Wikipedia:Reference desk/Archives/Humanities/2014 February 9

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February 9

Woodrow Wilson

Having come to familiarize myself with American conservatism, I'm wondering why Woodrow Wilson seems to be a target of it. I already have my reasons for disliking him, but what is it that makes him particularly noxious to conservatives? — Melab±1 ☎ 05:19, 9 February 2014 (UTC)

Well, look, first of all, the things that make him unlikable to the contemporary center-left (like the Klan stuff) are not particularly approved by the contemporary center-right, either. So pretty much today's whole mainstream spectrum is against him on those things. But the center-right also doesn't like him as a symbol of so-called "progressivism". He's one of those guys who just can't win. --Trovatore (talk) 05:26, 9 February 2014 (UTC)

Didn't some conservatives also dislike him due to his support for interventionism in foreign affairs, including in Europe? After all, some/many conservatives in the U.S. between c.1919 and c.1941 were not particularly fond of the League of Nations (into which Wilson unsuccessfully tried to have the U.S. enter). Futurist110 (talk) 08:48, 9 February 2014 (UTC)

War & taxes.  Believe it or not, before Wilson there was no  federal income tax; he was the original "tax & spend" liberal. He gained a 2nd term by campaigning as the president who "kept us out of war"; but once re-elected, he declared war, getting us into a foreign war that many thought was none of our business. ~:71.20.250.51 (talk) 15:32, 9 February 2014 (UTC)

Oddly enough, the Republican Teddy Roosevelt, who is often admired by the right, was likewise a progressive, and likewise a hawk about WWI, going so far as to call Wilson "yellow" for holding us back from that conflict. ←Baseball Bugs ^{What's up, Doc?} carrots→ 16:07, 9 February 2014 (UTC)

• Wilson introduced the draft, the income tax, the Federal Reserve, and racial segregation in the military civil service, among other things. He campaigned for re-election on the slogan "He Kept us out of War" then immediately began machinations to get the US into the war, leading to 117,000 dead, including two of my uncles, and one who came back mute from shell shock. In hindsight his meddling in the war led to an indecisive conclusion leading to WWII, as well as artificial states like Czechoslovakia, and worse, the Yugoslavian abomination which lead to dictatorship and then civil war and racial cleansing. Glenn Beck did various programs on Wilson (and TR) while at Fox, here are some programs and clips at youtube. μηδείς (talk) 19:51, 9 February 2014 (UTC)

• He introduced racial segregation in the military? I get the impression from our United States Colored Troops article that racial segregation in Army units was in place fifty years earlier. Nyttend (talk) 01:56, 10 February 2014 (UTC)

Sorry, it was the federal workforce, not the military itself. links μηδείς (talk) 03:49, 10 February 2014 (UTC)

Another view of the war is that Wilson prevented "an indecisive conclusion" which would have been healthier; without the Americans, it is believed, the parties would have soon said "Can we just stop this and try to forget it ever happened?" — As for the draft, Lincoln introduced it too, so it must be good. —Tamfang (talk) 01:06, 12 February 2014 (UTC)

That's just using indecisive in a different sense--militarily indecisive versus sociologically indecisive. I believe there was an income tax under Lincoln as well. It was temporary. Wilson argued in the supreme court that the draft was not involuntary servitude, and quote the Huns as an example of a state that had the draft. Might as well argue beheading Guantamo prisoners would not be cruel and unusual, given the fact the Taliban does it. μηδείς (talk) 21:56, 13 February 2014 (UTC)

"Final Solution"

Hi, at the moment I'm writing a paper which puts forward the view that the "final solution" evolved into a policy of genocide after numerous attempts to solve the "Jewish problem" during the Nazi time in government had failed. Instead, I will be arguing that the concept of a "final solution" changed since the Nazi party came to power - first, 1933-35, it was the attempt to kerb Jewish influence in Germany; then in 1935-1939 it was the attempt through laws, decrees, violence, arrests etc. which would encourage Jews to realise that they were no longer welcome in Germany and then encourage them to emigrate; from 1939-41, the concept was to resettle the Jews either in a sparsely populated area of Europe or Madagascar; and then from 1942-45 the policy was one of exterminating the Jewish people. Are there any references that support this view that the final solution didn't begin as a plan of extermination, just that after attempting other solutions, it was the only option that remained feasible after Operation Barbarossa? Thanks in advance --~~ — Preceding unsigned comment added by Mrandrewnohome (talk • contribs) 12:32, 9 February 2014 (UTC)

For reference, there might be a strong case for stating that the Holocaust started in (likely late) 1941, as opposed to 1942. According to this part of this article -- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Holocaust#Jewish -- it appears that the Nazis killed more than one million Jews in 1941 alone. Futurist110 (talk) 22:15, 9 February 2014 (UTC)

Our article at Final Solution discusses this position, as does our article for Functionalism versus intentionalism. The references sections (and further reading sections) have some sources that will likely be useful to you. I haven't read him, but Christopher Browning's work appears relevant. I'm sure I don't need to tell you that it can be very difficult to get neutral sources about a topic as abhorrent as this. Matt Deres (talk) 13:33, 9 February 2014 (UTC)

• The thing that I find difficult with the Holocaust is that the history of it tends to be dominated by Jewish historians who, understandably, may occasionally lack objectivity in their work. I'm Jewish and I find it abhorrent, but fascinating - it was certainly a unique historic event --Andrew 13:40, 9 February 2014 (UTC)

• Unfortunately, it was not unique. In the last century we had the Armenian Genocide, the Cambodian Genocide, the Rwandan Genocide, and, by mass starvation, in the Soviet Union under Stalin, China under Mao (The Great Leap Forward), and North Korea. Some of that starvation seems to have been intentional, while others might have been viewed by their leaders as a nice side effect of their policies, as it allowed them to get rid of their enemies and "undesirables". Serbia under Slobodan Milošević also seemed to be headed towards genocide against their neighbors, until stopped by NATO. There were numerous smaller cases of genocide, as well. StuRat (talk) 16:56, 9 February 2014 (UTC)

Andrew might have meant that it was unique in the sense that one of the goals of the Holocaust was the killing of all or almost all of the Jews that the Nazis got their hands on. In such a case, Andrew's point here might actually have some merit. However, I would still like to see and check if there were any other genocides which also fit this category (the attempted extermination of an entire or almost an entire ethnic group/race). Futurist110 (talk) 22:18, 9 February 2014 (UTC)

I should think that the goal in many of the cases I mentioned was the extermination of an ethnic group. Of course, each had varying degrees of success. StuRat (talk) 02:14, 10 February 2014 (UTC)

You allude to it with "starvation", but the Holodomor, from 2-12 million dead, belongs in your list, Stu. μηδείς (talk) 19:22, 9 February 2014 (UTC)

Was that one also arranged by Stalin ? StuRat (talk) 02:14, 10 February 2014 (UTC)

Questionable if we should ascribe that much power, planning, and personal culpability to Joseph, even though he clearly is amongst the guilty. The soviet union vacillated between forced extraction and indulgence in private production in agriculture until the 1940s. Vacillation, of course, offered Stalin and low ranked party members the perfect opportunities to denounce and eliminate other party members on the wrong side of the most recent line. More recently before the 1932-1933 Soviet Famine, urban workers had demanded forced extractions due to plummeting standards of living (Ural-Siberian_method), this was tail-ended by the party, and then criticised by Stalin (Dizzy with Success, "Collective farms must not be established by force. That would be foolish and reactionary.") 1932 in the Ukraine in particular saw a return to Ural-Siberian methods, but, at the same time, when and as the Central Committee was informed of famine, (obviously insufficient) famine relief ensued. Two of the most suasive arguments regarding the 1932-1933 famine are that attacks occurred on rural proletarians and peasants economically while labour demand increased, and secondly, that the remnants of Ukrainian nationalism were targeted consistently throughout the 1930s, including within the Party apparatus in particular. The beneficiaries of both these processes were far more than Stalin personally, and both party members and other Soviet elites gained by politically stabilising the Ukraine as a region of agricultural extraction, and by gaining cheap disciplinable labour. We should view the internal passports associated with this famine as connected with disciplining new labour in the cities. Andrle is pretty good on the complete ineffectiveness of internal passports in stopping labour mobility to new factories: but, we also know despite the pull factor, that people resent being completely economically uprooted in order to provide a propertyless proletariat. (Comparative studies of "primary accumulation" in industrialisation are both useful and disgusting here.) We shouldn't view soviet policy as rational: GuLag was an economic calamity—there are cultural factors at play as well. I'll let someone more familiar with the particularly Ukrainian features of the 1932-1933 famine discuss the attack on the peoples of the Ukraine as an attack on the possibility of independent Ukrainian politics in the Soviet Union. Fifelfoo (talk) 02:59, 10 February 2014 (UTC)

Just read Mark B. Tauger "The 1932 Harvest and the Famine of 1933" Slavic Review, Vol. 50, No. 1 (Spring, 1991), pp. 70-89 which covers a lot of the ground. Importantly Tauger picks out that while the dearth was probably a result of agricultural failures, the extent of the famine was human controllable, and that the control systems failed in ways that were acceptable to the elite. I'm not sure if we ought to consider these mass preventable starvations as genocide: I'm certain we ought to consider them as criminal. Fifelfoo (talk) 03:08, 10 February 2014 (UTC)

Yes, Stu, Stalin was responsible. IT was an intentional policy to break the independent landholders. The Ukraine had been a stronghold of the White Army during the civil war. μηδείς (talk) 18:26, 10 February 2014 (UTC)

• Perhaps unique was the wrong choice of word, but the scale of it, the fact that it was largely ignored by the world, and the repercussions that it continues to have today, with the creation of Israel and the controversy surrounding that, certainly make it one of the more interesting events in history. But no it is very unfortunate that ethnic cleansing is still happening in the world --Andrew 19:01, 9 February 2014 (UTC)

There was no Final Solution until 1942. Before 1942 it was the Jewish question (Judenfrage). The Final Solution was kept a secret from the non Waffen-SS part of the Wehrmacht and the German civilians.

The first law to dismiss Jews from the civil service was passed in 1933, not 1935. Jews were forced to emigrate [1] in 1938, not 1939.
Sleigh (talk) 14:59, 9 February 2014 (UTC)

• The point that I'm trying to make is that there were numerous attempts at a final solution prior to the final solution as it is understood today, the extermination of Jewish people. Any my summary of 1933-35 could have been phrased better as the removal of Jews from positions of prominence and influence in public life. But I agree with you that the official date for the "final, final solution" was 1942. Thanks for your information --Andrew 18:58, 9 February 2014 (UTC)

This is arguable, and an argument you should consider. I suggest for the functionalist perspective that you read Police Battalion and Einsatzgruppen studies: The Commissar order was taken as an open right to implement a final solution for slavs and Jews in the Soviet Union. And of course sections of the state bureaucracy planned to starve all slavs to death West of the stop lines over winter 1941. So there were clear movements by ordinary Germans and sections of government towards a final solution, even prior to the Wannsee Conference's (mentioned rightly below) considerations of the efficacy and throughput of starving Soviet POWs to death in concentration camps, or of the inefficiencies in causing mass civilian death of the anti-partisan / pogrom system. If nothing else, the Police Battalion and Einsatzgruppen studies present an excellent counterpoint to the long outdated "brainwashed boys" school of thought of genocide participants. Fifelfoo (talk) 22:20, 9 February 2014 (UTC)

I don't follow. What did the Commissar Order, which was about the treatment of captured enforcers of ideological purity in the military, have to do with a final solution for Slavs and Jews in the Soviet Union, presumably largely civilian and of no uniform political view? I mean, you could still be right; just because it doesn't make sense doesn't mean it wasn't taken that way, but I'd like to hear a bit more explanation. --Trovatore (talk) 22:28, 9 February 2014 (UTC)

To quote our article, "all those prisoners who could be identified as "thoroughly bolshevized or as active representatives of the Bolshevist ideology" should also be killed." The concrete effects of this order were to legalise arbitrary executions of civilians and captured enemy combatants. It was a blanket that stretched to cover any number. It was also indicative of the general military and civilian occupation policies which applied in the East, which was arbitrary execution conducted by low level apparatus on their own recognisance and generally legalised. We know the extent of this legality as the Wehrmacht readily transferred operational units for the support of Police or Einsatzgruppen operations. Fifelfoo (talk) 00:16, 10 February 2014 (UTC)

Hmm, so you're saying that low-ranking occupiers decided on their own initiative that Slavs and Jews generally were "thoroughly bolshevized"? Or was there some wink-wink-nudge-nudge from higher up encouraging them to make this inference? --Trovatore (talk) 00:32, 10 February 2014 (UTC)

My reading is "Yes." That the entire German state apparatus and individuals constituting the occupying power in the East were producing small local final solutions. So yes, low-ranking occupiers were deciding that local slavs and Jews were thoroughly bolshevised or otherwise totally undesirable; and, yes, higher ups were involved in encouraging them and suggesting to them. I follow a relatively strong functionalist line when it comes to explaining preventable mass human deaths, so my reading will be biased towards viewing bureaucracies and their members as responsive, generalist and haphazard rather than pro-active, specific and planned. We have an article on some of the historiography at Bottom-Up_Approach_of_the_Holocaust, which has an interesting discussion of a particular primary source on the efficacy and desirability of planned mass starvation. Other people reading the same material may wish to suggest that some strong intention manufactured this situation. I do not believe such a reading is tenable; and, given the wide scope of action available to occupying forces in the East we ought to be considering the considerable freedom of action as an indicator of widespread and fundamental support for extermination in specific, and increasingly for extermination in general. Again, I'd really recommend following up any interest in the mass execution and death by starvation and overwork of central Europeans under German control by looking into the German occupation of Soviet controlled territory in 1941. 1941 changed a lot of things. Fifelfoo (talk) 02:39, 10 February 2014 (UTC)

I recommend that you read our article on the Wannsee Conference in January 1942, which is sometimes seen as the starting point of the institutionalised genocide, but as our article discusses in the Interpretation section (near the bottom of the page), this was a process that was already well under way. Alansplodge (talk) 16:34, 9 February 2014 (UTC)

Just one observation, Andrew: If you try to argue that the wholesale extermination of millions of people was "the only option that remained feasible", expect a lot of negative reaction (to put it mildly). If that wasn't what you really meant, I hope your choice of words in your paper is better than that example. -- Jack of Oz ^{[pleasantries]} 21:14, 9 February 2014 (UTC)

Thanks Jack, I'll make sure that I word it so that that option is purely from the Nazi point of view, otherwise I realise it could be insensitive. Thanks for pointing that out --Andrew 22:03, 9 February 2014 (UTC)

The best book that you can read on the subject is The Third Reich: A New History by Michael Burleigh, which argues inter alia that the Holocaust arose out of the T4 extermination programme (this is certainly where Franz Stangl, later commandant of Treblinka, learned his craft). If you wish to widen your reading, Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin would be a good second choice.

Another issue you may wish to approach is the identification of Eastern European Jewry with Bolshevism/ Communism (including Marx, Lenin, and Trotsky). There was an article in the London Review of Books in either 1984 or 1985 which made the point that 3/4 of the early Mensheviks and Bolsheviks had been Jewish, a grossly disproportionate figure, and one which the article argued was a reaction against Tsarist persecution in the 19h. century. Although it has been edited out of the Wikipedia article, Ed Miliband's grandfather, Samuel, was a Polish Jew who put out the red flag during the Polish–Soviet War, and thereafter thought it prudent to withdraw himself to Belgium. Martin Gilbert's book, Churchill and the Jews includes a photograph of a newspaper article written by Churchill before the war headed (from memory) Communism or Zionism: the choice for the Jews. There are also reports - I think cited either in Lukas' Forgotten Holocaust or Davis' Rising '44. The Battle for Warsaw - of Jews putting out red flags and supporting the Soviet troops invading Poland in 1939

A word of warning: arguing the identification of Jewry and Socialism is likely to lead to accusations of anti-semitism. You should probably read the cautionary tale of the great Norman Davies before getting too carried away. 86.183.79.240 (talk) 07:54, 13 February 2014 (UTC)

Travel times in 1870's New England

I have been watching The Age of Innocence, the Martin Scorcese film starring Daniel Day-lewis. During the film, Archer takes several trips from New York City to The Hamptons, Newport, RI and Washington DC; and while in Newport he seemingly takes a day trip to Boston, MA. According to Google Maps, the modern distances by road are ~90 miles, ~180 miles, ~230 miles and ~70 miles respectively, all easily achievable in a few hours by car. However, back in the 1870's how would an upper-class New Yorker have made these journeys and about how long would each have taken? Was it a realistic proposition to take a trip to Washington DC "for a few days", or a day trip from Newport to Boston and make it there and back in daylight? Astronaut (talk) 17:28, 9 February 2014 (UTC)

I have seen detailed travel time maps for the US east coast in decade intervals in the 1800's, but am going crazy trying to find them. Maybe there's a key word I should be looking for. In any case, the obvious answer of how a Bostoner would travel to DC would be by rail in a Pullman car. μηδείς (talk) 19:55, 9 February 2014 (UTC)

Misread the header and thought you were asking about time travel :-) Since railroads were all over the place in the area by this time, and since the number of rail passengers was quite high, an upper-class traveller shouldn't have had any problems finding a train at convenient times; a poorer person might have to take the local and stop at every town, but the rich guy would be able to afford the express train and go straight from NYC to his destination. Nyttend (talk) 21:46, 9 February 2014 (UTC)

I very much doubt that express trains were in existence in the 1870's Nowadays the local from Philly/NYC to Boston takes 6-7 hours, while the express takes 4.5 to 5.5 hours. The difference really would have been accommodations, rather than speed. μηδείς (talk) 21:55, 9 February 2014 (UTC)

So in the 1870s, every train would have been stopping at every spot? An express train need not be "express" in the sense of "getting there faster"; it simply doesn't stop everywhere. Do the modern trains stop at every village, just going a half-dozen miles between stops? This was the case in my native Ohio during the high years of rail transport; I'd expect the same to be true in New England, stopping at every town center and perhaps at villages elsewhere along the way. Nyttend (talk) 22:30, 9 February 2014 (UTC)

The existence of "express" trains really depends on both swift locomotives and three-rail tracks so that the express can pass the local, wherever, as they encounter each other. I doubt (OR) either condition was common in the 1870's. μηδείς (talk) 23:21, 9 February 2014 (UTC)

Although I'm less familiar with the details of historic US railway practice, I can confidently assert that in the UK and France, at least, Fast or Express trains using locomotives specially designed for the purpose were running by the 1840's.

Before continuous 3- and 4-track lines were available, passing loops were built at stations and other convenient locations enabling slower trains to pull off the main line to permit faster ones to overtake. This might be controlled either by signals or, less satisfactorily, by reference to the working timetables, and could sometimes go wrong (hence the famous demise of Casey Jones, though that was slightly after the OPs period of interest). {The poster formerly known as 87.81.230.195} 5.66.222.61 (talk) 03:31, 10 February 2014 (UTC)

I'll gladly accept that, although express service today is really not worth paying for in the US. The NE Corridor is the most heavily travelled, and "express" is pretty much a bad joke. (Express subways in NYC, however, really are express.) Passing loops will work fine if you hold the locals. μηδείς (talk) 03:37, 10 February 2014 (UTC)

OP here. I'm not so sure trains of the 1870's could travel as fast as modern trains (stopping or express). I remember in Back to the Future Part III the train driver saying he once got his train up to 50 mph and expressing surprise that anyone would want to go faster. And how about local travel once Archer had arrived in the main city? Was there a network of local tracks with trains serving destinations within the same city, or would he get a carriage that was waiting at the station like I would get a taxi today? Astronaut (talk) 06:59, 10 February 2014 (UTC)

Certainly the absolute speed of trains in the 1870's was less than today, but the terms 'express', 'fast', stopping' 'local', goods', 'freight' etc (in their speed-related senses) were relative to each other and still meaningful in context.

Consider, for example, the famous British Express Passenger locomotives from exactly this period, the "Stirling Singles" (doubtless there were comparable US examples, although speed may be restricted more by the quality of track than a loco's inherent capabilities). An average express train speed (including station stops, etc) of 50mph and top speed of 85mph may not seem impressive today, but was cutting edge then. {The poster formerly known as 87.81.230.195} 212.95.237.92 (talk) 14:58, 10 February 2014 (UTC)

By the 1870s major cities had suburban lines and stations. There were, as pointed out in the previous post, express trains. Hansom cabs waited at stations and there were also horse-drawn omnibuses. I'm sure the actual timetables are online somewhere if you can find a train enthusiast website. Itsmejudith (talk) 15:46, 10 February 2014 (UTC)

The official speed record of a steam train is 125 mph but that wasn't until the 20th century. Speeds above 50 mph were possible by the 1870s. Itsmejudith (talk) 15:56, 10 February 2014 (UTC)

According to the History of the Newport Line, the scheduled time for a train between Newport and Boston in 1866 (and presumably still in the 1870s) was two and a quarter hours, including two stops. A day trip from Newport to Boston seems quite a realistic proposition. John M Baker (talk) 15:46, 10 February 2014 (UTC)

The average travel time nowadays is only 2:10 - 2:45. μηδείς (talk) 21:44, 10 February 2014 (UTC)

Yes, but that involves an inefficient detour to Warwick, Rhode Island, and transfer to a bus. The rail route in the 1870s would have been more direct, via Fall River. (Trains no longer operate from Boston to Fall River.) So if the journey took the same amount of time in the 1870s even on a more direct route, the train in the 1870s had to have been moving more slowly. Marco polo (talk) 21:49, 10 February 2014 (UTC)

That was a sarcastic "only". I find that if I use a </sarcasm> tag it doesn't work. μηδείς (talk) 03:36, 11 February 2014 (UTC)

According to this timetable from the 1880s, there were express trains in operation at that time, and a train from Boston, MA, to Utica, NY, about the same distance as New York to Washington, took about 10 hours. However, the terrain between Boston and Utica is much more rugged than between New York and Washington, so I would expect the latter trip to be faster, probably more like 7-8 hours. An affluent person traveling from New York to a destination like Newport, Rhode Island, in the 1870s would, in my opinion, probably not travel by train. A rail journey from New York to Newport would have required first traveling by train on the New Haven Railroad to New London, Connecticut. Based on the linked timetable a journey this distance would take at least 5 hours. Then the traveler would need to board a ferry across the Thames River, which was not bridged until 1889, and board a second train at Groton to continue on to Providence, Rhode Island, probably another 2.5 hours away, on the Stonington Line. In Providence, the traveler would have had to change again. Before 1875, he or she would have boarded the Fall River, Warren and Providence Railroad for a journey, probably lasting an hour or so, to Somerset, Massachusetts, and transferred to a second ferry, this time across the Taunton River, to Fall River. In Fall River, the traveler would have transferred to the Old Colony Railroad for another journey lasting an hour or so to Newport, Rhode Island. After 1875, when the Slade's Ferry Bridge was built, it would have been possible to travel directly from Providence to Newport in about 2 hours. The total travel time from New York to Newport thus would have been more than 10 hours, not including layovers. Instead of undertaking this tedious journey, an affluent traveler from New York to Newport would almost certainly have traveled in comfort by steamship with the Boston, Newport, and New York Steamboat Company, the successor to the Fall River Line. The affluent traveler would book a cabin for what I think was usually an overnight journey. Marco polo (talk) 21:45, 10 February 2014 (UTC)

Resolved

Thank you all. It seems days out by train - from Newport to Boston and presumably New York City to The Hamptons - were quite possible. The longer one-way trips by train from New York City to Newport or Washington DC were also possible, but might have taken a whole day to complete the journey. And a special thanks to Marco Polo for directing me to railroads.unl.edu, a very interesting site where I also learned about the story of Kate Brown. Astronaut (talk) 20:25, 11 February 2014 (UTC)