In the USSR, Agriculture was organized into a system of collective farms (kolkhozes) and state farms (sovkhozes). These farms were distributed amongst the peasantry and yearly production quotas were set by administrators. Before Stalin, Soviet agriculture held its own. Data from the 1920s infers a positive supply response to increases in the terms of trade. Farmers increased grain sales to urban areas when the price of grain increased.[1] However, at the time, agricultural production was limited by technology, as the whole of Soviet Agriculture relied heavily on animal powered tilling. In the 1930s due to massive famines and animal die offs, the number of remaining animals doing farm work was reduced by half.[2] This indicated the dire need of additional production outputs, which administrators predicted could be supplied by mechanical harvesters. The planning of Soviet leadership emphasized a mechanical agricultural industry, whereby technology and ideology met to create a booming agricultural industry.[3] This way, the technological evolution of Soviet agricultural production could be linked to urban industry.[4] Yet in reality, Soviet planners were more invested in industry than farmers, and the Soviet agricultural industry suffered as a result.[5]
Stalin’s first Five year Plan (1929-1933) was a massive failure. Soviet population declined after 1933, and would see modest growth until 1936.[6] The figures suggest a gap of about 15 million people between anticipated population and those that survived the five year plan.[7] Systemic inefficiencies plagued Soviet agriculture, such as obsolete technology, waste of fuel resources, and depreciating capital stock.[8] These inefficiencies clogged the Soviet agricultural machine and reduced output. Additionally, Climate greatly affected Soviet agricultural output. Many regions throughout the USSR had little rainfall, short growing seasons, low temperatures, and general extremes unsuitable for optimal agricultural production.[9] This was detrimental to agricultural output and prevented cost minimization. When harvests fell short of production quotas due to a sudden frost or long drought, Soviet output could not make up the difference. Consequently, when agriculture was not producing as promised, some peasants refused to work over fear of starvation. However, since Soviet farms were collectivized, no individual grievances could be tolerated for the societal system to succeed. As a result, peasants unwilling to join kolkhozy were forced off of their land, which was then redistributed to other peasants.[10]
![](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/f/fc/Joseph_Stalin_and_Nikita_Khrushchev%2C_1936.jpg/220px-Joseph_Stalin_and_Nikita_Khrushchev%2C_1936.jpg)
Following previous agricultural failures, Khrushchev abandoned Stalin’s agricultural model.[11] He instead looked comparatively at American agriculture through Soviet observers. He noticed that American agriculture flourished due to its specialization and interdependence on other farmers for goods and services. Similarly, Soviet farms could specialize in the crop which was best suited for growing in their region, and surplus could be transported throughout the USSR to satisfy quotas and distribute to people who needed the food. Khrushchev himself tended to suggest his favorite crops such as corn for planters.[12] Paired with a need to proselytize mechanized agriculture to nearby countries, the Khrushchev administration began a campaign for an optimistic future of mechanized Soviet agriculture.[13] However, Khrushchev was not able to fulfill his promises, and this contributed to his rising unpopularity which culminated in his removal from power.[14]
Following Khrushchev's leadership, Soviet agriculture's legacy was defined by patchwork that attempted to fix the mistakes of the previous administrations. Crop harvests, tractors, fertilizer, and capital investment were all increasing since 1955.[15] By 1965, the output of the Soviet worker was increasing, but still well below average for a developed country.[16] Problems such as a scarcity of educated workers, saturation of unskilled workers and jobs made obsolete by technology, and poorly trained and educated farmers brought costs up and drove production down.[17] These issues prevented the Soviet Union from producing enough food, as a lack of administration and management led to the mismanagement of farms and reduced worker productivity. From 1972-1986, the Soviet Union failed to produce more wheat than the Western European average.[18] This failure to produce resulted in forced Soviet imports of food. Between 1961 and 1985, Soviet food imports from foreign producers cost a total of nearly 240 billion dollars.[19] The root of this expense can be identified in the inefficiencies of the Soviet agricultural sector, such as the shortage of workers, lag in technology, or natural factors such as drought or frosts. Although the Soviet Union aimed to establish a mechanized agricultural giant, the shortcomings of Soviet agriculture put the sector behind other countries from the beginning. Soviet agriculture had the inability to meet basic consumer demands and expectations, requiring policy change culminating in the dissolution of the USSR in 1991.[20]
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- ^ Antel, John; Gregory, Paul (1994). "Agricultural Surplus Models and Peasant Behavior: Soviet Agriculture in the 1920s". Economic Development and Cultural Change. 42 (2): 375–386. ISSN 0013-0079.
- ^ Antel, John; Gregory, Paul (1994). "Agricultural Surplus Models and Peasant Behavior: Soviet Agriculture in the 1920s". Economic Development and Cultural Change. 42 (2): 375–386. ISSN 0013-0079.
- ^ Dekel-Chen, Jonathan (2020). "Putting Agricultural History to Work: Global Action Today from a Communal Past". Agricultural History. 94 (4): 512–544. doi:10.3098/ah.2020.094.4.512. ISSN 0002-1482.
- ^ Clayton, Elizabeth (September 1980). "Productivity in Soviet Agriculture". Slavic Review. 39 (3): 446–458. doi:10.2307/2497164. ISSN 0037-6779.
- ^ HALE-DORRELL, AARON (2015). "The Soviet Union, the United States, and Industrial Agriculture". Journal of World History. 26 (2): 295–324. ISSN 1045-6007.
- ^ Hunter, Holland (1988). "Soviet Agriculture with and without Collectivization, 1928-1940". Slavic Review. 47 (2): 203–216. doi:10.2307/2498462. ISSN 0037-6779.
- ^ Hunter, Holland (1988). "Soviet Agriculture with and without Collectivization, 1928-1940". Slavic Review. 47 (2): 203–216. doi:10.2307/2498462. ISSN 0037-6779.
- ^ Clairmonte, Frederick F. (1989). "Rise and Fall of Soviet Agriculture". Economic and Political Weekly. 24 (11): 555–560. ISSN 0012-9976.
- ^ HALE-DORRELL, AARON (2015). "The Soviet Union, the United States, and Industrial Agriculture". Journal of World History. 26 (2): 295–324. ISSN 1045-6007.
- ^ Hunter, Holland (1988). "Soviet Agriculture with and without Collectivization, 1928-1940". Slavic Review. 47 (2): 203–216. doi:10.2307/2498462. ISSN 0037-6779.
- ^ HALE-DORRELL, AARON (2015). "The Soviet Union, the United States, and Industrial Agriculture". Journal of World History. 26 (2): 295–324. ISSN 1045-6007.
- ^ HALE-DORRELL, AARON (2015). "The Soviet Union, the United States, and Industrial Agriculture". Journal of World History. 26 (2): 295–324. ISSN 1045-6007.
- ^ HALE-DORRELL, AARON (2015). "The Soviet Union, the United States, and Industrial Agriculture". Journal of World History. 26 (2): 295–324. ISSN 1045-6007.
- ^ HALE-DORRELL, AARON (2015). "The Soviet Union, the United States, and Industrial Agriculture". Journal of World History. 26 (2): 295–324. ISSN 1045-6007.
- ^ HALE-DORRELL, AARON (2015). "The Soviet Union, the United States, and Industrial Agriculture". Journal of World History. 26 (2): 295–324. ISSN 1045-6007.
- ^ Clayton, Elizabeth (September 1980). "Productivity in Soviet Agriculture". Slavic Review. 39 (3): 446–458. doi:10.2307/2497164. ISSN 0037-6779.
- ^ Clayton, Elizabeth (September 1980). "Productivity in Soviet Agriculture". Slavic Review. 39 (3): 446–458. doi:10.2307/2497164. ISSN 0037-6779.
- ^ Clairmonte, Frederick F. (1989). "Rise and Fall of Soviet Agriculture". Economic and Political Weekly. 24 (11): 555–560. ISSN 0012-9976.
- ^ Clairmonte, Frederick F. (1989). "Rise and Fall of Soviet Agriculture". Economic and Political Weekly. 24 (11): 555–560. ISSN 0012-9976.
- ^ Clairmonte, Frederick F. (1989). "Rise and Fall of Soviet Agriculture". Economic and Political Weekly. 24 (11): 555–560. ISSN 0012-9976.