negotiate a legally valid settlement agreement while it is still occupying the territory it captured in 1967. That would violate the terms of both the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949. Both of those are declarative of customary international law too. The prohibition on the threat or use of force is peremptory and NO derogation is permitted. Take a day off and study the doctrine of Preemption. Norms have preemptive effects. That first 8% of the resolution consists of references to the law, the rest of the resolution is desideratam.

By the way, the term "treaty" has regularly been used as a generic term embracing all instruments binding at international law concluded between international entities, regardless of their formal designation.[15] That includes UN resolutions (see below).

The UN Charter is a binding written instrument. The contracting state parties designed and intended for it to create legal rights and duties - including the prohibition on the use of force in article 2. Advisory opinions rendered by the juridical organs have ruled that Security Council decisions made in the exercise of responsibilities under article 24 are binding on the members. They have also affirmed the peremptory status of the prohibition of the use of force.

The preamble of 242 reminds members of their legal obligations under article 2 of the Charter, the repertory says that was a decision made under article 24. In many countries international treaties and resolutions of international organizations are treated under the national constitutions as legal instruments. See National implementation of United Nations sanctions: a comparative study, By Vera Gowlland-Debbas, Djacoba Liva Tehindrazanarivelo Resolutions are interpreted according to the rules of customary law that were codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, because they are considered to be international agreements that are binding law. See for example the "Plan for the Future Government of Palestine," UN GAR 181(II), in the long list of UN resolutions pertaining to minority rights that are included in the "Table of Treaties" (starting at the bottom of Page xxxviii), of Self-determination and National Minorities, Oxford Monographs in International Law, Thomas D. Musgrave, Oxford University Press, 1997, ISBN 0198298986.[16]

Experts who claim there are precious few opportunities to make binding decisions under Chapter VI admit that the Security Council can make binding decisions when it calls on parties to solve their disputes by peaceful means in accordance with Article 33, or when it makes dispositive decisions of a preliminary nature, e.g. that the acquisition of territory by war is illegal and that the settlement will be governed by that customary rule of law.[17] Many of the members of the Security Council stated that they were working within the framework of Article 33. For texts of relevant statements, see: S C, 22nd yr., 1373rd mtg.: Argentina, para. 266; India, para. 95; Nigeria, para. 107; 1377th mtg.: Canada,paras. 84-86; United States, para. 54; 1379th mtg.: United Kingdom, paras. 13 and 15-18; 1381st mtg.: USSR, para. 8; 1382nd mtg.: India, paras. 45-48. I hope that you are just about finished beating that dead horse. harlan (talk) 11:42, 24 November 2009 (UTC)

Misuse of Quotes

The use of long sections of quotes in the article does not clarify the positions actually taken by the respective governments and violates WP:Quote policy in many respects. The official views of the respective governments are available and those can be used to clearly set out their policies in a just a few sentences. The overuse of WP:Coatrack quotes should be avoided.

Here is an example where the neutral voice of the article is used to make editorial comments contrary to what was actually said by President Johnson about the borders:

Motions to require the withdrawal of Israel from ‘the’ territories or ‘all the territories’ occupied in the course of the Six Day War were put forward many times with great linguistic ingenuity. They were all defeated both in the General Assembly and in the Security Council.[18]

United States' President Lyndon B Johnson appears to support this last view, believing that a return to the '67 borders would not bring peace:

We are not the ones to say where other nations should draw lines between them that will assure each the greatest security. It is clear, however, that a return to the situation of June 4, 1967 will not bring peace.<ref>September 10, 1968</ref>

In What Weight to Conquest? Judge Schwebel provides a more complete version of the quote in his footnote 6:

(6) Resolution 242 (1967) of November 22, 1967; 62 AJIL 482 (1968). President Johnson, in an address of September 10, 1968, declared:

We are not the ones to say where other nations should draw the lines between them that will assure each the greatest security. It is clear, however, that a return to the situation of June 4, 1967, will not bring peace. There must be secure and there must be recognized borders ...

At the same time, it should be equally clear that boundaries cannot and should not reflect the weight of conquest. Each change must have a reason which each side, in honest negotiation, can accept as part of a just compromise. (59 Department of State Bulletin 348 [1968]) [19]

The United States had no problems with the borders and told other parties that were drafting resolutions about that fact:

455. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, October 3, 1967.

III. What's on the Arab Ambassadors' minds boils down to one big question: Will we make good on our pledge to support the territorial integrity of all states in the Middle East?

Our best answer is that we stand by that pledge, but the only way to make good on it is to have a genuine peace. The tough question is whether we'd force Israel back to 4 June borders if the Arabs accepted terms that amounted to an honest peace settlement. Secretary Rusk told the Yugoslav Foreign Minister: "The US had no problem with frontiers as they existed before the outbreak of hostilities. If we are talking about national frontiers--in a state of peace--then we will work toward restoring them."/7/ But we all know that could lead to a tangle with the Israelis.[20]

US Secretary of State Rogers said "The Security Council resolution neither endorses nor precludes armistice lines as the definitive political boundaries. However, it calls for withdrawal from occupied territories, the non-acquisition of territory by war, and the establishment of secure and recognized boundaries. We believe that while recognized political boundaries must be established and agreed upon by the parties, any changes in the pre-existing lines should not reflect the weight of conquest and should be confined to insubstantial alterations required for mutual security.

Here is another example where the voice of the article editorializes:

A key part of the case in favour of a "some territories" reading is the claim that British and American officials involved in the drafting of the Resolution omitted the definite article deliberately in order to make it less demanding on the Israelis. As George Brown, British Foreign Secretary in 1967, said:

I have been asked over and over again to clarify, modify or improve the wording, but I do not intend to do that. The phrasing of the Resolution was very carefully worked out, and it was a difficult and complicated exercise to get it accepted by the UN Security Council. I formulated the Security Council Resolution. Before we submitted it to the Council, we showed it to Arab leaders. The proposal said 'Israel will withdraw from territories that were occupied', and not from 'the' territories, which means that Israel will not withdraw from all the territories.<ref>The Jerusalem Post, 23 January 1970</ref>

The Johnson administration had commented and provided assurances that the clause in the resolution regarding the territorial integrity of all states in the region was applicable to Jordan. All five permanent members of the Security Council had referred to the West Bank as Jordanian territory. Great Britain had officially recognized the union between the West Bank and Jordan. Brown's statements on British policy were endorsed by Caradon and quoted verbatim at the 1381st meeting of the Security Council, and quoted by other members of the Security Council during the 1382nd meeting. Here are the extracts from the record:

During the fifth emergency special session, Mr. Brown said the following on 21 June 1967:

"I should like, if I may, to set out certain principles which I believe should guide us in striving collectively for a lasting settlement. Clearly, such principles must derive from the United Nations Charter. Article 2 of the Charter provides that:

"'All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State ...'. Here the words 'territorial integrity' have a direct bearing on the question of withdrawal, on which much has been said in previous speeches. I see no two ways about this; and I can state our position very clearly. In my view, it follows from the words in the Charter that war should not lead to territorial aggrandizement."

On 26 September 1967, at the twenty-second session of the General Assembly, Mr. Brown had this to say:

"I should like to repeat what I said when I was here before: Britain does not accept war as a means of settling disputes, nor that a State should be allowed to extend its frontiers as a result of a war. This means that Israel must withdraw. But equally, Israel's neighbors must recognize its right to exist, and it must enjoy security within its frontiers. What we must work for in this area is a durable peace, the renunciation of all aggressive designs, and an end to policies which are inconsistent with peace."

see S/PV.1381 and S/PV.1382

McHugo writes "See, for instance the Israeli Government’s website which includes a document entitled “Statements Clarifying the Meaning of U N Security Council Resolution 242.” This document states that “Israel held that the withdrawal phrase in the Resolution was not meant to refer to a total withdrawal.” It contains a highly selective list of statements by politicians and diplomats (many of whom were involved in the preparation and discussion of Resolution 242) which purportedly support the Israeli interpretation. However, this writer believes that the vast majority of statements in this list are perfectly compatible with the analysis set out in this paper, and that the individuals quoted would have been horrified to find their words used out of context in order to support a position which would appear to give Israel a right to acquire parts of the occupied territories."

harlan (talk) 20:02, 2 December 2009 (UTC)

Harlan, you raise some good points. I think the main issue here is that there is far too much in the way of wholesale quotes in the article.

I think you have correctly identified that the partial Lyndon Johnson quote is out of context. The full context could be given, but I am going to just remove it, rather than add yet more to the article.

What you put above does undermine the George Brown quote, but the quote that is in the article doesn't seem to be more of a problem than many of the others, so I'm leaving it.

I've also noticed the section "Statments by senior American officials...". There doesn't seem to me to me a need for such a section, and many of the quotes are not cited. The quotes also appear to be specifically selected to supportive to the Israeli position, and therefore misrepresent the actual position of the US government. I'm going to be WP:BOLD and delete that whole section. --FormerIP (talk) 00:48, 6 December 2009 (UTC)

UNGA 39/146

The resolution says "no consideration of whatever nature, whether political, economic, military or otherwise, may serve as a justification for aggression", which harlan SYNTHed with another sentence from the resolution which says that aggression is defined inter alia as "the invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State or part thereof". This resolution is quoting UNGA 3314 which does not say that occupation in and of itself is an act of aggression as harlan would like you to believe. It basically says that whoever is the first to use armed force is the aggressor, and then goes on to list examples of acts. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 23:05, 2 December 2009 (UTC)

Carefully summarizing or rephrasing source material without changing its meaning is not synthesis. The resolution itself labeled Israel's continued occupation of the Golan as an act of aggression and demanded the total immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Israel:

Reiterating all relevant United Nations resolutions which emphasize that the acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible under the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law and that Israel must withdraw unconditionally from all the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem,...

..."Condemns Israel's aggression, policies and practices against the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territories and outside these territories, particularly Palestinians in Lebanon, including the expropriation and annexation of territory the establishment of settlements, assassination attempts and other terrorist, aggressive and repressive measures, which are in violation of the Charter and the principles of international law and the relevant international conventions;...

...Declares once more that Israel's continued occupation of the Golan Heights and its decision of 14 December 1981 to impose its laws, jurisdiction and administration on the occupied Syrian Golan Heights constitute an act of aggression under the provisions of Article 39 of the Charter of the United Nations and General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX);...

...Reaffirms once more the overriding necessity of the total and unconditional withdrawal by Israel from all the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem

Your statement about what the resolution "basically says" is WP:OR nonsense. harlan (talk) 23:39, 2 December 2009 (UTC)

You did change its meaning. You took two sentences that were specifically made separate and SYNTHed them into one that does not agree with the source material, specifically 3314. You continue with this selective reading and SYNTH in your example above. Are you claiming that occupation as an act of self defense is illegal under international law and considered an act of aggression? No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 01:21, 3 December 2009 (UTC)

Part A of the resolution is only one sentence and both of the clauses that I quoted came from it.

The same sentence contains additional clauses that condemn Israel for aggression and says Israel's "continuing occupation violates the principles of international law". Part B is another long sentence which reiterates Part A and defines Israel's occupation as aggression:

Part A is all one sentence:

(a) a preambular clause which reiterated all relevant United Nations resolutions which emphasize that the acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible under the Charter and the principles of international law. It also said Israel must withdraw unconditionally from all the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem.

(b) Clause 5. which Condemned Israel's continued occupation of the Palestinian and other Arab territories, including Jerusalem, and said it is "in violation of the Charter of the United Nations, the principles of international law and the relevant resolutions of the United Nations, and demands the immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of Israel from all the territories occupied since June 1967;"

(c) Clause 8. charged Israel with aggression: "Condemns Israel's aggression, policies and practices against the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territories and outside these territories, particularly Palestinians in Lebanon, including the expropriation and annexation of territory, the establishment of settlements, assassination attempts and other terrorist, aggressive and repressive measures, which are in violation of the Charter and the principles of international law and the relevant international conventions;

Part B is all one sentence. It includes reiterations and a definition of aggression:

(a) Recalled its resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, in which it defined an act of aggression.

(b) Reaffirmed the fundamental principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force,

(c) Declared that the continued occupation and annexation constituted and act of aggression: "2. Declares ONCE MORE that Israel's continued occupation of the Golan Heights and its decision of 14 December 1981 to impose its laws, jurisdiction and administration on the occupied Syrian Golan Heights constitute an act of aggression under the provisions of Article 39 of the Charter of the United Nations and General Assembly resolution 3314(XXIX);

(d)Reaffirmed ONCE MORE the overriding necessity of the total and unconditional withdrawal by Israel from all the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, as an essential prerequisite for the establishment of a comprehensive and just peace in the Middle East;

I'll add the info on B(c) and B(d) regarding the essential prerequisites for the settlement.

harlan (talk) 22:28, 3 December 2009 (UTC)

I just noticed that this resolution doesn't mention 242. While I understand you're trying to pepper the article with as many references to the inadmissibility principle as you can, this article is about UNSC resolution 242. I don't think a resolution that doesn't even mention 242 belongs here. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 01:25, 4 December 2009 (UTC)

I haven't looked at the relevant diffs here, but it does look as if the later resolution does contain a clear reference to 242, even if it doesn't actually mention 242. It would be synth to try to draw conclusions about 242 from elements of the resolution that are purely about Golan, but I do not think it would be synth simply to note that principles set out in 242 were re-affiremed. --FormerIP (talk) 00:06, 6 December 2009 (UTC)

The fact that 242 was reaffirmed by later resolutions should certainly be noted in the article. Including quotes from later resolutions that don't specifically mention 242 seems excessive and doesn't really belong in a "context" section. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 01:11, 6 December 2009 (UTC)

The Resolution does contain references to 242

The resolutions of both the Security Council and the General Assembly regarding "the situation in the Middle East" are included by reference in each of the clauses which speak about "the relevant resolutions of the United Nations." For example, the Framework agreement included in the Camp David Accords had called for the establishment of an autonomous regime in the West Bank and stipulated that the settlement would implement all of the principles of UN Security Council resolution 242. There is a clause in UN GA 39/146 which complains that the territory is still occupied, and under Israeli control, and that the relevant resolutions of the United Nations have not been implemented. The minutes of the discussion held during the 101st meeting of the 39th session indicate that clause is a direct reference to resolution 242, 338, and the Camp David process that were included in response to suggestions made by the US Ambassador (more below).

The official title and subject of 242 and 39/146 are the same: The Situation in the Middle East. Including the majority viewpoint held by the members of the General Assembly on the applicable law and treaty obligations under the UN Charter regarding the same "situation in the Middle East" doesn't strike me as excessive in any way.

The official text of the resolution (from the UN Journal [21]) provides citations to the Secretary General's reports. Those were noted in the text of the resolution. Those reports were also discussed under the agenda item "the situation in the Middle East". That discussion is also mentioned in the preamble of the resolution. The minutes of that discussion are loaded with references to resolution 242. See A/39/PV.101, 27 Dec. 1984.

The reports from the Secretary General contained references to 242 among the comments collected from member states regarding the proposal for an international peace conference contained in this resolution. For example, the Secretary's report A/39/130-S/16409, 13 March 1984 contained a letter from the Representative of the United States to the President of the Security Council that said:

The United States believes firmly that the only path to peace in the Middle East lies in a process of negotiations among the parties based on Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, a process that the United States has sought vigorously and consistently to encourage, particularly in the Camp David Accords and in President Reagan's initiative of 1 September 1982. Holding an international conference as recommended by the General Assembly would only hinder this process.

This resolution notes that the US was obstructing the adoption of measures proposed by the other members of the Security Council in response to annexation of territory by Israel. When Ambassador Kirkpatrick vetoed the sanctions, she said "We believe that a good place to begin is, indeed, with the implementation of the resolutions of the Council. We believe that resolutions 242 (1967), 338(1973), and 497(1981) can serve as the basis for that constructive search. We urge the implementation of all three.S/PV.2329 (OR) That suggestion was somewhat illogical to the other members. She had just prevented the Council from enforcing the prohibition against acquiring territory by war that was contained in 242, while suggesting that the Council should implement it. 13 of the 15 members were so upset that they adopted UN Security Council resolution 500, calling for an Emergency Session of the General Assembly, so that it could exercise its own responsibility for maintaining international peace and security.

During the 9th Emergency Session, the General Assembly proposed an international peace conference and an arms embargo. The US tried to block adoption of those measures and, once again, tried to send the agenda item back to the Security Council for (in)action by suggesting that a settlement could ONLY be obtained by implementing the Security Council resolutions, not by adopting new approaches like the peace conference in the General Assembly:

As we have stated often the future of the Golan Heights, like that of all the occupied territories, can only be determined through negotiations pursuant to Security Council resolutions 242(1967) and 338(1973).

Resolutions like this one also mention the General Assembly's call for non-recognition. I'm definitely going to include a new subsection on that. harlan (talk) 14:55, 7 December 2009 (UTC)

39/164 does not mention 242. Your WP:OR on why you think "the situation in the Middle East" means the same thing in two resolutions that don't specifically reference each other is irrelevant to this article. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 16:22, 7 December 2009 (UTC)

It is only WP:OR if I make a claim that isn't in the sources. I didn't do that. The discussion by the Assembly and Secretary's reports did say that 242 was one of the relevant resolutions that had not been implemented and that it prohibited the unilateral annexation of the Golan.

I think it would be a WP:OR claim to say that 242 was somehow excluded from the references to relevant resolutions of the United Nations that had not been implemented, or all relevant United Nations resolutions which emphasized that the acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible. That claim would originate with you and Wikipedia, because the original sources contradict that. harlan (talk) 17:44, 7 December 2009 (UTC)

I did not say it was excluded, I said it was not mentioned or referenced. That's not WP:OR, that's plain English. Again, this is an article about resolution 242, not about the inadmissibility principle. I once again suggest you create an article about the inadmissibility principle and link to it from here. That way you could get all this information into the encyclopedia without taking over an article about something else. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 18:00, 7 December 2009 (UTC)

Context subsection

Lynk does discuss the three viewpoints. Steve you aren't citing the source that compare Lapidoth, Goldberg, Caradon, and McHugos positions. You are manufacturing a WP:Syth'd editorial about that.

McHugo wrote two articles on 242 that are both cited. In the one on the right-wing viewpoint he said: With respect, we would suggest that this interpretation is correct as regards withdrawal of armed forces, but should not be deemed to perfect any Israeli title to territory which was imperfect when Resolution 242 was passed. There is a confusion between the law of title to territory and the law of armed conflict which is a fudge at the heart of the Right-wing Interpretation. It is the ‘inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war’ in the preamble which recites the law on territorial sovereignty and imports it directly into the Resolution, not the Withdrawal Phrase. Resolution 242 does not ‘supersede the territorial formula in the Partition Resolution’.

The Partition resolution did not concern itself with the subject of secure borders. McHugo is correct that the law isn't superseded by a resolution, and that in any case the law has been imported directly into the resolution. If the preamble requires withdrawal to the partition line, as he suggests, and the withdrawal clause does not, that creates an internal inconsistency which renders the meaning unclear. harlan (talk) 18:38, 7 December 2009 (UTC)

WP:Synth

I moved this paragraph here for discussion. You can and should summarize or quote the individual sources. However you cannot say things on their behalf. You cannot say they agree with each other unless they said that themselves, or some other published source said that. You certainly can't say McHugo disagrees with Lynk and Orakhelashvili unless he said that. McHugo stipulated that "Resolution 242 does not ‘supersede the territorial formula in the Partition Resolution’ and he cited the law of title to territory and the law of armed conflict.

Unlike Lynk, McHugo, Lapidoth, Goldberg, and Caradon all regard the wording of the resolution to be clear. They also all agree where in the end Israel should withdraw to, namely secure and recognised boundaries agreed by negotiation. Israel had never had borders her neighbours were willing to recognise. Israel's Arab neighbours demanded the return of all their land captured in what they viewed as a war of aggression. As both Caradon and Goldberg noted, these demands were in fact complementary because provided agreement on Israel's borders could be reached, Israel would get secure and recognised boundaries whilst her neighbours would get all their own land (outside Israel's borders) back. As McHugo states such an agreement would be 'free from any illegalities', such as those raised by Lynk and Orakhelashvili. harlan (talk) 15:19, 8 December 2009 (UTC)

Hi Harlan. Yes I agree that the para is problematic. Firstly, all the sources may well agree that the wording is clear. However, this is very misleading, because they appear to disagree sharply about how the wording should be interpreted. It is particularly misleading if (as some recent versions have) you then quote one of the actors as if that is representative of all four (compare: The Pope, the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Chief Rabbi and the Grand Mufti all agree that there is one religion superior to all others. As the Pope puts it: "Catholicism is the bees knees").

Saying they all agree about "secure and recognised boundaries agreed by negotiation" isn't saying anything about how they interpret the Resolution, it's really saying no more than that they are all able to read.

Secondly the commentary added is not appropriate. The statement "Israel had never had borders her neighbours were willing to recognise" may be true, but it is used here as part of the construction of an argument, which is definitely a breach of WP:SYN. We need a source for the whole argument, we can't take bits from here and there and make them add up to a conclusion. --FormerIP (talk) 16:49, 9 December 2009 (UTC)

I agree with the above. Good example. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 17:44, 9 December 2009 (UTC)

Caradon's said that secure and recognized boundaries had nothing to do with geography or territory. His interpretation of the "obvious" meaning of the "balanced whole" has been misrepresented:

Q. By international consensus, what concessions would the Arab states have to make to Israel as part of an overall settlement?

A. Well, that's perfectly obvious if you read again the principles of 242, which have been accepted by Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Saudi Arabia, and in effect by Israel. The provision is that if there is an adequate withdrawal, all states in the area must be free to live within secure and recognized boundaries, free from force and threat of force. So it is an acceptance that Israel has a right to exist, just as the Palestinians have a right to their homeland, and have a right to exist. This is the essential bargain that we are proposing. It's not a new thing, it's been going since 1967. -- An Interview with Lord Caradon, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3/4 (Spring - Summer, 1976), page 147.

In 1967 he said 'If I had to sum up the policy, which has been repeatedly stated by my government, I would go back to the words used by the Foreign Secretary, in the General Assembly less than a month ago. These were his words: "I should like to repeat what I said when I was here before: Britain does not accept war as a means of settling disputes, nor that a State should be allowed to extend its frontiers as a result of a war. This means that Israel must withdraw. But equally, Israel's neighbors must recognize its right to exist, and it must enjoy security within its frontiers. What we must work for in this area is a durable peace, the renunciation of all aggressive designs, and an end to policies which are inconsistent with peace."'

harlan (talk) 15:45, 17 December 2009 (UTC)

Caradon quote

I just re-inserted a quote from Lord Caradon, which anon IP(s) have been deleting on the grounds that it doesn't say where and when the quote was made. However, the quote is footnoted to a book he published in 1981. Just posting here because by edit summary came out truncated. --FormerIP (talk) 16:30, 9 December 2009 (UTC)

It is quite misleading to state "Lord Caradon said" without specifying where and when or providing a link to the text in context. Accredited (talk) 18:44, 9 December 2009 (UTC)

I'm not necessarily saying you are wrong, but obviously WP is choc full of quotes without giving the time and place. What's different about this example? --FormerIP (talk) 00:00, 10 December 2009 (UTC)

This article has numerous citations to Caradon's remarks from the GWU Symposium on 242. It is a 60 page pamphlet, with chapters written by Caradon, Eban, and Goldberg. It is not a book. You can find it in many libraries, or via inter-library loan.

From page 13:
(b) Palestinian rights
The second criticism of the Resolution 242 is that the Resolution, while calling for a solution of the problem of the refugees, did not speak of Palestinian self-determination. But it is very necessary to remember that when we drew up Resolution 242 we all took it for granted that the occupied territory would be restored to Jordan.

From page 14:
(c) Jerusalem
There is a third main criticism of the 1967 Resolution. It is that no reference is made, in so many words, to the future of Jerusalem, and many would strongly and rightly maintain that without peace in Jerusalem there can be no peace in the Middle East. Why therefore did we not refer to the future of Jerusalem in the original Resolution? We all assumed that withdrawal from occupied territories as provided in the Resolution was applicable to East Jerusalem. This was not questioned at the time and has only much more recently been raised in fierce discussion. But, as I say, we who worked on the original Resolution, those who voted for it and indeed I think all concerned, assumed that withdrawal from occupied territories must include the area of Jerusalem which had been occupied by Israeli forces in the 1967 conflict.harlan (talk) 06:30, 10 December 2009 (UTC)

You had repeatedly posted Caradon's assertions at the Symposium. Furthermore, he did not say "insubstantial and mutually beneficial alterations." Accredited (talk) 10:51, 10 December 2009 (UTC)

The article had several quotes from the Symposium before I ever laid eyes on it. What is your point? Caradon and the UK government extended de jure recognition to the union of Arab Palestine and Transjordan. The clause in the resolution about "respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area" applied ipso jure to the West Bank of the Kingdom of Jordan.

Since you like having links you can read, here is one from "Conceived in Law: The Legal Foundations of Resolution 242, by Prof. Michael Lynk, Page 10" --Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1411698:

"This was not Caradon’s view. As he would later state, he was prepared to see some insubstantial and mutually beneficial alterations to the 1949 armistices lines, such as a re-alignment of the boundary at Latrun and Tulkarm to resolve some border awkwardness(footnote 30) ... ..*30 Caradon, supra [Lord Caradon, “Security Council Resolution 242”, in U.N. Security Council Resolution 242: A Case Study in Diplomatic Ambiguity (Washington: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 1981] note 27, at p. 13. Also see “An Interview with Lord Caradon” (1976), 5 Journal of Palestine Studies 142, at pp. 145-6."

I'm restoring the material you deleted. harlan (talk) 11:51, 10 December 2009 (UTC)

It already sounds like a broken record. Repetition unwarranted. Furthermore, It is particularly ludicrous to state that "the parties assumed" while his own Foreign Secretary George Brown said precisely the opposite. Accredited (talk) 14:01, 10 December 2009 (UTC)

You have provided a link to the Lynk article but not the Caradon interview. 79.178.42.55 (talk) 10:03, 11 December 2009 (UTC)

You may have noticed that CAMERA doesn't provide a link to the interview either. It is copyrighted, and not available online. harlan (talk) 11:08, 11 December 2009 (UTC)

CAMERA provided a quote of Caradon's own words: "We could have said: well, you go back to the 1967 line. But I know the 1967 line, and it’s a rotten line. You couldn’t have a worse line for a permanent international boundary. It’s where the troops happened to be on a certain night in 1948. It’s got no relation to the needs of the situation." There is no reason to believe that Caradon said at the same interview "insubstantial and mutually beneficial alterations." Accredited (talk) 10:49, 15 December 2009 (UTC)

Why is there no reason? It appears to be sourced. It looks, in any case, like partial quote as it provided by CAMERA is about a prospective settlement, not directly about 242 (because he refers to a "permanent international boundary" - it is clearly not his view that this was intended to be the outcome of 242). --FormerIP (talk) 11:26, 15 December 2009 (UTC)

Caradon did not say such a thing at the interview just as he did not say it at the symposium. It would be inconsistent with his numerous statements on the topic. Upon presenting Resolution 242 to the Security Council, Lord Caradon declared: "All of us recognize that peace is the prize. None of us wishes a temporary truce or a superficial accommodation. We could never advocate a return to uneasy hostility. As I have said, my Government would never wish to be associated with any so-called settlement which was only a continuation of a false truce..." Accredited (talk) 11:53, 15 December 2009 (UTC)

Yes, this makes his position reasonably clear with regards to a settlement, but he is also clearly not addressing the meaning of 242 in this quote. --FormerIP (talk) 11:56, 15 December 2009 (UTC)

I have restored this comprehensive quote to the context section so that you may be certain that he was indeed specifically addressing the meaning of 242. Accredited (talk) 12:13, 15 December 2009 (UTC)

Accredited you deleted the portions of the quote about returning the West Bank and Jerusalem that I cited verbatim above. Caradon damn sure did say that. There already was a cite to the Journal of Palestinian studies Interview with Caradon where he explained that the way to change the border without acquisition of territory by war was for both sides to negotiate the exchange of small parcels of land for the benefit of all. I've added a cite to Lynk, so that is not my personal interpretation. Caradon quoted British Foreign Minister Brown's policy statements for the record in the minutes of S/PV.1381 and the other representatives read them again during the 1382nd session. I notice you aren't quoting that official statement. harlan (talk) 14:33, 15 December 2009 (UTC)

Not really assured, Accredited. The fact that he talked about 242 on one occasion shouldn't really lead us to think that every time he spoke he was talking about the same. --FormerIP (talk) 15:04, 15 December 2009 (UTC)

(Outdent) Caradon had been in the Colonial Service and held several posts as District Commissioner in Palestine. He made it clear that the armistice lines were impractical because farmers had been cut off from their fields, but that "secure and recognized borders" had nothing to do with territory or geography.

Lynk cites "Interview with Caradon" from Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3/4 (Spring - Summer, 1976), pp. 142-152:

Q. The basis for any settlement will be United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, of which you were the architect. Would you say there is a contradiction between the part of the resolution that stresses the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and that which calls for Israeli withdrawal from "occupied territories," but not from "the occupied territories"?

A. I defend the resolution as it stands. What it states, as you know, is first the general principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war. That means that you can't justify holding onto territory merely because you conquered it. We could have said: well, you go back to the 1967 line. But I know the 1967 line, and it's a rotten line. You couldn't have a worse line for a permanent international boundary. It's where the troops happened to be on a certain night in 1948. It's got no relation to the needs of the situation. Had we said that you must go back to the 1967 line, which would have resulted if we had specified a retreat from all the occupied territories, we would have been wrong. In New York, what did we know about Tayyibe and Qalqilya? If we had attempted in New York to draw a new line, we would have been rather vague. So what we stated was the principle that you couldn't hold territory because you conquered it, therefore there must be a withdrawal to let's read the words carefully "secure and recognized boundaries." They can only be secure if they are recognized. The boundaries have to be agreed; it's only when you get agreement that you get security. I think that now people begin to realize what we had in mind that security doesn't come from arms, it doesn't come from territory, it doesn't come from geography, it doesn't come from one side dominating the other, it can only come from agreement and mutual respect and understanding.

Q. But how would one change the previous border without the acquisition of territory by war? Are you suggesting mutual concessions, that is, that both Israel and the Arabs would rationalize the border by yielding up small parcels of territory?

A. Yes, I'm suggesting that. And when the representatives of the four principal powers met together at that time in the United Nations after the 1967 resolution, we all agreed that what we had to do was to readjust the line to make it a reasonable line, instead of an unreasonable line, and that this could be done one way or the other.

Q. And that this should be mutually done, with mutual territorial concessions?
A. Yes, yes. To the benefit of all.

harlan (talk) 16:00, 15 December 2009 (UTC)

Lord Caradon speaks for himself. You are not his spokesman. As he said on Nov. 22, 1967: "All of us, no doubt, have our own views and interpretations and understandings. I explained my own when I spoke on Monday last. On these matters each delegation rightly speaks only for itself." Accredited (talk) 12:21, 16 December 2009 (UTC)

Caradon was speaking about his remarks during the 1381st session of the Security Council. It was held in New York on Monday, 20 November 1967, at 3:30PM. S/PV.1381(OR) and is available in the Journal of the United Nations:

• At paragraph 19. Caradon said "First on the policy of my government in the questions at issue, I have no hesitation in reaffirming what has been said by my Foreign Secretary and by myself on behalf of my government. Those statements are on the record. Our policy has been consistent and clear throughout.

• At paragraph 20 Caradon said If I had to sum up the policy, which has been repeatedly stated by my government, I would go back to the words used by the Foreign Secretary, in the General Assembly less than a month ago. These were his words: "I should like to repeat what I said when I was here before: Britain does not accept war as a means of settling disputes, nor that a State should be allowed to extend its frontiers as a result of a war. This means that Israel must withdraw. But equally, Israel's neighbors must recognize its right to exist, and it must enjoy security within its frontiers. What we must work for in this area is a durable peace, the renunciation of all aggressive designs, and an end to policies which are inconsistent with peace."

It is fairly obvious that you ask for citations, and when they were provided, you simply choose to ignore them. Caradon published explanations of his own remarks, and they are more than adequately cited by other published sources like Lynk. You haven't supplied any published source which says "Caradon never said such a thing", or excludes Lynk's interpretation. I'm going to revert your deletions. harlan (talk) 16:14, 16 December 2009 (UTC)

You chose to ignore Caradon's subsequent remarks just prior to the adoption of Resolution 242:

"Secondly, the draft resolution which we have prepared is not a British text. It is the result of close and prolonged consultation with both sides and with all members of this Council. As I have respectfully said, every member of this Council has made a contribution in the search for common ground on which we can go forward."

Furthermore, British Foreign Secretary George Brown had said:

I formulated the Security Council Resolution. Before we submitted it to the Council, we showed it to Arab leaders. The proposal said 'Israel will withdraw from territories that were occupied', and not from 'the' territories, which means that Israel will not withdraw from all the territories.

What does it make sense to add to the symposium repetitions "the parties assumed" the opposite? How can one ignore Caradon's assertion that "each delegation rightly speaks only for itself"? How can one mix part of the 1981 remarks with Lynk's interpretation of the 1976 interview and present it as a single Caradon statement? Caradon had described the 1967 lines as "rotten lines" and called for agreement on secure boundaries at the same interview. Accredited (talk) 19:02, 16 December 2009 (UTC)

Caradon explained that secure borders has nothing to do with territory or geography, so I'll add that to the article. President Johnson also said he was talking about a return to the 4 June 1967 situation. The United States told both the Soviets and Yugoslavia during the drafting process that there was no problem with the 4 June 1967 borders.

Brown and Caradon both stated that Brown's remarks to the General Assembly were a matter of record, and were the official policy of the British government. Brown's comments to the Jerusalem Post after he left office were not. Great Britain recognized the union of Arab Palestine and Transjordan on a de jure basis, but only recognized de facto control of Jerusalem. It bases its policy on a 1950 statement:

HMG’s formal position is based on the 1950 statement: it recognises that Israel exercises de facto authority in West Jerusalem and , from 1950 to 1967, recognised that Jordan exercised de facto authority in East Jerusalem. Since the war of 1967, HMG has regarded Israel as being in military occupation of East Jerusalem, and in this connection subject to the rules of law applicable to such an occupation, in particular the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949. HMG also holds that the provisions of Security Council Resolution 242 on the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the 1967 war applies to East Jerusalem.

The clause regarding territorial integrity applied to the West Bank of Jordan, and Caradon said so during the symposium. Brown said: "'All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State ...'. Here the words 'territorial integrity' have a direct bearing on the question of withdrawal, on which much has been said in previous speeches. I see no two ways about this; and I can state our position very clearly. In my view, it follows from the words in the Charter that war should not lead to territorial aggrandizement." He also said Israel could not expand its borders. harlan (talk) 19:51, 16 December 2009 (UTC)

Harlan, I think there is something wrong with what you are adding. Although it is not really very misleading as it is, I think it would be better to directly quote from the sources and cite them as they are relevant. For example:

• According to Lord Caradon: "We (those involved in drafting the Resolution) all assumed that withdrawal from occupied territories as provided in the Resolution was applicable to East Jerusalem". <ref name="ReferenceA"/> He also said that the Principle Powers supported mutual territorial concessions "to the benefit of all".<ref> “An Interview with Lord Caradon” (1976), 5 Journal of Palestine Studies 142, at pp. 145-6</ref>

An explanation of what Principle Powers is should be given (or, ideally by wikilink). I don't acutally know what it is. It is either the main WWII Allies (UK, Russia, France, US) or the main WWI Allies (UK, France, Italy, Japan). Although it seems less likely, it could be the latter, because of the San Remo conference.

I'd also note that he doesn't appear to mention the West Bank or use the word "insubstantial", so what you have been adding is a little loose in that regard.

Accredited, I don't think there is any valid general objection to what Harlan is trying to insert. It is a genuine representation of what was said (the above notwithstanding) and it is sourced. Your main objection seems to be that it doesn't chime with your understanding of Caradon's position. However, it is sourced. Perhaps your understanding is incomplete. You've posted a number of other quotes in which Caradon says various things, but none of them appears to be inconsistent with what Harlan wishes to include in the text. You need to either provide sources which directly undermine Harlan's contribution, or else just allow it. --FormerIP (talk) 22:08, 16 December 2009 (UTC)

FormerIP, I only supplied a few examples from "3 Shortcomings" here on the talk page. Caradon repeated those statements with slight variations a number of times to emphasize the points he was making. The article already cited Caradon's remarks about withdrawal from the West Bank. They appeared in section "2. Substance":

"It was from occupied territories that the Resolution called for withdrawal. The test was which territories were occupied. That was a test not possibly subject to any doubt. As a matter of plain fact East Jerusalem, the West Bank, Gaza, the Golan and Sinai were occupied in the 1967 conflict. It was on withdrawal from occupied territories that the Resolution insisted."

Abba Eban had a kitten over that remark. I think what is missing from the discussion is that CAMERA, Accredited, et.al are trying to suggest that Caradon supported the Israeli position or interpretation of 242 in the Security Council and in the GWU symposium. That was not the case, as Lynk and others have indicated. In his chapter of the GWU symposium, Abba Eban attacked Caradon's interpretation and recollections. Eban said that Caradon's memory had become faulty. Lord Caradon was granted permission by the GWU sponsors to write an annex with additional material under a "Right of Reply" heading that responded to Eban's attack. As I recall, that is where he cited corroborating policy statements made by other officials. Many said the resolution required a total withdrawal, some like the U.S. had said any territorial changes would be insubstantial. No one said Israel had "the right" to retain the occupied territory. McHugo noted that many people would be horrified to learn their words were being used out of context in order to support a position which would appear to give Israel a right to acquire parts of the occupied territories. In any case, it is inappropriate for Wikipedia to use the neutral voice of the article to suggest that Eban and Caradon held compatible views, and supported each others' interpretation of the resolution.

I had the pamphlet on loan a while back and transcribed some of its contents when Steve was discussing it under a previous thread. That extract is here. [22] There are also extracts online in Palestine and the law: guidelines for the resolution of the Arab-Israel conflict, By Musa E. Mazzawi [23]

I did not reproduce all of the material from (3) Shortcomings. There were additional comments about withdrawal in both the Palestinian rights and Jerusalem subsections. The Powers are the Permanent members of the Security Council who could veto any resolution. Here is the concluding comment from the Jerusalem subsection: But, as I have said, when we passed the unanimous Resolution in 1967 we all assumed that East Jerusalem would revert to Jordan. East Jerusalem, as a matter of fact, had been occupied in the 1967 conflict and it therefore plainly under the terms of the Resolution came under the requirement for Israeli withdrawal.

Caradon and Charles de Gaulle both said that the requirement for a restoration of Arab territory was necessary to the settlement of the refugee problem: It has been said that in the Resolution we treated Palestinians only as refugees, but this is unjustified. We provided that Israel should withdraw from occupied territories and it was together with that requirement for a restoration of Arab territory that we also called for a settlement of the refugee problem.

In his letter to David Ben-Gurion dated 9 January 1968, French President Charles de Gaulle said that he was convinced that Israel had ignored his warnings and overstepped the bounds of moderation by taking possession of Jerusalem, and so much Jordanian, Egyptian, and Syrian territory by force of arms. He felt Israel had exercised repression and expulsions during the occupation and that it amounted to annexation. He said that provided Israel withdrew her forces, it appeared that it might be possible to reach a solution through the UN framework which could include assurances of a dignified and fair future for refugees and minorities in the Middle East, recognition from Israel's neighbors, and freedom of navigation through the Gulf of Aqaba and the Suez Canal.

harlan (talk) 10:25, 17 December 2009 (UTC)

Harlan, whatever you put in needs to be sourced. If there are better sources, then use them instead. But you can't quote him as saying things that are not in the source you cite. You also can't put your interpretation of his position and present it as reported speech (that would be WP:SYN). You are right that Caradon does not support the Israeli position. All you need to do is pick the quote that best represents that. --FormerIP (talk) 10:47, 17 December 2009 (UTC)

You did not answer my questions while you continue to ignore Caradon's statement before the vote that the draft resolution is not a British text and that each delegation rightly speaks only for itself.

You wish to add to the article another 1981 symposium repetition that "Lord Caradon said that the parties assumed that withdrawal from occupied territories as provided in the resolution was applicable to East Jerusalem."

However, you make no mention of his conclusion: "but I am quite sure that if we had attempted to raise or settle the question of Jerusalem as a separate issue at that time our task in attempting to find a unanimous decision would have been far greater if not impossible."

You also insist on inserting "the West Bank" and mixing Lynk's interpretation: "insubstantial and mutually beneficial alterations" but not Caradon's words on the "rotten" 1967 line and his stress on "agreement" at the same 1976 interview. Accredited (talk) 18:28, 19 December 2009 (UTC)

This is completely unwarranted and quite inappropriate. Make up your mind. Amend or delete it. Accredited (talk) 18:30, 20 December 2009 (UTC)

You are trying to delete verbatim quotes from the Journal of Palestine Studies "Interview with Lord Caradon" and the restatement of British policy against expansion of borders by war and territorial aggradizment that was delivered twice during the Security Council discussions. There is nothing left to discuss on that material. It is properly sourced and is going to be included. harlan (talk) 05:17, 23 December 2009 (UTC)

Lord Caradon and his quotes appear no less than eight times in this article. Am I the only one who finds this a bit much? With all due respect to the guy (who's name is wikilinked 4 times, as if a reader wouldn't get it the first time), he is one representative of one country. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 10:41, 23 December 2009 (UTC)

The British negotiated the adoption of the resolution

The Foreign Relations of the United States documents the fact that Ambassador Goldberg could not draft a resolution that was acceptable to all of the members of the Security Council. In Document 467. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson, McGeorge Bundy said "Goldberg is no longer the ideal negotiator." Ambassador Goldberg subsequently reported on numerous private meetings with Caradon in which he asked the UK representative to draft the proposals and negotiate agreement with the other members of the Security Council.

Glenn Perry, Musa Mazzawi, George Brown, John Norton Moore, and Arthur Lall all said that Caradon not only negotiated the adoption of the resolution, he even stage-managed statements made by the other delegates to prevent a Soviet or USA veto. The USSR, Bulgaria, Ethiopia, France, India, Mali, Brazil, Argentina, and Nigeria all made statements on the record that they thought Israel was required to withdraw from all of the occupied territory. McHugo notes that of the other states on the Security Council, Canada, China, Denmark, Japan and the USA made no statements on the record, which touch directly on the meaning of the withdrawal phrase.

Glenn Perry says "The absence of any rejection of the "full withdrawal" interpretation was the result of a behind-the-scenes agreement. Until November 22, there was uncertainty whether the United Kingdom would expressly reject any clarification of the meaning of the draft, in which case the Soviet Union was prepared to veto it. According to Lall:

A crucial meeting took place at 3 p.m. [on November 22] between the Arabs and Caradon. He was able to reassure them that their position on the question of withdrawal remained unprejudiced. Further negotiations followed between Parthasarathi [the Indian representative] and Caradon which involved also the French and Nigerian delegates. As a result of these late exchanges Caradon agreed to delete from his proposed response to the Indian delegate's projected statement the words "But the Indian interpretation is not binding on the Council." On this basis Parthasarathi decided to vote for the resolution and so informed the Soviet Union. See Security Council Resolution 242: The Withdrawal Clause, Glenn Perry, Middle East Journal, Vol. 31, No. 4 (Autumn,1977), pp. 413-433, page 429

The Indian delegate said the resolution required Israel to withdraw from all the territories. He quoted George Brown's statements on British policy, which set out British rejection of the practice of territorial aggrandizement and which said that Israel could not expand its borders as a result of the war. Caradon said we stand by our declarations. Mazzawi quotes the statements made by Brown in the monthly magazine "Middle East" in May 1978. Brown said they had arranged beforehand for the Indian delegate to make that statement, and also that they would not respond so that interpretation of the policy would remain on the record.

In the same interview Brown said "It would have been impossible to get the Resolution through if the words "all" or "the" were included. But the English text is clear. Withdrawal from territories means just that, nothing more, nothing less. The French text is equally legitimate. In the French translation the word "des" is used before territories, meaning "from the", implying all the territories seized in the '67 war. The Israelis knew this. They understood that it called for withdrawal with only minor border changes from the old frontiers - just to straighten the lines. I told the Israelis they had better accept it, because if they didn't they could be left with something worse, and with our version there would be something to argue about later." See Palestine and the law: guidelines for the resolution of the Arab-Israel conflict, by Musa E. Mazzawi, Ithaca Press, 1997, ISBN: 0863722229, page 209. harlan (talk) 14:40, 23 December 2009 (UTC)

I really don't know what you think that wall of text proves. To be quite honest and blunt, I'm getting tired of reading your endless quotes which are usually only tangential to the issues being discussed.

Caradon was instrumental in the drafting process. Acknowledged. Why is he quoted 8 times in the article? No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 14:56, 23 December 2009 (UTC)

Your personal opinion about Caradon leaves me underwhelmed. In addition to his remarks, I'm citing verifiable published accounts and analysis written by others. I'd be happy to remove the long quotes about straightening or rationalizing the borders, those remarks were subject to much shorter British policy statements that were actually recited during the Security Council sessions, and they have been summarized by Brown and Caradon in much fewer words.

McHugo complains that statements by many statesmen are being misused to make it appear that Israel has the right to retain occupied territory. Perry says those sort of statements are not conclusive. He cites more than a hundred pages of statements by Goldberg, Rostow, Brown, Caradon and others that were cataloged by John Norton Moore: "Subsequent statements by particular statesmen who were involved in the drafting and passage of the resolution (e.g. George Brown and Lord Caradon) are not conclusive, particularly when they contradict what they said during the UN debates in 1967. For several statements in this category, see John Norton Moore (ed.), The Arab-Israeli Conflict, Volume II: Readings (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974. pp. 1024-1144. For example, Goldberg told the other members of the Security Council that their positions on withdrawal would not be jeopardized by the text of the resolution. But after the resolution was adopted, he adopted a very different position. harlan (talk) 16:10, 23 December 2009 (UTC)

Harlan, I agree with NMMNG about the quotes. The issues here seem to me to be quite specific, so it isn't helpful to anyone to throw down so much text on tangental points each time you post.

I think it is fairly obvious that there are two keys things that Caradon thought, with respect to his interpretation of 242. (1) that Israel had no entitlement to retain territory it had captured in the Six-Day War; (2) that the Resolution did nothing to enforce or reify the pre-1967 boundary, which should be modified by negotiation (this had been the British position ever since 1948). These two things are not contradictory, so that quotes supporting (1) do not undermine (2) and vice-versa. More to the point, the article should not be made to read as if either point is undermined by the other. The problem at the moment is down to attempts to shore up one or the other viewpoint as if they are in conflict. We just need a short quote to support (1) and a short quote to support (2). We do not need any additional quotes brought in with an unspoken "...however, this appears to be contradicted by...".

(This is all slighltly complicated by the fact that much of the article is in a terrible state, but one step at a time is best).--FormerIP (talk) 16:26, 23 December 2009 (UTC)

I agree. Caradon's position was that Israel was not entitled to the territories it captured and that the borders could and probably should be modified through negotiations, expecting relatively minor modifications. Now if we can put that in a way that is acceptable to everyone, we could use refs or footnotes for the actual quotes and start cutting down the clutter in the article. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 17:42, 23 December 2009 (UTC)

That's odd, I suggested that approach in the section regarding misuse of quotes above, but Accredited and NMMNG restored deleted material sourced to remarks made by Sisco and Caradon. I pointed out that the voice of the encyclopedia is making editorial remarks, including comments Brown reportedly made to the Jerusalem Post, but it was decided to leave those in the article.

Accredited deleted a short statement made by Foreign Minister Brown from the Context section. Those remarks actually were recited for the record during the 1381st and 1382nd SC sessions by Caradon and Parthasarathi as part of a negotiated deal to secure acceptance of the resolution by the USSR. They represented the official position of the British government on land for peace and recognized borders. The quote by Brown that I've got there now is very relevant and adequately sourced. harlan (talk) 19:36, 23 December 2009 (UTC)

You are completely missing the point. This article is quickly becoming a quote farm. Lets work out wording we can all agree too and move the excessive quotes (not only the ones you don't like) to the ref or footnote section. No More Mr Nice Guy (talk) 23:51, 23 December 2009 (UTC)