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User:Douglian30/sandbox/Litvinov dismissal

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Negotiations regarding Germany and dismissal

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After the 1938 Munich Agreement, German state media derided Litvinov for his Jewish ancestry, referring to him as "Finkelstein-Litvinov".[1] On 15 April 1939, Litvinov sent a comprehensive proposal to Stalin for a tripartite agreement with Britain and France.[2] The following day, Litvinov saw Stalin to discuss his draft, which Stalin approved. According to Soviet records, Litvinov submitted detailed arguments in favour of the proposed pact, which Stalin accepted. Litvinov stated they ought not to wait for the other side to propose what the Soviets wanted. Litvinov summarised his proposals, which were for mutual assistance in case of aggression against the Soviet Union, Britain or France; and support for all states bordering the Soviet Union, including Finland and the Baltic States. It also provided for rapid agreement on the form such assistance would take. There would be an agreement not to conclude a separate peace.[3]

By 16 April, Stalin still had faith in Litvinov and had no immediate plans to remove him.[4] No concrete proposals for a Nazi-Soviet pact had been made by either country. Litvinov said: "We can expect urgent and complex negotiations with the French and especially the British. We need to monitor public opinion and try to influence it."[5] The new proposals had Stalin's support; Litvinov summoned the British Ambassador, William Seeds, while he was at the theatre with his wife.[3][6] Litvinov could have had the proposals conveyed to the Embassy with a request for Seeds to visit Litvinov urgently in the morning.[7]

Litvinov had a poor opinion of Neville Chamberlain, and was not surprised Russia’s proposal for an alliance was not welcomed, but he may have been surprised by the attitude of the British Foreign Office.[7] Alexander Cadogan, in his diary, described Litvinov's proposals as "mischievous".[5][8] A Foreign Office report to the Foreign Affairs Cabinet Committee termed them 'inconvenient'.[9][7] On 7 June 1939, Winston Churchill stated he "much preferred the Russian proposals. They are simple. They are logical and conform to the main groupings of common interest." Churchill also stated the Soviet claim the Baltic States should be included in the triple guarantee was well founded.[10][11] Three years later, Britain would agree a similar pact of assistance with the Soviet Union.[12] Litvinov’s proposals were also conveyed to the French Ambassador.[13]

As soon as the proposals reached the French Government, the first reaction of Georges Bonnet, the Foreign Minister, was different from that of the British Government and Foreign Office. Bonnet saw the Soviet Ambassador Suritz, who cabled that "the first impression of the French is very favourable".[14] Britain persuaded the French Government to take no action until a common policy had been formulated. In talks between the French and the British governments, both failed to either accept or reject the proposals until after Litvinov’s dismissal on 4 May.[15] Molotov proceeded with negotiations for a pact and a military mission left for Moscow.[16]

The Foreign Office confirmed to the US chargé d’affaires on 8 August 1939 "the military mission, which had now left for Moscow, had been told to make every effort to prolong discussions until 1 October 1939".[17] Halifax disclosed to the Foreign Affairs Committee on 10 July 1939: "Although the French were in favour of the military conversations commencing, the French Government thought that the military conversations would be spun out over a long time and as long as they were taking place we should be preventing Soviet Russia from entering the German camp".[17]

Dismissal

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On 3 May 1939, Stalin replaced Litvinov, who was closely identified with the anti-German position,[18] with Vyacheslav Molotov.[19] At a prearranged meeting, Stalin said: "The Soviet Government intended to improve its relations with Hitler and if possible sign a pact with Nazi Germany. As a Jew and an avowed opponent of such a policy, Litvinov stood in the way." Litvinov argued and banged on the table. Stalin then demanded Litvinov to sign a letter of resignation.[20] On the night of Litvinov's dismissal, NKVD troops surrounded the offices of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs.[19] The telephone at Litvinov's dacha was disconnected and the following morning, Molotov, Georgy Malenkov, and Lavrenty Beria arrived at the commissariat to inform Litvinov of his dismissal.[19] Many of Litvinov's aides were arrested and beaten, possibly to extract compromising information.[19]

Hitler took Litvinov’s removal more seriously than Chamberlain.[21] The German ambassador to the Soviet Union, Schulenburg, was in Iran. Hilger, the First Secretary, was summoned to see Hitler, who asked why Stalin might have dismissed Litvinov. Hilger said: "According to my firm belief he [Stalin] had done so because Litvinov had pressed for an understanding with France and Britain while Stalin thought the Western powers were aiming to have the Soviet Union pull the chestnuts out of the fire in the event of war".[22]

Litvinov was not in disgrace;[23] he continued to attend official functions and carry out his duties as a member of the Supreme Soviet and the Central Committee.[24]

Litvinov also attended the Supreme Soviet when the budget was presented and on the occasion of Molotov's speech in support of the Nazi–Soviet Pact.[25] There was no praise or recognition of Litvinov’s work after he had held the position of Foreign Minister for nine years.[26][27] Two months later, when Litvinov applied for a passport to go to Vichy, France, to take the waters, it was refused, presumably on the grounds he might defect or abscond.[28]

According to Louis Fischer, "Litvinov never by hint or word approved of Stalin’s pact with Hitler".[29] Ivy Litvinov stated: "the Nazi-Soviet Pact had not inspired her husband with much confidence".[30] Litvinov would not have been surprised if Germany had broken any agreement and would have ensured the USSR would have been well prepared for a German invasion of its territory.[23]

Aftermath of dismissal

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Litvinov playing chess with his son Misha in 1936

According to Holroyd-Doveton, Litvinov, if he had been Foreign Commissar, would have approved the Pact. Sheinis states when foreign correspondents first asked Litvinov about the Pact, he evaded the question, but then said: "I think this calls for a closer look, because among other things enemies of the Soviet Union ascribe to me what I never said". Litvinov is reported to have told Ehrenburg: "The Pact was absolutely necessary".[31] He told foreign journalists:

The imperialists in these two countries had done everything they could to goad Hitler’s Germany against the Soviet Union by secret deals and provocative moves. In the circumstances the Soviet Union could either accept German proposals for a non-aggression treaty and thus secure a period of peace in which to redouble preparations to repulse the aggressor; or turn down Germany’s proposals and let the warmongers in the Western camp push the Soviet Union into an armed conflict with Germany in unfavourable circumstances and in a setting of complete isolation. In this situation the Soviet Government was compelled to make the difficult choice and conclude a non-aggression treaty with Germany. I, too, would probably have concluded a pact with Germany although a bit differently.[32]

Litvinov’s replacement by Molotov significantly increased Stalin's freedom to manoeuver in foreign policy.[33] The dismissal of Litvinov, whose Jewish background was viewed disfavorably by Nazi Germany, removed an obstacle to negotiations with Germany.[34] Stalin immediately directed Molotov to "purge the ministry of Jews".[1][35] Recalling Stalin's order, Molotov commented: "Thank God for these words! Jews formed an absolute majority in the leadership and among the ambassadors. It wasn't good."[35]

Given Litvinov's prior attempts to create an anti-fascist coalition, association with the doctrine of collective security with France and Britain, and pro-Western orientation by Kremlin standards, his dismissal indicated the existence of a Soviet option of rapprochement with Germany.[36] Molotov's appointment was a signal to Germany the USSR would negotiate.[36] The dismissal also signaled to France and Britain the existence of a potential negotiation option with Germany. One British official wrote Litvinov's disappearance meant the loss of an admirable technician or shock-absorber, while Molotov's modus operandi was "more truly Bolshevik than diplomatic or cosmopolitan".[37]

With regard to the signing of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact with secret protocols partitioning Eastern Europe between Germany and the USSR three months later, Hitler told military commanders; "Litvinov's replacement was decisive".[34] A German official told the Soviet Ambassador Hitler was pleased Litvinov's replacement Molotov was not Jewish.[38] Hitler also wrote to Benito Mussolini that Litvinov's dismissal demonstrated the Kremlin's readiness to alter relations with Berlin, which led to "the most extensive nonaggression pact in existence".[39] When Litvinov was asked about the reasons for his dismissal, he replied; "Do you really think that I was the right person to sign a treaty with Hitler?"[40]

American historian Jeffrey Herf views Litvinov's dismissal and the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact as conclusive proof the Nazi belief in a Jewish conspiracy that supposedly controlled the governments of the Soviet Union and other allied powers was completely false.[41]

Wartime career

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Following the Nazi–Soviet Pact, although given little official Soviet recognition, Stalin continued to respect Litvinov.[42] The British Embassy records confirm Litvinov was conspicuous at the 1939 anniversary of the Revolution by Lenin's Mausoleum. He was standing on the edge of a group that included Stalin, Molotov, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Andreev, Beria, and Dimitrov. Litvinov was in full view of the diplomatic stand of foreign journalists, some of whom had no hesitation in exchanging salutations with Litvinov. The New York Times said about thirty members of the German Trade delegation, the German Military Attaché, and members of a Finnish delegation watched the parade. The emergence of Litvinov wearing his usual flat cap was apparently a source of interest to the German delegation near the tomb; it was Litvinov’s first public appearance for several months in the company as Stalin’s entourage.[43][44] Litvinov was also in a conspicuous place at the 1940 celebration of the Russian Revolution.[45] According to Holroyd-Doveton, no meaningful position was allotted by Stalin to Litvinov.[46]

In the 21-month period between the declaration of war by France and Britain, and the invasion of the Soviet Union by Germany, Ivy Litvinov describes this period of her life.[47] She said the family spent their time with their daughter-in-law in their dacha 27 kilometres (17 miles) from Moscow [47] and outside school holidays in the family apartment in Moscow, when they spent long weekends in the country. For two years, the family played bridge, read music, and went on long walks in the countryside with their two dogs.[48]

On 21 February 1941, Litvinov was dismissed from the Central Committee of the Communist Party on the pretext of his inability to discharge his obligations as a member of the Committee.[47] According to Pope, he was dismissed because Stalin wanted to give no offence to the Germans.[49] Litvinov said: "My more than 40 years in the Party oblige me to say what I think about what has happened. I do not understand why I am being dealt with in such a peremptory style."[50]

Stalin rejected everything Litvinov had said. When Stalin stopped speaking, Litvinov asked: "Does that mean you consider me an enemy of the people?" Stalin answered: "We do not consider you an enemy of the people, but an honest revolutionary".[51]

Litvinov had followed with anxiety the steady advance of Hitler’s armies across Europe and wondered how long Britain could hold out unsupported.[52] Even to Litvinov, the German invasion of the Soviet Union was a surprise; he did not believe Hitler would risk embarking on a second front at this stage of the war.[47]

German invasion of the USSR

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The Soviet leaders, as well as Litvinov, were concerned Britain might come to an agreement with Germany.[51] Litvinov was worried Rudolf Hess's flight meant Britain was about to make peace with Germany.[51] Litvinov stated all believed the British fleet was steaming up the North Sea for a joint attack with Germany on Leningrad and Kronstadt.[53] The same day the German invasion of the USSR began, Churchill announced Britain’s intention to give full aid to the Soviet Union.[51] When Litvinov heard of Churchill’s broadcast, he was much relieved.[54] Nevertheless, Litvinov was suspicious of the British aristocracy.[51]

  1. ^ a b Herf, Jeffrey (2006) The Jewish Enemy: Nazi Propaganda During World War II and the Holocaust. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. pp. 97–98. ISBN 0674027388
  2. ^ "Maksim Litvinov". Encyclopaedia Britannica.
  3. ^ a b Soviet Peace Efforts, No. 158. 11 April 1939. p. 260.
  4. ^ Soviet Peace Efforts, No. 158. p. 347.
  5. ^ a b Carley, Michael J. 1939; The Alliance That Never Was. p. 124.
  6. ^ Holroyd-Doveton, J. Maxim Litvinov. p. 347.
  7. ^ a b c Holroyd-Doveton, J. Maxim Litvinov. p. 349.
  8. ^ Cadogan, Alexander. Diaries 1938-1945. p. 175.
  9. ^ CAB 27, 624, 309.
  10. ^ Cite error: The named reference Maxim Litvinoff, a Biography was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  11. ^ Herald Tribune. 7 June 1939. p. 7.
  12. ^ Holroyd-Doveton, J. Maxim Litvinov. p. 427.
  13. ^ Holroyd-Doveton, J. Maxim Litvinov. p. 329.
  14. ^ Carley, Michael J. 1939; The Alliance That Never Was. pp. 129–130.
  15. ^ Holroyd-Doveton, J. Maxim Litvinov. p. 350.
  16. ^ Holroyd-Doveton, J. Maxim Litvinov. p. 363.
  17. ^ a b Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS). Vol. 1. 1939. p. 294.
  18. ^ Cite error: The named reference britannica was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  19. ^ a b c d Nekrich, p. 109
  20. ^ Fischer, Louis (1952). Life and Death of Stalin. Harper. p. 62.
  21. ^ Holroyd-Doveton, J. Maxim Litvinov. p. 359.
  22. ^ Hilger, Gustav. Incompatible Allies. pp. 295–296.
  23. ^ a b Holroyd-Doveton (March 2013). Maxim Litvinov: A Biography. p. 370. ISBN 978-0957296107.
  24. ^ Schuman, Frederick (1940). "Night Over Europe". The Scientific Monthly. 51 (4): 233. Bibcode:1940SciMo..51..365F.
  25. ^ Foreign Office: General Correspondence. Vol. FO/371/23685. p. 96.
  26. ^ "The New York Times, 1 June 1939, pg. 13".
  27. ^ Foreign Office: General Correspondence. Vol. FO/371/23685. p. 72.
  28. ^ Murray, Nora. I Spied for Stalin. p. 125.
  29. ^ Fisher, Louis. Great Challenge. p. 46.
  30. ^ Ivy Litvinov Archives. Stanford University. pp. Box 8.
  31. ^ Ehrenburg, Ilya. Post-War Years: 1945-1954. p. 1.
  32. ^ Sheinis, Zinovy. Maxim Litvinov. p. 305.
  33. ^ Resis, p. 47
  34. ^ a b Nekrich, p. 110
  35. ^ a b Resis, p. 35
  36. ^ a b Resis, p. 51
  37. ^ Watson, Derek (2000). "Molotov's Apprenticeship in Foreign Policy: The Triple Alliance Negotiations in 1939". Europe-Asia Studies. 52 (4): 695–722 (698–699). doi:10.1080/713663077. JSTOR 153322. S2CID 144385167.
  38. ^ Brackman, Roman (2001) The Secret File of Joseph Stalin: a Hidden Life. London: Frank Cass. pp. 333–334. ISBN 0714684023
  39. ^ Nekrich, p. 119
  40. ^ Israeli, Victor (2003) On the Battlefields of the Cold War: A Soviet Ambassador's Confession. University Park, PA: Penn State Press. p. 110. ISBN 0271022973
  41. ^ Herf, Jeffrey (2006). The Jewish Enemy: Nazi Propaganda during the World War II and the Holocaust. Harvard University Press. p. 56. ISBN 978-0-674038-59-2.
  42. ^ Holroyd-Doveton (March 2013). Maxim Litvinov: A Biography. p. 372. ISBN 978-0957296107.
  43. ^ "The New York Times, 8 November 1939, pg. 10".
  44. ^ Foreigh Office: General Correspondence. Vol. FO/371/ 23685. p. 183.
  45. ^ "The New York Times, 8 November 1940, pg. 6".
  46. ^ Holroyd-Doveton. Maxim Litvinov: A Biography. p. 374.
  47. ^ a b c d Holroyd-Doveton, J. Maxim Litvinov. p. 375.
  48. ^ "Life Magazine". 12 October 1942. p. 124.
  49. ^ Pope, Arthur. Maxim Litvinov. p. 460.
  50. ^ Bryant, Christopher. Stafford Cripps. p. 241.
  51. ^ a b c d e Foreign Office, General Correspondence. Vol. FO95431.
  52. ^ Ivy Litvinov Archives.
  53. ^ Cadogan, Alexander (May 2010). The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan. p. 356. ISBN 978-0571269853.
  54. ^ Holroyd-Doveton, J. Maxim Litvinov. p. 428.
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