User:Ke4roh/Skylab 4 human factors

Gerald P. Carr, Edward G. Gibson, and William R. Pogue, August 1973

Figure 3-2. Performance lapses for time in bed (TIB) over 14 days of sleep restriction.

The launch of the U.S. space station Skylab, in 1973, marked NASA’s transition from the lunar competition to the orbiting space laboratory. The first crewed mission, Skylab 2, was 28 days in duration, which was twice as long as any previous American mission. Skylab 3 doubled this record, to 59 days. At 84 days, Skylab 4 extended the duration record by almost one more month. None of the crew had been to space before.

Mission Control planned extra work for the rookie crew, and placed considerable faith in measures to hasten their adaptation to working in space. The crew's days were scheduled at rates near the ending rate of the previous crew. The three-man crew, Commander Gerald P. Carr, Science Pilot Edward G. Gibson, and Pilot William R. Pogue fell behind the aggressive schedule and worked through several planned days off. Other factors likely also contributed to crew frustration. The crew pushed back and got some schedule relief mid-December, then described their rest days as not especially restful near new year. Mission Control created a "shopping list" of tasks that could be worked any time, and allowed for a genuine rest day on January 10, and the mission proceeded smoothly afterward.

Though author H.S.F. Cooper, two years after the mission, interpreted events as a "strike" or "rebellion," astronauts, doctors, mission controllers, and authors have disputed that characterization. This mission has been raised as case study in various fields of endeavor including space medicine, team management, and psychology. Man-hours in space were, and continued to be into the 21st century, profoundly expensive; a single day on Skylab was worth about $22.4 million in 2017 dollars. Difficulties on this mission also affected the planning of future space missions, especially long-term missions.

Background and causes

Behavioral problems during a spaceflight are of concern to mission planners, because they can trigger a mission failure. NASA has studied things that affect crew social dynamics such as morale, stress management, and how to solve problems as a group; SMEAT was a 56 day earth-based duration test of both Skylab's equiptment and personnel, conducted in 1972. But each Skylab pushed farther into the unknown of space medicine, and it was difficult to make predictions about the reaction of the human body to prolonged weightlessness and isolation. The first manned Skylab mission set a spaceflight record with its 28-day mission, and Skylab 3 roughly doubled that to 59 days; no one had spent this long in orbit.

Possible contributing factors to crew unrest include:

• Twelve-week length of stay (the longest stay by astronauts up to that time)
• Isolated environment
• Design of the spacecraft
• Microgravity environment
• Workload expectations of Skylab team
• Workload expectations of mission control
• Crew inexperience (all first-time astronauts)
• No transition period

Three three-man crews spent progressively longer amounts of time (28, 59, and then 84 days), launched to orbit by the Saturn IB and flying the Apollo CSM spacecraft to the station.

Skylab 3 had finished all their work and asked for more work—this may have led NASA to have a higher expectation for the next crew. However, the next crew were all "rookies"; they had not been in space before. Both previous crews had veteran members and both previous crews had one member that had been to the moon and back. That the astronauts were reprimanded for concealing motion sickness early on may have also contributed to difficulties. The crew increasingly became bothered by having every hour of their trip duration scheduled.

Skylab 4 contemporary timeline

Mission controllers packed the typical day full of activities.

The third crew aboard Skylab launched with an ambitious schedule. Doctors seemed sure their measures would prevent space motion sickness and Mission Control was confident that the new crew would begin operations at a similar pace to the ending pace of the recently-departed crew. A month before launch, planners deleted a "day-off" for the crew on day 4.

Things got off to a bad start after the crew attempted to hide Pogue's early space sickness from flight surgeons, a fact discovered by mission controllers after downloading onboard voice recordings. Astronaut office chief Alan B. Shepard reprimanded them for this omission, saying they "had made a fairly serious error in judgement." Pogue later described this exchange as "humiliating."

The crew's initial task of unloading and stowing the thousands of items needed for their lengthy mission proved to be overwhelming, especially undertaken during space motion sickness. The schedule for the activation sequence dictated lengthy work periods with a large variety of tasks, and the crew soon found themselves tired and behind schedule. Skylab 3 was also behind schedule in the first few days.

Carr's diary mentioned overwork and mistakes on mission days three, four, and six. He also mentioned being behind on day 7 - Thanksgiving Day, when they conducted the longest EVA to date, 6 hours and 33 minutes.

After the Thanksgiving Day EVA, Flight Director Neil Hutchinson had praise, "The crew was just impeccable. All in all I think it was a remarkable day. We managed to salvage another experiment."

On the ninth day of the mission, Mission Control gave a "rest" day during which few tasks were scheduled, and the crew was delighted. They were still having difficulty locating items on the station, including meals and tools. During this day, Hutchinson explained they were expected to "'…rest or do some catching up, without feeling that they have to keep up with a flight plan time' schedule." Organization of the myriad tools and equipment onboard was a high priority, as were other housekeeping tasks. Carr's diary says they're mostly adjusted to spaceflight, though congestion remains. "Our biggest problem right now is mental attitude. We're so damn mad at the guys on the ground that are scheduling this mission. It looks like they're trying to get everything finished early or something." Carr says they've been informing Mission Control of the scheduling problem.

Gibson did not relish the first week in space. Here, he operates the Apollo Telescope Mount.

The next week, Gibson reflected on the initial workload, "Our first seven or eight days up here were not something I would want to go through again." Several experiments had been added to the schedule with little or no training, including stereo and infrared photos, volume measurements, and blood pressure measurements.

The crew had another rest day on December 2, mission day 17, but it wasn't very restful. Photo passes, solar telescope photos, and housekeeping chores kept the crew busy. Each also took their weekly showers. Carr wrote, "For a day off we sure were busy today."

On December 5, the crew's chief physician, Dr. Jerry Hordinsky, said "They're at least performing up to the normal standards we're expecting. I expect that to improve. They're in very good health. And their mental health is excellent."

On December 8, it came to light that Pogue had forgotten to put lens filters on the cameras and quite a few days' worth of Earth observation pictures were ruined. Carr's diary included, "Today Bill uncovered a mistake that he made on day 4 or 5 which degrades all the EREP data we have gotten so far. The guys on the ground contributed, but it doesn't make him feel any better. He was really shattered when h realized that he had forgotten to put the filter in the cameras. I really felt for him because he had to swallow his pride and send word down that he had screwed up royally. It brought back the chaos of the first week we spent here and all the unhappy and frustrated feelings we had because we couldn't keep up and were making so many mistakes. I really feel bad, and I knew he felt worse."

December 10, the mission's 25th day, was another scheduled day off, with several hours of experiments scheduled. Planned tasks for this rest day included solar and comet observations, housekeeping, showers, and a conference with scientists at Mission Control. Also that day, it came to light that some earth observation pictures were overexposed due to Pogue's error. Johnson Space Center chief physician Dr. Royce Hawkins cited individual variations in performance. Carr's diary said the day included late sleep and light work until noon, shower, and looking out the window.

On December 11, Reuters reported doctors considered the crew's lethargy, and some privately expressed concern that they weren't adapting as quickly as previous crews had. The reporter wrote, "Everyone involved in the Skylab 3 mission has noticed the slowness of the crew and the lack of enthusiasm. The crew has been reluctant to work on their day off." Skylab program director Schneider refuted these reports in a news conference three days later. He said the crew were "'performing well' and he stoutly defended them against published reports that they had made more mistakes than previous crews," the Associated Press reported.

“ I don't like being put in an incredible position where I'm taking somebody's expesnive equipment and thrashing about wildly with it and trying to act like a one-armed paper hanger. ” — William R. Pogue, December 14, 1973,

On December 14, Pogue complained of being overworked, detailing steps involved in various activities and explaining that he was not pleased that he was rushed and having difficulty completing tasks correctly.

Pogue (vertical) and Gibson, holding a trash bag, work together on one of many housekeeping tasks: waste disposal through an airlock.

The crew had "much work, little play" on their rest day of December 17, 1973, with some sleeping late and about 2 hours unscheduled. On December 18, the crew and Mission Control appeared to have settled their differences. Mistakes were down and efficiency was up. Skylab program director William C. Schneider said,

“We literally made it hard for those guys in the first few days. It probably started the crew out a little behind because they had a lot of things that they had to pick up and stow.”

December 17 was another day off for the crew, but they planned to go heavy on solar observations after working overtime the day before to monitor the especially active sun and get ahead on housekeeping tasks. Carr was disappointed with the lack of rest, and planned to raise the concern with ground if they scheduled a rest day so full again. UPI reported "Carr and Pogue had harsh words" for doctors on the ground about the doctors' interpretation of space motion sickness.

The crew that had planned to take one rest day every 10 days took another rest day on December 26, 1973. Carr also recorded this day-off in his diary, including mention of work on the post-EVA procedure pushing dinner to 8:00 pm. He added, "…Today was a pretty nice day. The schedulers laid off us pretty well, so we got our showers and relaxation and can start another hard week tomorrow."

On December 27, Gibson and Pogue remarked about their observations of Comet Kohoutek. Carr's diary noted that they kept up with the flight plan all day.

On December 28, the crew talked to astronomer Luboš Kohoutek by video link about their observations of the comet he discovered, and earlier in the day joked with mission control as they passed the halfway point in their journey. This evening, Carr called for an assessment to understand if they were behind, and if so, how far. Carr's diary recorded the same conversation, and included, "Spent the afternoon getting ready for tomorrow's EVA… should be routine."

“ We need more time to rest. We need a schedule that is not so packed. We don't want to exercise after a meal. We need to get things under control. ” — Gerald Carr, December 29,

December 29 included an EVA to look at Comet Kohoutek.

On December 30, the crew had a "soul-baring session" talking to mission control about the workload. Mission Control sent a status report to the crew saying, "Accomplishments to date in the mission are less than planned for earth resources [14 of 23 runs], medical [196 of 228 hours] and corollary [140 of 235 hours] experiments." "We felt the pressure ease off when you shifted gears down there," said Carr, "We feel like we've been more efficient up here." CAPCOM Richard Truly noted that things had been going "as smooth as glass" for the past two weeks. Truly noted that science opportunities were missed because the crew insisted on rest time before sleep and after waking, and undisturbed exercise. Carr explained that his crew worked better with those restrictions, and he promised more definite suggestions for working some during those times by the next day.

Carr discussed this exchange in his diary, noting "They were trying to get the same output from us at the beginning that they were getting from the SL-3 crew at the end of their mission.… The truth of the matter is that we equaled the SL-3 pace. No wonder we were fit to be tied! On about day 30, they finally wised up and quit trying to get 28 man-hours of science per day out of us and dropped it to 24. Then everything smoothed out. We felt the pressure come off immediately."

“ The day off boiled down to about two free hours and a shower. That's not much of a day off, really. ” — Gerald Carr,

The crew had a "day off" on January 2, but Carr expressed disappointment, saying later in the week, "I think that last day off was kind of a shock to us. I don't think we expected to be doing quite as much as we did. The day off boiled down to about two free hours and a shower. That's not much of a day off, really." His diary was more direct: "Day off. Baloney!" He also discussed the press conference from this day, "…that was rough! They asked some mean questions, mainly concerning Bill's sickness, our mistakes, our demands for time off, etc. They also asked some rather philosophical questions about our view of the world, our inner selves, and the mission. We fielded them but felt bad because the critical questions indicated to us that we have been labeled as screw-ups and slackers. We were also feeling like the managers weren't behind us, either, otherwise the press wouldn't be asking so many critical questions." He spoke to his wife that day and received assurance that they were well received and fully supported by Deke Slayton and Kenny Kleinknecht.

On January 4, chief astronaut Deke Slayton called to the crew to congratulate them on setting a record for time in space. He also said, “As far as we're concerned down here, you're doing an outstanding job all the way. Just keep up the good work stay loose and enjoy it.” He added, “I think if you keep going the way you've been going, why, it'll be one of the best missions we've ever seen.”

Carr and Pogue demonstrate a position that would be impossible with gravity.

By January 10, the 56th day, the crew "enjoyed the closest thing to a day off in eight weeks." Flight Director Philip Shaffer said they'd "earned" a nearly entirely unscheduled day. For the day, Mission Control prepared a "shopping list" of optional jobs to complete and scheduled some earth observation photos as they were flying over Japan. Solar physicist Gibson spent much of the day observing the sun. "Now today was the kind of day off I've been harping for," wrote Pogue. He described some Kohoutek observations and much gazing at earth through the window. The "Purple" flight control shift concluded their day awarding the crew with a the "One-Armed Paper Hanger Award." "Apparently, it was a poster with a cartoon of a guy doing many things at once and cussing out the ground. They complemented us on getting so much done last week. This is the way the mission should have run—with everyone enjoying themselves."

Pogue climbs out of the Command Module, all grins, and with a full beard.

January 14, CBS News gave a report summarizing the mission to date, mentioning vomiting and workload issues.

January 26 afforded another break during which the crew took earth observation photos.

January 31 was their last day off before splashdown. The crew held a news conference and conducted an earth resources survey pass.

The crew returned to earth on February 8. Several reports mentioned the vomit cover-up and/or workload issues but omitted any rebellion. At the time, all of the astronauts were up for consideration for future flight, though, at the time, the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project was planned, and Shuttle development consumed the remainder of manned spaceflight budget.

Post-splashdown

The crew rests shortly after returning to Earth.

The crew undertook a debriefing on February 22. This report covered everything from liftoff to splashdown, their experiences with equipment on the flight, and their work with Mission Control. In the section on mission planning, Carr said he'd "told everybody I spoke to" that they were planning to take a slower pace than the Skylab 3 crew because they would be in "an endurance situation" and they were "low-key people, less energetic than the SL-3 crew." "Because we felt we had to produce, we did not call the situation to a halt early enough." He expressed dismay that Mission Control didn't allow time for adjusting to the new environment and expected them to work at the pace the previous crew left off. He found fault with crew for not assessing and taking action quickly enough to remedy the situation.

Gibson said, "We had several 18-hour work days at the beginning. We were up and working for 18 hours and did not have time to wind down before it was time to go to sleep As a result, we got only 4 or 5 hours of good sleep. That begain to add up after awhile."

Crew cited a change in the schedule after day 28 (December 13).

Lessons learned

Lessons learned focused on balancing workload with crew psychology and stress level. One factor that affects disaster planning is the process of lessons learned from past incidents. Two contrasting pressures are the desire to hide a problem to avoid issues such as reprimands verses the honest evaluation of the issue to prevent future occurrences.

Astronauts and flight controllers discuss procedures for repairing the coolant system early in the mission.

Among the complicating factors was the interplay between management and subordinates (see also Apollo 1 fire and Challenger disaster). On Skylab 4, one problem was that the crew was pushed even harder as they fell behind on their workload, creating an increasing level of stress. Even though none of the astronauts returned to space, there was only one more NASA spaceflight in the decade and Skylab was the first and last all-American space station. NASA was planning larger space stations but its budget shrank considerably after the moon landings, and the Skylab orbital workshop was the only major execution of Apollo application projects.

The final Skylab mission became known for the large amount of work accomplished during the long mission. Skylab orbited for six more years before decaying in 1979 due to higher-than-anticipated solar activity. The next U.S. spaceflight was the Apollo–Soyuz Test Project conducted in July 1975, and after a human spaceflight gap, the first Space Shuttle orbital flight STS-1.

Crew psychology has been a point of study for Mars analog missions such as Mars-500, with a particular focus on crew behavior triggering a mission failure or other issues. Since Skylab 4, at least one member of the International Space Station crew must be a space veteran (not be on a first flight).

The 84-day stay of the Skylab 4 mission was a human spaceflight record that was not exceeded for over two decades by a NASA astronaut; the 96-day Soviet Salyut 6 EO-1 mission broke Skylab 4's record in 1978.

The crew had been over-scheduled. The crew was scheduled for 24 science man-hours per day, to increase to 28 after day 18. "All parties involved should have realized that 24 hours was an overly ambitious goal," concluded the mission report. Workload was reduced to 24 hours per day on mission day 28. The report blamed "reluctance to speak forthrightly over the air-to-ground communications loop" for the delay in solving the problem.

Cancelling the day off on visit day 4 removed the "crew's best opportunity to consolidate their position and organize themselves for the remainder of the visit." The crew suggests limiting workload and task complexity early in the mission and gradually ramping up, ensuring early and continued success.

Estimating the time to accomplish tasks was a problem. A variety of medical tests had never been performed before, and estimates for their time were incorrect. Adjustments to estimates took two days to work into a flight plan because of the planning cycle.

Tasks with appropriate training can be estimated with a 50% time cushion. If there has been little or no training, a factor of 2 to 2½ is more appropriate.

A "shopping list" of tasks that aren't tied to a fixed schedule will allow the crew flexibility to manage some of their schedule onboard.

The diversity of tasks planned for a given crew member should be limited in the first days in orbit to accelerate their coming up to speed.

It takes 10 to 14 days to become acclimated to the environment of space, and likewise to become re-acclimated to one-g, much like, but more pronounced than, adjusting between sea level and high altitude. During this time, stamina is diminished.

Crew shifts, for example, two on and two off on 12-hour cycles, could enable experiments around the clock. Much information was lost because of rigid sleep time.

Hard requirements for low-priority experiments should be deferred until later in the mission lest they interfere with activation activities or high-priority experiments.

More dramatic accounts

Four months after splashdown, Carr recalled workload issues, and, "Finally, on day 48 [January 2] or 50, we rebelled, we just stopped everything. We did just what we wanted to do all day long. It was the day of the great camera orgy." (On their "earned" day off, mission day 56, January 10, Carr said, "Right now we're having a camera orgy." After the Mission Control shift change, the new CAPCOM, Robert Crippen, also mentioned the "orgy.")

Henry S. F. Cooper Jr. provided a "more dramatic" account describing a "strike at the end of the sixth week." Cooper also dubs Carr's inquiry as to how far behind schedule they might be as "sort of a declaration of independence". (NASA reports this inquiry on the evening of December 28. The Associated Press described Houston's December 30 reply.) Others give strike dates of December 25, December 27, 28, or December 29–30. Some add that the radio was off, some say for a whole day. And some accounts further conclude that these astronauts did not return to space because of their rebellion.

Different sources use different terminology for the "incident": "necessary readjustment", "rebellion", "strike", and "mutiny".

A House in Space

Skylab flight surgeon William K. Douglas found strong parallels between Nordhoff & Hall's novel "Mutiny on the Bounty" and Cooper's account of Skylab.

Cooper, regular contributor to The New Yorker and author of eight books provides a "more dramatic account" of astronauts "staging" a "strike" in his A House in Space. Nearly the same text previously appeared in The New Yorker.

Cooper did not speak to the Skylab 4 astronauts before writing his book, but got his information from transcripts.

NASA flight surgeon William K. Douglas found fault with Cooper's reporting for its emotional tone and rush to find (or invent) failure while overlooking greatness. Douglas observed that almost all articles covering the psychology of spaceflight lament the paucity of factual information available, and that they instead refer to "anecdotal evidence of emotional problems" with references to popular press, but not to astronaut statements in scientific literature. He drew strong parallels between Cooper's coverage of Skylab 4 and the novel Mutiny on The Bounty by Nordhoff and Hall, and notes that in both cases, popular literature has a tendency to overlook factual accounts in favor of the more dramatic, introducing errors into the popular understanding of the actual events.

B.J. Bluth, Ph.D., an associate professor of sociology at California State University, who had recently run a symposium on "industrialization and settlement of space" panned Cooper for succumbing to the temptation to dramatize a mundane event. She explained experiment M487, the "Habitability Experiment," in which astronauts were asked for their comments on a wide range of topics including housekeeping procedures, the color scheme of the lab, and plenty more. Bluth asserts that M487 diffuses "much of the 'rebellious' attitude of the crew," and concludes, "Cooper's revolt dissolves along with the mist of the 'strange alchemy of space,' leaving us again to marvel even more at the fact of people's capability for work and survival in space."

Some sources compare "rebellion" (Cooper) vs. "necessary readjustment" (Bluth) without attempting to reconcile them. Connors et al find "some agreement that the Skylab 4 crew appeared to be under an unusual degree of pressure, and that there was an unanticipated degree of friction between this particular crew and mission control."

Business curriculum

E. Mary Lou Balbaky of Harvard Business School wrote a popular exercise "Strike in Space" which relies extensively on Cooper. Balbaky reiterates Cooper's characterization of the crew as "hostile, irritable, and downright grumpy", Balbaky adds, in conclusion, "When complaints and blistering language failed to get their message across, the astronauts turned off the radio and would not talk to ground control Houston," and provides a timeline explaining that the "Skylab declaration of independence" was on December 27 and giving December 28 as the date for "Sixth week in space for third crew"

Alan Berkeley Thomas compiled The Organizational Behaviour Casebook and wrote the chapter "Working in Space: Skylab". In it, he references Cooper among others and relates a 24 hour work stoppage alternately mentioning "strike" and "mutiny", figuring the cost of the lost time at $2.5 million. Thomas also says, "On 30 December, communications with Mission Control were restored." He follows that with quotes from the January 2 press conference, including Pogue saying, "I'm a fallible human being". Thomas later referenced his earlier work and mentioned a "strike". Thomas cites Schoonhoven, who in turn cites Balbaky and Cooper. Schoonhoven writes, "On Friday, December 27, 1973[sic—Dec 27 was Thursday], the Apollo 3 [sic] astronauts conducted the first day-long, sit-down strike in space, closing down communication with mission control [sic] for 24 hours and refusing to work until management in mission control [sic] had set priorities for its work demands."

Manz and Sims reiterate Balbaky.

MIT's Kurtzman reiterated Cooper and Balbaky.

Space medicine

Giles Clément, in a footnote of his 2011 book Fundamentals of Space Medicine, alleges a mutiny and gives it as a "perfect" example of "Us Versus Them Syndrome" in space medicine. In this footnote, Clément only cites Shayler who doesn't devote much ink to the alleged mutiny, but quotes Carr saying, "We went over one of our ground stations with our radios off. The press picked up on that immediately and called that mutiny.… But [mutiny]'s not what really happened that day."

Additional responses

In addition to those addressing specific sources as mentioned previously, some responded more generally to the idea of a strike in space.

In line with January 10, flight day 56, Carr's biographer included the commander's comments about the radio being unattended for a pass over a ground station. Carr disputes there was a mutiny. Carr said he left NASA, "because it looked like we were facing six to eight more years before the next flight."

Ed Gibson asserted, "There was no 'strike in space' by any stretch of the imagination." He blamed media, specifically Cooper and Harvard Business School, for exaggerations.

When asked if the "strike" story was true, CAPCOM Story Musgrave, said “No. No, no, no,” and he went on to explain that Mission Control was accustomed to planning shorter missions and failed to account for the fact that humans need rest over longer periods of time.

CAPCOM Robert Crippen said, "Even though we all initially got off on the wrong foot, Jerry, Bill, and Ed did super once we got things back on track. And no, there was no rebellion. I think the rest of the flight directors and the Capcoms would certainly say the same thing."

Flight director Neil Hutchison said "There have been a couple of books written that stated that there was a strike in space even though that was clearly not the case. There is even a Harvard Business School case about it. If you get an MBA at Stanford or somewhere, you're likely to get the Harvard Business School case about Skylab III."

James Oberg writes, "The famous 'Skylab-4 Strike' in 1973 has been overblown, but the actual event was in fact symptomatic of Earth-space tensions and festering ill will."

Ben Evans addresses the radio being off for "a pass," quotes Carr's explanation of crew taking turns with the radio, and calls claims of "strike, on the brink of mutiny" "sensationalist." He writes, "It was an unfair accusation which led to a stigma that would hang over Carr's crew for decades."

See also

• Space psychology
• Psychological and sociological effects of spaceflight
• Team composition and cohesion in spaceflight missions
• Effects of sleep deprivation in space
• List of spaceflight records#Duration of spaceflight
• Space adaptation syndrome
• Timeline of longest spaceflights