User:Sm8900/Reorganziation of Chinese armed forces

Reorganization of Chinese armed forces refers to a major and ongoing reorganization of the Chinese armed forces, or the People's Liberation Army (PLA) from around 2008 until the present.

Overview

Background

There are four main factors that drove this reorganization:

• Chinese strategic doctrine
  • Historically the Chinese military avoided any overseas deployments or involvements.
  • The Chinese Navy has avoided any strategic posture which would imply any effort or desire to assume strategic guardianship of global freedom of the seas, preferring to leave that role to the United States Navy.
• US strategic doctrine
  • The US military has been training alongside the Chinese military for over a decade as of 2021. this is motivated by several global challenges for which the US will require strategic partners and allies to help relieve the burden of its global missions and responsibilities.
  • As the world's only superpower, the US is sorely in need of global strategic allies and partners. As of 2008, it didn't actually have any, except for the British Navy to a limited degree, as well as various regional partners mostly within their own respective regions.
• UN goals and efforts
  • In 2008, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1805, calling upon all nations to take a more proactive role in battling terrorism worldwide.
• Several global problems have made a Chinese proactive stance more urgent. these include:
  • Global warming
  • Global piracy
  • Terrorism
  • Emergence of rogue states and groups as heightened by the internet and worldwide technological advances.

The expansion of China’s economic and strategic interests occurs within the context of a mostly stable but fragmenting international order. In contrast to its experience in the Cold War, China does not have deeply antagonistic relations with any great powers. Despite growing tensions, Beijing’s relations with the United States, Japan, and others remain largely cooperative, and the prospect of major war remains remote. At the same time, a fragmenting international order has seen the proliferation of transnational threats, including terrorism, maritime piracy, and armed conflict. Climate change has, in some cases, exacerbated problems of natural disaster and armed conflict.

Chinese official documents recognize these trends. The 2015 Military Strategy White Paper observed, “The forces for world peace are on the rise, so are the factors against war.” However, it noted, “the world still faces both immediate and potential threats of local wars.” It cited, in particular, threats from terrorism and “hotspot issues,” such as “ethnic, religious, border and territorial disputes.” It observed, “small-scale wars, conflicts and crises are recurrent in some regions.”30 Chinese writings acknowledge security challenges regarding major foreign economic initiatives such as the BRI.31

Foundation in national strategy and goals

The US Defense Department's first annual report to Congress in 2000 assessed the PRC’s armed forces at that time to be a sizable but mostly archaic military that was poorly suited to the CCP’s long-term ambitions. The report recognized the CCP’s objective was for the PRC to become a “strong, modernized, unified, and wealthy nation.” Despite these great power aspirations, the PLA lacked the capabilities, organization, and readiness for modern warfare. Yet the CCP understood these deficiencies and set long-term goals to strengthen and transform its armed forces in a manner commensurate with its aspirations to strengthen and transform China. DoD’s 2000 report assessed that the PLA was slowly and unevenly adapting to the trends in modern warfare. The PLA’s force structure and capabilities focused largely on waging large-scale land warfare along China’s borders. The PLA’s ground, air, and naval forces were sizable but mostly obsolete. Its conventional missiles were generally of short range and modest accuracy. The PLA’s emergent cyber capabilities were rudimentary; its use of information technology was well behind the curve; and its nominal space capabilities were based on outdated technologies for the day. Further, China’s defense industry struggled to produce high-quality systems. Even if the PRC could produce or acquire modern weapons, the PLA lacked the joint organizations and training needed to field them effectively. The report assessed that the PLA’s organizational obstacles were severe enough that if left unaddressed they would “inhibit the PLA’s maturation into a world-class military force.”

History of national efforts

Initial steps

In late 2015, President Xi Jinping unveiled the most substantial PLA reforms in at least 30 years. The reforms were designed in part to make the PLA a leaner, more lethal force capable of conducting the types of joint operations that it believes it must master to compete with the U.S. military.

Initial reforms established joint theater commands and a new Joint Staff Department while reorganizing the 4 general departments that previously ran the PLA into 15 Central Military Commission (CMC) departments and offices. These efforts aimed to clarify command authorities, integrate China’s military services for joint operations, and facilitate Beijing’s transition from peace to war.

The structural reforms also established a separate Army headquarters, elevated China’s missile force to a full service by establishing the PLA Rocket Force, unified China’s space and cyber capabilities under the Strategic Support Force, and created a Joint Logistics Support Force to direct precision support to PLA operations.3,4,5 The decision to place the Army, which has traditionally played a dominant role in PLA leadership, on equal footing with the PLA’s other services underscores a postreform emphasis on jointness. Overall reforms, which the CMC aims to complete by 2020, are expected to touch all levels of the PLA, including cutting approximately 300,000 personnel and refining military doctrine and policies.

Foreign Policy Traditions

The PRC has advocated the principles of noninterference in the affairs of other countries as a key tenet of its foreign policy for six decades. The principle of noninterference accompanies the other principles of “mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence” that collectively comprise the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.” According to President Xi, adherence to these principles means China “neither interferes in other countries’ internal affairs nor imposes its will on others.”48 Upholding these principles provides political benefits to China as an advocate for the developing world. Moreover, Chinese observers remain skeptical about the effectiveness of military intervention abroad.

Deployments

As China’s national interests expand outside its national boundaries, the PLA has been increasingly called upon to protect those interests abroad. Hu Jintao’s 2004 call for the PLA to shoulder “New Historic Missions” ushered in this new era, but Xi Jinping has taken it to the next level by declaring that China’s interests are now global under the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the “community for a shared future for mankind.” Xi expects the PLA to more fully support this expansion. In his 2017 speech to the 19th Party Congress, Xi called for the PLA to become a “world class military” by 2050 and said that the CCP “must do more to safeguard China’s sovereignty, security, and development interests” (China Daily, October 18, 2017). The PRC’s 2019 defense white paper explains that the PLA is tasked with “safeguard[ing] China’s overseas interests,” and explicitly states that the PLA will “[develop] overseas logistical facilities.” It also identified some of the PLA’s specific overseas missions that these bases will support, including “vessel protection operations, maintain[ing] the security of strategic sea lines of communications (SLOCs), and carr[ying] out overseas evacuation and maritime rights protection operations” (Xinhua, July 24, 2019).

China is prioritizing three military development goals through 2030:

1. The ability to impose unacceptable costs on the access of, or freedom of maneuver within, China’s first and second island chains. This includes the South and East China Seas as well as the waters out to Guam.

2. The ability to contribute to international commons operations, which China perceives as the responsibilities of a great power.1 This is seen through China’s involvement in the Gulf of Aden anti-piracy task force missions and participation in overseas humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) operations.

3. Defending China’s overseas economic interests, particularly through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), including infrastructure and overseas Chinese nationals. The risk of terrorist activity targeting Chinese facilities and personnel is likely to be a major driver of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) expeditionary combat operations through 2030.

New organizational structures

In pursuit of these goals, China has pursued both organizational reforms as well as new military capabilities to aid in expeditionary operations. As part of broader organizational restructuring beginning in 2015, the PLA created the Logistic Support Department (LSD) and Joint Logistic Support Force (JLSF) to better support joint operations. The administrative separation of these two organizations divides responsibilities for force management and logistics implementation / operations support, countering corruption, enhancing joint logistics between the services, and better aligning the organizations with Central Military Commission (CMC) strategic planning. The JLSF manages the implementation of the joint logistics support system, coordinating logistics, personnel, and supplies to theater commands. Based at Wuhan Joint Logistics Support Base (JLSB), the JLSF directs five joint logistics support centers (JLSC) aligned with a specific theater command.

The LSD provides PLA-wide strategic logistics planning, coordinates military-civil fusion, and determines strategic priorities. Together the two organizations are responsible for diverse logistics activities including inventory and warehousing, medical services, transport, force projection, oil pipelines, engineering and construction management, reserve assets management.

The PLAN and PLAN Marine Corps (PLANMC) may be developing the capability to conduct organic amphibious combat operations in the model of a U.S. Marine Corps Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). The PLANMC has expanded to over 30,000 personnel in the last few years because of transfers from the PLA Army. Without foreign air bases and with limited aircraft carriers, China has a limited capability to project airpower beyond limited amphibious operations using its Type 075 LHD. Type 075s, in conjunction with Type 071 landing platform docks (LPD) and other, smaller landing ships, may be able to conduct limited amphibious operations overseas, but a lack of rotary wing assets (due in part to competition for capabilities with the PLA ground forces) will severely limit PLANMC amphibious assault capabilities at least until 2030.

New global missions

Operations: Since December 2008, the PLAN has participated in anti-piracy missions in the Gulf of Aden, and reportedly escorted over 6,600 civilian ships, more than half of which were foreign.19 According to Xinhua, by the end of 2018, China’s navy had “sent out 26,000 officers and soldiers” since 2008 as part of this Gulf of Aden mission.20 While specific numbers of ships escorted at any time varies, there are quantitative indications of the operational tempo of China’s counter-piracy mission. According to reporting in China Military Online, the 30th PLA escort task force escorted 59 vessels in 31 “batches” over its nearly four months deployment from September 1, 2018 to December 24, 2018.21

The counter-piracy mission has also afforded China the opportunity to increase the deployment of PLA Navy submarines in the Indian Ocean purportedly in support of the transit of task forces to the Gulf of Aden. The “growing footprint” of the PLAN has raised concerns in the United States, India, and other countries like Japan that rely on secure shipping lanes through the Indian Ocean. According to the 2018 U.S. Department of Defense report to Congress on China’s military activities, “these submarine patrols demonstrate the PLAN’s emerging capability both to interdict sea lines of communication (SLOC) and to increase China’s power projection into the Indian Ocean.”22 In addition, Chinese forces have deployed abroad to support the evacuations of Chinese citizens from both Libya and Yemen. The PLAN is also increasing its deployments and independent operations in the Atlantic Ocean along the western coast of Africa to support the growing scale of Chinese investment there as well as Chinese citizens living in West Africa.

Legal basis

China’s National Defense Law grants the state the power, in commensurate with the needs for national development, to adopt defensive measures, build support facilities, and develop an appropriate size of armed forces, for the purpose of protecting national security. The Law also emphasizes that any international military exchange and cooperation must be conducted on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and that China endorses the international community’s military activities for peaceful purposes and abides by the treaties and agreements it has signed with other states or which it accedes to.23 In a word, China’s overseas military base arrangements will be made according to its development interests and the principle of non-intervention, in accordance with international law, and for the purpose of international peace and common development. By China’s National Security Law, Chinese national security is guaranteed by military security and underpinned by international security. In the face of both traditional and non-traditional security challenges, China will actively conduct international security cooperation and fulfill international obligations. Moreover, China adopts a military strategy of a defensive nature, develops armed forces of a size commensurate with its national interests, and takes defensive measures deemed necessary to protect its national sovereignty and overseas interests. The Law not only articulates the peaceful purpose and principal missions of China’s armed forces, but also gives power to the state to employ all necessary measures for national defense, not ruling out the possibility of military installations abroad to protect national interests and provide public goods for international security.24

Diplomacy

In terms of international military diplomacy, China has signed an agreement on joint military exercises with other members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and another agreement with Russia regarding the status of troops on each other’s territories during joint military exercises. The two documents prescribe the status and behavior of Chinese troops on foreign soil. For example, China has made the commitment to respect the host nation’s sovereignty, laws, traditions and customs, refrain from interfering in their internal affairs or engaging in any political activity, do nothing that might in any way damage or harm the host nation’s natural resources, environment, or cultural relics. Both documents could serve as a basis for future legal frameworks that govern how Chinese troops and military bases on foreign territories are managed and maintained either bilaterally or multilaterally.25

Beijing has also adapted its non-intervention policy to the evolving geopolitical and geo-economic landscapes of the world. After the initial muted reaction to the Middle East political upheavals originating in Tunisia in 2010, Beijing began to participate in regional political and security matters as a third party by making a number of proposals regarding the civil wars in Libya and Syria as well as the peaceful settlement of Israeli-Palestinian conflicts.26

In recent years, China has been trying to present itself as a constructive actor in the Middle East, sometimes mediating among conflicting parties and at other times helping convene multilateral meetings among regional stakeholders. These exercises in constructive intervention are welcomed by regional countries and the international community at large.27 China’s policy position on UN peacekeeping has also been fundamentally changed. Initially opposing peacekeeping operations under the UN auspices as a form of violation of national sovereignty, Beijing has now become one of the leading contributors of troops and funding to UN peacekeeping missions since April 1992, when China first dispatched 400 PLA soldiers on a UN peacekeeping operation to Cambodia. Instead of undercutting the official non-intervention policy, Beijing’s participation in UN peacekeeping operations demonstrates its diplomatic flexibility and open-mindedness toward sending troops abroad for international security purposes.

Specific functions and reforms

Logistics

China has undertaken expansive reform of its military logistics system as part of broader People’s Liberation Army (PLA) organizational restructuring begun in late 2015. At an institutional level, these reforms consolidated command authority in the Central Military Commission (CMC) and improved the PLA’s ability to conduct joint operations. According to the 2019 State Council Defense White Paper “China’s National Defense in the New Era”, the objective of the reforms was to advance the establishment of a “modern and specialized military capable of fighting and winning wars in the information age” and to “improve the operational effectiveness and development of efficiency of the military.”5 The development of a joint logistics system is critical to improving the operational effectiveness and development of efficiency of the PLA. Indeed, the PLA defines joint logistics largely in terms of efficiency, referring to a system that “unifies the organization of the services to implement basic logistics work; avoids duplicate staffing, organizations, and facilities; and rationally distributes workforce, material, and financial resources to support joint operations and joint activities.”6 The reforms also cleared the way for the establishment of two new organizations that now anchor the PLA efforts to develop and deploy a joint logistics support system with these characteristics, both in supporting local and expeditionary operations and contingencies: the Logistic Support Department (LSD) and Joint Logistic Support Force (JLSF). The combined efforts of these organizations have created a logistics system more capable of supporting joint operations, especially along internal lines of communication. These organizations also have featured in the refinement of processes, practices, and relationships that will support China’s “going out” effort and need to protect its expanding global interests.

Joint Interservice Operations

China’s logistics reforms must be seen in the context of the sweeping CMC-led reforms begun in late 2015 that codified PLA emphasis on joint operations rather than services-based operations and guaranteed “the Party’s absolute leadership of the military and the CMC’s centralized leadership.” 40 Crucial reform components included the February 2016 announcement of the replacement of the PLA’s seven military districts with five theater commands subordinate to the CMC (see figure 1). Theater commands are largely responsible for combat operations and control the services components within their respective district. The creation of this three-layered CMC-Theater-Services construct is based on the principle that "CMC takes charge of the overall administration of China's armed forces, Theater Commands focus on combat, and different military services pursue their own construction”41 and was an essential step in moving toward unified joint operations.

High command structure

Consequently, core elements of national- and regional-level military reforms since 2015 have focused on refining the PLA’s C2 structure, producing a joint operational command system with decisionmaking emanating from the CMC to theater commands and down to operational units.45,46 The reform plan aimed to establish two clear lines of authority under the CMC, giving the services authority over force management issues while empowering theater headquarters to command operations—a distinction that had been ambiguous.47 One aspect of the new struc - ture that is different from previous Chinese military C2 is the permanence of operational C2, which eliminates the need to create ad hoc wartime commands.

This system theoretically gives China the ability to quickly transition to a war footing. Speaking on behalf of the PLA, a Ministry of National Defense spokesman said reforms sought to improve “leadership admin - istration and command of joint operations” so that the PLA would have a force structure able to fight and win modern conflicts. Core Elements of Command and Control Reform Theater Commands. The PLA transitioned from seven military regions to five “theaters of operations,” or joint commands.48 This struc - ture is aligned toward Beijing’s perceived “strategic directions,” geographic areas of stra - tegic importance along China’s periphery in which the PLA must be prepared to operate. Joint Operations Command Centers. The cornerstone of the military’s new joint C2 sys - tem is the PLA’s national- and theater-level joint operations command centers (JOCCs), staffed by personnel drawn from all services. The national-level joint operations command center, also known as the CMC JOCC, coordi - nates the efforts of the five theater commands to achieve the PLA’s strategic objectives. The theater-level JOCCs are responsible for all tasks in their area of responsibility, including carrying out around-the-clock watch functions, maintaining situational awareness, managing joint exercises, and providing a communica - tions hub linking theater commanders with service component commanders and forces.49

During PLA reforms, the CMC dissolved the former General Staff Department, establishing a number of CMC-subordinate departments from the former organization. According to the Ministry of National Defense, the Joint Staff Department (JSD) is responsible for combat planning, C2 support, and formulating strategy and requirements.50 The formation of the CMC JSD is likely to result in more streamlined and efficient operational planning because other former General Staff DepartAccording to China's Ministry of National Defense, the Theater of Operations construct will enhance combat effectiveness.

Theaters of Operation Image Source: DIA, D3 Design CHINA MILITARY POWER Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 27

ment functions, such as mobilization, train - ing, and administration, have been assumed by separate departments. The JSD is pur - ported to have greater representation from across the PLA’s services, potentially enhanc - ing joint operational planning and execution.51 Modernizing Joint Command and Control

China continues to place a high priority on modernizing the PLA’s command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, sur - veillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) sys - tem as a response to trends in modern war - fare that emphasize the importance of rapid decisionmaking and information sharing and processing. The PLA is seeking to improve its technological capabilities and organizational structure to command complex joint operations in near and distant battlefields with increas - ingly sophisticated weapons.52 Supporting the reforms with technological improvements to C4ISR systems is essential to improving the speed and effectiveness of decisionmaking while providing secure, reli - able communications to fixed and mobile com - mand posts. The PLA is fielding advanced automated command systems, such as its Integrated Command Platform, with units at lower echelons across the force. The adoption of the Integrated Command Platform enables multiservice communications necessary for joint operations.

As these technical improvements are brought on line, they greatly enhance the PLA’s flexi - bility and responsiveness. Informatized opera - tions no longer require in-person meetings for command decisionmaking or labor-intensive processes for execution. Commanders can issue In the implementation of the military stra - tegic guideline in the new situation, China’s armed forces must closely center around the CPC’s [Communist Party's] goal of building a strong military, respond to the state’s core security needs, aim at build - ing an informatized military and winning informatized wars, deepen the reform of national defense and the armed forces in an all-round way, build a modern system of military forces with Chinese characteristics, and constantly enhance their capabilities for addressing various security threats and accomplishing diversified military tasks. —Excerpt from China’s Military Strategy, May 2015 28 orders to multiple units at the same time while on the move, and units can rapidly adjust their actions through the use of digital databases and command automation tools. The nature of these reform and modernization efforts in part resembles a Western-style joint C2 structure in which operational commanders develop force packages from units that are trained and equipped by the services.

The creation of a permanent joint C2 structure that places more emphasis on naval and aerospace forces, along with a dedicated Strategic Support Force responsible for electronic warfare and operations in the space and cyberspace domains, reflects an emerging PLA capacity to more effectively execute joint operations.

Global operations and partnerships

In addition to land-based aircraft, China is currently building its first domestically designed and produced aircraft carrier.64 The primary purpose of this first domestic aircraft carrier will be to serve a regional defense mission. Beijing probably also will use the carrier to project power throughout the South China Sea and possibly into the Indian Ocean.65 The carrier conducted initial sea trials in May 2018 and is expected to enter into service by 2019.66 [For more information on China’s aircraft carrier program, please see Appendix B.] Other areas that reflect China’s growing military presence abroad include China’s participation in UN peacekeeping operations.67 Separately, China routinely employs its modern hospital ship, Peace Ark, to support HADR missions worldwide. In 2015, the PLA conducted its first permissive noncombatant evacuation operation, to extricate Chinese and other civilians from Yemen supported by Yemeni security forces.

China’s efforts to enhance its presence abroad, such as establishing its first foreign military base in Djibouti and boosting economic connectivity by reinvigorating the New Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Road under the “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI), could enable the PLA to project power at even greater distances from the Chinese mainland.68,69,70 In 2017, China’s leaders said that the BRI, which at first included economic initiatives in Asia, South Asia, Africa, and Europe, now encompasses all regions of the world, including the Arctic and Latin America, demonstrating the scope of Beijing’s ambition. Growing PLA mission areas and enhanced presence abroad may lead to an increase in demand for the PLA to protect China’s overseas interests and provide support to Chinese personnel. China’s increased presence also introduces the possibility that the PLA could play a more prominent role in delivering global public goods in the future.

Cyberforce

In December 2015, Beijing established the Strategic Support Force (SSF) to provide the PLA with cyber, aerospace, and electronic war - fare capabilities.259 The SSF forms the core of China’s information warfare force, supports the entire PLA, and reports directly to the CMC. The force’s formation appears to be the outcome of debate in the PLA since the 1980s regarding PLA needs in a potential conflict with peer nations. According to a Ministry of National Defense spokesman, “The SSF will integrate reconnaissance, early warning, com - munications, command, control, [and] naviga - tion … and will provide strong support for joint operations for each military service branch.”260 A key aspect of the SSF is that the new body unites previously dispersed elements, pro - viding more centralized command and con - trol of China’s cyber, space, and electronic warfare capabilities. Before the 2015 struc - tural reforms, for example, responsibility for space, cyber, and electronic warfare missions rested with offices across the former General Armaments Department and the General Staff Department (GSD), including the GSD Technical Department and GSD Electronic Countermeasures and Radar Department. The SSF constitutes the first steps in the devel - opment of a cyberforce by combining cyber reconnaissance, cyberattack, and cyberde - fense capabilities into one organization to reduce bureaucratic hurdles and centralize command and control. The SSF also appears to be in line with PLA efforts to support and execute modern informatized warfare.

Foreign and global relations

The USA

Overview

In 2019, the U.S. and China defense relationship focused on strategic communications and reducing the risk of misunderstanding or miscalculation. DoD continued to make progress with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in developing the capacity to cooperate in multilateral settings. The two militaries participated in a Disaster Management Exchange with an emphasis on deconfliction in a Multinational Coordination Cell. Such examples of defense engagement enable risk reduction and enhance understanding of how each side responds to humanitarian disasters. As the 2018 National Defense Strategy states, the United States is “open to opportunities for cooperation but from a position of strength and based on our national interests. Should cooperation fail, we will be ready to defend the American people, our values, and interests.”

Specific meetings and dialogues

Selected visits and exchanges are below. A complete list of 2019 engagements is in Appendix II. High-Level Visits and Engagements. High-level contacts are an important means to exchange views on the international security environment, to identify areas of common interest, to manage differences, and to facilitate common approaches to shared challenges. Discussions focused on areas of military cooperation and candidly addressed differences. Then-Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan met General Wei Fenghe, Minister of National Defense, on the sidelines of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on May 31. Additionally, Secretary of Defense Mark Esper met General Wei at the annual Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) in Thailand in November. At both meetings, the Secretaries engaged on strategic topics, discussed differences, and affirmed a strong commitment to a constructive, stable, results-oriented bilateral relationship. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral John Richardson visited Beijing in January 2019. However, the PRC delayed a counterpart visit in the United States between the Chief of the PLA’s Joint Staff Department, General Li Zuocheng, and then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Dunford. Similarly, the PRC delayed a visit by the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) Commander to the PRC.

In 2019, the PRC accepted several requests for the use of the Defense Telephone Link (DTL) or Video Teleconference (VTC). Six high level VTCs occurred, including the first initiated by the PRC in May between the PLA’s Office of International Military Cooperation Deputy Director, Major General Huang Xueping, and Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia Mary Beth Morgan. The DTLs and VTCs contribute to establishing regular communications and confidence building between senior defense leaders. While these DTLs allow communications with the PLA, the Department continues to work to build the systems necessary to communicate rapidly and effectively to prevent incidents from escalating into crises.

In August 2019, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for China (DASD) Chad Sbragia hosted a PRC delegation in Washington D.C. to discuss the contents of China’s recently released defense white paper titled China’s National Defense in the New Era. Major General Huang Xueping, Deputy Director of the Office of Interational Military Cooperation (OIMC) led the PRC delegation. The meeting was consistent with the Memoradum of Understanding on Notification of Major Military Activties Confidence Building Measure Mechanism to gain a better understanding of China’s national defense policy. The U.S. delegation included representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the State Department, and the National Security Council staff.

The Defense Policy Coordination Talks (DPCT) are an annual dialogue, The 2019 DPCTs were postposed to January 2020. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for China Chad Sbragia participated in the Defense Policy Coordination Talks in Beijing with Major General Huang Xueping, Deputy Director, Office for International Military Cooperation (OIMC). The U.S. delegation included representatives from the Joint Staff, USINDOPACOM, and the State Department. The leaders discussed how to reshape the U.S.-China military contacts and exchanges to achieve the goals of risk reduction, crisis communications, cooperation, and confidence building. In May 2019. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Randall Schriver co-hosted the 3rd Asia-Pacific Security Dialogue (APSD) in Washington DC with Major General Ci Guowei, Director, OIMC. The U.S. delegation included representatives from Joint Staff, USINDOPACOM, and the State Department. The leaders discussed regional security issues, the South China Sea, North Korea, and the enforcement of United National Security Council Resolutions.

Functional engagements focus on advancing risk reduction, understanding, and communication channels to promote deconfliction and coordination. Functional exchanges such as port calls are also used to enhance operational safety and exercise communications and navigation protocols. In March 2019, a U.S. Air Force Air War College delegation visited their PLA Air Force Command College counterparts in Beijing. In April, the U.S. National War College and China’s National Defense University exchanged visits, with the U.S. National War College conducting a research seminar in China and China’s National Defense University operational command course “Tigers” visiting the United States. In May, the U.S. Marine Corps War College visited China, followed by a visit to the United States by PLA general officers in the strategic-level “Dragons” course from the PLA National Defense University, and a visit by the PLA Air Force Command College to the U.S. Air Force Air War College.

In June, PLA Navy Command College students visited the U.S. Naval War College. In July, the presidents of both countries’ national defense universities conducted their biennial meeting, followed by the U.S. National Defense University CAPSTONE visit of new U.S. general and flag officers to China. In December 2019, the U.S. Naval War College visited the PLA Navy Command College as a reciprocal exchange event for the June visit. These visits and other academic exchanges during the year offered an opportunity to increase understanding of China and the Indo-Pacific through engagements with various echelons of the PLA. In November 2019, PLA and U.S. Army soldiers participated in a Disaster Management Exchange in Hawaii. U.S. Army Pacific Commander, General Paul

Future options

An expanded PLAN overseas presence will present both opportunities and challenges for U.S.-China strategic and military-to-military relations. Opportunities include expanding the U.S. cooperative military relationship with China to:121

• enhance cooperation in NEOs, HA/DR operations, and other nontraditional security fields
• enter into discussions with China, India, and other interested parties about multilateral SLOC protection
• allow for cooperation in counterterrorism, force protection, and littoral maritime security
• participate in joint U.S-China-India naval exercises
• expand opportunities for logistics cooperation (for example, U.S. ships refueling from Chinese underway replenishment ships or in Chinese-run facilities).

With only modest increases in military capability abroad, the PLA may not be able or willing to provide the United States much more help against shared threats than it currently does. Instead, the Chinese may decide that accepting higher levels of international instability is a less costly option than trying to provide that stability itself. In such conditions, Beijing may choose to instead concentrate available forces on narrowly eliminating threats to the country’s economic and strategic interests and protecting its citizens abroad through drone strikes and other targeted, small-scale operations. Moreover, China will likely remain reluctant to deepen its involvement in intractable problems around the world that could command a sizable military commitment.

For those hoping China can “burden share,” expectations of how much China can contribute against shared threats may need to be tempered. More likely, Beijing may well continue to rely primarily on U.S. efforts to suppress transnational threats and promote international stability.

The areas in which China is most willing to collaborate with the United States are likely to be those featuring a relatively limited commitment, a low probability of combat escalation, and opportunities to burnish the country’s reputation as an international leader. Good candidates for cooperation with the United States that already exist and will continue to persist include HA/DR operations, cooperation between military medical teams to address pandemics, operations to counter maritime piracy, exchanges of information and intelligence on shared concerns, and collaboration in UN PKOs.

Milestones and future goals as of 2020

Overview

Perceptions of the Global Security Environment. The PRC’s defense white papers can offer insights into how China’s leaders view global affairs. China’s National Defense in a New Era claims that China remains in the “period of strategic opportunity,” but describes the international security environment as marred by increased “strategic competition,” the growing prospect of nuclear arms racing, and shifting towards greater multi-polarity. The paper primarily blames the United States for increasing global and regional tension, and characterizes U.S. pursuit of “absolute military supremacy” as increasing international strategic competition. This characterization of the United States differs from the PRC’s 2015 defense white paper that vaguely referenced growing threats from “hegemonism.” The paper repeated the PRC’s longstanding policy of seeking unification with Taiwan while underscoring its right to use force against Taiwan if necessary, and specifically cited the Democratic Progressive Party of President Tsai Ing-wen as a primary source of hostility and a threat to peace, a first for a defense white paper. In response to its perceptions of the international security environment, the PRC elaborated its own vision for the international order in its concept of a “community with a shared future for mankind.” Although China frequently describes its vision for this community, the latest defense white paper notably draws a direct link between the PRC’s global military activities and the wellbeing of its community concept.

Justification for Expanding Overseas. The CMC has tasked the PLA with defending the PRC’s overseas interests and citizens, and provides its justification in the defense white paper for the PLA’s expanding global footprint. The paper states that in order to address deficiencies in overseas operations and support, the PRC has continued to improve its naval forces, develop overseas logistical facilities, and enhance the military’s capability to complete diversified tasks. The paper also depicts the PLA’s presence abroad as a benefactor to the regions where the PLA operates and the international system as a whole, arguing that the international community is becoming more dependent on the PLA’s support. The PLA base in Djibouti, for example, is touted for offering medical and military assistance, and for providing local donations to schools. Additionally, the paper portrays the PLA as positively contributing to UN peacekeeping operations, counterterrorism efforts, maritime security, and disaster relief as a provider of “international public security goods.” Probably due to concerns generated by the PLA’s expending presence and, the PRC’s white paper tries to assure audiences that the PLA acts responsibly and appropriately while defending the PRC’s interests. Building a National Defense Policy System.

Status of new planning efforts

China is developing a national defense policy and military policy decision-making and implementation system. It is an outcome of the major reforms the PLA has undergone since 2015, and this system was described as “the biggest difference compared to past white papers.” The national defense policy system will provide the organization and authorities for the PLA to develop and implement policy. The system includes the 15 offices organized under the CMC staff and the recently formed theater commands. It is unclear how the Central National Security Commission (CNSC) is involved with this system.

Status of 2020 Milestones (Mechanization and Reform). The PLA might be unable to meet some of its near-term modernization and reform milestones that it planned to achieve by 2020. Among the PLA’s modernization goals set by the CCP leadership is to “generally achieve mechanization” by 2020. However, the PRC’s 2019 defense white paper noted that the PLA had “yet to complete the task of mechanization,” suggesting it was also unlikely that the PLA would achieve this goal by the end of 2020. Additionally, PLA officials have indicated that the third (and final) stage of PLA reforms would take place in 2021 or 2022. The PRC’s original timetable from late 2015 for the completion of the PLA’s reforms indicated that 2020 was the target for completion. References to 2021 or 2022 may imply the PLA is a year or two behind in completing its reforms. Both of these years are significant for the Party and its strategy. The Party aims for China to achieve its “moderately prosperous society” goal by the CCP’s centenary in 2021. The CCP will also hold its 20th Party Congress in 2022.

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