| This user is a student editor in Wikipedia:Wiki_Ed/Yale_University/Beyond_Representative_Government_(fall_2015). Student assignments should always be carried out using a course page set up by the instructor. It is usually best to develop assignments in your sandbox. After evaluation, the additions may go on to become a Wikipedia article or be published in an existing article. |
Holly is pretty cool. I like her a lot. Maybe we should hang out sometime. ~~~~
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lotocracy - I was shocked to realize that there is not even a stub for "Lotocracy." I was truly fascinated by Manin's detailed arguments for its validity and the historical accounts of it existence in Florence and Venice. I would love to research it further and create a strong page for it.
Upon further research, I realized that there is an existing page for Sortition that is quite weak at the moment. I am going to improve this page as my project.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peacekeeping#Gender_and_Peacekeeping - The role of women within international peacekeeping efforts has been sorely misrepresented. I am interested in researching the ways in which women have specifically shaped post-conflict processes.
Matching funds - The current article on matching funds is woefully incomplete. I would be interested in learning more about electoral fundraising and contributing substantially to this article.
Hi Holly! Here are the edits I made to the wikipedia article "matching funds"
Prior to a 2011 Supreme Court decision, states like Arizona, Maine, New Mexico, North Carolina, and Wisconsin were using a system that distributed "additional funding to publicly financed candidates when they face big-spending opponents or opposition groups."[1] The combined cases, Arizona Free Enterprise Fund v. Bennett (2011) and McComish v. Bennett (2011) held that "the law impermissibly forces private candidates and independent political organizations to either restrain their spending or risk triggering matching funds to their publicly financed opponents."[1]
Now, states and cities are considering the implementation of programs like New York City's public financing model where public funds are used to multiply the impact of a small donor. These programs work by making each contribution worth more than their current value, thereby increasing the proportional impact of the contribution.[2] In New York City, for example, a $6-to-$1 program has resulted in "small dollar donors constitute the vast majority of spending in New York City elections, representing 73% of all contributions in 2013 and 80% specifically to City Council race."[3] A report by the Brennan Center found that "by pumping up the value of small contributions, the New York City system gives [candidates] an incentive to reach out to their own constituents rather than focusing all their attention on wealthy out-of-district donors, leading them to attract more diverse donors into the political process."[4]
Programs of this type incentivize candidates to "fuse fundraising with voter outreach," incentivizing political engagement by communities that can only afford modest contributions. Candidates may then have more an incentive to reach out to their constituents, rather than devoting their energy to financing their campaigns.[2] The Election Law Journal found that matching funds through a multiplier has increased the proportional role of small donors as well as the number of small donors. The programs have also helped to shift the demographic and class profile of those who give. Finally, besides diluting the power of major givers, these programs led candidates to reach out and engage a more representative set of constituents during fundraising.[5]
Training for Students complete!