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The Invasion Scare of 1756 took place in Great Britain during the opening stages of the Seven Years' War when it was widely feared that an invasion by the combined French Army and Navy was imminent. Despite extensive preparations to counter it, no such invasion was launched and the focus of the war soon shifted to the North American and German theatres. Nonetheless the threatened invasion led to the deployment of large numbers of British soldiers, militia and troops of Britain's German Allies, and led to considerable political debates.
Background
editDuring the recent War of the Austrian Succession, France had attempted an Invasion of Britain in 1744[1] and followed this up by providing support to the Jacobite Rising of 1745. The Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748 had established an uneasy peace between the two countries.
Although in 1755 an undeclared war in North America had taken place, in Europe formal peace still continued. Following the initial large-scale fighting in the Ohio Country and Nova Scotia, both Britain and France believed that a peaceful solution to the crisis could be still be found. However diplomatic negotiations failed, and the subsequent Diplomatic Revolution increased the likelihood of war. Both began escalating military preparations.
Under direction from Versailles, the French army began gathering forces along the Atlantic Coast. Under the command of the veteran Duc of Belle-Isle a force of ninety one battalions of infantry and twenty two squadrons of cavalry were assembled, totalling around 68,500 men. Significantly, however, few attempts were made to gather enough troopships needed to carry a force of this size.[2]
British response
editAs war became more likely the current government under the Duke of Newcastle became concerned that Britain's defensive preparations were inadequate. Despite the strength of the Royal Navy, Britain had a considerably smaller army than France and the coastline of Britain and its sister Kingdom of Ireland were considered exposed. This was compounded by sickness and undermanning in the Royal Navy, with the ships needed for home defence 15,000 men short of their full complement.[3] The prospect of a major French attack before Britain was fully ready for war now provoked a crisis in British strategy.
a rush to to form new militia units.
The need for professional soldiers led to the shipping of soldiers from the Elector of Hanover, also ruled over by George II and closely allied Hesse-Cassel in the spring of 1756.[4] This strategy led to the eventual deployment of 8,600 Hanoverian and 6,500 Hessian soldiers.[5]
Fall of Minorca
editFrench plans had been to ostentatiously form a potential invasion force on the northern coast as a feint, while also preparing a strike to the south at Britain's Mediterranean outpost at Minorca. This plan was successfully carried through as a force sailed from Toulon on 12 April 1756. Arriving on the island French forces landed without opposition and laid siege to Port Mahon.
Britain's response to the threat had been slow, because the head of the Admiralty Lord Anson believed that the moves towards Minorca had been a diversion to draw British ships away from the English channel.[6] At the Battle of Minorca the French held off a failed relief effort by the Royal Navy under John Byng, who was subsequently court-martialled and executed for his conduct. Byng had been sent with an understrength fleet for the task due to government fears about the security of home waters.[7]
Risk to Hanover
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As it became clear that France was not about to launch an immediate attack, concern grew for the status of Hanover itself. French plans were to overrun Hanover and use it as a bargaining chip to offset any losses to Britain in the country's colonial empire. This led to the formation of the British-financed Army of Observation to defend the Electorate and the forces who had been despatched to defend England were gradually shifted to northern Germany. Although the arrival and deployment of the Hanoverians had been resented, their rapid withdrawal was also criticised.[8]
The last Hessian auxiliaries left Britain in
Aftermath
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The government's handling of the early stages of the campaign, particularly the loss of Minorca, led to the fall of Newcastle in November 1756 and the appointment of a short-lived government dominated by Pitt. Unable to command a clear majority in the House of Commons, from June 1757 Pitt formed a Coalition government with his former enemy.
In late 1758 the new French war leader the Duke of Choiseul reactivated plans to launch a direct attack against Great Britain and Ireland in order to reverse French losses elsewhere in the global war. Although extensive preparations were made, and Britain was more vulnerable due to the large numbers of forces serving overseas and the lack of the potential German support of 1756, the naval victories at the Battle of Lagos and Battle of Quiberon Bay in 1759 dashed Choisuel's plans.
References
editBibliography
edit- Dull, Jonathan R. The French Navy and the Seven Years' War. University of Nebraska, 2005.
- McCormack, Matthew. Embodying the Militia in Georgian England. Oxford University Press, 2015.
- McLynn, Frank. 1759: The Year Britain Became Master of the World. Random House, 2008.
- Page, Anthony. Britain and the Seventy Years War, 1744-1815: Enlightenment, Revolution and Empire. Macmillan, 2014.
- Simms, Brendan & Riotte, Torsten. The Hanoverian Dimension in British History, 1714–1837. Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- Tracy, Nicholas. The Battle of Quiberon Bay, 1759: Admiral Hawke and the Defeat of the French Invasion. Pen & Sword Maritime, 2010.
External links
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