Talk:Battle of Cannae/Archive 4

Archive 1

Archive 2

Archive 3

Archive 4

Casualties

Polybius' claim, 70,000 were killed, is almost certainly exaggerated. Around 52,000 is Livyus guess. Right, some people don't have a very good understanding of some terms. So I'll make it 100% clear okay. A casualty DOES NOT MEAN SOMEONE WHO HAS DIED!!!!!! A casualty is a person who is dead, wounded or missing. Somme's first day might have had more casualties that Cannae, Somme about 60k casualties, cannae about 52k depending who you talk to. BUT!!!!!! almost every casualty at the battle of cannae was also a fatality!!! Only around 20k of the 60k casualties at the first day of the somme were fatalities So, recap. 20,000ish Died at the first day of the somme, 50,000ish at Cannae. NEXT!!!! Borodino Borodino had 66,500-125,000 casualties according the wiki article on here. BUT ONLY 25%-33% were fatalities. So thats 20,000ish to 45,000ish. The highest possible fatalities at that battle, 45,000 is lower than the lowest possible number at Cannae 50,000 So, recap again. 20,000-45,000 died at Borodino, and at least 50,000 at Cannae, probably more!! So before you edit this article again. Please make sure you have a full grasp of the differences between a casualty and a fatality ---OOPSIE- 17:38, 9 January 2006 (UTC)

The key point here is that its unknown how many Roman's fought, how many died, and how many were captured. The estimate's very widely on how many were actually killed.--Cannae 20:19, 10 January 2006 (UTC)

Your numbers need work. You mention the Roman army fielded 80,000 men at Cannae - which is generally seen as correct. How, then, did the Romans suffer between 70,000 and 80,000 casualties *and* have 16,000 survive to escape? 96,000 is a higher number than 80,000 in most numerical systems.

I have heard that the battle of Cannae had the greatest number killed in a battle in one day in all of history, more even than the first day of the Somme. Is this true? If so, this should be given a mention. Gingekerr 21:43, 14 Mar 2004 (UTC)

Highly unlikely. In the ancient world perhaps, but my sources don't even make that claim. Stan 14:02, 15 Mar 2004 (UTC)

User:-OOPSIE just added that to the page. However, Hiroshima may have seen 80,000 deaths when it was bombed, which probably exceeds this. The Battle of the Somme (1916) had 57,000 British casualties, but only about 19,000 deaths. I note that above and below, the casualty numbers are debated. So, perhaps that sentence should be reverted.... This is not my area of knowledge, so I defer. --Habap 6 July 2005 16:56 (UTC)

I'm pretty new to wikipedia, so sorry if I mess up. Cannae had 50,000 to 60,000 deaths, the first day of the somme had only 19,000. And Hiroshima wasn't really a battle to the way I see the meaning of battle, since it was more of a moment of slaughter, than two armies battling against each other.-OOPSIE- 6 July 2005 17:20 (UTC)

As noted on User Talk:-OOPSIE-, I get it now. --Habap 6 July 2005 19:06 (UTC)

The Battle of Plataeai (Plataea according to wikipedia, yikes) was most likely deadlier, even by conservative accounts. I will not edit, but if anyone is interested in looking into it, it would be nice. Further, the Battle of Mycale may have taken place on the same day, hence this might be the deadliest day in history by far. cangelis 02 (12:47 GMT+02:00) Aug 2005

If I'm not mistaken, at Platea Mardonius had more soldies (2.5k) than Hannibal and Rome had at Cannae combined. Cannae might be the single bloodiest day percentage wise for the percent killed of those deployed (60-70% Roman/10-30% Hannibal).--Cannae 22:30, 5 January 2006 (UTC)

I would like to note that this page is inconsistent as to the number of casualties with the page Second Punic War. In particular, that page claims that less than a hundred Romans survived. Pmetzger 19:16, 3 Aug 2004 (UTC)T

No one here has mentioned The Battle of Salamis, which may have had as many as 100,000 casualties, nearly all of which were fatal drownings.

I do believe drownings are always fatal. ;-)

Roman Forces

I think the number about Roman Forces should be revised. As far as I know, there are two versions on that:

1 - Romans had 2 "standard" Consular armies, each consisting of 2 legions, for a total of 4 legions.

2 - Romans had 2 "augmented" consular armies, each consisting of 4 legions, for a total of 8 legions.

This should set the Roman forces at 6000x4=24000 or 6000x8=48000 legionary infantry, plus the cavalry and auxiliary troops.

Moreover, during the early republic there were no legions formed entirely by Italic allies. Instead, every single legion was formed by approximately the same number of Roman and Allied men, organized in manipuli.

"The term 'legion' was apt to mean one Roman and one allied legion, nearly ten thousand men. Thus the usual consular armies was really two Roman and two allied legions, eighteen to twenty thousand men, of which eighteen hundred were horsemen."-Dodge pg. 57. Furthermore almost every Roman legion was augmented in some way or another, either with more foot or horse. In the standard 'blueprint' legion, there was supposed to be of both 1,200 velites, principes and hastati (1200 x 3 = 3600). Their were supposed to be 600 triarii and 300 horse (600 in allied legions). This all adds up to about (3600 + 300 + 600 = 4500) to about 4,500 soldiers in a standard Roman Legion and 4,800 in a standard Allied Legion. As I said before, almost every legion was augmented in some way, varying in size from the standard 4.5 k to upwards of 6,000. Aemillius Paullus had 6,00 per legion while in Macedon. Scipio had 5,200 per legion at Zama. At this stage in the Republic it was well established custom that Rome and its Allies fought as seperate legions, but alternated positions in battle line, i.e. Horse | Roman | Allied | Roman | Allied | Horse.--Cannae 23:19, 5 January 2006 (UTC)

Roman Tactics

Like many people, I've always wondered how this battle came to be such a disaster. How do you surround a larger force with a smaller one? If Hannibal had his weakest troops in the centre, why weren't the Roman legionaries able to break through them like they did at Trebia and Trasimene?

This isn't so hard to understand if you think about the geometry. Assuming roughly constant spacing between men, the number of troops in each unit should be roughly proportional to its area. The area of the surrounded unit rises as a square law with its size, while the surrounding unit is only circumference x thickness of cordon, which can be linear. Thus the larger and larger the two forces are, the less effectively the surrounded unit can apply its combat power, and the less relevant is its numerical advantage. Here are some concrete figures for illustration: let us assume 1m² per man, and that the Romans, at their most desperate plight, were forced into a circle. Then the 70,000 actually on the field would be in a circle 300 m in diameter, with just 938 on the circumference in a position to fight. They could, in principle, be surrounded by as few as 944 men; the Carthaginians actual 50,000 could have formed a cordon up to 46 men deep. In such a configuration they would have fought roughly one on one, with the Carthaginian's superior training and experience counting for more, and the Roman's 7:5 advantage totally negated. None of this discussion is meant to be an analysis of the actual tactics, just to point out that it is actually perfectly feasible for a smaller force to surround a larger one, and advantageous too. -- Securiger 07:39, 2 August 2005 (UTC)

I agree with that from a mathematical perspective (I double-checked the figures and they look right to me) but I wasn't really talking from a mathematical perspective. There are two problems as I see it - how do you get your enemy into this nice, neat circle, and how do you kill them once they are there. To answer the first one, you've got to explain what was different about this battle rather than the ones that came before it. One of the sources (from memory I think it was Polybius) suggests that in the year before Cannae strenuous efforts were made to improve the training of the legionaries, which was viewed as a failing at the previous battles. So I don't think simple "the Carthaginians were better soldiers and Hanibal was a genius" statements explain the difference. Equally, once troops start to retreat, it is very, very difficult for them to stop. So what caused the Carthaginian centre to hold, contrary to all experience? I've suggested one (admittedly far fetched) possibility - another is that the river was behind the Carthaginian centre and that caused it to hold. But to me the idea that the barbarian troops in the centre executed a careful retreat until just the right point is the most far-fetched of all.

OK, so assume that by whatever method, you have your Romans arranged in a nice neat circle. How do you get rid of them? I'm not very convinced by the idea of a long series of one to one combats where the superior weapons handling skill of the Carthaginian allowed them to butcher the Romans for negligible casualties. The normal method for causing large casualties in an ancient battle was to get your opponents to run, and then mow them down with your cavalry (see Xenophon). In contrast, forcing them into a position where they have nowhere to retreat is likely to nullify the better training and morale of you own troops rather than taking advantage of it (see Sun Tzu). People who have no choice tend to fight pretty well...

Modern experience tells us that a large crowd of panic stricken people in a constrained area will lead to people being crushed to death (see football tragedies, the Hajj). In fact, Livy provides a lot of evidence for this being the case here - those people who dug themselves into the ground were definitely panicking, and the behaviour sounds like someone trying to escape a fatal crush.

Interesting discussion, though! Mike Moreton 15:10, 21 July 2006 (UTC)

Here's the only theory I can come up with.

Trasimene and Trebia were both heavy defeats for the Romans. It's just possible that in the recriminations that must have followed, someone blamed the legionaries who cut their way out for not staying to help their colleagues.

So maybe, when the Carthaginian centre began to collapse, it was actually someone in the van of the Roman army who gave the order to halt. With that huge depth of legionaries behind, some of whom were beginning to be pressed from the sides and behind, utter confusion would have been caused. The retreating Carthaginian centre would have seen their foes halted and in confusion, and would have counter-attacked.

At this point the entire Roman army would have been in panic, and it's possible that the majority of them were killed by crushing, not by Carthaginian weapons.

Just a theory...

Why can't some people just accept that on the day of battle the Carthaginians were better soldiers lead by Hannibal an ackowledged millitary genius of all times? The carthaginian Army was as much a mercenary army and more professional at that point than the Roman army which in the early early repblic was not a professional force. That made part of the difference. Now by the end of the second punic war those men who survived cannae, transimene etc were hardy veterans looking for revenge led by Scipio Africanus who was at least as good of a general as Hannibal. Hannibals army of carthaginans that he raised to conter Scipio (in the last battle of the Second punic war fought just outside Carthage) was mostly inexperenced.

Dont believe me here is a source. http://www.barca.fsnet.co.uk/army-carthage.htm

--68.164.231.3 20:04, 2 Jun 2005 (UTC)

Not all of Hannibal's army was as good as the Romans. His well trained Africans and Spaniards who were armed with Roman plunder were most likely far better than the standard Roman legionary, but the Gauls and Italics were most likely far worse vis a vis equiptment, tactics and training. His Cavalry, it goes without saying, was vastly superior. Rome's tactics depended upon the mass of the legionaries, as well as their discipline, to simply step forward and shatter the weaker elements of Hannibal's line. The only reason that this did not happen was 1.) Hannibal's convex line, 2.) Hannibal's retention of his African's on the flanks, and 3.) Hannibal's enormous cavalry victory and subsequent deployment of the cavalry and his flank 'reserve'. The discipline and skill of Rome's army was shown by the savage battle that still raged in the center after they lost both consuls (one to flight) and were penned in. While they were somewhat ill-trained, they were still soldiers from one of the most martial societies ever.--Cannae 22:41, 5 January 2006 (UTC)

When Hannibal's centre moved backwards, the Romans fighting them moved as well. Hannibal's flanks however, remained stationary, as did the Romans fighting them. When any crowds of people are together, they will naturally "flow" into space (like sand in a funnel)- in this case the only availible space was in the centre, where the Romans were advancing and therefore freeing up space in their ranks. Consequently there would have been more men in the Roman centre and less men on their flanks. This enabled Hannibal's flanks to envelop the Romans- despite higher numbers, they had naturally squashed themselves into a relatively small area.

As for why so many were killed, there are myriad factors. Loss of formation and discipline (with so many men all fighting at the same time, the noise must have drowned out any commands coming from officers). The Romans would have been crushed together as well- fighting against a crowd is hard enough in the best of circumstances. With everyone around wearing some armour and being armed with wepaons and shields, it must have been very chaotic, and probably exhausted the Romans. Panic also works both ways- for every man who resolves to go out fighting, there is a man who drops his weapon and develops a sudden bout of incontinence. Canislupisbarca 13:15, 5 October 2007 (UTC)

Wrong info about the battle's execution

To the above poster - this battle was the most people killed in one day UNDER THE COMMAND of one field general. so, patton for example, never kllled that many people in one day. ya know?

to the other above poster - The weak Gallic center did not break 1) because the Gauls were fierce warriors who wanted revenge for their own war with Rome and 2) because the Romans could not even swing their swords because they were being crushed together by the elite african phalanxes. Roman spearmen were usually in the rear of the army to deal with cavalry or for emergency situations... the romans in the front were short sword carriers and the roans couldn't break out of the sides because the punic infantry used phalanx discipline and romans were short swords probably couldnt even TOUCH them. Also keep in mind that Hannibal himself was behind the Gauls and his presence must have inspired the center to hold fast.

The dusty wind also blew in the Roman front line's direction with a strong gust - thus "Pushing" the gauls into the Romans and giving them an advantage on the field.

Now, the major inaccuracu in the article is that Hannibals cavalry only fought and won on Hannibal's left flank. the numidian light cavalry and the roman light cabalry were waiting around not doing much of anything. the spanish/gallic heavy cavalry won against the outnumbered romans, then charged across the back of the roman lines in a show of great discipline and rode towards the roman light cavalry. the roman light cavalry werer young pretty boy nobles, and when they saw the spears of the heavy cavalry instead of the lighter weapons of the numidian cavalry, they ran. in fact, the carthaginians pointed their spears upwards towards the roman youths' faces to scare them from potential scars.

You're mixing up stories, Caesar at Pharsalus commanded his soldiers to slash Pompey's noble cavalry in the face or near it, so they'd shie back. According to most historians, including Dodge, the Roman left was allied cavalry while the right was Roman. Rome is notorious for its bad cavalry so there is some reason to think the allied contingent was the stronger, but neither would be termed 'light' cavalry. I have read a few books on the subject of Hannibal, but never have I seen it credited that the wind "pushed" the Gauls into the Romans. I have read that is blinded and disheartened them, a morale rather than physical force. And to invoke Gallic hatred of Rome as a valid argument for the Carthaginian center is rather silly. The center could have broken, the key word is key, we do not know. If it did break, the break obviously would have been small and hard to exploit 1) because of Rome's enormous front and 2) because Hannibal backed his army on the river. Most sources agree that the line held, but it was a rather tenuous position at best. Hannibal's subsequent deployment of his Africans halted the Roman advance. A further point which seems to be missing from this talk page is the fact that Varro effectively merged his first and second lines, destroying one of Rome's best weapons, its versatility/mobility. By pushing the Principes' maniples into the gaps between the Hastati's maniples, Varro eliminated about 2/3rds of his reserve capabilities which would have been used to deal with the threat of the Africans.--Cannae 23:03, 5 January 2006 (UTC)

Strategy & Tactics

Aren't tactics used on a single battlefield and strategy in a campaign? Why would someone have changed it to be wrong? --Habap 17:26, 20 October 2005 (UTC)

Someone have a reference/source to this information: "The Libyan troops in fact carried spears "shorter than the Roman Triarii""?????

I always tought the libyans fought on some kind of phalanx (probably with shorter spears than the sarisa), due to the greek technics in training that Carthage have imported before the war.

Delete it. It is simply nonsense. They did have longer spears and according to Polybius they had to hide them before the engagement with the Romans. Wandalstouring 09:04, 17 August 2007 (UTC)

mathematical analysis

"This isn't so hard to understand if you think about the geometry. Assuming roughly constant spacing between men, the number of troops in each unit should be roughly proportional to its area. The area of the surrounded unit rises as a square law with its size, while the surrounding unit is only circumference x thickness of cordon, which can be linear. Thus the larger and larger the two forces are, the less effectively the surrounded unit can apply its combat power, and the less relevant is its numerical advantage. Here are some concrete figures for illustration: let us assume 1m2 per man, and that the Romans, at their most desperate plight, were forced into a circle. Then the 70,000 actually on the field would be in a circle 300 m in diameter, with just 938 on the circumference in a position to fight. They could, in principle, be surrounded by as few as 944 men; the Carthaginians actual 50,000 could have formed a cordon up to 46 men deep. In such a configuration they would have fought roughly one on one, with the Carthaginian's superior training and experience counting for more, and the Roman's 7:5 advantage totally negated. None of this discussion is meant to be an analysis of the actual tactics, just to point out that it is actually perfectly feasible for a smaller force to surround a larger one, and advantageous too" the geographic and mathematic analysis of the battle above is extremely intresting perhaps it could be incorporated into the article.--Gary123 15:48, 19 December 2005 (UTC)

HOOK!

OF GAUUUUUUUUL! --Tykell 23:09, 29 January 2006 (UTC)

Why would you deliberately publish false information?--User:Soul Catcher 06:44, 30 January 2006 (UTC)

OF GAUUUUUL!!!!!!!!!!! --Tykell 20:37, 30 January 2006 (UTC)

Images

I miss images in this article, especially since the descriptions of formations are easier to understand if there is some form of drawings. I`m not too familiar with which pictures wikipedia can use, but I understand that american government material doesn`t have copyright. (Am I right?) What about United States Military Academy[1]? Can we use images like this[2]?Shauni 14:22, 16 February 2006 (UTC)

I just realised one thing about the image I put a link too: Why does it say 215 BC? Shauni 18:16, 17 February 2006 (UTC)

I agree. This article is in desperate need of images and diagrams. I'll put up a request. If I knew how to upload images, I would do it myself :-( --chub 03:05, 17 February 2006 (UTC)

Images for the article

there are some very good (I think) images that could help this article at http://www.roman-empire.net/army/cannae.html , I just don't know if adding them to the article would violate any copyright restrictions...

Putting them in would normally violate copyright - but, why not write the author (they have an e-mail contact link on the page) and ask for permission? Then it is no longer a copyright violation - and the owner gets to specifically control the use in Wikipedia. - Vedexent 15:58, 26 March 2006 (UTC)

Peer review?

You can probably take that banner off - there really wasn't a peer review - and the top of the page is getting crowded :) - Vedexent 15:59, 26 March 2006 (UTC)

Directions?

"In addition, the Carthaginian forces had maneuvered so that the Romans would face south, while they would face north. Not only would the morning sunlight face towards the Romans..." Ummm...didn't the sun rise in the east in Hannibal's time? The map shows the armies lined up east-west, so I'm going to reword it. Clarityfiend 23:30, 11 June 2006 (UTC)

Fatal casualties, Cannae vs Passchendaele

I know this has been referenced to Bradford, 1981 but I believe the claim "More men were killed at Cannae than in all the four months of the Battle of Passchendaele" is misleading. Estimates of casualties at Passchendaele are up to 700,000 or more, with approximately one-third killed. It is thus safe to say over 200,000 men were killed during Passchendaele, far more than the total at Cannae. Not all these bodies were recovered so many were listed as missing. In some sources the total reported toll of Passchendaele dead was about 75,000, with an equal number listed as missing. But the vast majority of those listed as missing would have been killed.

So basically the death toll at Cannae exceeds the death toll in the four months of Passchendaele ONLY if the HIGHEST estimate is used for Cannae and the LOWEST estimate used for Passchendaele. I believe this reference should be removed because it is far from conclusive. Regards, --203.213.7.130 00:38, 2 July 2006 (UTC)

If the statement is referenced, then it should remain. No matter if you perceieve it as inconclusive, it is validated by a source. If you feel the need to mention that the deaths at Passchendaele may be higher than what the article suggests, then by all means do so, but you would have to cite your soure as well. Chubdub 09:32, 2 August 2006 (UTC)

Passchendaele, a battle fought in an era which reliable records were kept that can be checked. Cannae fought in an era where such book keeping was not remotely so reliable. Add to that the two figures we have for Cannae differ so wildly. The crucial point is that the Roman field army was destroyed as fighting force but how many actally lay dead on the field and how many just ran back to their farms is impossible to determine today - not withstanding the guesses of Livy and Polybus.Dejvid 13:24, 2 August 2006 (UTC)

Fraustadt

I think the Battle of Fraustadt should be mention in the Historical significance section. The battles were very similar and to my knowledge the closest anyone has come to repeating Hannibal’s success. --Carl Logan 15:18, 24 July 2006 (UTC)

Unclear sentence

"He placed his lowest quality infantry (Iberians, Gauls and Celtiberians) in the middle, alternating the two across the front line to strengthen it." What two? And how did it strengthen the line? Clarityfiend 05:51, 13 November 2006 (UTC)

This is a bit silly

If true, this makes the Battle of Cannae one of the single bloodiest battles in all of recorded human history, in terms of the number of lives lost within a day. The total number of lives lost surpasses the number of servicemen killed in the Royal Air Force throughout World War I and World War II.[3] More men were killed at Cannae than in all the four months of the Passchendaele, which is considered one of the bloodiest battles of World War I.[9] So devastating were these losses, that the total number of casualties represents just under one third of the total number of American soldiers, sailors, and airmen killed in four years of fighting during World War II.[3] In fact, the losses suffered within a single day on the battlefield of Cannae (no larger than a few square miles), would not be rivaled until the first day of fighting on the Somme in 1916 — which took place on a 25-mile (40 km) front over 2,000 years later.[12]

How many comparisons are going to be made here? Simply saying it is one of the most costly battles and then linking to the most costly battles list should be sufficient, rather than comparisons that don't really make much sense - who knows how many servicemen died in the RAF in WWI and WWII? If you don't know, it is not a meaningful comparison, if you do know, then you already knew the difference. This just comes off as a bad documentary. Only the last sentence is worth keeping. Sad mouse 05:07, 23 January 2007 (UTC)

Probably give the number it ranks on the list (about thirtieth, and not even the highest ancient battle), because that is a sensible comparison and better than simply saying "it is on the list of the most costly". Sad mouse 05:10, 23 January 2007 (UTC)

I agree with sad mouse. These comparisons are in poor taste and also fairly meaningless. Dr Spam (MD) 07:19, 23 January 2007 (UTC)

I think this is a more appropriate way to compare the casuality toll

The total casualty figure of the battle, therefore, exceeds 80,000 men. At the time when Cannae was fought, it was probably the third most costly battle in history, behind only the Battle of Salsu and the Battle of Plataea. Until the Mongol invasions, ~1500 years later, it was ranked in the ten most costly battles in human history, and even in modern times the death toll remains in the fifty most lethal battles in world history. Sad mouse 16:00, 23 January 2007 (UTC)

Provide a source for more than 80,000 casualties. It sounds like a misquote to me. Wandalstouring 10:29, 27 February 2007 (UTC)

It is a bit silly actually, comparing Cannae to half the battles of the 20th century. (82.28.237.200 (talk) 13:23, 30 August 2008 (UTC))

Missing Historian

Peter Connolly is mentioned in the text, without citation, and without appearing in the article's bibliography.... Anyone care to remedy this? Paul James Cowie 05:48, 23 January 2007 (UTC)

It's most likely from Peter Connolly's Greece and Rome at War, but I don't have the publication data on that book (I've read it, but don't own it). IMO, one of the better resources on the ancient armies, but (sadly) out-of-print. The Dark 14:19, 24 January 2007 (UTC)

Name

I was seeing the picture of the route of Invasion of Hannibal and I wonder if there was "Spain" in 216 BC? Or just "Iberia"?RMVAC 10:31, 23 January 2007 (UTC)

Spain is used as a geographic location, Iberian peninsula works too, but Iberia was anything on the fringes of the world in classical geography (for example the Caucasus was called Iberia, etc.) Wandalstouring

Date

Would it be prudent to add a reference beside the uses of the month "August" to denote that the month was called "Sextilis" at the time when this battle was fought? Oberiko 14:33, 23 January 2007 (UTC)

No, just do it. Wandalstouring 10:25, 27 February 2007 (UTC)

Map title

I enjoyed the article, but I'd point out that there's a typo on the first map's title: "Thrird". qp10qp 17:44, 23 January 2007 (UTC)

Fixed Kmusser 14:01, 24 January 2007 (UTC)

It's not showing up for me yet.

There's something odd about the title box for "The Second Punic War", too. "Hannibal dominates Rome about the Third B.C." isn't quite right. Even if "century" were added, that phrasing still wouldn't really work, in my opinion. I hate to be picky because these maps are useful, and I love maps. qp10qp 15:55, 24 January 2007 (UTC)

You're right, these came out of a government publication, errors and all. The first one was an obvious typo, but I'm not sure what the second one would be changed to.Kmusser 17:38, 24 January 2007 (UTC)

As for the map showing up you probably just need to clear out your cache. Kmusser 17:39, 24 January 2007 (UTC)

I see it now. Seamless! Cheers. qp10qp 15:27, 25 January 2007 (UTC)

STOP THE VANDALIZATION

PLEASE STOP VANDALIZING!!!!

71.241.145.126 23:14, 23 January 2007 (UTC)

Someone wrote..."god was in this battle" in the beginning of the article. Regardless of whether you believe in god or not (and I do) I think that this is the equivalent of graffiti. Wikipedia provides a public service to many people who can't afford an Encyclopedia so please stop vandalizing...

Small change

Furthermore, the strict laws of the Roman state required that high command alternate between the two consuls — thus restricting strategic flexibility.

I don't think that "flexibility" is the proper word here--if anything, multiple leaders would lead to TOO MUCH flexibility. Thus, I have changed the word to "consistency." --Lode Runner 04:05, 21 February 2007 (UTC)

Atlernative View Section

Someone with IP 142.179.57.130 recently added this large section (which I have moved to the end of the article). At present I don't think it satisfies http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:NPOV. It doesn't cite its sources. I don't know enough about Cannae to say whether there is any academic controversy around the generally accepted version or not so I have left it in for now. I think that this section needs some serious work if it is stay in. Tomgreeny 22:51, 26 February 2007 (UTC)

Battle of Cannae - An alternate view

An unfortunate fact of the historical analysis surrounding the Battle of Cannae is that insufficient weight has been given to an entirely different, yet plausible, reconstruction of the battle, which greatly reduces the size of the Roman army present, and the number of casualties suffered on the Roman side. Too many observers have taken all of Polybius's possibly exaggerated statements at face value, ignoring a contradictory account found in Livy, for example. One of his sources said that only four legions, reinforced by 10,000 men, fought at Cannae. As for Polybius's statement that eight legions were present at the battle, this number is less believable than it might be, because earlier in his history, Polybius reports that four legions were conscripted after the Battle of Lake Trasimene, while Livy tells us that the dictator Fabius had only two legions at this time. One historian (in the first edition of the Cambridge Ancient History) suggested that Polybius was mistranslating the Latin terminology, and accidentally doubling the number of legions.

Livy's account of four heavily reinforced legions present at Cannae is also more likely for several other reasons. First, this would still have been by far the largest army ever put into the field by the Roman Republic. The Romans always moved in incremental steps, so it seems more likely that they reinforced a double consular army with 10,000 extra legionaries, as Livy reports may have been the case, rather than fielding the gigantic force reported by Polybius - something they had no prior experience of doing. Another reason for doubting Polybius's account has to do with the number of allies present on the battlefield. Rome had to be extremely careful calling up the allies for military duty. In normal circumstances, the allies (including the Latins) made up (give or take) approximately half a double consular army, roughly 20,000 out of 40,000 men total. The doubtful Polybian figure of 87,000 men present at Cannae may have been arrived at by assuming that the allies made up their usual proportion of 50%, matching the supposed eight Roman legions present at the battle. However, it is not at all clear that so many allies could be called up on such short notice, especially after the heavy allied losses already suffered in the war, also taking into consideration the political difficulties of placing such a heavy burden on peoples of perhaps wavering or doubtful loyalty. Maybe that accounts for Livy's mention of Roman legionary reinforcements prior to Cannae, but no specific mention of an increase in allied field strength, except the allied cavalry, which were doubled in strength. According to Livy, allied infantry strength remained the same, which makes it difficult to accept Polybius's battlefield accounting.

This set of doubts has prompted numerous historians to suggest that the Roman force at Cannae did not exceed 50,000 men, with the casualties suffered reduced accordingly. Another reason for reducing the casualty count is that we can be certain that upwards of 8,000 Roman infantry, (not allies) along with some of their military tribunes, occupying the centre of the line at Cannae, escaped from the battlefield to fight another day. This directly contradicts the usual assertion that Hannibal succeeded in trapping the entire Roman force. Perhaps these men pierced the Carthaginian line in one group, just as they did at the Trebia, or maybe scattered units managed to break out in the confusion and dust of battle. Either way, the Carthaginian trap could not have been as airtight as reported, which means that part of the traditional account of the battle is certainly wrong. The 8,000 or so escapees were sent to Sicily as punishment, and not permitted to return to Italy until Hannibal was no longer on Italian soil. We have not been told if there was a specific reason for this severe penalty inflicted on Roman citizen soldiers, but it is possible that orders were disobeyed, or that units panicked without sufficient cause, spooked by the professionalism, brilliance, and growing repute of the Carthaginian forces. Maybe the Senate simply felt that an example had to be set, and that running away from Hannibal was no longer an option. Later in the war, other disgraced units were sent to join this force in Sicily. (These highly experienced veterans later formed the nucleus of Scipio Africanus's army sent to Africa.)

If some or all of the above is true, it's possible that Cannae was not anywhere near as disastrous to Rome as the exaggerators would have it. Maybe the casualties were in the range of 30,000 men, still bad enough, but nothing like the highly doubtful Polybian figure of 70,000. This reconstruction of the battle also allows for around 8,000 captured -- on the battlefield, and in the two abandoned Roman camps. However, Livy also reports that in the aftermath Varro assembled 10,000 survivors at Canusium, which would reduce the casualty count even further. This view of the battle relegates Cannae to a disaster slightly more serious than the Battle of Trebia two years earlier, but not the catastrophe which too many historians have fallen in love with, and embellished into the perfect battle of encirclement and annihilation. Historians, military theorists, and commanders, from Schlieffen to Schwartzkopf, would like to have such a battle to hold up as an example of perfection, but Cannae may not actually have been what they would like it to be.

Other doubts about the reporting of Cannae are political in nature. If Varro was such a bad commander, why was he offically thanked by the Senate for "not despairing of the Republic?" Why was he given high command on other occasions later in the war? Why was he not prosecuted, as other failures or incompetents were taken to court? It must be that the Romans were coming to the belated and painful realization that their systems of command, training, and tactics were simply not up the Carthaginian standard. The decision to fight a pitched battle at Cannae with an improperly trained army had been shown to be a monumental blunder, and the mistake was not repeated. Varro was not the problem. The problem was expecting too many raw recruits in a conscript army to succeed against the far more experienced and professional Carthaginian forces. It would take many years to remedy this deficiency.

I moved the section out of the FA and on the discussion page. The anonymous user has some valid points and modern historiography does consider them. The article's information does not reflect state of science. The problem is that these are currently unsourced claims inserted into an FA article. To improve them we should discuss things point by point and integrate all sourceable views into the article. Wandalstouring 23:26, 26 February 2007 (UTC)

The source could be a design/historical note, supposedly by Richard Berg, for the Cannae scenario of his SPQR wargame. But I haven't made a thorough comparison, just skimmed over the above addition and checked the info was indeed in SPQR and not some other game. Whether a two page note in a wargame is an acceptable source is anotehr question.--Caranorn 23:51, 26 February 2007 (UTC)

Author of "Cannae, an alternate view."

I am the author of the section "Cannae, an alternate view." I am new to Wikipedia, user name "esf456." Interested parties can reach me at eric.fernatgmail.com. I wrote the piece because the main article, unfortunately, is not written from an expert perspective, and repeats uncritically too many doubtful assertions about the battle. It ought to be completely re-written. In writing the short insertion, I could have included many more points that throw doubt on this article. For example, the original author is obviously not aware that Livy states categorically the Romans did not employ as heavy infantry any forces except Roman citizens, and members of the Latin confederacy. The term "allies" is thrown around carelessly and needs to be far more specific. As for source citation, I can cite sources for every assertion I made in the piece, both modern historians, and Livy, of course.

I stand by my main point that Cannae has attracted all sorts of historical hyperbole from people who want to be able to cite an example of "the perfect battle." Even the renowned John Keegan gets into the act. In his "History of Warfare" he says there were sixteen legions present at Cannae. I have no idea where he got this crazy number.

It is very interesting to read some of the comments above. Several perplexed observers say they cannot understand how such a large Roman force was surrounded by a much smaller Carthaginian force. Answer. The Romans only slightly outnumbered Hannibal, and they weren't completely surrounded.

That is a point of view not all sources agree to. We write an encyclopedia here and have to tell at least all opinions that are reflected by recognized scholars on the subject. There are often issues one is unlikely to agree with many sources, but WP:NPOV demands to acknowledge them without judgement. Wandalstouring 10:23, 27 February 2007 (UTC)

When I have time, I will re-write "Cannae, An Alternate View." with full source citation. Esf456 10:55, 27 February 2007 (UTC)esf456

yes

i have got a question........if the strength of the romans were 84,400-87,000 including allied legions how could 70,000 killed with another 50,000 and 11,000 killed or captured which all is about 130,100 when the strength was 84,400-87,000 there cant be more casualties than strength can somebody tell me if this makes any sense

That's numbers according to two roman historians. Polybius (actually he's Greek iirc) says 70,000, Livy (latin: Livius) 50,000. So the two are not to be added together. I'm not quite sure who is used for the number of captured. Maybe instead of the current form this should be given as:

70,000<:ref>Polybius (with an exact modern translation)</ref> or 50,000<:ref>Livy (with an exact modern translation)</ref>
11,000 captured <:ref>the correct source</ref>

or something similar.--Caranorn 12:37, 13 March 2007 (UTC)

thats true

That is write because when i saw it i thought wait a minute this isnt correct.It should be changed the way you have just introduced it to me in your last post.

wait a second

it should have that estimation sign with numbers at 50,000-70,000.not 50,000 and 70,000 together

While I find many of the arguments in the "alternate view" plausible (though unsourced) IMO it is not correct. The reason beening that something like 1/3 of Italy, including major cities such as Capua and Tarentum (sorry spelling) deflected to Hannibal almost immediately after the defeat. This means the Roman had to have suffered a defeat so great that the provinces of southern Italy all felt Rome could no longer defend them and Carthage would emmerge from the war victorious. IMO a "disaster slightly more serious than the Battle of Trebia" would not cause such a reaction. I also believe that in a lot of instances modern historians underestimate the ancient governments' abilities to field armies. Also there is absolutely no problem that an army of 54000 can surround an army of 814000, since the Romans crowded in the middle. It has been done by other armies in history - can't think of an example off the top of my head, but I'm 100% sure there is. Though I have to say someone should put Liby's account of troop layout (ie how many legion, how many allies, and how many cavalry) on the article. This seems to be a very valid argument. ParallelPain 05:54, 31 March 2007 (UTC)

BTW, I fail to see why you can't see there's 16 legions. He obviously took from Polybious's (sorry spelling) account of 8 Roman letions and added the 8 allied legions that supposedly accompanied them. There's 16 for you.ParallelPain 10:55, 2 May 2007 (UTC)

Hello ParallelPain; This is [email protected], the author of "Cannae, An alternate view." I have not had time to write up my piece with full source citations, but should be able to some time in the near future. I have FIVE modern-day classical historians who all say that the Roman force at Cannae did not much exceed 50,000 men, who all agree that Polybius was mis-translating his Roman sources, and that four heavily re-inforced legions fought at Cannae, not eight or sixteen. As for the statement, "disaster slightly more serious than the Battle of Trebia," you are forgetting that Roman prestige had already been badly shaken by the lost battles at the Ticinus, Trebia, and Lake Trasimene. The Battle of Cannae was the tipping point after a series of disasters. It did not have to be as disastrous as people think, in order for serious consequences to follow. Including Cannae, Roman casualties now certainly exceeded 100,000, a large proportion of their trained military strength, and experienced officers. No coherent Roman army remained in the field to enforce allied loyalty. The allies who defected were not keen on Rome anyway, and harboured long-standing historical resentments. Many of these same "allies" had also deserted the Roman alliance 64 years earlier when Pyrrhus of Epirus had marched up the Peninsula to within a few miles of Rome. None of the defectors were Latin-speaking. Don't forget that all 30 Latin colonies remained loyal. The Latin colonies provided about half of the heavy infantry in a Roman army, while the other allies provided none. The loss of the allies was not a great loss, in terms of military recruitment, and Hannibal probably only got them to defect by promising not to conscript their citizenry, a fateful promise that was one of the reasons why his military power in southern Italy slowly faded away. Another reason was that he could not be reinforced direct from Carthage due to Roman naval supremacy.

Other factors enter into consideration. Remember that Rome, in a far-sighted strategic decision in 218BC, at the start of the war, had sent two of its best generals (the Scipio brothers) and the cream of its best infantry into Spain, to prevent Carthaginian reinforcements reaching Italy from that quarter. If these had all been available in Italy prior to Cannae, things might have been greatly different, especially if the Romans had maneuvered separate armies against Hannibal. These were the tactics by which the Romans had trapped and defeated the Gauls at Telamon only nine years earlier, in 225BC. The use of separate consular armies had also played a role in the final defeat of Pyrrhus at Malventum in 275BC.

As for Keegan's spurious mention of sixteen legions, and your suggestion about "8 allied legions," his and your terminology is wrong. Neither Livy or Polybius ever mention "allied legions." The correct terminology is "ala sinistra" for the left wing, and "ala dextra," for the right wing. Livy states categorically that all the heavy infantry in the "alae" or wings, were Latins, i.e. non-post-Cannae defectors.

The source of the error found in Polybius relates to the use of the term "στρατόπεδον" to refer to a "double unit of a Roman legion of citizens and allies." CAH 1st edition, chart facing Page 104.

Esf456 04:52, 7 May 2007 (UTC)esf456

Ic, ic. Actually I don't really since I don't know Latin or Greek. But I'll take you're word for it. Now all you have to do is rewrite your article with proper sitations and we can post it up. Though I still say it is possible for an army of less than 50000 to surround an army of over 80000 even if those were not the numbers. It all depends on cohorts/ranks deep, troop types, and how they're used. ParallelPain 05:12, 15 May 2007 (UTC)

I checked Gregory Daly, Cannae The experience of battle in the Second Punic War, page 79ff where he supports Polybius figure of 86k Romans in total. According to him(page 25ff), at least 10k Romans were in camp and of the rest 15k(page 175) were skirmishers and 6k cavalry, leaving 55k troops of the line. Hannibal(page 29ff) had 10k cavalry, at least 8k(page 175) skirmishers, 8k in camp and 32k troops of the line(estimated 16k Celts, 6k Iberians and 10k Africans). Does this information help you? Wandalstouring 10:23, 17 May 2007 (UTC)

test Esf456 06:52, 18 May 2007 (UTC)esf456

question

how is this considered one of the the most costliest battles in all of recorded history?just look at one of the battles in the 3rd punic war http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Third_Punic_War

in the battle of cannae it has one historian saying 50,000 and one saying 70,000...when there both in the same box like that without an explanation its assumingly both added up to the to 130,000 when its not. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 209.167.194.136 (talk) 23:05, 16 March 2007 (UTC).

No, it is 70k or 50k and not and. The Third Punic War was one war and quite a lot of civilians were killed in some stages of the siege of Carthage, yes, but the battle of Cannae is argueably so devestating because soldiers were killed in great numbers in one battle. Compare battles with battles, wars with wars and apple pie with apple pie. Wandalstouring 12:49, 17 March 2007 (UTC)

the third punic war said 64,000 casualties and this article says maybe 50,000 or 70,000...now which is more???

Compare battles with battles, wars with wars and apple pie with apple pie. Wandalstouring 11:39, 18 March 2007 (UTC)

this person who makes no sense come back when you no what your talking about!

Possible Mistake

I was reading the article for the Xth time when I found out a possible mistake. In the first section "Strategic Background" or something, it says the Fabian strategy is unpopular and so when his term is up power is transfered back to Gaius Flaminius and another counsel. But Gaius Flaminius died at Lake Trasimene according to the Lake Trasimene and Gaius Flaminius articles. And I know that battle comes before the Fabian strategy. Hell it is Lake Trasimene that caused the Fabian strategy. So the other articles are mistaken and the commander at Lake Trasimene wasn't Gaius Flaminius, or this article is mistaken. ParallelPain 05:23, 31 March 2007 (UTC)

Well reliable sources will help us fix the mistake, or if you have some regarding your question. Lakers 05:17, 4 April 2007 (UTC)

FAR

I think about nominating this article for FAR. In my opinion, several parts contain problematic statements which need at least some sources. Wandalstouring 17:24, 8 April 2007 (UTC)

BC vs BCE

This article seem to be using BC, and I noticed someone just swapped some BCE back to BC. Which one should we use? Isn't BCE the standard now since not everyone is Christian? ParallelPain 05:12, 15 May 2007 (UTC)

Guidelines say an artilce should use one style only and it should stay at BCE if it was started as BCE and BC if it was started BC. In articles about Islam for example, we add BH and AH. Wandalstouring 09:43, 17 May 2007 (UTC)