Talk:Battle of Campo Maior

Balancing

Campo Mayor was a controversial action, Oman, good historian though he usually was, took only the Beresford side of the argument into consideration when writing about it. I have introduced some material highlighting the controversy and some information from the Long/Napier side. Many accounts dwell on the overlong pursuit made by the 13th LD and completely ignore that startling fact that only two and a half squadrons of British cavalry routed six French squadrons (actually 5 French squadrons and 1 Spanish squadron from a "juramentado", quisling, unit). I did a lot of research on this cavalry clash for a magazine article I wrote some time ago. Urselius (talk) 09:13, 4 May 2010 (UTC)

I was wondering out of the 2400 Frenchmen participating in this combat, how many of them were cavalrymen? Secondly, what went wrong for the French here? Because the odds seemed stacked against the allies. --Guard Chasseur 20:00, 11 May 2010.

According to Lapene the French infantry were 1200 strong, the bulk of the remainder would have been cavalry - the half battery of horse artillery seem to have been undermanned or underhorsed as they were sent ahead with the seige guns not retained with the rest of the French force, where they would have been invaluable had they been in a useful state. The odds were very much in favour of the allies. Long's cavalry, 15 and a half squadrons, was just the advance guard of an 18000 strong army. Colonel Colborne (who later had his brigade shredded by lancers at Albuera and was instrumental in defeating the Imperial Guard infantry at Waterloo) was in command of the leading elements of the British infantry. He witnessed the charge of the 13th LD and later told Long that he was in a position to cut off the French force but was halted by Beresford when he asked for supports. British infantry were, therefore, not very far away from the French at the time of the 13th LD's charge.

Lots of things went right for the French. Given that they were heavily outnumbered they were very lucky to escape. Central to their luck was Beresford's obvious reluctance to commit his forces fully, and his apparent inability to co-ordinate his forces to mount a coherent attack on the French. The French cavalry, however, performed very patchily. The 26th Dragoons charged with elan but were broken by the 13th in the melee following the charge. For a force of 6 squadrons to be put to flight by 2.5 squadrons (with 2 small Portuguese squadrons guarding their flank) is quite poor. The two French squadrons left supporting the infantry performed much better and, following the rout of the other French cavalry, charged the 1st Portuguese Dragoons and put them to flight.Urselius (talk) 08:13, 13 May 2010 (UTC)

There's one question that's puzzling me. The Anglo-Portuguese drove the French back after initial progress, but then were met with heavy fire from Badajoz and, following a sortie of cavalry, were driven back in turn. The cannons were recaptured. Shouldn't this be a French victory???? --Guard Chasseur (talk) 16:50, 11 May 2010.

The French should have been destroyed, but they escaped largely due to poor communication between Beresford and his subordinate commanders and Beresford's lack of decisive leadership, escaping destruction isn't the same as being victorious. The sortie from Badajoz didn't really achieve much, they just picked up a few straggling allied cavalrymen. Having 6 squadrons of cavalry broken by 2.5 squadrons and then to be chased more than 6 miles can hardly qualify as a victory. Cannon to the artillery were equivalent to standards for other troops, to lose one on the field of battle was an equivalent disgrace. Overall, the relative casualties and the loss of a piece of artillery make it a French defeat, though it should have been a much more complete defeat than it was.Urselius (talk) 09:43, 15 May 2010 (UTC)