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Identity over time

I have been reading around the theories of identity and it seems that a key question must be answered before we can even start to consider whether an organism has free will. This key question is: if we assume time moves forward then is the identity of the organism the same after, say, five years? Medical science has already suggested that we are renewed over a period of about five years, that is, every molecule in our body is different from the ones from five years ago. Personality and identity change over time, too. So the idea that we are the same person as yesterday may be a myth. We must establish what the organism is that we are discussing when we speak of free will; time plays a key role in these discussions.

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It would be interesting to see a definition of "will", as in "free will." In English, it is conveniently the opposite of "won't" as a verb. So "will" is what you will do rather than what you won't do. Seems like as good a definition as any, but the philosophers can surely muck it up. Fairandbalanced 03:12, 28 Aug 2003 (UTC)

Regarding moral responsibilty, should the utilitarian notion be mentioned here that criminals should be punished not because they "deserve" it but because doing so would yield greater utility than not doing so? (I know far too little to make such an addition myself)

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It's not clear what side of dualism the article is on. Or rather from a NPOV angle, doesn't make it clear that dualism is involved as well. If it rejects (Descartes') dualism, then isn't even the "want" of a person, a state of the brain and subject to the same rules of physical determinism. Gyan

Excellent job. Thank you.

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An encyclopedic article should not be biased towards any particular side. However, a discussion of modern dualism would be welcome IMHO, as would an addition on utilitarianism. Whoever helped write the entry on free will is to be congratulated, it is very well written and clear, reasonably thorough and yet concise---unusual for this topic when one browses the literature!

So I don't want to rock the boat, nevertheless I had some heretical thoughts: the thing is, isn't it a valid position to supppose that a form of mysticism might surround free will and morality? Understand I'm a scientist so I abhor mystic approaches to purely rational topics, but when it comes to free will is it not an open question whether or not the phenomenon is materialistic and rational or not? I mean who can say for sure? Taking either a rational or a mystic stance is a prejudice IMHO, the only honest approach is to be completely open and honest. The free will debate is captured too much by ideologues of one stripe or the other. That would be my only advice at the moment for anyone who wants to extend or edit the article.

What would this third stance be? Post a draft here. Gyan

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Under "Other Issues": Probably it should be mentioned that the existence of a universally omnipotent entity does not logically imply that free will is illusory. An omnipotent being could logically choose to relinquish control to free agents, without relinquishing either omnipotence or omniscience. The key to resolving this seeming paradox being that free will might be granted provisionally to whatever agents have free will (but that's another topic I won't address), or in other words it is not an absolute gift. Now, does anyone know of simple (or not so simple?) models for this sort of scenario, i.e. is this a consistent set of propositions? I have been unable to say so one way or the other. I think it is the key to resolving the old conundrum of free will and omnipotence. Religionists needen't deny free will and libertarians needn't deny God! If there are any published papers dealing logically with this issue they should be cited. It's hard to believe no one has logically resolved this issue before in clear terms. That's just my 2 cents worth. Blair

It's my understanding that omnipotence is only part of the problem, that omniscience also presents challenges to the concept of free will. If an entity can see exactly what you're going to do five minutes into the future, it doesn't necessarily have to have the power to do anything about it to still call into question whether your will is "free." Bryan 18:15, 21 Feb 2004 (UTC)

Omniscience is not a problem worth writing too much about though, because a fairly simple reply would be that knowledge about some agent's future does not imply that that agent had no freedom to define that future (at least in part). The omniscient entity need not be the cause of the events that it knows about or can foresee. Blair 08 March 2004

That's missing the point. The omniscient being need not be the cause, but if it can accurately predict what you're going to do 100 hours into the future, how is your will "free"? How could you have done otherwise? If you could, the being wouldn't be omniscient. So by definition, if an omniscient being exists, there's no free will. -Gyan 01:12, 10 Mar 2004 (UTC)

I don't see this. If the being can foresee what you are going to do he may not be able to change anything. In fact, he can't, as he can only see what you are going to do which supposes that he can't subsequently change his mind and make you do something else. Suppose you have a TV set in your room which can show you every future event. You cannot, however, leave the room nor communicate with anyone so as to change the future you see on the screen.

Surely this doesn't influence the "free will" of everyone else.

Now if you have a TV screen which shows the future - and you are omnipotent and can change the future (so the screen actually shows WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF YOU AS AN OMNIPOTENT BEING DO NOTHING TO CHANGE THE FUTURE) - that's different!

Exile 16:51, 27 Jan 2005 (UTC)

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I agree with Gyan re: the above, for what it's worth. As for the earlier question, William James (I think) offered an interesting analogy that he felt offered a solution to the free will-omniscience debate. If you imagine God as a master chess player, and any human as his amateur "opponent," you could imagine him knowing he was going to win the game without knowing every specific move the amateur would make. In that respect, the individual choices would be free, which would technically constitute a qualification to omniscience, but the outcome would be inevitable. It is an interesting analogy, but I think it still doesn't explain away the problem of someone knowing what will happen to you when you are 80, and you still considering yourself free. Patrick Grey Anderson 19:04, 21 Apr 2004 (UTC)

Vandalism?

Why did you revert that, and even more so, why call it vandalism? Seemed like an acceptable ex. link to me. Sam [Spade] 00:55, 21 May 2004 (UTC)

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I agree with the removal of the external link. It was also added to the determinism page, and seems to be someone's pet project that is being advertised through Wikipedia. Of course, external links are allowed, but then by that broad criterion people can start putting links to their blogs at the bottom of the United States of America entry because they write about stuff that happens in the U.S. So, I will remove it again. Patrick Grey Anderson 18:48, 21 May 2004 (UTC)

Science of free will

(William M. Connolley 11:24, 15 Jul 2004 (UTC)) The page says that most interp of QM are that the universe is indeterministic. This isn't true: QM is only stochastic *when measured* otherwise it is perfectly deterministic. The universe can't be measured from outside.

The Stanford encyclopedia of Philosophy states, Quantum theory is indeed very well confirmed. However, there is nothing approaching a consensus on how to interpret it, on what it shows us with respect to how things are in the world. Indeterministic as well as deterministic interpretations have been developed, but it is far from clear whether any of the existing interpretations is correct. See below for further discussion...

The sentence "the brain activity leading up to the subject flicking their wrist began approximately one-third of a second before the subject consciously decided to move" could use clarification, and/or a reference to the actual experiment. How did the experimenter measure the exact time when "the subject consciously decided to move"? The subject couldn't very well indicate that moment by some action, say, flicking the wrist!

Alecke1 18:12, 26 August 2005 (UTC) : from heading section: "The information content of which is but 2 or 3 megabytes (despite junk DNA, which may really have almost no information content), implying that nurture may be more important than genetic determinists used to claim"

This is very unscientific. The conclusion, that nurture has been found to contribute to human personality traits significantly by scientific study, may be correct and has a substantial body of work that could be referenced as evidence, I assume. The implication that 2 to 3 megabytes is insufficient is weak and erroneus. A genetic character requires 2 bits to encode, as it has 4 states: T A G C <==> 00 01 10 11. A protein sequence has three genetic characters. Thus, each protein sequence, or gene, requires a mere 6 bits to encode. Taking 2-3 million bytes and dividing by 6 leaves 500,000 protein sequences. Now, assuming there are only 2 types of proteins (in reality there are many), the number of distinict protein sequences allowed by this storage capacity would be the same as the number of integers that can be represented by a binary number 500,000 digits long, or 2 ^ 499,999.

This number is so astronomically large (greater than the number of *every countable thing imaginable, summed* in the universe), it suggests that no two humans that have ever existed have had identical DNA. In fact, from what little I have read I have gathered that many human genetics researchers take this as a given.

I'm not a genetic scientist and know very little about genes, but the flawed logic and shoddy citation and/or use of authority in this statement should be cleaned up, anyone?

At the very least "nurture may be more important than genetic determinists used to claim" should be linked to some claims that have been made by specific "genetic determinists" so we can begin to see "what they used to claim". After a quick google search, I suspect that "genetic determinist" is a term that is only used in an attempt to condemn people who suggest that humans can have genetic predispositions towards behavioral patterns like homosexuality. Some people like Dawkins manage to earn the badge of honor "genetic determinist"; in the sense that Dawkins likes to postulate genes that incline (if not force) animals, including humans, towards specific behaviors, Dawkins obviously is a genetic determinist. I've read some of his books and as far as I know, he has never done other than present a reasoned and balanced account of the interaction between genes and environment. Frankly, there are so many things wrong with the "Free will" article that it is hard for me to see why we should single out this one shoddy statement for attention. I guess we have to start somewhere. --JWSchmidt 02:06, 27 August 2005 (UTC)

I agree, for "one of the best articles" in the wiki, it should be held to a higher standard. The "science" subheading should have a higher standard of scientific writing than it currently does. I'm not sure what the protocol is for reformatting and removing posts, as I'm rather new to the community. Perhaps statements of alleged fact, claims, and opinion that are not backed up by a cited scientific study (or published meta-analysis of several studies) could be moved to a "non-science" subheading. This would splinter off almost the entire body of "the science of free will". Perhaps we could call this other section that we dump the 'less-scientific' contributions into "scientific approaches" or "secular attitudes towards the study of free will". I don't do this myself because I don't have the time to do it right atm. --Alecke1 01:51, 29 August 2005 (UTC)

This casts some doubt on whether the universe is deterministic at all. Some scientific determinists such as Albert Einstein believe in the hidden variable theory, that beneath the probabilities of quantum mechanics there are set variables (see the EPR Paradox). This theory has had great doubt cast on it by the Bell Inequalties, which suggest that "God may really play dice" after all, perhaps casting into doubt the predictions of Laplace's demon. The leading contemporary philosopher who has capitalized on the success of quantum mechanics and chaos theory in order to defend incompatibilist freedom is Robert Kane, in The Significance of Free Will and other writing. Kane's arguments, however, apply equally well to any "unthinking" entitity that behaves according to quantum mechanics.

I'm a bit lost here, isnt the hidden variable theory the loophole in which Bells inequalities becomes void? Bell test experiments seems to imply not enough evidence is suffice as to cast "large amounts of doubt" on QM. The above statement seems to imply Einstein's hidden variable theory to be wrong. Can someone please give me some insight here, id rather not edit anything if Im wrong. Somerset219 01:43, 5 July 2006 (UTC)

Eh. I disagree with a lot of the phrasing changes you made in your series of edits, but as to the Bell inequalities, they basically prove that there aren't any hidden variables. To quote from the article you linked:

These experiments have (subject to a few assumptions, considered by most to be reasonable) confirmed quantum theory and shown results that cannot be explained under local hidden variable theories.

It's vaguely possible that we're doing the tests wrong, but the hidden variable hypothesis doesn't look good. No, I don't understand it entirely either; the EPR paradox page does a better explanation than I could. SnowFire 05:09, 5 July 2006 (UTC)

Like what phrasing changes? If I'm gramatically wrong please change it back. As for Bell inequalities, I feel the paragraph is unnessesary if Bell is right, but is not objective if Bell's inequality is uncertain. If Bell is right and proven right, then theres no need for "God may really play dice", because he has just proven he actually does. I went to the EPR article and found most physicists today regard the EPR paradox as an illustration of how quantum mechanics violates classical intuitions, and not as an indication that quantum mechanics is fundamentally flawed. That perhaps its missing something undiscovered as of yet, is the perception i keep going back to, like a hidden variable.

another example : 1) QM is incomplete because it is not the "right" theory; the right theory would provide descriptive categories to account for all observable behavior and not leave "anything to chance". or 2) QM is incomplete, but it accurately reflects the way nature is. I found this at incompleteness of quantum physics, but i think the secound sentence should be but it accurately reflects the way nature can be most of the time, I guess I don't understand why it has to be either dead-on or totally bogus.? Somerset219 07:11, 5 July 2006 (UTC)

Oh, I agree that it needs to be rewritten because it got addded on later and lost the focus of what it was saying, but the general intent is correct. That said, the general idea that "Modern quantum physics, as best as we can tell, has issued a verdict against determinism and hidden variables" should still be in there, and is not irrelevant. As for other issues, generally it's that I feel you "wimpified" the sentences too much. It's okay to be bold and simply state the general position; you don't always need to add "may" and "some" everywhere. That said, I haven't taken a close look yet due to being on vacation, and it's a minor issue anyway. SnowFire 06:35, 7 July 2006 (UTC)

This section is a grammatical train wreck. Please forgive my lack of boldness, but I have very nearly no understanding of the subject. Beginning with "Yet, however, the presence of genes that play a role in some forms of behavior, for example some mental disorders, does not make such a behavior automatic, studies suggest..." in the second paragraph, the writing falls apart. "Yet, however" should serve as a fitting herald of grammatical doom and is followed by what I suspect to be comma errors, adjectives modifying verbs, run-on sentences, etc. However, I cannot be certain that my edits will maintain the intent of the article or be accurate in any way. It is rare, but refreshing to see a comma whose omission or misplacement is a practical problem rather than a syntactic formality. That said, I will fix what I can fix with a clear conscience and hope that someone who is grammatically, scientifically, and philosophically adept can fix the rest--two out of three is not enough, here.--128.186.13.112 20:10, 18 July 2006 (UTC)

Not a grammatical train wreck (or, in other words, minor mistake on paragraph above); Checking the sentence-["Yet, however, the presence of genes that play a role in some forms of behavior, for example some mental disorders, does not make such a behavior automatic, studies suggest..."]- The previous statement is a very formal statement; It means, simply, "The fact you have the genes doesn't make you a sinner". "Yet, however..." means that "as far as you can see, now, but no neccesarily excluding what have been said" - this use two words- Yet, however. It's lack of boldness the problem there, as you apologized for, No offense. The problem is Not that the paragraph is a "grammatical train wreck". Also, read the article on Style over substance fallacy. That section is Not a grammatical train wreck, neither. Note: Style over substance fallacy shouldn't add confusion to an already difficult subject. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 206.248.97.99 (talk • contribs)

This section fails to represent the incomprehensibility of free will from a causal standpoint. If the physical brain (which must ultimately be responsible for free will, evidenced by lesions preventing voluntary tongue movement) gives rise to "free will", and "free will" is able to generate further neuronal activity INDEPENDENT of its origin (i.e., specific neuronal activity) then we are left with an unsatifying, unfathomable causal gap. I will attempt to add a paragraph to this section to explain that, since there is no evidence that we have free will, and it seems impossible, then it its an alright point of view to deny free will. Determinism, Ill agree with an earlier post here, is in question. Ill try to stay away from this. My real reason for changing the article is to get attetion. I will structure the argument in the form of reductio ad absurdum in the article to make it easier to grasp. - User:Onealej

Not seen by every scientist as "impossible"; See Scientific American Mind, the April 2005 issue...Still, your argument is an "Argument from lack of imagination" and, as you intented with the use of reductio ad absurdum, you shouldn't defend it by pointing your view, but by trying to prove false the "imaginative" part of the argument; But only that you failed to do so; I will give you a reason to see why is not as far from reality or "impossible" as you believe, not as absurd as you saw it (to reconciliate a mechanism of the brain with freewill): Just rename free will, and call it from now on: Free won't. We may not deliberate but we can resist, at least for time enough; Also, consider the existence of Behavioral Science- Proactively, at least, we can Learn, and that includes new habits and methods to manage with our impulse. There's more... Check for Studies on Cognitive Science books. One may not know all but can gain some certainty about a detail; Also , Someone wrote: -["The initial neuronal activity which gives rise to free will, is either deterministic or probabilistic, depending on the interpretion of quantum mechanics that is preferred. In either case, the initial 'cause' of free will would be outside of one's control. The only conceivable way to remedy this is to propose that free will causes the initial neuronal activity, but we then are left with the question of where this initial force came from. Neurology would have us beleive that still other neurons must cause this force - and again we find that the root of our actions is either deterministic or probabilistic. If the nature of a cause determines the nature of an effect, then our free will would be deterministic or probabilistic. Not enough is known about the brain be certain whether or not there is free will, but a revolution is necessary in the way scientists understand causality before free will, if it exists, is understood."]--If you wrote [ "Not enough is known about the brain be certain whether or not there is free will, but a revolution is necessary in the way scientists understand causality before free will, if it exists, is understood"...] then you agree that science still haven't achieve evidence that Free will (now free won't) doesn't exist. No point putting a very small number on limited causal possibility to choose as to explain away or remove Free Will principles. However, I know one may not know all but can gain some certainty about a detail. But it is not fair to don't follow all details, and want with this limitation to destroy all the concept. Notice that We cannot "beg the question" by putting words on the Neurological Community "mouth"- They haven't said that (simply and exclusively) other neurons give the initial "force" to that new alternate behavior/act. You may "believe" this, but Neurology doesn't affirm or reinforce your " believe". We should not "beg the question", that's why I will remove this few sentence. It's not Scientific to put a mere I believe as an "I conclude" statement or "Is a fact" statement; Also, It is the the lack of understanding from a causal point of view what helps free will to develop even further, even if this isn't a neccesity for these issues. The lack of evidence doesn't means evidence for the lacking. ; And we have a lot of evidence that suggest humans can learn, so they can change, at least with new methods, at least under some "not too difficult to obtain" conditions... —Preceding unsigned comment added by 206.248.97.99 (talk • contribs)

Theology

One possible response to the problems of an omniscient God and free will is "open theism." This position holds that God does not know the future because, quite simply, the future does not exist. That contrary to science fiction, the future is not "out there," waiting for us to live through it. And so, with this position one can espouse a God who knows everything there is to know, including all the millions of possibilities/alternatives that the future holds, but he does not know the future because the future, not existing, is not knowable.

In the case of a divine prophecy, it is not that God knows all the future, but that he knows that he will bring this or that to pass, and so, as the all-powerful God, that much is indeed certain and determined.

A further problem with Calvinism is that the Bible is clear that "God is not willing that any should perish." Of course, Calvinism's "double predestination" (i.e., some predestined to heaven, others to hell) falls prey to this scripture, along with scriptures that indicate that one can have their name removed from the Book of Life.

A wholistic view of scripture seems to indicate that some events are predetermined...and some are not. This permits God to predestine some to salvation, without predestining anyone to hell. That is, some are free to choose, and while their choice may take them to hell, it would not be because God preferred it in the sense of forcing it to happen.

I removed this because it seems to be rather biased, uses too many religious terms without explanation or reference, and is a very incomplete argument in any case--probably outside the scope of this article. Perhaps it could be moved, along with a more thorough discussion, to a separate article.

I don't know who you are, but receive a grateful ("amateur") theologian's thanks. It is incredibly biassed against one particular view of theology. It also bears mentioning that this is dangerously close to falling foul of the no original research policy, as it's an extremely limited minority which holds this position. Seems like someone was out to cause trouble. Wooster 16:54, 6 Aug 2004 (UTC)

(pmdulaney, 28 July 2005) As a Calvinist I take issue with the statement: "Calvinists, however, embrace the idea that God chose them and only them for salvation." What Calvinists hold to is that God elects some to salvation and withholds that election from others. It might well be that some of those elect are indeed Arminians. That is to say, most Calvinists would allow that you could be saved without having a correct (Calvinist!) understanding of predestination. The assertion that Calvinists believe that they alone are saved I perceive to be intentionally provocative and condescending.

A little off topic but the above paragraph invites the question; if God has predetermined those who are to be saved and if one who is ignorant of this may be among their number then what exactly is the point in Calvanism?

Free will in heaven?

In Christian theology, Adam ate the fruit that God forbid him to eat, and was thus practicing his free will. He chose evil instead of good, because evil was available. However, since evil is not supposed to exist in heaven, that means that there will be no choice to do evil, and we will have lost our free will. In other words, there is no free will in heaven given that condition.

Take a look at Alvin Plantinga's work.

Not everyone thinks of "free will" as meaning "equal possibility of contrary choice". Some might say that they would be free for the first time ever, if they were never again inclined to choose what is contrary to his will. — Mark (Mkmcconn) ** 00:20, 10 August 2005 (UTC)

Free of what, Mark? I find this question intriguing. If indeed God allows free will, meaning the freedom to make our own choices, then why would that change in an afterlife? Heck, ignoring the "evil" part, what happens when I get bored of singing and dancing after four hundred years and decide to make some "free will" choices for myself? Maybe play pranks on others, tell some bad God jokes or run around buck naked? Basically, if free will made me the person I was when I died, why would I become someone completely different for the rest of eternity? Please don't answer that I won't be interested in doing any of those things...because you know darned well we ALL will after several thousand years. --Metron4 00:35, 7 December 2005 (UTC)

It would change in the afterlife because we have already made a choice, the choice to do God's will. Those people who get to heaven will have found God's will to be prefferable to their own and therefore constantly choose His ways. Also, isn't heaven supposed to be a perfect place? How can boredom (an imperfection of earthly life) exist there? 216.99.65.10 18:34, 24 July 2006 (UTC)

First, I would have you define "perfect". Then explain how all human emotion and feeling would simply be a "non-issue" because Heaven is supposedly perfect. What distinguishes me from the rest of the "happy robots" running around up there? If being yourself got you into Heaven, why would you cease to be yourself? Invasion of the Body Snatchers anyone?--Metron4 22:53, 17 August 2006 (UTC)

Quantum mechanics deterministic?

1. A quick look at the chart on the interpretation of quantum mechanics page shows that, of the 6 interpretations mentioned, only two are deterministic (which would point to "some", not "many", "most", or "all"), and of the two that are deterministic, one, the many worlds theory, is only arguably deterministic in any meaningful sense, so that leaves one unarguably deterministic interpretation of quantum mechanics.
2. The one unarguably deterministic interpretation of quantum mechanics relies on unknown or unknowable (depending on who you ask) variables, meaning there is no particular reason, aside from a penchant for determinism, to choose the Bohm interpretation over others.
3. There are certainly other interpretations of quantum mechanics that don't appear on the page mentioned above, such as superstring theory (yes, superstring theory is more than an interpretation of quantum mechanics, but it includes such an interpretation), which is deterministic, but still the overriding majority of interpretations present the quantum world as either fundamentally random or subject to laws of cause and effect that don't meaningfully resolve into what we would call determinism.

-Seth Mahoney 00:17, Aug 4, 2004 (UTC)

(William M. Connolley 09:48, 4 Aug 2004 (UTC)) You have misunderstood me. The std interp of QM is indeed stochastic *but only when a system is measured from outside*. When the system is evolving internally, it does so deterministically. Since the universe has no outside and thus can't be measured, the QM interp for the whole universe would appear to be deterministic.

Throw out some references, please. -Seth Mahoney 17:09, Aug 4, 2004 (UTC)

(William M. Connolley 17:14, 4 Aug 2004 (UTC)) To what? That the copenhagen interp only introduces chance upon measurement? I can if you like, but its "well known".

Yes. -Seth Mahoney 17:18, Aug 4, 2004 (UTC)

(William M. Connolley 17:27, 4 Aug 2004 (UTC)) Read point (3) of Copenhagen interpretation - (the answer 3, not the qn 3). Admittedly that only says that measurement causes indet, it doesn't say that that is the only time indet occurs. Do you really require the second half? QM consists of precisely 2 bits: the equations, and the measurements. The equations are deterministic: they are d(system)/dt = f(system).

Actually, I read it to say that only when there is an act of measurement does the particle in question behave even remotely deterministically - before the collapse of the wave function, after which, if I'm remembering correctly, it behaves either as a particle or a wave (ie, its behavior can be predicted), it behaves as neither, and therefore can only be predicted statistically, that is, its behavior is not strictly deterministic. So I'm seeing CI as saying that the universe is basically behaving chaotically when we're not looking and deterministically when we are. This would be consistent with some work done by John Wheeler (his last project, he says) regarding the relationship between the observer and the observed universe and with some criticisms of CI (Schroedinger's cat, Einstein's criticisms, etc.). -Seth Mahoney 17:46, Aug 4, 2004 (UTC)

(William M. Connolley 08:41, 5 Aug 2004 (UTC)) No, this is all completely and totally incorrect. Measurement introduces chance: the wavefunction collapses (assuming we're in CI). After this, the system evolves deterministically.

So measurement introduces chance, by collapsing the wavefunction

(William M. Connolley 20:20, 5 Aug 2004 (UTC)) Yes

and forcing the thing in question to behave as a particle or as a wave.

WMC: no not really. The indeterminacy is rather more and less than this. Forget the wave/particle stuff: thats *not* where the endet comes in. The indet is (see next comment)

What is the state before the measurement? That is, what is the thing in question doing before the measurement takes place?

WMC: before the measurement the system is in a state sys = sum ( a_i * state_i ) where the sum is over the possible eigenstates (and may be an integral not a sum, but for simplicity...) and a_i are coefficients representing the chance of it being in eigenstate state_i. Measurement forces the system into one of the states state_i, with probability proportional to a_i.

From the fabulous Dr. Fynemann, if you can't describe it in terms that anyone can understand, you don't really understand it yourself, which I don't say to be insulting but to point out that 99.99999% of the people who happen to browse this talk page have no idea what you're talking about. -Seth Mahoney 22:00, Aug 6, 2004 (UTC)

Also, still waiting on those sources. -Seth Mahoney 18:37, Aug 5, 2004 (UTC)

WMC: Why not just read the Quantum mechanics article: it says it there.

Because the Quantum mechanics article makes contradictory statements about quantum mechanics and determinism. -Seth Mahoney 22:00, Aug 6, 2004 (UTC)

But it is perfectly clear about the 2 processes: evolution (deterministic) and measurement (not). See the bottom for this.

If it's a matter of whether some or most interpretations of QM are deterministic, is it a matter of what proportion of the interpretations are deterministic or is it a matter of how the consensus interprets QM? Either way, "some" is probably the safest bet. As to whether CI is deterministic, it seems pretty clear that in some circumstances CI says that multiple outcomes are physically possible and only one obtains; that is, the outcome (future) is not fully determined by the prior conditions. True for a single particle or a universe full of them? No? --Rikurzhen 23:36, Aug 4, 2004 (UTC)

(William M. Connolley 08:41, 5 Aug 2004 (UTC)) This is the same misinterpretation that SM made.

I think maybe your missing the definition of indeterminism: that some events are not fully determined by their causes. The definiton of determinism by contrast is that all events have sufficient causes. So in CI the collapse of a wavefunction is a indeterminsitic event that makes the universe "indeterministic". In a libertarian agent-causation theory of free will, it is the uncaused will of agents in an otherwise determinsitic universe that makes such a world indeterminsitic. --Rikurzhen 11:30, Aug 5, 2004 (UTC)

(William M. Connolley 20:20, 5 Aug 2004 (UTC)) You have missed the point. The point is, that for a closed system (the universe) there is nothing external to the system to make the measurement and hence nothing to cause the collapse.

That's a perfectly fine point to make (though some might argue that God would be an observer external to the universe). The problem that we're getting at here is that CI can't be said to be deterministic in a meaningful sense - it doesn't make absolute predictions about the future state of the universe. From the article:

Quantum mechanics provides probabilistic results because the physical universe is itself probabilistic rather than deterministic.

Which, as I understand it, is because any description prior to measurement in quantum mechanics is in terms of probability, not an absolute position, velocity, etc. This description evolves deterministically over time but does not describe a (again, meaningfully) deterministic universe because the initial description is not absolute, but in terms of probability - that is, either our ignorance or the nature of the very small things in the universe prevents us from describing things in terms of the very simple laws of cause and effect that make up any discussion of determinism. In fact, if the universe does actually operate this way and not along the lines of a hidden variable theory, it can only be described as indeterministic. -Seth Mahoney 22:00, Aug 6, 2004 (UTC)

(William M. Connolley 09:58, 7 Aug 2004 (UTC)) Drop the rather too deep indenting, but I'm replying to SM above: its true that CI is non-deterministic from a scientific POV of predicting the behavious of an observed system. But this is the *free will* article. If the entire universe if det from the POV of QM/CI, that is relevant to that debate, even if it doesn't have useful predictive consequences. ps: god as observer: Yes I've heard that one before.

Thanks for moving the indentation back a notch. First, I'm guessing you don't believe in God. That's fine - I'm not so keen on him either. However, you can't toss out God just because you don't believe in him. That is, without a solid proof of God's nonexistence as the ultimate observer, your argument actually doesn't imply that CI describes a deterministic universe. Since no such proof exists, any believer can just toss your argument out. As it goes, if you already believe in God, its a pretty good argument, though the implications of an all-observing being to CI would be interesting to explore.

(William M. Connolley 13:55, 8 Aug 2004 (UTC)) This is in the science section, to which god is orthogonal. Believers may insist that god is relevant to everything but thats no reason to accept it.

Believers have a valid claim, though, when someone says "there is nothing outside the universe to measure it and introduce chance", which is my entire point. No, a discussion of the existence of God doesn't belong in the science section, unless the science section makes a claim of that sort, in which case it is appropriate as a fairly common counter-argument. -Seth Mahoney 20:46, Aug 8, 2004 (UTC)

Second, if CI is non-deterministic, then as it applies to free will, it would allow for the possibility of, at least, an indeterministic universe. If that allows for free will would be the next question.

(William M. Connolley 13:55, 8 Aug 2004 (UTC)) OK, here we have a useful distinction that hasn't popped up before. Even if the universe is indeterministic, that doesn't mean FW exists. Of course if the univ *is* det, then FW doesn't.

Agreed, but that wasn't your claim in the page. -Seth Mahoney 20:46, Aug 8, 2004 (UTC)

(William M. Connolley 19:43, 9 Aug 2004 (UTC)) True: its a new and interesting point I hadn't thought of before.

Third, if the universe cannot be measured from the outside, it would seem that, as we are always inside the universe, that is, we're always a part of it, we can only measure from the inside, if that makes sense. That is, just marking something off and referring to it as a system which we are outside of doesn't actually make us, the observer, outside the system - there has to be some sort of meaningful and pre-existing boundary that places us definitionally outside.

One possible def of the universe is that it is everything, so by defn can't be measured from outside.

Right, that is one possible definition. However, since we're always inside, connected in a way to everything else, we can't measure from outside at all. We can't just pick out and label System X and say it is a candidate for measurement, because we're already involved in and a part of System X. If, then, System X can be said to be indeterministic only when measured from the outside, since we can never be outside, System X can never be said to be indeterministic. So, if that is indeed the claim of CI, it would seem that CI is not a viable explanation of QM. -Seth Mahoney 20:46, Aug 8, 2004 (UTC)

(William M. Connolley 19:43, 9 Aug 2004 (UTC)) No, I don't agree with that. There can be different levels of "boxes". You can put an imaginary box round an electron (if you know where it is, ha!) and consider it a system, then you are outside that system and can observe (with CI, certainly). And so on to bigger systems. Once you are inside your box, though, you have to describe the system differently.

Fourth, determinism requires a strict cause and effect relationship between everything. If there is a single inteterminate element in this system, its effects will cause future events which are unpredictable, even in theory, and therefore not determined in any sense that is meaningful. By way of cliche example, picture a pool table with a few normal billiard balls and one special billiard ball that moves about randomly. The normal billiard balls bounce off one another exactly as we would expect, and bounce off the special billiard ball as well. Because its movements are totally random, though, when it impacts one of the normal billiard balls it introduces an unforeseeable motion into the ball, resulting in a system that is, overall, not deterministic. -Seth Mahoney 00:41, Aug 8, 2004 (UTC)

Yeees, but what is the single non-det element?

From your earlier statement: Measurement introduces chance. If anything introduces chance, the overall system can't evolve deterministically. -Seth Mahoney 20:46, Aug 8, 2004 (UTC)

Not relevant if the system is the whole universe.

(William M. Connolley 13:55, 8 Aug 2004 (UTC)) Me, dropping indent again. Lets go back to what this was about, which is whatever sci might have to say about free will. My contention is that all sci theories (of the total universe) are det. Hence no support for free will. But this is not a strong support for no-free-will for 2 reasons: 1) these are all provisional theories and clearly none of them are of the total system 2) the only known way to write evolution-of-the-system eq's are det (the one exception being QM/CI measurement, but thats not "evolution"). I wouldn't want the article to say sci-says-there-is-no-free-will. But neither should the article use QM to try to support FW.

Dropping down another level, when you think about things in terms of sci (that is, of the material observable universe) there is no object that corresponds to FW. You can make chemical/elec signals in the brain some sort of object/system corresponding to "thought" but described in that way there is nothing of FW in them.

I agree that the article shouldn't use QM to try to support free will (unless it is going to include a discussion of Roger Penrose's much-disliked theories), but I don't think that saying "some interpretations of QM are deterministic" does that - for most people who have read a book or two or seen a PBS special or two on QM, that any interpretation of QM is deterministic is enough of a shock to prod them to think twice about its use as free will supporter.

OK. I'm happy with the current text, BTW.

I agree that on a scientific level there is no object that supports free will. I think that that is inherent in the nature of the process of science itself, though, not necessarily inherent in the universe. That is, according to the standard model: experiment, theorize, experiment, no unique event (which every act of free will would be) can ever be studied, because no experiment can be devised in which a unique event could be replicated. Science, generally, also studies caused events, which suggests that we could not scientifically study non-caused events (if they existed), which again, every act of free will would have to be (if it were caused, it would have to be unfree).

But yeah, I agree that ultimately scientific study excludes the possibility of free will. -Seth Mahoney 20:46, Aug 8, 2004 (UTC)

(William M. Connolley 19:43, 9 Aug 2004 (UTC)) Dropping indent again. You wanted a clear ref to QM-is-evolution-then-measurement. If you can find it, Penrose's new book has exactly that, very clearly diagrammed: its p529 fig 22.1, in the discussion of U/R operators. Note that Penrose says (very likely correctly, IMHO) that the current theory (he is describing QM/CI) may well be oversimplifying, but he does make it clear that this *is* the current theory.

That's cool. You don't have the title handy, do you? -Seth Mahoney 18:47, Aug 10, 2004 (UTC)

ParagonX 17:02, 21 Oct 2004 (UTC): WMC said - "My contention is that all sci theories (of the total universe) are det. Hence no support for free will." Determinism does not preclude free will.

(William M. Connolley 16:00, 23 Oct 2004 (UTC)) Oh yes it does.

ParagonX 17:38, 23 Oct 2004 (UTC): Not at all. Determinism does not necessitate predetermination, considering emergent system properties like consciousness and will. Determinism means that everything obeys causality, but this doesn't necessitate predetermination. You state otherwise, but give no reasons why.

WMC also said - "You can make chemical/elec signals in the brain some sort of object/system corresponding to "thought" but described in that way there is nothing of FW in them." You're looking it it wrong. Free will is not inherent in any object, it is an emergent property of a system (the brain).

(William M. Connolley 16:00, 23 Oct 2004 (UTC)) So what?

ParagonX 17:38, 23 Oct 2004 (UTC): So you're drawing an unsupported conclusion because of it. If you have something to support it, by all means, spit it out. Consider cellular automata (eg. the game of life by John Conway). It is based on essentially two simple rules. There are no rules governing the existence of objects or replication, etc. Yet objects, reproduction, and even simple "societies" form. These are emergent properties of the system, and are not determined by the rules of the system.

(William M. Connolley 18:43, 23 Oct 2004 (UTC)) Of course they are determined by the rules. What you mean is, something like: they would be hard to predict a priori from the rules; or that it wuld be hard to design rules to generate such properties. But that doesn't affect that obvious: those properties are totally determined by the rules, the domain size/shape/topology and the initial state.

ParagonX 01:27, 24 Oct 2004 (UTC): It's an analogy. Yes, the game of life is deterministic, but reality on the other hand has consciousness, and consciousness allows for free will (the act of choosing between possible choices one is conscious of). On the other hand, it's not quite determined solely by the rules, because it also depends on the initial configuration, and on whether anything is altered during the course of following those rules (like adding or removing dots from a generation). There are no rules for size/shape/topology etc. in the game, they are emergent properties. It's goverened by 2 simple rules: 1 - If a cell has three neighbours, a new dot is born, and 2 - if a dot has fewer than 3 or more than 4 neighbours it dies. Nothing is said about objects, etc.

Same in real life. The laws of nature do not govern the existence of such emergent properties as consciousness,

(William M. Connolley 18:43, 23 Oct 2004 (UTC)) Now you are assuming your conclusions. I think it entirely likely that the laws of nature *do* determine the existence of whatever it is that we have labelled conciousness.

ParagonX 01:27, 24 Oct 2004 (UTC): I didn't deny that. I'm saying there are no laws/rules regarding consciousness. It's a result of emergence. Emergent properties may be predetermined according to the rules and initial state, but only if one of those emergent properties doesn't happen to be something like consciousness.

or even matter (it is an emergent property of quantum physics), yet they exist. Consciousness and will allows us to interact with the world in a non-deterministic manner.

(William M. Connolley 18:43, 23 Oct 2004 (UTC)) You're just making this up.

ParagonX 01:27, 24 Oct 2004 (UTC): Seems you're the one making things up. You have repeatedly stated your beliefs contradict everything I write, and you have repeatedly failed to back up a single claim, despite my repeated queries. You have failed to support any of your arguments, and even if you were correct in claiming determinism necessitates predetermination, it does not matter with regard to the disputed point, since the argument should be included in the article to give it a more balanced view providing different perspectives. NPOV is preferred, so don't insert your bias. If you disagree with it, good for you, but you should not make a strawman argument simply because you disagree with it. If you truely believe there are good contrary arguments, then by all means add them to the page, but don't debate a strawman, it's really bad form. As far as I'm concerned, if you don't provide a shred of evidence/reasoning supporting your arguments in your next post here, then the matter is resolved, and the argument should stay.

I've not read everything above, but one point that keeps cropping up is that of the system evolving determninistically if not disturbed or observed by an external observer. This need not be God, but can be at the level of individual consciousness - Wigner and maybe even Von Neumann considered the possibility that conscious observers could be collapsing bits of the universe, as in the scientist opening Schoedinger's box and collapsing the cat into a dead or alive state - before he was presumambly a superpositon. And indeed this is not being made up - one of the modern exponents of this aspect of QM is Henry Stapp who describes rather eleoquently the difference between the deterministic phase of wave function evolution under Scroedinger's equation and the non-deterministic wave function collapse. This collpase at atomic level Stapp sees as a sort of prototype for conscious choice - he suggests a macroscopic superposition of brain states, each corresponding to a different choice of e.g. dinner - your choice occurs when you 'choose' to collapse onto one of the possible choices. Finally, on 'hidden variable' theory, the great white hope of the quntum dterminist minority - Alain Aspect's experiment in the early 80's showed that any such hidden variable theory must be non-local - i.e. 'ghostly action at a distance' - thus there is no local (non-ghostly) hidden variable theory. So whichever way you twist you have 'weirdness' - free will and indeterminism and/or non-locality or the interconnectedness of all things in the universe. --hughey 14:14, 21 Dec 2004 (UTC)

I'm going to chime in here, because this is actually my very area of expertise. If you want some references please look for the key words Decoherence, Quantum Brownian Motion by the authors Halliwell, Unruh, Zurek, and Bei Lok Hu.

The short answer is that Quantum Mechanics actually is deterministic, fully deterministic. Suprise! But this has not been well understood for very long. And QM is still not taught correctly in most classes. It will take years before this diffuses throughout the community.

In the standard pragmatic interpretation of quantum mechanics, there is the deterministic evolution and there is the discontinuous, probabilistic measurement. These two treatments are incompatible. But there is a larger problem.

The measurement itself should be nothing more than a complicated interaction between the quantum system and a larger macroscopic measuring apparatus. This interaction should be treatable by deterministic evolution as well. The discontinuous, irreversable collapse and probabilistic projection should be an approximation for what really happens when a large measuring apparatus interacts with the quantum system.

The discontinuity of the collapse comes from the smallness of the decoherence time. The irreversability of the collapse comes from the longness of the poincarre recurrence time. The probability comes from averaging over all the degrees of freedom in the measurement apparatus of environment. All of these things become very extreme because there are many, many degrees of freedom in the macroscopic world (and because of entanglement). Basically QM is not probablilistic, but is stochastic. This comes from the fact that you are course graining out avagadro's number worth of degrees of freedom in the measuring apparatus or environment to inspect only the quantum system. It is very much like a massive ensemble average in statistical mechanics. Now everything is not completely figured out. Not all large systems will lead to classical behavior. There are still outstanding questions.

There are detractors and critics. But all are not created equally. There are some really good things this modern "interpretation" has going for it. First of all, it's not really an interpretation at all. You are actually throwing away all of the interpretation and just keeping the equations of motion. Because of this you also have consistency. Many "interpretations" lack consistency, and are therefore wrong from the start. The one thing lacking is that decoherence assumes it works. There are many large problems left to be tackled. It is not absolutely certain that we can get a classical world from ordinary quantum mechanics.

The only valid critics I see are the people that point out that linear QM might be a local theory, and the true theory might become nonlinear and lose superstition, or perhaps do something else happens in the classical emergence. Lots of experiments are being done proving QM at long range and getting QM effects in larger systems. The verdict is still out, but so far experiment and Occam's razor is on the side of ordinary, linear QM.

I hope this was helpful. (CHF 06:25, 9 December 2005 (UTC))

Very interesting discussion. However, it seems to me that this QT thread has gone somewhat off-topic. I hope that the following points will help others to see why:

(1) It is not generally agreed that if determinism is true, then there is no free will. Rather, that is a particular view (called "incompatibilism") within the context of the free will debate. Incompatibilism is a logical claim, namely, the claim that it is logically necessary that it is not the case that both determinism and the free will thesis are true (where "the free will thesis" is something like the thesis that someone acts freely). The logical modality ("necessary") would apply in virtue of the concepts involved in determinism and "free will".

(2) The negation of incompatibilism is compatibilism, the view that it is logically possible that both determinism and the free will thesis are true. Compatibilists either think that one need not have an "ability to do otherwise" in order to act freely or think that nomic necessity is logically compatible with the ability to do otherwise. The former camp may maintain that some kind of voluntariness (acting intentionally, etc.) is, given that certain other unproblematic conditions are satisfied, sufficient for freedom, and that determination by previous states of the world and laws of nature is in no way incompatible with voluntariness, despite the fact that one who acted voluntarily may not have been able to act in any other way than that in which they did act. The latter camp may claim that one's having had the ability to have done otherwise amounts to having had the property of being such that if one had choosen otherwise, then one would have done otherwise. This claim is a hypothetical analysis of the ability to do otherwise - there are other such analyses.

(3) A less well-known compatibility issue exists in the free will debate, namely, that of whether freedom is compatible with indeterminism. It cannot simply be assumed that if incompatibilism is true and determinism is false, then the world is safe for human freedom. Suppose, for example, that an action or choice is free only if the agent in question originates it. But to the extent that an action or choice occurs independently of every other event, it seems that it is not originated by anything, and therefore is not free on the present supposition.

(4) Let's assume that QT is true on some interpretation. But since the compatibility issues are logical issues rather than issues about the actual world, the fact that QT is true is irrelevant unless the compatibility issues are settled and the issue of whether QT (on the true interpretation) is deterministic is settled.

(5) Suppose that the interpretation on which QT is true is an indeterministic one and that it is settled that freedom is incompatible with determinism and compatible with indeterminism. Even on this supposition, it remains to be seen whether and if so, then how quantum indeterminacy is relevant to human freedom.

Hemlock 01:31, 25 April 2006 (UTC)

Free will in the multiverse?

Imagine if for every decision the universe branches and each possible path is followed. This perspective seems to resolve a number of paradoxes to me... but I'll leave my doppelgangers to argue the particulars. :)

Predeterminism & Omniscience

While determinism isn't necessarily at odds with free will, predetermination is. Since omniscience necessitates predetermination, omniscience and free will are necessarily mutually exclusive. --ParagonX 03:53, 18 Oct 2004 (UTC)

I disagree with the above statement, and with the following quote from text: "In Christian theology, God is described as not only omniscient but omnipotent, which implies that not only has God always known what choices you will make tomorrow, but actually chose what you would choose. That is, by virtue of His foreknowledge He knows what will influence your choices, and by virtue of His omnipotence He controls those factors."

Two points of discussion:

• Can you support your statement that omniscience necessitates pre-destination? Doesn't such an implication rely on an omniscience that remains limited with regards to a fixed perception in time? That is to say, if the possessor of ominscience exists outside of , or is not bound by, what is typically considered the linear progression of time - a state not incompatible with an omnipresent being - doesn't that remove the implication?
• Can the statement that omnipotence implies agency as represented in the quote above be supported? Simply because a being possesses the power or facility to cause any or every event, does it necessarily follow that they must do/have done so?

Many thanks. --Alavery7 17:05:, 21 Dec 2004 (UTC)

if a GOD exists outside of what he is all knowing: and is called its creator, how can this God not be the cause of all that he is foreknowing? if he always knew every detail, how can it not be his doing? if he just discovers the total data base as it were and can know every detail by examination, how can he be considered a creator in any sense? if there are random elements built into the system, but knowable from outside the system, how can this God escape responsibility for placing those random elements into the system? if the system is generally randomized and can be altered by this God from outside, then it must be admitted that he does not know everything about the system. Jiohdi 12:52, 21 February 2006 (UTC)

---

William M. Connolley, you state the paradox referred to by some compatibilists is poorly thought out. I'd be interested in hearing your thoughts on it. -ParagonX 03:37, 20 Oct 2004 (UTC)

(William M. Connolley 08:51, 20 Oct 2004 (UTC)) Its the bits you keep removing...

• predestination does not imply predictability (why should it? Quite apart from the logical separation from the two, if you could "predict" the fate of the entire universe you would need the state of the entire universe in your head. There isn't room)
• even predictability does not imply the ability to change the future (again, its a complete disconnect between the two concepts).

hence the paradox is a very poor one. Are there really "professional" philosophers capable of advancing an argument this poor?

ParagonX 08:07, 21 Oct 2004 (UTC): Predestination doesn't logically imply predictability, it simply implies it is a possibility.

(William M. Connolley 08:37, 21 Oct 2004 (UTC)) So there is no paradox

ParagonX 16:35, 21 Oct 2004 (UTC): That does not follow. It does not matter whether you agree with the argument or not. It is a compatibilist standpoint, and as such ought to be included. And it should be stated properly, not as you would have it.

There is nothing that implies one would need the entire state of the universe in one's head in order to predict something which was predetermined. One need only consider relevant factors.

(William M. Connolley 08:37, 21 Oct 2004 (UTC)) Vague/meaningless.

ParagonX 16:35, 21 Oct 2004 (UTC): Premature dismissal. There is nothing to support your claim.

Many events are predetermined and most of them are predictable to some extent (eg. everyone will die, the question is when).

Splendid. So, given that you can predict that you will be dead in 1000 years, does that give you the ability to change it? No.

ParagonX 16:35, 21 Oct 2004 (UTC): If it could be changed it wouldn't be predetermined. If, on the other hand, I knew I was supposed to die on a certain date, I could change that. One obvious way would be to commit suicide before-hand. Not a desirable outcome, but it makes the point. Foreknowledge is mutually exclusive with predetermination.

(William M. Connolley 16:09, 23 Oct 2004 (UTC)) This is stupid. The argument you inserted into the article asserts that there is a paradox, because predictability implies an ability to change. However, you've just provided an example to falsify this: your death within 1000 years is predictable, but unchangable.

ParagonX 18:24, 23 Oct 2004 (UTC): Essentially yes. The implication depends on the existence of free will, but that is the argument. Your example is flawed, because being dead in 1000 years is not an event. Dying in 1000 years would be. There are predetermined things, and as such they can't be changed. I was asserting that non-predetermined events could be changed if they were predictable. The prediction would necessitate awareness of it, and then one can make conscious choices regarding it. It's not predetermined when I'll die, and foreknowledge of my death would give me the ability to alter it. I'm surprised you have difficulty reasoning through this yourself.

A predetermined event is simply where all possible future timelines intersect. One can disregard many things and still be able to predict predestined events. Predictability implies the ability to change the future because if one knows what will happen then a choice could be made which would alter the course of events.

(William M. Connolley 08:37, 21 Oct 2004 (UTC)) Simply repeating this won't make it true.

ParagonX 16:35, 21 Oct 2004 (UTC): Of course not, it stands on it's own merits, which you have apparently blinded yourself to.

Even incompatibilist determinists don't argue that we don't have the ability to choose. Consciousness gives us that ability. Knowledge of the future would give the ability to potentially alter the course of events in such a way as to prevent it from happening.

(William M. Connolley 08:37, 21 Oct 2004 (UTC)) Simply repeating this won't make it true.

ParagonX 16:35, 21 Oct 2004 (UTC): See above. Do you have any real arguments? Any at all?

Thus foreknowledge of the future precludes predetermination. You may argue that determinism does not equal predictability, but compatibilists can argue otherwise, and that is the point.

Compatibilist can argue whatever illogic they like. And you can even write it into the page, as long as no one objects anough to remove it. But ath doesn't mean that the obvious countere arguments shouldn't be presented, which is what I am doing.

ParagonX 16:35, 21 Oct 2004 (UTC): No, that's not what you are doing at all. You are censoring an argument you disagree with. I am stating the claims, and you are altering those claims, but that's not what such a compatibilist would argue. If you want to add counter arguments, do it in a different section of the page, not by altering the argument you want to refute.

(William M. Connolley 16:09, 23 Oct 2004 (UTC)) I'm censoring nothing. Its you thats removing text. I'm noting the obvious fallacies in the argument you're trying to insert. Determinism doesn't imply predicatability (its the other way round: predictability implies determinism). And predicatability doesn't imply the ability to change.

ParagonX 18:24, 23 Oct 2004 (UTC): You are censoring the argument by changing it. Censorship != deleting text, censorship is blocking ideas, which is what you're doing with your additions to the text. You were not noting any fallacies. Or at least if you were, you weren't adding them to the page. Predetermination necessitates determinism. Determinism implies predetermination.

(William M. Connolley 16:09, 23 Oct 2004 (UTC)) And finally: having been obliged to read the text you've inserted several times, it seems more like nonsense than ever. Please provide a source for it.

ParagonX 18:24, 23 Oct 2004 (UTC): If you have a problem with it, add your own arguments to the page. Debates all over the Internet regarding free will vs. the purported omniscience of God bring about this paradox.

(William M. Connolley 18:40, 23 Oct 2004 (UTC)) Please provide a (reputable) source: not merely an assertion that such sources exist.

Disputed para cut to talk.

(William M. Connolley 19:26, 23 Oct 2004 (UTC)) OK, Paragon and I keep reverting each other over this para, so I have cut it to the talk page to attempt to find agreement. P wants:

Some compatibilists point to a paradox that they assert is created when one assumes predetermination as a result of determinism. If the future is predetermined, they claim it would be ultimately predictable. If it were predictable, then knowledge of the future is possible, and it could be changed. This last contradicts predetermination, which was assumed to be true, thus they claim predetermination creates a paradox.

He has provided no sources for this. I think the "paradox" above is nonsense, and proposed:

Some compatibilists point to a paradox that they assert is created when one assumes predetermination as a result of determinism. If the future is predetermined, it might be thought to be ultimately predictable, although it is not clear why this predicatability should occur. If it was predictable, then knowledge of the future is possible. If knowledge of the future is possible, then it might be possible that it can be changed, although this it is unclear whether this follows. This last contradicts predetermination, which was assumed to be true, thus predetermination creates a paradox, but only if the other two assumptions are also true.

However, sicne I'm fairly sure the P para is junk, I'll now start arguing for it to be deleted entirely.

I'm not certain, but I think that this paradox assumes presentism. --Rikurzhen 04:55, Oct 24, 2004 (UTC)

ParagonX 04:41, 25 Oct 2004 (UTC): It does not appear to be dependant on presentism. It seems a strange viewpoint. Regarding time in that manner, I'd say existence is relative. The past and future exist in relative states, and are different for everyone, since each person has their own timeline (or worldline in physics). Regardless, even if it were dependant on such a stance, that does not necessarily invalidate the argument, nor provide sufficient reason to remove the entry.

True. I haven't heard this argument before, and it seems odd to me, but if it is discussed by free will thinkers, then it should be in the article. --Rikurzhen 06:13, Oct 25, 2004 (UTC)

(William M. Connolley 17:03, 25 Oct 2004 (UTC)) Well, although I'm obliged (much against my will) to accept that people do take compatibilism seriously, P has still not provided any evidence that compatibilists do indeed present this "paradox".

ParagonX 20:38, 25 Oct 2004 (UTC): Why do you still persist? Here, look for yourself.

(William M. Connolley 21:05, 25 Oct 2004 (UTC)) If you meant to refer to Newcomb's paradox, why didn't you say so before? Perhaps because it doesn't fit.

ParagonX 13:14, 26 Oct 2004 (UTC): Because I couldn't remember the name.

Newcomb's paradox is important to the free will debate. It should be mentioned by name/link. --Rikurzhen 01:50, Oct 26, 2004 (UTC)

I would agree that if you could collect all data that determinism implies predicability. But you have to assume free will to say that predictability implies ability to change. However, free will as defined as such under this assumption means that you the system will NOT be deterministic, which was an initial assumption. Therefore this paradox is not valid. If you assume the decision making process is deterministic, you can predict what someone will do. Try as they might, they can't do differently. It's very weird to think about, however, it would have to be some twisted Oedipus type of thing. So in that case, predictibility does not imply the ability to change. At root, I think this paradox fails because it does not have a consistent defenition of the terms used. This seems a semantic arguement, by definition, it cannot happen. I'm especially interested in William M. Connolley's thoughts on my interpretation. --C0h3n 14:30, 28 December 2005 (UTC)

This discussion seems to ignore Chaos theory, which shows that determinism does not imply predictability. For example, the motion of the moons of Jupiter is completely deterministic, never-the-less it is impossible to predict where in its orbit one of the moons will be one hundred years from now.

Also, the universe is stochastic, not deterministic. Two atoms of U-235 are identical. One decays, the other does not. Which will decay is inherently unpredictable. Rick Norwood 15:42, 28 December 2005 (UTC)

I don't think it ignores chaos theory. It is more a thought experiment that says "If you know everything at one point, you can predict everything thereafter". Just because something is very hard to predict doesn't mean its impossible to predict. Also, since the paradox assumes determinism, it doesnt matter if the universe is deterministic or stochasitc, but some hold that any stochastic things are just things we don't understand enough to see that they are deterministic. -- C0h3n 14:40, 30 December 2005 (UTC)

Compatibilism

(William M. Connolley 22:13, 23 Oct 2004 (UTC)) To me, the compatibilist position appears to be twaddle. Does it actually belong in the article, in the sense of: is it a major part of the thinking on free will? Google throws up about 3,400 hits for compatibilism (but one of the highest is [1]) as opposed to 100* that for determinism and 1.4M for free will. I'm beginning to wonder is this is just a minority POV hijacking the article.

ParagonX 01:35, 24 Oct 2004 (UTC): Doesn't matter. Popularity is not a measure of truth, and claiming something should be removed because you think it's "twaddle" amounts to explicitly stating you want to add an unfounded bias into the page. I say unfounded because you have repeatedly refused to support any of your claims with actual arguments.

To my knowledge, compatibilism is a major philosophical program. [2] --Rikurzhen 22:20, Oct 23, 2004 (UTC)

(William M. Connolley 22:28, 23 Oct 2004 (UTC)) Hmmm... I have to admit that link appears to demonstrate that it is taken seriously. OTOH it also confirms me in my view that that compatibilism is nonsense (how those philosophers can talk!). While I'm here, I note that the link asserts Hobbes as a classic compatibilist: he isn't: half of compatibilism is missing: the determinism bit.

ParagonX 01:35, 24 Oct 2004 (UTC): Compatibilism is taken seriously, and I find your insistent premature dismissals of it to be quite ignorant and imprudent. According to [Skepdic.com]: "The modern view of determinism and free will does not see the two concepts as mutually exclusive. This view began to take shape with arguments such as those offered by Thomas Hobbes."

Here's another link for you: [[3]]

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(DrRetard):

William M. Connelley, compatibilism is the MOST WIDELY-HELD position on the free will dispute among contemporary philosophers. You may not like this fact, but it is a fact. When you go on to change the article from "Some" to "Most" philosophers accepting incompatibilism, you are doing nothing more respectable than trolling, or simply acting the fool.

Moreover, Hobbes most certainly IS a compatibilist soft determinist (FYI: compatibilists needn't accept determinism). Just read the beginning of Leviathan, Chater 21. Or, for that matter, read the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry (written by real philosophy professors with real PhDs who are real experts in their respective field):

"For instance, Hobbes writes that a person's freedom consists in his finding, “no stop, in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to doe” (Leviathan, p.108). Hobbes' brief remarks represent an EXEMPLARY EXPRESSION of the classical compatibilist account of freedom. It involves two components, a positive and a negative one. The positive component (doing what one wills, desires, or inclines to do) consists in nothing more than what is involved in the power of agency. The negative component (finding “no stop”) consists in acting unencumbered or unimpeded. Typically, the classical compatibilists' benchmark of impeded or encumbered action is compelled action. Compelled action arises when one is forced by some foreign or external source to act contrary to her will." (Emphasis added)

ParagonX, you made a change to the article, whereby it characterizes compatibilists thus: "They accept determinism, and hold that the causal agent in a free choice is not necessarily predetermined." That is a TERRIBLE mischaracterization. First of all, compatibilists aren't required to accept determinism. They need only accept that determinism is compatible with free will. Of course, most compatibilists are indeed "soft determinists", who accept determinism and free will. Second, according to soft determinists, EVERY EVENT -- including free actions and the psychological events of the agents that produce free actions -- is subject to causal determinism. To say that the causal agent in a free choice is undetermined to accept some sort of Reid/Chisholm-style libertarianism -- QUITE THE OPPOSITE of soft determinism.

You two need to stop messing around with this article until you acquire some rudimentary knowledge of the subject matter.

moral responcibility.

there is nothing here about whether the issue of moral responcibility has any real place in law. Which is something that has been debated to great leangth.

It is often argued that the law doesn't simply punish people because they did something moraly wrong, and therefore determinism/free will is irrelevent.

For example, sentences are usually given with other things in mind: the article on punishment lists Deterrence, Rehabilitation, Incapacitation, Restoration and Retributive justice as reasons for punishment. And, arguably, none of these are influenced by the determinism debate. Just because a person had no responcibility for their actions, doesn't mean that we shouldn't attempt to prevent them from commiting a predictable crime in future, or that we shouldn't give apt retribution for those that were wronged.

(edit)I didn't add anything myself because this is on the featured articles list, and i didn't want to mess anything up :)

--220.240.173.96 03:51, 19 Dec 2004 (UTC)

"Unfree action?" "Up to something else"

I will admit to being somewhat an unsophisticated dilettante when it comes to philosophy, but what the hell does "Conversely, an unfree action would be "up to" something else" mean? The version on the Main Page reads even worse: "Consequently, an unfree action must be somehow "up to" something else." Taco Deposit | Talk-o Deposit 15:00, Dec 21, 2004 (UTC)

I agree (although I would use a more gentle language), these phrases are both very colloquial and very vague. Perhaps using some type of construct with the word "control" might be more enlightening? 69.141.33.247