Krastan03
Welcome!
editHello, Krastan03, and welcome to Wikipedia! Thank you for your contributions. I hope you like the place and decide to stay. Here are a few links to pages you might find helpful:
You may also want to complete the Wikipedia Adventure, an interactive tour that will help you learn the basics of editing Wikipedia. You can visit the Teahouse to ask questions or seek help.
Please remember to sign your messages on talk pages by typing four tildes (~~~~); this will automatically insert your username and the date. If you need help, check out Wikipedia:Questions, ask me on my talk page, or , and a volunteer should respond shortly. Again, welcome! Jonathan A Jones (talk) 15:47, 13 September 2018 (UTC)
Your submission at Articles for creation: Elizabeth Zechmeister has been accepted
editYou are more than welcome to continue making quality contributions to Wikipedia. If your account is more than four days old and you have made at least 10 edits you can create articles yourself without posting a request. However, you may continue submitting work to Articles for Creation if you prefer.
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Roger (Dodger67) (talk) 13:24, 14 September 2018 (UTC)Adding redlinks to lists
editPlease don't add links to the List of political scientists until the linked article actually exists. Thank you. Jonathan A Jones (talk) 16:23, 19 September 2018 (UTC)
Dear Jonathan - what is the best way to start a page from scratch? I have found the fastest way to do this is add a name onto this list, then from that name, create a page. this takes about an hour lag time while i create the page which I hope is not too offensive. Are there clear instructions on "how to"? I have searched around but there is a bit too much information overload on Wikipedia on article creation.
Also, i just saw you erased my work - maybe best to wait just a few hours to let people have time to get things up? I had to re-add Rebecca Morton to the list of political scientists and all the links.
- You can do it through drafts as you did for some previous articles, or you can do it through subpages in your user space, and then move to mainspace when you are ready. But you really shouldn't do it through creating redlinks and then editing those. And undoing my edit on the list page is easy: you just have to click the undo button on the history page. Jonathan A Jones (talk) 20:23, 19 September 2018 (UTC)
Your submission at Articles for creation: Brooke Ackerly has been accepted
editYou are more than welcome to continue making quality contributions to Wikipedia. If your account is more than four days old and you have made at least 10 edits you can create articles yourself without posting a request. However, you may continue submitting work to Articles for Creation if you prefer.
- If you have any questions, you are welcome to ask at the help desk.
- If you would like to help us improve this process, please consider .
Thank you for helping improve Wikipedia!
— Frayæ (Talk/Spjall) 22:20, 12 November 2018 (UTC)Fairness in political science coverage
editHello Professor, my name is Samuel and I'm a PhD candidate in political science at the University of Michigan. I wanted to reach out to you because I was really interested to read the material you've written on your user page. The bias in Wikipedia's political science coverage has been a very strong concern of mine for about half a year, and I decided that every single day this year I would make a sizeable contribution to the fairness of political science-related pages on Wikipedia, mainly focusing on writing new articles for political scientists from underrepresented groups. I guess I've just made my 123rd contribution, about 100 of which have been new pages for white women or minority scholars in political science (the others have mainly been pages about other severely underrepresented politics-related topics like First Nations and Inuit activists/politicians in Canada). If you're interested to see what pages I've written, I've been documenting them as I go along on my User Page. I also pulled a ton of women's pages that already existed on Wikipedia onto the List of political scientists back in December just to make that giant list a bit fairer, after I counted that only an astonishing ~13% of the people listed there were women. I think that in a few months, after I add all the pages I've written to that list, we'll actually hit parity on the list ... until we pull in the many articles about men that I'm sure exist but haven't been included in the list yet, at which point I fear the ratio will tip back and we'll have to push the boulder up the hill a second time! But so it goes. I just wanted to reach out and let you know that someone is trying to help out with the extremely glaring gaps that you identify on your user page, and to say that I hope you will please let me know if you would ever like to collaborate to improve the fairness of political science coverage on Wikipedia or if you ever think of any ways that I can help you out! - Astrophobe (talk) 04:01, 4 May 2020 (UTC)
- I should also say, I'll "Watch" your user page so that if you respond here, I'll see it - Astrophobe (talk) 04:02, 4 May 2020 (UTC)
Hi! Thanks for reaching out. That is really impressive and noble! So far, I've only done a few women in my department as well as some Africanists. I brought up the topic at the APSA African Politics section (APCG) and asked if anyone wanted to help and a number of people signed up and drafted articles, which I then posted since I had learned how to edit wikipedia. But that's it! I haven't done much more lately on an individual basis because of having a baby. However, I have had students - both UG and PhD - doing wikipedia projects in collaboration with wikiedu, which have all turned out really well. We have focused on expanding substantive pages regarding political science (not about political scientists). After I achieve tenure, I think i would devote more time to making or improving pages. I think creating a page is a rather tough job if you aren't already familiar with the person's research. Another risk is that one just basically uploads a summary of the CV but doens't additionally synthesize the person's research in a way that laypeople would leave knowing what the contribution is. However, any start at all is good, and I'll be eager to read some samples of what you have! One issue I came across is that some women did not want pages of themselves and so I respected this. Do you ask the people you make pages about? Just curious. Also, what is the criteria for significant? I basically just did some full professors, but decided having tenure qualifies someone as being recognized as a political science in the field. However, has Wikipedia ever pushed back that a certain person was not significant enough? I could imagine this for maybe some new associate professors. Again, just curious!
Krastan03 (talk) 22:40, 4 May 2020 (UTC)
- First I should apologise that this response got so long. You said such interesting things, and I guess it's no surprise that I write way too much on Wikipedia! I'm extremely interested to hear that people were keen to help out at an APSA section, that's great! I also know from talking to some of the organisers that there was discussion of political science coverage on Wikipedia and the projection of importance/notability at the APSA D&I Hackathon a few years ago. It sounds like there's latent interest in the topic among people in the field. I agree that writing a page from scratch about someone whose work you aren't already familiar with is a challenge, and the first few pages I wrote took me hours and hours, but I've streamlined the process to the point that I am consistently writing pages in not more than 1.5 hours -- still a sizeable daily commitment, but one that's been possible for me. And honestly, sometimes it helps to not be very familiar with their research, because then I'm not worried about including every single working paper they wrote in 1982 that I think makes a really good point and just has to be mentioned somewhere in the article! My typical strategy these days is to let book reviewers do a lot of the work for me. Wikipedia is supposed to be a summary of things that people have already written, so a high-quality academic page can just be a readable summary of how other experts have described their books, along with a few sentences about how those books connect to the rest of their research agenda. The point you raise about people potentially not wanting a page is a very important one; it's something that definitely worried me when I wrote my first several articles and that still concerns me from time to time. But what I keep coming back to is that people have not asked permission when writing terrible article after terrible article for all manner of white American men. I figured that the appropriate respect to pay to the people I write about is to do for them exactly what countless anonymous editors have been doing for white men in political science for years: to simply assume that these are important people, and important people get written about. So setting aside the admittedly more complicated question of whether it's good for Wikipedia to write about living people, I take the stance that so long as pages are being written about political scientists here, those pages need to be fair. And if somebody objects to the existence of a page about them, of course I will help them to get it taken down. However, of the >100 pages I've written about living political scientists, I've probably told about 50 people about their page, and nobody has said anything to indicate that they didn't want the page to exist. The modal response has definitely just been thanks; a lot of people have been very grateful, a small number have requested some corrections (usually because some information I got from a source is out of date), some just didn't respond to me, and others I think were just totally bemused, but nobody has yet said that they wished I hadn't written anything or that they'd like it taken down. There's also an amazing editor, Jess Wade, who has been writing daily pages about academics for years and telling people that she wrote pages for them on Twitter, and my impression is that in her much larger sample people have been pretty uniformly pleased. I think you're pretty safe if you keep your summary as close as possible to the way they describe themselves on the internet (without just copying their bio/CV of course) and add in respectful text from professional reviews of their work; then the biography is similar to writing that they've already chosen to put online. Finally, you asked about notability. In general it's extremely common for the notability of pages to be contested, yes. Wikipedia has one central rule for gauging encyclopedic notability, which is WP:GNG. Any topic that passes this guideline, as judged through a community deliberation process, can have a page. However, there's another way. The people who wrote the guidelines acknowledge that even very important academics rarely get, say, magazine profiles written about them. So even if an academic is not notable under WP:GNG, then they can be "presumed notable" if they satisfy any one of the 8 requirements at WP:NACADEMIC. Because these are pretty steep requirements, you're absolutely spot on that it's typically true that pages about pre-tenure faculty members will get deleted. However, it's not always true, because they could instead pass the general notability requirement, WP:GNG. So for example, even if Julia Azari and Nicole Hemmer weren't the phenomenal researchers that they are (and you could definitely make credible cases that they check off items at WP:NACADEMIC, but suppose for a second that they didn't), then I would argue that their public engagement efforts have been so extensive that they pass WP:GNG even if they don't satisfy, say, WP:NACADEMIC point 8 yet (although it's worth noting though that 11/12 incoming APSR editors didn't have pages, and I had to write those in January). Of course, the way you present it really really matters; I know of several people, including Mala Htun, who previously had pages when they were definitely already notable, those pages got deleted because the people who made them didn't quite know how to establish notability yet, and then I made a new page and it stuck. Of the 121 new pages I've created only 1 ever got deleted and that was years ago (knock on wood), and I'm more than happy to help out with that if you would ever like a second pair of eyes on something you write here. Anyways, I had better stop writing, apologies again for the extremely long response! - Astrophobe (talk) 00:06, 5 May 2020 (UTC)
Neat! Glad you've been so successful with everything! I wonder if you should write a monkey cage article or something just to get the word out more regarding what you've done. Very impressive! Maybe in the article, you could call on people to help embellish the articles, for example, students or coauthors of these individuals who are very familiar with their work and would have an easy time synthesizing main contributions across works. The book reviews are a great start of course, but obviously misses notability from the articles. I have a couple of short memos that I circulated about the initiative with African politics folks that might be helpful or thought provoking if you are interested. I can also link you up with an editor of the monkey cage if you want. I tried to look up a Samuel on the U Mich poli sci grad student roster but could not find. Could you email me to be in touch? Krastan03 (talk) 18:19, 5 May 2020 (UTC)
Ethiopian Nationalism
editEthiopian nationalism (Amharic: ኢትዮጵያዊነት Ītyop'iyawīnet) also referred as Ethiopianism or Ethiopianness and Pan-Ethiopian nationalism, asserts that the the people of Ethiopia or Ethiopians are a multicultural nation and promotes the cultural unity of the people. It sees that all Ethiopians regardless of ethnicity have equal claim over Ethiopian identity, culture, history, and land.[1] The views espoused by Ethiopian Nationalists is that, Ethiopian civic nationalism is in contrast to and in opposition against ethno-nationalist supremacy fueled by ethnic federalist policies in which Ethiopian Nationalists claim that regional subdivisions of the state were segregated according to ethnicity brought about by the partitioning and dissolution of traditionally multi-ethnic regions causing the internal displacement of people through internal population transfers. However, there has been opposition to Multi-ethnic Ethiopian Nationalism from ethnic nationalist and separatists groups as seen in the surge of ethnic tensions between various Ethiopian ethnic groups and political parties most notably among the most populace ethnic groups in the country like the Amhara, Oromo, Somali, and Tigray peoples, most of whom who have separatist movements among their ranks,[2] and conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrean Provincial Separatists vying for and later accomplishing the Independence of Eritrea (who had already formed their own region specific Eritrean Nationalism and national identity of the People of Eritrea / Eritreans having keen similarities to that of Ethiopian Nationalism because of its multi-ethnic nature) in the aftermath of the Amhara Political-Predominance Era that occurred towards the last stages of monarchic rule in the Ethiopian Empire. However, ethnic tensions surged between the Amhara, Oromo, Somali, and Tigray peoples, each of whom had formed separatist movements dedicated to leaving Ethiopia.[2]
History
editThe conception of an Ethiopian nation by Ethiopian nationalists is stated to have begun with the Aksumite Kingdom in the 4th century A.D.[1] The Aksumite Kingdom was a predominantly Christian state that at the height of its power controlled what is now the Ethiopian Highlands, Eritrea, and the coastal regions of Southern Arabia.[1] The Aksumite Kingdom was responsible for the development of the religious movement that became the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church.[1] However, the expansion of Islam in the 7th century caused the decline of the Aksumite Kingdom, and most of the lowland populations converted to Islam, while the highland people remained Christian.[1] Since the Aksumite people became divided between Christian highlands and Islamic lowlands, religious and tribal tensions and rivalries between the people intensified.[1] The Aksumite society changed into a loose confederation of city-states that maintained the language of Aksum.[1]
After the fall of Aksum due to declining sea trade from fierce competition by Muslims and changing climate, the power base of the kingdom migrated south and shifted its capital to Kubar (near Agew). They moved southwards because, even though the Axumite Kingdom welcomed and protected the companions of Prophet Muhammad to Ethiopia, who came as refugees to escape the persecution of the ruling families of Mecca and earned the friendship and respect of the Prophet. Their friendship deteriorated when South-Arabians invaded the Dahlak islands through the port of Adulis and destroyed it, which was the economic backbone for the prosperous Aksumite Kingdom. After a second golden age in the early 6th century[3] the Aksumite empire began to decline in the mid 6th century,[4] eventually ceasing its production of coins in the early 7th century. Around this same time, the Aksumite population was forced to go farther inland to the highlands for protection, abandoning Aksum as the capital. Arab writers of the time continued to describe Ethiopia (no longer referred to as Aksum) as an extensive and powerful state, though they had lost control of most of the coast and their tributaries. While land was lost in the north, it was gained in the south; and, though Ethiopia was no longer an economic power, it still attracted Arab merchants. The capital was moved to a new location, currently unknown, though it may have been called Ku'bar or Jarmi.[3]
Under the reign of Degna Djan, during the 10th century, the empire kept expanding south, and sent troops into the modern-day region of Kaffa,[5] while at the same time undertaking missionary activity into Angot and Amhara.
Local history holds that, around 960, a Jewish Queen named Yodit (Judith) or "Gudit" defeated the empire and burned its churches and literature. While there is evidence of churches being burned and an invasion around this time, her existence has been questioned by some western authors. Another possibility is that the Aksumite power was ended by a southern pagan queen named Bani al-Hamwiyah, possibly of the tribe al-Damutah or Damoti of the Sidama people. It is clear from contemporary sources that a female usurper did indeed rule the country at this time, and that her reign ended some time before 1003. After a short Dark Age, the Aksumite Empire was succeeded by the Agaw Zagwe dynasty in the 11th or 12th century (most likely around 1137), although limited in size and scope. However, Yekuno Amlak, who killed the last Zagwe king and founded the modern Solomonic dynasty around 1270 traced his ancestry and his right to rule from the last emperor of Aksum, Dil Na'od. It should be mentioned that the end of the Aksumite Empire didn't mean the end of Aksumite culture and traditions; for example, the architecture of the Zagwe dynasty at Lalibela and Yemrehana Krestos Church shows heavy Aksumite influence.[6]
Fearing of what recently occurred, Axum shifted its capital near Agew In the middle of the sixteenth century Adal Sultanate armies led by Harar leader Ahmed Gragn invaded the Ethiopian Highlands in what is known as the "Conquest of Habasha".[7] Following Gragn invasions the southern part of the Empire was lost to Ethiopia and scattered several groups like the Gurage people were cut off from the rest of Abyssinia. In the late sixteenth century the nomadic Oromo people penetrated the Abyssinian plains occupying large territories during the Oromo migrations.[8][9] Abyssinian warlords often competed with each other for dominance of the realm. The Amharas seemed to gain the upper hand with the accession of Yekuno Amlak of Ancient Bete Amhara in 1270, after defeating the Agaw lords of Lasta.
The Gondarian dynasty, which since the 16th century had become the centre of Royal pomp and ceremony of Abyssinia, finally lost its influence as a result of the emergence of powerful regional lords, following the murder of Iyasu I, also known as Iyasu the Great. The decline in the prestige of the dynasty led to the semi-anarchic era of Zemene Mesafint("Era of the Princes"), in which rival warlords fought for power and the Yejju Oromo እንደራሴ enderases ("regents") had effective control. The emperors were considered to be figureheads. Until a young man named Kassa Haile Giorgis also known as Emperor Tewodros brought end to Zemene Mesafint by defeating all his rivals and took the throne in 1855. The Tigrayans made only a brief return to the throne in the person of Yohannes IV in 1872, whose death in 1889 resulted in the power base shifting back to the dominant Amharic-speaking elite prior to Yejju Oromo and Tigrayan rule. His successor Menelik II an Emperor of Amhara origin seized power. League of Nations in 1935 reported that after the invasion of Menelik's forces into non Abyssinian-proper lands of Somalis, Harari, Southern Oromo, Sidama, Shanqella etc, the inhabitants were enslaved and heavily taxed by the gebbar-feudal system leading to depopulation.[10]
Some scholars consider the Amhara to have been Ethiopia's ruling elite for centuries, represented by the Solomonic line of Emperors ending in Haile Selassie I. Marcos Lemma and other scholars dispute the accuracy of such a statement, arguing that other ethnic groups have always been active in the country's politics. This confusion may largely stem from the mislabeling of all Amharic-speakers as "Amhara" even though they were from a different ethnic group, and the fact that many people from other ethnic groups have adopted Amharic names. Another is the claim that most Ethiopians can trace their ancestry to multiple ethnic groups, including the last self-proclaimed emperor Haile Selassie I and his Empress Itege Menen Asfaw of Ambassel of having both Amhara and Oromo linage.[11]
Oromo migrations, occurred with the movement of a large pastoral population from the southeastern provinces of the Empire. A contemporary account was recorded by the monk Abba Bahrey, from the Gamo region. Subsequently, the empire organization changed progressively, with faraway provinces taking more independence. A remote province such as Bale is last recorded paying tribute to the imperial throne during Yaqob reign (1590-1607).
By 1607, Oromos were also major players in the imperial politics, when Susenyos I, raised by a clan through gudifacha(or adoption), took power. He was helped by fellow Luba age-group generals Mecha, Yilma and Densa, who were rewarded by Rist feudal lands, in the present-day Gojjam districts of the same name.
The reign of Iyasu I the Great (1682-1706) was a major period of consolidation. It also saw the dispatching of embassies to Louis XIV's France and to Dutch India. During the reign of Iyasu II (1730-1755), the Empire was strong enough to undertake a war on the Sennar Sultanate, where the emperor leading its army to Sennar itself, was afterwards forced to retreat upon defeat along the Setit river. Iyasu II also conferred the dignity of Kantibai of the Habab (northern Eritrea) after homage by a new dynasty.
The Wallo and Yejju clans of the Oromo people rise to power culminated in 1755, when Emperor Iyoas I ascended to the imperial throne in Gondar. They would be one of the major factions contending for imperial power during the ensuing Zemene Mesafint, starting from 1769, when Mikael Sehul, Ras of Tigray killed Iyoas I and replaced him with Yohannes II.
The establishment of modern Ethiopia was led by the Shawan people (which included both Amharas and Oromos), particularly Amhara emperors Tewodros II of Gondar, who governed from 1855 to 1868, Yohannis IV, who was from Tigray governed from 1869 to 1889 and managed to expand his authority into Eritrea, and Menelik II, who governed from 1889 to 1913 and repelled the Italian invasion of 1896.[1]
From 1874 to 1876, the Empire, under Yohannes IV, won the Ethiopian-Egyptian War, decisively beating the invading forces at the Battle of Gundet, in Hamasien province (in modern day Eritrea). In 1887 Menelik king of Shewa invaded the Emirate of Harar after his victory at the Battle of Chelenqo.
Beginning in the 1890s, under the reign of the Emperor Menelik II, the empire's forces set off from the central province of Shoa to incorporate through conquest inhabited lands to the west, east and south of its realm. The territories that were annexed included those of the Western Oromo (non-Shawan Oromo), Sidama, Gurage, Wolayta, and Dizi. Among the imperial troops was Ras Gobena's Shewan Oromo militia. Many of the lands that they annexed had never been under the empire's rule, with the newly incorporated territories resulting in the modern borders of Ethiopia.
Ethiopia, unlike the rest of Africa, had never been colonized.[1] Ethiopia was accepted as the first independent African-governed state at the League of Nations in 1922.[1] Ethiopia was occupied by Italy after the Second Italo-Abyssinian War, but it was liberated by the Allies during World War II.[1]
After the war, Ethiopia annexed Eritrea.[2] However, ethnic tensions surged between the Amhara and the various ethnic groups of Eritrea, as well as Oromo, Somali, and Tigray peoples, in Ethiopia proper, each of whom had formed separatist movements dedicated to leaving Ethiopia.[2] After the overthrow of the Ethiopian monarchy by the Derg military junta, the country became aligned with the Soviet Union and Cuba after the United States failed to support it in its military struggle with Somali separatists in the Ogaden region.[2] After the end of military government in Ethiopia in 1993, Eritrea separated from Ethiopia.[2]
Legacy of independence
editIn March 1896 a definitive battle took place between the forces of colonial Italy, and those of the Ethiopian Empire in a town in northern Ethiopia called Adwa. The battle was short but extremely violent with tens of thousands of deaths. At the time Emperor Menelik II of Ethiopia had mobilized the Ethiopian people regardless of class and ethnicities. The mobilization drive would see millions of Ethiopian Citizens march from their towns, villages, and cities into the Northern Highlands for the preservation of their African Empire. This battle would end in a decisive victory for Ethiopia, marking the country with a unique legacy of independence in the face of European Aggression.[12]
The battle of Adwa is the foundation for Ethiopian Nationalist ideology. For many Ethiopians, the threat of foreign invasion is the rallying cry for patriotic sacrifices and nationalist ideologues. By the time the battle of Adwa took place almost all of Africa was dominated by European forces. Ethiopian independence broke the mold of European superiority & provided a beacon of hope for black nations and peoples around the world. For many Ethiopians this moment represents a transitional moment, in which the nation realized its teleological doctrine. While the first war against Italy was a uniting war, the 1934 invasion by Benito Mussolini was extremely divisive. In Observation on the Ethiopian Nation Charles McClellan argues that the Italo-Abyssinian war of 1934 was in fact "as much a civil war as one against foreign aggression."[13] McClellan argues that the political and factional differences which emerged in Ethiopia prior to the war, were not resolved by the Italian invasion but instead were amplified. This in the authors opinion led to an era of bitter factionalism which would "define the dynamics of post-war Ethiopian politics."[13]
Era of ethnic federalism
editSince 1992 prior to the appointment of Abiy Ahmed as Prime Minister the TPLF has had almost complete control of the government leveraging its power to concentrate wealth and development into the Tigray Region. The hegemonic rule of the Tigray people in Ethiopia was in many ways a reaction to the predominance Amharas had in media and governance. The hegemonic rule of a few ethnic groups or in some cases a single ethnic group has marginalized many groups within Ethiopia and has led to a cycle of violence and retribution. In the early 1990s the TPLF believed that through an ethnic federalist state system, one in which regions were assigned and divided by ethnic population, they could
"reduc[e] the inter-ethnic conflict that has divided Ethiopian society for centuries; (2) promot[e] equitable material conditions in all areas of the country; and (3) improv[e] the efficiency and effectiveness of public sector performance at the field level. They argued they could use political and administrative devolution to promote these objectives without threatening other important objectives, such as economic growth and political stability."[14]
While these region weren't given "extensive sub-national control over technical policies, laws, regulations, and tax" their creation lent credibility to the different independence and ethnic nationalist movements around the country.[14] For Ethiopian Nationalists, this credibility has emboldened different groups, giving them more cohesion, whilst corroding national unity and notions of Pan-Ethiopianism. The increased autonomy of these groups contrasted with the increased repression by Tigray elites created a situation in which the ruling class was both empowering groups through greater ethnic cohesion, but transparently stifling their political will. As evidenced by the 2005 elections the TPLF use of violent repression to subdue detractors of the ruling coalition only had the effect of radicalizing ethnic parties and increasing ethnic divisions. Many Ethiopian nationalists view the system of ethnic federalism as having made governing in Ethiopia a zero sum game. To win power in Ethiopia is to deny any other ethnic group significant power. By expelling notions of Ethiopianism or multi-ethnic Ethiopian national identity from the national political dialogue the TPLF has increased the ethnic cleavages and created a system revolving around ethnic affiliation, void of political ideology. In 2015 "after a master plan was unveiled to expand the boundaries of the capital, Addis Ababa" into Oromia thousands of Oromo Youth Liberation Movement Members took up to the streets demanding increased political representation, an end to the TPLF sponsored Master Plan, and avenues of dissent.[15] Although the ruling party tried to blunt these protests through physical force they only grew and Amharas "angered by an unfulfilled demand to retake control of some of their lands" launched protests of mostly Oromos and Amharas (but also other Ethiopians) demanding proportional political representation and influence.[15] After a 10-month state of emergency imposed by the TPLF, which saw the abdication of prime minister Hailemariam Desalegn, Abiy Amhed was selected by the ruling EPDRF coalition as the next prime minister due to his mixed Oromo-Amhara ethnic ancestry with a preference to his Oromo identify. Since taking power he has taken up major reforms allowing back political dissidents, releasing some political prisoners, and liberalizing the economy.[16] While his drive to reform and democratize the nation have garnered him support across the country he still has not addressed the fundamental issues of the Ethnic Federalist system, which in the Pan-Ethiopians' opinion is the root cause for ethno-nationalist politics and tensions. Ethiopian nationalists believe that Ethnic Federalism must be ended to shift Ethiopian politics from ethnic patronage to ideology, it must be ended to induce national cohesion and blunt sectarian loyalty, and through the blunting of ethnic cohesion induce an era of unity and prosperity.
Talk:Ethiopian Nationalism
editProblems
editI think it is important to stress that Rastafarian thought is quite distinct from Ethiopian nationalism. Ethiopian nationalism stresses the particularities of Ethiopian culture/history, negating the African heritage and influence. Ethiopian nationalism is, in essence, inherently contradictory to pan-Africanism or Black nationalism. --Soman (talk) 11:32, 15 January 2012 (UTC)
- Rastafarian thought is connected with Ethiopian nationalism - it views Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie as having been the reincarnation of Jesus and Rastafarians use Ethiopian national symbols - including the Ethiopian flag and the Lion of Judah. Where is your evidence that Ethiopian nationalism is universally contradictory to pan-Africanism or Black nationalism? Here is a source on Rastafari culture and Ethiopia: "Rastafarians believe that Ethiopia is the Promised Land and that it is Heaven on Earth"[1]. And here is another article for prominent Black nationalist and pan-Africanist leader Marcus Garvey who regarded Ethiopian monarchs as "black man's God" and the "Messiah returned".[2]. Plus, pan-African colours used by many African states are green, yellow, and red in homage to Ethiopia. Certainly not all black nationalists agree with Ethiopianism and Rastafarianism - especially not Nation of Islam supporters due to Ethiopianism's and Rastafarianism's implicit advocacy of Christianity. But the issue here is about Ethiopianism and Rastafarianism in relation to Ethiopian nationalism.--R-41 (talk) 17:34, 15 January 2012 (UTC)
- I will try to add sources for rewriting the lede. However, what you describe is the Rastafarian fascination with Ethiopia. This is a one-way street, Ethiopian nationalists don't consider themselves as sharing a community with the Rastafarians. On the contrary, Ethiopian nationalist narrative stresses Amharic culture, Orthodox Christianity and the uniqueness of Ethiopian statehood. All these three points stresses difference towards rest of sub-Saharan Africa. Notably, Haile Selassie I himself was not entirely comfortable with stressing the anti-Italian resistance as a pillar of nationalist discourse, as he was in power-struggle with many of the prominent resistance figures. --Soman (talk) 20:27, 15 January 2012 (UTC)
- Rastafarian thought is connected with Ethiopian nationalism - it views Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie as having been the reincarnation of Jesus and Rastafarians use Ethiopian national symbols - including the Ethiopian flag and the Lion of Judah. Where is your evidence that Ethiopian nationalism is universally contradictory to pan-Africanism or Black nationalism? Here is a source on Rastafari culture and Ethiopia: "Rastafarians believe that Ethiopia is the Promised Land and that it is Heaven on Earth"[1]. And here is another article for prominent Black nationalist and pan-Africanist leader Marcus Garvey who regarded Ethiopian monarchs as "black man's God" and the "Messiah returned".[2]. Plus, pan-African colours used by many African states are green, yellow, and red in homage to Ethiopia. Certainly not all black nationalists agree with Ethiopianism and Rastafarianism - especially not Nation of Islam supporters due to Ethiopianism's and Rastafarianism's implicit advocacy of Christianity. But the issue here is about Ethiopianism and Rastafarianism in relation to Ethiopian nationalism.--R-41 (talk) 17:34, 15 January 2012 (UTC)
Amhara nationalism
editAmhara nationalism redirects here, but the article does not explain the relationship between Amhara nationalism and Ethiopian nationalism, except to suggest that Amhara people played a part in promoting Ethiopian nationalism. This redirect is confusing in the context of 2019 Amhara Region coup d'état attempt, where "Amhara nationalist militias" are positioned against the government of Ethiopia. Duck type goose (talk) 13:38, 24 June 2019 (UTC)
- I think Amhara nationalism is worthy of its own article. Charles Essie (talk) 05:06, 28 January 2020 (UTC)
- Amhara nationalism should be its own article. Amhara nationalism is a form of (supremacist) ethnic nationalism while Ethiopian nationalism is contrary to that notion. Ethiopian nationalism on the other hand is multi-ethnic, inclusive, and rallies around the idea of pan-ethnic unity among Ethiopian citizens and their descendants, it is a form of civic nationalism. There is a big difference between the two one is ethnic nationalism while the other is pan-ethnic civic nationalism. Llakew18 (talk) 22:54, 13 April 2020 (UTC)
Issue of Contributors Conflating Civic Nationalism with Ethnic Nationalism
editAmhara Ethnic Nationalism of the Amhara people is completly different from Ethiopian Civic Nationalism. Ethnic nationalism and Civic nationalism are different things, Ethnic nationalism is based on ethnic superiority while Civic nationalism is based on shared values of a community that includes several different ethnicities.
I don't know if this is the right place to report editors that make such claims that Amhara Ethnic Nationalism and Ethiopian Multi-ethnic Civic Nationalism are one and the same, but here is one contributor named User:MfactDr who has been persistent in these claims.
I have tirelessly tried to reason with User:MfactDr, I have even gone to the talk page to try to understand or even communicate with people and there still aren't any responses to the issues I have raised in thw talk page, all I see are back and forth deletion and recontribution. I have done my best to try to compromise with people even retaining some contributions that I find biased, but they arent replying back or giving any constructive criticism. I'm trying to Compromise by keeping both for the time being until this issue gets straightened out. WelcomeToAmerica talk) 06:17, 6 November 2020 (UTC) WelcomeToAmerica (talk) 16:00, 5 November 2020 (UTC)
Vandalism and Deletion of the History Section
editI've been editing lately without an account but I just recently created one because I have to call out some of the incorrect things I've seen here. Someone keeps deleting information about what other ethnic groups have done in building up the evolution of the Ethiopian state, all sources have been cited but someone is deleting them with no comment as to why. I feel like the person deleting the information is most likely biased against the topic of Ethiopian nationalism to the extent of derailing the topic and misconstruing its positions as seen by their selective deletion of the parts the Yejju and Wollo clans of the Oromo people, as well as the Tigrayans, and Agaw played in the course of Ethiopian history and Ethiopian nationalism painting Ethiopia as a solely Amhara state or at the very least making it out to look like that only Amharas were the ethnic group that played a role in the development of Ethiopia completely ignoring other ethnic group's input. See comparison: https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Ethiopian_nationalism&type=revision&diff=990204589&oldid=990171499 . These issues are not only found in this Wikipedia article, but also seen throughout the internet with people with motives other than contributing the factual history, people have even started disinformation campaigns on Ethiopian history and politics, systematically trying to erase the role of other ethnic groups in Ethiopian history making it look like Ethiopia is an Amhara-only country with no historical leaders of other ethnicities, when in fact there were. This can be seen in the edits of other contributors and their deletion of large portions of the history section; compare the current iteration of this article with the previous one at the upcoming link: https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Ethiopian_nationalism&oldid=990171499#cite_note-11 . JohnStewart256 (talk) 15:05, 23 November 2020 (UTC)
- I reverted because multiple users are trying to add (essentially) the same content: example. -- Gyrofrog (talk) 22:29, 23 November 2020 (UTC)
- The user by the username of User:Gyrofrog has repeatedly been instigating an edit war by deleting information and sources from the history section of the Ethiopian nationalism Wikipedia article specifically on parts of the section that pertain to the role the Wello and Yejju clans of the Oromo people, as well as the role Tigrayans, Sidama, Agaw, and other ethnic groups of Ethiopia throughout history have played in the nation building and the building of civic nationalism in Ethiopia. This user has repeatedly reverted edits of those who have tried to add back the deleted text and sources. The wordings used and selective deletions that the user has done leads me to believe that User:Gyrofrog is trying to paint Ethiopian nationalism as only applying to one ethnic group, the Amhara people, and seems like they are insinuating that only Amharas have played a role in the nation building of Ethiopia completely ignoring the impact other ethnic groups have had. I would like to repeat what I have already said before in Talk:Ethiopian nationalism in the "Vandalism and Deletion of the History Section", that the user is pushing a viewpoint that can be seen as systematically trying to erase the role of other ethnic groups in Ethiopian history making it look like Ethiopia is a country only lead by ethnic Amharas with no historical leaders from other ethnicities, when in fact there were several others from different that were in high places of authority. Selectively deleting several key points of Ethiopian history and the development of Ethiopian Civic Nationalisms making it seem like it only applies to ethnic Amharas. This is a key tell-tale sign that this user may not be here to put forth constructive contributions but may be pushing an agenda that is keenly identical to that of the positions held by the Tigray People's Liberation Front that opposes Ethiopian nationalism and Civic nationalism and promotes ethnic federalism and ethnic nationalism in its place [17]. The user maybe trying to derail and sabotage the topic by deleting several key elements and history from the article. I can explain more if you need more information. This is my second timer reporting this user to Wikipedia:Administrator intervention against vandalism and my requests are being ignored with no explanation. JohnStewart256 (talk) 22:20, 27 November 2020 (UTC)
AbiyAbiy (talk) 02:52, 9 December 2020 (UTC)
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k Motyl 2001, pp. 149.
- ^ a b c d e f Motyl 2001, pp. 150.
- ^ a b Munro-Hay, Stuart (1991). Aksum: An African Civilization of Late Antiquity (PDF). Edinburgh: University Press. p. 57. Archived from the original (PDF) on January 23, 2013. Retrieved February 1, 2013.
- ^ David W. Phillipson (2012): Foundations of an African Civilisation: Aksum and the Northern Horn, 1000 BC – AD 1300. James Currey. p. 209
- ^ Werner J. Lange, ”History of the Southern Gonga (southwestern Ethiopia)“, Steiner, 1982, p. 18
- ^ Munro-Hay, Stuart (1991). Aksum: An African Civilization of Late Antiquity (PDF). Edinburgh: University Press. p. 57. Archived from the original (PDF) on January 23, 2013. Retrieved February 1, 2013.
- ^ Cook, David (15 January 2007). Martyrdom in Islam. Cambridge University Press. p. 91. ISBN 9780521615518.
- ^ Nelson, Harold D.; Kaplan, Irving (1981). "Ethiopia, a Country Study". U.S. Government Printing Office. 28: 13–14.
- ^ Reid, Richard (24 March 2011). Frontiers of Violence in North-East Africa: Genealogies of Conflict Since C.1800. Oxford University Press. p. 30. ISBN 9780199211883.
- ^ Ethiopia: land of slavery & brutality (PDF). League of Nations. 1935. pp. 2–5.
- ^ Emperor Haile Selassie I, Part 1 Archived 2012-01-19 at the Wayback Machine, Official Ethiopian Monarchy Website.
- ^ Jonas, Raymond. The Battle of Adwa: African Victory in the Age of Empire. Harvard University Press, 2011, www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt24hjxj.
- ^ a b “Observations on the Ethiopian Nation, Its Nationalism, and the Italo-Ethiopian War.” Northeast African Studies, vol. 3, no. 1, 1996, pp. 57–86. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/41931125.
- ^ a b Cohen, John M. “‘Ethnic Federalism’ in Ethiopia.” Northeast African Studies, vol. 2, no. 2, 1995, pp. 157–188. JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/41931208.
- ^ a b Kestler-D'Amours, Jillian. “Ethiopia: Mass Protests 'Rooted in Country's History'.” GCC News | Al Jazeera, Al Jazeera, 20 Feb. 2018, www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/02/ethiopia-mass-protests-rooted-country-history-180219130441837.html.
- ^ Burke, Jason. “'These Changes Are Unprecedented': How Abiy Is Upending Ethiopian Politics.” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 8 July 2018, www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/08/abiy-ahmed-upending-ethiopian-politics.
- ^ https://www.jstor.org/stable/29790508?seq=1