Wikipedia:Reference desk/Archives/Humanities/2007 November 21

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November 21

The King said what?!

I recenty heard that the current King of Spain told the president of Venezuela the following quote "Why don't you just Shut Up?" after the Venezuelan president insulted him. So my question is as such:

What kind of political/international backlash would this create between Spain and other countries?

From the Spainsh perspective: The king did nothing wrong, he was insulted and the person was punished. On the other hand, The Venezuelans would be digusted with the king because the King should not be rude in ANY situation. Would this small (or large) incident cause tension between the wo countires? If so, who would be to blame?

Thanks! ♥ECH3LON♥ 00:10, 21 November 2007 (UTC)

We have an article on the incident: ¿Por qué no te callas?. According to some news reports Chávez has recently demanded an apology, which he may not get. If so, any ideas what will happen then can, at this moment, only be speculation, and are as such not within the scope of the Reference desk. But you can follow the external links of our article to read a variety of opinions.  --Lambiam 00:46, 21 November 2007 (UTC)

I foresee other world leaders insulting Chavez to his face in the near future actually. He already is the subject of ridicule over much of the world and this incident could open the floodgates for further "official" put-downs of this man. Belicia (talk) 05:00, 21 November 2007 (UTC)

It's a modern notion that kings should smile and behave impeccably. Xn4 00:28, 22 November 2007 (UTC)

Jimbo's March to the Sea?

Is it just me or does Jimbo have an uncanny resemblance to William Tecumseh Sherman? --24.147.86.187 (talk) 02:05, 21 November 2007 (UTC)

Sherman

Jimbo

Have they ever been seen in the same room together? DuncanHill (talk) 02:09, 21 November 2007 (UTC)

Great men think alike i suppose ;)Esskater11 03:53, 21 November 2007 (UTC)

Arms Race in South East Asia....Any view?

Jot some idea pls

[ajin] —Preceding unsigned comment added by 203.102.255.222 (talk) 04:25, 21 November 2007 (UTC)

I personally think those people are still suffering from some sort of inferiority complex from their complete subjugation to the Japanese and then to the French. Belicia (talk) 04:31, 21 November 2007 (UTC)

This kind of question/speculation isn't really appropriate on the reference desk. Malamockq (talk) 19:31, 21 November 2007 (UTC)

Which would be fascinating, as most of them were ruled by the Dutch and the English. Relata refero (talk) 11:34, 21 November 2007 (UTC)

Trotsky in 1905

Was Trotsky's role in the Petersburg Soviet of 1905 as significnt as he alleges? Zinoviev4 (talk) 06:51, 21 November 2007 (UTC)

No, Zinoviev, it was not; he greatly exaggerated both his own role and minimised the independent attitude of the Soviet, which was always mindful of its own agenda and its own priorities. I will provide a more detailed answer if you wish, but not just at the present; I am simply too tired. Sorry! And so to bed. Clio the Muse (talk) 03:17, 22 November 2007 (UTC)

What's the name of the cue?

the one used in billiards with a bracket at the end on which the other cue can be rested for long shots?

thanks, Adambrowne666 (talk) 09:29, 21 November 2007 (UTC)

They are called rests. DuncanHill (talk) 09:33, 21 November 2007 (UTC)

Outside of Britain it is known as a Mechanical bridge or "bridge stick." Edison (talk) 17:28, 21 November 2007 (UTC)

wonderful - thanks Adambrowne666 (talk) 22:03, 21 November 2007 (UTC)

We called it a spider. Polypipe Wrangler (talk) 23:21, 22 November 2007 (UTC)

wealth of average american

we all know that GDP and per capita income is not about wealth but it is all about annual production and annual consumption. It is around $40,000. I came across a world bank study, but that study was confusing. What is the wealth per capita of america? Is $500,000 said in that report correct? When you ask an american what is your wealth, it means something. I want to know that exactly and not a study which says about natural resources and forest wealth. Can you understand me? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 59.96.137.63 (talk) 10:27, 21 November 2007 (UTC)

I don't understand you clearly. But I will say that, like GDP per capita (or per capita income), a measure of wealth per capita might not show what is typical, because it is a mean. If you have 10 people making $30,000 per year and 10 children and elderly people not working, this group of people would have a per capita income of $300,000/20, or $15,000. If you add to that group of 20 people one person making $30,000,000 per year, you would have a per capita income of $30,300,000/21, or $1,442,857. Now, in this group of 21 people, 20 live with a very modest income (by American standards), but if you look at the statistic for the group, you might assume that they are all millionaires. The statistics for wealth are even more skewed, because wealth is even more concentrated in a few hands in the United States.

If you were to add up all of the real estate value and all of the financial and capital wealth in the United States (not including the intrinsic value of forests or minerals in the ground), you might well come up with a number close to $500,000 per person. However, the typical (or median) American does not have so much wealth. According to Census statistics, as cited here, U.S. median household net worth in 2004 was $93,100. With a median household size of about 2.5, this works out to a median net worth per capita of $37,240. Half of Americans had net worths (divided among household members) above this, half had net worths below. It is possible for both this median number and a mean number of $500,000 to be true, because there are approximately 3 million Americans with net worths over $1 million. Some of these Americans have net worths over $10 billion (or $10,000 million). Even though the vast majority of Americans have nothing remotely near this wealth, if you were to divide that wealth among all Americans, you might end up with a number close to $500,000.

Marco polo (talk) 20:22, 21 November 2007 (UTC)

I just would like to add some commemts. GDP is not only about production and consumption. It is also about earnings (well, there is some difference between earning and the other concepts, because you must count some taxes out). It measures a flow, while wealth may be considered a stock derived from income (and comsumption, of course). Marco polo's comments are very useful in regard to distintion between mean and median. You may also like to check out these articles: income distribution and lorenz curve: Also useful could be median income. Pallida  Mors 22:29, 21 November 2007 (UTC)

per capita income and life

If USA's per capita income is 30 times that of north korea, then is an average american 30 times happier than an average north korean? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 59.96.137.63 (talk) 10:31, 21 November 2007 (UTC)

It's difficult to judge happiness, but most recent studies have indicated that the level of happiness as measured by various polls/psychological evaluations depends less on income than on other factors. However, those other factors might be indirectly correlated with income. See Happiness economics, which has a pretty map. Relata refero (talk) 11:33, 21 November 2007 (UTC)

There are lots of other factors, too, as you no doubt know. What that amount of imcome will purchase is just one of them. Does the North Korean number cover food, housing, fuel, transportation, medical care, education etc. etc. as compared with the American number? Perhaps the North Koreans are better "covered" by the smaller income. Not only are there huge differences between North America and Asia, but between, say, England and North America and even with individual countries. My experience with London, for example, is that an GB pound buys about what a dollar buys, but, I have to pay about two dollars to buy the pound. So, on just that basis, a Londoner has to make, looked at in American dollars, twice as much as an American does. But London is a special case . . . and so on and so on. Not only is the question largely unanswerable, except perhaps in individual terms, but it is almost too complex even to draw up the factors affecting "happiness". Now it's the turn of someone who has the stats and knows the appropriate study. :-) Bielle (talk) 00:41, 22 November 2007 (UTC)

Anschluss

Why did none of the European powers, Italy in particular, come to Austria's aid in 1938? Mustapha Fag (talk) 12:30, 21 November 2007 (UTC)

"Austria's aid" makes it sound like Austria was an unwilling victim. Are you sure that's an accurate depiction? And why would "Italy in particular" want in 1938, to antagonise Germany? --Dweller (talk) 12:43, 21 November 2007 (UTC)

• Austria and Germany, as far as my knowledge goes, tells me that Germany and Austria have always been strong allies; hence, why the leader of Germany was an Austrian. A better question may be why did none of the European powers come to the aid of the Jews of Austria, who were forced to scrub streets with Acid and clean toilets with their blouses - their blouses were subsequently rubbed in their face. See Martin Gilbert's the Holocaust: the Jewish tragedy for further details of the harrassment of the Jews after the Anschluss. Hope that helps --Hadseys (talk • contribs) 13:57, 21 November 2007 (UTC)

In Austria at 1918 most people and parties wanted to join Germany. The monarchists and some conservatives wanted a Danubefederation or Austria ruled by Charles and later by Otto. In 1933 there when Hitler became the "Führer" the Conservatives tried to show Austria as the "better Germany", a Christian German State (see i.e."Sei gesegnet ohne Ende" the national anthem or Dollfuss speech at the Katholikentag 1933 in Vienna)and also the monarchists became more influence again. The socialists, communists and NSDAP was banned in 1933. But there was still the "Großdeutsche", which still wanted to become part of Germany. In 1934 chancellor Engelbert Dollfuß was shot by members of the NSDAP. Until 1936 Italy was the protector of Austrian Independence and supported the Heimwehr under Starhemberg,Dollfuß and Schuschnigg. In 1936 Germany and Italy become allies and so Austria lost its protector. In the Austrian population there were illegal Nazis (especially in Carinthia and Styria), there were the "Großdeutschen"(but the lost a lot of their followers to the NSDAP), there were the conservatives and monarchists.Especially the Austrian Jews, the monarchists, most of the conservatives and also among the Catholics there was a strong sympathy for an independent Austria. After Anschluss Jews, Austrian politiacians, members of the "Vaterländische Front",members of the Civil society (i.e.Georg von Reininghaus, president of the Catholic Austrian Boy Scouts), monarchists were arrested shortly of the Germans came to Austria. The day before the Germans came there were demonstrations in Salzburg und Innsbruck to show the independence will of Austria. There was also resistance against the German occupation. This resitance came from monarchists, communists, socialst, communists and Slovenians in Carinthia (see de:Widerstand gegen den Nationalsozialismus), but his were not the majority. There were also about 12.000 Austrians killed in action fighting in Allied Armies. In exile they had the big problem that there was a strong fragmentation between the groups (communists, socialists, monarchists).And that the socialists had strong sympathy for beining a part of Germany. See: http://www.doew.at/thema/exil/exiloeid.html (in German). So there were not able to set up an Austrian Goverment in Exile and an Exile Army. The fragmentation was also a problem of the resitance in Austria. At the end of the war there were movements, which crossed the parties or sub-cultures (catholic, socialistic...) such as O5 or the Austrian movement of Liberation in Innsbruck.

International protested only Mexico at the League of Nations and gave asylum up to 10.000 refugees from Austria and Europe. Also protests came from Red Spain (Rot Spanien, Chile, China and the UdSSR) (seeDer mexikanische Protest und seine Vorgeschichte(in German)) (see:bei akustische-chronik.at (in German)

See also österreichische bei AEIOU-Österreichlexikon (in German)

@Hadseys: not always they were strong allies: wars between them were in 1740–1742,1756 to 1763,in 1809 Bavaria and France fought against the Tyroleans and in 1866 Austro-Prussian War.

Hitler served in WWI in the German Army (16th Bavarian Reserve Regiment), in 1925 he gave away Austrian citizenship, in February 1932 he became German citizen, between 1925 and 1932 he was stateless. Hitler is in 1933 a German citizen born in Austria. -Phips (talk) 16:18, 21 November 2007 (UTC)

Dweller, I hope you do not mind me saying so, but I think your view of Austria does not quite accord with the facts; there is every reason to suppose that Austria was an unwilling victim in 1938. The enthusiasm for Anschluss comes after the event. Beforehand Kurt von Schuschnigg, the Austrian Chancellor, had arranged for a plebiscite that almost certainly would have given its support for continuing Austrian independence. It was to prevent this that Hitler presented his ultimatum on 11 March, with German troops crossing the border soon after. Later during the Second World War the Allies had an ambivalent attitude towards Austria, and the degree of its participation in the crimes of the Third Reich, though they accepted at a conference held in Moscow in 1943 that the country had been the first to fall victim to Hitler's expansionist ambitions.

Mustapha, Italy was , indeed, the chief protector of Austrian independence, and had effectively prevented Anschluss in 1934, after the Nazis murdered Engelbert Dollfuss, by moving troops to the Brenner Pass. But by 1938, as Phips has pointed out, a great deal had changed. In 1935-6 Italy's involvement in the conquest of Ethiopa had alienated it from its former allies in the Stresa Front and made it more economically dependent on Germany, particularly for essential supplies like coal. Mussolini's change in attitude to his former protectorate was evidenced in May 1936, when he sent a note to Vienna calling for the dismissal of Prince Starhemberg, the most anti-Nazi member of the Austrian cabinet. Hitler was more than adept at the continuing seduction of the Duce, being among the first to recognise the new Italian Empire in East Africa. Not long after this the Austro-German Agreement was signed on 11 July 1936, which had the effect of drawing the Nazi Trojan Horse through the gates of the city. Nazi newspapers were allowed into the country and two crypto-Nazis, Glaise-Horstenau and Guido Schmidt, allowed into the government. The conclusion of the Rome-Berlin Axis and the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War brought the two Fascist powers still closer together, casting Austria still further into the shade. In the end Austria could call on no assistance in the defence of its independence. The British government did send a note of protest over the Anschluss, but was effectively told that the matter was none of its business. Clio the Muse (talk) 03:06, 22 November 2007 (UTC)

Of course I don't mind. Serves me right for pontificating outside my period. --Dweller (talk) 10:32, 22 November 2007 (UTC)

Appeasement

Churchill said that an appeaser is one who feeds a crocidile, hoping it will eat him last. Is this an apt description of Chamberlain's policy in 1938-9? Was the notion of collective security quite dead in his mind? If not the League of Nations would an alternative to pacifying Hitler not have been to call on the power of France and its eastern European allies and possibly even a military alliance between the west and the Soviet Union? Thank you. Mustapha Fag (talk) 12:37, 21 November 2007 (UTC)

In whose mind, Churchill or Chamberlain? France's "power" (or, more accurately, lack thereof) was made quite clear in the ensuing Blitzkrieg. And it's hard to make an alliance with someone who has a greater vested interest in allying with the person you're trying to make an alliance against. What could the western European powers offer Stalin that would have been more enticing than a fat chunk of Poland? --Dweller (talk) 12:46, 21 November 2007 (UTC)

It is also by no means certain that a majority of the Conservative parliamentary party would have welcomed an alliance with Stalin even to control Hitler before the war. The Conservative reaction to the Spanish Civil War is instructive to those wondering which of the two expansive ideologies of the time they were particularly averse to. Relata refero (talk) 13:01, 21 November 2007 (UTC)

Chamberlain thought that once Hitler's demands had been met (military equality, German unification) then peace would be ensured because grievances would be cured. He did not see that Germany was aiming to dominate Europe again and that the rational policy was a system of alliances with France, Russia, etc to constrain German ambitions: Chamberlain wanted to avoid encircling Germany at almost all costs until it was too late. Chamberlain was just too idealistic; he trusted Hitler and when sending a British delegation to Russia to negotiate an Anglo-Russian alliance he did not sanction Russian troops to go through Poland to fight Germany and so Russia allied to Germany who gave them all they wanted. He was not cut out for balance of power politics.--Johnbull (talk) 22:40, 21 November 2007 (UTC)

Churchill, as always, was a master of Emglish prose, always managing to coin a striking phrase. But, no, his assessment of Chamberlain's motives, of the intention behind appeasement, is woefully inaccurate. It was always Chanberlain's intention to preserve the peace; to sacrifice only as much felt had to be sacrificed in this process. At the time it was considered by the vast majority of people to be an entirely reasonable position. Only in retrospect does it seem to be morally bereft.

There were three seperate roads to the preservation of peace: collective security through the League of Nations; an alliance with the anti-Axis powers outwith the auspices of the League; and appeasement.

By 1938 there was little confidence in the authority of the League. It had coped with the 'little crises' in its early years, but the 'big crises' of the late 1930s were quite beyond its power and its authority. "What country in Europe today if threatened by large power can rely on the League for protection?", Chamberlain asked in Parliament in March 1938. The answer was obvious to all, "None."

What, then, of an agreement among the powers to arrest German expansion? The United States was effectively precluded by the Neutrality Act of 1935, which in practice limited President Roosevelt to expressions of sympathy alone. Britain and France stood side by side, though by no firm treaty of alliance. France was certainly still a strong power military terms, though no longer what it once was. Besides, many British Conservatives held the Popular Front government in deep suspicion. Even if the French had been prepared to act, and there is no guarantee of this, the country was seriously weakened at the time by industrial, social and political conflict.

The Soviet Union was a possibility, and Dweller is quite wrong in suggesting that Stalin was not interested in a western alliance. He had been deeply unsettled by the Nazi seizure of power in Germany-which came in the face of the Comintern's ultra-left Third Period strategy-seriously weakening his position in Europe. Thereafter he became a late convert to collective security, with the Soviet Union joining the League of Nations and entering into the Franco-Soviet pact in 1935. No territorial concessions were demanded as part of this bargain. However, for Chamberlain and his party, Soviet Russia was not a reliable partner, and not just for the obvious political reasons. In 1937 the Soviet officer corps was all but destroyed in the purges, leaving justified suspicions of the effectivness of the military.

So, in the end, appeasement was the policy of political and strategic realism. It was based on an illusion, of course, a misreading of Hitler and his true intentions. But it had the press and it had the nation behind it, Churchill's Cassandra-like warnings notwithstanding. Even Lloyd George was convinced of Hitler's honourable intentions. Besides, what was the alternative: Churchill and war? If Britain had gone to war in 1938 it is almost certain, on the basis of the information that we have, that defeat, real defeat, would have followed. Appeasement, if nothing else, bought time. Clio the Muse (talk) 02:19, 22 November 2007 (UTC)

Clio, I agree with your comments about Stalin, but I would go further. My recollection, from reading long ago and perhaps dimly remembered, is that Stalin was much more aware of the danger posed by Hitler than were the leaders of Western Europe. After Anschluss, Stalin's attitude was that the USSR and the smaller countries in eastern Europe should work together to check Hitler's expansionism. The Poles, however, motivated by traditional hostility toward Russia, and emboldened by Russia's defeat in World War I, disdained any such cooperation; the Western allies, despite Stalin's urgings, refused to pressure Poland on the subject. (I think the prevailing attitude was that the USSR should help defend Poland but that no Soviet troops should enter Polish territory, a strategy that would have required some king-hell artillery.) Stalin was not represented at Munich. The agreement reached there represented a mortal blow to his vision, and led him to give up on trying to rouse the West to the gravity of the Nazi threat. As Relata refero points out, there was considerable anti-Communism in the West, which impeded the cooperation that was needed from the point of view of anti-Nazism. JamesMLane t c 10:43, 22 November 2007 (UTC)

At the risk of making myself look even more dumb by talking outside my preferred period, I think it's almost impossible to gauge what Stalin wanted, because the man was so impossible to judge and as variable as a weather cock. However, I maintain that the opportunity to slice up Eastern Europe between himself and even a leader he would rather have opposed would have been too sweet an inducement for Stalin. Not many of the influential figures on the world stage seem to have got the measure of Stalin. I've read somewhere that Churchill thought Roosevelt was way off in his dealings with him, while C himself was self-admittedly bemused by him. Hitler seems to have understood Stalin only patchily - I think he underestimated Stalin (and the Russians') grim resolve and ruthlessness. Patton seems to have been one of the few to understand what Stalin was about, but no-one had the stomach for Patton's inevitably militaristic answers to the problems Stalin posed. --Dweller (talk) 10:54, 22 November 2007 (UTC)

Philippines' name before Spaniards came

Can you tell me the name of the Philippines before the Spaniards came? 122.53.209.135 (talk) 12:41, 21 November 2007 (UTC)

The question seems to be something of an anachronism. The Spaniards seem to have arrived before the Philippines developed an identity as a Nation-state. Our History of the Philippines article includes the line "Neither the political state concept of the Muslim rulers nor the limited territorial concept of the sedentary rice farmers of Luzon, however, spread beyond the areas where they originated.". The comment is referenced to [url=http://countrystudies.us/philippines/3.htm this site]. Hope that helps. --Dweller (talk) 13:35, 21 November 2007 (UTC)

To expand on Dweller's answer, from the perspective of a rice farmer or his local chief on, say, Luzon, he did not live in the same country as a rice farmer in Mindanao. So the island group did not have a common local name. Even from the perspective of Chinese or Malay merchants who may have visited the Philippines, there was little to distinguish the Philippine islands from Borneo or other East Indian islands. So those languages did not have a name that applied to the island group as a whole. Marco polo (talk) 19:53, 21 November 2007 (UTC)

Potsdam Conference

Please forgive me for imposing upon your hospitality for a third time but I have one further question on an aspect of international relations in the mid twentieth century, this time on the period following on the defeat of Germany. It is this: why did Britain and the United States not make a stronger stand against Stalin at the Potsdam conference in 1945? Why was so much conceded? Thanks. Mustapha Fag (talk) 13:37, 21 November 2007 (UTC)

There are a number of reasons; I am sure Clio will be able to give a much better answer than I, but here goes one small attempt: one major factor is that the USSR was already in a strong military position in Eastern Europe and was not interested in backing out. It's hard to imagine the Allied forces forcing them out without another war, which nobody wanted or was willing to wage at that point. Additionally much of the tougher points had been set at the Yalta Conference which already gave Stalin a lot, as the US expected to need his help in the invasion of Japan and out of Roosevelt's concern for giving Russia what they "deserved" due to their major sacrifices in troops and civilians, and the desire to make them a participant in the new United Nations. Add to it that two of the negotiating powers were new to it (Truman had no diplomatic experience; the British had a change of leadership in the middle of the conference, I don't know about Attlee's abilities) against an experienced devil like Stalin, and you're asking for a lot for them to have been able to take a hard stand, even though I don't think anyone was deceived by Stalin's intentions. From Russia's point of view, they had a lot of incentive to push for as much as they could, wary of Western invaders (with good reason, frankly) and with full knowledge of the US and UK's secret atomic developments ahead of time (and as such well aware that the US and the UK did not consider the USSR to be a full partner, despite the essential role the USSR had played in the war). --24.147.86.187 (talk) 18:50, 21 November 2007 (UTC)

I think your answer leaves little to be improved upon, 24.147. I really only have one or two additional points to make in support.

Both Churchill and Truman, Mustpha, came to Potsdam with the intention of toughening up their stand over the western border of Poland, which the Yalta Conference agreed should be the Oder-Neisse Line. Stalin wanted this to be the Western Neisse, but the Western Allies tried to insist that the Eastern Neisse was meant, whch would have left a good bit of Silesia still part of Germany. The Americans were also keen to stop Polish expansion in Pomerania to the north, well to the east of the port of Stettin. But Stalin was obdurate, and obduracy prevailed.

I have to say that I think little is to be gained by apportioning blame. For Stalin possession was indeed nine points of the law, and there was little anyone could do to alter the strategic realities. I'm not really sure that Churchill's departure made that much difference, though Clement Attlee had not the same degree of experience. I do think, though, that Harry Truman was extraordinarily naive in many ways. He seemed to have no idea what was going on in Eastern Europe and made no attempt to find out. He was also prepared to accept rather bland assurances that all outstanding matters, all areas of disagreement, would be settled by a final peace conference that was never to come. Could Truman have held out for a more concrete agreement at the time, for more concessions from the Soviets? Yes, he probably could, for he was still in a reasonably strong bargaining position. The Americans had control of Thuringia and much of Saxony, areas which were to fall within the Soviet zone of control. Stalin got everything and gave little in return. Did America really need Soviet participation in the war in the Far East? On balance, probably not. In my view he best verdict on Potsdam was that passed by the diplomat George F. Kennan-"I cannot recall any political document the reading of which filled me with a greater sense of depression than the communiqué to which President Truman set his name at the conclusion of these confused and uneal discussions." Clio the Muse (talk) 01:24, 22 November 2007 (UTC)

If I recall, Truman encouraged the Soviets not to proceed too quickly in the Far East, whereas Roosevelt had thought they would need their help. I think it clear that by the time late 1945 came around, it was the Soviets who wanted to get their hands in the Far East to get a piece of that pie as well, hence their last-minute invasion of Manchuria (which was just as big news at the time in US papers as the bombing of Nagasaki). --24.147.86.187 (talk) 01:41, 22 November 2007 (UTC)

In Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam, Gar Alperovitz argues that Truman was waiting for the dropping of the atomic bomb. Truman's hope was that, with this powerful weapon having been demonstrated, he would have more leverage against Stalin. (Contrary to 24.147.86.187's reference to Stalin's "full knowledge" of atomic developments, Alperovitz believes that Truman was deliberately vague about the project in his communications to Stalin, preferring to wait until after the actual bombing.) Although Mustapha Fag's original question refers to the concessions that were made, Alperovitz emphasizes the scope of matters that were left unresolved at Potsdam -- because, in his view, the U.S. preferred to resolve them later, from a stronger bargaining position.

In fact, Alperovitz suggests that the desire to intimidate the USSR was a major factor in the decision to drop the bomb. That view, of course, explains why the U.S. didn't simply wait a week or two, to see whether the impending Russian declaration of war on Japan (scheduled for early August, 90 days after V-E Day), would induce a Japanese surrender. Some U.S. policymakers may have been so overwhelmed by the unprecedented power of the new weapon that they believed that they would easily get their way in any post-bombing negotiation. That belief would affect the American negotiating stance at Potsdam. JamesMLane t c 11:04, 22 November 2007 (UTC)

Of course, waiting until the atomic bombings to negotiate wouldn't have been workable. George Flerov had already informed Stalin in 1942 that no nuclear physics scientific papers was being published in the U.S., U.K., or Germany, concluding that those countries were researching nuclear weapons. The atomic spies gave the USSR information about the Manhattan Project, and the Soviets were developing their own weapons before the war's end. --Bowlhover (talk) 16:34, 25 November 2007 (UTC)

Truman was vague but that had nothing to do with what Stalin knew about the bomb. Stalin knew about the Allied bomb project through the extensive espionage (the Soviets called the Manhattan Project ENORMOZ) which was being taken in an analyzed by none other than Beria himself. As for the "the US dropped the bomb to influence the USSR" thesis, it's believed by most historians that while that might have been a side issue, it wasn't the main issue which led to the dropping of the bombs when they did. The US basically dropped them as soon as they could, and it was not at all clear to anyone at the time that they would necessarily end the war quickly (they were planning to drop a third one when the Japanese eventually surrendered). --24.147.86.187 (talk) 05:05, 26 November 2007 (UTC)

Denazification

After the second world war, and after the abolition of the Nazi regime, did anti-Jewish legislation such as the Nuremberg laws and the Civil Service act still apply, or were they immediately rescinded after the death of Hitler. Not that I can imagine many Jewish people wanted to return to Germany, I'm just wondering if the racial policy's implemented by the Nazi's still applied. Thanks --Hadseys (talk • contribs) 13:51, 21 November 2007 (UTC)

I'm pretty sure that when the various occupational governments took over that the previous Nazis laws, especially the racial ones, would have been immediately rescinded, though I confess to not know this for a fact or know much of the details of the hand over. --24.147.86.187 (talk) 18:23, 21 November 2007 (UTC)

In Austria the Military Administrations of the United Kingdom, France, the United States and the UdSSR arrested members of NSDAP and SS and put them to special prisons (i.e.Glasenbach)>>starting in April/Mai 1945. New laws were made by the Military Administrations and the Austrian bodies (Regional goverments, Federal goverment (Landesregierungen, Bundesregierung). The Laws you mentioned were put out of order in 1945 (starting in April/Mai 1945). It is to mention that a lot Austrian politician in 1945 had been prisoners in the Nazi concentrationscamps as well (i.e.Leopold Figl),came back from the exile (i.e. Johann Koplenig) or were members of the resistance (i.e. Adolf Schärf,Karl Gruber)so why should people like them stick on the Nazi Laws.-Phips (talk) 19:01, 21 November 2007 (UTC)

From our article End of World War II in Europe: "Debellation - On 5 July 1945 the four powers signed [a four-power document, the Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany] in Berlin and the de facto became the de jure. In July/August 1945, the Allied leaders planned the new postwar German government, resettled war territory boundaries, ordered German demilitarization, denazification, and settlements of war reparations at the Potsdam Conference." The Declaration contains, in Article 6 (b), the clause "The German authorities and people will in like manner provide for and release ... all other persons who may be confined, interned or otherwise under restraint for political reasons or as a result of any Nazi action, law or regulation which discriminates on the ground of race, colour, creed or political belief."[1] From a purely legalistic point of view, at least until then the laws of the Third Reich were nominally in force.  --Lambiam 19:25, 21 November 2007 (UTC)

I think there may be some confusion here over the date of the Berlin meeting, which I understood to have been on 5 June. I'm assuming, perhaps wrongly, that business concluded on the same day? Anyway, the full title of the document signed by Eisenhower, Montgomery, de Lattre de Tassigny, Zhukov and others was the Declaration of Defeat and Assumption of Authority. The precise form of the Allied Control Council that was to rule Germany was also agreed at this time. Forgive me if I appear to be splitting hairs, but the emphasis in the Wikipedia aricle is quite wrong. The Allies did not meet at Potsdam 'to plan the the new post war German government' but the post-war government of Germany, two quite different things. Anyway, the German state ceased to exist by the Berlin declaration; so German law no longer applied. Clio the Muse (talk) 00:34, 22 November 2007 (UTC)

German author - Wickenstein?

I was told to look into works by wickenstein...except i can't find it anywhere. i believe he writes about the words and their significance and uses. i think i may be mispelling it. can someone help me find his work? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 66.127.8.90 (talk) 18:51, 21 November 2007 (UTC)

Almost certainly they meant Ludwig Wittgenstein, a noted philosopher of language, among other things. He's Austrian, incidentally. --24.147.86.187 (talk) 18:56, 21 November 2007 (UTC)

thank you!

At least some of his works were written in German, so in that sense he's a "German author". -- JackofOz (talk) 21:10, 21 November 2007 (UTC)

If the aspect of his work you are more interested in is "words and their meaning" you might be interested in reading first his Philosophical Investigations. If your interest lies more in aspects of logic in relation to language than his Tractatus might be for you (not without a companion book though). I would specially recommend to the philosophically minded his short On Certitude (not for the anxious person) and the posthumous editions of his personal notebook (not the blue and brown book but I think it was published under the title Culture and value) is a great read too. Any biography of him reads like a novel. Enjoy your read! Keria (talk) 21:35, 21 November 2007 (UTC)

Since Karl Popper is mentioned in the question below I thought I might mention the book Wittgenstein's Poker: The Story of a Ten-Minute Argument Between Two Great Philosophers which has a lot of background information on Wittgenstein and is a very enjoyable read too! Lord Foppington (talk) 23:48, 21 November 2007 (UTC)

Marxism

I thought the responses to the earlier question on Marxism and tyranny very interesting indeed (The God that failed-19 November). I now have a question of my own arising from this. Is there a fundamental intellectual weakness in Marxism as a body of thought that somehow leads to a process of degeneration? Was the worm already in the bud? I hope my question is not too vague. Stockmann (talk) 19:22, 21 November 2007 (UTC)

On a slight tangent I've always thought Communism could be summed up in six words - 'Great in theory, lousy in practice' Exxolon (talk) 21:23, 21 November 2007 (UTC)

I would reccommend Karl Popper to anyone interested in the intellectual hole at the centre of Marxist theory. The Poverty of Historicism is as good a place to start as any, but The Open Society and its Enemies is better. DuncanHill (talk) 21:36, 21 November 2007 (UTC)

I've just been struck by the thought that the historian whose writings I enjoy most is A. L. Rowse, a lifelong Marxist, and the philosopher whose writings I most enjoy is Karl Popper. Odd that. DuncanHill (talk) 22:02, 21 November 2007 (UTC)

There's a big difference between Marxism as a body of thought and Marxism as a philosophy of the state. There are plenty of smart Marxists (though I find most Marxists to be a bit narrow, not all are), but there have been pretty much zero successful/non-totalitarian Marxist states. If I were to do a rather off-the-cuff sort of assessment, I'd say that Marxism (and Marx himself) does best when it is providing analysis and critique of the capitalist/imperialist state, but is absolutely miserable if not lousy when suggesting what ought to be done about it. It's a great way for looking at how states work (one of many ways, to be sure—don't believe anybody when they tell you there's only one way to look at things that is correct), but it's a really, really lousy formula for how to run a state. --24.147.86.187 (talk) 23:01, 21 November 2007 (UTC)

That's an excellent point 24.147.86.187 (or may I call you 24?). I think one could say that Rowse found Marxism a useful tool in analysing historical power relationships, while Popper concentrated on how Marxist policies impacted on personal freedoms. DuncanHill (talk) 23:05, 21 November 2007 (UTC)

(after edit conflict) Is the (rather extreme) version of historicism that Popper sets up and then attacks really a hallmark of Marxism and Marx's theory of history? If I remember correctly (it has been a long time), he never defines what philosophy he sees as being Marxism, but the (mostly side-ways) attacks on Marxism appear directed at Marxism-Leninism, which has more to do with Stalin than with Marx. I also don't see how Plato's political ideas apply to Marxism; to me they appear rather antithetical to it. I can see how they apply to ideologies with a fascist tinge, such as corporatism.  --Lambiam 23:07, 21 November 2007 (UTC)

Let's reduce this question, Stockmann, to the most basic terms. What is Marxism? Oh, I know what the standard answer is: it's a synthesis of German idealism, French politics and English economics. But at an even more basic level Marxism is no more than the intellectual process behind this supposed synthesis. Marxism, in other words, is Pallas Athena emerging fully armed from the head of Karl Marx in the shape of a nineteenth century Zeus. He conceived and he encompased in one mortal life a doctrine which supposedly explains the whole procees of human history and evolution. In this shape it is as absolute as the most doctrinare of Medieval scholasticism, because it envisiges and embraces the end of history itself. This, in all of its appealing simplicity, is its strength; and this, in all of its ambition and arrogance, is its weakness. For the process of degeneration, or, better still, the process of ossification, begins with the death in 1883 of the prophet himself. You see, while Karl Marx stopped, history did not. Clearly, with the master no longer present, the doctrine required interpretation and adjustment. The canon was safe for a time with Friedrich Engels in the role of Aaron. But with Engels's departure in 1895 there is no sure path left, no way of adjusting Marx to the continuing evolutions of history.

By the turn of the nineteeth century the German Social Democrats, by far the strongest Marxist party in the world, had turned the doctrine into sacred text rather than living practice, something to be visited on high days and holy days, and largely disregarded thereafter. It was Eduard Bernstein who recognised that Marxism, as it stood, was becoming historically obsolete, and was bold enough to suggest that there was a better, more modern way of dealing with the problems the party faced. He was attacked for his challenge to accepted orthodoxy by Karl Kautsky, the guardian of the sacred flame, though, for all his efforts, the theory became steadily more instrumental and less relevant. There was no one left to say, with authority, what Marxism was, and what it was not-at least not until Lenin took it in an entirely different direction from the Social Democrats-and from Karl Marx.

With Lenin Marxism moves in steadily decreasing circles; no longer the doctrine based historical inevitability and the mass party, but a doctrine of political action embraced by a self-selecting and conspiratorial elite. Lenin wins in Russia by a process that in no way corresponds to Marx's historical model; but political victory brings intellectual authority. Alternative views, like that of Rosa Luxembourg or Julius Martov are disregarded, because Marxism has now become predicated on political success; it becomes, in turns, what Lenin, or Trotsky, or Bukharin or Stalin say it is, with authority always and everywhere derived from power, and power alone. In the end it becomes no more than an intellectual excuse, cynically exploited to justify the power and practice of the Soviet state. And so it continues, fragmenting and dividing, finding homes further and further from its origins, degenerating to ever more oppressive and ever more murderous forms. It is one of history's greatest frauds, a supreme exercise in bad thinking and bad faith; bad as theory, worse as practice. Clio the Muse (talk) 00:13, 22 November 2007 (UTC)

Clio is right that it all depends on what is meant by "Marxism". If by "Marxism" one means Marx's theory of capitalism as a "mode of production", or way of organizing economic life, and the body of theory that builds on his work in this area, then I question whether a body of theory exists with better explanatory power for the workings of capitalism. If by "Marxism" one means the quasi-religious belief in Marx's grotesque theory of history and the practice of totalitarian politics masquerading as the "dictatorship of the proletariat" that Marx prescribed, then I agree with Clio that it is a fraudulent and oppressive ideology. Marco polo (talk) 01:29, 22 November 2007 (UTC)

Well, you have to agree that some aspects of Marxist theory are not totally worthless; indeed, much of historical and economic work has adopted them (often without crediting them)—the idea of the superstructure and a core, things like commodity fetishism and the labor theory of value, the idea that values shape around the modes and forces of production, etc. Whether one individually finds such an approach useful or not (in my work, I don't), those theoretical questions and elements aren't fraudulent, and much of the Marxian approach to things has been assimilated into our modern approach to big questions about society, labor relations, etc. Again, I would draw the distinction between Marxism as a tool for analysis and a Marxism as an ideology—the latter is the fraud, the latter is piss-poor, the latter is the producer of bores at best (there is nothing more dull than a committed Marxist) and maniacs at worst. But the former is something quite different, so let's not tar all of Marx with the same brush as all of his followers, just as we would not with Christ. --24.147.86.187 (talk) 01:38, 22 November 2007 (UTC)

Marxism as a 'body of thought' would encompass several things: Marxian economics, Marxist political theory and marxist historiography - here generally with a lowercase 'm'.

Of the three, the first, like all economic theory, is extremely sensitive to assumptions. The assumptions made by Marx when he was writing in the high noon of Victorian capitalism were that monopolies would continue to increase, and that value would be added essentially through the production of real goods. These assumptions failed: monopolies never spread naturally beyond those industries which are natural monopolies and a vastly increasing proportion of national income came from the production of services.

The second, Marxist political theory, was unfortunately dependent upon Marxian economics; in the absence of the clear class-based confrontations that Marxian economics predicted, Marxist political theory began to make no sense whatsoever. Hence the wild attempts to fit facts to theory: the creations of categories of "temporary allies" of the proletariat in the bourgeoisie, the replacement of the changing of relative prices with outright expropriation as a method of transferring funds from agriculture to industrialisation, and, as Clio points out, the prioritisation of the 'party' and radical intellectuals, when Marx himself would have been hard put to make a theoretical distinction between the party and the proletariat. So that was doomed to failure.

The third, marxist historiography, is alive and well. As 86.187 says above, much of our social analysis is carried out using tools of class-based analysis. Interestingly, neoclassical economics, which one would think is the traditional enemy of Marxism, would agree completely with that tradition's approach to rational analysis of broad movements using technical progress as the initial motive factor.

To sum up, the only problem with Marxism is that Marx died. Like any large, diverse body of work being used for political purposes, those with an interest in a particular interpretation would focus on that; and because of the diversity of the man's entire body of work, any particular hypothesis would find support somewhere, through some form of esoteric textual analysis. If this reminds you of certain religions, you would not be the first to make that comparison. The intellectual flaw in Marxism is that there was a sacred text to start off with; the flaws in its application are flaws that would emerge in any such project, regardless of the context of the text. Relata refero (talk) 09:17, 22 November 2007 (UTC)

Muhammad quote

I've been looking for a ref for this statement and can't seem to find it:

Muhammad is reliably quoted in a hadith as saying that “water, greenery, and a beautiful face” were three universally good things.

Anybody got one? I'm pretty sure it's true, as I've found sources that allude to this, but I haven't found any that quote it exactly and attribute it to Muhammad. Wrad (talk) 22:00, 21 November 2007 (UTC)

I see the statement appears in Green, and a citation for it has been requested there. A hadith is an oral tradition. philiptaaffe.info quotes it in this form: " Three things of this world are acceptable: water, greenery, and a beautiful face. — Hadith (attributed to the Prophet Muhammad)". Xn4 00:21, 22 November 2007 (UTC)

Yeah, the green article is what I'm working on. Thanks. Wrad (talk) 01:39, 22 November 2007 (UTC)

There are loads of sayings "attributed" to Jesus and the Buddha which turn out to have no basis in fact. People are very fond of attributing something to a respected religious leader to give it some authority. I've no doubt the same thing happens with Muhammed.--Shantavira|^{feed me} 08:43, 22 November 2007 (UTC)

Actually, mainstream Christianity has a "closed canon", so if anything claimed to be said by Jesus isn't included in the Bible, then it isn't considered to be particularly important by Christian theologians, and certainly isn't accepted as authoritative for faith and morality.

By contrast, a significant part of traditional Islamic scholarship has been assembling and evaluating huge collections of thousands upon thousands of purported sayings of Muhammad, or hadith, some of which are very important in establishing Muslim religious practice and legal precedents, others of which are discredited and considered useless according to the consensus of Muslim religious-legal scholars, and many of which are of disputed authenticity. Any purported hadith which isn't found in the Six major Hadith collections would be considered irrelevant according to the consensus of traditional Sunni scholarship... AnonMoos (talk) 18:28, 22 November 2007 (UTC)

Just how hard the Sitar?

Please give every detail on the difficulty, I am very interested in Sitars but the difficulty scares me. MalwareSmarts (talk) 23:26, 21 November 2007 (UTC)

Not too much detail as far as I know, but it would depend on your musical background. If you can play a guitar, you will have an advantage already. It is also an advantage if you know soemthing about Indian music theory, as the production of music in the Indian tradition is somewhat different to our Western traditions. Steewi (talk) 01:18, 22 November 2007 (UTC)

The hard part is listening to it. ;-) —Kevin Myers 16:53, 22 November 2007 (UTC)