User:LegesFundamentales/Separation of powers (userspace draft)

This is not a Wikipedia article: It is an individual user's work-in-progress page, and may be incomplete and/or unreliable.

Separation of powers or division of powers, in political philosophy and constitutional law, is the idea that a distinction may be made between several qualitatively different types of state power, and that each of them properly belong to a specific governing body or group of such bodies. These bodies are usually referred to, individually or in conjunction with other bodies, as branches of government (also known as departments, divisions, or arms, of government). Most commonly, three branches are distinguished: Executive, legislative, and judicial. "Separation of powers" may describe a such a system of government that conforms to this principle, or it may prescribe such a principle as a matter of political wisdom or of law.

The terms "separation of powers" and "division of powers" are somewhat ambiguous. Used expansively, they may cover any political or legal principle restricting concentrations of power in government (distribution of power). A closely related principle, often subsumed into the separation of powers, is that of checks and balances, which demands that governing bodies be given joint responsibility for exercising a single type of power -- such as by cooperating, obstructing, or supervising one another. The countervailing principle to the separation of powers is the intertwining or fusion of powers.
Some conceptions reject the separation of powers on the grounds that it is inconsistent with the undivided sovereignty of the state. Others deny that a meaningful qualitative distinction can be made between types of power, or that a system of government adhering to the separation of powers principle is inherently superior to any other system wherein the power of the state is distributed.

The purpose driving the commitment to a doctrine of division of powers has most often been the prevention of the tyrannical exercise of state power, as a safeguard for political and civil rights. It has also, at times, been considered conducive to efficient and effective government. Thus, the principle of separation of powers has guided constitutional design in many countries, and it has been given political or legal force in many constitutions.

The doctrine of separation of powers in its most popular form, the specifically tripartite division of government into executive, legislative and judicial powers, developed in 17th and 18th century England, France, and America. ...
They are usually defined by their relation to law: The legislative branch has the right and duty to make law, the executive branch carries the law into effect, and the judicial branch resolves disputes arising under the law.

History

Intellectual precursors

See also: Ancient constitutionalism

Distinction of functions or powers

Ancient Greece and Rome: Plato, Aristotle, and Polybius

Klosko Vol. 1 (2012), pp. 182-188 on Polybius. Esp. on p. 186: "Perhaps because of its clarity, Polybius' account became an influential discussion of the mixed constitution in the subsequent history of political theory, exercising strong influence on Macchiavelli, Montesquieu, and other thinkers. [...] Polybius does not clearly distinguish separation of powers and checks and balances from other aspects of the mixed constitution [...]. It should be noted that Polybius' view of the 'mixed constitution' is highly eccentric and difficult to defend. Rather than concentrating on separation of powers or checks and balances per se, he rests his view upon the cycle of political change. Simple forms are inherently subject to decline and so the ideal constitution combines rule of one, few, and many. Of course, the validity of this constitutional theory depends on the valditiy of the historical view on which it rests. Of this, little good can be said." (put this in an explanatory footnote?)

High and Late Middle Ages: The Magna Carta, Marsilius, and Bracton

Catholic canon law differentiated between papal auctoritas and imperial potestas, represented here by two swords, being bestowed by Jesus Christ on the Pope and the Holy Roman Emperor, respectively.

Marsilius of Padua (Marsilio de Mainardini), esp. Defensor pacis (compl. 1324).

Gubernaculum <--> jurisdictio (Bracton, 13th century)
Doctrine of the limitation on all power: See Charles H. McIlwain (1947), Constitutionalism, Ancient and Modern (Ithica, NY: Great Seal Books), esp. pp. 69 et seq., 126 et seq., 144 et seq.

Ständestaatlichkeit (cf. Heun, Werner (Habil. 1989). Staatshaushalt und Staatsleitung.)

Absolutism and early development of separation of powers

(Early modern period) Advent of modern statehood
Absolutism (in England and France) - Niccolò Machiavelli; Jean Bodin; Thomas Hobbes

Failed revolution in England (Commonwealth of England) and earliest liberal thought (religious freedom) --> Hobbes (Leviathan)
Impeachement of ministers for countersigning exercises of the royal prerogative (oblique reference in McIlwain 1947, pp. 19)?

Moderate/conservative liberalism of early Whigs (Algernon Sidney, et alia)

John Locke (England, 1632 - 1704)

Enlightenment thought

In opposition to Leviathan and absolutism

Montesquieu (France, 1689 - 1755)

Arg. (Montesquieu?): Intra-function separation cannot be maintained

Connection between mixed government and differentiation of a few abstract functions to form "powers". First appearance of "separation of powers" in the modern sense
Main article: Mixed government
Weaking ("moderating") the state (minimizing intervention) -- negatory effects
(guarantee of limited government)
Compromise between real actors in society, by giving each defined powers in the state

Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Geneva, 1712 - 1778)

Counter-point to mixed government: Popular sovereignty, supremacy of the legislative function (in the material sense). Executive as a commissioner of the legislative power.

American and French revolutions

American Revolution and Confederation period

The United States constitution and the early republic

Main article: History of the United States Constitution; Federalist Era (1789-1800); Jeffersonian democracy (1801-1817).

Madison, Federalist No. 47 (see also Federalist No. 10)

Thomas Jefferson (esp. thoughts on the senate)

McIlwain, C.H. (1923). The American Revolution. A Constitutional Interpretation. New York: Macmillan.

French Revolution and constitution of 1791

Criminal responsibility of ministers for countersigning the King's executive actions (if they were not pursuant to the laws) -- principle of legality for the executive power (Gesetzmäßgikeit der Exekutive).

1793 and 1795 French constitutions

Constitutional monarchism in mainland Europe

Immanuel Kant (Prussia, 1724 - 1804)

German-speaking lands

In the German-speaking lands, the struggle between the monarchies and the rising bourgeois class (Bürgertum) saw the separation of powers take on a strongly dualistic nature in constitutional legal thought. The distinction between executive and legislative power eventually became largely synonymous with the demarcation between kingly prerogative and acts requiring the assent of parliament (which represented the newly ascendant bourgeois estate in society).^[1]

France

Other mainland European states

Parliamentarism on the British Isles and in mainland Europe

Pure parliamentarism

(Parliamentary sovereignty as a leftover of the sovereignty of the King-in-Parliament)

Presidential parliamentarianism

Limited parliamentarism

Reception in Euro-American colonies

Modern theoretical approaches

What are these "powers" you speak of?

Formal principles of separation

Not to be confused with the use of formalist legal doctrine to distinguish functions (see below).

Multiple organs holding power
Hierarchy between forms of exercise of state power
Personal exclusion

Discernment of functions

Main article: Functions of government

Differentiation of powers (in order to determine the proper competency and area of responsibility)

Dispensation of justice: Enforcing promises and compensating or punishing damages
Legislation: Codifying and introducing supreme general rules
Administration: Providing all functions (infrastructure, resources, personnel) necessary to enforce/fulfill or render enforceable/fulfillable the laws (including making lesser rules on behalf of the legislative power)
Governing: Supervising the administration; declaring war and making peace; making supreme decisions that are not general rules

Functions and structures

Traditionally, certain functions have been designated to belong to certain organs, or to require particular procedures in order to be exercised. Also, some organs of state have traditionally been associated with certain powers which may or may not be associated with one function or another.

Adjacent and overlapping concepts

Sovereignty
Pouvoir constituant
Staatszwecklehre
Non-delegation doctrine, Wesentlichkeitslehre
Verfassung als Rahmenordnung, die durch die Gesetzgebung ausgefüllt wird; oder als geschlossenes System, dass die verfassten Gewalten abschließend ermächtigt; Kompetenzvermutung

Purposes and roles

(Contemporary ideological context)
Cf. M.J.C. Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers, p. 315.

Rule of law
Limited government (cf. Federalist No. , 1986 MichLRev article)
Representation and responsibility
Efficiency and coordination
Rational decision-making, to the end of just and good outcomes
Multiplicity of sources of legitimation

See also: Constitutional economics#Separation of powers

Central criticisms

Insufficiency (liberalism)
Fixation on procedure in some ways

In structural constitutions

(Navbox: Constitutions series)
See also: History of constitutionalism § Allocation of constitutionalism
See also: Strutural constitution; Constitutional design; Structure of government

As a constitutional principle,

This is where presidential vs. parliamentary systems must be discussed

Inter-function division of powers

Pure theory/execution

Trias politica branches

Main article: Branches of government

Other branches

Many alternatives have been proposed to the three-branch, trias politica, model. Indeed, many constitutions explicitly distinguish more branches, such as a moderating branch or pouvoir neutre, an electoral branch, or a branch responsible for civil service examinations (Taiwan).

Intra-function divisions

Is this checks and balances? Must checks and balances consist of giving one "branch" power over another?

Legislative bicameralism

Plural executive

Mixed models

Countervailing principle to pure separation: Checks and balances

Specific implementations

For historic constitutions see: History of constitutionalism § Separation of powers

Replace all these sections with a big table, and perhaps create separate articles for them??

World map representing the Bertelsmann Transformation Index's separation of powers / checks and balances score from 1-10; data only collected non-Western countries

European Union

Craig, Paul. Institutions, Power, and Institutional Balance, in: Craig, Paul; de Búrca, Gráinne (eds.). The Evolution of EU Law, 3rd ed. (Oxford University Press 2021), pp. 46-89. Available online (subscription only) at doi: 10.1093/oso/9780192846556.003.0003.

France and former colonies

German-speaking world

Former Warsaw pact countries

Other nations

Separation of powers law

Main article: Separation of powers in law
Legal doctrine

Formalist approaches

Reconstruction of the general rules from the positive provisions of law

Functionalist approaches

Doctrinal justification of the principle

Different bases of legitimation
Fitness of certain organs to perform certain functions

Cf. M.J.C. Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers, p. 315.

Rule of law/Rechtsstaatlichkeit
Enumerated powers (cf. limited government, above)
Representation and responsibility (Verantwortungszusammenhang)
Efficiency and coordination (effectiveness; cf. einheitlicher Staatswille idea)
Rational decision-making, to the end of just and good outcomes

By legal system

Germany

Main article: Separation of powers in the law of Germany
The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany (Grundgesetz) does not expressly refer to the separation of powers. However, article 20, section 2 -- "[State authority] shall be exercised by the people [...] through specific legislative, executive and judicial bodies."^[a] -- is broadly understood to allude to the idea of separation of powers. This is particularly significant to German constitutional law because art. 20 sec. 1-3, are subject to the Eternity Clause of art. 79 sec. 3, meaning they cannot be amended using the German Basic Law's procedure for its own amendment.^[2]
Further, art. 20 sec. 3 provides that the legislature is bound to the "constitutional order", and that the executive and the judiciary are bound by "law and justice".
The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany (Bundesverfassungsgericht, BVerfG) has authoritatively interpreted art. 20 sec. 2 sentence 2 as enshrining the separation of powers as principle of constitutional law.^[b]
Constitutional scholarship in Germany

United Kingdom

Main article: Separation of powers in UK law; see also: Parliamentary sovereignty in the UK; Royal prerogative in the UK § Limitations; Delegated legislation in the UK § Controls; UK constitutional law § Substantive judicial review

United States

Main article: Separation of powers in U.S. law; see also: Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer; Marbury v. Madison; Unitary executive theory; INS v. Chadha

Modern challenges

(Mention also: Empirical research. Throughout, where possible, but in particular here.)

Industrialized societies

Imperial presidency (war) Enormous scope of government (parliaments overwhelmed)

Modern social state

Agencies

Political planning

Separation of powers refers to the division of a state's government into "branches", each with separate, independent powers and responsibilities, so that the powers of one branch are not in conflict with those of the other branches. The typical division into three branches of government, sometimes called the trias politica model, includes a legislature, an executive, and a judiciary. It can be contrasted with the fusion of powers in parliamentary and semi-presidential systems where there can be overlap in membership and functions between different branches, especially the executive and legislative. In most non-authoritarian jurisdictions, however, the judiciary almost never overlaps with the other branches, whether powers in the jurisdiction are separated or fused.

The intention behind a system of separated powers is to prevent the concentration of power by providing for checks and balances. The separation of powers model is often imprecisely and metonymically used interchangeably with the trias politica principle. While the trias politica model is a common type of separation, there are governments that have more or fewer than three branches.

Citations

https://network.bepress.com/law/

References

See: https://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/publications/titre-vii/revue-doctrinale-la-separation-des-pouvoirs

McIlwain, Charles H. (1923). The American Revolution. A Constitutional Interpretation. New York City: Macmillan.

Krabbe, Hugo (1930). Kritische Darstellung der Staatslehre. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

Loewenstein, Karl (1938). "The Balance Between Legislative and Executive Power: A Study in Comparative Constitutional Law". University of Chicago Law Review. 5 (4): 566–608. doi:10.2307/1596786. JSTOR 1596786. Retrieved 8 June 2023.

McIlwain, Charles H. (1958) [1947]. Constitutionalism, Ancient and Modern (rev. ed.). Ithica, NY: Great Seal Books.

von Fritz, K. A. Kurt (1954). The Theory of the Mixed Constitution in Antiquity: A Critical Analysis of Polybius' Political Ideas. New York City: Columbia University Press.

Imboden, Max [in German] (1959). Montesquieu und die Lehre der Gewaltentrennung (PDF). Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co.

Kägi, Werner [in German] (1961). "Von der klassischen Dreiteilung zur umfassenden Gewaltenteilung". In Imboden, Max; Bäumlin, Richard; Eichenberger, Kurt (eds.). Verfassungsrecht und Verfassungswirklichkeit: Festschrift für Hans Huber zum 60. Geburtstag. Berne: Stämpfli+Cie. pp. 151–173.

Böckenförde, Ernst-Wolfgang (1964). Die Organisationsgewalt im Bereich der Regierung (Habilitation thesis). Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. doi:10.3790/978-3-428-42477-1. ISBN 978-3-428-02477-3. OCLC 1127195895.

Gwyn, William B. (1965). The Meaning of the Separation of Powers. New Orleans; The Hague: Tulane University Press; Martinus Nijhoff. OCLC 174573519.

Loewenstein, Karl (1965). Political Power and the Governmental Process (With a New Postscript by the Author). Chicago University Press.

Vile, Maurice J. C. (1967). Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (1 ed.). Oxford: Clarendon Press. OCLC 390050.

Küster, Otto (1969). "Das Gewaltenproblem im modernen Staat (1949)". In Rausch, Heinz (ed.). Zur heutigen Problematik der Gewaltentrennung. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.

Leisner, Walter (1969). "Quantitative Gewaltenteilung". Die Öffentliche Verwaltung (DÖV): 405 ff.

Achterberg, Norbert (1970). Probleme der Funktionenlehre (Habilitation thesis). Munich: C.H. Beck. OCLC 611301523.

Fisher, Louis (August 1971). "The Efficiency Side of Separated Powers". Journal of American Studies. 5 (2): 113–131. doi:10.1017/S0021875800000712. ISSN 0021-8758. JSTOR 27670637. OCLC 5543978469.

Michel, Troper [in French] (1973). La séparation des pouvoirs et l'histoire constitutionnelle française (dissertation). Bibliothèque constitutionnelle et de science politique, vol. 48. Paris: Pichon et Durand-Auzias. OCLC 699128.

Sabine, George Holland; Thorson, Thomas Landon (1973). A History of Political Theory (4th ed.). Hinsdale, Ill., U.S.A.: Dryden Press/Holt, Rinehart and Winston. ISBN 9780030803055. OCLC 504319291.

Zimmer, Gerhard (1979). Funktion - Kompetenz - Legitimation (Habilitation thesis). Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. ISBN 9783428044825. OCLC 263168587.

Panagopoulos, Epaminondas P. (1985). Essays on the History and Meaning of Checks and Balances. Lanham et al.: University Press of America. ISBN 0819149969.

Franklin, Julian H. (1991). "Sovereignty and the mixed constitution: Bodin and his critics". In Burns, James Henderson; Goldie, Mark (eds.). The Cambridge History of Political Thought 1450-1700. Cambridge University Press. pp. 298–328. ISBN 0-521-24716-0.

Cooper, Samuel W. (1994). "Considering the "Power" in Separation of Powers" (PDF). Stanford Law Review. 46 (2): 361–400. doi:10.2307/1229187. Retrieved 24 May 2023.

Exekutive als reiner Gesetzesvollzug (magistracy)

Seiler, Hansjörg (1994). Gewaltenteilung (Habilitation thesis). Berne: Stämpfli+Cie. ISBN 3-7272-9635-6. OCLC 243800980.

Barendt, Eric. "Separation of powers and constitutional government". Public Law (Winter 1995). ISSN 0033-3565.

Michalowski, Sabine; Woods, Lorna (1999). German Constitutional Law: The Protection of Civil Liberties. Aldershot, UK; Brookfield, Vermont, U.S.A.: Ashgate/Dartmouth. ISBN 1 85521 920 4.

Horn, Hans-Detlef (1999). Die grundrechtsunmittelbare Verwaltung (Habilitation thesis). Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck. ISBN 9783161472213. OCLC 42918431.

Ackerman, Bruce (2000). "The New Separation of Powers" (PDF). Harvard Law Review. 113 (3): 633–729. doi:10.2307/1342286. JSTOR 1342286. Retrieved 24 May 2023.

Magill, M. Elizabeth (2000). "The Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law". Virginia Law Review. 86: 1127. JSTOR 1073943. SSRN 224797. Retrieved 29 June 2023.

Lorz, Ralph Alexander [in German] (2001). Interorganrespekt im Verfassungsrecht: Funktionenzuordnung, Rücksichtnahmegebote und Kooperationsverpflichtungen; eine rechtsvergleichende Analyse anhand der Verfassungssysteme der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, der Europäischen Union und der Vereinigten Staaten (Habilitation thesis). Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck. ISBN 9783161474460. OCLC 237400046.

Barber, Nicholas W. (March 2001). "Prelude to the Separation of Powers". The Cambridge Law Journal. 60 (1): 59–88. JSTOR 4508751.

Nourse, Victoria F. (2004). "Toward a New Constitutional Anatomy". Stanford Law Review. 56: 835–900. JSTOR 40040165. SSRN 2111506. Retrieved 1 June 2023.

Möllers, Christoph [in German] (2005). Gewaltengliederung (Habilitation thesis). Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck. ISBN 9783161486708. OCLC 181465333.

Maxwell A. Cameron, Tulia G. Falleti. Federalism and the Subnational Separation of Powers. Publius, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Spring, 2005), pp. 245-271 - https://www.jstor.org/stable/4624711.

Fombad, Charles Manga (1 May 2005). "Separation of Powers and Constitutionalism in Africa: The Case of Botswana". Boston College Third World Law Journal. 25 (2): 301–342.

Barendt, Eric (2005). "Separation of Powers and Constitutional Government (ch. 12)". In Bellamy, Robert (ed.). The Rule of Law and the Separation of Powers. London: Routledge.

Vignudelli, Aljs [in Italian] (2007). "Sulla separazione dei poteri nel diritto vigente" (PDF). Diritto & Questioni Pubbliche (D&Q) (7): 201.

Bamforth, Nicholas. "Separation of Powers, Public Law Theory and Comparative Analysis (ch. 9)". In Baranger, Denis; Bradley, Anthony W.; Ziegler, Katja S. (eds.). Constitutionalism and the Role of Parliaments. Studies of the Oxford Institute of European and Comparative Law. Oxford: Hart/Bloomsbury. pp. 167–190. doi:10.5040/9781472560094.ch-009. ISBN 978-1-84113-643-1. OCLC 255509306. OL 12567052M. (not available in my library)

Carolan, Eoin (2009). The New Separation of Powers: A Theory for the Modern State. Oxford University Press. (based on the author's 2006 doctoral dissertation, "A Theory of Institutional Separation for the Administrative State", available (PDF) via Trinity's Access to Research Archive.)

Matthew Stephenson & Jide O. Nzelibe, Complementary Constraints: Separation of Powers, Rational Voting, and Constitutional Design, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 617 (2010). https://dash.harvard.edu/handle/1/10849723. --> Economic analysis

Cornils, Matthias [in German] (2010). "Gewaltenteilung". In Depenheuer, Otto [in German]; Grabenwarter, Christoph (eds.). Verfassungstheorie. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck. ISBN 978-3-16-150631-4. OCLC 670418084.

Manning, John F. SEPARATION OF POWERS AS ORDINARY INTERPRETATION, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 124, No. 8 (JUNE 2011), pp. 1939-2040 - https://www.jstor.org/stable/41306771.

Troper, Michel. Chagnollaud, Dominique. Traité International de Droit Constitutionnel, Tome 1: Théorie de la Constitution, Tome 2: Distribution des Pouvoirs. ISBN (Vol. 1): 978-2-2471-0744-5; ISBN - (Vol. 2, online ed.): 978-2-247-12195-3.

Klosko, George (2012). History of Political Theory: An Introduction. Volume I: Ancient and Medieval (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-969542-3.

Klosko, George (2013). History of Political Theory: An Introduction. Volume II: Modern (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-969545-4.

Waldron, Jeremy (2013). "Separation of Powers in Thought and Practice?" (PDF). Boston College Law Review. 54: 433–468. Retrieved 24 May 2023.

Möllers, Christoph [in German] (2013). The Three Branches: A Comparative Model of Separation of Powers. Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780198738084.

Barber, Nicholas W. (November 2013). "Self-Defence for Institutions". Cambridge Law Journal. 72 (3): 558–577. doi:10.1017/S0008197313000706. JSTOR 24694078.

Breakey, Hugh (4 October 2014). "Dividing to conquer: Employing the separation of powers to structure institutional inter-relations". Research in Ethical Issues in Organizations. 12. Emerald Group: 29–58. doi:10.1108/S1529-209620140000012005. {{cite journal}}: |archive-url= requires |archive-date= (help)

https://blog-iacl-aidc.org/new-blog-2/2018/6/1/report-on-iacl-roundtable-on-the-new-separation-of-powers

Michaels, Jon D. (April 2015). An Enduring, Evolving Separaiton of Powers. Columbia Law Journal, 115(3) - https://www.jstor.org/stable/43267874

Klarman, Michael J. (2016). The Framers' Coup: The Making of the United States Constitution. New York City: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-994203-9.

Fombad, Charles M. (ed.): Separation of Powers in African Constitutionalism (2016), https://oxcon.ouplaw.com/display/10.1093/law/9780198759799.001.0001/law-9780198759799

Wehle, Kimberly L. (14 December 2016). "Defining Lawmaking Power". Wake Forest Law Review. 51: 881–915. SSRN 2885428. Retrieved 29 June 2023.

Kavanagh, Aileen (2016). "The Constitutional Separation of Powers". In Dyzenhaus, David; Thorburn, Malcolm (eds.). Philosophical Foundations of Constitutional Law. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198754527.003.0012. ISBN 978-0-19-875452-7.

South Sudan: https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep11018

Séparation des pouvoirs et contre-pouvoirs (Actes des 1ères journées scientifiques de droit constitutionnel - Palais des Congrès de Niamey, du 10 au 13 octobre 2017 - Oumarou Narey - Avec l'Association Nigérienne de Droit Constitutionnel (ANDC) - Collection : Harmattan Sénégal

Mikuli, Piotr (2018). "Separation of Powers" (PDF). In Grote, Rainer; Lachenmann, F.; Wolfrum, Rüdiger (eds.). Max Planck Encyclopedia of Comparative Constitutional Law. Oxford University Press.

Fontana, David; Huq, Aziz Z. (2018). "Institutional Loyalites in Constitutional Law" (PDF). University of Chicago Law Review. 85 (1): 1–84. SSRN 2940769. Retrieved 2 July 2023.

5 Journal of International and Comparative Law, Issue 2

Saunders, Cheryl (2018). "Theoretical underpinnings of separation of powers". In Jacobsohn, Gary J.; Schor, Miguel (eds.). Comparative Constitutional Theory. Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar. pp. 66–85.

Bumke, Christian [in German]; Voßkuhle, Andreas (2019). German Constitutional Law: Introduction, Cases, and Principles. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-880809-1.

Fombad, Charles Manga (2019). "The Separation of Powers in African Constitutionalism". In Cheeseman, Nic (ed.). The Oxford Encyclopedia of African Politics. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.1327. ISBN 978-0-19-008904-7.

https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.12657/59780/9781000800982.pdf;jsessionid=974B673C115EF56B0EAED5D827A3AC34?sequence=1

Weber, Albrecht [in German] (2019). European Constitutions Compared. Oxford: Hart Publishing. ISBN 978 1 509931545.

Troper, Michel [in French] (October 2019). "À quoi sert la séparation des pouvoirs? Le point de vue de la théorie du droit". Titre VII (3): 3–9. doi:10.3917/tvii.003.0003. Retrieved 21 June 2023.

Le Divellec, Armel (2020). "Parliament in constitutional law". In Benoît, Cyril; Rozenberg, Olivier (eds.). Handbook of parliamentary studies. Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, Mass., U.S.A.: Edward Elgar. ISBN 978 1 78990 650 9. OCLC 1231963438.

Craig, Paul (2021). "Institutions, Power, and Institutional Balance". In Craig, Paul; de Búrca, Gráinne (eds.). The Evolution of EU Law. Oxford University Press.

Tushnet, Mark V. (2021). The New Fourth Branch: Institutions for Protecting Constitutional Democracy. Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781009047609.

Bowie, Nikolas; Renan, Daphna (2022). "The Separation-of-Powers Counterrevolution" (PDF). Yale Law Journal. 131: 2020–2125. Retrieved 29 June 2023.

Macey, Joshua; Richardson, Brian M. (2022). "Checks, Not Balances". Texas Law Review. 101: 89–163. SSRN 4307216. Retrieved 29 June 2023.

Sandro, Paolo (2022). The Making of Constitutional Democracy: From Creation to Application of Law. Oxford/New York City: Hart Publishing/Bloomsbury. ISBN 9781509905225.

2023 translation of Ius Publicum Europaeum: https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-max-planck-handbooks-in-european-public-law-9780198726425?lang=en&cc=de#

Primary sources

Dallison, Charles (attributed) (1648). The Royalist's Defence. London – via Early English Books Online (Univ. of Michigan).

Lawson, George (1657). An Examination of the Political Part of Mr. Hobbs his Leviathan. London: Francis Tyton – via Early English Books Online (Univ. of Michigan).

Adams, John (1797) [1787]. A Defense of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America (PDF). Philadelphia: William Cobbett – via Online Library (archive.org).

Madison, James (1863) [1787]. Dawson, Henry (ed.). Federalist No. 10 . The Federalist Papers. New York (1863 ed.: New York, London): 1863 ed.: Charles Scribner (NY), Sampson Low, Son & Co. (London) – via Wikisource.{{citation}}: CS1 maint: location (link)

Madison, James (1863) [1787]. Dawson, Henry (ed.). Federalist No. 47 . The Federalist Papers. New York (1863 ed.: New York, London): 1863 ed.: Charles Scribner (NY), Sampson Low, Son & Co. (London) – via Wikisource.{{citation}}: CS1 maint: location (link)

Madison, James (1863) [1787]. Dawson, Henry (ed.). Federalist No. 48 . The Federalist Papers. New York (1863 ed.: New York, London): 1863 ed.: Charles Scribner (NY), Sampson Low, Son & Co. (London) – via Wikisource.{{citation}}: CS1 maint: location (link)

Madison, James (1863) [1787]. Dawson, Henry (ed.). Federalist No. 49 . The Federalist Papers. New York (1863 ed.: New York, London): 1863 ed.: Charles Scribner (NY), Sampson Low, Son & Co. (London) – via Wikisource.{{citation}}: CS1 maint: location (link)

Madison, James (1863) [1787]. Dawson, Henry (ed.). Federalist No. 50 . The Federalist Papers. New York (1863 ed.: New York, London): 1863 ed.: Charles Scribner (NY), Sampson Low, Son & Co. (London) – via Wikisource.{{citation}}: CS1 maint: location (link)

Madison, James (1863) [1787]. Dawson, Henry (ed.). Federalist No. 51 . The Federalist Papers. New York (1863 ed.: New York, London): 1863 ed.: Charles Scribner (NY), Sampson Low, Son & Co. (London) – via Wikisource.{{citation}}: CS1 maint: location (link)

Artur, Émile Marie Gustave (1 July 1900). "Séparation des pouvoirs et séparation des fonctions". Revue du droit public et de la science politique en France et à l'étranger. 7 (2). Paris: Chevalier-Marescq (at that time): 32–64. ISSN 1963-1790. available at Gallica.

Table of cases

Südumfahrung Stendal [Stendal South Bypass case], 95 BVerfGE 1, 15 (or at para. 42 online) (Federal Constitutional Court of Germany 17 July 1996).

Notes

Explanatory notes

^ Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany . art. 20. 2010 – via Wikisource. {{citation}}: Unknown parameter |authors= ignored (help)CS1 maint: location (link) CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
^ Stendal case (Fed. Const. Ct. Germany) 1996, at para. 42 (online) - Relevant excerpt translated in Bumke & Voßkuhle 2019, at margin note no. 1407 (p. 348).

Shortened references

^ Achterberg 1970, pp. 12–15.
^ Bumke & Voßkuhle 2019, para. 1293 (p. 320).