Talk:Allied logistics in the Kokoda Track campaign

Latest comment: 6 years ago by Peacemaker67 in topic GA Review
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The text of the entry was: Did you know ... that Allied logistics in the Kokoda Track campaign relied on aircraft (example pictured) and "Fuzzy Wuzzy Angels"?
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Number of carriers

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Hi @User:Hawkeye7, just reading the part where it cites McCarthy (p 264) that there were about 9,000 carriers on the track at the start of October. McCarthy's text is a little cagey in that it might suggest that these were "on the track" does not state it in such a way that is categorically clear. Rogerson (p 12), the source of your other figures, continues to say that a month later [that is October] the number forward for the advance on Kokoda had dropped to 1,000. I have cited McCarthy (p 308) that in late October there were 1,250 forward of Myola and none in the rear. Rogerson (p13) reports 16,000 odd conscripted into the ANGAU by December. I would suggest that the figure of 9,000 odd were conscripted by the ANGAU for all work and not specifically on the track. This is how I read it. I would be interested in what Powell has to say on it (if anything) but I don't have this work atm. Regards, Cinderella157 (talk) 08:04, 14 July 2017 (UTC)Reply

Nothing like working on the Second World War to give you an appreciation of Charles Bean. I have Powell, but it doesn't say anything. I will dig deeper. The main other users of native labour woulkd have been the base section and the Bulldog LoC. Hawkeye7 (talk) 11:45, 14 July 2017 (UTC)Reply
I get the impression they were also still used for plantation work under the ANGAU, being essential for the war effort but I couldn't give you a source. Cinderella157 (talk) 02:31, 15 July 2017 (UTC)Reply
I have the ANGAU Native labour statistics from 31 January 1944 (AWM 506/5/11). At that time, there were 23,043 Papuans and New Guineas employed by ANGAU. Nearly all of them were parcelled out to US and Australian military units, large and small. Most (13,335) were working in the base areas at Bulldog, Port Moresby, Milne Bay, Goodenough, Kiriwina and Woodlark. They were doing, well, everything. They were working in the hospitals, the laundries, the messes. Many were skilled workers. There were 664 working in ANGAU sawmills and just 323 working on ANGAU copra, rubber, rice and coffee plantations. Hawkeye7 (talk) 06:38, 15 July 2017 (UTC)Reply
While we might agree to disagree on a handful of other matters, this really needs to be resolved as it is not the number working on the track. Cinderella157 (talk) 08:07, 27 July 2017 (UTC)Reply

Pls check

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@User:Hawkeye7, You might like to look at this. I think there might be some misplaced words: "Because the tracks were narrow, they talk the animals to walk in single file, lead by a mounted rider at the front and trailed by one at the rear of the column. Each animal carried 160 pounds (73 kg) of stores, which were packed in backs to facilitate their transfer to Papuan carriers." I could take a guess but I thought I would go to the horses mouth (couldn't help myself). Regards Cinderella157 (talk) 08:34, 15 July 2017 (UTC)Reply

Should have been "talk" and "bags". Corrected. Hawkeye7 (talk) 00:31, 16 July 2017 (UTC) Reply
  Resolved

Similarly, "using the horses from the state there", the meaning here isn't clear. Regards Cinderella157 (talk) 08:37, 15 July 2017 (UTC)Reply

Should have been "from the station" Corrected. Hawkeye7 (talk) 00:31, 16 July 2017 (UTC) Reply
  Resolved

Re: "The 1st Pack Transport Company took over the work in October, and the 1st Independent Light Horse Troop became one of its sections." Did it literally become a section within one of the platoons or is it perhaps better to say it was absorbed into the company (or something similar)? Cinderella157 (talk) 08:50, 15 July 2017 (UTC)Reply

McCarthy, p. 264: "It was then reorganised as a section of a pack transport company." Lindsay, p. 258 "The original unit was restructured as 7 Pack Transport Company". Hawkeye7 (talk) 09:13, 15 July 2017 (UTC)Reply
Up to you but I think I would take the lead from Lindsay since "section" has both a figurative and a literal meaning. Regards Cinderella157 (talk) 09:26, 15 July 2017 (UTC)Reply
Pack transport companies had sections, not platoons. I've taken it literally, but I'm going to look it up. In the meantime, I have changed the text to "The 1st Independent Light Horse Troop was absorbed into the 7th Pack Transport Company" Hawkeye7 (talk) 00:31, 16 July 2017 (UTC) Reply
  Resolved

Re:"The 7th Division Australian Army Service Corps (AASC) assumed control of the Track on 10 September." Was the AASC identified as a battalion (say 7th Div AASC Bn) or was it a collection of independent companies controlled by 7th Div HQ log cell? Cinderella157 (talk) 09:24, 15 July 2017 (UTC)Reply

The latter. At this stage, the 7th Division had three AASC companies (2/4th, 2/5th, 2/6th) under Headquarters, 7th Division AASC. There was a commander, AASC (CAASC). Like the engineers and medical services, it was not organised as a battalion. In the early stage of the war in the Middle East, each company specialised in supplies, POL or ammunition; but before the campaign in Greece, they were reorganised so each could handle all commodities. After the Kokoda Track campaign, the AASC was reorganised again, into a general transport company (2/153) and a supply depot company (2/2). Hawkeye7 (talk) 00:31, 16 July 2017 (UTC)Reply
Suggest: "From 10 September, responsibility for control of logistics along the track fell to the Commander Australian Army Service Corps (CAASC) 7th Division, insert name if known ...". as I tried to say below, it is perhaps a subtle point but the CAASC did not assume control of the track (Allen did) but for the logistics.Cinderella157 (talk) 09:09, 16 July 2017 (UTC)Reply
The CAASC 7th Division was LTCOL E. L. Smith NX435; but he was in hospital during the Kokoda Track campaign, so LTCOL G. A. Richardson NX432, normally the CAASC I Corps Troops acted as CAASC 7th Division. Hawkeye7 (talk) 00:13, 18 July 2017 (UTC) Reply
  Resolved

Re: "assumed control" - a subtle point perhaps but Allen assumed control of the track. Having said that, NGF still maintained control of airdrops so it is not just a straight forward simple fix. The control exercised by Blamey is a significant issue. Cinderella157 (talk) 09:50, 15 July 2017 (UTC)Reply

I wrote: "7th Division Australian Army Service Corps (AASC) assumed control of the Track". NGF didn't have control of the airdrops; they were still under AAF. Theoretically, requests had to go through GHQ, but in practice Morris would talk to Scanlon, and later Blamey to Whitehead, who replaced Scanlon in September. Hawkeye7 (talk) 00:31, 16 July 2017 (UTC)Reply
NGF was the controlling authority. Requests had to go through NGF not direct to AAF. Blamey subsequently exercised control over where supplies were dropped. To this extent (a significant extent), 7th Div did not control the logistics on the track. Cinderella157 (talk) 05:48, 16 July 2017 (UTC)Reply
  • "the carry was short, and despite the fact that there were no suitable air dropping zones," I thin the point is that the LOC was so short that there was no need for dropping? To this extent, I think it is a bit redundant? Cinderella157 (talk) 09:35, 15 July 2017 (UTC)Reply
    The point is that supply was almost entirely overland until new drop zones were secured. Hawkeye7 (talk) 00:31, 16 July 2017 (UTC)Reply
    Then this is what should be said, noting that drops were made at Nauro (about a days march in) with a DZ being cleared on 3-4 Oct (McC p 263). Cinderella157 (talk) 12:36, 16 July 2017 (UTC)Reply
    There is an issue with this. The present text implies that the lack of DZs was material at this early point - that carriers were used because there was a lack of DZs. In fact, DZs were not sought because it was within the capability of the carriers and there would have been significant wastage by dropping that outweighed any advantage by dropping. It is not a case of "despite" but rather, that they were not required. Supply was entirely overland and did not need to be otherwise until it reached a critical point of "diminishing returns". The text, as it reads, suggests that airdrops would have been preferred but could not happen for a lack of suitable DZs. Cinderella157 (talk) 10:15, 1 August 2017 (UTC)Reply
  • You report two different aircraft types landing the troops at Kokoda on 26 July. McCarthy (p 126) says that there were only two aircraft serviceable that day. I am pretty certain it is Anderson that says that it was the same aircraft (and hence the spacing in the landings) that made the landing that day but I don't have him atm - if it wasn't him, then I am sure it has definitely been stated. I'm not saying you are wrong by any means. I am saying that there is a conflict in the sources. As an aside, Owen landed there on 24 July but I don't know what in. Cinderella157 (talk) 10:36, 15 July 2017 (UTC)Reply
    I'm trusting Kelly because he knows which aircraft it was. Hawkeye7 (talk) 00:31, 16 July 2017 (UTC)Reply
    I think it appropriate to note discrepancies in sources and provide a balanced view. It is reasonable to trust Kelly. A footnote could then read something like: "Anderson (p?) reports that a single plane made both lifts; however, Kelly is able to identify two separate planes by type". As I said though, I don't have Anderson atm though I am reasonably certain this is where it comes from. If I could confirm Anderson, I would make the change myself. Cinderella157 (talk) 03:50, 16 July 2017 (UTC)Reply
    I haven't got Anderson here though, so it will have to wait until I find a copy. Hawkeye7 (talk) 05:56, 16 July 2017 (UTC)Reply
    I am back in the big smoke and was able to get Anderson today. I have made a note to the above effect (also citing Kelly - if I got that right). If you are happy with what I have added, then this can be marked as resolved. Cinderella157 (talk) 08:03, 18 July 2017 (UTC)_Reply
    PS Moremon provides more info on this. PS see the note I have just revised in the main article. It gives some reason to doubt Kelly without confirming what actually happened against primary sources.[1]
    per my edit as note. Unless you disagree
      Resolved
    Cinderella157 (talk) 10:19, 25 July 2017 (UTC)Reply

Arbitrary break

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  • Regarding the missing rations. It is Moremon's hypothesis that these were dropped at Myola 2. The problem is that Myola 2 was used in the Australian advance. It is hard to imagine that there was no sign 35,000 rations and other stores having been dropped there without any sign that was later remarked upon - unless the possums carried off everything. This is the counterpoint that I have previosly observed (less the possums). You note that NGF staff initially assumed that stores sent were received (Keogh p 204-205) and that a system of daily checks were put in place (Keogh p 204-205). The issue is when these checks were put in place. Lieutenant Fayle, Allen's aide-de-camp, commented that: "The whole fact of the matter, and NGF seemed unable to understand all through the campaign, was that recoveries were never 100 per cent of the supplies dropped and wastage was at times terrific." Where did the rations go? Some may well have been dropped into Myola 2 or elsewhere into the never-never somewhere else. Others were unrecoverable or unusable. My hypothesis is that the discrepancy arose from a failure to close the feedback loop, with staff failing to confirm what had been received as opposed to what had been sent - something that was not done until later (and is thereby supported). There may also have been a failure to account for consumption. Even if consumption was accounted for at the NGF end, a discrepancy in what was sent v's what what arrived and was then consumed would create a significant discrepancy. My point is that Moremon's hypothesis (though not having read it) lacks confirmation where there should reasonably be evidence beyond speculation to give it credibility. The article, as it stands, gives credence to Moremon's hypothesis. I think that the alternative is much more creditable. One does not have to delve into analysis or synthesis to leave the matter open for the reader to draw their own conclusions. I think that this is what should be done. Regards Cinderella157 (talk) 11:38, 15 July 2017 (UTC)Reply
    In later campaigns there were parachutes, some coloured, and well-organised recovery efforts, and recovery hovered at around 50%. A lot of stuff just disappeared in the long grass; much was dropped outside the drop area. Things must have been much worse during the Kokoda Track campaign, as containers would break open and scatter the contents. About 180,000 lb of rations were despatched in August; the supply summary that shocked Rowell showed about 27,000 lb at Templeton's Crossing and 3,900 lb forward of that. Do we need to assume a gross error? Hawkeye7 (talk) 00:31, 16 July 2017 (UTC)Reply
    Not gross error - no, unless you call a failure to close the feedback loop at this earlier time a gross error? At present, the idea of closing the feedback loop is well separated from the issue of the missing rations as is the rate of loss. Horner quoted Fayle in regard to to issue. I think the possible reasons should be put to the reader. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that there is no evidence to support Moremon's hypothesis. Cinderella157 (talk) 03:42, 16 July 2017 (UTC)Reply
    All I have said is that "drops may have been made at the wrong one". I have kept it in because it is also important for the readers to understand that the maps were no good. I have moved the two paragraphs on the problems of air dropping up so the readers will get a better picture. Hawkeye7 (talk) 05:56, 16 July 2017 (UTC)Reply
    I don't think it should be removed. I have added a note. If it is your intention "for the readers to understand that the maps were no good", then perhaps this should be stated more clearly. I believe there are other sources that make this point in this context. I still think that the last para in this section needs to be drawn closer to the issue of the missing rats and the issue it addressed "for the readers to understand" and make the connection. Cinderella157 (talk) 11:58, 16 July 2017 (UTC) {{resolved}}Reply
    I notice that Williams argued that the Japanese found supplies in the area. Hawkeye7 (talk) 12:21, 20 July 2017 (UTC)Reply
    I don't have him here atm but I will have a look at it. I know that they got sick on tainted rations left a Myola 1. Pretty certain in Brube ABoaP but I don't have that either atm. Cinderella157 (talk) 04:11, 21 July 2017 (UTC)Reply
    If you mean at p 124, he states "Myola" and does not refer to Myola 2. I remember reading that supplies might be dropped over a mile or more if the pilot was reluctant to make multiple passes. Cinderella157 (talk) 09:19, 1 August 2017 (UTC)Reply
    I note that the footnote I added in resolution has been deleted with the comment that it was unsourced. It is a valid statement, even if you wish to modify it wrt Williams and it is consistent with WP:Blue. Your rationale for deleting the note is a logical conundrum. Moremon makes an argument to support his hypothesis but provides no proof of evidence where the evidence might reasonably exist if it were to account for the 35,000 rats and other war stores. It is valid to observe the deficiency in his hypothesis. Furthermore, the possibility of evidence coming to light diminishes with time. The possibility that something might "turn up" that has not previously been found is an ever decreasing possibility. This is not to say that it does not account for part of same, however, it is not the answer in total (without proof). Balance dictates the need to report his hypothesis but also, it dictates the need to report the deficiency in it - the absence of proof. The logical conundrum is quite Popperian. Because we can't prove that green Martians don't exit, must we always surmise that green Martians might exist? This matter is now not resolved. Cinderella157 (talk) 11:14, 4 August 2017 (UTC)Reply
  • "Heavy loads were not practical for air dropping missions, since the aircraft had to side-slip at low speed in order to arrive low and slow over the drop zone." The meaning of "had to side-slip" is not clear and I have some understanding of flight dynamics. Needs to be clarified? I would think this is a cross-wind issue too (on the plane and not just the parachutes) but the meaning is not clear at all. Cinderella157 (talk) 12:01, 15 July 2017 (UTC)Reply
    Linked to the Wikipedia article on the subject. Hawkeye7 (talk) 00:31, 16 July 2017 (UTC)Reply
    Phoned a friend. The problem with a heavy load is that you need more airspeed to maintain lift. A headwind creates airspeed for a lower ground speed - as I am sure you are aware. You don't "have to" side-slip to arrive over a DZ - side-slip is dictated by the approach and the prevailing wind. A side-wind for a given approach and weight (load) will require a higher airspeed and consequently, a higher ground speed (once you factor in all the vectors) - thereby making it harder to achieve the requisite (low) speed for a larger load without crashing into the ground at such a low altitude. My point is, "had to side-slip"? This probably comes under wp:jargon. I don't doubt that this is sourced. I would say that there is a simpler way to say why weight was an issue. Furthermore, the link doesn't make things much clearer. At present, it is a bit of a "black box" statement. Cinderella157 (talk) 11:20, 16 July 2017 (UTC) Reply
      Resolved
  • "Packaging was primitive and inadequate, even for normal handling under New Guinea conditions". The second part has no real meaning? What are "normal handling under New Guinea conditions"? Suggest removing or elaborating. Cinderella157 (talk) 12:11, 15 July 2017 (UTC)Reply
    This takes us into territory beyond the Kokoda Track campaign. If your experience with soldiering is from the post-WWII period, this might come as a shock. There were no one-man rat packs or ten-man packs made of waterproof cardboard with metal straps! Everything was in the bags, boxes and tins of the giant economy size at the market. Everything was left outside in the tropical rain. Tins rusted and "blew". There are pictures of mountains of tins where the labels have fallen off and what was in them was anyone's guess. At one dump there was a sign: "Lucky dip: Take one!" If you were lucky it was peaches; if not, it might be bully beef. The Army had the manufacturers (there wasn't much canning in Australia before the war - the US and Australian Armies paid to set up the industry) stamp the contents on the cans and leave off the labels. Blamey wanted the cans to be flat and square like sardine tins so you could heat and eat straight from the can, but this proved too difficult to do. He asked why they didn't heat their food with hexamine tablets - that's what they used to use in the trenches in WWI - but they didn't have any; he had to find a supply in Australia. "Tropic proofing" was a major effort that affected nearly everything; but it occurred in 1943, not 1942. Hawkeye7 (talk) 00:31, 16 July 2017 (UTC)Reply
    Added a sentence about this. Hawkeye7 (talk) 01:06, 16 July 2017 (UTC)Reply
    Not so much of a shock. Works much better now. BTW, you can heat and eat regardless of the shape of the tin by denting the tin and pressure cooking it until the sides pop. I also remember the "lucky dip" with 10 man packs if you were on the go and had no time to bring it together to make a meal and you and your weapon-pit buddy only had tiny taters between you.Cinderella157 (talk) 05:27, 16 July 2017 (UTC) Reply
      Resolved
  • On the matter of Malaria. The climate around PM was relatively dry and should have mitigated the risk. However, despite this, the incidence was high. Although malaria was an issue at each end of the track, primary infection was not an issue along the track. The rate of malaria quoted is for NGF and is inclusive of Milne Bay! If the article is about Kokoda, then these statements need to be contexturalised. Certainly, at Milne Bay and the at Buna-Gona, the impact was near catastrophic. Cinderella157 (talk) 09:32, 16 July 2017 (UTC)Reply
    Agreed. Rewritten. Hawkeye7 (talk) 00:13, 18 July 2017 (UTC) Reply
      Resolved
  • "Every effort was made to allow the wounded to walk back down the Track." This is a fairly flaccid way of stating the harsh realities of the situation during the withdrawal - which I have cited. There is also a contradiction in that casualties were evacuated forward: "Eventually, they were evacuated forward, to Kokoda, and flown out from there." Sources I have quoted indicate that casualties at Myola were "eventually" carried back? Cinderella157 (talk) 12:26, 16 July 2017 (UTC)Reply
    Added a bit. Hawkeye7 (talk) 00:27, 19 July 2017 (UTC) Reply
      Resolved
  • Re Maroubra, the initial order was for the 39th and then amended to less a company but only one company was deployed forward before the landing. As I read it, the rest were deliberately held back. The main page has a ref to the Op Inst. It is just a matter of making the articles consistent to the extent that there was only B Company forward at the time of the landing. Cinderella157 (talk) 08:29, 18 July 2017 (UTC)Reply
    Added. Hawkeye7 (talk) 00:27, 19 July 2017 (UTC) Reply
      Resolved
  • There is some mixing of primary units, particularly in geography. Personally, my science background says that the primary unit in any citation should match the citation but apparently WP doesn't like mixing primary units. It doesn't upset me but it might others. Up to you. Cinderella157 (talk) 08:34, 18 July 2017 (UTC)Reply
    I have a science background too. I would do it that way too. I have set the article to metric, per MOS:UNITS. The only place I see trouble in is the Shipping section. Hawkeye7 (talk) 00:27, 19 July 2017 (UTC)Reply
    I might have left Imperial as the primary unit given most of the sources would have been in Imperial. But metric probably keeps more people happy. I will have a look through for significant figures though.
      Resolved

arbitrary break

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  • Moremon (p182) refers to flight crews (at the early stage at least) being on short rotations such that each crew had to re-learn where and how to drop and this short rotation contributed increasing losses. I am finding him a good read and insightful. only observation is about the hypothesis of the missing rats and while Myola 2 may account for a portion, in the absence of a body of evidence it would have left, it is not "the" answer. As I have suggested (and is supported, "the" answer is likely to be a failure to close the feedback loop together with losses from all causes. Cinderella157 (talk) 03:46, 22 July 2017 (UTC)Reply
    Agreed. Hawkeye7 (talk) 04:51, 22 July 2017 (UTC)Reply
  • Reading Walker, the crashes at Myola appear to be because of boggy ground at the ends of the strip. Kienzle (in Kienzle) tried desperately to improve this. He wanted some psp but this wasn't forthcoming. Cinderella157 (talk) 02:11, 24 July 2017 (UTC)Reply
    Kienzle 's arithmetic is wrong. The Marston Mat sheets were 15" across and 10' long, so a 100' x 5,000' runway required 60,000 of them. The only way to get them to Myola would have been to have carriers carry them down the Track, and the only source would have been the mat laid at Rogers. Hawkeye7 (talk) 03:24, 24 July 2017 (UTC)Reply
    I don't have it here with me so I can't say that he wanted to make a strip 100 x 5000 or just improve the end? There is a big difference and I don't think he was so naive as to expect 60000 could be carried overland. Cinderella157 (talk) 04:55, 24 July 2017 (UTC)Reply
    Kienzle (R) is incorrect in her maths by a factor of 10. She does indicate the intent was to address the boggy end and notes that the trimotor crashed after the runway markings were "moved". She notes the subsequent recommendation of the Air Board and MacArthur's response. I think it is worthy of mention if only in a note. Cinderella157 (talk) 08:50, 1 August 2017 (UTC)Reply
    I note that she incorrecty describes a nose plant as a ground loop. Cinderella157 (talk) 09:23, 1 August 2017 (UTC)Reply
  • Re the evacuations from Myola. Neither McC p316-317 nor Walker p76-77 specify the type of Stinson - simply that it was a single engine type. Do you have a source? I note that the AWM pics of planes at Kokoda include both LO1 Stinson and LO3 Aeronica.
    [2] Hawkeye7 (talk) 06:33, 24 July 2017 (UTC)Reply
    [3] misidentifies this as an L-3 but the nose cowling is distinctively of an L-1 (not 2 or 3) so, as you amended, the AWM dows get it wrong sometimes and I sent them a message. The messageboard probably isn't of itself a WP RS. Perhaps an AWM photo at Myola might be cited as I did in the main article. I note that Stinson made a number of single engine aircraft and the sources don't specify type or even that they were necessarily military aircraft. While I am not saying they weren't L-1s, this is unsourced. Cinderella157 (talk) 09:09, 24 July 2017 (UTC)Reply
    Another example in the image in the article of a DC-2. The AWM caption said it was a C-47, but I could see at a glance that it was not a C-47, as they had a 7' wide cargo door that could accommodate a jeep. Since the tail number was visible, I could look it up, and found that it was a DC-2. Hawkeye7 (talk) 21:42, 24 July 2017 (UTC)Reply
    My tacit agreement - with some reservation as to the source. Cinderella157 (talk) 11:33, 25 July 2017 (UTC)Reply
  • Walker indicates Brig Johnson's intent for cases to be carried forward to Kokoda. It does not unambiguously state that this happened. Further, McC (quotes him): "For those still bedridden, native porters were finally obtained in sufficient numbers to act as stretcher bearers and after being shut up at Myola for some two and a half months, the last patients, together with the remainder of the unit, arrived back in the Port Moresby area, after their long trek, a day or two before Xmas." It is written in such a way as imply they were evacuated rearward. Moremon does state that they were evacuated forward (p328-329) citing Nicholson, 'The early days of supply dropping in New Guinea and evacuation of wounded'. Brig Johnston quoted in McCarthy, South-West Pacific Area, p.317. Walker, The Island Campaigns,pp.76-77. Cinderella157 (talk) 05:26, 24 July 2017 (UTC)Reply
    The footnote points to Pilger, p. 60:

    In late November, following the Australian break-through at Eora Creek, the Japanese were driven out of Kokoda and the cases still held at Myola were evacuated forward-a most unusual procedure-carried by native bearers to the Kokoda airstrip and thence to Port Moresby and base hospital by air.

    Hawkeye7 (talk) 06:18, 24 July 2017 (UTC)Reply
    Thankyou for the quote as I wansn't able to access the article and would have checked it if I could. I would observe, given what is at best, ambiguous statements in the official histories, it is probably worth a note of clarification - to, at least observe the ambiguity and reconcile the sources. Cinderella157 (talk) 10:23, 24 July 2017 (UTC)Reply
    Added note and unles you disagree ... {{resolved}} Cinderella157 (talk) 11:29, 25 July 2017 (UTC)Reply
    Strike resolved tag - edit removed. Cinderella157 (talk) 01:25, 26 July 2017 (UTC)Reply
    There is an inconsistency with the official history (even if it is that the official history is ambiguous) that should be reconciled. You were unhappy with my solution. Do you have an alternative? Cinderella157 (talk) 10:22, 1 August 2017 (UTC)Reply
    Already done. Hawkeye7 (talk) 14:15, 1 August 2017 (UTC)Reply

arbitrary break 3

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  • From Moremon (p326)): "The 2/lst Battalion's RMO estimated that 20 per cent of his battalion was suffering from pronounced dietary deficiency" as they approached Oivi just before 5 November. It is a remark that indicates that despite air drops and carriers, the system wasn't coping. Furthermore, their performance would be down too. Cinderella157 (talk) 04:58, 25 July 2017 (UTC)Reply
    Not necessarily. Moremon says:

    Ordnance [sic - he means AASC] staff at Bolo had compounded the problem by failing to adjust dispatches to reflect the urgency of the situation; for example, they had been forwarding at least 13 commodities of ration (bully beef, biscuits, tea, sugar, salt, dried fruit, jam, butter, milk, cheese, tinned fruit, tinned vegetables and bacon) which was a 'luxury' for front-line troops; it is not clear what quantities actually reached Maroubra Force, but Allen's staff took the last seven items off the ration scale to free up capacity and reduce confusion. (p. 244)

By doing that, they removed important vitamins from the men's diet, particularly B group vitamins, thereby exposing the men to vitamin deficiencies. Now, vitamins were only discovered in the 1920s, and were a new thing even in the late 1930s. Many medical officers wouldn't have understood their importance. (Stanton Hicks addressed the problem in 1943 by adding Vegemite to the ration.) Hawkeye7 (talk) 05:55, 25 July 2017 (UTC)Reply
At the same point in Moremon: "The carrier lines bringing supplies from Kokoda were welcomed by Lloyd's 16th Brigade, which had run desperately short of rations in their approach to Oivi. The men had been forced to scrounge in gardens for pawpaws, sweet potatoes and cucumbers but they were still 'perpetually hungry, and one soldier complained that his guts were flapping against his backbone'". Noting that Vasey was advancing on two axies at the time.
As an aside, is the Japanese diet by comparison, which included a number of commodities to ensure its balance - including bran mixed with the rice I believe, apparently to the disgust of the troops. Cinderella157 (talk) 06:21, 25 July 2017 (UTC)Reply
It already mentioned dietary deficiency, but I've expanded it an bit. (In 1943, Hicks discovered that Australian bread was low in gluten. While the Vegemite was a success, the blue peas never took off.) Hawkeye7 (talk) 13:21, 25 July 2017 (UTC)Reply

GA Review

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This review is transcluded from Talk:Allied logistics in the Kokoda Track campaign/GA1. The edit link for this section can be used to add comments to the review.

Reviewer: Peacemaker67 (talk · contribs) 04:16, 20 December 2017 (UTC)Reply


This article has already passed Milhist A-Class review, so I doubt it will struggle to pass GAN. I'll just give it a quick once-over to see if there are any tweaks to be made. Peacemaker67 (click to talk to me) 04:16, 20 December 2017 (UTC)Reply

More to come Peacemaker67 (click to talk to me) 07:48, 20 December 2017 (UTC)Reply

There's something weird about the way the campaign boxes on the right expand, they go off the right side of the page frame on both my monitors. Just wondering if it is just a Google Chrome thing or happens in general?

That's me done. Great job, really comprehensive. My only outstanding point is that one about equipment repair and maintenance, I suggest you see if you can locate anything on that before FAC. Placing on hold for the last few comments to be addressed. Cheers, Peacemaker67 (click to talk to me) 00:48, 21 December 2017 (UTC)Reply

Unfortunately, the book I need for that is Craftsmen of the Australian Army, and its back in Canberra. It will have to wait until I return. Hawkeye7 (discuss) 04:03, 21 December 2017 (UTC)Reply
No worries, as I said, more of a FAC thing than GAN. This article is well-written, verifiable using reliable sources, covers the subject well, is neutral and stable, contains no plagiarism, and is illustrated by appropriately licensed images with appropriate captions. Passing. Peacemaker67 (click to talk to me) 04:27, 21 December 2017 (UTC)Reply