Wikipedia:Featured article candidates/Metaphysics/archive1

Metaphysics

Featured article candidates/Metaphysics/archive1

Nominator(s): Phlsph7 (talk) 12:53, 30 October 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Metaphysics is the branch of philosophy that examines the basic structure of reality. Some of its main topics include the categories of being, the concepts of possibility and necessity, the nature of spacetime, and the relation between mind and matter. It is relevant to many fields, ranging from other branches of philosophy to the sciences, which often implicitly rely on metaphysical concepts and ideas. Thanks to 750h+ for their GA review and to Patrick Welsh for their peer review! Phlsph7 (talk) 12:53, 30 October 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Generalissima's comments

Mark me down for a prose review here. Generalissima (talk) (it/she) 16:21, 30 October 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Shapeyness

Another amazing article on a core topic in philosophy! Here are some initial comments from my first read through Shapeyness (talk) 15:30, 9 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Hello Shapeyness, it has been a while. Thanks for reviewing the article! Phlsph7 (talk) 17:08, 9 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]

It is sometimes characterized as first philosophy to suggest that it is more fundamental than other forms of philosophical inquiry. It is probably best to attribute this idea, e.g. "Some philosophers, including Aristotle, designate metaphysics as first philosophy to suggest that it is more fundamental than other forms of philosophical inquiry."
Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 17:08, 9 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Universals are general repeatable entities that characterize particulars, like the color red. Would suggest simplifying or rewording this sentence a bit for the general reader
Done. It's probably still not ideal but I hope it's better now. Phlsph7 (talk) 17:08, 9 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Yeah that's better! :) Shapeyness (talk) 20:23, 13 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
metaphysics was once declared meaningless, and then revived with various criticisms of earlier theories and new approaches to metaphysical inquiry. imo this is a bit vague and awkwardly worded
Done. The new version is hopefull less awkwardly worded but I'm not sure I can do much about the vagueness without making it longer. Phlsph7 (talk) 17:08, 9 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]

I think that's clear enough now, don't need to make it any longer. Shapeyness (talk) 20:24, 13 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Phillips 1967 and Haack 1979 are relatively old sources to be using for the sentence about Strawson
I found a newer source to replace them. Phlsph7 (talk) 17:46, 9 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Thanks! Should the MacDonald source be citing page 18 instead? Shapeyness (talk) 20:33, 13 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Yes, page 18 supports our text more directly. I changed it. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:21, 14 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Veldsman 2017 and Heidegger 1996 - are these appropriate for the etymology section? On that note, the sources for "Metaphysics got its name by a historical accident" could maybe be better, I would expect them to be from historians/historians of philosophy focusing on Aristotle or etymologists, but maybe I'm missing something?
I removed Veldsman 2017 and Heidegger 1996 since the paragraph is already well-covered by the remaining sources. I found a source on the history of metaphysics for the part about the historical accident. Phlsph7 (talk) 17:46, 9 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Do you have the quote you are using from that source? Shapeyness (talk) 20:34, 13 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
From Hamlyn 2005, p. 590: The term ‘metaphysics’ originated, however, as a title given to some of Aristotle’s works in the catalogue of the edition of them produced by Andronicus of Rhodes in the second half of the first century bc (although it may have come from an earlier library classification). It meant simply the works which followed those on physics in the catalogue. But those works, which were concerned with being, both as such and in respect of various categories of it, especially substance, contain discussions concerning matters which have an obvious continuity with later metaphysical theories. Hence it is reasonable to see Aristotle’s Metaphysics, untidy though it is in the form in which it has come down to us, as the first systematic treatise in metaphysics... Phlsph7 (talk) 09:21, 14 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Ok I was wondering if it used the term historical accident. It doesn't use that phrase but paints the same picture as the other sources. Potentially could attribute "historical accident" phrasing but I'm not sure if that is necessary or not. Shapeyness (talk) 20:16, 14 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Metaphysicians often regard existence or being as one of the most basic and general concepts Very minor one but Gibson 1998 and Vallicella 2010 are slightly weaker inclusions in the citation here imo
I removed them since the other references should be sufficient. Phlsph7 (talk) 17:46, 9 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
exist outside space and time This is often used to get the idea across, but really "outside" is an inappropriate concept to use here as it is a spatial concept. The sentence is also quite long, although I didn't have any issue parsing it.
Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 17:59, 9 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
The part on the problem of the many could do with some rewording so it's as clear as possible for the general reader
Reformulated. Phlsph7 (talk) 10:15, 10 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]

For instance, it raises the issue of whether a dust particle on a tabletop is part of the table. I think this could still do with some motivating, or the reader might just think "why would anyone think a dust particle is a part of the table?" I've not read the cited sources and whether they use particular examples, but could be worded in terms of atoms maybe, not sure what the best way to do it simply is. Shapeyness (talk) 20:45, 13 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I used a different example about a coffee cup and a printer. Another common example focuses on the boundary of a cloud and whether a cloud is one or many. We could also use something else if you have a different idea. Phlsph7 (talk) 10:05, 14 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
They belong to modal metaphysics, which investigates the metaphysical principles underlying them This is a bit weirdly worded
Reformulated. Phlsph7 (talk) 10:15, 10 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
A possible world is a complete and consistent way of how things could have been This is also a bit weirdly worded
Reformulated. Phlsph7 (talk) 10:15, 10 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]

I read through the sources and I think the wording I'm finding strange is "a way of how", but I guess this is an attempt to avoid close paraphrasing? I would word it A possible world is a complete and consistent way things could have been. I don't think "way things could have been" being a shared wording with some of the sources should be a problem per WP:LIMITED and the fact that a few different sources all seem to use the same wording as a kind of standard definition. Shapeyness (talk) 21:06, 13 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
A possible world is a complete and consistent way the totality of things could have been might also work. Shapeyness (talk) 21:42, 13 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I used your second suggestion. I agree that for the short definition itself, WP:CLOSEPARAPHRASE shouldn't be a problem. Phlsph7 (talk) 10:05, 14 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
McLaughlin 1999 - should this have a chapter/entry?
Added. Phlsph7 (talk) 10:15, 10 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Züricher 2021 - is this a high quality source for metaphysics, it seems to be a psychotherapy handbook
Replaced. Phlsph7 (talk) 10:15, 10 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Imaguire 2018 - this is a bit more specific compared to the other sources in this citation, I think it isn't needed
Removed. Phlsph7 (talk) 14:20, 10 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
For example, the statement "a tomato is red" is true because there exists a red tomato as its truthmaker - as far as I'm aware, truthmakers are generally not identified with ordinary objects like tomatoes, they are usually identified with facts, states of affairs or tropes. Slightly nitpicky but also quite important to the debate I think (I can provide sources if useful).
I think you got a point that various truthmaker theories focus on facts. I tried to reformulate it in a way that leaves either option open so both thing ontologists and fact ontologists can read it the way they want. Phlsph7 (talk) 14:20, 10 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Doesn't this still say that the red tomato is the truthmaker? A truthmaker of a statement is the entity whose existence makes the statement true. For example, the statement "a tomato is red" is true because of the existence of a red tomato as its truthmaker. The problem with the tomato being the truthmaker is that there is a possible world where the tomato is not red, so the tomato doesn't necessitate the truth of the statement. My understanding is that truthmaker theorists will generally say that the truthmaker is "the tomato's being red" or "the redness of the tomato" or "the fact that the tomato is red". Shapeyness (talk) 19:14, 10 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Well, the expression "a red tomato" refers to a particular. The question is probably whether the expression "the existence of a red tomato" can refer to a fact.

The issue of necessitation most likely also depends on how we interpret the expression. Interpreted in a simple manner, a red tomato can't be blue at the same time, so we would be on the safe side. However, if "a red tomato" means "a tomato that is red in the actual world" then the tomato could have a different color in another world.

Our source, Tallant 2017 p. 1–2 (chapter 1. An introduction to truth-making), says: that ‘a tomato is red’ is true is due to there existing a red tomato. ... when we say that ‘ “the tomato is red” is true,’ we say this because there exists a red tomato.

Some alternative formulations:
For example, the existence of a red tomato or the tomato's being red acts as a truthmaker for the statement "a tomato is red".
This version covers several variations.

For example, the statement "a tomato is red" is true because of the fact that a tomato is red as its truthmaker.
This version focuses on facts. It might sound too tautological to some readers.

I'm also open to other suggestions. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:43, 11 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
How about For example, the fact that a tomato exists and that it is red acts as a truthmaker for the statement "a tomato is red"? It mirrors the kind of language the Tallant source uses for other claims (except I explicitly added the word "fact"). I think maybe there isn't a perfect way to reflect the nuance here in a way that will be picked up on by the someone who doesn't know anything about the topic without being overlong. Fwiw I'm drawing from thoughts similar to those in these overviews:
Take an alleged contingent truth about a certain rose, say that <The rose is red>. Clearly, the rose itself cannot be the truthmaker for this proposition, since given that it is contingent that it is red, it is possible for the rose to be another colour. But if it is possible for the rose to be another colour, then the rose itself does not necessitate the truth of <The rose is red> and so it is not its truthmaker. (Rodriguez-Pereyra 2006)

The existence of such an object is not sufficient to satisfy [the truthmaker principle], however. The existence of something which happens to satisfy ‘x is a rose and x is red’ does not entail the truth of 〈The rose is red〉, since the object in question—a rose, which, as it happens, is red—might not have been red, and so there are possible worlds where that object exists yet 〈The rose is red〉 is false. (Beebee & Dodd 2005)

—Shapeyness (talk) 19:10, 11 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Sounds good. I implemented the suggestion and added these two sources. Phlsph7 (talk) 10:47, 12 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Ryckman 2005 - why is a book on philosophy of physics being used as a source on phenomenalism
Replaced. Phlsph7 (talk) 14:20, 10 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
The transcendental method is... do we need the sources other than Stern & Cheng 2023?
I also kept Pihlström 2009 since it has a section explicitly dedicated to the transcendental method but I removed the others. Phlsph7 (talk) 17:30, 10 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I don't think we should label Hume a skeptic in Wikipedia's voice when that is a matter of controversy. According to the most recent philpapers survey only 37% of philosophers label Hume a skeptic vs 55% that call him a naturalist (when you filter by those specialising in 17th/18th century philosophy, that goes up to 63%)
I think it uncontroversial that Hume has a skeptical outlook about metaphysical knowledge but I changed the term to "critical outlook" to avoid problems. Phlsph7 (talk) 17:30, 10 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]

I was thinking more about the discussion in the criticism section but I guess you're right that there's a difference between being skeptical of metaphysics and being a skeptic full stop. Do the sources generally phrase it using the term skepticism? If so then there's probably no problem. I don't have access to all of the sources used for those sentences. Shapeyness (talk) 19:34, 14 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
New scientific discoveries have also influenced existing and inspired new metaphysical theories I think this should be something like "New scientific discoveries have also influenced existing metaphysical theories and inspired new ones."
Changed. Phlsph7 (talk) 17:30, 10 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
History - do you think there is room for a sentence on Locke to fill out the major empiricist philosophers
I found a way to mention him in relation to Hume. Phlsph7 (talk) 17:30, 10 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]
At the turn of the 20th century in analytic philosophy, philosophers such as Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) and G. E. Moore (1873–1958) led a "revolt against idealism" Maybe this can be explained slightly (e.g. why? how?), obviously we don't want lots of detail
Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 17:30, 10 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]