User:Yerevantsi/sandbox/Azeri clans

Clans in Azerbaijan have dominated the political scene in the country since its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991.

The role of clans in Azerbaijan has been a constant source of debates in the academic literature for the last 20 years. For some, the clan in Azerbaijan is a fantasy constructed by researchers to understand networks based on shared interests and sometimes kinships (Alievaand Torjesen 2007; Andvig 1999). For others, taking into account the clan is essential tounderstand the Azerbaijani society and the dynamics of Azerbaijani politics (Avioutskii2007). In this debate, several points have to be recalled.

According to the Transparency International, Azerbaijan is one of the most currupt countries in the world (139 of 176 in the Corruption Perceptions Index).

The constants in the struggle for political power in modern Azerbaijan are connected, in many cases, with one of a number of regionally associated networks, often referred to as "clans."

The political and economic system in Azerbaijan is largely based on a pyramidal web of patronage. Clans, mainly based on regional origin as well as the ruling elite, keep the system intact to secure their financial and power interests.

Writing in the Harvard International Review in 2011 Alec Rasizade suggested that "Modern Azerbaijan is a typical Middle-Eastern petrostate ruled by a classical Middle-Eastern despotia, where political (and economic) power is concentrated and inherited within the ruling family."

• "Azerbaijan: Turning Over a New Leaf?" (PDF). Crisis Group Europe Report N°156. International Crisis Group. 12 May 2004. p. i. Retrieved 16 June 2013. Its government is a carefully designed autocratic system, which the father and former Soviet-era politburo member began to construct in the late 1960s, with heavy reliance on family and clan members, oil revenues and patronage.

Overview

A turning-point for Azerbaijani history dates back to 1969, when Moscow appointed Heydar Aliyev as secretary general of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, in order to defeat the clientelistic network developed by his predecessors in the public administration. With the support of his KGB colleagues, Aliyev succeeded in replacing the previous patronage system –by “removing approximately 80 percent of the administrative and party apparatus”– with a new one.17 In short, he was able to fill positions of authority with people whose loyalty he absolutely trusted, mainly relying on networks from his home regions of Nakhchivan and Armenia, where his parents resided.18 As a matter of fact, the Nakhchivan and Yeraz –which stands for Yerevan Azerbaijanis– clans still dominate the political life of the country and the governing YAP itself can be considered as representative of political and economic interests of the Nakhchivan and Yeraz clans.19 The system of loyalties based on clan membership has turned out to be the basis for the stability of Aliyev’s regime, and this has been confirmed once again by the YAP’s support to Ilham Aliyev’s nomination after his father Heydar Aliyev’s retirement for health reasons. Thus, rather than a personalistic system of power, Baku can be viewed as a regime that owes its stability to the informal structure based on strong clientelist networks, developed since the Soviet era.

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The clans that were in power at the breakup of the Soviet Union are determined not to be pushed aside, the diplomat explained, even if the ideology that propped up their ambitions has fallen out of favor.

In fighting to hold onto wealth and power, ex-Communists downplay their former party ties, all the while insisting that their considerable political experience makes them best suited to lead their unstable nations in this perilous new era.

Meanwhile, rival clans eager to settle old scores use nationalism and religious fervor to rally supporters to their side. Sometimes they receive help from foreign sources. In Tajikistan, for example, Uzbekistan backs the ex-Communists, while Iran and Afghanistan aid the insurgents.

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While a few Azerbaijani clans are getting richer and richer, thanks to all the dollars pouring into the country, the rest of the population is barely scraping by. Over 40 percent of the country's inhabitants are living in poverty; the average monthly income is just €24. As Lala Shevkat, the leader of the Liberal Party of Azerbaijan, says: "Oil is our tragedy."

Mocking Azerbaijan is such easy sport that you wonder if it was this Caspian potentate that was Sacha Baron Cohen’s real target when he invented Borat, not Kazakhstan. WikiLeaks did not help. Leaked cables showed US diplomats likening moustachioed despot Aliyev and his ruling clan to the mafia family in the Godfather films, quoting the line: ‘I don’t feel I have to wipe everybody out – just my enemies.’

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One day after the removal of the Aliyev brothers—who were accused of plotting a coup d'etat with Rasul Guliyev, the exiled leader of the opposition Democratic Party of Azerbaijan—President Aliyev promptly moved against some influential members of the old guard that had been close to his father, former president Heydar Aliyev. Health Minister Ali Insanov, one of the founders of the YAP, and Akif Muradverdiyev, the powerful chief of Presidential Apparatus responsible for financing the state-run Khalg Gazeti newspaper, were the most notable victims of Aliyev's purge, but also included Social Security Minister Ali Nagiyev, Education Minister Misir Maradanov, and Fikret Sadigov, head of state-owned Azerkimya (the country's largest chemical company). Isanov and Muradverdiyev were the two most prominent members of the Yerazi clan, which, along with Ilham Aliyev's own Nakhichevani clan, has dominated politics in Azerbaijan for several decades. As one of the unofficial leaders of the Yerazi, Insanov presided over the powerful "Ararat" movement, essentially a vehicle to spread the clan's influence at the national level, particularly over the country's health system. All of those removed were viewed by the vast majority of the electorate as being clearly corrupt; by dismissing them, Aliyev and the reformers within the YAP have offered them a sweetener ahead of the vote.

Major clans

Two clans, the Nakhichevanis and Yerazi, have dominated politics for decades. As a result, other clans were excluded from power. Heydar Aliyev had its origin in both clans, which gave him a strong powerbase and an opportunity to build a certain unity between the two clans.

Nakhchivan clan

Heydar Aliyev (left), President of Azerbaijan from 1993 to 2003 and his son Ilham Aliyev (right), president since 2003.

Nakhchivan is an autonomous republic of Azerbaijan and an exclave between Armenia and Iran with a 10-km long border with Turkey.

When Moscow appointed Heydar Aliyev as Secretary General of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan in 1969, his mission was to break the influence of clientelist networks in politics and administration. In fact, Aliyev immediately began to purge the party and administrative apparatus, removing 80 percent of the staff. Nevertheless, he similarly recruited new people according to local and personal criteria. Apart from his KGB colleagues, he mainly drew on relatives and friends from his home region Nakhchivan and Armenia, where his parents resided. By doing so, Aliyev became the unchallenged head of a patronage network that pervaded the entire republic. As he incorporated elements of the traditional networks from both regions, the so-called Nakhchivan-clan and the Yeraz-clan (“Yeraz” stands for “Yerevan Azerbaijanis”) also gained political influence. It is disputed to what extent these groupings can be described as clans in the proper meaning of the word, since they do not share traditional common roots. They are rather patronage networks that are not deeply tied by cultural traditions.

Since his death in 2003, competition between the clientelist networks has increased, although the Aliyev family still controls the informal system. While the new president Ilham Aliyev weakened the position of the Yeraz-clan, the Aliyev family is now competing with the Baku-rooted Pashayev family of the president’s wife. However, these competitions are never strong enough to lead to open struggles. The ruling clientelist networks are rather united by their common interest to preserve access to oil rents by authoritarian means of rule.

In 2004, Illham Aliyev has carefully started with appointing new young government officials to implement reforms. It won’t be an easy job for him to open up the system, since he has to balance between interests of domestic oligarchs, of western criticisers and of his clan / family interest.

The Aliyev family stands on the top of the pyramid and makes sure that key-positions in all spheres of society are taken by closely related and like-minded. The father of the current president started well before his resignation as president to replace older people in his surroundings with younger, in order to move his son to the top and secure family interests. This structure has developed into extensive bureaucracy and corruption. Corruption in all spheres of society poses the largest threat to the functioning of the state. Most ministers have bought their jobs and many are directly related to the president. Moreover, membership of the president’s party, YAP, is a precondition for state employment. Furthermore, persons closely related or loyal to the president can be found in key-positions in the judiciary, banks, academic institutes, business sector, state oil companies, diplomatic scene, media as well as security services. It goes without speaking that the top of the pyramid also represents the wealthiest part of society, highly involved in the oil and gas business. However, as a consequence of the corruption it is often difficult to distinguish private wealth from government property.

As in other Transcaucasian states, "clans" or "mafias" are patronage networks. Such networks form around individuals who come to enjoy favorable treatment by higher echelons of the economic or political apparatus. Exchange of favors and privileges provide for acquisition of political influence and upward mobility in the economic entrepreneurship area. In Azerbaijan, the major network centers on the Aliev "clan", which remains in place even after the death of Haidar Aliev. One time rival networks, including led by the former speaker of the parliament, Resul Guliev, and the former foreign minister, Hasan Hasanov, were already eliminated before the elder Aliev handed over the reins to government to his son.

The Nakhichevan factor is often important in the many high government officials originate from there, and regionalism requires that one look after his/her close and distant relatives and those originating from the same region.

A second major network is called Yerazi or Yerazi clan, consisting of Azeris who had moved to Azerbaijan from Armenia during the Soviet rule when both republics increasingly became more homogeneous.

Haidar Aliev belonged to both of these clans at the same time because although he was born in Nakhichevan, his family originated from Zangezur, which became part of Armenia in December 1920. Like the Nakhichevanis, the Yerazi also control a patronage network which promotes nepotism.

Nevertheless, since independence, people not belonging to any of the clans have also become part of the ruling elite due to their loyalty to the president and reputation fro getting the job done. Moreover, those in important governmental positions, that is, powerful officials, might and do create their own networks based on self-interest.

Yeraz clan

But, in terms of population, the Yeraz is the largest clan in Azerbaijan. ‘Yeraz’ is a nickname for ‘Yerevan Azerbaijanis’. The members of this clan are originally from Armenia and their families have immigrated to Azerbaijan in the 19th and 20th centuries. It is importance to note that the last important migration wave from Armenia to Azerbaijan is from the beginning of the Nagorno-Karabakh war in 1988-1990. The Yeraz represent between two and three million people, that is around 30% of the Azerbaijani population (Avioutskii 2007).

The key figures of this clan are the Aliyev brothers notably Farhad and Rafiq They have no family links with the ruling power. They are also known as the Alar brotherhood (they are all from the village of Alar in the district of Jalilabad in Azerbaijan), and Rasul Guliyev. The latter is now in exile in the United States. Rasul Guliyev was forced to exile in 1996 for very trouble reasons. According to some sources, he used the money he made heading the Baku Oil Refinery to build a small army aiming to seize power. He is the head of the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan and has several times expresses his desire to come back to Azerbaijan but has not be allowed to by the Azerbaijani presidency. If he does not held anymore day-to-day responsibility within the Yeraz clan, he is still considered as one of its leaders.

Minor clans

Kurdish clan

The last clan – the one of the Kurds – is a bit special. It is a rather new one because the Kurdshave been kept away from Azerbaijani politics during both Russian and Soviet rules. After the collapse of the USSR, they became increasingly important and, nowadays, they wouldoccupy 80% of the high positions within the Azerbaijani public administration (Sidikov2004). This number is very high compared to the total number of Kurds living in Azerbaijan:50-60 000 people, that is less than 1% of the total population of the country. Because of its recent development and of its weak regional identity (its members are originally from variousregions of Armenia and Azerbaijan), the Kurds have sometimes been depicted as a ‘subclan’(International Crisis Group 2004, 21). But this grouping is based on strong kinship relationsand is structured vertically. The leader of the clan is Beylar Eyyubov, who used to be the bodyguard of Heydar Aliyev and is now the head of security of Ilham Aliyev. The clanicnature of the Kurdish grouping is also the result of the construction of the Yeraz. They oftenconsider the Kurds as a rival clan (both are in competition to held power jointly with the Nakhchivanis) and denounce a ‘kurdification’ of Azerbaijan.

Talysh clan

According to Svante Cornell "the southern Talysh networks, they have failed to become a significant force in politics, but instead dominate the religions hierarchy in the country.""

sources

Political Scientist Samuel Lussac points out that the political weakening of the Yeraz clan had first and foremost an economic component. When Rafiq Aliyev, a key figure of the Yeraz-clan, owned AzPetrol Holding, he had a dominant position within the Azerbaijani oil transportation network. In October 2005, Rafiq and his brother Farhad, who was then Minister of Economic Development, were arrested for allegedly preparing a coup attempt against Ilham Aliyev. In December 2005, the Azerbaijani Economic Court transferred the property of AzPetrol Holding to Ibrahim Mammadov, who is a leading figure of the Kurdish-clan. Another leading figure of the Yeraz-Klan, Rasul Guliyev, controlled refineries in Baku and oversaw the refining and transport of Turkmen oil flows. He was forced into exile in 1996, allegedly for having ambitions to seize power.

As in other peripheral Soviet successor states, clientelist networks dating back to Soviet and pre-Soviet rule control the formal political order of Azerbaijan and its entire economy. These networks also determine the patterns of corruption and rent-seeking. Such practises are, however, embedded in a broader context, since members of the ruling elite accumulate money in different ways. Frequently, there is little distinction between legal and illegal actions. Much of the public sector is corrupt, as demonstrated by the sale of public posts and the illegal demands for money from the population in exchange for public services. Members of the ruling elite are rent-seeking, since they systematically misuse their public positions to siphon off oil and gas revenues. Since oil revenues are more or less transparent, such corruption takes place indirectly when officials embezzle public investments carried out through the state budget, the state oil fund (SOFAR) and the state oil company (SOCAR).

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By the end of 1990s, as the ruling power and economic resources of the country became dominated by the Nakhichevani and Yerazi groupings, a rivalry between them gradually emerged. Heydar Aliyev skillfully played upon this rivalry, promoting and punishing each side at different times and thus preventing the rise and consolidation of either clan. In the absence of an institutional division of power, the two clans in many ways provided a system of a system of "checks and balances." That changed in 2005, however, when Ilham Aliyev, undoubtedly believing the Yerazi leaders were part of a plot against him, fired and jailed Ali Isanov and prevented Aleskerov from being re-elected as Speaker of Parliament. Since then, the balance in the system has gradually slipped, allowing the Nakhichevani leadership consolidate its influence.

Regionalism is not solely an attribute of the government: some opposition parties function within the same framework.

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The geographical boundaries of the clans usually coincide with these of the khanates on the territories of contemporary Armenia and Azerbaijan in the medieval times (Sidikov 2004).

However, clan as a structured political phenomenon mainly rose in the 1970s, when H. Aliyev was the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan. He was originally from the Azerbaijani region of Nakhchivan and he offered some positions within the administration to people from the same part of Azerbaijan than him. Thus, he reinforced clan politics and built informal normative networks based on common geographical background and on shared interests. For instance,in the 1970s, someone willing to have a position within the Azerbaijani administration had togo for at least six months to Nakhchivan to learn the dynamics of the clan. When he/she came back, he/she was then appointed in the administration and was expected to transfer somemoney to the clan (Andvig 1999; Vaksberg 1991). This system was supposed to guarantee the loyalty of these newly appointed civil servants to the then First Secretary.This leads to the second point, related to the importance of kinship links within the clan.Some scholars have assumed that some clans may be non-kinship-based (Ilkhamov 2007) or even that there is no such thing as clans but rather ‘regional groupings’, at least in Azerbaijan (Sidikov 2004).

First, it is important to notice that kinship links within the clan can be perceived or imagined (Collins 2007). This was the case of Azerbaijan in the 1970s. Once someone has lived in Nakhchivan for a while, he/she was then considered as a member of the clan with a common kinship, even if he/she was originally from another part of Azerbaijan (Vaksberg 1991). Then, if kinship ties may be weak at the bottom of the clan, are essential at the top level. For instance, the origin of the Nakhchivan clan lies in the Aliyev wider family (Avioutskii 2007). Finally, the clan in Azerbaijan is not a regional grouping, where there is no reverse flow from the centre to the region of the clan (Sidikov 2004). On the contrary, it seems that members of the clans occupying positions in companies or public administrations are expected to transfer part of their revenues (85% according to some sources) to the clan (Andvig 1999). Even if it is hard to prove, Nakhchivan seems to havegreatly benefit from H. Aliyev’s rule. At the political level, it has been granted huge autonomy (it has its own Constitution, parliament and government). It is also very likely to have received financial support from all the elites from Nakhchivan who are based in Baku.Six clans are usually mentioned in Azerbaijan. However, three (the ones of Baku, Karabakh and Ganja) are more regional groupings (Sidikov 2004). The two most important clans are the one of Nakhchivan and the one of the Yeraz. The former is well known because of its links to the ruling power. Indeed, both Heydar and Ilham Aliyev are its most famous members. The Prime Minister Arthur Rasizade as well is part of this clan. It is also important regarding its number, around 361 500 people living in Nakhchivan.

The clanic organization of the Azerbaijani society has repercussions on the Azerbaijani oil transportation network. Within this network, a clanic system used to coexist with a crony capitalist one. The former was particularly strong under H. Aliyev’s time. SOCAR and AzPetrol then controlled most of the oil transportation business. SOCAR was of course closely related to the Nakhchivan clan, as the vice-president of SOCAR was the son of the then president H. Aliyev. AzPetrol Holding is another business group. It belonged to RafiqAliyev, from the Yeraz clan and notably owned AzerTran (AzerTrans notably owns the Baku oil port (it will be soon replaced by the newly built Qaradagh oil terminal)and the Sangachal oil terminal (different from the BP-owned Sangachal oil terminal). It also has a shipping agreement with ExxonMobil since late 2004). Rasul Guliyev was also heading refineries in Baku and handling the refining and transportation of Turkmen oil volumes. Thisshared clanic control of the network was similar then to the organization of Azerbaijani politics. When he came to power for the second time in 1993, H. Aliyev had to be backed by both the Yeraz and the Nakhchivanis in order to decrease political instability. If the former president was born in Nakhchivan, his parents were originally from the Sisian district in Armenia (Sidikov 2004). This double clanic identity helped H. Aliyev getting the support of both the biggest clans in Azerbaijan. He also gave key responsibilities to some Yeraz as long as they did not threaten its authority (For instance, Rasul Guliyev used to be the speaker of the Azerbaijani Parliament). Therefore, the Azerbaijani presidency shaped the partof the Azerbaijani oil transportation network it translated on the same way it managed Azerbaijani politics.But some links within this network were also based on crony capitalism. For instance, thehead of Azersun Holding was a Kurd born in Iran and was not considered to be part of anyclan. But he was very close to H. Aliyev. When the latter had to come back to Nakhchivan inexile in the late 1980s, the head of Azersun Holding welcomed him. He then supported him financially. When H. Aliyev became president and then forced Rasul Guliyev to leave Azerbaijan, he got Azersun Holding involved in the oil business to ‘thank’ its manager for his support. This helped implementing a crony capitalist structure within the Azerbaijani oil transportation network. Therefore, in the late 1990s, the part of this network translated by theA zerbaijani presidency was a mix between clan politics and crony capitalism. But thetakeover of the Baku oil refinery, previously controlled by Rasul Guliyev, by AzersunHolding reflects the potential shift from a clanic system to a crony capitalist one.

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• "Azerbaijan: Turning Over a New Leaf?" (PDF). Crisis Group Europe Report N°156. International Crisis Group. 12 May 2004. Retrieved 16 June 2013.

Much of Azerbaijan's political and economic systems operate on a pyramidal web of patronage and often institutionalised corruption where regional and clan influences remain strong. The president and his family sit at the apex of this pyramid. Regionalism provides a crucial under-pinning to the patterns of influence, although outsiders often have a difficult time tracing this, since some families have been in Baku for more than a generation. Many clans are identified by region of origin.70 The regional and clan influences that were operative under the late President Aliyev remain largely active. However, since independence in the early 1990s, a portion of the ruling elite quite separate from traditional clan ties has also begun to emerge.

The ruling clan groups -- the Nakhichevanis and Yerazi -- oversee deeply embedded patronage networks which promote nepotism. Analysts have observed that the distribution of bribes to senior officials and the buying of official positions both remain common,71 often making it difficult to distinguish private wealth from government property.72 While private business can operate, substantial sums from any such enterprise are transferred to members of the ruling elite who "cover" the investor. This happens in almost every sector of the economy.73 Moreover, every business is subject to a large number of inspections that are clearly driven by an effort to secure bribes and reduce any chance for legitimate profit.74

Political institutions are closely linked to clan structures and the ruling elite. The executive firmly controls the legislature. The president appoints the prime minister and a cabinet. This structure has developed into a sprawling bureaucracy that appears mainly to search for bribes and "official" transaction fees. Most ministers have bought their jobs, and many are directly related to the president. Almost every senior civil servant both secures bribes from lower in the bureaucracy and dutifully passes on a percentage. The 125-member national assembly (Mili Mejlis), is largely a rubber stamp to codify bills drafted by the presidential apparatus, without its own political weight. For example, it voted on the 2004 budget after a twenty minute debate.

The ruling Yeni Azerbaycan Party (New Azerbaijan, YAP) was established in Nakhichevan by Heydar Aliyev in 1991. It continues to be managed much like a Soviet communist party; membership is a precondition for state employment. The YAP has branches all over the country and claims several hundred thousand members. Many high-ranking YAP officials are close Aliyev relatives, with the late president's brothers, Jalal and Agil Aliyev, his nephew, Jamil Aliyev, and his son-in-law, Vasif Talibov, all holding prominent party offices.76President Ilham Aliyev became the YAP's first cochairman in 1999. The party, which clearly benefits from broad administrative resources, nurtured something close to a cult of personality around Heydar Aliyev.

Around the Aliyev family, power is tightly held by a small group that exploits its administrative positions. Ramiz Mehtiev, the chief of the President's office, is perhaps most notable. He held the senior post of Azerbaijan Communist Party secretary for ideology in the late 1980s. A prominent figure among Western Azerbaijanis (many of whom are from Armenia), he founded in 2001 the NGO Erivan Birliyi (Yerevan Unity). He is given considerable sway over the appointments of regional and local executives. He is also reported to control ATV, a nominally independent television channel. While he is a powerful behind the scenes decision-maker, his

position in the presidential administration is balanced by that of the chief of the presidential apparatus, A. Muradverdiev, and Y. Gumbatov, the chief of the local administration department.93

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• "Azerbaijan: Vulnerable Stability". Crisis Group Europe Report N°207. International Crisis Group. 3 September 2010. Retrieved 16 June 2013.

See also

• Politics of Azerbaijan