Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (Cranch 1) 103 (1803) is a case of the Supreme Court of the United States. It formed the basis for the exercise of judicial review in the United States under Article III of the Constitution.
This case resulted from a petition to the Supreme Court by William Marbury, who had been appointed as Justice of the Peace in the District of Columbia by President John Adams shortly before leaving office, but whose commission was not delivered as required by John Marshall, Adams' Secretary of State. When Thomas Jefferson assumed office, he ordered the new Secretary of State, James Madison, to withhold Marbury's and several other men's commissions. Being unable to assume the appointed offices without the commission documents, Marbury and three others petitioned the Court to force Madison to deliver the commission to Marbury. The Supreme Court denied Marbury's petition, holding that the statute upon which he based his claim was unconstitutional.
Background of the case
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In the presidential election of 1800, Thomas Jefferson defeated John Adams, becoming the third President of the United States. Although the election was decided on February 17, 1801, Jefferson did not take office until March 4, 1801. Until that time, the lame-duck Adams and the Federalist-controlled 6th Congress were still in power. Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 1801. This act modified the Judiciary Act of 1789, establishing ten new district courts, expanding the number of circuit courts from three to six, and adding additional judges to each circuit, giving the President the authority to appoint Federal judges and justices of the peace. The act also reduced the number of Supreme Court justices from six to five, effective upon the next vacancy in the Court.[1][2]
The decision
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The Court rendered a unanimous (4-0) decision, that Marbury had the right to his commission but the court did not have the power to force Madison to deliver the commission, on February 24, 1803.[3] Chief Justice Marshall wrote the opinion of the court. Marshall presented the case as raising three distinct questions:
- Did Marbury have a right to the commission?
- Do the laws of the country give Marbury a legal remedy?
- Is asking the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus the correct legal remedy?
Marshall quickly answered the first two questions affirmatively. He found that the failure to deliver the commission was "violative of a vested legal right."
In deciding whether Marbury had a remedy, Marshall stated: "The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right." One of the key legal principles on which Marbury relies is the notion that for every violation of a vested legal right, there must be a legal remedy. Marshall next described two distinct types of Executive actions: political actions, where the official can exercise discretion, and purely ministerial functions, where the official is legally required to do something. Marshall found that delivering the appointment to Marbury was a purely ministerial function required by law, and therefore the law provided him a remedy.
A federal court has a "special obligation to 'satisfy itself not only of its own jurisdiction, but also that of the lower courts in a cause under review.'"[4] If a court does not have the power to hear a case, it will not issue dicta. Consequently, with exceptions not applicable here, a federal court must decide whether it has jurisdiction before discussing the merits of the case.[5] Chief Justice Marshall, however, did not address jurisdictional issues until addressing the first two questions presented above. Because of the canon of constitutional avoidance (i.e., where a statute can fairly be interpreted so as to avoid a constitutional issue, it should be so interpreted), courts generally deal with the constitutional issues only if necessary. In this case, the jurisdictional issue was a constitutional one.[6]
In analyzing the third question, Marshall first examined the Judiciary Act of 1789 and determined that the Act purported to give the Supreme Court original jurisdiction over writs of mandamus. Marshall then looked to Article III of the Constitution, which defines the Supreme Court's original and appellate jurisdictions (see Relevant Law above). Marbury had argued that the Constitution was only intended to set a floor for original jurisdiction that Congress could add to. Marshall disagreed and held that Congress does not have the power to modify the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. Consequently, Marshall found that the Constitution and the Judiciary Act conflict.
This conflict raised the important question of what happens when an Act of Congress conflicts with the Constitution. Marshall answered that Acts of Congress that conflict with the Constitution are not law and the Courts are bound instead to follow the Constitution, affirming the principle of judicial review. In support of this position Marshall looked to the nature of the written Constitution—there would be no point of having a written Constitution if the courts could just ignore it. "To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be restrained?"[7] Marshall also argued that the very nature of the judicial function requires courts to make this determination. Since it is a court's duty to decide cases, courts have to be able to decide what law applies to each case. Therefore, if two laws conflict with each other, a court must decide which law applies.[8] Finally, Marshall pointed to the judge's oath requiring them to uphold the Constitution, and to the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, which lists the "Constitution" before the "laws of the United States." Part of the core of this reasoning is found in the following statements from the decision:
| “ | It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department [the judicial branch] to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each. So if a law [e.g., a statute or treaty] be in opposition to the constitution: if both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law: the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty.
If then the courts are to regard the constitution; and the constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature; the constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply. Those then who controvert the principle that the constitution is to be considered, in court, as a paramount law, are reduced to the necessity of maintaining that courts must close their eyes on the constitution, and see only the law [e.g., the statute or treaty]. This doctrine would subvert the very foundation of all written constitutions.[9] |
” |
"In denying his request, the Court held that it lacked jurisdiction because Section 13 of the Judiciary Act passed by Congress in 1789, which authorized the Court to issue such a writ, was unconstitutional and thus invalid."[10] Marbury never became a Justice of the Peace in the District of Columbia.[11]
See also
editNotes and references
edit- ^ Federal Judicial History, The Judiciary Act of 1801— Historical Note 2 Stat.89
- ^ Judiciary Act of 1801
- ^ Due to illness, Justices William Cushing and Alfred Moore did not sit for oral argument or participate in the Court's decision.
- ^ Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986) (quoting Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 244 (1934)); accord Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998)
- ^ See Irving v. United States, 162 F.3d 154, 160 (1st Cir. 1998) (en banc), admonishing that the federal courts "have an affirmative obligation to examine jurisdictional concerns on their own initiative" even if the parties have neglected them; Berner v. Delahanty, 129 F.3d 20, 23 (1st Cir. 1997), noting "that a court should first confirm the existence of rudiments such as jurisdiction . . . before tackling the merits of a controverted case").
- ^ Supreme Court History: The Court and Democracy, Marbury v. Madison, pbs.org, retrieved 2/12/07
- ^ 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176.
- ^ Id. at 177.
- ^ 5 U.S. at 177-78.
- ^ Marbury v. Madison. In Encyclopaedia Britannica.
- ^ James A. Henretta (2007). America's History: Volume 1: To 1877 (6th ed.). Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's. pp. 218–219. ISBN 978-0-312-45285-8.
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