Folk Psychology can be described as the embodiment of understanding the causal structure of human action [1] In other words, it is the practice of attributing mentality to the everyday understanding the mind[2]. A key feature, nomenclature of processes and items encountered in daily life (e.g. pain, pleasure, excitement, anxiety, etc.) are grounded in the use of common linguistic terms as opposed to technical or scientific jargon.[3] Folk psychology and analogy are invariably linked, with the both concepts having evolved as a result of the relationship they have with each other[4]. Once technical terms is stripped, the easiest way to describe something is through references to familiar items. In this way, the union between analogy and folk psychology was inevitable.

Traditionally, the study of folk psychology has focused on how everyday people—those without formal training in the various academic fields of science—go about attributing mental states. This domain has primarily been centred on intentional states reflective of an individual's beliefs and desires; each described in terms of everyday language and concepts such as “beliefs”, "desires”, “fear”, and “hope"[5]. As a result of this amongst other intrinsic factors, the domain's scope, method, and contributions are consistently subjects of dispute in many scientific quarters.


Key Folk-Concepts

edit

Intentionality

edit

When perceiving, explaining, or criticizing human behaviour, people distinguish between intentional and unintentional actions[6]. An evaluation of an action as stemming from purposeful action or accidental circumstances is the key determinant in social interaction. For example, a critical remark that is judged to be intentional on the part of the receiver of the message can be viewed as a hurtful insult. Conversely, if considered unintentional, the same remark may be dismissed and forgiven.

This folk concept of intentionality is used to distinguish between intentional and unintentional behaviour in sports where intentional fouls are punished more harshly than ones deemed to be unintentional. It is also applied in the legal system in terms of criminal law distinguishing between murder and manslaughter.

The importance of this concept transcends almost all aspects of everyday life: with empirical studies in social and developmental psychology exploring perceived intentionality’s role as a mediator for aggression, relationship conflict, judgments of responsibility blame or punishment[7][8]

Recent empirical literature on folk psychology has shown that people’s theories regarding intentional actions is comprised of four distinct factors: beliefs, desires, causal histories, and enabling factors[9]. Here, beliefs and desires represent the central variables responsible for the folk theories of intention.

Desires embody outcomes that an individual seeks, including those that are impossible to achieve [1]. The key difference between desires and intentions is that desires can be purely hypothetical, whereas intentions specify an outcome that the individual is actually trying to bring to fruition [1].

In terms of beliefs, there are several types that are relevant to intentions—outcome beliefs and ability beliefs. Outcome beliefs are beliefs as to whether a given action will fulfill an intention, as in “purchasing a new watch will impress my friends” [10]. Ability consist of an acotr’s conviction regarding his or her ability to perform an action, as in “ I really can afford the new watch”. In light of this, Heider postulated that ability beliefs could be attributed with causing individuals to from goals that would not otherwise have been entertained[11].

Comprehension and Prediction

edit

The Context Model

Folk psychology is crucial to evaluating and ultimately understanding novel concepts and items. Developed by Medin, Altom, and Murphy, the Context Model[12] hypothesizes that as a result of mental models in the form of prototype and exemplar representations, individuals are able to more accurately represent and comprehend the environment around them.

According to the model, the overall similarity between the prototype and a given instance if a category is evaluated based on multiple dimensions (e.g., shape, size, color). A multiplicative function modeled after this phenomenon was created:

 

Here, S(P,Ei) represents the similarity between the prototype and the ith exemplar, k is the subscript for the dimensions (k = 1…k), and S(P,Eik) is the similarity between the prototype and the ith exemplar on the kth dimension.

Explanation

edit

Hilton’s (1990) Conversational Model

Given that folk psychology represents causal knowledge associated with the mind’s categorization processes, it follows that folk psychology is actively employed in aiding the explanation of everyday actions. Hilton’s (1990) Conversational Model was created with this causal explanation in mind, with the model having the ability to generate specific predictions. Hilton coined his model the ‘conversational’ model because he argued that as a social activity, unlike prediction, explanation requires an audience: to whom the individual explains the event or action[13]. According to the model, causal explanations follow two particular conversational maxims from Grice’s (1975) models of conversation—the manner maxim and the quantity maxim. Grice indicated that the content of a conversation should be relevant, informative, and fitting of the audience’s gap in knowledge[14]. Cognizant of this, the Conversational Model indicates that the explainer, upon evaluation of his audience, will modify his explanation to cater their needs. In essence, demonstrating the inherent need for mental comparison and in subsequent modification of behaviour in everyday explanations.

Application & Functioning

edit

Belief-Desire Model

edit

The belief-desire model of psychology illustrates one method in which Folk Psychology is utilized in everyday life. According to this model, an individual performs an action if he or she wants an outcome and believes that it can be obtained by performing the action. However, beliefs and desires are not responsible for immediate action; intention acts as a mediator of in this relationship belief-desire and action[1]. In other words, an individual who wants to achieve a goal, G, and believes action A will aid him or her in attaining G; this leads to an intention to perform A, which is then carried out to produce action A.

 
Figure 1 - A schematic representation of folk psychology of belief, desire, intention, and action.

. For example, an observer watching Jim’s hand grasp the bottom of a basket and move his arm such that the basket is lifted off the table, the observer understands that the moving of the basket from its current position is an intentional action that Jim initiated; a deduction that can be categorized as a reached via “common sense”. Additionally, if Jim desires an apple and he believes he can obtain one from the basket, his belief will drive his action to reach into the basket and retrieve an apple. It follows that if Jim actually reaches into the basket and retrieves an apple, his action is explained by this belief-desire relationship.

Schank & Asbelson (1977) described this inclusion of typical beliefs, desires, and intentions underlying an action as a akin to a “script” whereby an individual is merely following an unconscious framework that leads to the ultimate decision of whether an action will be performed[15]. Similarly, Barsalou (1985) described the category of the mind as an “ideal” whereby if a desire, a belief, and an intention were all present, they would “rationally” lead to a given action. They coined this phenomenon the Ideal of Rational Action[16] .

Goal-Intentional Action Model

edit

Existing literature has widely corroborated the fact that social behaviour is greatly affected by the causes to which people attribute actions[17]. In particular, it has been shown that an individual’s interpretation of the causes of behaviour reflects their pre-existing beliefs regarding the actor’s mental state and motivation behind his or her actions[18]. It follows that they draw on the assumed intentions of actors to guide their own responses to punish or reward the actor. This concept is extended to cover instances in which behavioural evidence is lacking. Under these circumstances, it has been shown that the individual will again draw on assumed intentions in order to predict the actions of the third party[19].

Although the two components are often used interchangeably in common parlance, there is an important distinction between the goals and intentions. This discrepancy lies in the fact that individuals with an intention to perform an action also foster the belief that it will be achieved, whereas the same person with a goal may not necessarily believe that the action is able to be performed in spite of having a strong desire to do so. For example, if we say that Paul has the intention of going into graduate school next year, this implies that he believes that he will be able to accomplish the action. Conversely, if we say that Paul has the goal of going into graduate school, he may not necessarily believe that he will be able to accomplish this.

Predicting goals and actions, much like the Belief-Desire Model, involves moderating variables that determine whether an action will be performed. In the Goal-Intentional Action Model, the predictors of goals and actions are: the actors’ beliefs about his or her abilities and their actual possession of preconditions required to actually carry out the action[20]. Additionally, preconditions are comprised of the various conditions necessary in order for realization of intentions. This includes abilities and skills in addition to environmental variables that may come into play. Schank & Abelson raises the example of going to a restaurant, where the preconditions include the ability to afford the bill and get to the correct venue, in addition to the fact that the restaurant must be open for business[21]. Traditionally, people prefer to allude to preconditions to explain actions that have a high probability of being unattainable, whereas goals tend to be described as a wide range of common actions.

Contention

edit

Folk psychology remains the subject of much contention in academic circles with respect to its scope, method and the significance of its contributions to the scientific community[22]. A large part of this criticisms stems from the prevailing impression that folk psychology is a primitive practice reserved for the uneducated and non-academics in discussing their everyday lives[23]. However folk theories represent an opportunity for social psychologists to gain insight into social behaviour, contributing to the knowledge of the psychological disciplines.

Useful for Scientific Purposes?

edit

There is significant debate over whether folk psychology is useful for academic purposes; specifically whether it is can be relevant with regards to the scientific psychology domain. It has been argued that a mechanism used for laypeople’s understanding, predicting, and explaining each other’s actions is inapplicable with regards to the requirements of the Scientific Method[24]. Conversely, opponents have called for patience, seeing the mechanism employed by laypeople for understanding each other’s actions as important in their formation of bases for future action when encountering similar situations. Malle & Knobe hailed this systematization of people’s everyday understanding of the mind as an inevitable progression towards a more comprehensive field of psychology[25]. Medin et al. provide another advantage of conceptualizing folk psychology with their Mixture Model of Categorization[26]. It is advantageous due its facilitation of action prediction. In other words, through the accumulated knowledge laypeople gain via their understanding of each other’s actions, stories with varying degrees of coherence in belief, desire, and intention are able to be deciphered. This multiplicative function accounting for total deviations from the ideal can be very advantageous for the purposes of consolidating a more comprehensive domain of psychology.

References

edit
  1. ^ a b c d Kashima, Yoshihisa (1). "The category of the mind: Folk psychology of belief, desire, and intention. Author". Asian Journal of Social Psychology. 1. 1 (3): 289–313. doi:10.1111/1467-839X.00019. Retrieved 21 February 2012. {{cite journal}}: Check date values in: |date= and |year= / |date= mismatch (help); Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help); Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
  2. ^ Arico, Adam (2010). "Folk psychology, consciousness, and context effects". Review of Philosophy and Psychology. 1 (3): 371–393. doi:10.1007/s13164-010-0029-9. Retrieved 19 March 2012.
  3. ^ Wellman, H (1990). Chidlren's theories of mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
  4. ^ Bach, T. R. "Folk-psychology and anaology". Dissertation Abstracts International Section A: Humanities and Social Sciences.
  5. ^ Arico, Adam (2010). "Folk psychology, consciousness, and context effects". Review of Philosophy and Psychology. 1 (3): 317–393. doi:10.1007/s13164-010-0029-9. Retrieved 10 March 2012.
  6. ^ Malle, Betram F (Mar 1997). "The folk concept of intentionality". Journal of Expiermental Social Psychology. 33 (2): 101–121. doi:10.1006/jesp.1996.1314. {{cite journal}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)CS1 maint: date and year (link)
  7. ^ Karniol, Rachel (Jan 1978). "Children's use of intention cues in evaluating behaviour". Psychological Bulletin. 85 (1): 76–85. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.85.1.76.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: date and year (link)
  8. ^ Piaget, Oxford (1932). The Language and Thought of the Child, 1926; Judgment and Reasoning in the Child, 1928; The Child's Conception of the World, 1929; The Child's Conception of Physical Causality, 1930; The Moral Judgment of the Child, 1932. Oxford, England: Harcourt, Brace. pp. 54–93.
  9. ^ Malle, Betram F (Mar 1997). "The folk concept of intentionality". Journal of Expiermental Social Psychology. 33 (2): 101–121. doi:10.1006/jesp.1996.1314. Retrieved 10 April 2012. {{cite journal}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)CS1 maint: date and year (link)
  10. ^ Malle, Betram F (Mar 1997). "The folk concept of intentionality". Journal of Expiermental Social Psychology. 33 (2): 101–121. doi:10.1006/jesp.1996.1314. {{cite journal}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)CS1 maint: date and year (link)
  11. ^ Heider, F (1958). The psychology of interpersonal relations. New York: Wiley.
  12. ^ Medin, D.L. (1984). "Given versus induced category representations: Use of prototype and exemplar information in classification". Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition. 10 (333): 352. doi:10.1037/0278-7393.10.3.333. PMID 6235306. {{cite journal}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
  13. ^ Hilton, Denis J. (Jan 1990). "Conversational processes and causal explanation". Psychological Bulletin. 107 (1): 65–81. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.107.1.65.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: date and year (link)
  14. ^ Grice, H Paul (1979). "Logic and Conversation". Communications. 30: 7–72. doi:10.3406/comm.1979.1446.
  15. ^ Schank, R.C. (1977). Scripts, plans, goals and udnerstanding. New Jersey: Eribaum.
  16. ^ Barsalou, Lawrence W. (Oct 1985). "Ideals, central tendency, and frequency of instantiation as determinants of graded structure in categories". Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition. 11 (4): 629–654. doi:10.1037/0278-7393.11.1-4.629. PMID 2932520.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: date and year (link)
  17. ^ Heider, F (1958). The psychology of interpersonal relations. New York: Wiley.
  18. ^ Weiner, B. (1986). An attributional theory of motivation and emotion. New York: Springer.
  19. ^ Heider, F (1958). The psychology of interpersonal relations. New York: Wiley.
  20. ^ Boonzaier, Ann; McClure, John; Sutton, Robbie M. (2005). [doi:10.1002/ejsp.280 "Distinguishing the effects of beliefs and preconditions: The folk psychology of goals and actions"]. European Journal of Social Psychology. 35 (6): 725–740. doi:10.1002/ejsp.280. {{cite journal}}: Check |url= value (help)CS1 maint: date and year (link)
  21. ^ Schank, R.C. (1977). Scripts, plans, goals and udnerstanding. New Jersey: Eribaum.
  22. ^ Goldenweiser, A. A. (1912). "Folk-psychology". Psychological Bulletin. 9 (10): 373–380. doi:10.1037/h0074365.
  23. ^ Fletcher, G. (1995). he scientific credibility of folk psychology. Hilsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Inc.
  24. ^ Fletcher, G. (1995). he scientific credibility of folk psychology. Hilsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Inc.
  25. ^ Malle, Betram F (Mar 1997). "The folk concept of intentionality". Journal of Expiermental Social Psychology. 33 (2): 101–121. doi:10.1006/jesp.1996.1314. {{cite journal}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)CS1 maint: date and year (link)
  26. ^ Medin, D. L. (1984). "Given versus induced category representations: Use of prototype and exemplar information in classification". Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition. 10 (3): 333–352. doi:10.1037/0278-7393.10.3.333. PMID 6235306. {{cite journal}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)