Perception (create new heading)

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There are many perceptions on who Mohamed Bouazizi was. After his self-immolation, Bouazizi’s image flooded social media which lead to worldwide discourse. This complicated how Bouazizi was seen,"Mohamed Bouazizi is not our hero. He's your hero," said Arabic Nader Ncibi.[1] There are accusations that social media diluted what Bouazizi stood for. Naafil Harshani, an activist that grew up with Bouaziz, said, "what was important to Mohamed was putting food on the table and football. He had nothing to do with politics and wanted nothing to do with politics."[2] Mohamed Bouaziz did not plan to start a revolution, but it is undeniable that it preceded his anger towards not being able to sell his fruit. "There are many stories on who Mohamed was and who Mohamed wasn't," said Zahra Shwabli, a Hay Al Noor primary school teacher, "It is important for us on this day to remember what Mohamed Bouazizi stood for: the dignity of all Tunisians. And that is something that not even time can take away from us." [3]

A power struggle continued after the immediate response to the Arab Spring. While leadership changed and regimes were held accountable, power went up for grabs across the Arab world. Ultimately it came down to a contentious battle between a consolidation of power by religious elites and the growing support for democracy in many muslim-majority states. [4]

Eighteen days after protests emerged President Hosni Mubarak stepped down. But the clear cut victor or direction of the country was not announced. The lack of a formal re-election process led Egypt into a chaotic transfer of power.[5]

Social Media and the Arab Spring

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A study by Zeynep Tufekci of the University of North Carolina and Christopher Wilson of the United Nations Development Program concluded that "social media in general, and Facebook in particular, provided new sources of information the regime could not easily control and were crucial in shaping how citizens made individual decisions about participating in protests, the logistics of protest, and the likelihood of success."[6] Marc Lynch of George Washington University said, "while social media boosters envisioned the creation of a new public sphere based on dialogue and mutual respect, the reality is that Islamists and their adversaries retreat to their respective camps, reinforcing each other's prejudices while throwing the occasional rhetorical bomb across the no-man's land that the center has become."[7] Lynch also stated in a Foreign Policy article, "There is something very different about scrolling through pictures and videos of unified, chanting Yemeni or Egyptian crowds demanding democratic change and waking up to a gory image of a headless 6-year-old girl on your Facebook news feed"[8]

Who's Marc Lynch? And I don't think a blog post is a good source.

Response: Marc Lynch is the author of the foreign policy article. I meant article not blog post, thanks for catching that.

Aftermath

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Even though a revolution did take place and the prior government has been replaced, Tunisia's government can not conclude that another uprising will not take place. There are still many grievances taking place today.[9]

Due to tourism coming to a halt and other factors during the revolution and Arab Spring movement, the budget deficit has grown and unemployment has rose since 2011. [10] "Unemployment remains at 15.3% from 16.7% in 2011, but still well above the pre-revolution level of 13%."[11] Large scale immigration brought on by a long and treacherous civil war has permanently harmed the Syrian economy. Projections for economic contraction will remain high at almost 7% in 2017. [12]

Still to this day, in countries affected by the Arab Spring, there is great division amongst those who prefer the status quo and those who want democratic change. As these regions dive ever deeper into political conflict time will show if new ideas can be established or if old institutions will still stand strong. [13] The largest change from the pre-revolution to the post-revolution was in the attempt to break up political elites and reshape the geopolitical structure of the middle east. It is speculated that many of the changes brought on by the Arab Spring will lead to a shifting of regional power in the Middle East and a quickly changing structure of power.  [14]

You can also talk about how the revolution slowed down tourism in Tunisia/Arab World.

Response: Ok, I will also add socio-economic effect afterwards. Currently looking for a study that is only available to Berkeley students to use.

Coverage of women in the Arab spring came at a somewhat perplexing rate. While CNN and other major american news outlets covered muslim women more, they often gave them a passive role in the commentary of their coverage. Most of the women were also shown wearing hijabs and more traditional muslim clothing than before, pointing to a change in coverage by US media outlets. This however was not reflective of the realities of the Arab Spring. [15]

Women were instrumental in every facet of the movement ascribing to a post-colonial feminism that rejected their powerlessness and gave them unique thoughtful roles.[16] While women joined men with a similar cause, to fight for regime change, they ultimately were pursuing different goals unique to their gendered status in society. In some cases women had set backs and suffered from more oppression than pre-Arab Spring. But, more than anything they made the issues of women’s rights vulnerable again to conservative values. While a democratic election is a right for all citizens, women had very little influence on the election and most often a leader was chosen that did not address their concerns or bring justice for women. [17]

The Arab spring has massively setback all economies involved in the conflict. As most middle eastern countries tried to reintegrate into the global economy, uncertainty about their political future shunned investors and did little to promote economic growth. With a large refugee crisis, unstable regional governments and currency, and a questionable future, many of these economies and countries will suffer compounding future effects. [18] The Arab spring could prove to be detrimental to women’s rights for economics reasons as well. In a 2012 World Bank Report, they highlighted how greater access to economic resources can increase women’s agency. As the economies of countries in the MENA region have suffered, slowing due to the Arab Spring, then so could the advancement of women's rights. [19]

A divided international response can be seen in the difference in the response from the United States and the response from Russia. While the United States openly supported any group looking for democratic representation Russia took a much more hands off approach. Russia, an authoritarian state, has been seen supporting other authoritarian regimes in more geopolitically convenient areas. Northern Africa did not however pose enough of a threat or advantage for Russia to become actively involved in the regime change but nevertheless was a point of contention between Russia and the west. [20]

The United States narrative could change dramatically with a Trump Presidency. His hawkish comments on foreign policy are similar to that of Presidential Nominee Clinton’s. So far, most of his cabinet appointments confirm a hawk like foreign policy position and one that would rely on heavy intervention in the area.[21]

Varying reactions

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"American philosopher and counterculture commentator Noam Chomsky claimed, "The U.S. and its allies will do anything they can to prevent authentic democracy in the Arab world. The reason is very simple. Across the region, an overwhelming majority of the population regards the United States as the main threat to their interests."[62]" <-Already in article, add this after it -> It is known that the United States supported the regimes of Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen all the way up to and during the protests. The United States strategically changed it's support when it became evident that the regimes were losing power.[22] Israel considered these countries regimes a "strategic treasure." [23]

In March of 2011, just months after the protests started in Tunisia, Hilary Clinton commented on worldwide news sources,“Al Jazeera has been the leader in that are literally changing people’s minds and attitudes. And like it or hate it, it is really effective.” Clinton's State Department has even began Tweeting in Arabic and Farsi. [24]Global communication has become more prominent after Arab Spring to connect us all.

Reactions around the world turned many into activists from afar when the effects of the Arab Spring began to affect their loved ones still in these countries. After seeing the personal nature of the repression, many who were abroad began to speak out, creating a global network that would help hold these leaders accountable. While many citizens abroad typically feared coming out against their own government, by the time the Libyan government began to fall most were actively speaking against their government’s oppression.[25]

Interest in the Arab spring had a different tone around the world. In South Korea, for example, there was political coverage that focused on the causes of the arab spring but never really went into in depth analysis. This important difference is between the United States vested interest in the country compared to other countries across the globe. South Korea, an ever increasing world power, has very little use in covering this story. Most of the newspapers took tones that reflected a possible sentiment similar to what people would feel in China and in North Korea but never really sought far to compare the two. Political coverage in these far reaching parts of the globe was dim because of the lack of national interest in these states.[26]

For other countries in the region, foreign policy has been heavily shaped by the Arab Spring. For example, many in Turkey are calling for “zero problems with neighbors” approach which helps unify MENA countries by ending warfare and struggle across the region. This is a proactive response which recognizes a country like Turkey’s unique influence in the region.[27]

How US responded:

United State's reaction was formed by it's history, "Washington’s pursuit of regional security over democracy dated back to traditional interests in a US-led security framework and cordial ties with oil-rich Arab states. Administrations from both major parties had long backed pro-US Arab tyrants to preserve oil flows and defend Israel. These behaviors stemmed from historic changes in the 1970s, including Great Britain’s departure from the Persian Gulf in 1971, the 1973 War and oil shock, and, in 1979, the Iranian Revolution and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan."[28]

"Global communication has become more important after Arab Spring to connect us all." Keep the tone objective.

Responses: Changed to prominent, thanks for noticing that.

Daniel Doherty is a San Franciscan street artist. He is widely known for creating graffiti murals in the Mission District. Laura Lengel and Victoria Ann Newsom, authors of "Symbolic Interaction and New Social Media," mention the significance of Doherty's mural of Mohamed Bouazizi. They describe Doherty's work of art as an "alternative offline media form."[29]

Doherty has created several murals that consist of a local homeless man. These images touch on social problems. In one of them titles "Everything Must Go!" a bookstore filled with books about San Francisco is going out of business.[30]He has also captured a famous location in San Francisco, Dolores Park, where he used pointillism. [31]

Clarion Alley Mural Project participates in spreading awareness of heroes worldwide. Every year, 200,000 people visit these murals in San Francisco's Mission District.[32] in 2011, Doherty painted an informative mural of Mohamed Bouazizi. The mural consists of a painting of Bouazizi surrounded by an explanation of how he became a catalyst for the Tunisian Revolution.[33] Doherty’s mural educated each visitor about this Tunisian martyr while promoting local art, helping spread Bouazizi's actions worldwide.

->>I am not sure if we can upload photos from websites or not?? If yes, then I would upload a picture of it.

You'd have to cite the photo.

Response: I messaged the wikiedu employee to see how to go about that.Good start.

  1. ^ Jensen, Jon. "The making of a martyr: truth or legend? - Some doubt the story of Mohamed Bouazizi whose suicide sparked the revolution in Tunisia.." GlobalPost: Beats (North America) 16 May 2011, Regions. NewsBank. Web. 26 Oct. 2016.
  2. ^ "One year on, Tunisia celebrates man behind 'Jasmine Revolution'." Jordan Times, The (Amman, Jordan) 18 Dec. 2011, NEWS. NewsBank. Web. 26 Oct. 2016.
  3. ^ "One year on, Tunisia celebrates man behind 'Jasmine Revolution'." Jordan Times, The (Amman, Jordan) 18 Dec. 2011, NEWS. NewsBank. Web. 26 Oct. 2016.
  4. ^ Hoyle, Justin A. "A Matter Of Framing: Explaining The Failure Of Post-Islamist Social Movements In The Arab Spring." DOMES: Digest Of Middle East Studies 25.2 (2016): 186-209. Academic Search Complete. Web. 18 Nov. 2016.
  5. ^ Zartman, I. William (2015-01-01). Arab Spring. University of Georgia Press. ISBN 9780820348261.
  6. ^ "Debate flares on 'Twitter revolutions,' Arab Spring." Agence France-Presse 10 Mar. 2013. NewsBank. Web. 26 Oct. 2016.
  7. ^ "Debate flares on 'Twitter revolutions,' Arab Spring." Agence France-Presse 10 Mar. 2013. NewsBank. Web. 26 Oct. 2016.
  8. ^ "Twitter Devolutions". Foreign Policy. Retrieved 2016-10-27.
  9. ^ Fahmy, Nabil. "Managing compromise in Middle East - Managing compromise in Middle East." Daily Star, The (Beirut, Lebanon) 25 Oct. 2016, Commentary: 7. NewsBank. Web. 24 Oct. 2016.
  10. ^ "Tunisia Overview". www.worldbank.org. Retrieved 2016-10-27.
  11. ^ "Tunisia Overview". www.worldbank.org. Retrieved 2016-10-27.
  12. ^ "East Med." Middle East Monitor: East Med 26.11 (2016): 1-8. Business Source Complete. Web. 18 Nov. 2016.
  13. ^ Bülent Aras & Richard Falk (2016) Five years after the Arab Spring: a critical evaluation, Third World Quarterly, 37:12, 2252-2258, DOI: 10.1080/01436597.2016.1224087
  14. ^ Aras, Bülent, and Emirhan Yorulmazlar. "State, Region And Order: Geopolitics Of The Arab Spring." Third World Quarterly 37.12 (2016): 2259-2273. Business Source Complete. Web. 18 Nov. 2016.
  15. ^ Dastgeer, Shugofa, and Peter J. Gade. "Visual Framing Of Muslim Women In The Arab Spring: Prominent, Active, And Visible." International Communication Gazette 78.5 (2016): 432-450. Academic Search Complete. Web. 18 Nov. 2016.
  16. ^ Jackson, Melissa. "A Season Of Change: Egyptian Women's Organizing In The Arab Spring." Undercurrent 11.1 (2015): 38-45. Academic Search Complete. Web. 18 Nov. 2016.
  17. ^ Johansson-Nogués, Elisabeth. "Gendering The Arab Spring? Rights And (In)Security Of Tunisian, Egyptian And Libyan Women." Security Dialogue 44.5/6 (2013): 393-409. Academic Search Complete. Web. 18 Nov. 2016.
  18. ^ Karam, Fida, and Chahir Zaki. "How Did Wars Dampen Trade In The MENA Region?" Applied Economics 48.60 (2016): 5909-5930. Business Source Complete. Web. 18 Nov. 2016.
  19. ^ Adnane, Souad. "Economic Freedom And Women's Emancipation In The MENA Region." Economic Affairs 35.3 (2015): 416-427. Business Source Complete. Web. 19 Nov. 2016.
  20. ^ Dannreuther, Roland. "Russia And The Arab Spring: Supporting The Counter-Revolution." Journal Of European Integration 37.1 (2015): 77-94. Academic Search Complete. Web. 18 Nov. 2016.
  21. ^ Gulf. Middle East Monitor: The Gulf [serial online]. November 2016;26(11):1-12. Available from: Business Source Complete, Ipswich, MA. Accessed November 18, 2016.
  22. ^ "The United States and the Arab Spring: The Dynamics of Political Engineering". Arab Studies Quarterly. Vol. 35 Issue 3. {{cite journal}}: |volume= has extra text (help)
  23. ^ Heilbrunn, Jacob. (2011). Israel and me Arab revolutions. The National Interest, February 14, http:// nationalinterest.org/blog/jacob-heilbrunn/israel-me-arab-revolutions-4872 
  24. ^ News, ABC. "Sec. of State Hillary Clinton: Al Jazeera is 'Real News', U.S. Losing 'Information War'". ABC News. Retrieved 2016-10-27. {{cite web}}: |last= has generic name (help)
  25. ^ Moss, Dana M. "Transnational Repression, Diaspora Mobilization, And The Case Of The Arab Spring." Social Problems 63.4 (2016): 480-498. Academic Search Complete. Web. 14 Nov. 2016.
  26. ^ Ha, Jae Sik, and Donghee Shin. "Framing The Arab Spring: Partisanship In The News Stories Of Korean Newspapers." International Communication Gazette 78.6 (2016): 536-556. Academic Search Complete. Web. 18 Nov. 2016.
  27. ^ Aras, Bülent, and Sevgi Akarçeşme. “Turkey and the Arab Spring.” International Journal, vol. 67, no. 1, 2011, pp. 39–51. www.jstor.org/stable/23265964.
  28. ^ http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199660063.001.0001/acprof-9780199660063-chapter-3
  29. ^ Lengel, Laura (2014). Symbolic Interaction and New Social Media. Emerald Group Publishing.
  30. ^ "Everything Must Go! - Clarion Alley Mural Project". Clarion Alley Mural Project. Retrieved 2016-10-27.
  31. ^ "A Sunday Afternoon at Dolores Park (2009)". www.sfmuralarts.com. Retrieved 2016-10-27.
  32. ^ "Clarion Alley Mural Project". Clarion Alley Mural Project. Retrieved 2016-10-27.
  33. ^ "Mohamed Bouazizi - Clarion Alley Mural Project". Clarion Alley Mural Project. Retrieved 2016-10-27.