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British Royal Air Force (RAF) bomber aircraft attacked the German battleship Tirpitz on multiple occasions between 1940 and 1942. None of these attacks inflicted any damage on the battleship.

The attacks commenced on the night of 9/10 October 1940 when 17 bombers attempted to bomb Tirpitz at Wilhelmshaven in Germany. Three further, much larger, attacks took place against the battleship there on the nights of 8/9 January, 29/30 January and 28 February/1 March 1941. Two attacks were made on Tirpitz after she moved to Kiel on the nights of 28/29 May and 20/21 June 1941. The battleship deployed to Norway in January 1942, and the RAF attempted to bomb her at Åsenfjorden on the night of 28/29 January. Three raids were made against Tirpitz at her anchorage at Fættenfjord on the nights of 30/31 March, 27/28 April and 28/29 April.

The failure of these attacks led to a decision to use midget submarines to attack Tirpitz instead. Royal Navy carrier aircraft attempted to bomb the battleship on several occasions in mid 1944. In August 1944 responsibility for sinking Tirpitz was handed back to the RAF, which conducted a further three heavy bomber raids. The last such attack, Operation Catechism, resulted in the destruction of the battleship on 12 November 1944.

Background

Tirpitz being launched at Wilhelmshaven on 1 April 1939

Before the outbreak of World War II the Kriegsmarine (German Navy) developed plans to attack Allied merchant shipping in the event of war. The navy's commander, Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, believed that battleships and cruisers were a key part of this strategy. As a result, the Scharnhorst and Bismarck-class battleships that were constructed in the late 1930s and early 1940s were designed to be capable of making long-range anti-shipping raids into the Atlantic Ocean. Tirpitz was the second of the two Bismarck-class vessels and was launched in April 1939 and commissioned on 25 February 1941.

1940

Due to the threat the Kriegsmarine's warships posed, pre-war British plans called for air attacks to be made against them while they were in port. This was to include attempting to damage or sink ships that were under construction. RAF planners considered it unlikely that the bomber crews would be able to locate individual warships or inflict any damage, however, due to the inadequacies of the available aircraft at the time.

Tirpitz at Wilhelmshaven in February 1940

In September 1939 Tirpitz was at Wilhelmshaven in north-west Germany, where she had been launched on 1 April that year. The battleship was fitting out. RAF aircraft frequently overflew Wilhelmshaven to monitor progress with the construction of Tirpitz and other warships; for instance, the Photographic Reconnaissance Unit (PRU) conducted 20 flights over the city between 4 April and 25 September 1940. The RAF was not permitted to bomb Wilhelmshaven or other German port cities at this time.

Attacks against German cities began following the German invasion of Belgium, France and the Netherlands in May 1940. The first operation targeting Tirpitz was made by 11 Handley Page Hampden medium bombers on the night of 9/10 July 1940. A force of 14 Armstrong Whitworth Whitleys was dispatched to attack the battleship on the night of 24/25 July, but due to bad weather only two reached the target area. No damage was caused by either operation. The RAF did not suffer any losses in these attacks. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill wrote to the Admiralty on 2 August and the Air Ministry on 4 August (these were the government departments responsible for the Royal Navy and RAF respectively) requesting they report on options to bomb Bismark and Tirpitz; in the letter to the Admiralty Churchill stated that these attacks seemed "to be one of the most vital steps to take". A further raid by Hampdens was made on 5/6 August as part of a broader series of attacks on cities in north west Germany involving 85 of this type of aircraft. No damage was inflicted on Tirpitz and all of the RAF aircraft returned safely.

Several unsuccessful raids targeting Tirpitz at Wilhelmshaven were made in October. On the night of 8/9 October 17 Hampdens attacked the battleship while she was in a floating dry dock. A force of 14 Hampdens was dispatched on the night of 10/11 October but did not achieve any hits. The next night four Hampdens attempted to bomb the battleship, also without success; this operation was to have involved a larger force of aircraft, but most had to turn back before attacking. On the night of 12/13 October an operation involving 40 Vickers Wellingtons and 35 Hampdens was conducted to attack the two Scharnhorst-class battleships at Kiel and Tirpitz at Wilhelmshaven. This attack was disrupted by poor weather, and only four Hampdens reached Wilhelmshaven of which the crew of only one claimed to have attacked Tirpitz. Seven Wellingtons sought to bomb the battleship on the night of 19/20 October; while this may have caused damage to the nearby docks the bomber crews did not report any direct hits on Tirpitz. The final targeting Tirpitz during 1940 was made during the night of 25/26 November, with four bombers dropping bombs on where their crews believed the battleship to be as the area was covered with thick clouds. None of the raids during October and November 1940 inflicted significant damage on Tirpitz. All of the British aircraft involved in the raids during October survived, but one of the 36 aircraft dispatched against various targets in Kiel and Wilhelmshaven on 25/26 October was lost.

1941

Raids against Wilhelmshaven

Further attacks were made against Tirpitz while she was at Wilhelmshaven in January 1941. These operations were complicated by bad weather, which included snow on the British bomber airfields and clouds over Germany most days. On the night of 8/9 January seven Wellingtons from No. 75 Squadron were detailed to attack the battleship as part of a larger operation against Wilhelmshaven and Emden. Their crews claimed several hits and near misses, but in reality no damage was inflicted. No British aircraft were lost. The next attack took place on 11/12 January, with 10 of 16 aircraft dispatched bombing. The battleship was undamaged and there were no British loses. A force of 96 aircraft were dispatched to the Wilhelmshaven area on 16/17 January. Many of those that were to have attacked Tirpitz needed to turn back due to bad weather, but those that continued to the city inflicted considerable damage on its port facilities and other buildings. A Whitley was lost. On the night of 29/30 January 25 Wellingtons were dispatched to attack the battleship. While all reached the Wilhelmshaven area, none reported being able to bomb Tirpitz. Many houses were destroyed in the city, and no British aircraft were lost.

The attacks on Wilhelmshaven continued in February. A force of 25 Hamptons was dispatched on the night of 9/10 February. The crews of the 13 aircraft from No. 83 Squadron were ordered to attack Tirpitz, but did not achieve any hits. All of the British aircraft survived the operation. Another attack involving 30 Wellingtons was made on 27/28 February; 26 of these aircraft reached the target area and attempted to bomb the battleship, but without success.

A major attack against Tirpitz involving 116 aircraft was made on the night of 28 February/1 March. Thick clouds and ground haze made it impossible to sight the battleship, though 75 aircraft dropped bombs in the Wilhelmshaven area. A Bristol Blenheim was lost. This was the final raid against Tirpitz at Wilhelmshaven, as the battleship departed in early march to conduct sea trials in the Baltic Sea.

The attacks against Tirpitz at Wilhelmshaven had few results. While they slowed the work to complete the battleship, none of the bombers achieved any hits on her. The failure to inflict any significant damage was due to the typically poor weather, which made it difficult to locate specific targets, as well as the under-developed state of the British bomber force at that time. The available aircraft could only carry a small bombload and were short ranged and slow. Bomber Command had also yet to develop tactics for accurately bombing targets at night. Due to these deficiencies, the historian Jan Forsgren has observed that "had Tirpitz been struck by RAF bombs, it would have been through pure luck".

Raids against Kiel

Tirpitz was based at Kiel during her sea trials, which continued for much of 1941. During this period she was frequently at sea. PRU aircraft monitored Kiel and occasionally located Tirpitz away from the port. It was not possible for the RAF to attack the battleship which she was at sea, including as the Baltic was well protected by German fighter aircraft.

During the periods Tirpiz was at Kiel she was a more difficult target to attack than she had been at Wilhelmshaven. This is because she used different berths in the harbour and her movements in and out of the port were unpredictable. Due to the threat the battleship posed, it was decided to nevertheless attempt to attack her at Kiel. A large number of attacks were made against the port facilities in Kiel during 1941 without specifically targeting Tirpitz. On the night of 28/29 May 14 Whitleys were directed to attack the battleship. They encountered storms and thick clouds, and only three bombed the Kiel area without any results. One of the Whitleys was lost. An attack against Tirpitz by 63 aircraft was planned for the night of 3/4 June, but was cancelled due to bad weather. On the night of 20/21 June a force of 115 aircraft were dispatched against Tirpitz. Owing to cloud cover, none of the crews were able to sight the battleship and they attempted to bomb the city instead. No damage was caused and two Wellingtons were lost. As part of a raid on Kiel by 47 aircraft on 25/26 June, 11 aircraft were directed to attack Tirpitz. Seven of these aircraft reached the target area, but did not inflict any damage. A Hampden was lost.

1942

Transfer to Norway

Fættenfjord

Oslo

Trondheim

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Southern Norway

In December 1941 the German military began transferring substantial naval and air forces to northern Norway, which they had occupied since early 1940. The forces sent to Norway were tasked with attacking the Arctic convoys as well as defending the area from an invasion. At this time the German dictator Adolf Hitler wrongly believed the Allies intended to invade Norway. On 12 January 1942 Hitler ordered Tirpitz to be transferred from Germany to Fættenfjord in Norway, which is located to the east of the city of Trondheim and forms part of Trondheimsfjorden (English: Trondheim Fjord). The battleship and two escorting destroyers departed Wilhelmshaven in Germany on 14 January and arrived in Trondheim on 16 January. She was to form the main element of a powerful battle group once other German warships arrived in the area. Kapitän zur See Karl Topp commanded Tirpitz at this time.

Tirpitz's berth at Fættenfjord made her a difficult target to attack. The fjord was only 300 yards (270 m) wide, with steep hills on its northern and southern sides. Tirpitz, was anchored close to the northern shore of the fjord. This meant that any aircraft attacking the battleship would need to approach from her west. The typically bad weather conditions in the Trondheimsfjorden area also protected Tirpitz, as due to frequent cloud cover, fogs and high winds few days each month were suitable for attacking aircraft. The British had difficulty accurately predicting the weather, including as it could change rapidly.

The battleship was also well defended against air attack. Torpedo nets were installed around Tirpitz, foiling any attempts to use torpedos against her. To further augment the natural defences, 16 anti-aircraft gun batteries were eventually installed nearby. Two flak ships were moored near Tirpitz, and the other warships assigned to the German battle group provided further anti-aircraft defence. Anti-aircraft batteries were also located at Trondheim and the nearby airfield at Værnes. Several searchlight units were also stationed in the general area. The most effective defence proved to be a network of smoke generators that were installed around Fættenfjord and the nearby Lofjord as well as on small boats. These could cover the Fættenfjord in an smokescreen that shrouded Tirpitz from view within ten minutes of being activated. Radar stations in the Trondheimsfjorden were able to detect incoming raids and provide enough warning time for a smokescreen to be generated by the time Allied aircraft arrived over Tirpitz. Camouflage netting was also placed over the battleship's superstructure and obscured the battleship from aircraft. German fighter aircraft were based at Værnes, but did not intercept any of of the air raids against Tirpitz due to poor liaison between the air and naval units in the area.

The Allies learned of Tirpitz's arrival at Trondheim on 17 January from Ultra intelligence obtained by decrypting intercepted German radio signals. British photo reconnaissance aircraft located the battleship there on 23 January, and regular sorties were subsequently flown over the Trondheim area to monitor her. A network of Norwegian Special Operations Executive agents code-named 'Lark' was located in the Trondheim area, also provided intelligence on Tirpitz. Due to the threat Tirpitz posed to Allied convoys in the Atlantic Ocean and the Norwegian Sea, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill directed on 25 January that "the destruction or even crippling of this ship is the greatest event at sea at the present time. No other target is comparable to it". The Allies needed to keep a powerful force of warships with the British Home Fleet to counter the threat Tirpitz posed and capital ships accompanied most convoys part of the way to the Soviet Union.

Operation Oiled

Following Chuchill's direction, consideration was given to different options for attacking Tirpitz from the air. The Royal Navy's Fleet Air Arm judged that it was unable to strike the battleship from aircraft carriers as its torpedo bombers would not be effective and its dive bombers could only carry a small bombload. This meant that the RAF's heavy bombers were the only aircraft capable of striking Tirpitz.

On 25 January the RAF's Air Staff directed that a night attack be made against Tirpitz during the full moon period at the end of the month. This raid was designated Operation Oiled, and was to involve up to 30 heavy bombers. It was intended that the Royal Navy would also launch an aircraft carrier raid against the battleship on the morning after the heavy bomber attack, but this did not eventuate. On 28 January, 16 Short Stirlings from Nos. 15 and 149 Squadrons and 10 Handley Page Halifaxs from Nos. 10 and 76 Squadrons were directed to fly to RAF Lossiemouth in northern Scotland and prepare for the attack. Two of the Stirlings were damaged during their flights, and another broke down before departing.

Two PRU sorties on 29 January confirmed that Tirpitz remained at Fættenfjord and weather conditions were assessed as suitable for an attack. The bomber crews were briefed on the operation that day and their aircraft were bombed up with 2000 pound armour piercing bombs and 500 pound semi-armour piercing bombs; some aircraft carried a mix of these weapons and others only one type.

The attack force left Lossiemouth shortly after midnight on 30 January, though mechanical problems reduced the size of the raid. Seven Stirlings took off at 12:30 am, but their crews encountered heavy cloud during the flight over the North Sea as well as over Fættenfjord. Only one aircrew spotted Tirpitz, but were unable to attack as their bomber could not reach the altitude of 8,000 feet (2,400 m) which was needed for its bombs to reach velocities sufficient to penetrate the battleship's armour. All of the Stirlings returned to Scotland, though one was damaged beyond repair when it crashed on landing. Nine Halifaxes were dispatched between 2:04 and 2:34 am, though all four from No. 10 Squadron had to return before reaching Norway when they ran low on fuel. The other five aircraft reached the Fættenfjord, and were fired on by German anti-aircraft guns. Four of the bombers did not attack as their crews were unable to find Tirpitz. The other bombed an area from which anti-aircraft gunfire was rising. A Halifax ditched into the sea off Aberdeen, and its crew were rescued.

The heavy bombers remained at Lossiemouth after Operation Oiled in the hope that they could be used in another attack. This proved unfeasible due to bad weather, and on 4 January they were directed to return to their home bases. The failure of Operation Oiled due to bad weather highlighted to the RAF that it needed better intelligence on local conditions in the Fættenfjord area. During subsequent attacks efforts were made to source this from the Norwegian resistance.

In February a plan was developed to use Bristol Beaufort light bombers to make a one-way attack against Tirpitz. This would have involved No. 217 Squadron flying from RAF Leuchars in northern Scotland. After bombing Tirpitz the aircraft would either cross into Sweden, where their crews would parachute out, or ditch in the North Sea; the Beauforts were unable to return to Scotland as they lacked the necessary flying range. An advance party from the squadron was deployed to Scotland, but the operation was cancelled in mid-March. Historian John Sweetman has called this plan "somewhat bizzare" and a "fantasy".

On 6 March 1942, Tirpitz and three escorting destroyers departed Fættenfjord to attack two Allied convoys that were passing through the Norwegian Sea. These convoys were escorted by elements of the British Home Fleet, and planes operating from the aircraft carrier HMS Victorious made an unsuccessful attack on Tirpitz on 9 March. Following this operation Hitler directed that Tirpitz was to not attempt further attacks against convoys unless it was first confirmed that no aircraft carriers were nearby. The RAF dispatched 14 heavy bombers to Scotland during this period, most likely to attack Tirpitz during her return voyage, but no raid was attempted. The battleship returned to Fættenfjord on 13 March.

30/31 March

Planning for another heavy bomber raid against Fættenfjord continued during March. Orders for this attack were issued to Nos. 10, 35 and 76 Squadrons on 21 March. The plan called for 32 Halifaxes from these squadrons to bomb Tirpitz while two Avro Lancasters heavy bombers from No. 97 Squadron attacked Værnes Airfield. All ten Halifaxes from No. 10 Squadron and ten of the twelve from No. 35 Squadron were to be armed with four Mk XIX naval mines which had been modified to be air dropped; it was hoped that these weapons would be much more effective than the available bombs. Each of these aircraft would also carry incendiary bombs. The other two No. 35 Squadron Halifaxes were to carry large quantities of incendiaries, and the ten No. 76 Squadron aircraft were to be armed with a single 4000 pound 'cookie' blast bomb and four 250 pound or 500 pound bombs.

The plans for the attack called for it to be made in two waves. No. 76 Squadron comprised the first wave, and was scheduled to approach Fættenfjord from the west drop their 'Cookie' bombs on Tirpitz. The Halifaxes would then attack anti-aircraft gun positions with their other bombs. The No. 97 Squadron Lancasters would simultaneously strike Værnes. Nos. 10 and 35 Squadrons would attack Fættenfjord from the east about 50 minutes later. Search and rescue support for the attack force was to be provided by three Royal Navy destroyers stationed along the routes taken by the bombers, as well as two seaplane tenders located at Burghead and a pair of fast boats near Lossiemouth. The bombers and their ground crews were deployed to Scotland during late March. One of the Lancasters crashed during its flight to Lossiemouth and the other was withdrawn from the operation; this caused the cancellation of the attack on Værnes. An additional two Halifaxes were drawn from No. 35 Squadron.

The attack force departed Scotland at 6 pm on 30 March. The aircraft began to arrive over over the Fættenfjord area at about 11 pm local time. Due to thick clouds none of the aircrew were able to spot Tirpitz. Several Halifaxes bombed areas from which searchlights and anti-aircraft gunfire were coming from, and the others did not attack. Topp directed that Tirpitz not fire its anti-aircraft guns to avoid giving away the battleship's position. Four Halifaxes were shot down in the Trondheim area, and another two damaged aircraft crashed into the North Sea during their return flight. Tirpitz was not damaged. Following this attack the surviving bombers returned to their usual bases.

See also

• List of Allied attacks on the German battleship Tirpitz

References

Works consulted

• Bennett, G.H. (2012). "Introduction". In Bennett, G.H. (ed.). Hunting Tirpitz: Naval Operations Against Bismarck's Sister Ship. Plymouth, United Kingdom: University of Plymouth Press. pp. 7–25. ISBN 978-1-84102-310-6.
• Bishop, Patrick (2012). Target Tirpitz. London: Harper Press. ISBN 978-0-00-743119-9.
• Chesneau, Roger, ed. (1980). Conway's All The World's Fighting Ships 1922–1946. London: Conway Maritime Press. ISBN 978-0-85177-146-5.
• Forsgren, Jan (2014). Sinking the Beast: The RAF 1944 Lancaster Raids Against Tirpitz. Stroud, United Kingdom: Fonthill Media. ISBN 978-1-78155-318-3.
• Konstam, Angus (2018). Sink the Tirpitz 1942–44: The RAF and Fleet Air Arm Duel with Germany's Mighty Battleship. Oxford: Osprey Publishing. ISBN 978-1-4728-3159-0.
• Lyman, Robert (2015). The Real X-Men: The Heroic Story of the Underwater War 1939-1945. London: Quercus Editions. ISBN 978-1-78429-674-2.
• Middlebrook, Martin; Everitt, Chris (1996). The Bomber Command War Diaries : An Operational Reference Book, 1939–1945 (Revised ed.). Leicester, United Kingdom: Midland Publishing. ISBN 978-1-85780-033-3.
• Roskill, S.W. (1961). The War at Sea 1939–1945. Volume III: The Offensive Part II. History of the Second World War. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office. OCLC 59005418.
• Sweetman, John (2000). Tirpitz: Hunting the Beast: Air Attacks on the German Battleship, 1940–44. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 978-1-55750-822-5.
• Zetterling, Niklas & Tamelander, Michael (2009). Tirpitz: The Life and Death of Germany's Last Super Battleship. Philadelphia: Casemate. ISBN 978-1-935149-18-7.