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Allied logistics in the Kokoda Track campaign

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Nominator(s): Hawkeye7 (talk)

Allied logistics in the Kokoda Track campaign (edit | talk | history | links | watch | logs)

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I promised to write an article on Allied logistics on the Kokoda Track. It took a bit more effort than I expected. I am sending it here to get as many comments as possible. Hawkeye7 (talk) 23:00, 10 July 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Support Comments from Cinderella157

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I have been following this and will participate in the review but would like to await some other participation first. Cinderella157 (talk) 11:24, 11 July 2017 (UTC)[reply]

I have made some comments on this article's talk page. At this point, these are mostly resolved. I agree with AR that it is an impressive work. The article is very much "big picture". As such, I perceive it deals not just with Kokoda but the New Guinea campaign. Much of this big picture stuff has as much to do with Kokoda as it does with Kanga Force, Milne Bay and Buna-Gona just later. It touches on developments very late in the year and would have had no impact on Kokoda. This tends to reinforce my perception. I also see that by such a big view, some of the "nuts and bolts" of supply on the track that were of perhaps critical significance get a little lost in such a broad view. There are also some details in Kokoda Track campaign#Alied logistics that have not been carried forward into this article. I could expand on this. Matters that occur to me first off would be the supply of parachutes. The critical shortage of planes forward which led to P-39s dropping supplies in belly tanks and just how significant the raid on 17 August was. It might also touch more on the organisation of carriers - some detail I omitted for brevity in the main article. As much as anything, these things make me a little cautious about how the material in the main article will be massaged in relation to this "offspring" article. If this is to be an offspring of the main article section, then there needs to be a cross-check done. Having said all of that, I am thinking it is worthwhile to discuss where this article might best sit. Cinderella157 (talk) 03:29, 19 July 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Have we a source for the use of P-39s dropping supplies? I sounds like the development of the "storepedo", which would be a feature of the 1943-45 campaigns. Fighters and bombers were usually preferred over transports for dropping in areas where flak or enemy fighters were a concern. The supply of parachutes was inadequate, forcing the use of free dropping. Large orders for parachutes were placed (from memory, 10,000 in Australia and 30,000 from India), but they did not arrive in time. The next big test was the Wau-Salamaua campaign, which depleted SWPA's stock of parachutes. The 17 August air raid is mentioned, and the reader can see that the loss of seven aircraft out of thirty was a significant hit. MacArthur may sound like the Black Knight but (a) he really had seen worse and (b) as he pointed out, air supply was not critical; the main LoC was the Track. Although the AAF was unable to prevent the Japanese from bombing Port Moresby, its fighter and bomber losses were heavy they never reached the point where abandonment of Port Moresby was considered on those grounds. Hawkeye7 (talk) 05:11, 19 July 2017 (UTC)[reply]
See McC p 131. Also NGF war diary p 7-8 & 26 of pdf. Mistakenly recalled as P39 but specifically say fighters. From Watson 1944 p 26-27: A requisition to the US was made on 21 July for 5,000 parachutes and containers. An initial delivery of 1,000 parachutes (less containers) was sent by plane on 22 September, with the remainder, sent by ship. Regarding the 17th, this occurred on the eve of Isurava when the lack of rations was already a critical factor in Potts; ability to deploy his force. A request by him for 800 carriers was met with 300. There simply wasn't the alternative resource available. NGF sig (Aug App1&2 p19&20 of pdf) indicate the supply situation and attributes the loss of Kokoda to the lack of transports earlier. The five day break caused by the raid would have commensurately eaten into the reserves. Even if the carrier force could have been ramped up straight away, it would have been nearly 6 days before this could have any impact at the front. Consequently, the 2/14th and 2/16th were not available for a concerted operation. In the situation, it is a bit like saying "let them eat cake". Putting aside the issues of MacArthur and Blamey's leadership at this critical time, these are the issues that are not immediately apparent as things stand. Cinderella157 (talk) 08:37, 19 July 2017 (UTC)[reply]
I will incorporate the material on the fighters, drop tanks and parachutes. I remember the incident in App 1; Whitehead replaced Scanlon at Advon, and one of his first actions was to send the transport aircraft back to Australia. Blamey went to MacArthur, and he allocated four DC-3 type aircraft.
With regard to the 17th, the article already points out that aircraft cannot operate every day, and that multi-day breaks were only to be expected. The article also explains that just because the weather is good over the Track does not mean that the transports could fly. It would not have eaten up reserves, as the Track LoC was still supplying their needs. Potts took council of his fears. The supply situation did not cause him to go onto the defensive; nor was he opposed by superior Japanese forces; it was his own lack of aggression and resolution. Hawkeye7 (talk) 14:36, 19 July 2017 (UTC)[reply]
The daily maintenance resupply was 15,000 lb or 200 carrier loads (near enough). For a six day carry to Isurava this would require 2,400 carriers. This does not take into account carrier rations for the whole trip (for a carrier force of this size) though there is some portion of carrier rations in the daily maintenance - perhaps 25% more would be needed. Even a two day carry forward of Myola for half his force would require 400 carriers for maintenance. Your figures for the ANGAU are not numbers of carriers on the track. My recollection is that Kienzle had less than 1800 on the track at peak strength but I don't recall when this was but I doubt it was at this time. There was a big shortfall in what could be supplied just along the track. It caused Potts to hold the 2/16th back at Myola with a plan to send the 39th out of battle to alleviate the problem. With this disposition, the track probably supplied 50% or less of daily maintenance and would have significantly consumed reserves with a break of this long. Cinderella157 (talk) 03:01, 20 July 2017 (UTC)[reply]
I have added the bit about the drop tanks and parachutes. I will check Kienzle and see if I can find out how many carriers there were on the Track. I'm pretty certain that the maximum would have been at the end of the campaign. Only 180,779 lb was dropped in August, and 306,576 lb in September, so well below 15,000 lb per day. In October though, the figure was 1.5 million lb. Hawkeye7 (talk) 03:24, 20 July 2017 (UTC)[reply]
Pls see McC p 197. (re 15000 maintenance supply and a need for an additioal 2000 carriers to compensate) Also Horner (1978) p 126-131. "No more carriers were available, and

therefore an immediate offensive was out of the question. Potts was ordered to hold where he was and plan to advance on or about 1 September." Therefore, he was put on the defensive as a result. & Willoughby reaffirmed that an overland operation against Port Moresby should be discounted in view of the logistical difficulties of maintaining any force in strength on the Kokoda Trail. It is remarkable that GHQ recognised all the difficulties that the Japanese would have on the Trail, yet missed the point that the Australians might have similar problems." (both p131) Also Rowell to Osmar White "He recorded that Rowell ‘shrugged and said frankly: “As far as I’m concerned, I’m willing to pull back and let the enemy have the rough stuff if he wants it. I’m willing to present the Jap with the supply headache I’ve got. But there are those who think otherwise. We need a victory in the Pacific, and a lot of poor bastards have got to get killed to provide it”" (p126) I find the amount of stores delivered by air in August and then September a bit telling, since, although the number of troops forward increased in mid August, it probably decreased through September and the length of the supply line also diminished. The 17th Aug on its own may not have been catastrophic but togeather with command expectation, the missing rats and a lack of carriers these created a dilemma of consequence. Then there is the tactical situation. Even though the forces were nominally of similar size (in favour of Horii) the 2/16th was held way back and the 2/14th was only just coming forward. The 53rd was perhaps more of a liability than an asset (better to know that nobody is covering your side than to mistakenly trust the man that is there) and then there is the Japanese artillery which was a significant force multiplier (but this is an aside to your earlier comment). The key issue I see herein is the logistical implications. Your own perception is that the track was the main LoC and the impact was not that significant? Even without painting MacArthur as the Black Knight, I hope that I am making sufficient case that the combination of events were of more significance than the reader might glean from the article at present - and in an appropriately collegiate manner. Cinderella157 (talk) 09:46, 20 July 2017 (UTC)[reply]

PS, I was mistakenly working on an 80lb carry and not 40lb. Cinderella157 (talk) 01:10, 21 July 2017 (UTC)[reply]

I've added a bit about Rowell's response to the disaster. (We'll pass on his doubts about the wisdom of fighting in New Guinea at all. Gavin Long believed that the Japanese navy would cut Port Moresby off and it would fall like Singapore. Chester Willmot couldn't understand why Port Moresby couldn't be held like Tobruk.) I've included figures on the stores carried by pack transport. I've also read through the correspondence on air supply. LHQ and GHQ were sympathetic and responsive. What I can't find is anything from the RAAF indicating interest in air supply before the war. (Is Ian Rose around?) Hawkeye7 (talk) 06:48, 21 July 2017 (UTC)[reply]
Noted -- I don't think the RAAF formed any dedicated transport squadrons until WWII, but will see if they showed any other interest in the idea... Cheers, Ian Rose (talk) 07:51, 21 July 2017 (UTC)[reply]
Yes, the RAAF announced that it would for air transport squadrons in 1941. It didn't actually do so until 1942. Hawkeye7 (talk) 08:40, 21 July 2017 (UTC)[reply]
Hi, I've combed Coulthard-Clark's The Third Brother, the dedicated history of the RAAF between the wars, and there's no discussion of the concept of air supply. On the practical side, all we hear of is small drops of food and water to lost explorers and pilots who force-landed in the outback -- appears very ad hoc, nothing systematic. Cheers, Ian Rose (talk) 23:36, 21 July 2017 (UTC)[reply]
The short answer as to why the RAAF had no dedicated casualty evacuation aircraft was that the purchase of an aircraft specifically for such an uncommon purpose was considered uneconomical. The RAAF did form a dedicated unit early in the war, No. 1 Air Ambulance Unit RAAF, which served in the Middle East. No. 2 Air Ambulance Unit RAAF was formed in 1942, and served in New Guinea from 1943, flying casualties back to Australia. Two specialised units, No. 1 Medical Air Evacuation Transport Unit RAAF and No. 2 Medical Air Evacuation Transport Unit RAAF were formed in 1944 for service in forward areas. The RAAF had no aircraft in 1942 (and with the retirement of the Cariboux, has none today) that could have landed at Myola. General Blamey (the man behind the adoption of the periscope rifle at Gallipoli) had an idea. He would acquire helicopters for the Army. The plan ran into predictable opposition; the RAAF argued that aircraft were a RAAF responsibility. After a prolonged bureaucratic battle that went all the way to the War Cabinet, the RAAF was charged with acquiring the helicopters in 1944. A drawn-out evaluation process ensued, resulting in the RAAF purchasing two Sikorsky H-5 helicopters in 1946. Hawkeye7 (talk) 00:02, 27 July 2017 (UTC)[reply]
We can pass on some of those things but there is a direct counterpoint to your statement in that it did put operations on the defensive and even hindered these by limiting the ability to deploy the 2/16th forward of Myola. I also note that in the preceding month that the equivalent of only five days maintenance supply was moved forward on the first stage of the track by pack transport - indicative of only 15% of the daily requirement being supplied along the track. A counterpoint to your statement: "air supply was not critical; the main LoC was the Track." Cinderella157 (talk) 09:16, 21 July 2017 (UTC)[reply]
"They calculated that by 16 August only 880 carriers remained, far short of the 1500 claimed by Morris less than a fortnight earlier; one or both these figures could be inaccurate, however it probably does give an approximation of how many carriers had deserted)" Moremon p157
And you're absolutely right. What we're looking at for August is about 6,000 lb per day over the Track, and about the same by air; which falls well short of 15,000 lb. For September, we're looking at around 27,000 lb per day down the Track and 10,000 by air. In October, about 23,000 per day down the track and 50,000 by air. But these are figures for the amount despatched; we probably need to discount the track by about 10% and and the air supply by 50% for losses. So air supply was critical, and the main LoC was down the Track until October. So Rowell's action, cutting back from three battalions to two makes perfect sense; this is what could be supported. Which brings us to the absurdity of the whole exercise:
  1. There was no point in sending forces down the Track without being able to supply them, either by air or overland;
  2. GHQ could promise aircraft, but it didn't have them;
  3. Diverting aircraft to unprofitable supply missions over the Track meant foregoing critical supplies, including spare parts needed to keep the aircraft operational.
Hawkeye7 (talk) 22:26, 21 July 2017 (UTC)[reply]
I think we now have a common understanding of of just how critical this was at this particular point in time and that it can be sourced. It is about making the significance clear in the article. I note Moremon's observation that these reversals bought the Japanese to the place where Morris (and Rowell) thought the battle should have been fought - but at a significant cost in manpower and resources. Cinderella157 (talk) 11:22, 23 July 2017 (UTC)[reply]
I had morning tea with John. He pointed out that the objective of the campaign to capture Buna, not hold Port Moresby. Hawkeye7 (talk) 23:02, 11 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]
The initial orders deploying the 39th were for the defence of Port Moresby. Subsequent orders were for the recapture of Kokoda and ultimately (later), for the capture of Buna. Any distinction is perhaps a matter of timing but also, the latter achieves the former. If we could return to the thread though and not get bogged down in semantics. The missing rats and the losses of 17 August were critical by their combination. This is about where the thread started. The situation did cause Potts to adopt a defencive posture. This cannot simply be attributed to a lack of resolve by Potts since you attribute actions to Rowell. Air supply was critical. Overland supply was well short of being able to support the force and the labour force just wasn't there. The supply situation dictated the disposition of Potts' force at the start of Isurava. You have previously argued a contrary position to each of these key points and each has been addressed, until we arrived at your last post but one. As an aside, a simple comparison of monthly figures does not consider how the length of the LoC changed over this time. However, this all comes back to addressing my initial comment of "just how significant the raid on 17 August was". Your initial response was "The 17 August air raid is mentioned, and the reader can see that the loss of seven aircraft out of thirty was a significant hit. MacArthur may sound like the Black Knight but (a) he really had seen worse and (b) as he pointed out, air supply was not critical; the main LoC was the Track." Could we please put all of this discussion to a useful end by "making the significance clear[er] in the article". Regards Cinderella157 (talk) 04:33, 12 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]
Added a bit about 21st Infantry Brigade assuming a defensive posture. Hawkeye7 (talk) 10:33, 12 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]
Hi, I note your edits but these still do not address the issue - specifically, the significance of the culmination of the missing rats and the losses on 17 August. To what you have added ... By your own (of above), Potts was to adopt a defencive posture in consequence. He was to relieve the 39th to reduce the logistical pressure. This he did as the Japanese attacked. The 2/16th was held back. These things were (as you acknowledge above) in accordance with Rowell. Yes, as you quote Williams, both his battalions were present at Isurava. This is not in dispute. Equally, the matter is that the logistical circumstances and his orders in consequence dictated the disposition of his forces as much as the capacity of the track to maneuver his forces (the 2/16th) to respond to the attack. His comment that his force was never "intact and available for a concerted operation ... solely due to delays occasioned by supply" was equally true. To quote Williams, that both of his battalions were present is correct but is done in such a way that ignores the detail. It consequently creates a POV that is not neutral. Williams does report that the 2/16th did soon arrive but leans in such a way that this was inconsequential? Williams' main argument is the myth that the Australians were outnumbered significantly. I don't disagree that overall, the numbers were comparable. However, such a simplistic argument ignores (to some degree or another) the impact of Japanese artillery. While he later observes this impact, at this point (in his conclusions) he largely ignores this and concentrates on numbers. However, this particular article is about the Australian logistics; however. It is pertinent to focus on how logistics shaped the Australian battle. These edits raise as many concerns as they address. As much to the point though, is this thread and the issue of the combination of the missing rats and the raid of 17 August - which remains unaddressed despite your acknowledgement in your most recent minus two (now). Cinderella157 (talk) 12:46, 12 August 2017 (UTC) [reply]

Readers, however, become aware of a tendency in almost all regimental histories, Australian included, to attribute eneiny successes to mechanical instrumentality—artillery fire, bombing and so forth—rather than to human ones; it is less hurtful to pride

Bean VI:34

I don't know what you think the article should say. It describes the 17 August air raid and its effects. That 20 replacement aircraft were sent, along with six whole squadrons. It details Rowell's decision to delay the 21st Infantry Brigade's attack on Kokoda until reserves were built up at Myola. The article is about logistics, and discusses how reserves were being built up at Myola. Was Potts' defeat the result of not having enough food or ammunition, of being heavily outnumbered, or, as you say, of faulty dispositions and tactics? Hawkeye7 (talk) 22:31, 12 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]
Yes, this article is about logistics. Yes, the dispositions were at fault but adopted in consequence of faulty logistics and significantly compounded by the losses of the 17th. That is what I would like it to say: "it delayed the arrival in the actual battle area of his tried 2/14th and 2/16th Battalions ... at a crucial time." (McC p199) Previously, you had suggested that the loss was not so significant because the track was the main LoC and the situation did not cause Potts to go on the defencive and you have made some edits by way of remedy. The effects you list were well down the track and did not resolve the immediate problem of a lack of planes. With only 6 days reserve and limited overland supply, the break would have consumed a significant portion of that reserve. The quantities dropped on 23 - 24 August look impressive but are only about 40% of consumption for balanced rations, without factoring in losses. The article is written such that masses given for biscuits and ration components are additional to the balanced rations and thereby raises the question of whether this is not double counting? Moremon (p179) refers to same, quoting primary sources and the quote does read to suggest that the 1500 complete rations might consist of these masses or is, at least ambiguous since it is not quoted fully. I can confirm the 7 Div sig to Maroubra [1] (p 109 of pdf). The biscuits and sundry rations were additional to the balanced rations. At 3lb a ration (a carrier load of 40 lb being 13 rations) this means that in the two days, about 4,500 standard rations (not emergency) were dropped. Without breakage or loss, this is about break-even. You indicate that the 2/27th was not sent forward so as not to compound the logistical problems further. I understand however, that it was held back more for the reason of securing PM and as divisional reserve (see McC p 202). The 39th was to be withdrawn to ease the situation but this did not happen until after Isurava. The article reads as if this actually happened before the fact. The article reads: "Potts' role was to be a defensive one until then. On 23 August, an aircraft dropped rations ...". This reads as if to suggest that these drops were the "until then" and that they solved the supply situation. Moremon treats the urgency of the situation as do most other sources. "Hamstrung by the original failure to build up supplies ahead of the Japanese attack" (Moremon p209). McC (p199) notes that Potts lost the initiative - not through action of the Japanese but through the logistical failure. Slightly out of chronology, Moremon (p150) observes: "As a result of the inability to deploy and adequately maintain a strong force in the mountains, NGF was hamstrung and Maroubra Force was withering." You do not indicate that the 2/16th was being held back around Myola in consequence. These are the reasons why Potts has made the statement in the report. The article reads as if these matters were all trifles and ultimately of no consequence to the outcome - that there is no validity in Potts' statement. Yes, our forces failed at Isurava and for a number of reasons - not just as a consequence of logistics but it was significant in how it affected the initial disposition of forces. To acknowledge the quote by Bean, it was perhaps not so much the Japanese success in destroying the aircraft but how this was responded to. Potts was obliged by Allen and Rowell to hold his forces back at Myola for a considerable time but also, to hold at Isurava (Williams p69). Logistics is as much a part of the "art" of warfare and gereralship as tactics and fighting. The logistics to support Potts broke down. A failure of logistics is just as much a failing of generalship as a failure of tactics. Cinderella157 (talk) 03:58, 13 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]
PS, there were human faults (per Bean) in both the missing rats and the 17 August raid and I don't dismiss these faults but highlight the consequences of the combination. Cinderella157 (talk) 10:06, 13 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]
Sure, and I wish more commanders would be relieved for it; but simply restricting your operations to the available resources does not constitute logistical failure. I have re-phrased the bit about the rations to make it clearer. McC says that Rowell informed Allen that "there could be no question of sending forward the third battalion of the 21st Brigade until the supply situation was sufficiently secure to enable offensive operations" (p. 198) On 26 August, Potts "repeated his request for the 2/27th. In reply Allen, responsible for the defence of Port Moresby itself from seaborne and airborne attack, referred to the Japanese landings which had taken place early that morning at Milne Bay, under instructions from New Guinea Force stated that it was inadvisable to send the 2/27th yet, and suggested that the relief of the 39th and their return to Port Moresby be expedited". According to Anderson (p. 62) Honner argued that Isurava could not be held by only one battalion, and that the 39th Battalion should stay a little longer. I have re-worded this.
But you bring up an interesting point. By your count and mine, the reserves at Myola had not been built up to the requested levels when Potts set out for Kokoda on 23 August. So... what happened? Hawkeye7 (talk) 07:38, 13 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]
I have just been reading. See: Potts pointed to the delay caused by the loss of that "at no. There is a word missing. Do you mean the loss of rations? Yes, it is prudent to limit operations to the available resources. However; Potts was obliged to defend Isurava (Williams p69) To this extent, the operation was not limited. Given the need to restrict operations, it might have been prudent to shorten the LoC toward Myola and establish a main defensive position closer, while still maintaining Isurava as a screen. That then could have been reinforced once the logistical situation firmed or have been used to delay the Japanese advance if it were attacked in the mean time. What happened though, is that Potts was obliged (ordered) to defend at Isurava. I understand that Potts moved the 2/14th forward to comply with the order to extract the 39th. But just as this was happening (with the advance companies arriving), the Japanese struck - causing Honner to remain and then drawing in the rest of the 2/14th and 2/16th piecemeal. Potts would have been damned for giving up Isurava too easily. As it was, he was damned by Blamey. The various orders Potts was given defined a course of action and took the initiative from him and there were inherent contradictions in being able to comply with the restrictions imposed upon him. While this is not a forum, I have indicated an alternative as a way of high-lighting these contradictions. To quote Moremon, he was "hamstrung" by the logistics. If not a logistical failure, then it was certainly a command failure (higher) to fail to adjust to the changed logistical situation or to maintain a belief that the logistical situation had not significantly changed and all was rosy. I then return to the point that it was not either on their own but the combination of events that held Potts back and put him on the back foot. This is my understanding of what happened. Cinderella157 (talk) 08:50, 13 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]
PS, If you question why Potts personally went forward earlier (as opposed to his force), then certainly, he was obliged to. Cinderella157 (talk) 11:50, 13 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]
That would have been a good plan. I might have also considered a reverse slope defence. On 23 August, Potts set out to recapture Kokoda, which was his intention as late as 25 August. (Anderson, p. 54) The order to retake Kokoda was not cancelled until 29 August. (p. 70) According to Honner, when the 2/14th reached reached him, it still had orders to push on to Kokoda, not to defend Isurava. He protested the order to withdraw the 39th, as he felt that one battalion could not hold Isurava. (p. 62) Added a quote by John Moremon. Hope this resolves the issue. Hawkeye7 (talk) 21:27, 13 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]
Reading the para, I think it needs a little context for the uninformed reader - what was Potts doing there. Can I suggest something like the following, noting that I have plucked Potts change of role out of where it presently sits but otherwise this would sit at the front of the present para.

When the raid of 17 August occurred, two battalions of the 21st Brigade under Potts were moving forward to reinforce Maroubra Force. Rowell was initially unconcerned for any immediate impact the raid might have on the Maroubra operation since he believed adequate reserves had been accumulated at Myola. As his advance companies were approaching Myola, it was Potts that discoverd that these reserves fell far short of what was expected and the loss of these planes now took on a critical [different] dimension. Where Potts had been ordered to quickly recapture Kokoda he was now ordered to adopt a defencive role until adequate stocks could be established at Myola.

Cinderella157 (talk) 01:12, 14 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

PS, you might qualify "defeated" (and withdrew or something) - again, for the sake of the uninformed reader, who might equate this as synonymous with captured. I will also say that the para more clearly exposes how logistics shaped the battle. Regards, Cinderella157 (talk) 08:02, 14 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Added. Hawkeye7 (talk) 12:50, 14 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

While we might agree to disagree on a number of points which may or may not benefit from a third opinion, there is still the matter if the number of carriers working along the track. Specifically: "On 9 October, there were 9,270 carriers working on the Track." as raised at Talk:Allied logistics in the Kokoda Track campaign#Number of carriers. As raised there, the source does not appear to support that this number was "working along the track" and other sources indicate a significantly lower number "working along the track". As previously indicated, this really needs to be resolved. Regards, Cinderella157 (talk) 10:42, 6 October 2017 (UTC)[reply]

checkY Re-worded. Hawkeye7 (discuss) 11:13, 6 October 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Comments from AustralianRupert

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Support: very impressive work, IMO. Far better than my own chicken scratchings could ever have hoped to produce. Thanks for your efforts. I have a few minor suggestions: AustralianRupert (talk) 10:10, 16 July 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Comments from Anotherclown

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  • Support - article looks in very good shape to me, only a few minor suggestions / nitpicks:
    • The tools seem to be broken at the moment so I wasn't able to check these. Earwig reveals no issues with close paraphrase though [2] (no action req'd).
      Per [3] you can replace dispenser.homenet.org with its IP address 69.142.160.183. But I wasn't going to change the template, as there was some argument about whether we should use IP addresses. Hawkeye7 (talk) 21:45, 25 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]
      Although I'm not an admin, I am a template editor, so I can make this change. It should work now, although you may need to refresh to pick up the latest version of the template. I'll put it back when dispenser.homenet.org becomes available again. Hawkeye7 (talk) 23:13, 25 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]
    • "...whereas the Japanese airfield at Lae and Salamaua..." should this be airfields (plural)?
      checkY Yes. Corrected. Hawkeye7 (talk) 21:45, 25 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]
    • Wording here is a bit of a mouthful "...The first Second Australian Imperial Force..." (first Second), perhaps consider rewording it to something like "The first unit of the Second Australian Imperial Force to arrive..."
      checkY That one was bothering me too. Changed. Hawkeye7 (talk) 21:45, 25 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]
    • "...having returned to Australia from the Middle East just four weeks before..." I wonder if some readers will know why it was in the Middle East? Could this do with a brief explanation?
      There's no article on Stepsister. If there was I would link it. I am not sure how or where I could add such an explanation. Hawkeye7 (talk) 21:45, 25 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]
    • "Brigadier Arnold Potts therefore decided on 24 August..." this is the 2nd time Potts is mentioned so probably should just be surname and remove the link per WP:REPEATLINK.
       Done. Hawkeye7 (talk) 21:45, 25 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]
    • I did a light copy-edit [4] but otherwise this looks fine to me. Anotherclown (talk) 13:58, 25 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Support I really should have looked in on this review ages ago. The article is in excellent shape, and easily meets the A-class criteria. I have only one minor comment:

The discussion above is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.
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