Weak states and late state formation
editCurrently, many states are often labeled as weak or failed. States in this situation have lost the capability to fully exercise sovereignty over their territory or have never exercised it. This phenomenon have increasingly brought the attention of scholars, since it could explain many of the particular features of underdeveloped economies and countries in conflict in Africa, Asia and Latin America.
Authors like David Samuels and Joel S. Migdal have explored the emergence of weak states, how they are different from Western "strong" states and its consequences on the economic development of developing countries.
Early state formation
To understand the formation of weak states, Samuels compares the formation of European states in the 1600 with the conditions under which more recent states were formed in the twentieth century. In this line of argumentation, the state allows to resolve a collective action problem, in which citizens recognize the authority of the state and this exercise the power of coercion over them. This kind of social organization required a decline in legitimacy of traditional forms of ruling (like religious authorities) and replaced them with an increase in the legitimacy of depersonalized rule; an increase in the central government's sovereignty; and an increase in the organizational complexity of the central government (bureaucracy).
The transition to this modern state was possible in Europe around 1600 thanks to the confluence of factors like the technological developments in warfare, which generated strong incentives to tax and consolidate central structures of governance to respond to external threats. This was complemented by the increasing on the production of food (as a result of productivity improvements), which allowed to sustain a larger population and so increased the complexity and centralization of states. Finally, cultural changes challenged the authority of monarchies and paved the way to the emergence of modern states[1].
Late state formation
The conditions that enabled the emergence of modern states in Europe were different for other countries that started this process later. As a result, many of these states lack effective capabilities to tax and extract revenue from their citizens, which derives in problems like corruption, tax evasion and low economic growth. Unlike the European case, late state formation occurred in a context of limited international conflict that diminished the incentives to tax and increase military spending. Also, many of these states emerged from colonization in a state of poverty and with institutions designed to extract natural resources, which have made more difficult to form states. European colonization also defined many arbitrary borders that mixed different cultural groups under the same national identities, which has made difficult to build states with legitimacy among all the population, since some states have to compete for it with other forms of political identity[1].
As a complement of this argument, Migdal gives a historical account on how sudden social changes in the Third Worlk during the Industrial Revolution contributed to the formation of weak states. The expansion of international trade that started around 1850, brought profound changes in Africa, Asia and Latin America that were introduced with the objective of assure the availability of raw materials for the European market. These changes consisted in: i) reforms to landownership laws with the objective of integrate more lands to the international economy, ii) increase in the taxation of peasants and little landowners, as well as collecting of these taxes in cash instead of in kind as was usual up to that moment and iii) the introduction of new and less costly modes of transportation, mainly railroads. As a result, the traditional forms of social control became obsolete, deteriorating the existing institutions and opening the way to the creation of new ones, that not necessarily lead these countries to build strong states[2]. This fragmentation of the social order induced a political logic in which these states were captured to some extent by "strongmen", who were capable to take advantage of the above-mentioned changes and that challenge the sovereignty of the state. As a result, these decentralization of social control impedes to consolidate strong states[3].
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- ^ a b Samuels, David (2012). Comparative Politics. Pearson Higher Education. pp. Chapter 2.
- ^ Migdal, Joel (1988). Strong societies and weak states: state-society relations and state capabilities in the Third World. Princeton University Press. pp. Chapter 2.
- ^ Migdal, Joel (1988). Strong societies and weak states: state-society relations and state capabilities in the Third World. Princeton University Press. pp. Chapter 8.