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1 May 1982 engagements
Part of Falklands War
Sea Harriers in 1980
Sea Harriers in 1980
Date1 May 1982
Location
Area around the Falkland Islands
Result British victory
Belligerents
 United Kingdom  Argentina
Commanders and leaders
Sandy Woodward Ernesto Crespo
Casualties and losses
One wounded
One aircraft damaged
Two ships damaged[1]		 17 killed, 28 wounded
Five aircraft destroyed, two damaged
Two ships damaged[2]

The engagements between British and Argentine forces on 1 May 1982 were the first major battle of the Falklands War.

Background

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Following the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands on 2 April 1982 the British Government resolved to re-take the islands. During the first two weeks of April a powerful Royal Navy force was assembled at Ascension Island in the South Atlantic. The main elements of this force were a Carrier Battle Group centred on the aircraft carriers HMS Hermes and Invincible, and an amphibious group with 3 Commando Brigade embarked. The Carrier Battle Group was commanded by Rear Admiral Sandy Woodward and the amphibious group was headed by Commodore Michael Clapp. Both men, along with the commander of the commando brigade, reported to Admiral John Fieldhouse who commanded the force from the Northwood Headquarters in London.[3]

Following a conference with Fieldhouse on 17 April, Woodward sailed with the Carrier Battle Group. His goals were to gain control of the area around the Falkland Islands and land reconnaissance parties to gather intelligence on the Argentine forces there. The amphibious forces remained at Ascension to re-stock the ships (which had been hastily loaded with supplies as they departed the UK) and await the arrival of further Royal Navy warships.[4] During its voyage south the Carrier Battle Group fired chaff whenever it was shadowed by Argentine Boeing 707 aircraft to simulate the presence of amphibious ships. Woodward and his staff assessed that the Argentine commanders would assume that the British used United States Marine Corps doctrine of making frontal assaults on their main target and would seek to directly attack Port Stanley.[5]

Woodward's objective for the operations on 1 May was to begin the process of attriting the Argentinian air and naval forces by luring them to attack the British fleet while also distracting their attention away from the insertion of special forces reconnaissance teams. To do so, he decided to enter the TEZ at night, and conduct strong attacks on the Port Stanley area while also striking the airfields in the Falkland Islands to suppress the aircraft stationed there in the hopes of convincing the Argentinians that the fleet was preparing to land troops near the town. That night, helicopters would land small parties of special forces personnel on the islands; these teams had the mission of locating and assessing the quality of the Argentinian defences. In addition to the operations over the Falkands, the submarine HMS Splendid was to operate against 25 de Mayo, and helicopters and warships were to seek out Argentinian submarines.[6][7]

Opposing forces

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See also: British air services in the Falklands War and Argentine air forces in the Falklands War

The Argentine air forces tasked with defending the Falklands were split into two separate commands. The units deployed to the islands came under the South Atlantic Theatre of Operations. However, the units on the mainland were assigned to the newly-established Southern Air Force (Fuerza Aerea Sur [FAS]), which was commanded by Brigadier General Ernesto Crespo and reported directly to the Junta. The FAS comprised the air force's most capable units.[8] While the air force was reasonably well equipped, its structure and doctrine were focused on a potential war against Chile in which its aircraft were expected to mainly fly short range close air support sorties. No preparations had been made to fight a technologically advanced nation, and none of the Mirage III or Dagger fighter aircraft was capable of aerial refueling. The Air Force had a shortage of tanker and maritime reconnaissance aircraft, and only a third of the A-4s were fitted with modern long-range navigation equipment. The force's main air-to-air missile, the Matra R.530, was also significantly inferior to the the British Harriers' AIM-9L Sidewinder missiles; the Matra had a shorter range and could only lock onto an enemy fighter while flying behind it.[9]

 
HMS Invincible during the Falklands War

During April the FAS was deployed to bases in southern Argentina from which its aircraft could reach the Falklands. By the end of the month it had a strength of 110 aircraft, and the Navy contributed a further 12 Super Étendard strike aircraft.[10] The Argentine fighter and strike aircraft could not operate from the Falkland Islands as the only sealed runway in the Falklands, which was located at Port Stanley Airport, was too short.[10] However, a force of 24 Pucará light attack aircraft, six MB-339 advanced trainers and either four or six T-34 Mentor training aircraft were dispatched to the Falklands during April.[11][12] The MB-339s operated out of Port Stanley Airport, most of the Pucarás were stationed at Goose Green and the T-34s and several other Pucarás were based at Pebble Island.[12] The airfields at Port Stanley and Goose Green were protected by 30mm and 35mm anti-aircraft guns, as well as Roland and Tigercat surface-to-air missiles.[13]

The British Carrier Battle Broup had a strength of twelve warships and two support vessels on 1 May. Its most powerful elements were the carriers HMS Hermes (Woodward's flagship) and Invincible, each of which had a squadron of Sea Harrier fighters embarked as well as larger numbers of anti-submarine helicopters. 800 Naval Air Squadron operated 12 Sea Harriers from Hermes, and 801 Naval Air Squadron's 8 Sea Harriers flew from Invincible. The carriers were escorted by the destroyers HMS Coventry, Glamorgan, Glasgow and Sheffield as well as the frigates HMS Alacrity, Arrow, Brilliant, Broadsword, Plymouth and Yarmouth. The warships were accompanied by the ammunition ship RFA Resource and the fuel tanker RFA Olwen.[14]

8th Air Brigade (Argentina)

British air attacks

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XM607, the Vulcan which bombed Port Stanley Airport on 1 May, after being retired from RAF service
See also: Operation Black Buck

The Vulcan raid on Port Stanley Airport marked the beginning of the fighting on 1 May. During the night of 30 April a force of two Vulcans (one as a reserve) and thirteen tankers (including two reserves) took off from Ascension Island and headed south. The lead Vulcan had to abort, and the reserve took over.[15] At 4:46 am local time on 1 May this aircraft dropped 21 1000-lb bombs on Port Stanley Airport, one of which exploded on the runway.[16] The Argentinian air defences around Port Stanley did not engage the Vulcan as it successfully jammed the fire-control radar for the 35-mm anti-aircraft guns emplaced near the airport; while the AN/TPS-44 radar located on Sapper Hill detected the aircraft, the Argentinian forces were unsure whether it was a hostile aircraft. The bombardment is believed to have killed three Argentinian personnel at the airport and injured several more. The bomb which exploded on the runway caused a large crater which proved difficult to repair, and the other bombs caused minor damage to aircraft and equipment.[17] 801 NAS Sea Harriers held at readiness on board Invincible to protect the Vulcan, but were not required as no Argentine aircraft were in the area at the time of the attack.[18] Two Mirage IIIs were dispatched from the mainland in response to the attack, and arrived over the Falklands at around 7:30 am. They departed soon after, however, as they were unable to make radio contact with Radar Malvinas.[16]

The Sea Harriers went into action shortly after the Vulcan raid. Two of the aircraft flew over Port Stanley airport to photograph the damage caused by the Vulcan.[19] At 7:48 am all twelve 800 NAS Sea Harriers were dispatched from Hermes to attack targets on East Falkland.[20][16] Invincible also launched four Sea Harriers which established two combat air patrol (CAP) orbits to the east of Port Stanley. These aircraft were replaced hourly. The orbits were controlled from the destroyer HMS Glamorgan.[16]

Nine of the Sea Harriers struck Port Stanley Airport and dropped 27 bombs on the airfield and its defences. The bombs set a stockpile of fuel on fire and may have slightly damaged the runway.[19] One of the Sea Harriers was struck by a 20mm anti-aircraft round which damaged its fin and tailplane; the aircraft managed to return to Hermes and was quickly repaired.[21] The Argentine air defence headquarters wrongly assessed British losses as three aircraft destroyed.[19] The other three 800 NAS Sea Harriers attacked the airfield at Goose Green with cluster bombs shortly after the raid on Port Stanley, resulting in the destruction of a Pucará and severe damage to another two. The pilot of the destroyed aircraft and five maintenance personnel were killed. Neither of the damaged aircraft flew again.[22] The three British aircraft did not encounter any opposition and safely returned to Hermes.[21] After the aircraft were refueled, 800 NAS began launching Sea Harriers on combat air patrol sorties.[21] 801 NAS maintained a four aircraft combat air patrol to the east of Port Stanley throughout the operation.[18]

Two Argentine Daggers arrived over East Falkland at about the same time as the Sea Harriers were attacking Port Stanley and Goose Green. The Argentine ground controllers vectored them to attack the northerly of the two Sea Harrier CAP orbits. Glamorgan's crew detected the incoming aircraft, and also vectored the northerly CAP orbit to intercept them. No combat ensued, however, as neither pair of aircraft was able to spot the other before the Argentines ran low on fuel and departed.[23]

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Two groups of warships were detached from the Carrier Battle Group for independent tasks on 1 May.[24] The frigates Brilliant and Yarmouth were directed to conduct an anti-submarine sweep 20 miles (32 km) off the north-east shore of East Falkland.[24] Glamorgan and frigates Alacrity and Arrow were to conduct a shore bombardment.[25]

Brilliant and Yarmouth were hunting the Argentine submarine ARA San Luis. British intelligence had intercepted a radio signal directing it to operate off East Falkland on 29 April. The two frigates and three Westland Sea King helicopters from Hermes searched the area, and conducted depth charge attacks on several sonar contacts.[24] While the British were hopeful that they had sunk the submarine after spotting an oil slick, their ships did not come close to the submarine. San Luis fired a torpedo at a British ship at 10:05 am, but it missed.[26]

The bombardment group was tasked with attacking Argentine positions around Port Stanley. The attack aimed to simulate the pre-landing bombardment for an amphibious landing, and also formed part of efforts to wear down the area's defences. Its targets were the parking area for aircraft at Port Stanley Airport, the road between the airport and town, two suspected artillery positions and suspected radar stations on Sapper Hill and Mount William. The ships approached Port Stanley from the south, and opened fire at about 1:30 pm when they were 7 miles (11 km) off the coast.[25] Argentine guns initially fired back, but soon ceased fire as the British ships were beyond their maximum range. The Argentine forces did not suffer any casualties, but some equipment was damaged.[27]

Two British helicopters which were operating with the bombardment group were fired on by Argentine air defences. The Coast Guard patrol boat PNA Islas Malvinas exchanged machine gun fire with a Westland Lynx operating from Alacrity. One of the Argentine sailors was wounded, and the helicopter damaged. Tigercat batteries at Port Stanley Airport also fired two missiles at a Westland Wessex which was patrolling off Port Stanley in the hope of attacking any Argentine ships which departed the town. The helicopter was not damaged, but withdrew. These two exchanges led the Argentine command to report to the mainland that a British landing was taking place at Berkeley Sound area to the north of Port Stanley.[27]

Argentine response

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A retired Argentinian Mirage III

Initial attacks

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Twelve Argentine aircraft were dispatched from the mainland in response to reports of British ships shelling the Port Stanley area. This first operation involved four A-4B Skyhawks from the 5th Fighter Group armed with bombs escorted by four Mirage IIIs from the 8th Fighter Group, as well as four Dagger IAIs from the 6th Fighter Group operating independently in the air-to-air role.[27] After reaching the Falklands area the local Air Force controllers directed the Skyhawks towards what they believed were British ships detected by radar. This proved to be a mistake, as the radar had actually detected Sea Harriers. The Mirages fired one or two missiles at the Sea Harriers, but did not achieve any hits. The Sea Harriers manoeuvred in response to the attack, but did not fire on the Argentines. The Skyhawks and Daggers did not engage any targets, and all twelve aircraft returned to their bases.[28]

While this operation was underway, three Beechcraft T-34C Turbo-Mentor propeller-driven aircraft were dispatched from Pebble Island in the Falklands with orders to attack British helicopters which were believed to be landing troops near Port Stanley. These aircraft were operated by the 4th Naval Attack Squadron and were mainly used as trainers during peacetime. Their pilots located a British helicopter off the north-east tip of East Falkland, but were driven off by two Sea Harriers as they prepared to attack it. One of the Turbo-Mentors was slightly damaged by cannon fire; the British pilots did not use Sidewinder missiles on this occasion as they judged that the Turbo-Mentors weren't worthwhile targets for these expensive weapons. Historian Martin Middlebrook has noted that "the pilots on both sides would soon shed such inhibitions". This was the only time Turbo-Mentors were used in combat during the war.[29] The MB-339s at Port Stanley Airport were not used, most likely due to the damage to the airfield.[28]

Anti-shipping attacks

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The Argentine forces planned a major attack on the British for the afternoon of 1 May involving all of the frontline air units stationed on the mainland. This operation was focused on attacking British ships; around 37 of the least 50 planned sorties were anti-shipping missions. It was intended for the attackers to arrive in the combat area within a short period of time in an attempt to overwhelm the British.[30]

The first of the anti-shipping aircraft to arrive off the Falklands were three Daggers from the 6th Fighter Group.[30] These aircraft attacked the British bombardment group off Port Stanley with bombs, but did not score any hits. Bombs exploded in the water near both Alacrity and Glamorgan, causing minor damage, and both ships were also hit by cannon fire. A member of Arrow's crew was injured by a splinter of metal. The British were taken by surprise, and though Glamorgan fired a Seacat missile and Arrow engaged the attackers with a cannon, the Argentines escaped without damage. The British ships ended their bombardment as a result of this attack, and withdrew from the area. This action was visible to Argentine troops in the Port Stanley area, and improved their morale.[31]

A large force of 24 Skyhawks from the 4th and 5th Fighter Groups was the next to arrive in the combat area. These aircraft operated in flights of four aircraft, and were all armed with bombs.[31] One of the flights attacked the Argentine merchant ship Formosa off the south coast of East Falkland after their pilots mistook her for a British supply ship, but did not cause any significant damage. None of the other Skyhawks made contact with British warships or aircraft.[32]

The other anti-shipping attack was conducted by six English Electric Canberras from the 2nd Bomber Group. Two flights each of three Canberras were dispatched from the Trelew Almirante Zar Naval Air Base, and were armed with bombs. They did not locate any British warships. One of the flights was intercepted two Sea Harriers, which shot down a Canberra with a Sidewinder missile. The crew ejected but could not be located by rescuers.[33]

Air to air combat

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Aftermath

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British forces resumed offensive actions against the Argentinian forces after night fell. The three ships of the bombardment group sailed south, and bombarded Argentinian positions to the west of Port Stanley, killing one soldier and wounding five. An Argentinian marine may was also been killed in either this attack or the bombardment earlier on 1 May. The bombardment concluded at 10.00 pm, after which the three warships rejoined the main body of the Task Force.[34] 846 Naval Air Squadron Sea King helicopters also landed several parties of special forces personnel on the north shore of East Falkland during the night. Once these missions were concluded, the Task Force sailed away from the Falklands.[34][35] The Argentine air units did not contest these attacks as their combat aircraft lacked the avionics necessary to perform combat missions at night.[36]

In his memoirs Woodward described the results of the fighting on 1 May as "a busy and useful start to hostilities". He noted that his forces had inflicted casualties on the Argentinians, damaged two airfields and demonstrated the effectiveness of the Sea Harriers while not suffering any casualties.[37]

During the evening of 1 May the Argentine garrison at Goose Green directed the civilians at the settlement to leave their homes and assemble at the community hall. They were held there until Goose Green was liberated almost a month later. The Argentinian commander justified this act on the grounds that the civilians had been uncooperative, and that they would be safer in the hall (which was prominent and marked with a red cross on its roof) if British forces attacked the settlement again.[38]

The Argentinian Air Force units were placed in reserve following the fighting on 1 May until a major British landing in the Falklands was confirmed. During this period, the force evaluated its performance on 1 May, and concluded that the Canberras were not capable of safely operating during daytime. It was also decided to reserve the eight remaining Mirages of the 8th Fighter Group to protect air bases on the mainland from attack; these aircraft had good performance in all weathers, and were the best suited to this role.[39]

References

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Citations

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  1. ^ Middlebrook 2009, p. 93.
  2. ^ Middlebrook 2009, pp. 92–93.
  3. ^ Thompson 2003, pp. 292–294.
  4. ^ Thompson 2003, p. 295.
  5. ^ Woodward & Robinson 2012, p. 182–184.
  6. ^ Freedman 2007, pp. 278–279.
  7. ^ Woodward & Robinson 2012, p. 184–185.
  8. ^ Corum 2002, pp. 60–61.
  9. ^ Corum 2002, p. 62.
  10. ^ a b Corum 2002, p. 63.
  11. ^ Chant 2001, pp. 35–36.
  12. ^ a b Corum 2002, p. 65.
  13. ^ Chant 2001, p. 36.
  14. ^ Brown 1987, pp. 69, 78, 111–112.
  15. ^ Freedman 2007, p. 284.
  16. ^ a b c d Dildy & Calcaterra, p. 46.
  17. ^ Middlebrook 2009, pp. 77–78.
  18. ^ a b Burden et al. 1986, p. 210.
  19. ^ a b c Middlebrook 2009, p. 78.
  20. ^ Burden et al. 1986, p. 193.
  21. ^ a b c Burden et al. 1986, p. 194.
  22. ^ Middlebrook 2009, p. 79.
  23. ^ Dildy & Calcaterra, p. 47.
  24. ^ a b c Middlebrook 2009, p. 80.
  25. ^ a b Middlebrook 2009, p. 81.
  26. ^ Middlebrook 2009, pp. 80–81.
  27. ^ a b c Middlebrook 2009, p. 82.
  28. ^ a b Middlebrook 2009, p. 83.
  29. ^ Middlebrook 2009, pp. 83–84.
  30. ^ a b Middlebrook 2009, p. 84.
  31. ^ a b Middlebrook 2009, p. 87.
  32. ^ Middlebrook 2009, pp. 88–89.
  33. ^ Middlebrook 2009, p. 89.
  34. ^ a b Middlebrook 2009, p. 91.
  35. ^ Brown 1987, p. 127.
  36. ^ Brown 1987, p. 128.
  37. ^ Woodward & Robinson 2012, p. 198.
  38. ^ Middlebrook 2009, p. 92.
  39. ^ Middlebrook 2009, p. 152.

Works cited

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  • Brown, David (1987). The Royal Navy and the Falklands War. London: Leo Cooper. ISBN 0850520592.
  • Burden, Rodney A; et al. (1986). Falklands : The Air War. London: Arms and Armour Press. ISBN 0853688427. {{cite book}}: Explicit use of et al. in: |last2= (help)
  • Chant, Christopher (2001). Air War in the Falklands, 1982. Oxford: Osprey Publishing. ISBN 1841762938.
  • Corum, James S (2002). "Argentine Airpower in the Falklands War: An Operational View". Air & Space Power Journal. 16 (3): 59–77.
  • Dildy, Douglas C.; Calcaterra, Pablo (2017). Sea Harrier FRS 1 Vs Mirage III/Dagger: South Atlantic 1982. Oxford: Osprey Publishing. ISBN 9781472818898.
  • Freedman, Lawrence (2007). The Official History of the Falklands Campaign. Volume II: War and Diplomacy (Revised and updated ed.). London: Routledge. ISBN 0415419115.
  • De La Pedraja, René (2006). "The Argentine Air Force versus Britain in the Falkland Islands, 1982". In Higham, Robin; Harris, Stephen J. (eds.). Why Air Forces Fail: The Anatomy of Defeat. Lexington, Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky. pp. 227–260.
  • Middlebrook, Martin (2009) [1989]. Argentine Fight for the Falklands. Barnsley, United Kingdom: Pen & Sword Military. ISBN 9781844158881.
  • Thompson, Julian (2003). "The Falklands, 1982: War in the South Atlantic". In Thompson, Julian (ed.). The Imperial War Museum Book of Modern Warfare : British and Commonwealth Forces at War 1945 - 2000. London: Pan. pp. 59–77. ISBN 0330393049.
  • Woodward, Sandy; Robinson, Patrick (2012). One Hundred Days : The Memoirs of the Falklands Battle Group Commander (Third ed.). London: HarperPress. ISBN 9780007436408.
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