Wikipedia:Reference desk/Archives/Miscellaneous/2017 June 5
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June 5
editRasputitsa
editWhen planning the invasion of Russia, how come the Germans did not consider the effects of the autumn rains? Or did they expect to reach Moscow before then? 2601:646:8E01:7E0B:31F8:F4C1:54AA:454B (talk) 04:20, 5 June 2017 (UTC)
- There are several points in the article you linked to which make relevant points: the invasion was delayed due to the Balkan campaign, the intended stop-line was well to the east of Moscow, and the intention was to destroy the Soviet armies in the border areas, rather than to push them back (the Germans expected the enemy to try and hold their ground). The failure to destroy the Soviet forces, which did retreat rather than defending, was probably the main reason for the failure, along with the German under-estimation of Soviet capacity and capability. Wymspen (talk) 09:15, 5 June 2017 (UTC)
- The German expectation was that an early defeat would lead to a rapid collapse of the Soviet regime: "You have only to kick down the door and the whole rotten edifice will come crashing down" according to Hitler himself. [1] Alansplodge (talk) 17:37, 5 June 2017 (UTC)
- German optimists might have hoped the Russians would roll up like the Poles, Danes, Belgians, Norwegians, French and British had in 1939 and 1940. If the German forces had captured, killed or caused rout of the Soviet forces as fast as they did the Polish forces in 1939, from 17 September to 6 October, or as they did to French and British forces in France in 1940, from 10 May to "early June," how quickly would they have reached Moscow? Basically how many km per day did the Germans advance in the aforementioned successful invasions? Edison (talk) 20:35, 5 June 2017 (UTC)
- As for the example of the British, they retreated to a defensible position (the far side of the English Channel), then fought tooth and nail to hold that line. This should have been the German's lesson as for what to expect from Russia. While Russia lacked an English Channel, they did have rivers, mountain ranges and thousands of miles of land to retreat behind, should the need have arisen. StuRat (talk) 20:06, 7 June 2017 (UTC)
- I believe that Barbarossa was initially more successful than the previous campaigns; the forward Soviet armies were caught in huge encirclements netting hundreds of thousands of prisoners, and immense casualties and materiel losses. The Germans had underestimated the number of Soviet divisions under arms and their ability to raise fresh divisions and to replace equipment. Whereas the commanders of a Western army might surrender to avoid a bloodbath (eg the Netherlands), the Soviets had no qualms about throwing huge numbers of raw recruits into combat, sometimes even without rifles, and shot those who didn't want to go (see Barrier troops). Whereas the French sought an armistice to prevent further hardship to their people, the Soviets just told their farm workers to burn their farms and move on. Success on the battlefield was not enough.
- By way of a reference, have a look at Operation 'Barbarossa' And Germany's Failure In The Soviet Union by Ian Carter (Imperial War Museum). Alansplodge (talk) 21:59, 5 June 2017 (UTC)
- The "two soldiers to a rifle" is a bit of myth. In reality, the Soviet industry had been consistently outproducing Germany in every weapons system since 1939. The Soviet to Axis military losses ratio on the Eastern Front about 11.2 million to 8.5 million, or 1.3:1. As to the implication that the bad, bad Soviets were only concerned with staying in power... consider that Hitler's plans explicitly called for the annihilation of the vast majority of Russians and helotization of the rest. 78.53.25.121 (talk) 02:49, 6 June 2017 (UTC)
- After some research, I agree that the lack of rifles seems to be a myth. It did actually happen in 1916 though. [2] Alansplodge (talk) 18:29, 8 June 2017 (UTC)
- That's a good point. Had the Nazi's been able to credibly argue that they were going to replace the communists with democracy, or re-establish a tsar, or give each ethnic group it's own self-determination, etc., then they may have gotten less resistance than their plan to exterminate the Russians (and more broadly, "Slavs", as they categorized them) generated. StuRat (talk) 20:55, 7 June 2017 (UTC)
- The "two soldiers to a rifle" is a bit of myth. In reality, the Soviet industry had been consistently outproducing Germany in every weapons system since 1939. The Soviet to Axis military losses ratio on the Eastern Front about 11.2 million to 8.5 million, or 1.3:1. As to the implication that the bad, bad Soviets were only concerned with staying in power... consider that Hitler's plans explicitly called for the annihilation of the vast majority of Russians and helotization of the rest. 78.53.25.121 (talk) 02:49, 6 June 2017 (UTC)
- Actually, their plan was to enslave them rather than to exterminate them, but that's not much of a difference. 2601:646:8E01:7E0B:F821:2693:F38:C173 (talk) 01:07, 8 June 2017 (UTC)
- But see the Hunger Plan which "was a plan developed by Nazi Germany during World War II to seize food from the Soviet Union and give it to German soldiers and civilians; the plan entailed the death by starvation of millions of "racially inferior" Slavs following Operation Barbarossa". However, all this was unknown to the Soviets, and the Germans were initially able to recruit considerable numbers of disgruntled Russians, Belarussians and Ukrainians into their forces, see Waffen-SS foreign volunteers and conscripts#Soviet Union. Alansplodge (talk) 18:22, 8 June 2017 (UTC)
- Actually, their plan was to enslave them rather than to exterminate them, but that's not much of a difference. 2601:646:8E01:7E0B:F821:2693:F38:C173 (talk) 01:07, 8 June 2017 (UTC)
- For anyone confused by the title, see Rasputitsa. StuRat (talk) 22:10, 7 June 2017 (UTC)
2nd week of July
edit1) When is it?
2) Is there an off-line opensource software (desired) that states the ‘week number’ of the ‘year’ as well the ‘month’ itself in one layout?
43.245.123.33 (talk) 18:00, 5 June 2017 (UTC)
- See Week#Week numbering and Perpetual calendar in JavaScript. Blooteuth (talk) 20:04, 5 June 2017 (UTC)
- It's right after the 1st week of July. ←Baseball Bugs What's up, Doc? carrots→ 20:44, 5 June 2017 (UTC)
- Also right before the 3rd week of July. 64.170.21.194 (talk) 22:57, 5 June 2017 (UTC)
- Or, simply put, it begins on the 9th and ends on the 15th. 81.148.187.1 (talk) 08:42, 6 June 2017 (UTC)
- That is one of those ambiguous phrases, which can have different meaning depending on who is using them. If you think that the first week in July starts on the 1st, then the second week is from the 8th to the 14th. If, by week, you mean seven days beginning on a Sunday, or a Monday, then you have to decide if a part week counts as the first week, or not. Depending on that choice, the second week could begin Sunday 2nd, Monday 3rd, Sunday 9th or Monday 10th. The pattern described in previous answers is based on a decision to count the week as being in a particular month if at least four of the seven days fall in that month - so this year that would mean the second week beginning on the 9th or 10th. If you have been told something will happen in the second week of July, you have to check exactly what the person who told you that means by it. I would always use a phrase like "the week commencing July 10th" to make it plain. Wymspen (talk) 09:19, 6 June 2017 (UTC)