Template talk:Campaignbox Yom Kippur War

How come the only battles mentioned are the ones with Israeli victory ?

Isn't this biased ?213.6.110.253 (talk) 11:37, 20 November 2008 (UTC)

These are the battles on which articles were created, AFAIK. -- Nudve (talk) 11:40, 20 November 2008 (UTC)

Operation Badr

I used the term Operation Badr to replace the term: "The Crossing". Operation Badr is more accurate as it was the term used by Egyptian commanders during the planning of the attack. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Sherif9282 (talk • contribs) 20:06, 7 January 2009 (UTC)

I've studied the Yom Kippur War -known for Arabs as 6th of October War- from both Egyptian and Israeli perspectives and point of views and I've come to some conclusions considering that Israel's success was "The Gap" or "The Israeli Pocket" and the Israeli forces west of the Canal.

From the Egyptian point of view: My sources: "Sadat's diaries" Egyptian president by the time of the war and "El-Gamasy's diaries" Egyptian Field Marshall by the time of the war.

From Sadat's diaries, he recorded a conversation with Henry Kissinger and it was as following:

"Sadat: Henry, I'm not asking the Israelis to go back to the East of the canal but, I want them to go back to the 22nd of October line. That was our agreement by the time of the cease-fire so, either they go back to it or I'll bring it back by force.

Kissinger: Why go for a battle?

Sadat: Because the Israelis think that they're scaring us with this gap and I'm not ready to eliminate October War's results actually, I will not let that happen. Do you know the situation of my forces and their forces in the gap?

Henry: Yes, I know. Then Henry got a satellite photo out of his pocket and he said: Before coming to you, I asked the Pentagon for the situation so they gave me this photo which has: 400 ISRAELI TANKS AROUND IT 800 EGYPTIAN TANKS AND YOU HAVE APPROXIMATELY A MISSILE AND A HALF FOR EACH TANK BESIDES THE SAM UMBRELLA...YOU TRULY CAN ELIMINATE THE GAP WITH THESE FORCES."

Then the rest of the conversation Sadat basically asked about America's position and the result was an agreement between Sadat and Kissinger to eliminate the gap diplomatically. The rest of the Egyptian generals basically said the events that happened during the war but none of them denied Egyptian military victory.

From El-Gamasy's diaries, he gave the very final results of the war by saying.... "...It was necessary for the Israeli command to secure their forces west of the canal in a limited area of land; And that by invading more land with the result of pushing more forces west of the canal.

The conclusion was a strategic position not so good for Israel: 1) Israel had a huge force (6-7 Brigades) in a very limited area of land, and surrounded from all directions either by natural obstacles or industrial obstacles or Egyptian forces which put them in a weak military position. Above that, they had to experience difficulties for sending supplies and evacuating the wounded forces, the length of the supply lines and the daily loss of personell and equipment. 2) to secure those forces, the Israeli command sent (4-5 brigades)to protect the entrance by the gap."

From the Israeli point of view: My sources: "David Elazar's diaries" Israeli chief of staff and "Moshe Dayan's diaries" the Israeli minister of Defence by the time.

David El-Azar said in his diaries:

"...I don't want to talk about the gap that our army created west of the canal because the Israeli street man now knows very well that it's only meaning was a trap by the Egyptian army to continue the bleeding from the Israeli blood vein."

Moshe Dayan in his diaries:

"The cease-fire remained only on paper. And not continuing the cease-fire was not the only feature about the Southern border, the period between 24th of October and the 18th of January had a lot of possibilities for the combat to be renewed. And there were 3 plans behind this possibility 2 from Egypt's side and 1 from Israel's side. There was an Egyptian plan to attack our forces west of the canal from Cairo's direction. The 2nd one was isolating our bridgehead by connecting both the 3rd and 2nd army on the eastern side. Both plans were going to happen while huge targeted artillery being fired on our forces that were not fortified which was going to cause us severe losses. So, the possibility that was put was that Israel was going to pull back to the east of the canal to spare the lives of it's soldiers which is a sensitive matter to Israel. Egypt had by that time 1700 tanks on the front lines of both fronts, 700 on the East side and 1000 on the west side. Also on the west side there were 600 tanks as a 2nd defensive line to protect Cairo. And they also had more than 2000 cannons, 500 planes and at least 190 SAM batteries around our forces to prevent any air support."

Golda Meir does mention the war in her diaries but she said she's not going to talk about it militarily but it will only be about a "nightmare" that she lived and it's memory will remain with her for her entire life.

Which was confirmed in Henry Kissinger's diaries "Years of Upheaval" "The Golda Meir who arrived in Washington on Oct. 31 was a different person from the leader who had so confidently, even cockily, told Nixon a few months earlier: "We've never had it so good." The war had devastated her; Israel's 2,000 dead were the equivalent of 150,000 dead in the U.S., and she suffered with every bereaved family. In that psychological condition she had to guide her people into a new environment."

So, according to the sources that are stated above from both sides of the conflict; by the end of the war, the Egyptian military was in a better position and literally surrounding all Israeli troops west of the canal while Egypt itself was still in the east of the canal strongly holding what they could achieve. David Elazar the Israeli chief of staff said on 3rd December 1973 "Sharon still continues his irresponsible declaration to journalists trying to lessen the role of other leaders to appear as an unique champion, although he knows well that our crossing to the western side of the canal caused too much losses. However, we could not, along ten days of fighting, overcome any of Egyptian armies. The second army resisted and prevented us ultimately to reach Al-Ismailia city. As for the third army, in spite of our encircling them, they resisted and advanced to occupy, in fact, a wider area of land at the east. Thus, we can not say that we defeated or conquered them"

Thus, I more than just humbly ask whoever can edit this article by editing or correcting the section on the very right to be as following:

"Date: 6th of October 1973- 25th of October 1973 (officially) War continued on Egyptian front until "Disengagement of Forces agreement" on 18th of January 1974 signed by Egypt and Israel"

Location: Both banks of the Suez Canal, Golan Heights and surrounding regions. Result: Egyptian military victory and a UN cease-fire after UNSCR 338, 339 and 340, leading to the Geneva Conference and the Sinai Interim Agreement. Political and strategic gains for Egypt and Israel."

If this is the wrong section to post this, I ask you to please show me where I can post this.

Cites: 1)Sadat, "Search For An Identity" P.305 Arabic Edition 2)Elazar, "From General Elazar's diaries" P.150 Arabic Edition. 3)Dayan, "Story of My Life" P.337 Arabic Edition. 4)Kissinger, "Years Of Upheaval." Time 119.9 (1982) 5)El-Gamasy, "October War 1973" P.435 Arabic Edition Many thanks! JAN94OCT73 (talk) 05:43, 4 August 2012 (UTC)

References

Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 6 October 2023

Change the section International front to the following 2A04:EE41:4:45A6:8855:4024:FEAD:E778 (talk) 12:00, 6 October 2023 (UTC)

International front

• United States strategic to Israel
• Soviet strategic airlift to Egypt and Syria
• 1973 Arab oil embargo

 Not done for now: Per WP:EXISTING, red links should normally be avoided in navigation templates. —TechnoSquirrel69 (sigh) 05:39, 7 October 2023 (UTC)