Talk:Conflict thesis

Finocchiaro's commentary on the Galileo Affair

I have taken the long, first paragraph of our section on the Galileo affair and 1) moved it to the end, since it is a commentary and not a summary, 2) attributed the commentary to Finocchiaro, and 3) shortened the paragraph. I believe this is justified since there's no reason to give this particular commentary of Finocchiaro so much weight (there are many others even from the same author that are of a very different tone). -Darouet (talk) 18:23, 8 February 2016 (UTC)

That looks fine. I may put back the evidences paragraph though. Galileo did not really provide strong evidences for heliocentrism (those came centuries later) and in fact his position was weak empirically and conceptually in his time period (the data was theory laden so many evidences could be interpreted into any model in reality). The sources do document this well. Mayan1990 (talk) 07:49, 9 February 2016 (UTC)

I'm skeptical of the claim that his evidence was weak: it was much stronger than Copernicus' evidence, and Copernicus' calculations were used by the church even when they first didn't comment on, and then later rejected heliocentrism. He discovered lunar topography, planetary satellites, and planetary phases, all consistent with heliocentrism. Within a single generation all astronomers accepted the Heliocentric model (from Kepler onwards to Newton, Euler, Lagrange, Laplace), even though further proof would come later. Also, I don't see any mention of parallax in discussion of Church arguments against Galileo, and even Finocchiaro describes these as principally theological, not astronomical. That would be consistent with the fact that astronomers, scientists and mathematicians accepted Galileo's discovery. -Darouet (talk) 08:27, 9 February 2016 (UTC)

For instance, here is what astronomy professor Ian Morrison writes in his 2013 "Introduction to Astronomy and Cosmology" textbook published by Wiley and Sons: "Galileo's proof of the Copernican theory of the solar system: One of the first triumphs of observational astronomy was Galileo's series of observations of Venus which showed that the Sun, not the Earth, was at the centre of the Solar System so proving that the Copernican, rather than the Ptolemaic, model was correct..."

Here is another textbook by astronomer Leslie Golden, published in 2012 by Springer: "Laboratory Experiments in Physics for Modern Astronomy: With Comprehensive Development of the Physical Principles." Golden writes, "When Galileo Galilei pointed the telescope he had built... at the skies, he made four momentous discoveries about the solar system. He found spots on the sun, craters on the Moon, and satellites revolving around Jupiter, and he discovered that Venus, the brightest object in the sky when visible, displays phases like the Moon... The last two [discoveries] provided observational proof of the theory of Nicolaus Copernicus that the Sun, not the Earth, was the center of the solar system."

I have seen a few (not all) historians of science argue that Galileo didn't provide "proof" of heliocentrism, but this view appears at odds with the modern scientific view, and with the fact that his theories were adopted by astronomers in his lifetime. -Darouet (talk) 08:47, 9 February 2016 (UTC)

I am very skeptical of both of the sources you mention here since they are general textbooks that do not specialize in historical research on the Copernican or Galilean topic. In fact they clearly seem to show ignorance of the historical details - neither one of them is a historian of science as well. Clearly they project into the past without mentioning some of the contemporary arguments for and against heliocentrism or even the actual controversy itself. How does the spots on the sun, craters in the moon, satellites around Jupiter or Venus phases prove heliocentrism? In the time of Galileo, these observations really didn't prove much on this considering that there were other alternative models available and these observations they merely added physical details to some of these planets and the sun. Everyone knew of the moon as a satellite for thousands of years with many phases and yet that was not seen as evidence of helocentrism. It was interpreted differently. Also, it is quite false that astronomers in Galileo's time adopted the Copernican view automatically considering there were alternatives to the Ptolemaic and Copernican system (e.g. Tycho Barhe's spliced model) and even observations on Jupiter and its moons by Simon Marius led to arguments against the Copernican view too. Later on of course many adopted the Copernican view, but it was not well established or decisive at the time of Galileo - which is the time period we are talking about.

I agree with you that Copernicus' model was used heavily by the Church because the Church was not necessarily opposed to it by default and of course the fact that there never was any widespread persecution of Copernicans also testify to the acceptance of the model as useful. The issue was if the model should be taken literally.

The Nature article [1] notes that Christopher Graney actaully looked at the evidence rather than make generalizations like the 2 textbooks you mentioned and he came to a more nuanced understanding of the situation - that Galileo's observations were more in line with Tycho Brahe than with Copernicus. Also the article mentions "Galileo was strongly committed to Copernicanism. That he chose not to include arguments against it is not very surprising, although according to modern scientific standards he probably should have done so," says Rienk Vermij, a historian of science from the University of Oklahoma in Norman. Vermij adds that the different world views were hotly debated for many years, and that this argument about the size and distribution of the stars was only one among many. "It is not evident that this argument should be decisive, any more than other arguments," says Vermij." Indeed there were many during and after the time of Galileo.

On top of that Maurice Finocchiaro, who is an expert historian on the Galilean affair says there were many scientific reasons for not accepting Galileo's views "In 1543, Copernicus published his epoch-making book 'On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres'. In it, he updated an idea originally advanced by the Pythagoreans and Aristarchus in ancient Greece, but almost universally rejected: the earth moves by rotating on its own axis daily and revolving around the sun yearly. This contradicted the traditional belief that the earth was standing still at the center of the universe, with all heavenly bodies revolving around it. In its essentials, this geokinetic idea turned out to be true, as we know today beyond any reasonable doubt, after five centuries of accumulating evidence. At the same time, however, the situation was very different (cf. Finochiaro 2010, 21-36). Copernicus's accomplishment was anew argument supporting and old idea: he demonstrated in quantitative detail that the known facts about the motions of the heavenly bodies could be explained more simply and coherently if the sun rather than the earth is assumed to be motionless at the center, and the earth is taken to be the third planet circling the sun. For example, from the viewpoint of simplicity, there are thousands fewer parts moving in the Copernican system than in the geostatic system, since the apparent daily westward motion of all heavenly bodies around the earth is explained by the earth's daily eastward axial rotation, and thus there is only one body rotating daily, not thousands. Regarding explanatory coherence, this concept means the ability to explain many details of the observed phenomena by means of one's basic principles, without adding ad hoc assumptions. Copernicus could thus coherently explain the periodic changes in the brightness and direction of motion of the planets whereas the geostatic explanations of these details were improvised piecemeal. However, Copernicus's argument was a 'hypothetical' one. That is, it was based on the claim that 'if' the earth were in motion 'then' the observed phenomena would result; but from this it does not follow necessarily that the earth is in motion. This claim does provide a reason for preferring the geokinetic idea, but it is not a decisive reason. It would be decisive only in the absence of contrary reasons. In short, one has to look at counterarguments, and there were many. Some counterarguments were mechanical, namely based on physics - the science of motion. For example, according to traditional Aristotelian physics, if the earth moved then terrestrial bodies would have to move in ways that do not correspond to how they are known (and easily observed) to move: freely falling bodies could not fall vertically, but would have left behind slanting westward; westward gunshots would range farther than eastward ones, instead of ranging equally; loose bodies not firmly attached to the ground would fly off toward the sky due to centrifugal force. There is no way of escaping these mechanical consequences unless one rejects Aristotelian physics. To reject it effectively, one must put something in its place. This in turn involves building a new physics - something easier said than done. In short, Copernicus's astronomy contradicted the physics of the time; the motion of the earth seemed to be a physical impossibility. A moving earth was also considered to be a philosophical absurdity. For Copernicus did not claim that he could either feel, see, or otherwise perceive the earth's motion. Like everyone else, his senses (eyes and kinesthetic awareness) told him that the earth is at rest. Thus, some people objected that if his hypothesis were true, then human senses would be lying to us, and it was regarded as absurd that the senses should deceive us about such basic phenomenon as the state of the terrestrial globe on which mankind lives. That is, the geokinetic hypothesis seemed to be in flat contradiction with direct sense-experience, and so to violate the fundamental epistemology principle claiming that under normal conditions the senses provide us with an access to reality. The Copernican theory also faced empirical difficulties in astronomy. That is, it had observational consequences regarding the heavenly bodies that were not in fact observed (until the invention of the telescope). For example, it implied that the earth (being a planet) should share various physical properties with other planets; that the planet Venus should show periodic phases similar to those of the moon; that the planet Mars should show periodic changes in apparent size and brightness of a factor of about sixty; and that the fixed stars should exhibit an annual shift in apparent position." (p. 11-12) Mayan1990 (talk) 20:05, 9 February 2016 (UTC)

[Edit conflict -- written before above] The question of whether Galileo had proof of Copernicanism is more a historical question than a scientific one. For such historical questions, historians of science are more reliable sources than astronomers. Consider Thomas Kuhn's comment (The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, pp. 137-140) on the temptation of scientists – and scientific textbooks – to rewrite the history of their discipline in a linearly progressive fashion.

Furthermore, Finocchiaro's statement is not the anomalistic claim of a single historian; it represents mainstream history of science. An example of that is the recent publications by Christopher Graney, which document the scientific arguments advanced by G. B. Riccioli for a geocentric model in 1651, well after Galileo was supposed to have proved geocentrism to be false. --SteveMcCluskey (talk) 20:11, 9 February 2016 (UTC)

I don't agree with the idea that historians of science are more reliable sources than scientists on this sort of question. Many scientists are very knowledgeable about the history of their fields, and have the great advantage over historians of having a better understanding of both the specific scientific questions involved, and of how the scientific method works in practice. We shouldn't be discounting or down-weighting sources simply because they're written by scientists. -Thucydides411 (talk) 20:22, 9 February 2016 (UTC)

I agree with SteveMcCluskey. I forgot about Kuhn on this, but yes textbook authors are not necessarily experts on what they write when it comes to historical claims - which is the case with Galileo. The history of ideas (mechanics and astronomy) is different than the history of people (Galileo). Social dimensions like debates, issues, politics, culture, language, etc are what historians of science navigate through and on top of that some historians of science are indeed scientists themselves. In any case, understanding the disagreements requires reading the contemporary sources of the time period, which is something scientists normally do not do - which is why many scientists do have black and white understanding of many historical episodes. Mayan1990 (talk) 20:39, 9 February 2016 (UTC)

I don't have time this instant to respond in detail, but briefly SteveMcCluskey I strongly disagree with this revert because it:

• preempts ongoing discussion here,
• restores a rambling editorial commentary to the beginning of the Galileo Affair section,
• fails to properly attribute the commentary to Finocchiaro,
• misquotes Finocchiaro,
• falsely implies to the reader that heliocentrism was scientifically unsupported in Galileo's lifetime and for centuries following,
• discounts the consensus among scientists living today and during Galileo's time,
• fails to note the serious theological objections to heliocentrism including those mentioned by Finocchiaro,
• maintains that historians of science are better qualified than astronomers and astrophysicists to evaluate whether astronomical evidence supports heliocentric or geocentric models.

Further, it is one thing to point out that there were other models besides Galileo's that had their merits, even if they were rejected by most astronomers by the mid 1600s. Plenty of historians of science write about this. But it's another thing entirely to maintain that Galileo was wrong (he wasn't) - this line of arguments looks like a dubious apologia for the Catholic Church in the 1600s, something that neither we, nor our readers, nor even the Church needs. And it's bad scholarship. @Ramos1990: thanks for putting up the long Finocchiaro quote. I think it'll be important to also cite him elsewhere in that book, and in his book Galileo on Trial, where he explains the merits, and advantages, of Galileo's system over the Ptolemaic one. -Darouet (talk) 21:12, 9 February 2016 (UTC)

I think we can reach a compromise here. I liked some of your wording so I will bring some of it back. I think that it is important to note though that by saying that Galileo did not have strong support for his views during his time, it does not mean that he was wrong. Copernicus and his predecessors like Aristarchus of Samos had little direct support for it (presumably because of lack of better tools like telescopes), but they were right in the end. It is important to note that there were diverse views on heliocentrism and geocentrism at the time and that it took even more time for things to really be "settled" (Riccioli's list of arguments in 1651 is noteworthy). The fact that Aristarchus had held such a view thousands of years before without much support should remind that in the sciences, having a belief does not equate to having sufficient evidence for that belief. Part of the myth of Galileo of course is that he was right and therefore had strong evidence for his views and that everyone else was theologically clouded to see it. But the reality is more nuanced and certainly there were powerful arguments from science and reason against it too which carried most of the weight for most "scientists" of the time and before (including Aristotle and Ptolemy). Mayan1990 (talk) 22:25, 9 February 2016 (UTC)

I also agree that we can find a compromise, Mayan1990, and appreciate your response. However, it's not quite true to say that judgement was not clouded by theology. The Catholic Church had plenty of brilliant scholars in its ranks during the time of the Galileo affair, and easily could have found theological justifications for heliocentrism (Galileo offered them himself). And, the Church used Copernicus' (heliocentric) calculations to reform their calendar even before Galileo. They did not officially accept heliocentrism and ultimately condemned it however because, as Langford repeatedly notes in his book on the topic , the Church hierachy's overarching concern at the time was the crisis of the protestant reformation. Galileo's observations, writings and interpretations were viewed by the inquisition within the context of the recent collapse of Catholic unity in Europe and the loss of credibility over matters of theology, and by extension politics, the natural world, etc. There were momentous and real political consequences - civil war throughout Christendom. In any event mentioning this broader context, as Langford and others do, could help readers further understand the condemnation of Galileo without a simple moralistic judgment against the Church. -Darouet (talk) 22:57, 9 February 2016 (UTC)

Agreed. The Protestant Reformation was certainly a major factor for the condemnation since the Church was losing power and it is around this time that the Index of prohibited books popped up too coincidentally. Interestingly, there was no condemnation of heliocentrism for many decades after the publication of Copernicus' book and it went through Church officials before publishing too.

I think there may be an issue in talking about "the" Church as a monolithic thing. If "the" Church rejected heliconetrism it likely was due to a combination of scientific, philosophical and theological objections, not just theological. But it is more complex. Galileo did offer some theology via Augustine and it is certain that many in "the" Church would not have had an issue with heliocentrism. After all, Copernicus was a Catholic and dedicated the work to the Pope at the time and Galileo was also a Catholic and even Pope during Galileo's time saw value in the model since it did simplify things for astronomy calcualtion-wise. On top of that, like you noted, Copernicus was used by "the" Church before Galileo to reform the calendar. Considering this mix of acceptance and the lack of decisive evidence for heliocentrism at the time, I am not sure it makes sense for "the" Church to make an official opinion "for" heliocentrism when the situation was much more unclear with many alternatives. I saw a good summary in [2].Mayan1990 (talk) 23:34, 9 February 2016 (UTC)

Whatever wording we adopt in the end, we should make sure not to give the impression that any form of Geocentrism was seriously considered in the scientific community beyond the late-17th century. The current wording makes it seem as if Geocentrism survived much longer than it did:

"Observations that favored the Copernican model over the Ptolemaic or other alternative models accumulated over time:[23] the emergence of Newtonian mechanics later in the 17th century, the observation of the stellar aberration of light was first observed by James Bradley in the 18th century, the orbital motions of binary stars were analysed by William Herschel in the 19th century, the accurate measurement of the stellar parallax in 19th century"

Stellar parallax, for example, was observed nearly two centuries after the scientific community had abandoned Geocentrism. After Kepler's precise determination of planetary orbits, his formulation of the laws of planetary motion, and the development of a physical theory that explained those laws from first principles, Geocentric theories were simply untenable.

As it is, the article makes it seem as if Galileo's evidence at the time was weak. From a scientific perspective, Heliocentrism would actually have been strongly favored, given what was known at the time. As Darouet writes above, it's important to note that in the Galileo affair, theological objections to Heliocentrism were primary what we would now call scientific objections to the theory. This is a point where I think it is important to listen to what scientists write about the subject, because in my experience, there are many scientists who understand the contemporary scientific questions (as in, they could actually write down the math, and understand better how scientific arguments are made and evaluated) much better than historians of science. Owen Gingerich, an astronomer who has also written on the history of science (and incidentally, a devout Catholic), goes over both the scientific arguments made at the time of Galileo, and why what we now consider scientific arguments would not have convinced Bellarmine of Heliocentrism. The primary overarching argument for Heliocentrism, as opposed to the Tychonic system, dealt with the unity and harmony of Heliocentric models. Heliocentric models explained the whole range of apparent motions observed in the solar system in one coherent framework, rather than by combining separate elements to explain each individual phenomenon. For example, the fact that retrograde motion occurs, and that for the outer planets, it always occurs opposite the Sun, becomes a "reasoned fact" in Heliocentric theories, whereas in the Ptolemaic model, it's something that has to be put in by hand.

In any case, as written, the section on Galileo in this article gives a completely wrong impression of the Galileo affair. The important things to emphasize are that:

1. The Galileo affair was driven primarily by the Church's fears over loss of authority,

2. From a scientific perspective, there were strong reasons at the time to adopt Heliocentrism, and

3. There were fundamental differences at the time over how truth about the natural world could be obtained - whether empirical evidence and theoretical harmony were important, or whether theological considerations and proofs were more important.

-Thucydides411 (talk) 23:00, 10 February 2016 (UTC)

Thanks for the Gingrich source. It is pretty good. As it stands, the article does not give much of an impression on geocentrism. It merely notes that more observations that favored heliocentrism did accumulate through time - which is certainly true because of more usage of telescopes. During the time of Galileo, however, the situation was indeed ambiguous because telescopes were not abundantly used and there were competitive models available (Tycho's system, accommodations to the Ptolemaic system). Riccioli's list of arguments in 1651 on heliocentrism and geocentrism [publications shows that the situation was not necessarily decisive at the time - all of these models suffered from imperfections. Evidences do not speak for themselves. People have to make interpretations and re-interpretations of the evidence to make them fit their theories. Also in many instances, belief in theory comes before evidences in various forms as was the case with Galileo and Copernicus. The paper you mentioned by Owen Ginerich notes this very well. For instance on Copernicus - "Copernicus himself does not state directly what induced him to work out the heliocentric arrangement, apart from some rather vague dissatisfaction with his perceived inelegance of the traditional geocentric pattern." His dissatisfaction with the Ptolemaic system is reasonable since if one could make a complex system simpler then many would have appreciated it. Theories that Unify are very attractive to anyone.

In terms of "strong evidences for heliocentrism", even Gingerich notes that there were no slam dunk evidences at the time available to convince Bellarmine even though he was willing to accept heloicentrism if there was good evidence for it - "Bellarmin made very clear that he was unwilling to concede the motion of the earth in the absence of an apodictic proof when he added: "If there were a true demonstration, then it would be necessary to be very careful in explaining Scriptures that seemed contrary, but I do not think there is any such demonstration, since none has been shown to me. To demonstrate that the appearances are saved by assuming that the sun is at the center is not the same thing as to demonstrate that in fact the sun is in the center and the earth in the heavens."" Even Tycho objected to Copernicus based on physics, but accepted it as mathematical construct - "Thus Tycho had no problem with the Copernican system as a mathematical construction, but he believed that Copernicus fell short with respect to physics."

Gingrich says also "Consequently, by the 1590s, there was no unambiguous evidence in favor of a moving earth. Why, then, did Kepler and Galileo both opt for the Copernican arrangement at that time, when the choices were so confused?" and "Neither Kepler nor Galileo tells us precisely why he became a Copernican. Kepler always justified his choice in terms of the Holy Trinity, but this hardly could have been the starting point. Surely it was the aesthetic appeal that arrested their attention, the sheer geometrical beauty of an arrangement that included the distant promise of a new physics."

Also since evidences could be accommodated in any theory at the time it means that there was no slam dunk argument for heliocentrism during Galileo's time including seeing phases of Venus - "In other words, the Copernican system very nicely explained the appearances, the phases of Venus, but this explanation did not guarantee that the sun was fixed in the center. Why not? Because Tycho’s geo-heliocentric arrangement also had Venus going around the sun, albeit a mobile sun, and therefore the Tychonic system explained the Cytherian phases equally well." and also "You may immediately think of Ockham’s razor, that the simpler explanation would surely prevail. But remember that Ockham’s razor is not a law of physics. It is an element of rhetoric, in the toolkit of persuasion. In the absence of new physics, a myriad epicycles might not have been an obstacle to keeping the earth safely fixed. Also, the absence of an observed stellar parallax worked seriously against the acceptance of the Copernican system throughout the seventeenth century." Gingrich notes that even Robert Hook (more than a century after Galileo) said that the situation was still unclear and undecided. - "There is needed, Hooke declares, an experimentum crucis to decide between the Copernican and Tychonic systems, and this he proposed to do with a careful measurement of the annual stellar parallax."

Gingrich also notes that we, who are in a post-Newtonian age, see the evidences differently than people at the time of Galileo (who were before Newtonian physics). They interpreted things differently back then so to speak of a "scientific perspective" is quite an issue. The scientific perspectives from the 16th and 17th century were diverse and not decisive on the issue since anything which deviated from any model (Copernican, Tychonaian, Ptolemaic) could be accommodated or adjusted to "fit". And it was, according to Gingrich. Mayan1990 (talk) 04:11, 11 February 2016 (UTC)

New paragraph

Thucydides411 says that Owen Gingerich is "a devout catholic". Gingerich is actually a Mennonite. Thucydides411 says that he knows the secret intentions of others. Thucydides411 says " the church's fears over loss of authority". He is wasting our time with these theories. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 212.56.151.251 (talk) 12:12, 11 February 2016 (UTC)

See the Wikipedia article Owen Gingerich, which notes that Owen is a Mennonite. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 212.56.151.251 (talk) 12:18, 11 February 2016 (UTC)

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"Science", vaguely posed

Research on perceptions of science among the American public concludes that most religious groups see no general epistemological conflict with science, and that they have no differences with nonreligious groups in propensity to seek out scientific knowledge, although there may be epistemic or moral conflicts when scientists make counterclaims to religious tenets.

For my dollar, this is uninterpretable.

Mandatory first question: Do you regard creation science as actual science? If answer "yes", do not pass Go, head directly to conflict jail.

My point here is that avoiding the conflict by inflating the term "science" to include things that it very much does not include ought to be counted as a liability of agreement, and not an asset.

What standard of the word "science" (and its sufficient comprehension) is imposed by the two citations given for the passage above on the respondents questioned?

Does it go this far: "Do you regard creation science as a pseudoscientific, unscholarly, dishonest, and misguided sham?" (Language I lifted directly from the Wikipedia lead of said article.) I'm personally in 100% conflict with the least equivocation on this matter. (Not because it's false, but because it makes no claims that can be meaningfully tested or falsified.)

So you want to argue that creation science is science. Then tell me, what claims does it advance that could be directly falsified by repeatable, observational, mutually shared, external evidence? What's your version of the Precambrian rabbit? (Probably one Precambrian rabbit wouldn't sway me—tricksy bunny nun bun—but the third Precambrian rabbit, unearthed on different present-day continents, that would certainly have me nervously fingering my rosary beads, and pondering my next move in ways I can't presently even begin to imagine.) — MaxEnt 23:29, 10 March 2017 (UTC)

Counterfactuals in Abundance

Article is heavily biased to the Christian West without acknowledging same, implicitly asserting a false universality. It's also inaccurate about the matter of fact of disbelief and assertion of the incompatibility of made up and found out belief which certainly long precedes the 19th century. At the very least for the modern period the mid 18th would be accurate (d'Holbach, etc.) but not working this article further. I held a lede redact to be preferable to a globalize tag. 98.4.124.117 (talk) 18:03, 13 May 2018 (UTC)

But turned out otherwise. 98.4.124.117 (talk) 20:23, 19 May 2018 (UTC)

@98.4.124.117: Could you please clarify the point, where you said, "It's also inaccurate about the matter of fact of disbelief and assertion of the incompatibility of made up and found out belief which certainly long precedes the 19th century." I can't find any discussion in the article alluding to the rise of the "assertion of the incompatibility of made up and found out belief" in (or before) the 19th century. --SteveMcCluskey (talk) 21:01, 19 May 2018 (UTC)

In the first sentence of the first named § Lycurgus (talk) 10:06, 20 May 2018 (UTC)

Where is "the first names §"? Please be more precise in your citations. I cannot find either a names § or a reference to "found out belief" anywhere in this article. --SteveMcCluskey (talk) 12:29, 20 May 2018 (UTC)

Did you just visit the version of this page in my domains? In any case "first sentence of the first nameD §" shouldn require any explanation to a competent speaker of English, relative to the state of the article at that time. Lycurgus (talk) 08:05, 19 February 2024 (UTC)

How can we globalize a Western topic?

The recently added Globalize template is totally inappropriate. As A. D. White wrote in one of the basic texts defining the conflict thesis, it was a "A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom." Asking one to globalize a dispute about science and theology in Christendom is as impractical as it would be to ask one to globalize a history of the Carolingian Empire. Although it might be a good thing to broaden the focus of the question to deal with the conflict between science and religion in non-Western cultures, that wasn't how the conflict thesis developed and at present there is comparatively little – if any – historical writing on that aspect of the so-called conflict between science and religion. Wikipedia's expectation of balance expects the weight of an article to follow the prominence of its treatment in existing reliable sources. Overemphasizing the role of non-western cultures in the study of the conflict between science and religion would provide a misleading impression of what the conflict thesis is actually about. --SteveMcCluskey (talk) 20:51, 19 May 2018 (UTC)

No source in the article discusses any relations of conflict or otherwise about science or religion before the 19th century. So this is not a historical view or topic for nearly all of history and thousands of years of Islam, Judaism, Christianity, Buddhisms, Taoism, etc. On of the reasons for this is that religion is a modern invention and category which is not found in most languages. I suppose if globalization is considered, it would have to reflect international sources of the 19th century and above from non-Western countries. But I have been looking for such sources for a long time and have found none that share a conflict thesis view. Any modern books on Buddhism, Islam, Judaism, Christianity that even support the conflict thesis? I have not found any that support the conflict thesis. Again probably because they do not have science or religion as cultural monolithic categories. They don't think as narrow minded - even westerners don't either - which is why the conflict thesis has been debunked and historical trends from sociology also do not support such conflict views in the 20th or 21st century. Huitzilopochtli1990 (talk) 16:32, 20 May 2018 (UTC)

As the lead points out, this article discusses a historiographical approach to writing the history of Western Science, which came to prominence in the nineteenth century with the publications of John William Draper and Andrew Dickson White. It may be possible to identify earlier precursors of the conflict thesis, but studies of the conflict thesis agree that these authors' canonical texts shaped historians' understanding of the conflict thesis. As you point out, discussions of the conflict thesis does not appear in non-Western sources, although the more general question of the relations of science and religion has been discussed in non-Western religious contexts, e.g., Islam, Judaism, Greek Chiristianity, etc. The focus of discussions of the confilct thesis, per se, is not too surprising given that the authors were writing about, as White put it, "A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom. (my emphasis). --SteveMcCluskey (talk) 00:58, 4 June 2018 (UTC)

Yes, we can globalize the topic. Here's the proof.

I just got access to the monograph Science and Religion: New Historical Perspectives (Oxford 2010). I haven't read it yet (and wont have the time to for some time), but I took a little check at the table of contents, and whatdoyaknow, there's a full chapter by Harun Kucuk called Islam, Christianity, and the conflict thesis. The second paragraph of the chapter;

Historical studies of Islam, Christianity, philosophy, and science cametogether in the nineteenth century in a way that was made possible by thefashioning of ‘science and religion’ as a coherent field of enquiry. A closelook at nineteenth-century accounts of the conflict between science andreligion shows that Islam and Christianity were often interlinked, and thatthe narrative accounts of one often complemented the other. Modernhistoriographies of Christianity and Islam, and their relationships withscience, have been closely intertwined. (pg. 111)

So yes, we can globalize the topic. It's just a matter of someone actually doing the relevant reading at this point and telling the rest of us the further readings on this talk page. I've played my role. P.S. You guys can freely access this book here. 70.49.181.61 (talk) 05:59, 20 November 2018 (UTC)

The tag is unnecessary per the section discussion above. I will remove it. However, please feel free to expand this article with sources from other cultures. The tag seems to just be redundant since there is always room to expand the article. The tag does nothing here at all. If anything it may deceive readers as if there is a global thesis when it mostly comes from Jewish and Christian cultures that even discuss this. Most cultures do not have a conflict thesis. Huitzilopochtli1990 (talk) 08:16, 22 November 2018 (UTC)