User:Conlinp/Directorate of Military Intelligence (South Africa)

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Directorate of Military Intelligence

History

Early origins

The Union Defence Force (UDF), formed two years before the outbreak of World War One in 1912, but the Act creating it designated no intelligence service. Any intelligence required would have been the mandate of the UDF's General Staff. Most intelligence gathering was adhoc and purely for tactical decisions.

World War 1

When WW1 broke out, the UDF would rely on the British Army to supply strategic intelligence while local intelligence could be gained by sending out squads to gather information via reconnaissance. The South Africans would maintain units in German colonies of west and east Africa, to gather intelligence by means of reconnaissance. Under Major Langbaard Grobler and a fifty man unit called Grobler's Scouts based in Walvis Bay, the UDF would collect information on the Germans in German South West Africa. When Louis Botha's forces entered German South West Africa in 1915, he had employed six mounted scout units of fifty men each, to carry out reconnaissance ahead of the force. His forces also gathered intelligence by means of telegraph and radio interception as well as from the indigenous population who viewed the South African's as liberators.

Inter-war years

During the thirties from 1933 until 1936, the intelligence staff were attached to the Director of Military Training and Operations. In 1937, that directorate was renamed Director Operations and Intelligence under Colonel P. de Waal. Later in 1937, Lt. Colonel B.W. Thwaites was appointed by the UDF as Deputy Director of Military Intelligence but on a part-time basis. He attempted to get assistance from the British War Office to set up a military intelligence division but they were not forthcoming as they distrusted the Hertzog government that was in power in South Africa. The British authorities squashed the formation of a national intelligence service in South Africa in 1938, based on MI5, as they feared that it would be infiltrated by nationalist Afrikaners, the Ossewabrandwag and Nazi sympathisers so basic intelligence was provided by the Detective Branch of police and the fledgling intelligence unit in the Union Defence Force.

World War 2

In September 1939,Thwaites would submit a report to Col. de Waal expressing his concerns about the inefficiencies in the intelligence section of his department. The Intelligence section was severely hampered by the lack of funds and relied on information volunteered by agents from around the country and Southern Africa, that was then analysed and managed by a small group of army members. Thwaites would eventually be ordered in 1940, to establish an South African Intelligence Corps. Its focus was on the white nationalists and Nazi sympathisers while an Intelligence Records Bureau was formed to collect, record and disseminate information fed to it by South African government organisations and British and Colonial intelligence services.

Prior to WW2 the South African Police (SAP) were responsible for monitoring the work of Nazi's in the country. As UDF was responsible for the defence of the country, Chief of General Staff General Sir Pierre van Ryneveld approached the Defence Minister Oswald Pirow for additional funds to enlarge the intelligence section in an effort to monitor Italian and German intelligence operations in Southern Africa. This was refused by Pirow as he believed the SAP had that function already though some academics believe his right wing beliefs dictated his decision.

On 6 September 1939, Jan Smuts in addition to being Prime Minister, assumed the cabinet role of Defence minster and began to allocate funding to the UDF's intelligence section. In December 1939, a post of Director of Intelligence was created reporting to Chief of General Staff, with Colonel B.W. Thwaites holding the position until 1941 with a mandate for civil security, local censorship and propaganda. In 1940 Lieutenant-Colonel H.T. Newman became Deputy Director of Military Intelligence and reported to Colonel P de Waal, Operations. Newman would be responsible for military intelligence and security for the UDF when on operations outside the country.

In September 1940, the Defence Advisory Committee, under the chairmanship of Denys Reitz, reported their concerns about the confusion, the overlapping of information and delays when it came to the collection and distribution of intelligence. He suggested the creation of an organisation to centralise the collection, analysis and distribution of intelligence. This organisation was created and was called the Intelligence Record Bureau (ICB) headed by Colonel Lenton. Weekly meeting were held and attended by representatives for censorship, intelligence, SAP, railway police, treasury, immigration and customs. The ICB was then able to share and receive information from other British colonial intelligence gathering operations around the world.

Colonel Pierre de Villiers, Chief of South African Police and the countries liaison with MI5, approached MI5 in 1938 in an attempt to set up a security organisation based on the latter. They refused believing they were solely responsible for monitoring security in the Union and when intelligence gathering was reorganised in 1940, with internal security remaining the prerogative of the SAP now under Colonel Baston and not military intelligence, MI5 input with the SAP declined regarding the SAP as being corrupt and inefficient and some in elements, anti-British.

Years leading up to the 1948 election

In 1942 until 1948, Dr. E.G. Malherbe would assumed the role of Director of Military Intelligence. With the end of WW2, South Africa did not possess a dedicated military intelligence service, with the British War Office providing the British Commonwealth countries with intelligence and the few UDF officers it did have responsible for intelligence, were attached to Chief of General Staff. Prior to 1948, the Union Defence Forces' Military Intelligence section was said to consist of one or two officers who concentrated on counter-intelligence, attempting to identify persons within the service and police who sought to undermine the government and its structures. With the National Party gaining government on 26 May 1948, the unit would destroy all files of persons it had investigated.

1950s

By the early 1950s, the National Party of Afrikaner nationalists introduced the first apartheid laws in South Africa. MI5, seeing the new governments anti-communist credentials, initially thought of helping to establish a new intelligence service in South Africa styled on its own structure as it had done with ASIO in Australia, but had second thoughts fearing it would be used to suppress and oppress opposition in the country.

The Union Defence Force was renamed the South African Defence Force in 1957. Its Military intelligence division, at the creation of the South African Republic four years later in 1961, consisted of four officers, two managing counter-intelligence and two gathering intelligence.

1960's

In 1961, after the success of a referendum campaign, South Africa became a republic. Prior to 1961, national intelligence, if and when required, had been provided by British intelligence but after 1961 any remaining official links between them ended. After South Africa became a republic in May 1961 and withdrew from the Commonwealth, South Africa's ties with the British Intelligence organisation dried up and the CIA increased its contact with emphases on concerns of black liberations movements use of armed conflict to achieve regime change in the country. The CIA would maintain good ties with various South African intelligence organisations until 1974.

By July 1962, the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) was formed and by 1964 was a independent unit reporting to the Commandant-General of the Defence Force (later Chief of Defence Force) with strategic national intelligence added to its mandate. In addition to the gathering of military and strategic intelligence, it would be responsible for military security and counter-intelligence. Its first director General Pierre Retief, proposed to Prime Minister John Voster that the DMI should be the central collector of military and domestic intelligence, but the PM had other ideas which would form the basis of a future Republican Intelligence organisation. With the republic responsible for its own intelligence, military officers were sent overseas for training in the UK, Germany, France and the USA. By 1965, the directorate now reported to the Army Chief of Staff (Chief of the Army) before returning to direct control of the Chief of the Defence Force in 1967.

But the South African government favoured a police approach to gather intelligence and three intelligence gathering organisations would gather momentum in the early sixties with the DMI side lined. In 1960, Hendrik van den Bergh was appointed as the Head of the Security Branch of the South African Police. By 1963, he would form the Republican Intelligence (RI) a secretive offshoot of the Security Branch. By the late 1960's RI would become bogged down in internal security matters and could not become an effective external intelligence gathering and analysis organisation. The Security Branch concentrated on internal security as well and the DMI had failed to achieve the country's requirements for external intelligence.

During the middle of 1968, the South African cabinet approved the implementation of a centralised security service and on 28 August of the same year, General Hendrik van den Bergh was instructed to start planning the new organisation. On the 1 October 1968, Van den Bergh, Deputy Police Commissioner and Head of the Security Branch, was promoted to General and then appointed as Security Adviser to Prime Minister John Vorster. Attached to the Prime Minister office, he would be in command of all security and intelligence chiefs in the country including the military, and reported only to Vorster.

By March 1969, the skeleton of a new security service begun to emerge with the release of the expenditures for 1969/70 when R5,320,500 was allocated to the secret services, a 188 percent increase over the previous year with R4,063,000 allocated to the Prime Minister's office and Van den Bergh. Military Intelligence's (DMI) budget was reduced from R830,000 the previous year to a R39,000 a move which would lead to continuous struggle for power between MI and BOSS throughout the seventies. With BOSS's increased role, they even acquired the DMI's headquarters in 1970.

On 13 May 1969, Minister of the Interior S.L. Muller introduced the framework of the new service in the Public Service Amendment Bill which he said was responsible for co-ordination and would draw personnel from other security and intelligence organisations. It outlined that the control of the Bureau for State Security would rest with Prime Minister and that the civil service Public Service Commission would have no control over it powers, functions and duties. A Government Notice No. 808 on 16 May 1969 announced the Bureau for State Security's formation and came into being retrospectively on the 1 May as a department under the Prime Minister. BOSS's function was stated as investigating matters of state security, collect and evaluate any information received and distribute the analysis when necessary throughout the government and secondly but more ambiguously, perform other functions and responsibilities when required.

Nigerian Civil War

Major General Fritz Loots, Director of Military Intelligence was visiting Angloa in 1968 when he received a request for help by South Africa in Biafra that had broken away from Nigeria. Defence Minister PW Botha consulted Prime Minister Voster about the request

Captain Jan Breytenbach was sent to Biadra, to support the breakaway republic with training as well as to observe the war and brought with him advisors, small arms and communications equipment.

1970's

On 5 September 1969, Prime Minister John Vorster formed a commission led by Justice H.J. Potgieter to establish the guidelines and mission for intelligence gathering by the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) and the Bureau for State Security. The Commission to Inquire into Certain Intelligence Aspects of State Security, known better as the Potgieter Commission would investigate the clashes between the two organisations over who had primary responsibility for intelligence gathering in South Africa.

As the BOSS head Hendrik van den Bergh was a close ally of the Prime Minister, it was seen by DMI as a foregone conclusion that BOSS would achieve favour. The Potgieter Commission reported back on the 2 February 1972 and the results were subsequently used to enact the Security Intelligence and State Security Council Act 64 of 1972 on 24 May 1972. The Act formalised the functions and the brief of BOSS while another part of this act would also established the formation of the State Security Council under the control of the cabinet and established it as the government's national centre for operational security.

The DMIs importance would change rapidly in the mid-70's. In 1973, the South African Police lost control for security in South-West Africa/Namibia and the SADF took over a military counter-insurgency role against SWAPO. In 1974, the South African Special Forces were founded and would carry out the special missions required by DMI and SADF. With the collapse of Portuguese control of Angola in 1974 and with civil war breaking out over who would control that country by November 1975, the South African Defence Force would attempt to involve itself in the conflict to prevent the MPLA winning. This SADF operation became known as Operation Savannah and the DMI would control the strategic and tactical intelligence during the campaign.

The years between 1974 and 1978 were dominated by infighting as various areas of the government for control of the countries foreign and security policy. Foreign Affairs and the Department of Information argued over foreign policy in South Africa and abroad while BOSS and the DMI argued over the direction of security policy for the country. In 1977, a Defence White Paper was published and outlined the Total Strategy Plan that would later be implemented and dominate the PW Botha years when he assumed power a year later. This plan envisioned the mobilization of South Africa's military, economic, political and social resources so as to defend and advance the country's interests at home and abroad and also called for an increase in the military budget so as to balance the playing fields relative to the southern African states.

With the Info scandal breaking in early 1978 both the Bureau of State Security (BOSS) and Prime Minister Vorster become mired in the scandal with the head of BOSS, Hendrik van den Berg, resigning in June 1978. By 2 October 1978, Prime Minister B.J. Vorster had also resigned and on 9 October, the Defence Minister PW Botha was appointed as the new Prime Minister of South Africa.

On 20 November 1978, the Bureau of State Security was brought under tighter control as a cabinet portfolio called National Security managed by Prime Minister who also held the Minister of Defence portfolio. With the rise of PW Botha to prime minister, so the SADF's power increase in cabinet and with that the Directorate Military Intelligence (DMI), who would strive to dominate security issues in the new government and decide its policy and implementation.

In October 1978, Deputy Defence and Intelligence Minister Kobie Coetsee was appointed by Prime Minister PW Botha to lead a commission of inquiry into intelligence gathering in South Africa and in particular who would be the lead agency. It was believed that it was predetermined that the DMI would be the lead intelligence agency. PW Botha had decided to split the intelligence gathering ability of South Africa amongst four agencies, the DMI, BOSS/DONS, Security Branch and Foreign Affairs, hoping to reduce the political dominance by one over the others, but the rivalry would continue.

On the 12 February 1979, the State Security Council issued guidelines for who could authorize five types of external operations by South African forces. A regional strategy for destabilization was also established to prevent the establishment of ANC bases in Southern African countries. In Angola, the South African strategy was to divide the country, supporting secession in the south of the country, managed by the South African Defence Force (SADF) and DMI. In Mozambique, it meant the building up RENAMO, created by the Rhodesians in opposition to the Mozambican government, and under SADF control by 1980, managed by the DMI's Directorate of Special Tasks.

PW Botha described the Westminster system as not appropriate for the country and that in order to implement the Total Strategy, it was necessary to integrate the states resources and overhaul the states political and administrative structures. This rationalization process begun in March 1979 to restructure the states decision making process. It would centralize the power with the prime minister and sidelined the cabinet and parliament. A cabinet secretariat was created in the Office of the Prime Minister, with the reduction of Vorster's twenty cabinet advisory committees to four under PW Botha as decision making bodies not advisory, not accountable to the cabinet. These would be the committees of National Security, Constitutional, Economic and Social Affairs, each under a minister appointed by the Prime Minister. The National Security committee would manage the SSC and the National Security Management System, with its decisions not having to be ratified by the Cabinet and only informed of them if required by the Prime Minister. The SSC's strategy was managed by thirteen to fifteen Interdepartmental Committees and implemented through fifteen internal and external Joint Management Centre's.

On 16 August 1979, the National Security Management System (NSMS) was established which would integrate the efforts of the entire government and its assets towards protecting the state with the SADF, Police and Intelligence services as the core of the system and managed by the Security Council.

1980's

In November 1980, PW Botha ordered a Rationalisation Committee be formed to rationalise the intelligence services so as to improve the co-ordination of intelligence in the State Security Council. This committee met between 14 and 19 January 1981 in Simonstown to finalise the functions of each department. This resulted in the Simonstown Accords with DMI would be responsible for military intelligence and contra-mobilisation within South Africa and externally. The NIS would be responsible for political and economic intelligence, counter-intelligence and evaluation. The Police's Security Branch would be responsible for counter-subversion within South Africa and externally.

During SADF Special Forces raids in the 1980s into countries such as Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe, the SADF would fail to mention it beforehand, to departments within the South African government such as the DFA and the NIS. On at least two occasions the NIS would lose sources of information in the ANC organisation. One raid took place in 1986 during Foreign Minister Pik Botha's meetings with an Eminent Persons Group visit to South Africa that immediately ended the talks. The lack of coordination was a concern with Pik Botha quoted at TRC hearing in 1997 stating:

In these matters...a clear divergence of views existed between the Security Forces and Foreign Affairs.

— Pik Botha, A Spook's Progress

In fact all three organisations DMI, DFA and NIS where attempting to cultivate contacts with African governments without each other knowing what each was doing though the latter had more contact with DFA.

Continuing Voster's idea of a Constellation of Southern African States surrounding South Africa in the 1980s, that were economically and politically aligned with the latter, became PW Botha's Total Strategy to sideline SWAPO and ANC liberation movements based in those countries. South Africa strategy set out to force the Angolan and Mozambique government's to negotiate and comply with the formers political wishes by attacking the political and economic structures of those countries, and believed Zambia and Zimbabwe would fall in line too after that objective was achieved.

The political objective of South Africa in Angola was to support UNITA to the point it controlled southern Angola and which would deny SWAPO its bases to infiltrate into northern Namibia. So supporting UNITA and attacking SWAPO bases in Angola became the strategy. The ultimate objective was a power sharing agreement with the MPLA and UNITA in Angola.

Angola

South African military involvement with the Portuguese in Angola began in the 1960's but by October 1970, the involvement became official called the Alcora Exercise which also involved the Rhodesian military. By September 1973, the SADF was funding the Portuguese military in Angola, to R150 million over five years, to counter the UNITA, FNLA and MPLA. The coup in Portugal on 25 April 1974 took all the South African military and intelligence organisations by surprise.

In August 1974, the Portuguese Angolan government had proposed a two-year plan for independence with the three groups and white settlers forming a coalition government but this was rejected outright. In order to end the conflict amongst the groups, individual ceasefires were arranged between the groups and the Portuguese Angolan Military Council, with the FNLA signing on 15 October 1974 that allowed it and the other three liberation parties to set up political offices in Luanda. By 25 November 1974, a ceasefire was concluded between the FNLA and UNITA and with the MPLA on 18 December.

The FNLA and the other parties would meet in Portimao, Portugal on 10 January 1975 and resulted in the formation of the Alvor Agreement, signed on 15 January 1975, which would grant Angola independence from Portugal on 11 November ending the war of independence. The plan also called for a coalition government and a united army.

By August 1975, the SA Military Attaché in Luanda had concluded in a report to Chief of Staff Intelligence (CSI), that Portugal was no longer important in deciding Angola's future and that the MPLA would be victorious and assume power as a communist government. By 11 August 1975, Defence Minister PW Botha had obtained permission from Prime Minister Vorster to invade Angola to occupy and provide security of the dam at Calueque to protect northern SWA's irrigation water supply, contrary to the views of BOSS and the Department of Foreign Affairs. SADF communications with UNITA as with RENAMO, were under the command of DMI through its Special Tasks directorate reporting to the CSI. They were also responsible for training on-site at Mavinga and equipping UNITA for which they maintained a depot at the Rundu base in SWA/Nambia.

After the South African Defence Force's failed attempt from 14 October 1975 to reach Luanda to prevent the MPLA being installed as the legitimate government in Angola with Operation Savannah, the SADF would begin their withdrawal in late December 1975. So began the SADF's involvement in training and managing the anti-government forces in southern Angola to prevent SWAPO from gaining a foothold in the region in order launch attacks in an attempt to liberate SWA/Namibia.

In April 1975, UNITA's forces consisted between 600-800 men but Savimbi had managed to persuade the South African's that he was anti-communist. SADF MI Colonel Chris Thirion informed UNITA's Jonas Savimbi on 25 December 1975 about the SADF withdrawal and had him regroup his UNITA forces and headquarters in the Caprivi strip in northeastern Namibia where MI began training his forces. This would be carried out by MI's Directorate of Special Tasks (DST). Here the South Africans would provide financial aid from UNITA's foreign backers. In 1979, China supplied UNITA with 550 to 600 tons of weapons via Namibia.

Mozambique

RENAMO, the anti government force in Mozambique, was the creation of the Rhodesian intelligence service the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) was formed in 1977. Mozambique had gain its independence from Portugal on 25 June 1975. The FRELIMO government assumed control and tolerated the establishment of ZANLA (Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army) bases in the country which supported overthrow of the white Rhodesian government and gave support to black organisation opposed to apartheid in South Africa. RENAMO was therefore created to disrupt the Mozambique governments control of its country and in doing so disrupt its support to ZANLA. RENMAO was supplied and trained by the Rhodesians and consisted of black Mozambicans who had fought on Portuguese side prior to independence and dissatisfied ex-FRELIMO members. After the Rhodesia gained independence in 1980 and became Zimbabwe, members of the formers intelligence and defence services emigrated to South Africa with some integrating themselves into the SADF. Renamo's control would then be "transferred" to the DMI. Renamo would be used by the South Africans to pressure the Mozambique government not to support the ANC. In 1980, 200 members would be settled near Phalaborwa were the CSI took control and the were the SADF Special Forces reorganised and retrained the force. By 1982, up to 8,000 Renamo soldiers had been trained with operations resuming in Mozambique. From 1982 negotiations began leading up to the Nkomati Accord in 1984 between South Africa and Mozambique with the NIS and DFA working together on reaching an agreement while the DMI, with its management of Renamo, was attempting to undermine the possibility of a settlement. The Nkomati Accord would be signed on 16 March 1984 at Komatipoort which would see the ANC leave that country, ending training and missions planning there by that organisation and the ending of South African support to RENAMO. All that remain of the ANC in Mozambique was an official ANC Diplomatic Mission. But SADF support would continue with both Defence Minister Magnus Malan and the CSI claiming later that the support was of a non-military nature, medical support and communication equipment so as to allow for diplomacy but Pik Botha, in September 1985 on diplomatic mission to Mozambique, would be supplied with information about the capture of a diary and documentation at Casa Banana base in Gorongoza province, showing continued SADF military support and training for the anti-government group. At South African commission of enquiry with a clear military bent would conclude support was continuing but was non-military. By 1986, Mozambican President Samora Machel was dead. The plane he was onboard had flown into a hill just inside South Africa after connecting to the wrong beacon as it attempted to land in Maputo in Mozambique. Subject to an official enquiry and many conspiracy theories, to this date no evidence of SADF collusion has been produced that would stand up in a court of law. DMI and SADF continued their military support for Renamo continued until 1989.

Lesotho

Since Lesotho's independence from Britain in 1966, Chief Leabua Jonathan and his Basotho National Party (BNP) had maintained friendly relations with South Africa and maintained an anti-communist outlook. But he would also turn a blind-eye to the African National Congress's (ANC) exiles in his country. Lesotho was dependent on South Africa for all its imports and exports and a sizeable proportion of its population worked on the mines in that country. In the mid-80s, the Highlands Water Project to supply water to South Africa was of strategic importance.

In 1970, Chief Jonathan cancelled the election results when Ntsu Mokhehle's Basotho Congress Party (BCP) appear to win, imprisoning the latter and its leadership and declaring a state of emergency. This had please the South African government as BCP party had shown an anti-South African sentiment. But from 1976 onwards, with the lack of progress towards the curbing of Apartheid in South Africa, Chief Jonathan began to speak out on his opposition to the political situation in that country. The South African security structure began to see Lesotho as part of the Total Onslaught problem and adopted their Total Strategy to counter it.

From 1979, the South African government would use a number of means to destabilise the Chief Jonathan's government. One means was the arming of the BCP's Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) and whom conducted attacks on various targets such as government infrastructure, assassinations of rival BNP members and attempts on Chief Jonathan himself. Some attacks like a mortar attack in 1982 came from the South African side of the border. Others included attacks by SADF Special Forces on 9 December 1982 against ANC targets in Lesotho which claimed 42 people killed and would result in the Jonathan government sending 100 ANC members to Mozambique. Another raid took place on 20 December 1985 in which nine people of which six were ANC members, were killed though the SADF would deny their involvement. A third method used was the use of border restrictions to cripple the Lesotho economy, a landlocked country that relied on the traffic across its borders to survive and prosper, a method adopted soon after the raid in December 1985.

On 20 January 1986, the Lesotho Paramilitary Force (LPF) under Major-General Justin Metsing Lekhanya, assumed control of the country in a bloodless coup after a insurrection by members of LPF in Maseru five days earlier when the protested against the BNP Youth Wings activities. Three days prior to his coup, Lekhanya and a delegation had attended talks on mutual border security in Pretoria. Within hours of the coup, a train with fuel and supplies arrived and talks between the nations began later in the week. The border restrictions were officially lifted on 25 January 1986. Lekhanya assumed control of the country by means of a six man Military Council.

Lekhanya would meet PW Botha in Cape Town in March 1986 and the two agreed that peace and stability was important to both countries economic development with both agreeing not to allow their respective countries to be used as a spring-board for acts aggressive against the other. Later that same month and an announcement was made stating that the ANC no longer had a diplomatic presence in Lesotho with early deportations of the latter's members to Zambia and Kenya.

1990's

From 1990 until the election 1994, 14,000 people lost their lives as political violence instigated firstly and evolving from the Third Force as each side vied for power.

Capabilities

• Strategic Intelligence
• Tactical/Operational Intelligence
• Special Operations

Organisational structure

Directorates early to mid 70s

• Directorate Covert Collection (DCC)
• Special Tasks (DST)
• Counter Intelligence
• Combined Operations
• Interpretation

Directorates late 70s onward

• Directorate Covert Collection (DCC)
• Sub Division, Military Intelligence (SDMI) - Strategic Intelligence
  • Directorate Southern Africa
    West Front – Angola, Namibia
    East Front – Zimbabwe, Zambia, Mozambique, Tanzania & Malawi
    Home Front - Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland , Homelands, Subversion, Church Affairs and Terrorism
  • Directorate Rest of Africa/Middle East/World
• Sub Division, Counter Intelligence (SDCI)
• Sub Division, Communications Operations or Intelligence Operations (SDOI)
• Directorate Tactical Intelligence
  • Chief of Army Staff Intelligence
  • Chief of Naval Staff Intelligence
  • Chief of Air Staff Intelligence
  • Chief of Medical Staff Intelligence
  • SADF Signals Intelligence Unit
• Directorate Electronic Warfare
• Directorate Foreign Relations
• Military Information Bureau

Organisational heads

Director of Military Intelligence

• 1961 – 1966 Pierre Marais Retief
• 1966 – 1971 Frederick Wilhelm “Fritz” Loots
• 1971 – 1974 Heinrich de Villefort du Toit

Chief of Staff, Intelligence (CSI) overall command of DMI and Special Forces

• 1974 – 1977 Heinrich de Villefort du Toit
• 1978 – 1985 Lieutenant-General Pieter Willem van der Westhuizen
• 1985 – 1989 Vice-Admiral Dries Putter
• 1989 – 1991 Lieutenant-General Rudolph “Witkop” Badenhorst
• 1991 – 1994 Lieutenant General Joffel van der Westhuizen

Chief of Staff, Intelligence (CSI) Defence Intelligence Division SANDF

http://www.dod.mil.za/news/2014/04/celebration.htm

• 1994 – 1999 Lieutenant General Dirk Verbeek
• 1999 – 2009 Lieutenant General Mojo Motaung
• 2009 – 2012 Lieutenant General Abel Shilubane
• 2013 – present Lieutenant General Jeremia Nyembe

References

Category:Defunct South African intelligence agencies

External links

• www.example.com