Jfeen

jfeen

jfeen (pronounced dʒe fiːn) is my pen and user name. I am interested in Wilfrid Sellars, the Frankfurt school, orismology, Metaphysics, fictionalism, Logic, mereology, Latin abbreviations, and, more recently, a form of abridgment called SAQing.

Summarizing in Abridged Quotation

A Summary in Abridged Quotation (or "SAQ")--similar in appearance to block quotation--is a common procedure in academic writing. In block quotation, the author will select a relevant passage from another publication’s text (e.g., an article, essay, or book) and insert it into his or her work, indicating (to the reader) its status as a separate publication by slightly indenting both of its margins and slightly shrinking its font counter to the primary margins and font, and will, occasionally, eliminate any words, phrases, or sentences that he or she finds vacuous, superfluous, or, primarily, unnecessary with regard to the intended message by replacing these words, phrases, or sentences with the spaced ellipsis (i.e., " . . . "--different from the un-spaced ellipsis, "...").

However, some, such as author David Weinberger and columnist Kathleen Parker, suggest that there is too much information , and although neither Weinberger nor Parker propose a solution, Weinberger makes the strong case that “[w]e’re just never going to catch up." Additionally, Information theory suggests that the increase in information of a system directly increases the entropy of that system, the result being that information may become irretrievable. While this is a mathematical relationship, the psychological result is even more dire; as the information of a text or situation increases, the cognitive effort increases, and the result may be the (unfortunate) identification of a chaotic system.

Thus, it has been suggested that synopses, summaries, or analyses on works be deemphasized, and that, instead, summaries in abridged quotation, or "SAQs", be carried out on crucial texts, like articles or books.

Example

Consider being confronted with the following passage, which consists of 530 words:

"It may be objected at this point that there is no such thing as the image of man built from postulated entities and processes, but rather as many images as there are sciences which touch on aspects of human behaviour. And, of course, in a sense this is true. There are as many scientific images of man as there are sciences which have something to say about man. Thus, there is man as he appears to the theoretical physicist--a swirl of physical particles, forces, and fields. There is man as he appears to the biochemist, to the physiologist, to the behaviourist, to the social scientist; and all of these images are to be contrasted with man as he appears to himself in sophisticated common sense, the manifest image which even today contains most of what he knows about himself at the properly human level. Thus the conception of the scientific or postulational image is an idealization in the sense that it is a conception of an integration of a manifold of images, each of which is the application to man of a framework of concepts which have a certain autonomy. For each scientific theory is, from the standpoint of methodology, a structure which is built at a different 'place' and by different procedures within the intersubjectively accessible world of perceptible things. Thus 'the' scientific image is a construct from a number of images, each of which is supported by the manifest world.

The fact that each theoretical image is a construction on a foundation pro-vided by the manifest image, and in this methodological sense pre-supposes the manifest image, makes it tempting to suppose that the manifest image is prior in a substantive sense; that the categories of a theoretical science are logically dependent on categories pertaining to its methodological foundation in the manifest world of sophisticated common sense in such a way that there would be an absurdity in the notion of a world which illustrated its theoretical principles without also illustrating the categories and principles of the manifest world. Yet, when we turn our attention to 'the' scientific image which emerges from the several images proper to the several sciences, we note that although the image is methodologically dependent on the world of sophisticated common sense, and, in this sense, does not stand on its own feet, yet it purports to be a complete image, i.e. to define a framework which could be the whole truth about that which belongs to the image. Thus although methodologically a development within the manifest image, the scientific image presents itself as a rival image. From its point of view the manifest image on which it rests is an 'inadequate' but pragmatically useful likeness of a reality which first finds its adequate (in principle) likeness in the scientific image. I say, 'in principle', because the scientific image is still in the process of coming into being--a point to which I shall return at the conclusion of this chapter.

To all of which, of course, the manifest image or, more accurately, the perennial philosophy which endorses its claims, replies that the scientific image cannot replace the manifest without rejecting its own foundation.

But before attempting to throw some light on the conflicting claims of these two world perspectives, more must be said about the constitution of the scientific image from the several scientific images of which it is the sup-posed integration. There is relatively little difficulty about telescoping some of the 'partial' images into one image. Thus, with due precaution, we can unify the biochemical and the physical images; for to do this requires only an appreciation of the sense in which the objects of biochemical discourse can be equated with complex patterns of the objects of theoretical physics. To make this equation, of course, is not to equate the sciences, for as sciences they have different procedures and connect their theoretical entities via different instruments to intersubjectively accessible features of the manifest world. But diversity of this kind is compatible with intrinsic 'identity' of the theoretical entities themselves, that is, with saying that biochemical compounds are 'identical' with patterns of sub-atomic particles. For to make this 'identification' is simply to say that the two theoretical structures, each with its own connection to the perceptible world, could be replaced by one theoretical framework connected at two levels of complexity via different instruments and procedures to the world as perceived.

The effort required to process this passage is greatly reduced if, instead, one were confronted with the following passage--containing only 441 words,

Arguably, there is no such thing as the scientific image but rather as many images as there are sciences. In a sense, this is true. There is man as man appears to the theoretical physicist, biochemist, physiologist, behaviourist, social scientist, etc., and all of these images must be contrasted with man as man appears to itself in sophisticated commonsense--the manifest image, which even today contains most of what man knows about itself. Thus, the scientific image is an idealization from an integration of a manifold of images. Though each scientific theory is, methodologically, a structure which is built at a different 'place' within, ė and connects their theoretical entities via different instruments and procedures to, the intersubjectively accessible ė features of the manifest world, melding some of the 'partial' scientific images into the scientific image is doable--cautiously, we can unify the biochemical and the physical images; for the objects of biochemical discourse can be equated with complex patterns of the objects of theoretical physics. Of course, this is not to equate the sciences themselves but rather to say that this diversity is reducible to the intrinsic 'identity' of the theoretical entities themselves, for making this 'identification' is to say that the two theoretical structures could be replaced by one theoretical framework connected at two levels of complexity via different instruments and procedures to the world as perceived.

That each theoretical image is a construction on a foundation provided by the manifest image, and, in this methodological sense, presupposes the manifest image, tempts one to suppose that the manifest image is prior in a substantive sense; that the categories of a theoretical science are logically dependent on the categories of its methodological foundation in the manifest world , and, hence, that the scientific image could not illustrate its theoretical principles without also illustrating the categories and principles of the manifest world. Yet, although 'the' scientific image--which emerges from the several images of the several sciences, i.o.--is methodologically dependent on the world of sophisticated commonsense, it purports to be a complete image; i.e., it purports to define a framework which could be the whole truth about that which belongs to the image. Thus, al-though methodologically a development within the manifest image, the scientific image presents itself as a rival image. From its point of view, the manifest image on which it rests is an 'inadequate' but pragmatically useful likeness of a reality which becomes a more, in principle (for it is still coming to be), adequate likeness in the scientific image.

The perennial philosophy replies that the scientific image cannot replace the manifest image without rejecting its own foundation.

which would be the product, or the "P-SAQ", of the following "SAQ":

". . . [Arguably,] there is no such thing as the [scientific] image . . . but rather as many images as there are sciences[.] . . . [I]n a sense[,] this is true[.] There . . . is man as [man] appears to the theoretical physicist[,] . . . biochemist, . . . physiologist, . . . behaviourist, . . . social scientist[, etc.,] . . . and all of these images [must] . . . be contrasted with man as [man] appears to [itself] in sophisticated commonsense[--]the manifest image, which even today contains most of what [man] knows about . . . [itself.] Thus[,] . . . the scientific . . . image is an idealization . . . [from] an integration of a manifold of images[.] . . . [Though] each scientific theory is, . . . methodology[icall]y, a structure which is built at a different 'place' . . . within[,] [e.i. and connect[s] their theoretical entities via different instruments] and . . . procedures to[,] . . . the intersubjectively accessible . . . [e.i. features of the manifest world][, melding] . . . some of the 'partial' [scientific] images into . . . [the scientific] image [is doable--] . . . [cautiously], we can unify the biochemical and the physical images; for . . . the objects of biochemical discourse can be equated with complex patterns of the objects of theoretical physics. . . . [O]f course, [this] is not to equate the sciences . . . [themselves but rather to say that this] diversity . . . [is reducible to the] intrinsic 'identity' of the theoretical entities themselves, . . . [for making] this 'identification' is . . . to say that the two theoretical structures . . . could be replaced by one theoretical framework connected at two levels of complexity via different instruments and procedures to the world as perceived. . . . [T]hat each theoretical image is a construction on a foundation provided by the manifest image, and, in this methodological sense, presupposes the manifest image, . . . tempt[s one] to suppose that the manifest image is prior in a substantive sense; that the categories of a theoretical science are logically dependent on [the] categories . . . [of] its methodological foundation in the manifest world . . . [, and, hence,] that the . . . [scientific image could not] illustrate . . . its theoretical principles without also illustrating the categories and principles of the manifest world. Yet, . . . [although] 'the' scientific image[--] . . .which emerges from the several images [of] . . . the several sciences[, i.o.--] . . .is methodologically dependent on the world of sophisticated commonsense, . . . it purports to be a complete image[; i.e.,] . . . [it purports] to define a framework which could be the whole truth about that which belongs to the image. Thus[,] although methodologically a development within the manifest image, the scientific image presents itself as a rival image. From its point of view[,] the manifest image on which it rests is an 'inadequate' but pragmatically useful likeness of a reality which [becomes a more, in principle (for it is still coming to be),] . . . adequate likeness in the scientific image. . . .

. . . [T]he perennial philosophy . . . replies that the scientific image cannot replace the manifest [image] without rejecting its own foundation.

. . . "

Methodology

The method is, simply, omitting the unnecessary language with the spaced ellipsis (i.e., ' . . . '), and inserting any words necessary to make the text coherent while simultaneously omitting the unnecessary phrases but maintaining the same meaning.

In many instances, authors write in a logically unstructured manner; that is, authors frequently either make unnecessary digressions or make helpful elaborations on topics they either discuss much later or had discussed much earlier in the text. In the former case, the unnecessary material is, obviously, replaced by the spaced ellipsis or ellipses; in the latter case, the relevant material can be inserted using the brackets with the addition of noting whether the relevant material came before or after were it is being placed. This is noted by either "e.s." (ex supra) or "e.i." (ex infra), Latin for "from above (in this writing)" and "from below (in this writing)", i.o..

After the "SAQ" is complete, it should be saved and uploaded, with the permission of the author or publisher, to any relevant sites. After this, the "SAQ" should be purged of all its "ellipses" and "brackets"--and any "e.s." or "e.i." placements--and uploaded to the relevant site(s) alongside the "SAQ". The process of purging the "SAQ" of its ellipses, brackets, and "e.s." or "e.i." placements is called "purging the summary in abridged quotation", or "P-SAQing", and the resulting document is called the "purged summary in abridged quotation", or the "P-SAQ". In most word processors, the "P-SAQing" can be done by locating the "Replace" tool, and typing "[", "]", and " . . . " (and "e.s." or "e.i.", if any) in the "Find what:" box and typing a single space (i.e., " ") in the "Replace with:" box, and then selecting "Replace all".

The Six Cases of Ellipses

"Replace with:" space cases

• These are cases where " . . . " (i.e., space-dot-space-dot-space-dot-space) is typed in the "Find what:" box and " " (i.e., space) is typed in the "Replace with:" box.

Case	Example
ISO (in-sentence omission)	(The original) "...blah unnecessary blah..." results in (the SAQ) "...blah . . . blah...", which results in (the P-SAQ) "...blah blah..."
ASO (after-sentence omission)	(The original) "...blah unnecessary. Blah..." results in (the SAQ) "...blah[.] . . . Blah...", which results in (the P-SAQ) "...blah. Blah..."
ACO (after-comma omission)	(The original) "...blah, unnecessary blah..." results in (the SAQ) "...blah, . . . blah...", which results in (the P-SAQ) "...blah, blah..."
BCO (before-comma omission)	(The original) "...blah unnecessary, blah..." results in (the SAQ) "...blah . . . , blah...", which results in (the P-SAQ) "...blah, blah..."

"Replace with:" nothing cases

• Type ". . . " (i.e., dot-space-dot-space-dot-space) for BPO and ". . ." (i.e., dot-space-dot-space-dot) for PO in "Find what:" and then leave "Replace with:" blank (i.e., "").

Case	Example
BPO (before-paragraph omission)	(The original) "Blah unnecessary. Blah..." results in (the SAQ) ". . . Blah...", which results in (the P-SAQ) "Blah..."
PO (paragraph omission)	(The original) "Unnecessary." results in (the SAQ) " . . . ", which results in (the P-SAQ) the omission of the paragraph.