Hannah Porter
— Wikipedian  —
Name
Hannah Porter
Born25th April 1989
Current locationSouthampton, UK
Education and employment
OccupationStudent
EducationCurrently studying Psychology BSc
Contact info
Emailhannahporter25@hotmail.co.uk

My name is Hannah Porter and I am currently studying for a degree in Psychology at the University of Southampton. The modules I am partaking in this Semester include Psychosocial issues in Oncology, Forensic Psychology and the Psychology of Self and Identity. I am also in the process of researching for my Literature Review. For that I am looking into research on teaching children with Autism to recognise emotion.


On a more related note... For Self and Identity, I am updating, rewriting and hopefully bettering the Wikipedia article on Self-categorization theory.


I decided to keep the Group Psychology section from the current article, but aside from that all the rest is my work.


Current Article

edit

Self-categorization theory, sometimes referred to as the social identity theory of the group, seeks to explain the assumptions that need to be made about psychological group formation in order to understand social categorization studies on intergroup behavior conducted by Henri Tajfel. To do this, self-categorization theory develops the concept of social identity and the assumption of an “interpersonal-intergroup continuum” of social behavior. It draws from the ideas of group psychology, individualism, and interactionism to produce a framework for group interaction and its impact on development of the self-concept presented in social identity theory.

Theory

edit

Self-categorization theory further develops social identity theory by noting that self-conception occurs on multiple levels of inclusiveness. Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, and Wetherell suggest that there are at least three levels of self-categorization that serve as important factors in the social self-concept. The superordinate level of the self as human being bases self-categorization on one’s identity as a human being with similarites to other humans versus alternate life forms. The intermediate level of ingroup-outgroup categorizations is based on social similarities and differences. This intermediate level focuses on the membership in social groups such as classifying oneself as African-American, male, or working class. The subordinate level of personal self-categorizations is based on differences between the person as a unique individual and other ingroup members.

According to the theory, people self-categorize “depending on whether a social categorization into ingroup and outgroup can meaningfully be applied to the current social context". In one setting, it may be more advantageous for someone to group himself according to race whereas in another setting, benefit may be derived from categorizing himself based on educational experience. People may also categorize themselves within a subset of a larger group in a nested pattern of sorts, choosing to identify with a smaller group to which positive attributes are ascribed, but dissociate from the broader, encompassing group to which negative attributes are attached. The idea is that there is a tendency for one to categorize himself in the group that will provide association with a higher status.

Where there are groups similar to the one in which a person has categorized himself, the theory asserts that the ingroup will seek to distinguish itself from the outgroup by attributing negative distinctions to the outgroup or bolstering the positive aspects of the ingroup. In this way, the member of the ingroup is able to construct a group prototype, defined as “a fuzzy set of features defining and prescribing essential properties of the group". These prototypes are based on the metacontrast principle which contends that people “maximize the ratio of intergroup differences to intragroup differences”. By establishing such a ratio of differences, the group is capable of appearing as coherent and distinct with structure and clear boundaries.

In the sense that the group prototypes describe members and their behavior, these prototypes can also stipulate appropriate behavior for ingroup members and outgroup members. This, in turn, aids in group distinctiveness and positive differentiation as a strategy for intergroup comparison. Operating upon group prototypes, members will begin to see and describe themselves in group terms rather than as an individual member. In this way, the group member has formed stereotypes of themselves within the ingroup (self-stereotyping) and stereotypes of the outgroup. This directly corresponds to the claim that self-categorization “depersonalizes perception and conduct such that members, including oneself, are not processed as complex, multidimensional whole persons but rather as embodiments of the contextually salient group prototype."

Group Psychology

edit

The idea of group psychology came about prior to empirical testing and is highly associated with the assertions of LeBon, McDougall, and Freud. LeBon (1896) professed that mental unity is what defined a psychological crowd, not its physical proximity. He further stated that it is within this “collective mind” that the individual gets lost, as one begins to think in terms of the group instead of utilizing the individual cognitive process. The “collective mind” can be broken down into three processes: the de-individualization process, contagion, and suggestion or suggestibility. De-individualization produces a loss of personal identity and a feeling of superior power (as a member of the group) and loss of the constraint one would exhibit as an individual. Contagion is the dispersion of group emotion and action which leads to group homogeneity. Finally, suggestion or suggestibility refers to submission to the influence of contagion.

LeBon’s (1896) overall suggestion is that group behavior is based on emotional impulses and displays logical inferiority to the otherwise rational individual members. McDougall (1921) agreed with LeBon’s notion of the “collective mind” in which the group is cognitively inferior to the individual and further stated that the group actually degrades the individual. However, McDougall added a social aspect to the notion of the group mind, asserting that:

the individual minds which enter into the structure of the group mind…do not construct
it; rather, as they come to reflective self-consciousness, they find themselves already
members of the system, moulded by it, sharing in its activities, influenced by it at
every moment in every thought and feeling and action…but the parts in the several
individual minds reciprocally imply and complement one another and together make up the
system which consists wholly of them. (p. 11)

Overall, McDougall (1921) disagreed with the notion of collective consciousness or uncosciousness and stressed that the group mind does not collectively act as a “supra-personal being outside of the individual mind”(p. 7). In other words, a group can be better or worse than its individual members, but does not exhibit a sort of hypnotic force over the members so that it is more powerful than the individuals it possesses. In McDougall’s framework, a psychological group consisted of people within the same social context that exhibit the same emotions, each person being affected by the emotion of other group members with eventual awareness of their membership in the group.

Freud’s (1921) contention correlates with some of the ideas of both LeBon (1896) and McDougall (1921). The main distinction in Freud’s theory is the entrance of eroticism in that group formation is based on sexual-emotional ties. Freud also suggested that the psychological group represented an automatic uncognizant controlling force on the members by the leader. Overall, the three researchers share the ideas that individuals act differently in groups, group behavior is based more on instincts and emotions whereas individual behavior would be based on logic, and group psychology both reflects and shapes self-perception and identity.

Apart from group psychology is the idea of individualism, an approach supported by F. H. Allport (1924). Allport rejected the idea of a group mind and the group concept as a whole. Allport suggested that there is no group psychology, only that of the individual. All groups are made up of individual members with individual psychological processes. Thus, the only way a group can exist is as an aggregate of individuals. There is, therefore, no group attittude or behavior, but attitudes and behaviors of individuals. People behave differently in groups because they alter their actions to fit the situation. This is not an influence of the group or group psychology, but rather an effect of the social context.

In his theory of social facilitation, Allport (1924) argued that “the sight and sound of others doing the same thing as oneself functioned as conditioned social stimuli to release and augment learned reaction tendencies previously existing in individuals” (p. 10). Individuals do not change to become like the group. They simply modify their normal behavior within the social construct of the group. In this way, the individual conforms temporarily to the group, but never loses their individuality.

The work of Sherif, Asch, and Lewin drew upon the ideas of group psychology and individualism. The three cognitive social psychologists rejected the concept of group mind, but supported the idea of group psychology. In other words, they agreed with McDougall (1921) that individuals are influenced psychologically in group settings and this influence results in the adoption of group norms and stereotypes by the group member. They disagreed with Allport (1924), stressing rather that the group concept lends itself to the explanation of individuals.

Sherif, Asch, and Lewin were all influenced by Gestalt psychology, which rested on the notion that the whole was different from the sum of its parts. This gives credibility to the study of group psychology and the introduction of the law of interdependence of parts which states:

when the organism is stimulated by different parts of a stimulus field, the parts fall
into a functional relationship and each part influences the other parts. The result is…
that the properties of any part are determined by its membership in the total functional
system.(Sherif, 1936, p. 84)

Sherif’s (1936) group research centered on the premises of context, social norms and values, self-identity, and the psychological process of the formation of norms.

Asch’s (1952) interactionism study emphasized perceived flaws in Allport’s (1924) concept of individualism. Asch asserted that individualism does not properly explain the relationship between the individual and the group, failing to recognize that membership within a group enhances the individual’s personal identity. On the other hand, the stimulus-response of social interaction did not fully grasp the psychological processing that envelops human interaction and subsequent group formation.

Lewin argued that groups were not simply a sum of their parts. He viewed intragroup relations as being influential to a person’s self and further described the individual and group as interdependent.1 Lewin deemed groups to be an important variable in understanding, explaining, and changing the behavior of individuals within the group. Individual behavior, as derived from Lewin’s perspective, was “socially and psychologically transformed and determined by group membership” (p. 17).

The concepts of the group mind, individualism, and interactionism presented a problem in the area of psychology that eventually caused contemporary researchers to delve into the area of group psychology. Research focused on establishing that there is, in fact, a group that is worth empirical study and further development of framework of the group and its relation to the self-concept. This research led to the development of such theories as social identity and self-categorization.

References

edit

Allport, F. H. (1924). Social psychology. New York: Houghton, Mifflin.

Biernat, M., Vescio, T. K., & Green, M. L. (1996). Selective self-stereotyping. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71, 1194-1209.

Chattopadhyay, P., George, E., & Lawrence, S. A. (2004). Why does dissimilarity matter? Exploring self-categorization, self-enhancement, and uncertainty reduction. Journal of Applied Psychology, 89, 892-900.

Freud, S. (1921). Group psychology and the analysis of the ego. London: Hogarth Press.

Grieve, P. G., & Hogg, M. A. (1999). Subjective uncertainty and intergroup discrimination in the minimal group situation. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 25, 926-940.

Hewstone, M. (2000). Contact and categorization: Social psychological interventions to change intergroup relations. In C. Stangor, Stereotypes and prejudices (pp. 394-418). Philadelphia, PA: Psychology Press.

Hogg, M. A. & Reid, S. A. (2006). Social identity, self-categorization, and the communication of group norms. In Communication Theory (16th ed., pp. 7-30). International Communication Association.

Hogg, M. A. & Hains, S. C. (1996). Intergroup relations and group solidarity: Effects of group identification and social beliefs on depersonalized attraction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70, 295-309.

Jetten, J., Spears, R., & Manstead, A. S. (1996). Intergroup norms and intergroup discrimination: Distinctive self-categorization and social identity effects. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71(6), 1222-1233.

LeBon, G. (1895, translated 1947). The crowd: A study of the popular mind. London: Ernest Benn (also Unwin, 1896).

McDougall, W. (1921). The group mind. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Sherif, M. (1936). The psychology of social norms. New York: Harper.

Simon, B. Hastedt, C., & Aufderheide, B. (1997). When self-categorization makes sense: The role of meaningful social categorization in minority and majority members' self-perception. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 73, 310-320.

Tafjel, H. & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In W. G. Austin, & S. Worchel, The social psychology of intergroup relations (pp. 33-47). Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.

Turner, J. C., Hogg, M. A., Oakes, P. J., Reicher, S. D., & Wetherell, M. (1987). Rediscovering the social group: A self-categorization theory. Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell.


Category:Social psychology




My Wiki Project

edit

Self-Categorization Theory

edit

Definition

edit

Self-categorization theory says that when a person greatly identifies with a group, they will begin to categorize themselves within that group and subsequently will take on the identity of the group rather than their own individual identity. This is called depersonalization. They become one part of the group entity, an indistinguishable representative.


A prototypical group member is one who epitomizes everything that the group stands for. A highly prototypical member will be well respected and of high status.


Self-categorization theory emphasizes the difference between the ingroup and the outgroup. People who strongly identify with the ingroup will avoid being at all similar to the outgroup. This may become a subconscious desire once the views of the group are internalized.

It is closely related to social identity theory.


Group Psychology (Taken from previous article)

edit

The idea of group psychology came about prior to empirical testing and is highly associated with the assertions of LeBon, McDougall, and Freud. LeBon (1896)[1] professed that mental unity is what defined a psychological crowd, not its physical proximity. He further stated that it is within this “collective mind” that the individual gets lost, as one begins to think in terms of the group instead of utilizing the individual cognitive process. The “collective mind” can be broken down into three processes: the de-individualization process, contagion, and suggestion or suggestibility. De-individualization produces a loss of personal identity and a feeling of superior power (as a member of the group) and loss of the constraint one would exhibit as an individual. Contagion is the dispersion of group emotion and action which leads to group homogeneity. Finally, suggestion or suggestibility refers to submission to the influence of contagion.


LeBon’s (1896) overall suggestion is that group behavior is based on emotional impulses and displays logical inferiority to the otherwise rational individual members. McDougall (1921)[2] agreed with LeBon’s notion of the “collective mind” in which the group is cognitively inferior to the individual and further stated that the group actually degrades the individual. However, McDougall added a social aspect to the notion of the group mind, asserting that:

the individual minds which enter into the structure of the group mind…do not construct
it; rather, as they come to reflective self-consciousness, they find themselves already
members of the system, moulded by it, sharing in its activities, influenced by it at
every moment in every thought and feeling and action…but the parts in the several
individual minds reciprocally imply and complement one another and together make up the
system which consists wholly of them. (p. 11)


Overall, McDougall (1921) disagreed with the notion of collective consciousness or uncosciousness and stressed that the group mind does not collectively act as a “supra-personal being outside of the individual mind”(p. 7). In other words, a group can be better or worse than its individual members, but does not exhibit a sort of hypnotic force over the members so that it is more powerful than the individuals it possesses. In McDougall’s framework, a psychological group consisted of people within the same social context that exhibit the same emotions, each person being affected by the emotion of other group members with eventual awareness of their membership in the group.


Freud’s (1921)[3] contention correlates with some of the ideas of both LeBon (1896) and McDougall (1921). The main distinction in Freud’s theory is the entrance of eroticism in that group formation is based on sexual-emotional ties. Freud also suggested that the psychological group represented an automatic uncognizant controlling force on the members by the leader. Overall, the three researchers share the ideas that individuals act differently in groups, group behavior is based more on instincts and emotions whereas individual behavior would be based on logic, and group psychology both reflects and shapes self-perception and identity.


Apart from group psychology is the idea of individualism, an approach supported by F. H. Allport (1924)[4]. Allport rejected the idea of a group mind and the group concept as a whole. Allport suggested that there is no group psychology, only that of the individual. All groups are made up of individual members with individual psychological processes. Thus, the only way a group can exist is as an aggregate of individuals. There is, therefore, no group attittude or behavior, but attitudes and behaviors of individuals. People behave differently in groups because they alter their actions to fit the situation. This is not an influence of the group or group psychology, but rather an effect of the social context.


In his theory of social facilitation, Allport (1924) argued that “the sight and sound of others doing the same thing as oneself functioned as conditioned social stimuli to release and augment learned reaction tendencies previously existing in individuals” (p. 10). Individuals do not change to become like the group. They simply modify their normal behavior within the social construct of the group. In this way, the individual conforms temporarily to the group, but never loses their individuality.


The work of Sherif, Asch, and Lewin drew upon the ideas of group psychology and individualism. The three cognitive social psychologists rejected the concept of group mind, but supported the idea of group psychology. In other words, they agreed with McDougall (1921) that individuals are influenced psychologically in group settings and this influence results in the adoption of group norms and stereotypes by the group member. They disagreed with Allport (1924), stressing rather that the group concept lends itself to the explanation of individuals.


Sherif, Asch, and Lewin were all influenced by Gestalt psychology, which rested on the notion that the whole was different from the sum of its parts. This gives credibility to the study of group psychology and the introduction of the law of interdependence of parts which states:

when the organism is stimulated by different parts of a stimulus field, the parts fall
into a functional relationship and each part influences the other parts. The result is…
that the properties of any part are determined by its membership in the total functional
system.(Sherif, 1936, p. 84)


Sherif’s (1936)[5] group research centered on the premises of context, social norms and values, self-identity, and the psychological process of the formation of norms.


Asch’s (1952) interactionism study emphasized perceived flaws in Allport’s (1924) concept of individualism. Asch asserted that individualism does not properly explain the relationship between the individual and the group, failing to recognize that membership within a group enhances the individual’s personal identity. On the other hand, the stimulus-response of social interaction did not fully grasp the psychological processing that envelops human interaction and subsequent group formation.


Lewin argued that groups were not simply a sum of their parts. He viewed intragroup relations as being influential to a person’s self and further described the individual and group as interdependent.1 Lewin deemed groups to be an important variable in understanding, explaining, and changing the behavior of individuals within the group. Individual behavior, as derived from Lewin’s perspective, was “socially and psychologically transformed and determined by group membership” (p. 17).


The concepts of the group mind, individualism, and interactionism presented a problem in the area of psychology that eventually caused contemporary researchers to delve into the area of group psychology. Research focused on establishing that there is, in fact, a group that is worth empirical study and further development of framework of the group and its relation to the self-concept. This research led to the development of such theories as social identity and self-categorization.


Self-categorization and Ingroup bias

edit

The ingroup bias is a large part of self-categorization. When a person categorizes themselves strongly within a group, they consequently form an “us and them” mindset. People will identify only with those in their ingroup and will avoid anything that could associate them with the outgroup (anyone other than their group). The bias relates to them thinking that they are better than others and always right. This obviously varies according to how strong their bond is to the group. Group members become depersonalized and conform to a group identity and a group mentality. They are no longer just individuals, but are now a group, considered as a single entity.


Hall and Crisp (2008)[6] looked at varying levels of commitment to the ingroup (either age or gender) and found that as participants’ identification with the ingroup increased, so did their perception of being more distinct from the outgroup. This was echoed in their performance in the tasks undertaken. This finding was attributed to an unconscious desire to be different to the outgroup and also to self-stereotyping both themselves as individuals and as part of the group. The participants were thought to have self-categorized into a group then internalized their perceived stereotype of that group.


There tends to be a lot of competition between the ingroup and the outgroup, the ingroup obviously wanting to be better. A number of studies by Pettit and Lount Jr. (2010)[7] looked at the effects of intergroup status differences on performance. Those who believed that their performance in a task would be compared to an outgroup member of lower status, worked harder and consequently performed better than both the control group and the group who were told their work would be compared to another member of the ingroup. This desire to be better than the outgroup, as an individual, may stem from a need to reaffirm and defend their self-categorization and status within the group. In one of their studies Pettit and Lount Jr. found that threat to the ingroup member’s prototypicality and possible loss of membership to the group was a much stronger motivator than purely the challenge of beating the outgroup’s performance. Those who self or group-affirmed before taking part in the task displayed less effort in completing the task than those who did not reaffirm their place within the group, and were therefore seen as being less affected by threat. There are of course limitations to this research as not all extraneous variables could be taken into account and therefore the results found could be attributed to other factors. Despite this, the work of Pettit and Lount Jr. supports and contributes greatly to the theories of self-categorization and identity threat.


Laughter is highly infectious, except when it’s coming from the outgroup. Hearing laughter induces more laughter and smiles in an audience; however when it is the outgroup being heard laughing, the reaction is significantly less[8]. This again shows a need to not identify or be similar to the outgroup, even if just sharing the same sense of humour.


A study by Levine et al. (2002)[9] aimed to give further explanation of bystander non-intervention. They suggested that it is not only the amount of people in the bystander group, but who those people are. They found that people were less likely to intercede if they identified best with the bystander group, however if the bystanders are in the outgroup, they will have little effect on the person. Additionally, if the victim is part of their ingroup, a person is more likely to help than if they are in the outgroup.


Changing which group a person most strongly categorizes themselves within can alter their feelings towards an outgroup. Ray et al. (2008)[10] manipulated whether a person self-categorized into the American ingroup or the student ingroup, then asked them their views on Muslims and the police. More anger was felt towards Muslims by those who were guided towards self-categorizing themselves into the American ingroup than those who self-categorized as students. Those who self-categorized as Americans were also more likely to feel respect towards police, than those who self-categorized as students.



Self-categorization and Leadership

edit

Leadership depends strongly on the self-categorization of members to the group.

Hogg and van Knippenberg (2003)[11] created the Social Identity Model of Leadership, which proposes that if a leader is highly prototypical of the group they are leading and are acting with the best interests of the group, they are almost certainly going to be followed. This becomes truer as the group members become increasingly more committed to the group in which they categorize themselves. The closer the leader is to the prototypical group member, the more they are seen to embody the values of the group.

They highlight four things that make a person more leader-like and therefore more likely to be followed:

    • Those group members who are highly prototypical tend to be more knowledgeable about the group prototype than those lesser prototypical group members, so can educate others and are often turned to in times of uncertainty. This is obviously a trait of a leader.
    • Highly prototypical group members are also liked more than other members, as they differ most from outgroup members and are most characteristic of the group identity. This makes them more popular and subsequently gives them a higher status. People are more likely to follow someone they like and respect.
    • Where prototypical members stand out from the crowd, they are often seen to display leadership qualities. These are attributed to the internal traits of the person rather than situation, making the highly prototypical member more likely to be followed
    • It is also very important for the leader to care about the group it is leading and its values. Those who do this are also seen to be better leaders.


Cicero et al. (2008) [12]built upon van Knippenberg and Hogg’s model, suggesting that if a leader’s effectiveness was based on their prototypicality, employee’s work effort should also be based on this. Greater self-categorization into the group enhances the degree to which leader effectiveness is determined by the leader’s prototypicality. Thus a strongly self-categorized employee should respond well to a prototypical leader, and the quality of their work should be enhanced by this. Cicero et al. (2008) looked at how well team identification and leader prototypicality predicted self-reported levels of work efforts. Using questionnaires, they measured the strength of the participant’s attachment to their job and to the company, their views on the team leader, and the effort they put into their work. Team identification alone did not correlate with work effort; however, when combined with leader prototypicality a significant correlation was found. A further regression analysis identified that the work effort of those with higher team identification was significantly more likely to be affected by leader prototypicality than that of those with low team identification which was found to be non-significant. Being correlational, this evidence cannot be used to determine cause, only highlight the relationship between the variables.



Where self-categorization can be functional

edit

There are many instances where self-categorization can be used for good. Some of the studies previously mentioned have implications that could be used to better society or improve performance.


Cicero et al. (2008) showed how self-categorization can ultimately enhance employee’s performance, by teaching team leaders how to lead effectively. If the points outlined in the Social Identity Model of Leadership are followed, productivity should improve because of workers applying greater effort. The study by Pettit and Lount Jr. (2010) shows how self-categorization can encourage people to perform better, in the face of social identity threat, to maintain their status within their ingroup. This can push people to want to do better and work harder. Ray et al. (2008) showed that if you can influence a person to self-categorize in a different direction, you could potentially change their views and ultimately lessen people’s destructive thoughts and behaviours towards others. The findings from Levine et al’s bystander non-intervention study (2002) could be used to find ways to encourage bystander intervention.


A study by Johnston and White (2003)[13] looked into binge-drinking in University students. The act of binge-drinking is a well known stereotype of the student identity. With this being the ingroup norm, it is understandable why those who have self-categorized into this group are likely to engage in this behaviour. Applying the theory of planned behaviour to binge-drinking, they found that those who identified most with the ingroup felt more pressure to binge-drink, therefore had a greater intention of binge-drinking. The implications of this research may have the ability to reduce binge-drinking in students. “Interventions designed to reduce students’ binge-drinking should aim to target the impact of groups that link strongly to the enactment of excessive alcohol consumption; in this instance, friends and peers at university. University-based campaigns could try to weaken the link between the identity of university friendship groups and excessive drinking, and, instead, strengthen the link between university friendship groups and the execution of more healthy behaviours such as sporting and other recreational pursuits.”


Social capital theory suggests that social networking and social trust are important and can aid productivity. Many companies join with voluntary organizations to put back into society. Things like this can teach useful skills to members like cooperation, trust, tolerance and reciprocity and enlighten them about cultures and other things they never knew. It is thought that it is the views of the group rather than the individual employees that relate to social trust. Due to it being the group identity that is being influenced, individual opinions and social backgrounds have little impact. Because people self-categorize into the group, they will take on the universal views and may make a permanent change to their personal identity also. Social capital is very influential and has the ability to make a difference in society. Transferring the social norms of the volunteer groups to the companies can improve the values of all the workers and make them more productive and better people. [14]


edit

Self and Identity Task Force


References

edit
  1. ^ LeBon, G. (1895, translated 1947). The crowd: A study of the popular mind. London: Ernest Benn (also Unwin, 1896).
  2. ^ McDougall, W. (1921). The group mind. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
  3. ^ Freud, S. (1921). Group psychology and the analysis of the ego. London: Hogarth Press.
  4. ^ Allport, F. H. (1924). Social psychology. New York: Houghton, Mifflin.
  5. ^ Sherif, M. (1936). The psychology of social norms. New York: Harper.
  6. ^ Hall, N. R. & Crisp, R. J. (2008). Assimilation and contrast to group primes: The moderating role of ingroup identification. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 44, 344–353
  7. ^ Pettit, N. C., & Lount Jr., R. B. (2010) Looking down and ramping up: The impact of status differences on effort in intergroup contexts. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 46, 9–20
  8. ^ Platow, M. J., Haslam, S. A., Both, A.., Chew, I., Cuddon, M., Goharpey, N., Maurer, J., Rosini, S., Tsekouras, A., & Grace, D. M. (2005) “It’s not funny if they’re laughing”: Self-categorization, social influence, and responses to canned laughter. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 41, 542–550
  9. ^ Levine, M., Cassidy, C., Brazier, G., & Reicher, S. (2002) Self-Categorization and Bystander Non-intervention: Two Experimental Studies. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 32 (7), 1452-1463
  10. ^ Ray, D. G., Mackie, D. M., Rydell, R. J., & Smith, E. R. (2008) Changing categorization of self can change emotions about outgroups. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 44, 1210–1213
  11. ^ Van Knippenberg, D. & Hogg, M. A. (2003). A Social Identity Model Of Leadership Effectiveness In Organizations. Research in Organizational Behavior, 25, 243–295
  12. ^ Cicero, L., Bonaiuto, M., Pierro, A., & Van Knippenberg, D. (2008). Employees’ work effort as a function of leader group prototypicality: the moderating role of team identification. Revue européenne de psychologie appliqué, 58, 117–124
  13. ^ Johnston, K. L., & White, K. M. (2003). Binge-Drinking: A Test of the Role of Group Norms in the Theory of Planned Behaviour, Psychology and Health, 18 (1), 63 - 77
  14. ^ Zmerli, S. (September, 2007). How social identity and self-categorization theory can enrich the concept of social capital. Unpublished paper presented at 4th ECPR General Conference, Pisa, Italy

Boxes

edit
 This user is a psychologist.