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I rewrote this:
- "The Imperial Japanese Navy developed a counter-plan to allow the US Fleet to sail across the Pacific while using submarines to weaken it. The Japanese fleet would then attempt to force a battle against the US fleet on territory that was favorable to it after the US fleet had been weakened."
To this:
- "The Imperial Japanese Navy developed a counter-plan to allow the Pacific Fleet to sail across the Pacific while using submarines to weaken it. The Japanese fleet would then attempt to force a battle against the U.S. in a "decisive battle area", near Japan, after inflicting such attrition. This is in keeping with the theory of Alfred T. Mahan, a doctrine to which every major navy subscribed before World War Two, in which wars would be decided by engagements between opposing surface fleets[1] (as they had been for over 300 years). It was the basis for Japan's demand for a 70% ratio (10:10:7) at the Washington Naval Conference, which would give Japan superiority in the "decisive battle area", and the U.S.'s insistence on a 60% ratio, which meant parity.[2]
- "Both IJN planning, and ORANGE, failed to notice technological developments in submarines and aircraft had made Mahan obsolete. ORANGE
- "Later, the U.S. achived total dominance with her carrier task forces, a mobile strike force[3] Japan could not have dreamed of.
- "Moreover, by their obsession with "decisive battle", IJN would ignore the vital role of antisubmarine warfare.[4] Germany and the U.S. would demonstrate this with their submarine campaigns against merchant shipping, ultimately choking Japan's industrial production."
and added these:
- ^ Mahan, Alfred T. Influence of Seapower on History, 1660-1783. Boston: Little, Brown.
- ^ Miller, Edward S. War Plan Orange. Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute Press, 1991.
- ^ Willmott, H.P. Barrier and the Javelin. Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute Press, 1983.
- ^ Parillo, Mark. Japanese Merchant Marine in World War 2. Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute Press, 1993.
Trekphiler 01:47, 12 February 2007 (UTC)
- Mostly that is correct however Japan demanded a fleet 70% of the size of the US and British navies. The 5:5:3 ratio was imposed in the treaty over Japan's loud protests. There is a lot more to this however. Japan wanted a fleet equal to that of the US and it was part of the reason that Japan withdrew from the London Naval treaty of 1936. Further, when the US looked at a Pacific war with Japan the requirement for a campaign was that a series of bases for repair and resupply be set up across the pacific. So when it was laid out as to the number of landing ships, equipment, air forces needed, tanker requirements, freighters, and all the rest, the cost was staggering to a nation only just recovered from the Great Depression. So obviously the US couldn't afford such a war (it could and actually did so) so War Plan Orange was developed. Japan had a bad case of institutional blindness going as well. Militaries have always had a bad case of fighting the last war and Japan's wasn't much different. Their plan was to have another battle of Tsushima in the Sea of Japan with a whittled down US Fleet. Multiple war games had been run over the years in the Japanese Navy and the true results were that the IJN lost every exercise. The inability to predict the time and place of the US fleet's arrival being the spoiler. The results were then adjusted to show the IJN victory. Tirronan (talk) 02:38, 4 July 2017 (UTC)
Additional Popular Culture
editIt might be worth writing up Avalanche Press' strategy wargame "War Plan Orange"