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Tom M. Girdler
Tom Girdler testifying before the U.S. Senate in 1937.
Born	Tom Mercer Girdler (1877-05-19)May 19, 1877 Silver Creek Township, Clark County, Indiana, U.S.
Died	February 4, 1965(1965-02-04) (aged 87) Easton, Maryland, U.S.
Occupation(s)	Chairman of the Board, President, and Chief Executive Officer, Republic Steel
Years active	1901-1956
Spouse(s)	Mary Elizabeth Hayes (1903-1917; her death) Clara Edna Astley (1918-1924; divorced) Lillian Compton Snowden (1924-1942; divorced) Helen Rita Brennan (1942-1964; her death)

Tom Mercer Girdler (May 19, 1877 — February 4, 1965) was an American steelmaking executive who was Chairman of the board of directors of Republic Steel from 1929 to 1957, and President of the company from 1930 to 1937. He is well-known for turning the Jones and Laughlin Steel company town at Aliquippa, Pennsylvania, into quasi-police state (derided as "Little Siberia") in the 1920s. He led Republic Steel through the Little Steel strike of 1937, coordinating the resistance of Republic Steel, Bethlehem Steel, Youngstown Sheet and Tube, and Inland Steel against a union organizing drive led by the Steel Workers Organizing Committee. From 1941 to 1945, he also served as Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of both Vultee Aircraft and Consolidated Aircraft, and merged the two companies into Consolidated Vultee Aircraft. During this time, his aircraft companies designed and built the B-32 heavy bomber, which Girdler named.

Early life and education

Family and early years

Tom Mercer Girdler was born on May 19, 1877, in Silver Creek Township, Clark County, Indiana, to Lewis and Elizabeth Tracy (née Mercer) Girdler. He was named for Dr. Tom Mercer, his maternal grandfather, a physician who assisted his mother in delivering Tom in the family farmhouse. Tom had two older sisters, Jennie and Kate, and in time would have two younger brothers, Lou and John. His father's family were originally Gauls from France. Sailors and ship captains, they emigrated to the Isle of Guernsey in the English Channel before relocating to Marblehead, Massachusetts in the 1600s. Girdler later claimed his grandfather joined the nascent United States Navy at the age of 14 to fight in the American Revolutionary War, and rejoined the Navy to serve as a ship captain during the War of 1812. A great-uncle, he said, fought in the Continental Army during the American Revolution, and nearly all of Girdler's male relatives had fought in the American Civil War. His mother's family was English, and the family could trace its arrival in America to John Upham, who emigrated from England to Weymouth, Massachusetts, in 1635. By the mid 1800s, there were numerous Girdlers and Mercers in Massachusetts.

Lewis Girdler was originally from Buffalo, New York. His older sister, Jenny, married a Canadian, Dexter Belknap. During the American Civil War, the Louisville and Portland Canal was rebuilt by the firm of Bartin & Robinson. Belknap, an employee of the company, took his wife and moved from Buffalo to Louisville, Kentucky, where he established two cement manufacturing plants and became wealthy. Lewis Girdler moved his family to southern Indiana, across the Ohio River from Louisville, and managed one of Belknap's cement plants. He also bought a small farm near Sellersburg, where he raised hay and other fodder for the horses and mules used by the plant and bred trotting horses. The Girdlers were well off enough to pay a teenaged girl to assist in the home and had more than enough to eat, although Girdler said his family struggled to make ends meet. Tom began attending public school at the age of six, and he and his brothers worked on the farm and (later) at the cement plant when school was not in session.

When Tom was 14, the Girdler family moved to Jeffersonville, Indiana, a town directly across the Ohio River from Louisville. Tom's older sisters attended a private finishing school in Louisville, while Tom entered the eighth grade at the Lloyd and Chestnut Public School. He entered duPont Manual Training High School in Louisville, walking across a bridge over the Ohio River every day. The Girdlers were Episcopalians, and at 17 Tom became a "licensed lay reader" (authorized to lead services in the absence of the rector). Girdler's Aunt Jenny, who inherited her husband's businesses in 1894 after his death, was rich and childless and had often said she would help the family. As Girdler's high school graduation neared, the family began to discuss sending him to college. His mother was an advocate for Purdue University, while his father pushed for him to attend Boston Tech (later known as the Massachusetts Institute of Technology). His Aunt Jenny suggested that he attend Harvard University.

Education

Girdler claimed that the family was not wealthy enough to send him to college, so after graduating from high school he spent a year teaching at duPont Manual High School. He earned no money from it, but received a year of college-level industrial training for free. He earned money by teaching stationary engineers math and physics on the side. At the age of 19, Aunt Jenny told Girdler that he should enroll at Harvard. Girdler, who wanted a degree in mechanical engineering, announced he was going to enroll at Lehigh University (noted for its engineering program). Aunt Jenny relented, and Girdler enrolled at Lehigh in the fall of 1897. Jenny Belknap paid for his tuition.

Girdler was a popular student at Lehigh. He joined the glee club, edited The Brown and White (the school's twice-weekly newspaper), and joined the Beta Theta Pi fratemity. During his first summer vacation, he returned to Louisville and worked in the cement plant his father managed. Each summer thereafter, he returned to work in the plant, but now his father left him in charge. He seriously considered enlisting in the United States Army when the Spanish–American War broke out in April 1898, but his mother persuaded him not to do so. The summer after his junior year, through a school friend, Girdler got a job at the Sandy Hook Proving Ground of the U.S. Army, near Sandy Hook, New Jersey, measuring the projectile velocity of new artillery pieces. Girdler graduated from Lehigh in 1901 with a bachelor's degree in mechanical engineering.

Early steel career

With the assistance of a fraternity brother, Girdler obtained a position selling industrial and home heating and blowing equipment in London, United Kingdom, for the Buffalo Forge Company. His salary was $12.50 ($458 in 2023 dollars) a week, and he lived in a shabby room in a boarding house. Girdler found the atmosphere in Britain to be oppressive and the population dour, and he returned to the United States in March 1902. Cadwallader "Cad" Evans Jr., another of Girdler's fraternity brothers, was the nephew of James Oliver, owner of the Oliver Iron and Steel Corporation. With the assistance of Cad Evans, Girdler found work as a shop foreman in an Oliver steel nuts-and-bolts plant in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. One day, Girdler said, he spotted a man leaving work 10 minutes early. The 5-foot-9-inch (1.75 m) tall Girdler confronted the taller, more muscular man, attacked him, and beat his head against the brick floor until the man was unconscious. Girdler's supervisor did not punish him for the attack, and the man refused to return to work. Girdler was promoted to plant superintendent the following year.

Sensing that Oliver Iron and Steel was not investing in new methods of steel production, Girdler left the company in 1905 and took a position as an assistant superintendent of the nut, bolt, and spike mill at the Minnequa Steel Works of the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company in Pueblo, Colorado. Shortly after the birth of his daughter Jane in August 1905, he moved into the assistant superintendent position at the rail mill. The job required him to work half the week at night, and half during the day. Ill from lack of sleep and losing weight, he nearly quit before the company transferred him to the assistant superintendent job in the the merchant mill in May or June 1906. He spent just two years in Colorado.

Assistant general manager Joseph A. Durfee, under whom Girdler worked, left Colorado Fuel to become manager of the Atlanta Steel Company. Durfee offered Girdler the superintendent job at Atlanta Steel's rolling mill in June 1907, and Girdler accepted. His salary was $300 ($9,810 in 2023 dollars) a month, and within six months of his arrival he was named general superintendent of Atlanta Steel—overseeing all steel manufacturing throughout the firm. In 1908, shortly after being promoted, unionized workers at Atlanta Steel went on strike. Girdler personally recruited enough strikebreakers to fill two railroad boxcars. These workers kept the plants going, and the strike was broken. Girdler almost lost his life at the plant when a malfunctioning direct contact condenser nearly sucked him in. Girdler claimed that the plant was one and a half times bigger then when he arrived, and more profitable and better organized than ever before.

After seven years in Atlanta, however, Girdler felt he was only working on the periphery of the steel industry, as Atlanta was remote from the great steelmaking centers of Cleveland, Pittsburgh, and western Pennsylvania. The Jones and Laughlin Steel Company (J&L) had built a 500-short-ton (450 t) modern blast furnace at the hamlet of Aliquippa, Pennsylvania, in 1909, added two more in 1910, and a fourth in 1912. Four open hearth furnaces, a blooming mill, a tin mill, a wire mill, and a nail mill were finished in late 1912. Coke ovens and a steel and iron rod mill were finished by 1916. Collectively, these were known as the Aliquippa Works. Jones and Laughlin Steel also purchased 1,500 acres (6,100,000 m²) of land (some of which belonged to an abandoned amusement park) near Aliquippa in 1909 and constructed a 1,200-home company town on the site. After a friend alerted Girdler to an opening at the Aliquippa Works, he sent a telegram to plant general superintendent Fred Hufnagel asking for the job. After traveling to Aliquippa and pressuring Hufnagel for a position, Girdler won the job and was appointed his assistant in March 1914.

Jones and Laughlin Steel

One of Girdler's jobs was to run the company town. Girdler immediately imposed what he himself described as a "benevolent dictatorship". Jones and Laughlin corporate executives believed that a moral worker was a hard worker, and Girdler claimed that no gambling places or brothels ever emerged in the town. He also claimed that the company ensured that the elected city council was free from corruption.

About 1916, Girdler was promoted to assistant general superintendent.

Aliquippa and "Girdlerism"

Historians argue that J&L's company town was one of the most extreme social experiments of the 20th century, one that "test[ed] the limits of paternalism and conformity." The townsite was a deep valley with six hills on each side. Twelve small communities (called "plans" by the company) were built on the slopes of each hill. A different racial, ethnic, or social group was assigned to each plan: Serbs and Croats in one plan, Dutch and English in another, African Americans in another. Mid-level managers had their own "plan", as did upper-level managers. Each community was "deliberate[ly] and effective[ly]" cut off from its neighbors by this topography, heightening class and ethnic tensions and keeping the workforce divided.

Employees at the Aliquippa Works were required to register as a member of the Republican Party, and those who supported the Democratic Party were denied jobs. Political allegiance was enforced every election day, when J&L officials bused all residents, regardless of age or citizenship, to the local polling place and demanded that they vote Republican. Only J&L managers and loyalists were allowed to run for the town council.

J.A.C. Ruffner managed town affairs for Girdler. Ruffner was chairman of the local Republican Party, was a director of the town's only savings and loan and both of the town's banks, and acted as the tax collector for the city and the local school district. Ruffner also published the local newspaper, which advocated only Republican policies and was virulently anti-union. The paper frequently ran front-page boxed stories identifying union supporters or union organizers and warning residents to avoid them.

Most of the houses in Aliquippa were owned by J&L, and workers who resisted company policies would be fired and lose their homes. Jones and Laughlin Steel owned the water company, the electric company, the bus system, the streetcar system, and the railroad serving the town. The company owned all the buildings on the town's main street, and businesses could rent space from J&L only if their owners agreed not to criticize the company. Clothing, toiletries, and consumer goods could only be purchased at the J&L-owned Pittsburgh Mercantile Company. This store only sold items on credit, and accepted no legal tender; payments were deducted from workers' paychecks.

Contrary to Girdler's claims, historians say that the company town was plagued by extensive crime, with murders fueled by blood feuds. There were numerous bars, brothels, and gambling houses. Massive slag heaps blocked the view of the Ohio River. The Aliquippa Works were so large and so powerful that windows in homes near the plant rattled continuously. The plant generated such immense amounts of soot (known as "black sugar") that porches had to be swept twice a day to prevent it from building up. The blast furnaces were so numerous and powerful that the light they put out made it hard to tell night from day.

Girdler took the Aliquippa experiment even further, creating a virtual police state in the town. In 1916, Hufnagel hired Harry G. Mauk, a former Pennsylvania State Police trooper, to be chief of the Jones and Laughlin Police. Although this force had existed since the plant began construction, historian Richard C. Cortner says Mauk turned it from a simple plant security unit into a professional police force. Mauk put the J&L Police into uniform, gave them sidearms, and had them deputized as members of the Aliquippa Police. The main role of the J&L Police was to root out any unionism attempt among the workers. Mauk reported primarily to J.A.C. Ruffner, who also supervised Mike Kane, Aliquippa's chief of police and a local magistrate. Aliquippa police functioned as an arm of the J&L Police: Jones and Laughlin funded the Aliquippa police department, and vacancies in the local police department were filled only from the ranks of the J&L Police. The focus of the J&L Police was the company town, not the plant. They carried their weapons in their hands, to intimidate workers.

An extensive network of spies and informants was established throughout the plant and the town whose main goal was to root out any information about union organizing. Informants and spies were planted in local church congregations, as customers and staff in bars, and as members of social clubs. Every block in town had at least one informer, reporting back to management about suspicious gatherings or rumors about labor organizing. Aliquippa police would visit the home of anyone suspected of nonconformity to company policies, and anyone who persisted in resisting was beaten. A system was established to monitor suspicious behavior, with each incident receiving a point. Too many points, and a worker would be fired or run out of town. Even talking freely or too openly was seen as suspicious, and often led to a raid on one's home by the J&L or Aliquippa police. Aliquippa Police Chief Mike Kane rode about town on a motorcycle, breaking up gatherings of two or more people. Whenever he became aware of a suspicious meeting in a home, he used his motorcycle to break down the door, ride into the room, and shout, "Break it up, you Hunkies!" J&L Police raided homes without search warrants, and seized any literature they found (no matter how innocuous or unrelated to union activity). Any plant worker found carrying a union card was brutally beaten by J&L Police, and the J&L and Aliquippa police attempted to bar all known union organizers from entering the town. Anyone unknown or suspicious arriving via train would be met at the station and questioned. Those suspected of union organizing activity were beaten and put on the next train out of town. Union staff caught in town were arrested by the Aliquippa Police, charged with suspicious activity, questioned, and searched. Mauk worked closely with his good friend R.B. Spencer, an FBI agent, to secure federal complicity in J&L's anti-union activities. Mauk and others defined the free exercise of association and freedom of speech as seditious, criminal, and an incitement to riot.

Steel industry executives praised Aliquippa as "the perfect company town". To union organizers, it was known as "Little Siberia", because the union was frozen out there. Girdler's approach to labor-management relations became known as "Girdlerism".

Rise at J&L

Girdler was an extremely competent and effective plant manager. When the demand for steel skyrocketed during World War I, he was the manager most responsible for helping Jones and Laughlin Steel meet this demand. In 1920, Girdler was promoted to general superintendent at Aliquippa. Early in 1924, he was appointed general manager of all of J&L's plants, mines, and other properties, with a particular focus on Aliquippa and the SouthSide Works in Pittsburgh. The following year, Girdler hired Rufus J. Wysor away from Bethlehem Steel and made him his assistant. Wysor was promoted to Vice President in charge of operations and appointed a director of the company in January 1926.

Girdler later said that stockholder Andrew Mellon wanted Girdler as president in 1926, but that company co-owner Benjamin Franklin Jones, Jr., wanted his son, Benjamin Franklin "Frank" Jones III, in that position. Frank Jones being too inexperienced, company treasurer Charles A. Fisher was installed as president instead. Girdler felt Fisher's appointment was nothing but a stop-gap, and he chafed under what he believed was a "ceiling" placed on his corporate ascendancy. Girdler was appointed to the J&L board of directors' executive committee in May 1927. But on Sunday, January 1, 1928, Benjamin Franklin Jones, Jr. died. With Jones dead, the J&L board was less willing to put Frank Jones in the president's chair. William Evans, J&L's general counsel and a member of the company's board of directors, opened negotiations on behalf of the board on January 2 to secure Girdler's services as as president. Evans asked Girdler to delay by two weeks any decision to resign. Girdler demanded an offer by the end of the day. George M. Laughlin, Jr., William L. Jones, Jr., and Ledlie Laughlin—heirs of the company's founders and some of the largest stockholders—visited Girdler that afternoon and urged him to stay. Late that afternoon, Evans offered Girdler the presidency. Girdler demanded a major increase in salary, compensation in the form of large amounts of stock, and options to buy more stock. Evans balked, but Girdler demanded an answer by Thursday, January 4 (the day after Jones' funeral). The board grudgingly agreed to his demands at the deadline. Fisher retired and Girdler was elected president of the firm on January 12, 1928. His salary was $100,000 a year ($1,800,000 in 2024 dollars).

Role in the Republic Steel merger

Eaton group's early consolidations

There was rapid consolidation in the steel industry in the 1920s, much of it led by Canadian American investor Cyrus S. Eaton. Eaton entered the utilities field in Canada in 1907, obtaining bank loans and purchasing natural gas and electric utilities, merging them, and achieving large profits through economies of scale. In 1912, Eaton settled in Cleveland, Ohio, and joined the investment banking firm of Otis & Co. He became a partner in the firm in 1916. At the urging of a friend, shipping magnate Harry Coulby, Eaton (through Otis & Co.) began acquiring troubled steel companies. He purchased a controlling interest in the financially troubled Trumbull Steel Co. in 1925.

In April 1926, Otis & Co. formed a new investment company, Continental Shares, whose purpose was to acquire stock in various steel companies. Eaton owned half the company, the shareholders of the iron mining firm Cleveland Cliffs the other half.

In July 1926, Eaton acquired the United Alloy Steel Corporation, the Central Steel Co., and the United Furnace Co., and combined them to form and incorporate the Central Alloy Steel Corporation. He also began buying stock in the Republic Iron and Steel Company, and by early 1927 had won control of four seats on the company's board of directors. Eaton then began buying shares in the Youngstown Sheet & Tube steel company in 1927. In 1928, Eaton merged Trumbull Steel with Republic Iron and Steel, and Trumbull Steel purchased Sheet & Tubes, Inc. Central Alloy Steel acquired Interstate Iron & Steel Co. in 1929. By September 1929, Eaton had won a controlling interest in Donner Steel. In 1929, Donner Steel purchased the Witherow Steel Corporation. In 1930, Trumbull Steel merged with the Union Drawn Steel Co.

Eaton's connection with Girdler

Eaton was also interested in Jones and Laughlin Steel. He was aware that Girdler was unhappy at J&L, and approached him in the summer of 1927 to ask him to run Republic Iron and Steel (with an eye to overseeing the much larger steel company Eaton would assemble in the next few years). Girdler told Benjamin Franklin Jones Jr., about Eaton's overtures. Girdler turned Eaton down shortly after these discussions began, feeling that too many of Eaton's steel properties were outdated or needed expensive repair. Eaton asked to meet Girdler for breakfast in Cleveland on January 1, 1928, to discuss Eaton's latest offer: The chairmanship of Republic Iron and Steel. It is unclear what Girdler's reaction was to Eaton's new offer, but he and Eaton agreed to continue talking. Leaving the meeting, however, Girdler learned of Jones' death from heart failure, and he told Eaton all negotiations would have to end for the time being.

On February 5, 1928, The New York Times reported that Eaton was interested in purchasing and merging a number of smaller, independent steel companies to create a large steel conglomerate based in the Midwest. The newspaper repeated this claim in April 1929, noting that the merger most likely would involve Youngstown Sheet and Tube, Inland Steel, Republic Iron and Steel, and Central Alloy Steel. When Eaton formed Continental Shares a few days later, it was widely seen as a move toward achieving this goal. Donner Steel was now seen by the press and industry observers as part of the merger.

On May 31, 1929, Eaton and William G. Mather organized a holding company, The Cliffs Corporation, ostensibly to own and control the Cleveland Cliffs mining company and align its interests with Eaton's steel interests. The true purpose of the holding company, however, was to acquire control of steel manufacturers. Eaton controlled about half of The Cliffs Corporation.

In a surprise move, on October 21, 1929, Tom M. Girdler resigned as president of Jones and Laughlin Steel. He convinced Rufus Wysor to leave with him. The reasons why Girdler left J&L are, in part, unclear. According to Girdler, he had spent the better part of the last 20 months attempting to persuade the Jones and Laughlin board of directors to merge the company with Eaton's steel interests. The J&L board refused, even though (according to Girdler) J&L did not have the financial resources to invest in plant and equipment and thus remain competitive in the steel industry, and J&L would soon lose market share to the vast steel corporation Eaton was assembling. Girdler says he resigned after it became apparent he was leading a dying business. He joined Eaton's effort because Eaton, Mather, and Edward B. Greene (a Cleveland banker and, after 1933, president of Cleveland Cliffs) assured him he would be chairman of any merged steel company. Eaton, Girdler later said, was instrumental in getting him to resign. But sources at the time as well as modern historians believed that Girdler had been engaged in double-dealing—mismanaging Jones and Laughlin Steel to make it easier for Eaton to purchase, passing insider information about J&L to Eaton so that Eaton could gain a competitive advantage vis-à-vis the company, and generally acting as Eaton's agent (not the agent of the J&L board of directors). The Plain Dealer newspaper in Cleveland reported in December 1929 that Girdler had been helping Eaton with mergers "since last summer" and even had an office at Otis & Co. These sources claim Girdler was forced out.

The same day that he resigned, Girdler "associated" himself with Eaton and his plans to create a large, merged steel company. Girdler devoted all his time to Eaton's merger plans from October 21, 1929, to April 8, 1930. Behind the scenes, he also began actively managing Donner Steel. Rumors that Jones and Laughlin Steel would immediately merge with Eaton's other steel companies gripped the steel industry as well as Wall Street, forcing J&L to issue a denial of these merger reports on October 24. On November 1, just nine days after leaving Jones and Laughlin Steel, Girdler was elected to the advisory board of Continental Shares. His salary was set at $100,000 ($1,800,000 in 2023 dollars) a year, an amount to be repaid by Republic Steel to Continental Shares once the merger was complete. When Cyrus Eaton appointed four new members to the Donner Steel board of directors on November 12, Girdler was among them.

Becoming chairman and president of Republic Steel

Rumors of a merger

Eaton's attempt to create a giant steel conglomerate was no secret. When Eaton gained control of United Alloy Steel in April 1926, the purchase was said to "put to rest" all talk of any additional mergers in the steel industry. But when Eaton merged United Alloy with the Central Steel Company in July 1926, The New York Times reported that this was but the first step in Eaton's long-term goal to create a massive steel conglomerate based in the Midwest. In January 1927, The New York Times reported that Eaton was focused on building a steel empire based on Youngstown Sheet & Tube, Republic Iron and Steel, and the Corrigan, McKinney Steel Company. These rumors were repeated in April 1927, although now the press reported that Republic Iron and Steel would be the firm leading the merger. Youngstown Sheet & Tube, Central Alloy Steel, Trumbull Steel, and Otis Steel were said to be involved in the merger talks in May 1927. Eaton was also reportedly purchasing large amounts of Youngstown Sheet & Tube stock in preparation for a merger, and when he won control of Repbulic Iron and Steel on May 20 the rumors only grew in intensity. The New York Times reported a "definite trend" toward steel company consolidation in the Midwest in October 1927, and in late November the companies involved were, again, said to be Youngstown Sheet & Tube, Trumbull Steel, and Central Alloy Steel. Eaton succeeded in merging Trumbull Steel and Republic Iron and Steel on November 25, 1927, and once more The New York Times reported that Eaton was planning a major steel conglomerate. Sources close to Eaton denied this, but the Times reported that Eaton's next goal would be to merge Central Alloy with Republic-Trumbull. Rumors about Eaton's big merger plans swirled again in January 1928. In April 1928, The New York Times said Eaton's plans involved Youngstown Sheet & Tube, Inland Steel, and Republic Iron and Steel, and that Eaton had substantial stock holdings in the former two firms.

For more than a year, merger rumors were quiet. But they swept Wall Street again in July 1929, and by September Eaton was said to be close to merging Republic Iron and Steel, Central Alloy Steel, and Inland Steel. Girdler's defection from Jones and Laughlin Steel to Eaton's investment team in October led to additional reports that an Eaton-led mega-merger was in the works. In mid November 1929, The New York Times reported that Eaton would lead Youngstown Sheet & Tube; Inland Steel; Corrigan, McKinney Steel; Central Alloy Steel; Otis Steel; Donner Steel; Interstate Steel; the Bourne-Fuller Co., and other companies in a massive merger effort to rival the size of U.S. Steel. These rumors were repeated on December 16, 1929.

Creation of Republic Steel

Eaton was clearly close to bringing his merger plans to fruition when Girdler quit Jones and Laughlin Steel. On December 17, 1929, Eaton announced that he had was merging the Bourne-Fuller Co., Central Alloy Steel, Donner Steel, and Republic Iron and Steel into a new company, which was named Republic Steel Corporation. Youngstown Sheet & Tube was to have been involved as well, but its chairman called off the merger in November. Girdler was named the chairman of the board of directors of the company at an annual salary of $175,000 ($3,100,000 in 2023 dollars) a year, while Elmer T. McCleary was named president. The merger was engineered by The Cliffs Corporation; Continental Shares; Pickands, Mather; Otis & Co.; and the M. A. Hanna Company. It was the largest merger in the steel industry since Bethlehem Steel merged with the Lackawanna Steel Company in 1922.

Rumors that Youngstown Sheet & Tube, Jones and Laughlin Steel, or some smaller independents would join the Republic merger soon followed. Neither company did so. In February 1930, The New York Times reported that Eaton had acquired Gulf States Steel Co. and would merge it with Republic Steel. The report was retracted a week later, when the newspaper admitted that Eaton was still battling the American Rolling Mill Company for control of Gulf States.

On March 4, 1930, a joint merger committee announced that it had received enough shareholder votes from the Bourne-Fuller Co., Central Alloy Steel, Donner Steel, and Republic Iron and Steel to effect the merger. The four-way steel merger was declared effective on April 8, 1930.

On April 22, 1930, Elmer T. McCleary died suddenly after abdominal surgery. Seven days later, Girdler was elected president and made a member of Republic Steel's executive committee.

In May, Girdler convinced Charles M. White to leave J&L and join Republic Steel as assistant vice president in charge of operations.

Early leadership of Republic Steel

Girdler took over Republic Steel just as the Great Depression was beginning. In his first two years at the helm of the corporation, sales fell from $144 million ($2,626,400,000 in 2023 dollars) in 1930 to $47 million ($1,049,600,000 in 2023 dollars) in 1932. Girdler's salary was reduced to just $117,420 ($2,800,000 in 2023 dollars) in 1933 and to $129,372 ($2,900,000 in 2023 dollars) in 1934. The press credited Girdler with keeping the company out of bankruptcy. Although Girdler struggled to improve results, the company ran a deficit until 1935.

In 1934, Corrigan, McKinney Steel approved a merger with Republic Steel worth $51 million ($1,161,600,000 in 2023 dollars). The deal added the Corrigan-McKinney Works in Cleveland, the Newton Steel Plant in Monroe, Michigan, and the N&G Taylor Plant in Cumberland, Maryland, to the list of Republic Steel's plants. Although initially the press believed that steel industry leaders had pressed Girdler to buy Corrigan, McKinney, the prime mover behind the deal was Oscar L. Cox of the Union Trust Company, a large Cleveland bank. The bank had loaned Corrigan, McKinney a large amount of money, and knew that if the company could not be bought out or otherwise saved, it would lose its money. Girdler also purchased Trussed Concrete Steel Company (better known as "Truscon Steel") for $8.6 million ($195,900,000 in 2023 dollars) in August 1934. The U.S. government sued Republic Steel, arguing that the Corrigan, McKinney merger violated the Sherman Antitrust Act, but the government lost the case in May 1935. The government did not appeal Republic Steel's merger with Truscon Steel, and that merger was consummated on September 23, 1935. Girdler remained chairman and president of Republic Steel once the merger with Corrigan, McKinney was finalized on September 25, 1935.

Republic Steel returned to profitability in 1935, and made $9.5 millionn ($208,600,000 in 2023 dollars) in 1936. The Plain Dealer newspaper called him "one of the smartest operating heads in the industry", noting that he had assembled a highly skilled group of executives, all of whom were devoted to Girdler. Although Girdler had dramatically increased Republic Steel's indebtedness, he had used $3 million ($65,900,000 in 2023 dollars) of this money to invest heavily in research into new steel alloys and steel manufacturing processes and upgrading plants, so that Republic Steel's plants were now considered superior to those of all the company's competitors. Despite the increased debt, Republic Steel was actually better off: Girdler refinanced all but $24 million ($527,000,000 in 2023 dollars) of the company's old debt at much lower interest rates, and created a $2.7 million ($59,300,000 in 2023 dollars) sinking fund to pay off Central Steel's debt. Girdler had also tightened the board's control of the company by buying up preferred shares (halving the number of outstanding shares) and highly diluting the amount of common shares.

Girdler began to pursue Gulf States Steel in January 1936, purchasing 15,000 shares in the company. Negotiations for a merger began, but did not result in a merger until February 1937.

Gridler also approved expansions in Republic Steel's manufacturing capacity. In late 1936, he approved the expenditure of $15 million ($329,400,000 in 2023 dollars) to build a rolling strip mill in Cleveland that employed between 1,500 to 2000 workers. He ordered another $3.5 million ($76,800,000 in 2023 dollars) to be spent building a tin plate factory in Niles, Ohio, and $1.25 million ($27,400,000 in 2023 dollars) to build a wire mill in South Chicago. The company also spent large sums to improve its steel strip mill in Warren, Ohio and its electrically-welded pipe mill in Youngstown, Ohio.

As a Republican, Girdler opposed President Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal legislative program. He called the National Labor Relations Act "dictatorial" and "vicious", and said it was designed to "unionize all industry and subject our plants to the domination of national labor unions." He categorically denied that Republic Steel's employee representation plans were company-dominated, and claimed that the company's labor relations were "eminently satisfactory to both sides." He attacked the legislation as an attempt to seize investments, saying, "I call it a bill to tie the hands of employers and turn industry over to the American Federation of Labor." He called legislation establishing the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission "a serious mistake", arguing that the bill went well beyond the regulation of speculation. He said the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 consisted of nothing more than "strangling regulation", and claimed it would place an "unbearable financial burden" on companies. He opposed legislation establishing Social Security, imposing a corporate income tax, and imposing an excess profits tax.

Labor relations

Girdler's opposition to labor unions was strong and unequivocal. Political scientist Irving Bernstein said that Girdler's philosophy toward labor relations consisted of "every man has a price and any man can be shaken by fear." Both public relations historian Karen Miller Russell and labor historain Robert Zieger have called Girdler "fanatically anti-union", while steel industry economist and historian Robert P. Rogers has been slightly less harsh in his assessment, and called him "militantly anti-union". Advertising historian John Bush Jones has called Girdler's union avoidance views rigid, unrepentant, and arrogant, and Ohio historian James L. Baughman described him as an "intractable union foe". Comparing Girdler to other steel industry executives, Berstein has written: "As a group, the steel master who ran these corporations were tough and violently antiunion... The most virulent of the lot, Girdler, emerged as the leader and 'Girdlerism' was soon to become the name of the most violent form of antiunionism."

Girdler's approach to labor relations at Republic Steel did not vary much from those he employed at Aliquippa, although he ceased to employ some techniques after the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 barred them. Espionage continued, with the company later admitting to spies working at its plants in Buffalo, Canton, Cleveland, Massillon, Warren, and Youngstown. Republic Steel's spying campaign against its own workers reached its height in 1936.

NAM, Y&K, ERPs, and AISI

National Association of Manufacturers

In early 1933, as word spread that the Roosevelt administration was working on a federal labor relations bill, various businesses sought to reorganize and revitalize the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) as a means of promoting the economic and workplace views of big business, primarily their aversion to union organizing. In early February 1933, Charles R. Hook, president of American Rolling Mill and chairman of the finance committee of the NAM, asked Girdler to underwrite NAM's union avoidance programs. Girdler agreed to do so, and on April 11, 1933, he became the first steel industry executive to subscribe to the program (giving $750 [$17,653 in 2023 dollars]). Girdler then took the lead in encouraging other steel companies to make contributions as well. After Frank Purnell, president of Youngstown Sheet & Tube, consulted with Girdler, he became the second steel industry executive to contribute to the NAM union avoidance fund (donating $500 [$11,769 in 2023 dollars]).

By the middle of 1933, nearly all major steel companies as well as the American Iron and Steel Institute were participating in the revitalized National Association of Manufacturers. Girdler also pledged that Republic Steel would donate $50,000 ($1,200,000 in 2023 dollars) annually for two years if NAM reorganized. Girdler demanded two changes: First, that NAM elect a highly regarded industrialist as its chairman, and second, that NAM employ an executive manager. Both conditions were met. Republic Steel became a leading member of NAM. The company also became NAM's 11th largest contributor, donating $42,050 ($900,000 in 2023 dollars) to NAM from 1933 to 1937 (more than any of the other top 15 largest steel companies). The firms that comprised "Little Steel" were the NAM's most influential financial backers, and Girdler subsequently became a leader within NAM, with responsiblity for the development and implementation of NAM's union avoidance program.

Hill & Knowlton

In early 1931, Girdler met John W. Hill while Hill (then an independent advertising consultant) was working for a previous client, Central Alloy Steel. They were introduced by W. Russell Burwell, nephew of Cyrus Eaton and president of Continental Shares. Girdler was so impressed with Hill that he retained him at the end of their first meeting. Republic Steel became John Hill's largest client.

In March 1933, Hill co-founded the public relations firm of Hill & Knowlton. Republic Steel was one of the firm's first clients.

Few steel companies had any press staff at the time. Girdler convinced six other steel companies to join Republic Steel in establishing a $100,000 account with Hill & Knowlton in March 1933.

In mid-November 1933, Girdler successfully pushed AISI to hire Hill & Knowlton as well. The initial deposit with H&K was $150,000 ($3,500,000 in 2023 dollars). The true extent of Hill & Knowlton's work for AISI is unknown (as records have not been retained), but it consisted of conducting research into the economic benefits of the steel industry, the negative aspects of unions and unionization, the mapping of a public relations campaign, the writing and issuance of press releases, and assisting steel companies with public relations. Hill also attended all meetings of the AISI board of directors.

full extent of H&K's work in the Little Street Strike is unclear Hill claimed that he counseled Little Steel to make a statement accepting unionism, But that ERPs would be effect in representaition H&K pamphlet for Republic attacked dues checkoff and closed shop

National Industrial Recovery Act and promotion of ERPs

Section 7(a) of Roosevelt's proposed National Industrial Recovery Act guaranteed the right of workers to form unions and banned yellow-dog contracts. As the legislation neared passage in the U.S. Senate late May 1933, Rufus J. Wysor, Republic Steel's vice president in charge of operations, suggested to Girdler that the company establish an Employee Representation Plan (ERP), a company-dominated "union" which provided only the sheen of employee participation and had little influence within Republic Steel. On June 12, 1933, the Republic Steel executive committee adopted an ERP, and from June 1933 to April 1937 the company spent $392,120 supporting the ERP ($9,200,000 in 2023 dollars). With the ERP, Republic Steel largely succeeded in preventing the spread of unionism within its plants.

Passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act on June 16, 1933, created a huge upsurge in labor union organizing.

Girdler made his views on unions public. He told the annual meeting of the AISI on May 24, 1934, that he adamantly opposed unions and union contracts. He praised company unions, and vowed to shut down Republic Steel rather than have any relationship with a union.

Girdler also worked hard to prevent passage of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), and denounced it repeatedly through the years after President Roosevelt signed the legislation into law on July 6, 1935.

In 1935, a split developed in the American Federation of Labor (AFL), the largest trade union federation in the United States, as to how best to organize workers under the new legal protections offered by the NLRA. On November 9, 1935, 10 unions of the AFL formed the Committee for Industrial Organization to more agressively organize workers using industrial unionism. The AFL ejected these unions on September 5, 1936, and they formed the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) on November 9, 1936. Girdler was a vociferous foe of the CIO, calling it "irresponsible, racketeering, violent, [and] Communist".

Leadership of the American Iron and Steel Institute

On May 27, 1937, Girdler became president of the American Iron and Steel Institute.

Robert P. Lamont on August 18 schwab to become chairman, the nominal CEO for all practical purposes, Lamont will rule Lamont was president of American Steel Foundries Lamont Heads Steel Institute Times Union Fri, Aug 05, 1932 ·Page 9

Lamont is president Lamont Named Head of Steel Institute The Buffalo News Fri, Aug 19, 1932 ·Page 1

Lamont resigned due to NIRA Steel Czar Quits His $100,000 Post The Buffalo News Thu, Sep 14, 1933 ·Page 5

AISI considering stting up a governing board Board May Govern Steel Institute in Place of Lamont The Buffalo News Wed, Sep 20, 1933 ·Page 29

Walter Sheldon Tower, of Bethlehem Steel, elected executive secretary Steel Institute Elects Tower Executive Sec'Y Times Union Thu, Sep 21, 1933 ·Page 8

AISI became more than just a statistics agency in 1933

AISI day-to-day operations overseen by Walter Tower, Max D. Howell US Steel, and Benjamin Fairless Jr. of Bethlehem Steel

Schwab to Quit Steel Institute The Buffalo News Thu, May 24, 1934 ·Page 37

age and health denunciation of unions by Girdler Schwab Quits as Steel Group Head Harrisburg Patriot-News Fri, May 25, 1934 ·Page 9

merger of Republic, Corrigan-McKinney, and Trucson catapulted Girdler Ex-Pittsburgh Man Ascending Steel's Throne The Pittsburgh Press Tue, Aug 28, 1934 ·Page 9

Eugene G. Grace, pres of Bethlehem Steel Girdler elected a VP Grace Elected Head of Steel Institute The Pittsburgh Press Thu, Dec 13, 1934 ·Page 41

Top men on the AISI board: Grace, Weir, William J. Filbert of US Steel, Frank Purnell, Tom Girdler, C.R. Hook of ARAMCO, L.G. Block of Inland

In 1936, AISI published its stand on unions

Grace, Tower, George Nathan Miller, Hoyt Moore of Cravath

Changes made: Moore became legal counsel of AISI

In May 1937, Hill talked to Girdler and White

Girdler was the unofficial spokesman of Little Steel

Little Steel seized control of AISI with Girdler election 27 may 1937

Republic spent $49,439 on munitions for a force of 370 men 552 revolvers, 64 rifles, 245 shotguns, 2,702 gas grenades

Girdler: Rather close plant than deal tiwh tunion Steel Shipments Best in 4 Years The Buffalo News Wed, Jul 11, 1934 ·Page 32

Tom Girdler elected to succeed him Labor Unrest Casts Shadow over Steel institute Meeting The Iron Age June 3, 1937 p 32 https://archive.org/embed/sim_chiltons-iron-age_1937-06-03_139_22

from 30 to 32 Directorate of Steel institute Expanded The Iron Age may 10 1934 43 https://archive.org/details/sim_chiltons-iron-age_1934-05-10_133_19

as meeting opened, board of directors changed the bylaws so that the president is new CEO of the organization only a two year term formerly, chief officer was chairmand of the board chairmand of the board abolished Grace is the first president under the new form of organization Girdler elected VP to succeed him Eugene G. Grace Elected President of American iron and Steel Institute The IRon Age December 20, 1934 p. 37 https://archive.org/details/sim_chiltons-iron-age_1934-12-20_134_25

Elbert Gary, head of US Steel, founder and president of the AISI from 1909 to 1927. His death in August 1927 led to significant change Charles Schwab now become president of AISI and the steel industry's most important executive schwab was alarmed by lower returns on capital investment, uncontrolled competition, excess plant and equipment, price wars, with Gary's demise, power in the industry shifted away from US Steel and toward the AISI, which now acted for the entire industry rather than reflecting only the views of Gary and US STeel Planning war, pursuing peace : the political economy of American warfare, 1920-1939 Paul A. C. Koistinen University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, Kan., ©1998 9780700608904 https://books.google.com/books?id=tXSrEAAAQBAJ&newbks=1&newbks_redir=0&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false 109

Domination of the AISI by the larger firms Corporatism and the rule of law : a study of the National Recovery Administration Author:Donald Robert Brand

Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1988

9780801421693 https://books.google.com/books?id=Vu2YDwAAQBAJ&newbks=1&newbks_redir=0&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false 329, fn 35

Tradition, Innovation, and Expertise: Writing the Steel Code for the National Recovery Administration Charles Cheape BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC HISTORY, Vol 25 no 2 Winter 1996 https://thebhc.org/sites/default/files/beh/BEHprint/v025n2/p0069-p0088.pdf pp 69-87

The fortuitously timed general meeting of the AISI in New York City in May 1933 permitted the heads of the nation's largest steel firms to initiate the industry's responses as the NlRA bill was making its way through Congress. On May 26, eighty-six top executives, including the heads of over fifty firms, gathered in anxious discussion about the pending law. Despite an assertion in the most recent analysis of the NlRA that steel was a proponent of the new law, industry leaders were definitely unenthusiastic and viewed the new program (in the words of the most detailed study of the steel code) "with caution" [Gordon, 1994, p. 172; Moody, 1965, p. 106; Fine, 1995, pp. 257-58]. Two months earlier, AISI president Robert Lamont had publicly criticized a bill for a government agency to help enforce industrial self regulation because he worried about "what industry might lose by getting tied in with bureaucracy." Like Eugene Grace, president of the Bethlehem Steel Corporation, Ernest Weir, head of the National Steel Corporation, and many other industry leaders, Lamont deeply opposed government in business and wanted only voluntary self-control. As steel's spokesman he urged only a government council composed of leading businessmen as advocated in the plan of Secretary of Commerce Daniel Roper [Galambos, 1966, p. 190; Scholes and Leary, 1994, p. 174; Moffett, 1932, p. 270; "Industrial," 1933].

Thus the steel industry moved forward not because of its enthusiasm for the NlRA but because of defensive concerns about disorganized markets and growing government power. Fears about the loss of individual firms' traditional dominion over wages and hours and over worker organization dominated the first meeting. Labor issues were the major subject of W.A. Irvin, the president of the U.S. Steel Corporation (the nation's largest steel company) and the first speaker after AISI president Robert Lamont opened the meeting. Furthermore, labor concerns and the organization of the writing of a code continued to resurface in the ensuing discussion. 71

Among all labor issues, steel manufacturers were especially frightened about labor unions [Fine, 1995, pp. 257-58, 261]. Any advance in organized labor was seen as a serious threat to an industry in which only 2% of the workforce were in independent unions. 72

So powerful were fears about the defense of traditional, individual company control of labor issues that the second major issue, the organization of manufacturing and trade practices, received scant attention. The slight was even more remarkable because Eugene Grace, as head of the industry's second largest firm, Bethlehem Steel, had followed Irvin at the meeting's beginning to present commercial regulations "as an opportunity" to organize the industry in order "to help ourselves and under the guidance and support of the Federal Government, to conduct our business commercial-wise on a fair and equitable basis." The potential of government support for control of price and production was virtually ignored until near the meeting's end 72

Meeting endorsed a centrally administered code authority while it also called for a group of confederated committees organized around traditional product lines and appointed from top executives running the firms or corporate divisions involved 73

Established in 1908, the AISI had played a central role in its early years by hosting the famous Gary dinners, where top steel men openly discussed agreements about stabilizing price and production in order to increase profits 73

After federal legislation, close scrutiny by government, and a major antitrust prosecution stopped such discussions, the organization stagnated. 73-74

By the late 1920s it played a limited, rather perfunctory role, collecting and publishing data on basic industry statistics and membership. The AISI sustained its predominant social function by hosting semiannual dinners that concluded a day-long gathering devoted to the presentation of papers. Recordkeeping was incomplete, the board of directors stopped meeting during the summer, and the annual business meeting was conducted by proxy. Though the society claimed over sixteen hundred members, it enrolled only ninety-four companies, scarcely one-fourth of the firms in the industry. 74

An attempt in 1932 to revitalize the association was stillborn. The board of directors created an executive committee and hired former steel manufacturer Robert P. Lamont as a full-time president to replace Charles Schwab, the semi-retired creator of Bethlehem Steel who had presided in a largely ceremonial capacity. Lamont resigned as secretary of commerce in the Hoover administration to join the AISI amidst considerable ballyhoo about fresh programs for public relations, product development, and promotion of new markets. The reform was ill-timed in the face of the depression, and Lamont and new AISI secretary George Charls (another former industry executive) produced no plans in the ensuing year [Newspaper clippings, September 14 and November 8, 1933]. In the spring of 1933 the organization was simply unprepared to play a central role in writing a code of conduct vital to the steel industry. Lamont's limited role at the May 26 meeting, where he served merely to introduce thr topic and the speakers and to moderate discussion, demonstrated that he was more a spokesman than an administrator and policymaker 74

Little Steel strike

The Great Depression, the "Little Steel strike" of 1937, and World War II were the three most important events to occur during Girdler's tenure at Republic Steel. Historian Ahmed White has argued that Gridler is the key to understanding the Little Steel strike, and White and public relations historian Scott Cutlip have argued that Girdler so deeply influenced the other heads of the Little Steel companies that he should be considered the leader of the steel industry's response to the strike. Girdler, Cutlip says, was also seen as the unofficial spokesperson for the group.

Girdler's union avoidance activities prior to the strike

The Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers (the AA) was a steelworkers' union founded in 1876. On June 30, 1934, Republic Steel declined to renew the AA's contracts at Republic's steel and iron works in Moline, Illinois, and Warren, Ohio. Anticipating a strike, in June 1934 the company bought $11,900 ($271,036 in 2024 dollars) worth of munitions. These included 24 riot guns, 236 gas grenades, 174 tear gas projectiles, 5,000 .38 caliber bullets, 500 .45 caliber shot cartridges, 500 .45 calber bullets, 101 revolvers, and 16 tear gas guns. Republic Steel was not alone in refusing to bargain. Almost one-quarter of the nation's steelworkers were about to strike at a large number of steel firms. On June 28, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order Number 6763, which established the National Steel Labor Relations Board. The board was given the power to investigate the labor relations crisis in the steel industry, hold hearings, subpoena witnesses and records, and issues recommendations. But it had no authority to enforce its orders. Once the National Steel Labor Relations Board began holding hearings into worker grievances, Republic Steel signed a contract with the AA.

Bolstering its position, the Little Steel companies next seized control of the executive committee of the American Iron and Steel Institute, and Bethlehem Steel president Eugene Grace was elected the AISI president for a two-year term beginning on January 1, 1935. Girdler was named the organization's vice president. By this time Girdler had clearly emerged as the leader of the anti-union effort among Little Steel executives, and the AISI began to bitterly oppose unionization among steelworkers.

From 1930 through 1937, Girdler ratcheted up the spying campaign against pro-union workers in Republic Steel's plants, with the spying campaign reaching a height in 1936. On June 7, 1936, the AA affiliated with the Steel Workers Organizing Committee (SWOC), a newly-established unit of the CIO. On July 2, 1936, Republic Steel issued a circular under Girdler's name in which he accused SWOC of being a front organization controlled by United Mine Workers president John L. Lewis; claimed most SWOC staff and many members were communists; asserted that the unionization drive wasn't intended to improve wages or working conditions but only to secure dues income to make Lewis wealthy; denounced SWOC as internally undemocratic; claimed SWOC was using force, coercion, and intimidation against Republic Steel workers; and threatened to discipline or fire anyone who disrupted the orderly function of the company (e.g., by supporting a union).

Named regional VP of NAM Girdler Named By Association Plain Dealer (Published as CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER) - January 23, 1937Browse Issues 10

Lead-up to the strike

On March 2, 1937, U.S. Steel—far and away the largest steel manufacturer in the United States, and colloquially known as "Big Steel"—signed a historic collective bargaining agreement with the Steel Workers Organizing Committee. The wage was raised to 62.5 cents an hour (a minimum of $5.00 a day), the eight-hour day was established, and workers received time-and-a-half pay for overtime. On March 17, this agreement was extended to all U.S. Steel subsidiaries and plants. By April 1, 59 other steel companies (most of them small firms) had signed almost identical agreements with SWOC.

But Girdler and other Little Steel executives saw the U.S. Steel agreement as a betrayal of deeply held principles.

"It is an open secret that the steel independents have felt all these weeks that they were sold down the river by Myron C. Taylor" Girdler and Weir are predisposed to resist now, rather than later when th issues will be closed shop and check-off "the organization is disposed to follow his leadership in labor relations." Weisman Russell The Week in Finance and Trade Plain Dealer (Published as CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER) - May 31, 1937Browse Issues 15

The day the U.S. Steel pact was announced, Girdler decided to bolster his position vis-à-vis SWOC by giving most workers at Republic Steel at 10 cent-an-hour pay increase that matched U.S. Steel's new wage rate. Girdler also implemented the eight-hour day and overtime rules established by the SWOC-U.S. Steel pact, and enhanced vacation time. On March 3, a meeting of all Republic Steel plant managers was held in Cleveland, at which time Joseph A. Voss, director of industrial relations for Republic Steel, and Charles M. White, vice president of operations for Republic Steel, reiterated that the company had no intention of signing a contract with SWOC and demanded that managers show their support. The managers voted unanimously to support Girdler's position. Girdler expanded the wage rise to all Republic Steel employees on March 11.

At a regularly scheduled meeting of the board of directors of AISI held shortly after the U.S. Steel contract was signed, Girdler said he would never sign a contract with any labor union. American Rolling Mill, Bethlehem Steel, Inland Steel, Jones and Laughlin Steel, National Steel, and Youngstown Sheet & Tube also resolved not to sign a contract. Later evidence uncovered by the La Follette Committee in late 1937 and in 1938 proved that the heads of Little Steel were collaborating and coordinating their efforts to oppose SWOC.

SWOC now began attempting to place pro-union steelworkers on the board of the employee representation plan at Republic Steel, and co-opt the body. SWOC had used this tactice successfully at U.S. Steel, and it was attempting to use it again at all the Little Steel firms. Although SWOC privately claimed it was successful at Bethlehem Steel and Jones and Laughlin, it had little success at Republic Steel. Girdler implemented a massive internal company propaganda campaign in early March aimed denigrating the CIO and improving support for its ERP. It held frequent mass meetings of its workers in every plant during which the company's propaganda line was reinforced. Still confident of success, however, SWOC sent a letter to Republic Steel on March 30 asking it to sign a contract similar to the U.S. Steel agreement. The letter reached Girdler on March 31, 1937, but he declined to answer it. Five days later, Girdler met with Rufus J. Wysor; Joseph A. Voss; Charles M. White; and Thomas F. Veach, counsel for Republic Steel. At this meeting, Girdler reaffirmed his decision not to sign any contract.

The legal environment for labor unions improved dramatically when, on April 12, 1937, the Supreme Court of the United States upheld the constitutionality of the NLRA in National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, 301 U.S. 1 (1937). The ruling also affirmed a decision by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) that Jones and Laughlin Steel had defeated a 1934 AA organizing drive at Aliquippa only by using "systematic terror".

Girdler resigned the presidency of Republic Steel on April 15. Cox Dale The Byproduct Plain Dealer (Published as CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER) - April 16, 1937Browse Issues 11

His long-time deputy, Rufus J. Wysor, was elected his successor.

Demands for bargaining

It's not entirely clear why Girdler and Little Steel decided to fight SWOC. Labor historian Walter Galenson has suggested that a major motivating factor was each executive's antipathy toward labor unions, especially that of the group's unofficial leader, Tom Girdler, whose anti-union animus was very powerful. Galenson also identifies the Recession of 1937–38 as a factor, as the recession (just beginning in the spring of 1937) left steel companies with excess product as well as the prospect of much lower revenues in the summer and fall. This provided the wherewithall for Little Steel to shut down plants (and still meet orders) while avoiding the financial impact higher wages and benefits would impose. Galenson also argues that SWOC appears to have made little headway in major steel towns like Canton, Massillon, and Youngstown, and Little Steel executives were not only aware of this but felt that the AFL's refusal to support the CIO would help split the labor movement and weaken SWOC even further. On balance, therefore, Little Steel felt it had a good chance of beating the strike.

On May 3, SWOC organizing director Clinton Golden sent a telegram to Girdler. He advised Girdler that Republic Steel's resistance to union organizing efforts was causing "widespread unrest" among the steel firm's workers. SWOC, he said, was urging the workers to stay at their jobs. But the time was swiftly approaching, he said, in which SWOC's efforts would be overwhelmed by this unrest. The only solution was to sign a contract.

Wysor and Girdler conferred about the telegram. SWOC had made inroads at all foru Cleveland plants (Trucson Steel, Corrigan-McKinney, Upson Works, and Steel & Tubes); 6000 workers SWOC sent Republic the US Steel contract on March 30 and asking for a date to be set for negotiations. Republic did not acknowledge it or respond to it Girdler to Tackle Threat of Strike Plain Dealer (Published as CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER) - May 4, 1937Browse Issues 2

Wysor and Girdler conferred by phone LPC, Part 34, 13875-77.

Girdler, however, focused on a key passage in the Supreme Court's ruling in NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel which said a company was only obligated under the law to bargaing in good faith. A company was not, the court said, under an obligation to sign a contract. Voss replied on May 5 that Republic Steel was under no obligation to sign a contract. Golden replied via telegram on May 6, sarcastically asking whether Voss intended to agree to a verbal contract.

Throughout the month of May and to the end of June 1937, Republic Steel armed itself for the strike. The company spent $49,439 for munitions for a force of 370 company police. This included the purchase of 552 revolvers, 64 rifles, 245 shotguns, and 2,702 gas grenades.

Nevertheless, SWOC met with Republic Steel officials on May 11, 1937, but the company refused to sign a collective bargaining agreement with the union. Girdler accused SWOC of attempting to impose a closed shop on Republic Steel, and he declared it Republic Steel policy never to sign a written collective bargaining agreement. Workers throughout Republic Steel were then required to attend a mass meeting at their place of work on the night of May 12, at which time plant managers addressed the crowds, denouncing the CIO and SWOC and praising the ERP for being successful and democratic. SWOC also met with Jones and Laughlin officials on May 11, who refused to sign a contract as well. The union then declared it would strike on May 12. Although J&L offered to sign a contract identical to the U.S. Steel contract, SWOC officials rebuffed them and 27,000 steel workers walked off the job. In Aliquippa, there was a virtual insurrection against town officials. Within 36 hours, J&L capitulated and agreed to sign a contract granting the union exclusive representation for all its workers. All signs indicated that the rest of Little Steel would capitulate to SWOC.

On May 16, SWOC said it would strike Republic Steel within 10 days if Republic did not sign a contract. Ernest T. Weir called for a meeting of Little Steel exeuctives at The Union League Club in New York City on May 17. Girdler attended the meeting, during which the group discussed the National Association of Manufacturers' union avoidance educational campaign.

On May 20, Girdler had Republic Steel's works in Massillon, Ohio, shut down and the employees locked out in order to avoid a strike there. SWOC had begun organizing workers at the Massillon Works in June 1936, and on July 2 a flier was sent out under Girdler's signature accusing SWOC of various nefarious activities. Union organizes were spied on, and workers followed. Plant managers threatened to fire SWOC supporters. Despite these tactics, only one in three Massillon workers agreed to be represented by the ERP. To prevent a successful strike, Girdler ordered the Massillon Works closed and the workers locked out. Although Girdler and other Republic Steel officials later blamed a bad generator, the NLRB found their rationale unsustainable given other testimony and evidence, and concluded Republic Steel was attempting to intimidate its workers.

In an NRLB-supervised election held on May 21, workers at Jones and Laughlin Steel voted 2-to-1 in favor of representation by SWOC.

The strike begins

The Little Steel strike began on May 27, 1937. That same day, the AISI held its annual convention in New York City. Girdler "seized control" of the AISI at this meeting, winning election as the AISI's president.

intense dissension over the election of Girdler, and it took three hours to elect him Grace Hints Fight in Girdler Choice Plain Dealer (Published as CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER) - May 28, 1937Browse Issues 2

In a speech widely reported by the media, Girdler declared, "I have a little farm with a few apple trees, and before spending the rest of my life dealing with John L. Lewis I am going to raise apples and potatoes." After the meeting, Girdler and Republic's executive vice president Charles White stayed in New York City to map out a strategy for beating the strike.

Violence broke out immediately at Republic Steel's Berger Works in Canton, Ohio. In the previous two months, Republic had purchased an armored truck, gas bombs, revolvers, and shotguns, and hired 125 security guards. On May 27, Republic brought in 63 strikebreakers to staff the plant and keep operations going. Company guards patrolled the streets of Canton with wooden and iron clubs, while company guards on company property openly displayed sidearms. That day, company guards charged and beat union members who had assembled a block from the plant. The attack was unprovoked, and 14 picketers were injured. On May 28, two contingents of company guards trapped a crowd of about 200 picketers and their supporters. The guards attacked using long-range and short-range gas guns, gas grenades, pistols, and steel pipes. During the unprovoked attack, the guards brutally beat several women with iron bars and launched a number of rounds of tear gas into the neighborhood. Fifteen people were injured, including several who received gunshot wounds. Republic Steel officials later took full responsibility for the May 28 attack. Girdler later admitted that "mistakes" were made at Canton, but said the only mistake made was to allow company security guards to leave company property to roam the streets.

In Massillon, Republic Steel worked to keep its Massillon Works and its Union Drawn Steel Company plant open. During the last two weeks of May, the company stockpiled 15 days' worth of food at the plant, purchased a number of cots for plant managers to sleep on, and retained 85 people (managers, salesmen, foremen, pro-company workers, and three cooks) at the plant on the night of May 26. On May 25, Republic Steel asked the Massillon Police Department to help it break the picket lines. The city mayor and police chief declined to do so. On May 26, Republic Steel plant managers and loyal employees established an allegedly independent Back-to-Work Committee to press for an end to the strike. A day or two later, the Massillon Chamber of Commerce established the allegedly independent Law and Order League of Massillon. On June 9, Massillon Police Chief Stanley W. Switter met privately with Massillon Works plant superintendent Carl Myers, and agreed to accept three shotguns, three gas guns, six combination gas mortar shells, and 90 gas shells. On June 14, Chief Switter and Massillon Mayor Henry Krier privately met with Law and Order League leaders. The League offered to hire 50 police officers on behalf of the city if the city would use them to break the picket lines. Krier said he would not employ them in this fashion. When Myers repeated this offer later that day, Krier again declined to accept. Myers threatened to close the plant permanently if Krier did not back down. On June 20, the Back-to-Work Committee met with the Law and Order League to map out a strategy to put pressure on . The following day, leaders of the Back-to-Work Committee and a mob of 300 stormed city hall, demanding that the city hire extra police and break the strike. Krier managed to calm the mob, which dispersed. But later that day, an agitated Krier and Switter met with Colonel Edward P. Lawlor of the Ohio National Guard to demand protection. Lawlor demurred, saying there was no need. The League delivered petitions to the mayor on June 25, claiming law and order had broken down and demanding to know why the mayor had refused the League's offer to pay for additional police. That night, Krier agreed to hire some additional police. On June 26, the the Back-to-Work Committee sponsored a rally of some 200 people outside the Massillon Works. Through a series of events, this swelled to several thousand people—loyal company workers, picketers and their supporters, and bystanders—and the situation was tense. Alarmed National Guard officers pleaded with Switter to break up the crowd before something happened, which he did. On June 29, the Back-to-Work Committee hired a crowd of men to appear at an event where "employees" could sign a petition to repoen the plant. Such "registration events" occurred daily until July 3. The Back-to-Work Committee also paid for full-page advertisements in the Massillon Independent newspaper on July 1 and 2. The League, however, had paid for nearly all this work and the advertisements. Although the Back-to-Work Committee claimed more than 2,200 employees had signed its petition, the LaFollette Committee discovered that the vast majority of signatures on the petitions were fraudulent. On the night of July 1, Governor Davey ordere the Ohio National Guard to invest Massillon. The National Guard took up living quarters inside the Massillon Works, and the plants reopened on July 2.

Tension increased in marked degree today in the steel strike in this area as pickets, armed with baseball bats and clubs, barred freight cars and food trucks from entering the property of the Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company and the Republic Steel Corporation. STEEL PLANT SIEGE IS BEGUN BY UNION LOUIS STARK May 30, 1937 1, 3

H&K's role in Little Steel strike is largely unknown RS retained tight, centralizwed control over its public realtions H&K proposed that RS plant managers establish friendly realtions with locak newspaper eidtors and reporters. In a sign of Girdler's intransigence, he refused H&K stationed staff at each of RS's plants to handle issuing of press releases Hill personally assisted Girdler in making statements to press, community and congreess RS paid 13,499, but Girdler claimed he'd only gotten a newsletter 9which had dgone to all Little Steel) LaFollette claimed H&K had sponsored most of the back to work movement, citizens' committees, and more LaFollette claimed H&K had sponsored most of the back to work movement, citizens' committees, and more

Not only was Girdler opposed to unionism within Republic Steel, he personally coordinated the response of "Little Steel" to the SWOC strike. SWOC fully expected "Little Steel" to sign contracts, as nearly every other steel firm had done. But

Girdler denied his home was being guarded by armed men Republic claimed operatinga at 40 percent Two Hurt in Strike Clash Plain Dealer (Published as CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER) - June 1, 1937Browse Issues Page: 1, 3

claimed Republic had laid in a store of weapons and ammunition years ago to prevent thievery "I have never seen John L. Lewis except at a distance and I hope to God I never see him." at first press conf since strike began, reiterated he would never sign a contract said Republic would obey the law, but not sign the same contract as US Steel did; claimed this would impose the closed shop said he would resort to the courts for an interpretation of the NLRA claimed Republic had hired no strikebreakers and that all guards were verteran employees not newly-hired refused to meet with James F. Dewey, federal conciliator claimed the four plants in Cleveland were closed due to threat of violence asserted most of the men in Chicago and guns and clubs Fullerton Spencer Always Had Guns On Hand, Girdler Says Plain Dealer (Published as CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER) - June 2, 1937Browse Issues 1, 4

On the morning of June 1, reporters filed into a room in the executive suite of the Republic office building in Cleveland where Tom Girdler was holding a press conference, an action which in itself was news. Surrounded by his chief aides, Girdler faced the reporters. Was it true, as Murray had charged, that Republic had stockpiled arms and munitions in anticipation of the strike? "I wouldn't say in anticipation of a strike. . . . 1 never knew a steel plant that didn't have guns and ammunition to protect its property and its employes," replied Girdler. Did the company still maintain its original atiitude toward the Carnegie-type contract offered by SWOC? "We won't sign a contract," replied the Republic chairman. What about a different type of contract? "We are not committed on anything else." One of the reporters then asked why Republic had not kept its Youngstown and Cleveland plants open. Vice-president White explained that the company had refrained from such action due to the fact that these plants were situated in more highly populated areas than the others. But, he quickly added, "We expect to open them when enough employes want to work and can get to work safely." Another reporter wanted to know whether the report that the Memorial Day marchers sought to invade the plant was based on anything more than an assumption. "I don't know. Most of them had clubs and weapons. . . . Maybe they were out to catch butterflies," quipped Girdler. Had there been any attempt to arrange a meeting between Republic executives and the head of the CIO? "No," snapped Girdler, "I have never seen John L. Lewis, except at a distance, and I hope to God I never do see him." gotschalk 184-185 cieveland Plain Dealer, June 2, 1937, 1; Youngstown Vindicator, June 2, 1937, 1; New York Times, June 2, 1937, 11.

shareholder lawsuit alleging misallocation of $1,000,000 for arms, ammo, and strikebreakers edward lamb is shareholder attorney Girdler on shareholder: "he's crazy" Report Republic Gets Men By Air Plain Dealer (Published as CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER) - June 2, 1937Browse Issues 4

Girdler met with Governor Davey Davey optimistic 1,500 men at Corrigan-McKinney attended union meeting Republic complained to USPO that no mail at Warren and Niles pickets at Girlder's home in Mentor Assail Use of Field Here By Strike Planes Plain Dealer (Published as CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER) - June 3, 1937Browse Issues 1, 14

airplanes dropped food to strikers occyping plants pickets barricaded plants, guarded bridges employer snipers shot at planes phalanzes of automobiles rushed picketers from place to place six killed in Chicago as pickets clashed with police Girdler sowre to quit before he signed a labor contract "hang Tom Girlder from a sour apple tree" 'LITTLE STEEL' REJECTS 'BIG STEEL' LABOR LEAD LOUIS STARK June 6, 1937 E7

SWOC began unionization drive aimed at Republic Steel's coal and iron Murray: "The moral guilt for the massacre in Chicago Sunday rests with Girdler and his associates." "bloodthirsty heads of Republic countenanced" "I'm not going to settle this strike until Tom Girdler signs an agreement." Fullerton Spencer SWOC Drives at Republic's Ore Plain Dealer (Published as CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER) - Friday, June 4, 1937Browse Issues 1

The next day, June 5, Tom Girdler wired James Farley: Local postmasters at Warren and Niles, Ohio claiming to be acting on instructions from your First Assistant have refused to accept staple food products for delivery through the United States mails. . . . Postmaster at Niles submitting mail packages addressed to these plants to inspection of C.I.O. organizers for approval as to acceptance and delivery. Sanctity of United States mails and authority of your Department being flagrantly flaunted. I protest this situation and request that you take steps to remedy it immediately. wail Hearings, 19.

post office denied mail being interfered with at niles and warren Girdler took issue with them Council Will Get Fight On Food Planes Plain Dealer (Published as CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER) - Sunday, June 6, 1937Browse Issues 1,

at Warren, Girdler hired airplanes to drop food to the loyal workers inside the plant

blamed outsider agitators for Memorial Day Massacre

The question arises as to exactly what Girdler and his attorneys were attempting to accomplish by their agitation of the mail situation in the Warren area. While there is not an abundance of documentary evidence available, the circumstances and the actions of the corporation suggest that Girdler was concerned about something more than the sanctity of the United States Mails. Probably a complex of motives was involved. First, by insinuating that SWOC was censoring the mails and by drawing public attention to the fact that there had been certain instances of interference with the mails. Republic hoped to embarrass the union. Second, it would be far less expensive to mail rather than to fly food into the Niles and Warren plants. But beyond this, the company seems to have wanted to force a mail crisis on the picket lines, apparently hoping that either the administration would adopt on its own initiative a policy approximating that of President Cleveland, or that Congress would put pressure on the Roosevelt administration to take some such a c t i o n . 1^2 Mail Hearings, passim.

Girdler agreed to send J.A. Voss, director of industrial relations, to a meeting with Governor Davey and SWOC Girdler: strike is not about hours, wages, or working conditions but merely our refusal to sign a contract with SWOC none of Republic's Cleveland plants operating David J. McDonald spoke to crowd of 3,000 17 Hurt, 14 Jailed In Strike Clash Plain Dealer (Published as CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER) - June 10, 1937Browse Issues 1, 6

John L. lewis claimed Eugene Graceof Bethlehem Steel was behind Girdler, managed Girdler's AISI campaign Girdler elected by one vote Buel Walker S. Lewis Swats Steel With Mine Strike Plain Dealer (Published as CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER) - June 14, 1937Browse Issues 1, 2

Gov. davey telgramed Girdler, demanding he meet Fullerton Spencer 'Sign', Is Roosevelt's Hint to Steel Firms Plain Dealer (Published as CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER) - June 16, 1937Browse Issues 1, 4

Girdler issued statement to all Republic workers, said he would never sign said a contract is a first step to closed shop and checkoff "communistic dictates" and "terroroism" State Policies to Steel Employes Plain Dealer (Published as CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER) - June 16, 1937Browse Issues 4

While their representatives were going through the motions of negotiations in Columbus, Girdler and Purnell were signing statements which reaffirmed their determination not to sign any CIO contracts. The two executives' letters, addressed to their employees, were identical in substance and tenor. The arguments set forth in justification of the companies' refusal to sign were essentially the same as those previously invoked in negotiating sessions and statements. The CIO was characterized as an irresponsible organization, incapable of enforcing contractual obligations entered into by its affiliates. And once again aversion to the closed shop vfas cited as a major objection to formal relations with the CIO, although now it had become necessary to shift the argument concerning this issue on to somewhat new ground. Murray's willingness to accept Davey's seven-point formula as a basis for negotiations had come dangerously close to destroying the companies' contention that a CIO contract was the prelude to the closed shop and the enslavement of the workers by John L. Lewis. Consequently, it was necessary to point out that even if SWOC agreed to renounce the closed shop management could not afford to sign, because John L. Lewis and his cohorts had already irrevocably committed the CIO to this principle. However, according to Purnell, should "the C.I.O. leaders become willing to drop the closed shop. . . in the steel industry, let them join in a request to Congress to amend the National Labor Relations Act so as to prohibit the closed shop and the check-off. . . . only by law can we be given assurances that C.I.O. will not demadd them."® gotschalk 256-257 l f c , Part 29, 12090.

Girdler*s letter was the more extreme in this regard, concluding: So, when you get all through, the present controversy sums up somewhat like this: MUST REPUBLIC AND ITS MEN SUBMIT TO THE COMMUNISTIC DICTATES AND TERRORISM OF THE CIO? IF AMERICA IS TO REMAIN A FREE COUNTRY THE ANSWER IS N O . 87 gotschalk 258 l f c , Part 29, 12090.

In a last desperate attempt to avert the outbreak of the industrial warfare which seemed imminent, pavey urgently requested Girdler and Purnell to meet personally with him to further explore the possibilities of reaching an amicable solution,8 n c w York Times, June 16, 1937, 1; Cleveland Plain Dealer, June 16, 1937, 1

gridler claims "urgent" appointment out of town he could not break Fullerton Spencer Davey Works on New Steel Peace Course Plain Dealer (Published as CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER) - June 17, 1937Browse Issues 1, 3

Perkins appoints steel strike mediation board under Charles P. Taft Perkins broached the idea 10 days ago Republic said it will coooperate Taft Calls Strike Board Tomorrow Plain Dealer (Published as CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER) - June 18, 1937Browse Issues 1, 6

"sure we've got guns in our mills." Ohio Steel Leaders May Balk Mediation The Pittsburgh Press June 19, 1937 Page: 3

Federal Steel Mediation Board, led by Charles P. Taft II and Lloyd Garrison 100,000 in seven states Philip Murray and John L. Lewis to meet with Tom Girdler of Republic Steel; Eugene Grace of Bethlehem Steel, Frank Purnell of Youngstown Sheet and Tube, and Wilfred Sykes of Inland Steel in Cleveland "reign of anarchy" ALL 4 STEEL HEADS WILL MEET BOARD June 20, 1937 1, 6

The next day, after it had become known that the administration wanted the companies to agree to a status quo, Tom Girdler announced the policy which Republic would follow toward the situation created by the establishment of the Board. Strongly intimating that he would treat the Board in the first instance as an investigatory rather than a mediatory body, Girdler stated that its "first duty" should be to look into the "intimidation and terrorism of the CIO" which had kept "thousands" of Republic employees living in the mills and other "thousands" from entering their places of employment. As for the request to maintain the status quo, it was rejected outright as an "unwarranted and impossible" proposition, because of the circumstance that "thousands" of employees wanted to return to work. To subject these workmen to "weeks" of idleness would be intolerable. Therefore, the company would proceed with its plans to reopen the plants just as "rapidly" as local authorities could assure safe access to returning employees. New York Times, June 18, 1937, 1; June 19, 1937, 1; Cleveland Plain Dealer, June 18, 1937, 6.

In the first place, extremists on both sides indulged in statements which exacerbated the prevailing bitterness. On Saturday, Girdler publicly stated that, while he was quite willing to appear before the Board, he had absolutely no intention of meeting in the same room with either Lewis or Murray. New York Times, June 20, 1937, 1; June 21, 1937, 1.

Then Girdler proceeded to lecture Taft and his associates on the necessity for keeping in mind the fact that the "fundamental" issue of the strike was the right of employees to work without being harrassed or threatened by a union. The controversy over a signed agreement was a mere "technical" issue, according to the Republic chairman. But, insofar as it was involved, Republic could not and would not conclude a "contract, oral or written, with an utterly irresponsible party" such as the CIO. Hence, "any discussion" of that subject would be "futile." The company, Girdler added, would not submit voluntarily to arbitration. n c w York Times, June 22, 1937, 2; Cleveland Plain Dealer, June 22, 1937, 1.

Contrary to the belief which had come to be commonly held, all of the companies asserted that they had never reached any kind of agreement with the union regarding the terms of the Carnegie-Illinois type contract. Among other things, they objected to the time-consuming grievance procedures which were provided for in the contract. Furthermore, Girdler told the Board that he "positively" refused to sign a "term contract," for such an agreement would deprive the company of the ability to meet fluctuations in the price of steel by lowering wages if that became necessary. New York Times, June 22, 1937, 2,

Finally, as the meeting was about to end the Board invited the heads of the four companies to participate with Murray and Lewis in a joint conference, a step without which there could hardly be any real negotiations. Adhering to their original policy of dealing with SWOC exclusively through their subordinates— it will be recalled that Girdler had twice expressed an aversion to meeting face to face with Lewis— the steel executives said they would not take part in such a conference. They did, however, consent to meet again with the Board 6New York Times, June 22, 1937, 2.

Girdler, emerging from the conference in a jocular and flippant mood, declared that Republic's position was "unchanged." Asked whether he would return for a further session, the president of Republic replied cryptically that he could not be sure because the "Great White Father" had not yet asked him to do so. New York Times, June 22, 1937, 1; Cleveland Plain Dealer, June 22, 1937, 1.

Tom Girdler, testifying before the Senate Post Office Committee, branded the CIO "the most dangerous threat to the preservation of democracy in the United States." As for Philip Murray, he was an inveterate "liar."60 PMail Hearings, 208, 211-212

Further testimony was quits revealing of the inner nature of Girdler*s aversion to the CIO— that basically he objected to the CIO not because of the type of labor organization it was, nor because of its policies, but rather because of the fact that it was a labor organization. Mail Hearings, 228

Girdler minced no words in making his position unmistakably clear. "I am trying to tell this distinguished committee," he blurted out, "that I won't have a contract, verbal or written, with an irresponsible, racketeering, violent, communistic body like the C.I.O., and until they pass a law making me do it, I am not going to do it." Mail Hearings, 244

company heads refused even an oral pact Pennsylvania Governor Davey ordered the state militia to keep all plants closed Judge L.B. Griffits, court of common pleas in Warren Ohio, issued injunction barring more than 12 picketers at a gate in Warren or Niles 58,000 idle at Republic "Republic cannot and will not make a contract, oral or written, with an irresponsible party, and the C.I.O. as at present constituted, is an irresponsible party." PARLEY IS FUTILE LOUIS STARK June 22, 1937 1, 2

Gov Earle delcared martial law Johnstown Reopening Is Deferred After Earle Cancels Martial Law June 25, 1937 1

Hio sends in 4500 antional guard to keep mills open GOV. DAVEY ORDERS MILLS KEPT OPEN June 25, 1937 1

"irresponsible, racketeering, violetn, Communist body" never sign unless forced by law rfused an order except that of the Supreme Court denounced Murray as a liar called Senator Guffey a liar, "did not kow what he is talking about" cite news|title=Girdler Is Defiant|work=The New York Times|date=June 25, 1937|pages=1, 2

In another of his rather intemperate utterances, Girdler rejected the suggestion of any further dealing with the Board. Talking to reporters in Washington on the twenty-fifth, he characterized the Board as "incompetent and unfair," Taft as "a man who likes to talk about the things his father did," and Edward McGrady as an "office boy" for Perkins and Lewis. Asked if he would accept Roosevelt as an arbiter, the ebullient chairman of Republic responded with a booming f«NoI"65 washington Post, June 23, 1937, 1; June 26, 1937, 5; New York Herald Tribune, June 26, 1937, 1; June 27,1937, 2. Girdler later denied that he had ever made any such remarks, saying that his statement had been distorted and misquoted by the press.

In their fight to break the steel strike, Girdler and Purnell had the unstinted backing of their boards of directors; lLFC, Part 27, 11.435; Part 34, 13945.

was present for Monroe negotiations

present at Hollenden Hotel for June 21 negotiations

RS baord completely approved of of Girdler's handling of the strike on June 29, 1937

late July meeting about H&K; Grace, Weir, Hook, Purnell or Dalton, Block or Ryerson Hill & Knowlton kept separate books for the Little Steel account in mid July, Girdler personally met with John W. hill of H&K with Dalton, YST; Block of Inland; Grace of Bethlehm;Weir of national; Hook of ARM; in Girdler's officer to finalize plans for research H&K would do

Sheriff Limits Pickets, Sets 'Danger' Zones, at Republic's Four Cleveland Plants CANTON WORKERS STONED Six C. I. O. Agents Arrested—Guardsmen Accused of Urging Men to Resume Jobs Determined to Stay Out "Solicitation" Is Denied Pickets Seized at Canton OHIO MILLS TO OPEN Ohio National Guard trucks, loaded with armed troops, rolled in Cleveland today to enforce peace when four strike-bound steel mills reopen tomorrow. 1,500 troops in cleveland to open Republic Steel plants, which employed 6,650 workers; Sheriff O'Donnell established 1,500 yard 'danger zones' around plants OHIO MILLS TO OPEN July 6, 1937 1, 6

companies declared "complete victory", pickets dwindled to nothing stockholders suit filed, demanding accounting of $1 million in stirke expenditures four SWOC lawsuits totalling $220,000 for death and injury Republic cited by NLRB; more hearings on Aug. 9 company unions now operating everywhere 10,000 rallied in Cleveland Public Square STEEL UNION FIGHT TURNS TO COURTS JOHN M. STORM August 1, 1937 E6

lt was estimated that at the height of the strike Republic was spending $35,000 per day to guard and maintain its plants just in the Youngstown district. Youngstown Vindicator, June 17, 1937, 1. In an interview shortly after the strike, Girdler declared that it was "a situation which could admit of no compromise whatsoever, because the least sign of concession, however slight, would ha/re been seized upon by I wis and the CIO as a smashing victory and used as another club to coerce the men." New York Times, August 1, 1937, II, 3.

16 dead, 307 injured,m although final numbers will never be known RS spent $1.9 million on the strike 21 percent of their net profit for the year

CIO's first major defeat WAGNER ACT RULING TOPS LABOR'S YEAR September 5, 1937 4

NRLB investigation into Republic Steel's conduct

Girlder demanded right to work, outlaw of non-contractual strikes, and elmination of check-off communist GIRDLER OFFERS LABOR PEACE PLAN February 1, 1938 8

$15,000,000 Continuous Strip Plant Can Produce Ribbons in Quarter-Mile Lengths in Cleveland HUGE MILL OPENED BY REPUBLIC STEEL March 16, 1938 33

NLRB ruled against Republic Steel "wrong", contrary to evidence, "reflects the one-sided character of the Wagner Act", "astounding" will appeal GIRDLER SEES BIAS IN NLRB DECISION April 11, 1938 1, 7

The Republic Steel Corporation was named defendant today in four suits seeking a total of $260,000 for injuries received in last year's Memorial Day steel strike clash at Chicago. REPUBLIC SUED ON CLASH May 13, 1938 4

Girdler testified befor the LaFollette Committee that corporate espionage was done without his knowledge, and no justification for it company police impersonated union workers, infiltrated uniion meetings, tapped phones, and read mail company police attacked pickets, used armored cars admitted "honest mistakes" -- including not arming his police told mediation board that even if SWOC won an election, it would not sign a cotnract GIRDLER ATTACKS NLRB ASONE-SIDED LOUIS STARK August 12, 1938 1, 6

April 9, 1938 - ordered 5000 rehired, but that order withdrawn Third Circuit Court of appeals refused to allow withdrawal Supreme Court permitted withdrawal Decision Says 'Unfair Labor Practices' Caused Strikes in Ohio Plants Last Year The National Labor Board ordered the Republic Steel Corporation today to offer reinstatement to about 5,000 employes who went on strike in six Ohio plants in May, 1937. ordere to pay remedial wages t anyone not rehired ordered to fire strikebreakers pay employees at Canton and Masillon during lockouts NLRB accused Republic "brutal acts of violence" committee during organizing campaign, and hundreds of ULPs spies, company unions, physical attacks, threats, layoffs, discharges, shutdown for the purposes o stopping organizaing, ahdowing, refusing to bargain, incitement to violence, tear and vomit gas, illegal fake third-party back to work movements, incitement to violence, propaganda campaings REPUBLIC STEEL ORDERED BY NLRB TO REHIRE 5,000 October 20, 1938 1, 2

Republic asked Circuit Court of Appeals to overturn NLRB ruling NLRB STEEL ORDER TESTED ON APPEAL August 8, 1939 7

15 Other Officers and Directors of Republic Steel Accusedin a Stockholder's ActionBASED ON 1937 STRIKEMismanagement and Neglect,Resulting in Labor Clashesand Big Losses, Charged 12.8 milion GIRDLER IS NAMED IN $12,850,000 SUIT April 10, 1940 40

GIRDLER IS ACCUSED IN $12,800,000 SUIT October 19, 1940 16

The Republic Steel Corporation ended today its four and a half year battle against the C.I.O.'s Steel Workers Organizing Committee and the National Labor Relations Board, and the corporation, the C.I.O. and the NLRB signed a stipulation settling all charges of Wagner Act violation against the company. REPUBLIC STEEL TO SIGN WITH C.I.O. W.H. LAWRENCE July 16, 1941 12

Girdler's extreme anti-union attitudes and his refusal to seek labor peace deeply angered President Roosevelt. In a speech in Cleveland on November 2, 1940, he denounced Girdler: "There are certain forces within our own national community, composed of men who call themselves American but who would destroy America. They are the forces of dictatorship in our land—on one hand, the Communists, and on the other, the Girdlers. It is their constant purpose in this as in other lands to weaken democracy, to destroy the free man's faith in his own cause."

Post-strike leadership of Republic Steel

H&K counseld Girdler during the Post Office and the LaFollette hearings in 1938 H&K advised Girlder on his appearances before the Post Offices and Post Roads Committee in June 1937

H&K prepped Girlder for his 1938 Post Office Committee testimony Prepared his opening statement before Post Officwe Comnte Girlder claimed CIO stopped the mail, dynamited RR tracks, threatened and stoned familes Claimed law and order so flagrantly violated, law enforcement broke down

Girdler said everything he'd done, he did for his workers

Officials of the Republic Steel Corporation won today against a stockholders' suit which contended that their 1930 merger and anti-merger operations lost the company $2,500,000. Cyrus S. Eaton. the "merger maker," was involved in the questioned stock transactions through three stock-dealing companies he once controlled and as a former director of Republic Steel, but not as a defendant. six stockholders questioned the merger of Inland Steel and Youngstown Sheet and Tube. Judge Frank J. Lausche upheld Republic STEEL STOCK DEAL UPHELD BY COURT December 23, 1938 35

10 percent reductiion of pay as chairman in 1939 to 157,500

Heads of 140 Companies Pick Widely Representative Body to Aid OPM Program 38 WILL ACT FOR INDUSTRY Fairless, Grace and Girdler Chosen on the Executive Subcommittee The heads of 140 steel companies met at the Hotel Waldorf-Astoria yesterday afternoon to organize formally the Iron and Steel Industry Defense Committee at the request of the Office of Production Management. The committee is to work in cooperation with the national defense authorities in Washington on problems relating to iron and steel supplies. STEEL MEN SET UP GROUP FOR DEFENSE May 8, 1941 15

The revitalization of SWOC, the Supreme Court’s decision in the H. J. Heinz case, the destruction of the independent unions, and Henry Ford’s sudden capitulation to the UAW combined to create a situation in which the Little Steel concerns had no alternative other than to accept unionization and to come to terms with SWOC. Inland was the first of the companies to consider a signed contract. Then, in June, Bethlehem agreed to enter conferences looking toward a contract, after NLRB elections in the Corporation’s plants had given SWOC an overwhelming majority. In July, Republic Steel undertook to do what Tom Girdler had vowed it would never do; sign a formal CIO union contract, if a cross-check demonstrated that a majority of the company's production employees belonged to the union. The cross-check revealed that 70% of Republic steelworkers were union members. Sheet & Tube followed suit, thus finally ending the resistance of the Little Steel concerns as a g r o u p . ^ gotschalk 399-400 Formal contracts were concluded during the summer of 1942. The delay was occasioned by a deadlock over the terms of the contracts and the War Labor Board Hearings, which produced the "Little Steel /wag£/ formula." Harry A. Millis et al.. How Collective Bargaining Works (New York, 1942),, 532-533; vincent D. Sweeney, United Steelworkers of America, Twenty Years Later, 1936-1956 (Indianapolis, no date of publication), 50-54.

Vultee Aircraft

Victor Emanuel, a long-time friend with a mutual interest in breedig horses Girdler asked him to joint he board of Republic some years earlier Emanuel asked Girdler to join Cord Corporation in 1937, and he did Emanuel organized a syndicate to take over Cord, and its name was changed to The Aviation Corporation

cORD HAD SEt up Gerald Vultee in business, building the V1-A and the V-11 bomber. Cord's Aviation Development Company became Vultee Aircraft Division of Aviation Manufacturing Corporation after Emanuel took over Cord in late December 1937, Girdler fired the manager of the Vultee plant in California for refusing to implement new policy changes met Dick Millar, and had him run Vultee November 1939 Vultee Aircraft, Inc. formed out of Aviation manufacturing corp. and merged Stinson with Vultee Harry Woodhead of Republic elected president of Vultee in sprign 1940

spring 1941 got wind that Reuben Fleet was trying to sell Consolidated Aircraft Corporation tried to buy in August 1941, but failed bought it in November 1941

as Consolidated purchase occurred, Emanuel and others began urging Girdler to run all three companies Girdler demanded and got aboslutely authoirty as chairman and CEO got republic board to agree

named cahirman and ceo of Vultee Aircraft Inc. and Consolidated Aircraft Corporation NEW POST FOR GIRDLER December 16, 1941 49 Stockholders of the Consolidated Aircraft Corporation, meeting in San Diego, Calif., and of Vultee Aircraft, Inc., meeting in Wilmington, Del., voted yesterday overwhelmingly in favor of a merger into a single company to be known as the Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corporation. AIRCRAFT CONCERNS WILL BE COMBINED March 18, 1943 27 came up with the name "Dominator" for teh B-32 Super-Bomber Named Dominator August 25, 1944 5

The Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corporation announced yesterday that Tom M. Girdler has resigned as chairman and director after almost three and one-half years of service, during which the company has become one of the world's largest aircraft producers. Girdler Resigns Aircraft Posts In Which He Speeded Production The New York Times April 24, 1945 32

army ordnance association awarded the Rice Gold Medal for ordnance production to Girlder TO GET ORDNANCE MEDALS December 23, 1943 4

Charles M. Whiite, vice president in charge of operations of the Republic Steel Corporation for ten years, was elected president of the company at a meeting of the board of directors here yesterday, it was announced by Tom M. Girdler, chairman of the company. Charles M. White New President Of Republic Steel Corporation May 10, 1945 28

American Iron and Steel Institutie gave him the Gary Gold Medal FAIRLESS HEADS STEEL INSTITUTE May 27, 1955 28, 30

Other business roles

Tom M. Girdler Made Vice President. cite news|title=E.G. Grace Heads Steel Institute|work=The New York Times|date=December 14, 1934|page=37 elected chair of American Iron and Steel Institute ite news|title=Grace Sees Peril in Labor Unrest|work=The New York Times|date=May 28, 1937|page=11 Girdler retired may 25, 1939 because bylaws barred anyone serving more than two years American Iron and Steel Institute Names Honorary Vice Presidents May 12, 1939 36

Girdler is a trustee of Equitable Trust of NYC, director of Union National Bank of Pittsburgh, trustee of Lehigh University, director of Petroleum Corporation of America, and director of AISI 1936

elected director of NAM in 1936, and director and vice president in 1937.

elected director of Union Trust Co of Cleveland Girdler on Union Trust Board Plain Dealer (Published as CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER.) - November 27, 1929Browse Issues 14

trustee of the Equitable Trust Co. of NY; Union National Bank of Ptitsbrug; Lehigh U; Petroleum Corporation of America; and director of american iron and steel institutte

added to board of directors of Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. Eaton Puts 3 on Goodyear Board Plain Dealer (Published as CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER.) - April 1, 1930Browse Issues Page: 1

Chase National Bank, created from the merger of Chase Bank, Equitable Trus, and Interstate Trust merging Put On Board of Giant Bank Merger Plain Dealer (Published as CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER.) - April 15, 1930Browse Issues 14

Case School of Applied Sciences board member Case Adds 2 to Board Plain Dealer (Published as CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER) - January 22, 1937Browse Issues 16

Retirement and death

Tom M. Girdler stepped aside today as the chief executive officer of the Republic Steel Corporation and turned over that title to C. M. White, president. Retains Post of Chairman -White Takes Over Title of Chief Executive Officer when he took over Republic, he began a campaign to use steel in the home born Clarke County, Ind. GIRDLER GIVES UP HELM AT REPUBLIC June 22, 1955 41

stepped down as chairman and director studied in one-room schoolhouse when he left J&L, he had a salary and bonus of $350,000 a year and stock worth $1.5 milion Tom M. Girdler Ends Steel Career Fabian Bachrach August 22, 1956 39, 42

bought a home outside Easton, Md., after retiring fractured left writs, fractured ribs, slight concussion cahuffeuer-driven car hit by another Retired Founder of Republic Steel Injured in Collision TOM L. GIRDLER HURT January 3, 1957 L35

ill health for two years Harleigh, 13 acre estate near Easton, Md. funeral at Christ Episcopal Church, Easton burial in Louisville, Ky. news|title=Tom Mercer Girdler, 87, Dies|work=The New York Times|date=February 5, 1965|page=31

Walnut Ridge Cemetery Jeffersonville, Indiana

Personal life

Wives and children

Girlder married his childhood sweetheart, Mary Elizabeth "Bessie" Hayes of Louisville, Kentucky, on November 4, 1903. The couple had five children: Teresa Bertha (born in September 1904 and died a few days after birth), Jane Belknap (born August 17, 1905), Joseph Hayes (born September 13, 1908), Mary Elizabeth (born c. 1910), and Tom Mercer Jr. (born October 31, 1911). Bessie died of influenza in late July 1917.

Girdler married Clara Edna Astley August 5, 1918, in Detroit, Michigan. The couple divorced in March 1924. Girdler next married Lillian Compton Snowden of Maryland on April 26, 1924. The couple divorced on November 28, 1942. Girdler's last wife was his secretary, Helen R. Brennan, whom he married on December 2, 1942. She died on August 27, 1964, at Easton Memorial Hospital in Easton, Maryland.

Mentor estate

Girdler moved from Pittsburgh to Cleveland in December 1929, initially renting a home. In February 1930, he purchased 15 acres (61,000 m²) of the heavily wooded, 70-acre (28 ha) Chesterfield estate of Colonel Frank A. Scott on Center Road in Mentor, Ohio. Girdler renamed the estate Greystone Farm, and began renovating the 17-room, stone, Tudor Revival, Hubbell & Benes-designed home there. The Girdlers moved into their new home about June 1930. Girdler established an apple orchard on the property. He retained the farm after becoming head of Republic Steel, but sold it in 1941 to James A. Bohannon of Brewing Corp. of America for an undisclosed sum.

Col Frank August Scott of Warner & Swasey Co. built 25 room mansion on S Center Street. fieldstone and timber designed by English architect. matching servants quarters and barns. completed in 1924 on 477 acre farm. Called Chesterfield. Girlder purchased in 1930 and renamed it Greystone Manor. James A. Boahnnon, forher CEO of Peerless Motor Car, bought it in 1941. When the route of I 90 was announced in 1960, the freeway ran within 100 feet of the hourse. Bohannon sold is to Thomas Peterson, former chair of the First Unitarian Church of Shaker Heights, which bought the house and 23 acres. He donated the house and five acres to the East Shore Unitarian Church. Mansion purchased in 1996 by Charles Bolton, an adjoining property owner. Barns and servants quarters just south of I 90 remain.

Girdler spent most of the winter months of February, March, and April of each year living in Cleveland in a luxury apartment at Wade Park Manor (now Judson Manor), an 11-story residential hotel for the wealthy located on E. 107th Street overlooking Wade Park.

Health, religion, affiliations

In late 1918, Girdler vacationed in Atlanta, where he had his appendix removed.

Girdler was an active member of the Episcopal Church his entire life.

An excellent horseman, Girdler belonged to the Allegheny Country Club (Sewickley, Pennsylvania), Chagrin Valley Hunt Club (Gates Mills, Ohio), and Kirtland Country Club (Kirtland, Ohio). He dabbled in the breeding of hunting steeds on his Mentor estate, and one of his horses, Hamburg King, came in second in the Overall category at the 1936 Chagrin Valley Hunt Horse Show and first in the Novice Hunter class. Girdler was also a long-time member of the Duquesne Club (Pittsburgh), India House (New York City), the Metropolitan Club (New York City), the Racquet and Tennis Club (New York City), and the Union Club (New York City).

In 1943, Girdler wrote an autobiography entitled Boot Straps: The Autobiography of Tom M. Girdler.

GIRDLER, TOM MERCER (19 May 1877 - 4 Feb. 1965), steel industrialist and labor and New Deal critic, was born in Silver Creek Twp., Clark County, Ind., to Lewis and Elizabeth Mercer Girdler. graduating from Lehigh University (1901) in mechanical engineering. Girdler worked for Buffalo Forge (1901-02), Oliver Iron & Steel (1902-05), Colorado Fuel (1905-07), Atlantic Steel (1908-14), and Jones & Laughlin Steel (1914-29) before accepting an offer from CYRUS S. EATON† and Wm. G. Mather to assist negotiations leading to the formation of the REPUBLIC STEEL CORP. in Cleveland in 1929, then become the company's first president and board chairman. Republic became a major producer of light alloys, with profits exceeding $87 million between 1936-43. Girdler first supported Pres. Roosevelt's Natl. Industrial Recovery Act, establishing a representation plan for Republic's employees, but when the Wagner Act outlawed such plans and promoted negotiations with regular unions, Girdler lost all affinity for the New Deal. He refused to bargain with the CIO; though conceding the need for collective bargaining, Girdler refused to do so by government edict. Republic's refusal to bargain and allow union elections resulted in the LITTLE STEEL STRIKE in May 1937. In 1942, under order of the War Labor Board, elections were held and the CIO organized Republic. Girdler resigned from Republic's presidency in 1937 but continued as board chairman, later becoming board chairman and chief executive officer of Vultee and Consolidated, engineering their merger in 1943. He retired from Republic in 1956. Girdler was married four times: first to Bessie (Mary Elizabeth) Hayes (d. 1917) in 1903; Clara Astley; Lillian Snowden in 1924; and Helen Brennan in 1942. Girdler had two sons: Tom M., Jr. and Joseph; and two daughters, Mary Elizabeth and Jane. He died at his estate in Easton, Md. cite web|title=Girdler, Tom Mercer|website=Encyclopedia of Cleveland History|date=July 16, 1997|accessdate=March 3, 2016|url=https://ech.case.

Legacy

first of the C-4 ships owned by Nicholson Universal Steampship Co. converted to ore carrier at Maryland Dry Dock Co. to ply Great Lakes Ore Ship to Get Long Tow August 21, 1951 37

Citations

Notes

Citations

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