https://mepc.org/journal/iran-and-caucusus
- Support for Armenia
Another regional power, Iran, also wanted to be a mediator in the conflict. Iran tried to prevent a spilling over of the conflict to its territory. Having a substantial number of Azerbaijani minorities, Iran fears the rise of irredentism among its Azerbaijani population, which is 20 million, mainly Shi'a Azerbaijanis.m° Iran cannot explicitly go against Azerbaijan and support Armenia, risking to antagonize the Azerbaijanis living in Iran and also other Iranians sympathizing with Azerbaijan on the grounds of religious proximity. Azerbaijani leaders have reportedly suggested that the Azerbaijanis in Iran should have autonomy. Iran would like to see the conflict resolved to quell prospects of an Iranian-Azerbaijani in-dependence movement and to avoid possible regional intervention by the U.S. or Turkey. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan, with a secular government, fears the potential of an Iranian-style fundamentalist movement. Iran supported the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and gave some humanitarian aid to the refugees, but in the meantime widely cooperates with Armenia and even Karabakh Armenian authorities. Iran unsuccessfully tried to find a peaceful solution to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, which also disrupted Iranian trade with Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. Because of the conflict the railway service be-tween Iran and Transcaucasia was shut down. On 8 May 1992, Iran brought together the Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents and an agree-ment was signed in Tehran. According to the agreement within one week a cease-fire would come into effect and international observes would be admitted into the area and prisoners would be exchanged. However, the next day the Armenian militias captured Shusha and continued their at-tacks. Following Armenian advances, Azerbaijani refugees flooded to the Iranian border creating a big refugee problem for Iran.'°' But it should be noted that Iran once dared to intervene militarily when she was worried about possible significant disruption of balance between Azerbaijan and Armenia during the second massive Armenian offensive to Nakhichevan in 1993. At that time Iranian troops passed across the border (without Azerbaijani permission) to defend "jointly constructed dams" and also established some camps for the refugees. It did not want refugees flowing to her territory and occupation of Nakhichevan by Armenia and feared "spillover" of the conflict to her territory. [1]
As the war between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Mountainous Karabakh escalated in the 1990s, Iran was domestically torn in devising a poli-cy. Some religious forces as well as ethnic Azerbaijani groups advocated support of the brethren in Azerbaijan against the Armenian infidel. Mean-while, the foreign policy establishment saw the weakening of the Republic of Azerbaijan as a boon to Iranian national interests, and therefore pursued a policy that combined official neutrality with growing support for Arme-nia. Iran's vacillation and hesitation in the first years of the 1990s can be ascribed to this internal division, but within a few years the broad direction of Tehran's policies became obvious. In general, the regime used the con-flict to pressure Baku, with the exception of instances when restoring a balance was necessary. An example occurred in mid-1993, when Armenian aggression was throwing the region into chaos, and defeat and suffering in Azerbaijan were raising the possibility that Iranian public opinion would become aroused, forcing the regime to act preventively. At the time, Iran was serving as Armenia's main purveyor of electricity and goods, and once the Armenian conquest of Karabakh had been completed, Iranian trucks began to supply most of the secessionist enclave's needs. The decisive factor tilting Tehran toward Yerevan was the policies of the Azerbaijani Popular Front (APF) government. As discussed in chapter 11, President Abulfez Elcibey's regime developed a vehemently anti-Russian and anti-Iranian policy. Elcibey himself was a convinced secularist, des-pised Iran's theocracy, and openly criticized Iran's denial of cultural rights to its Azerbaijani minority. Before ascending to the presidency, Elcibey spoke of Iran as a "doomed state," and flaunted the idea of reunifying Azerbaijan. In a sense, Elcibey and his nationalist policies confirmed Te-hran's worst fears, and pushed Iran further toward Armenia. Iranian economic support played an important role in keeping Armenia alive and func-tioning at a time of economic embargo by Turkey and severed trade links with Azerbaijan. Should Iran have sided with Azerbaijan and joined the embargo on Armenia, the latter would have had to rely exclusively on sup-plies shipped through Georgia. In this sense, from the Azerbaijani perspec-tive, Iran can be said to have made Armenia's expansionist policies possible. [2]
Despite its rhetoric of neutrality in the Karabagh conflict, in and of itself inconsistent with the official ideology of a state that portrays itself as the protector and champion of the Shi'i in the world, throughout most of the post-independence period, Iran cooperated with Armenia despite its struggle with Shi'i Azerbaijan for control of Karabagh, evidently preferring overall that the Republic of Azerbaijan remain involved in a conflict, making it less attractive to Iran's Azerbaijanis and unable to allocate resources to stir-up South Azerbaijan. Tehran adopted anti-Armenian rhetoric only at times when the results of the conflict directly threatened Iranian state interests. Yet, the non-ideological nature of Iran's policy toward the Karabagh conflict, for instance, has not strengthened the stability in the region. Rather, Iran's cooperation with Armenia and its tacit support in the conflict with Azerbaijan over Karabagh strengthened Yerevan's actual and perceived power and consequently may have lessened its sense of urgency to resolve the conflict.[3]
Despite sharing the Shia Islamic faith with Azerbaijan, Iran has provided substantial support to Armenia in its conflict with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. This policy was driven by Iran’s growing concern about Turkey’s and Azerbaijan’s influence in the Azerbaijani-populated Northwestern provinces of Iran. The rulers in Tehran felt that separatism inside Iran could rise dramatically in the case of Armenia’s strategic defeat. Iran’s position has favored maintaining the status-quo in Nagorno-Karabakh through a sustained balance of power between the adversaries, in order to retain relative peace at its North-Western border region.[4]
Meanwhile, Iran supports Armenia on the geopolitical logic that as long as Baku is focused on regaining control over the Nagorno-Karabakh region, Azerbaijan has limited means with which to stir up trouble in the heavily Azeri-populated areas of Iran. To be sure, the assistance provided to Armenia and Azerbaijan respectively by these neighboring states has been limited to diplomatic support and occasional economic favors. [5]
Azerbaijan has long chafed at Iran’s support of Armenia, Azerbaijan’s western neighbor and sworn enemy, in the long-running war over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh.[6]
Fearing Baku's intentions to fuel secessionism inside its borders, Iran provided vital backing to Armenia in its war against Azerbaijan over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh, which dragged on from 1988 to 1994 and ended in an inconclusive cease-fire.[7]
The violence may also affect Iran’s domestic arena as ethnic Azerbaijanis in Iran call for demonstrations against Tehran’s support for Armenia in the conflict.[8]
While relations between Iran and Azerbaijan have been historically been cordial, they have been growing increasingly more distant due to Iran’s support of Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, alliance with Russia in the case of the status of the Caspian Sea, attempt to influence Azerbaijan’s political and religious orientation, and due to recent events including Azerbaijan’s growing cooperation with the United States and Israel.[9]
- Support for Az
Mohsen Rezaee: "“I personally issued an order … for the Republic of Azerbaijan army to be equipped appropriately and for it to receive the necessary training,” he said. “Many Iranians died in the Karabakh War. In addition to the wounded, who were transported to [Iran], many of the Iranian martyrs of the Karabakh War are buried in Baku.”" [10]
Hassan Ameli: Во время нагорно-карабахской войны Иран снабжал Азербайджан оружием и боеприпасами, оказывал организационную поддержку в доставке на линию фронта бойцов из Афганистана. Об этом заявил представитель духовного лидера Ирана аятоллы Хаменеи в Ардебиле имам-джуме аятолла Сеид Гасан Амели https://regnum.ru/news/polit/1402476.html
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/iran-karabakh-belongs-to-azerbaijan/1366528
"Iran considers Karabakh to be Azerbaijani territory and supports the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan," said Lt. Gen. Mohammad Bagheri, Iran’s chief of General Staff. "Changing borders by force is unacceptable, and Iran always stands by the [Azeri] side on this issue."
Mohammad Bagheri (Iranian commander)
Tehran Armenian Embassy 1993 attack
- Neutral
In the context of the Karabakh conflict that pitted the two South Caucasian countries against one another, Iran, despite its Shi'a Muslim identity, decided to maintain a neutral stance. This was mostly due to the pro-Turkish and clearly anti Iranian stance of the second Azeri president, A. Elchibey, and to the traditional close ties between Iran and Armenia...... [11]
In general, Iran has not taken sides in the conflict and seeks to maintain good relations with both Armenia and Azerbaijan. It’s not clear that the Iranian government would even necessarily know if private Iranian fuel trucks were traveling to Karabakh, which can only be entered via Armenia.[12]
Russia and Iran have made it clear that they support neither party. https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/op-ed/what-is-behind-armenias-military-provocation-on-azerbaijans-border
https://en.isna.ir/news/99042417963/Iran-stresses-peaceful-settlement-of-Azeri-Armenian-dispute “We believe these two neighboring countries should resolve their difference peacefully, and the Islamic Republic of Iran has always announced its readiness to help settle this row,” he said.
https://en.irna.ir/news/83749897/Iran-denies-shipment-of-aid-to-Karabakh Iran's Embassy to Azerbaijan Republic denied allegations by some media outlets in the country about shipment of fuel and food from Iran to Karabakh region of the Republic of Azerbaijan, which is under Armenian occupation.
Meanwhile, the Iranian minister had made separate phone calls on Sunday to his Azeri and Armenian counterparts calling them to stop military conflict as soon as possible and exercise self-restraint.
https://en.irna.ir/news/82021926/Iran-defense-minister-Azeri-counterpart-discuss-Karabakh-issue
https://en.irna.ir/news/83229979/Qasemi-Karabakh-should-not-affect-Tehran-Baku-Yerevan-ties Referring to the recent visit of Armenian prime minister to Tehran, as we have stated for several times, Tehran's stand with regards to all its neighbors is very crystal clear, transparent and definite as neighbors are among Iran's first priority in the country's foreign policy, Qasemi said.
Qasemi: Karabakh should not affect Tehran-Baku-Yerevan ties
https://en.irna.ir/news/82020736/Iran-calls-on-Azerbaijan-Armenia-to-exercise-self-restraint
Minister of Defense Brigadier-General Jaafar Dehqan on Sunday called on Azerbaijan and Armenia to stop military conflict as soon as possible and exercise self-restraint.
https://en.irna.ir/news/82478097/Iran-s-policy-to-support-Azerbaijan-Republic-territorial-integrity Iran’s embassy in Baku announced that Iran’s policy in support of Azerbaijan Republic territorial integrity is unchangeable
https://jam-news.net/azerbaijan-outrages-iran-builds-in-karabakh/ Iran building power stations in Karabakh – outrage on Azerbaijani social media, Baku says project carried out with its consent
- ^ Balayev, Bahruz (2013). "Islamic Republic of Iran". The Right to Self-determination in the South Caucasus: Nagorno Karabakh in Context. Rowman & Littlefield. p. 69. ISBN 9780739178270.
- ^ Cornell, Svante E. (Routledge). Azerbaijan Since Independence. 2015. pp. 321-322. ISBN 9781317476214.
{{cite book}}: Check date values in:|date=(help) - ^ Shaffer, Brenda (October 31, 2000). "It's not about ancient hatreds, it's about current policies: Islam and stability in the Caucasus". Caucasian Regional Studies. 1–2 (5). Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.
- ^ Abrahamyan, Eduard (15 March 2016). "The potential and obstacles to Armenia-Iran strategic relations". Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst. Central Asia-Caucasus Institute. Archived from the original on 6 May 2019.
{{cite web}}:|archive-date=/|archive-url=timestamp mismatch; 3 May 2019 suggested (help) - ^ Rudolph, Joseph Russell (2008). Hot Spot: North America and Europe. ABC-CLIO. pp. 185-186. ISBN 9780313336218.
- ^ Herszenhorn, David M. (June 5, 2012). "Iran and Azerbaijan, Already Wary Neighbors, Find Even Less to Agree On". The New York Times.
- ^ Vatanka, Alex (January 15, 2013). "Tangle in the Caucasus: Iran and Israel Fight for Influence in Azerbaijan". Foreign Affairs.
- ^ Shaffer, Brenda (July 17, 2020). "Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict Poses Threat to European Energy Security". Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Archived from the original on 27 July 2020.
- ^ Ehrmann, Maya; Kraus, Josef; Souleimanov, Emil (2013). "The Iran-Israel-Azerbaijan Triangle: Implications on Regional Security". Revista de Estudos Políticos. 4 (7). Fluminense Federal University: 215–228.
- ^ Kucera, Joshua (March 8, 2013). "Iranian Official: We Helped Azerbaijan In Karabakh War". EurasiaNet.
- ^ Zarifian, Julien (2009). "Iran and Its Two Neighbours Armenia and Azerbaijan: Resuming Relationships under America's Suspicious Eyes". Iran & the Caucasus. 13 (2).
- ^ Kucera, Joshua (April 17, 2020). "Iranian trucks in Karabakh spark protest in Azerbaijan". EurasiaNet. Archived from the original on 27 June 2020.