Talk:Six-Day War/Archive 5

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Six Days?

I see June 5 to June 10, and, correct me if I'm wrong, but that looks an awful lot like five days. Anyone know where the discrepancy came from? 66.19.99.59 (talk) 17:55, 14 December 2009 (UTC)

June 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10. Count them. Hertz1888 (talk) 18:10, 14 December 2009 (UTC)

Weird wording

I think this paragraph sounds weird:

The Israeli decision [to offer back taken land in exchange for peace] was to be conveyed to the Arab nations by the United States. The US was informed of the decision, but not that it was to transmit it. There is no evidence of receipt from Egypt or Syria, and some historians claim that they may have never received the offer.

It kind of makes it sound like Israel managed to keep their decision to return land a secret from the Arab nations. Does anyone have access to newspaper clips from about June 19, 1967? -- Heptor _talk 00:55, 18 December 2009 (UTC)

This was a decision made in a secret cabinet meeting, not a publicly made "offer". The text of the cabinet decision was ultimately released decades later, and you can find it in the opening pages of Dennis Ross's book (The Missing Peace). This was an internal discussion among Israeli leaders about what they would be prepared to give up in any future negotiations. It is normal for countries keep their negotiating positions secret before a deal is struck, so the fact that the decision was not made public at the time is not unusual. By the way, the land they were prepared to return in this hypothetical situation did not include Gaza or the West Bank. Sanguinalis (talk) 18:29, 17 January 2010 (UTC)

change losses

according to this israeli site http://he.shvoong.com/internet-and-technologies/1737250-%D7%9E%D7%9C%D7%97%D7%9E%D7%AA-%D7%A9%D7%A9%D7%AA-%D7%94%D7%99%D7%9E%D7%99%D7%9D/ israel lost 800 soldiers egypt 10,000-15,000 jorden 6,000 syria 1,000-2,5000 Please check it and change --Yaniv1234 (talk) 16:58, 6 January 2010 (UTC)

Hey Yaniv, Thanks for the research. Two points in response

1) There is already a reliable source cited that puts the number of Israeli soldiers killed at 983. If you find a second source that you believe is reliable stating that Israeli causulities numbered 800, you should add the reference, and change the number to 800 - 983 to indicate that there is some disagreement between sources regarding the exact number.

2) Also, read Wikipedia:Verifiability#Non-English_sources regarding citing references that are not in english.

Thanks NickCT (talk) 19:52, 6 January 2010 (UTC)

Arab casualties seem to be grossly understated while Israeli casualties seem to be somewhat inflated. Currently, as far as I can tell, the article uses only one source for casualties. Additional reliable sources on casualty figures should be added and I will provide them in due course.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 18:57, 5 February 2010 (UTC)

I have added alternate, sourced figures for Arab casualties, per Churchill and Herzog.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 05:33, 15 February 2010 (UTC)

Belligerents

Sending some aircraft to the war does not warrant the inclusion of Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Sudan, etc... The infobox should not include providers of token forces. --Sherif9282 (talk) 13:06, 17 February 2010 (UTC)

Why not? If a token show of solidarity deserves to be mentioned anywhere it's in a historical summary. I mean isn't that the point? To be able to say in the end, we were there. We helped. It ended differently than they hoped but that doesn't mean that they now get to take it back right? --68.41.80.161 (talk) 01:06, 20 February 2010 (UTC)

Does the death of troops constitute more than a show of support? http://elderofziyon.blogspot.com/2010/03/algeria-reveals-extent-of-its.html —Preceding unsigned comment added by 79.71.113.103 (talk) 12:04, 16 March 2010 (UTC)

---

General Hod said at a press conference given in Tel Aviv in June 1967: "For 16 years we lived with the plan, we slept with the plan, we ate with the plan ... ." —Preceding unsigned comment added by The Fifth Column (talk • contribs) 18 March 2010 23:15

no citation

"U.S ambassador to Israel, Walworth Barbour, did not deliver it in a timely manner.." can anyone find a source for this or should it be removed? --68.41.80.161 (talk) 01:06, 20 February 2010 (UTC)

U.S. Collusion with Israel

It's well-documented. George Lenczowski, for example, found that as early as May 23, President Johnson secretly authorized supplying Israel by air with a variety of arms systems, even when an embargo on weapons shipments were placed on the Middle East. Stephen Green's research proves in his book that the U.S. sent reconnaissance aircraft to track nighttime movement of Egyptian forces. 76.191.230.178 (talk) 20:26, 1 March 2010 (UTC)

If by "well-documented" you mean "a conspiracy theory that refuses do die out", then yes, it's well-documented. Green's assertion has been shown to be false by a serious scholar who published it in a respected academic journal. Richard Bordeaux Parker was, among other things, the American ambassador to Algeria and Lebanon, not some trivial "observer". If anyone should be dismissed in this dispute, it is Green rather than Parker. Lenczowski's account, even if true, means nothing in regards to the planing or execution of the war, especially when there's a plethora of evidence that shows that the U.S. and Israel were in disagreement on a great many things and hardly aware of each others plans'. There's not a single shred of evidence to connect it to Green's account and nothing to show that this supposed "collusion" ever extended beyond "authorization". But hey, what's evidence when you can always juxtapose two facts to arrive at some sinister conclusion?

The question is whether we want this to be a serious article about the Six Day War, or the dumping ground for every fable that keeps poping up. Talk of "collusion" has no place here, just as you will not find it in serious scholarly debate. Poliocretes (talk) 21:42, 1 March 2010 (UTC)

Parker, who is not a professor at a university, carries no more authority than Stephen Green and far less than Professor Lenczowski. I don't have any problem with including Parker's views, but attempts to exclude accounts of American support to Israel in 1967 are unhelpful. Although Green's work has been disputed, there does not appear to be consensus that it's all a hoax as suggested by Parker. 76.191.230.178 (talk) 00:09, 2 March 2010 (UTC)

Parker is legitimate, and although about another war, I found this note in a ref, which says: For the proceedings of a major conference on the October War involving scholars and major players from all sides, see Richard Parker, ed., The October War: A Retrospective (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2001). Green tends to be less-so, and use of his material must be well written to survive; I have two of his books, and have yet to use either as a ref in Wiki. The anon's mentioning of LBJ's 5/23 secret authorization, however, made me at my copy of Lenczowski (p110). For the anon, I would suggest being a little more circumspect in what you attempt to insert here, concerning notability, relevance and phrasing. That paragraph in particular speaks of American military behavior just before and during the actual war, with "Johnson's dualism" being "the most important feature" of his pro-Israel US tilt, by secretly sending supplies to Israel, while publicly declaring an embargo on all arms to the entire region. Put that in the article. You will find by choosing a user name and learning how to edit well, you can become more productive for the project and NPOV. Regards, CasualObserver'48 (talk) 01:25, 2 March 2010 (UTC)

I was rather intrigued by the addition made by 76.191.230.178, "that on June 5th, the United States sent Israel ammunition and jet fighters", taken from Quigley's "The Case for Palestine" (p. 162). Quigley's book can be viewed on both Google Books and Amazon, where this exact statement appears with a reference to page 216 in Donald Neff's "Warriors For Jerusalem" (1984). I troubled myself to the library and found the relevant paragraphs. In an episode titled "June 5: Israel Attacks", Neff says the following about president Johnson (top of page 216):

"He also received a message from his friend Arthur Krim. A memorandum to the President that day read: "Arthur Krim reports that many arms shipments are packed and ready to go to Israel, but are being held up. He thinks it would be most helpful if these could be released."

Under the message the President had scribbled: "1,000 rounds of 105mm artillery shells cleared. 2,000 fuses - availability, Gas masks. New Requests: A-4 jet fighter-bombers Hawk antiaircraft missiles."

Before the day was out, Krim was informed that gas masks had already been dispatched to Israel and he left a message for Johnson expressing his appreciation."

That's it. The rest of the page deals with various people he met and communicated with, and has nothing to do with arms shipments of any kind. In short, Quigley's assertion that "on June 5th, the United States sent Israel ammunition and jet fighters" is unsupported by the evidence he provides. The only thing documented as sent are gas masks. There's no indication if and when any ammunition had even been dispatched and an Israeli request for jet fighters, possibly made on June 5, somehow becomes jet fighters sent to Israel. In light of this I am deleting the sentence from the article. Poliocretes (talk) 18:17, 4 March 2010 (UTC)

That indeed shows admirable inquisitiveness for the project’s good and for those near a library; but I am not near one, though similarly motivated by the project. I am however, unsure exactly how definitive your conclusions might be, regarding the specificity of June 5. Lenczowski uses different wording; he says (about LBJ's 5/23 secret authorization) that “these items were sent just on the eve of the June 5 invasion…” He refs it to a cite that says: “National Security File, NSC History---Middle East Crisis, May 12—June 19, 1967. The May 23 memo signed by H.H.S (Harold H. Sanders) and the attached table, “President’s Decisions, Israeli Aid Package 23 May 1967,” signed by W.W. Rostow are in vol.1. A note to the President about a delay in some shipments, signed by Marvin (Watson), dated June 5, 1967, 6:55 P.M., is in vol.4. These originally Top Secret materials were declassified on January 6, 1982 and May 9, 1982. Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin Texas.

Green’s book Taking Sides (1984), uses somewhat similar wording ("These were packed and sent just prior to the June 5 invasion, in preparation for it,...") He also cites the first of those (vol1) as the source. His mention notes the following on the attached table: “armored personnel carriers, tank spare parts, spare parts for Hawk missile air defense system, bomb fuses, artillery ammunition, and gas masks, among many other items.[ref mention] (Parts of the list have been excised.)” It is likely we will never know just what was asked for and sent to Israel before June 5. Green also mentions Krim’s note, but writes “that certain of the “armed shipments” due to leave that day by chartered airline had been delayed.” Green also quotes the “most helpful if these could be released", but also says “believe it or not” that a note to this effect is in the National Security File of the LBJ Library. Green also notes more about Krim than his wiki-page, noting that he was the “Chairman of the New York State Democratic party and an active Zionist.”

I do not object to the deletion; it seems unsufficiently sourced, and besides, the title seems too emotive and so pre-Dershowitz. On the other hand, I do not believe that LBJ’s 5/23 secret supply authorization is given its due weight, certainly in the light of how Lenczowski presents it. Mansur’s mention of it doesn’t make it for notability and weight NPOV. I’ll change the wording, as I get to it, to reflect Lencz’s more reliable, notable and nuanced mention. Regards, CasualObserver'48 (talk) 15:23, 8 March 2010 (UTC)

Proposed Change

It's clear from numerous quotations and references throughout the article and discussion pages that a substantial body of respected opinion does not agree that Israel's attack was "pre-emptive". I therefore propose changing the lead to:

"On June 5, 1967, Israel launched a bombing raid on Egyptian airfields. Initially it told the UN that Egypt had attacked first, but later described the strikes as preemptive. Egypt denied planning to attack Israel, and asserted that Israel's strike was not preemptive but an unwarranted and illegal act of aggression."

Any thoughts? Phersu (talk) 13:10, 28 May 2010 (UTC)

The Arab states' words and actions make it clear what their plans were. Their rhetoric was "We'll destroy Israel", their actions were to expel the UN peacekeepers from Sinai, and move the Egyptian army into it, close the straits, and form a unified military command with Syria, Jordan and Iraq. Jordan allowed the Iraqi forces to enter its realm, in preparation for their attack. As Henry Shue and David Rodin say in their "Preemption: military action and moral justification", "A classic example of a preemptive war is Israel's Six Day War of 1967."

And yet, both U.S. and Israeli intelligence assessed that Egypt would not attack. The use of the adjective "preemptive" is subjective and therefore the first sentence of the third paragraph of the introduction needs to be revised for neutrality. 118.160.21.65 (talk) 02:31, 5 July 2010 (UTC)

What I see on this page is some out-of-context quotes, interpreted by Wikipedians. Sources, however, seem to very much support the phrasing "preemptive"; you don't have to go far - search for something like "1967 war Israel preemptive" in Google books, and see what the sources say. (A search string such as this will equally find sources contesting the "preemptive" claim). It seems it is widely accepted that this was a preemptive strike, and is commonly quoted as an example of one. okedem (talk) 18:52, 28 May 2010 (UTC)

One needn't have had "to go far" to find claims that Iraq had WMD and ties to al Qaeda, either. Yet some of us were pointing out at the time that there was no evidence to support those claims. Non sequitur. Just because many people say the attack was "preemptive" doesn't make it so. Nor does it makes the use of a subjective adjective in a statement of fact on Wikipedia any less inappropriate. 118.160.21.65 (talk) 02:31, 5 July 2010 (UTC)

I don't think it's Wikipedia's role to interpret the meaning or significance of Egypt's words and actions, merely to reflect significant bodies of opinion. In this respect, it's clear that views over "preemptive" vs "not-preemptive" tend to break down along entrenched pro-Israel vs pro-Arab lines.

Nor do I think it's fair or accurate to dismiss the argument against preemption as "out-of-context quotes interpreted by Wikipedians". I would draw your attention to reference number 22 in the main article, which cites numerous notable commentators who believe the attack was not pre-emptive. I could add more examples, but it seems pointless. The fact remains that a substantial body of respected opinion does not agree that Israel's attack was "pre-emptive", and I submit that the lead should therefore be changed to state (as in this example from the BBC: http://news.bbc.co.uk/panorama/hi/front_page/newsid_7875000/7875655.stm ) that Israel claimed or said the attack was preemptive, not to take one side of the argument by stating that it was preemptive. Phersu (talk) 02:43, 29 May 2010 (UTC)

Actually, it seems the view that it wasn't preemptive is quite limited to "pro-Arab" commentators, whereas the view that it was is quite general. Let's look at the quotes in ref 22:

• De Gaulle - okay, that's his opinion, in a rather round-about way (seems to be before the actual events).
• Cattan - rejects the very idea of a preemptive strike, so is obviously irrelevant to this question. He also falsely claims "None of the Arab States had attacked or threatened to attack Israel" (their threats are well documented). As our wiki article about him notes, Cattan "was a member of the delegation which represented the Arab Higher Committee before the United Nations General Assembly in 1947 and 1948." This is hardly an impartial expert.
• Fisher - the quote is quite unclear, and I can't get to the source, which is a letter to the editor.
• Quigley - the quote does not question the designation of the strike as "preemptive", but the legality of such action in general ("Even if Israel had expected Egypt to attack, it is not clear a preemptive strike is lawful.").
• Al-Ahram - bizarre. Has nothing to do with the question of preemptive strike.
• Hinnebusch - the quote doesn't say the Israelis knew Nasser wouldn't attack, but that they were confident of victory; it doesn't reject the preemptive claim, but actually strengthens it - "For the Israeli hawks, the crisis was less a threat than an opportunity - to smash Nasserish Egypt and the Pan-Arab movement while Israel still had military superiority." (my bold).
• Shlaim, Bailey - basically the same one; says the Americans didn't think Egypt would attack. Says nothing of the Israelis' beliefs (which are the relevant ones). The Americans have been wrong before. Many, many times. The fact that the quote speaks of McNamara is just ironic.
• Finkelstein - A failed academic, getting fired from so many universities it's hard to keep count. I don't even know what he does now. One of the most partial commentators I've ever heard of.
• Begin - Unclear. Begin was only a Minister without Portfolio at the time, and I have no idea when these words were said. The quote has no source.
• Chomsky - quite a lazy quote, from a book by a linguist and political activist. Not the best source.
• Rabin - maybe, but one can easily say that this was the right time to attack, before Nasser sent in any more divisions.
• Dayan - says nothing of the preemptive strike, and doesn't even mention Egypt, the main adversary. Remember that the four Arab states formed a joint military command before the war (Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Iraq).

So, in actuality, the sources of ref 22 are of very low quality, and few actually support the claim they're attached to. okedem (talk) 09:14, 29 May 2010 (UTC)

Neither the Arab states' words nor their actions made it clear what their intentions were. There was a continuing power struggle between conservative Arab states, such as Jordan, and radical ones like Egypt. The threats against Israel must be seen in this context.

As for Arab (i.e. Egypt) intentions to attack Israel Tom Segev in his Book "1967" says outright that Egypt was not about to attack. --Frederico1234 (talk) 09:31, 29 May 2010 (UTC)

Frederico1234, your employing an ad hominem argument that has no place on this page. 118.160.21.65 (talk) 02:31, 5 July 2010 (UTC)

I fail to see where I made any such kind of argument.--Frederico1234 (talk) 11:05, 7 July 2010 (UTC)

Appealing to the supposed prejudice of the source rather than addressing their arguments is the definition of "ad hominem". Your entire argument is a fallacy. JRHammond (talk) 01:10, 12 July 2010 (UTC)

Okedem - I think it's inaccurate to say the sources of ref 22 are "of very low quality, and few actually support the claim they're attached to". Excuse me for going through this in some detail (your comments in light, my comments in bold):

1. De Gaulle - okay, that's his opinion, in a rather round-about way (seems to be before the actual events). De Gaulle (correctly) feared Israel would strike, and was making it clear that he would not consider such a move justified. Clearly a notable commentator.
2. Cattan - rejects the very idea of a preemptive strike, so is obviously irrelevant to this question. He also falsely claims "None of the Arab States had attacked or threatened to attack Israel" (their threats are well documented). As our wiki article about him notes, Cattan "was a member of the delegation which represented the Arab Higher Committee before the United Nations General Assembly in 1947 and 1948." This is hardly an impartial expert. Cattan – “a renowned international jurist and writer” - also said Israel was the aggressor. He stated: “In fact, Israel, as we have seen, created the crisis and attacked its neighbours.” This addresses the pre-emptive issue directly.
3. Fisher - the quote is quite unclear, and I can't get to the source, which is a letter to the editor. Wikipedia describes Roger Fisher (I’m assuming it’s the same one!) as “Samuel Williston Professor of Law emeritus at Harvard Law School”. His quote is perfectly clear – he says that in his opinion Egypt had a strong legal case for closing the Strait of Tiran (Israel, by contrast, portrayed it as a casus belli and justification for their attack). He also says that – again in his opinion – Israel’s attack was unlawful. His statement, published in the New York Times, has been widely quoted over the years.
4. Quigley - the quote does not question the designation of the strike as "preemptive", but the legality of such action in general ("Even if Israel had expected Egypt to attack, it is not clear a preemptive strike is lawful."). You’re right. However, if you go to Quigley’s book you see that immediately before this discussion Quigly addresses the issue of preemption directly. He writes: “Israeli officials later admitted that 'Israel had not in fact anticipated an imminent attack by Egypt when it struck June 5'”. According to Wikipedia, Quigley is Professor of Law at Ohio State University, where he is also the Presidents’ Club Professor of Law and was recipient of the Ohhio State University Distinguised Scholar Award.
5. Al-Ahram - bizarre. Has nothing to do with the question of preemptive strike. The quote speaks to the motivation for Israel’s attack, implying that Israel sought wars (“at least [once] every decade”) in order to prevent “the emergence of any genuine Arab military force..” It suggests that rather than reacting preemptively to a real and sudden emergency, “the Israelis were preparing for the 1967 War a decade in advance”.
6. Hinnebusch - the quote doesn't say the Israelis knew Nasser wouldn't attack, but that they were confident of victory; it doesn't reject the preemptive claim, but actually strengthens it - "For the Israeli hawks, the crisis was less a threat than an opportunity - to smash Nasserish Egypt and the Pan-Arab movement while Israel still had military superiority." (my bold). I don’t think we should expect every quote to address every issue (in this case, Israeli perceptions of Nasser’s intentions). The reference does, however, explicitly state, that “Nasser had no intention of striking first”. This is in direct contradiction to those who claim he did. The second half of the quote suggests that – rather than a pre-emptive strike against a real and imminet threat of invasion – Israeli hawks saw the attack as a move calculated to undermine an emergent rival. That’s preventive war, not pre-emptive; two very different things.
7. Shlaim, Bailey - basically the same one; says the Americans didn't think Egypt would attack. Says nothing of the Israelis' beliefs (which are the relevant ones). Again, every quote doesn’t have to address every issue. The point here is that the US President told Eban “it was the unanimous view of his military experts that there was no sign that the Egyptians were planning to attack Israel”. In discussing whether or not Egypt WAS planning to attack Israel (which the pro-preemption side frequently argue), this is surely highly relevant. The argument that Israel may have mistakenly thought Egypt was planning to attack is interesting and valid, though it’s undermined by subsequent quotes from senior Israeli leaders (eg Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin).
8. Finkelstein - A failed academic, getting fired from so many universities it's hard to keep count. I don't even know what he does now. One of the most partial commentators I've ever heard of. You are entitled to your views. On the question of Finkelstein, Noam Chomsky, Avi Shlaim and Raul Hilberg disagree with you.
9. Begin - Unclear. Begin was only a Minister without Portfolio at the time, and I have no idea when these words were said. The quote has no source. The quote from Begin ( “In June 1967 we again had a choice. The Egyptian army concentrations in the Sinai approaches did not prove that Nasser was really about to attack us. We must be honest with ourselves. We decided to attack him”) The statement was made in a speech delivered on August 8, 1982, before the Israeli National Defense College and cited in New York Times, August 21, 1982. It’s one of the most-quoted statements on the issue. The fact that he did not have a portfolio isn’t relevant; he was a full cabinet member. Moreover, at the time he made the speech he was Prime Minister of Israel.
10. Chomsky - quite a lazy quote, from a book by a linguist and political activist. Not the best source. Chomsky is one of the world’s leading intellectuals. And what on earth is “lazy” about quoting Israel’s former Commander of the Air Force stating that there was “no threat of destruction” but that the attack was nevertheless justified so that Israel could “exist according to the scale, spirit, and quality she now embodies”?
11. Rabin - maybe, but one can easily say that this was the right time to attack, before Nasser sent in any more divisions. Rabin states: "I do not think Nasser wanted war. The two divisions he sent to The Sinai would not have been sufficient to launch an offensive war. He knew it and we knew it." You are entitled to argue this was the “right” time to strike (at least in terms of a “preventive” war) but the quote strongly suggests the war was not preemptive (ie in the face of imminent attack).
12. Dayan - says nothing of the preemptive strike, and doesn't even mention Egypt, the main adversary. Remember that the four Arab states formed a joint military command before the war (Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Iraq). It isn’t directly relevant, however the Dayan quote speaks to the context of the times. It suggests Israel had an aggressive and expansionist mindset. This of course is one of the theses put forward by some of those who believe 1967 was a war of choice rather than a preemptive war.

I repeat, it isn't Wikipedia's job to decide who's right and who's wrong. We must reflect notable and significant bodies of opinion. It seems clear to me that in light of this, for Wikipedia to baldly state that the war was preemptive is clearly wrong. Phersu (talk) 14:06, 29 May 2010 (UTC)

Forgive me, but for clarity, I'll number the sections of your response. Revert me if you don't want this. Response follows. okedem (talk) 16:23, 29 May 2010 (UTC)

1. De Gaulle - according to the source, this was his position "As late as May 24"; the war started on June 5; De Gaulle couldn't possibly know everything about Arab actions and intentions even at that timepoint, but things were changing so quickly it doesn't matter. If after the events he said "it wasn't preemptive", that would be notable. The current quote isn't (for this discussion).
2. Cattan:
   1. If you have access to the book, present the right quote in ref 22, and not the current one speaking to the general legality of preemption, and not whether it was preemption.
   2. With all due respect to Cattan, he is far from an impartial expert.
3. Fisher - irrelevant; if we accept Israel's position that the closing of the straits was an act of war, then its subsequent actions were self defense following an attack, and the preemption claim becomes irrelevant. His quote isn't clear enough to understand if he rejects the general legality of a preemptive strike, or thinks this isn't one; this quote does not qualify the designation "preventative". I would think a better source could be obtained; letters to the editor are hardly appropriate.
4. Quigley - again, then present the correct quote for this point. Quigley is a respected scholar, but does not represent the mainstream (you can especially see this in claims like that the British mandate for Palestine was a state, or claims to that effect. Interesting, but far from accepted).
5. Al-Ahram - not only irrelevant, but - this newspaper is owned by the Egyptian government! I mean, seriously...
6. Hinnebusch - actually, I do expect every source to address the issue it's posted to. If this one doesn't directly address the preemption question (which depends on beliefs), it has no place here. The border between preemption and prevention is blurred, and the time-scales are unclear.
7. Shlaim, Bailey - again, if it doesn't address the issue, it doesn't belong here. In any case, these things change extremely quickly. The quote is from the May 27 meeting, more than a week before the war. Things change.
8. Finkelstein - certainly, he has supporters. However, I'd prefer to consults actual experts, not unemployed commentators.
9. Begin - I say unclear, because the timescales are unknown; did not intend to attack within a few days? Weeks? Would additional forces prove it? And I have no idea how much information he was privy to at the time. He and his party was never trusted by Mapai people.
10. Chomsky - he's a linguist, not a historian or political scientist. It's lazy, because one should cite the actual source of these quotes, and surely we can find an actual expert to comment on them. A "threat of destruction" is not a requirement for justifying a preemptive strike. The high likelihood of an enemy attack is enough, even if such an attack won't completely destroy you (perhaps just kill thousands of soldiers and civilians).
11. Rabin - suggests, but again - the line between preemptive and preventative is far from clear.
12. Dayan - not directly relevant - doesn't belong here. We're not discussing anyone's mindset.

So we had a few irrelevant quotes, an Egyptian government owned newspaper, and the opinions of the same old bunch who always seem to take the position that casts Israel in a bad light (Quigley, Finkelstein, Chomsky). On the other hand, we have a ridiculously long list of uninvolved reliable sources, such as CNN, BBC (generally critical of Israel), Encarta, Economist, and various books (ref 21), calling it a "preemptive strike". Many more such sources can be found in a couple of seconds of searching.

It seems quite clear what the mainstream formulation is. The opposing view is notable, and is currently mentioned right there in the lede. I think it's enough for such a minority (perhaps fringe) view. okedem (talk) 17:17, 29 May 2010 (UTC)

I suspect we could argue these points back and forth all week without coming to an agreement. Let me try to move the discussion on.

It’s clear that a good many newspapers, broadcasters, commentators and magazines regularly repeat – unqualified – that it was a “pre-emptive war”. Wikipedia is held to different standards however. When faced with a situation in which TWO former Israeli Prime Ministers (Rabin and Begin), Noam Chomsky (“Perhaps the most feted liberal intellectual in the world”, according to the BBC) and a host of other notable (despite your personal opinions!) academics and commentators clearly DON’T believe it was a pre-emptive war, it is incumbent on Wikipedia to avoid baldly stating that it WAS.

One further point: Pre-emptive war has a precise meaning. It is launched “in anticipation of immediate enemy aggression”. It is clear that even the most respectable newspapers and magazines, however, frequently use the term in a quite different way (more akin to “preventive” war). Just type “Israel”, “Iran” and “Pre-emptive” into Google. Countless mainstream sources discuss the possibility or advisability of Israel or the US launching a pre-emptive attack against Iran, yet it’s clear that what they mean is a PREVENTIVE attack (I doubt anyone in the US or Israel believes an attack from Iran to be imminent, though they may feel it is a future possibility). I’d therefore be particularly wary of arguing that Wikipedia should adopt the unqualified term “pre-emptive strike” in relation to 1967 on the basis that many mainstream media sources use it.

The article lead currently reads: “On June 5, 1967, Israel launched a preemptive attack on Egypt”. What we are explicitly saying is: “On June 5, 1967, Israel launched an attack on Egypt because it believed Egypt was about to attack it”.

Incorrect. What the sentence is explicitly saying is that Egypt was about to attack Israel. But that is highly debatable and the use of the adjective is subjective, and this therefore needs to be revised.118.160.21.65 (talk) 02:31, 5 July 2010 (UTC)

My question is this: Should Wikipedia baldly state that Israel DID believe Egypt was about to attack? Even when one Israeli Prime Minister states: “"I do not think Nasser wanted war. The two divisions he sent to The Sinai would not have been sufficient to launch an offensive war. He knew it and we knew it,” and another states: ““In June 1967 we again had a choice. The Egyptian army concentrations in the Sinai approaches did not prove that Nasser was really about to attack us. We must be honest with ourselves. We decided to attack him”.

Wouldn’t it be far more encyclopedic to state: “On June 5, 1967, Israel launched what it claimed was (or 'described as') a pre-emptive attack on Egypt”?

I note, incidentally, that the BBC’s most highly-respected documentary strand, Panorama, itself uses the word “claimed”. It states: “On June 5 1967 Israel launched a strike against Syria, Egypt and Jordan which became known as the Six Day War. Israel claimed it was a pre-emptive strike in the face of a planned invasion of Israel by these countries”

(see http://news.bbc.co.uk/panorama/hi/front_page/newsid_7875000/7875655.stm) Phersu (talk) 05:50, 30 May 2010 (UTC)

I know it might be tiring, but I would like you to reply to those points, since they require action, like deleting some, or changing quotes in others.

Not just "newspapers, broadcasters, commentators and magazines", but a host of serious books as well. The few people on the list above actually rejecting the "preemptive" designation belong to a small, I-dare-say fringe, group, with a well known political agenda; Chomsky, for instance, is an extremely important linguistics expert, but has no expertise in the other matters, and even if he had - show me some impartial experts, not people happily meeting with genocidal murderers.

Ad hominem argument. 118.160.21.65 (talk) 02:31, 5 July 2010 (UTC)

I can list many more books, using the "preemptive" formulation, but that's a waste of space. Go to Google books, and just run the search string "Israel 1967 preemptive". You'll see books by a great variety of authors, using this phrasing, like "World Politics in the 21st Century", "Israel and Palestine", "Philosophical perspectives on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict", etc. I'm not even listing people like Dershowitz, despite his accurate books, since he's considered a "pro-Israel" advocate. Re: BBC - I guess some have different tastes there... okedem (talk) 12:56, 30 May 2010 (UTC)

The view that the Israeli strike was preventive in character rather than strictly pre-emptive is hardly a fringe view among historians. As stated above, Segev even explicitly says that Egypt was not about to attack. The Israeli government knew this so it wasn't anything really pre-emptive about it in the strict sense of the word. What non-historians say is not relevant. --Frederico1234 (talk) 13:25, 30 May 2010 (UTC)

There's a large variety of sources using the word "preemptive", including history books (see ref 21).

And if "what non-historians say is not relevant", we should disregard the quotes from Cattan (Jurist), Fisher (Jurist), Quigley (Jurist), Al-Ahram (government propaganda vessel), Hinnebusch (International Relations and Middle East Politics), Finkelstein (unemployed political scientist) and Chomsky (linguist). okedem (talk) 16:45, 30 May 2010 (UTC)

Exactly. I really fail to see the point of using any other source than professional historians as sources when describing historical events. --Frederico1234 (talk) 17:10, 30 May 2010 (UTC)

Consensus of mainstream sources agree that attack on Egypt was pre-emptive. Any attempt to indicate otherwise is revisionist propaganda.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 17:03, 30 May 2010 (UTC)

How is it "revisionist" to say that Egypt did not intend to make a first strike on Israel (that is to say, that Israel's attack was "preemptive")?

* U.S. intelligence assessed that Egypt would not be so foolish as to attack Israel with it's vastly superior military.

* Israeli intelligence assessed that there was no serious threat of attack from Israel.

* "By all reports Israel received from the Americans, and according to its own intelligence, Nasser had no interest in bloodshed". -- Michael B. Oren, Six Days of War (widely considered the definitive account)

* "I do not think Nasser wanted war. The two divisions he sent to the Sinai would not have been sufficient to launch an offensive war. He knew it and we knew it." -- Yitzhak Rabin, 1968.

* "In June 1967 we again had a choice. The Egyptian army concentrations in the Sinai approaches do not prove that Nasser was really about to attack us. We must be honest with ourselves. We decided to attack him." - Menachem Begin, 1982.

Are you seriously suggesting that U.S. intelligence, Israeli intelligence, Michael B. Oren (current Israeli Ambassador to the U.S.), Yitzhak Rabin, and Menachem Begin are "revisionists"?

Your argument cannot be taken seriously. JRHammond (talk) 01:37, 12 July 2010 (UTC)

A major problem is that the statement above "Pre-emptive war has a precise meaning" is quite false. "Pre-emptive" is a word sometimes used even with opposite meanings - the opposition preemptive vs. preventative used mostly above is sometimes characterized as anticipatory self-defense vs. pre-emptive attack respectively (especially in legal literature). So compiling lists of how many sources use this word may not be too helpful if it isn't clear how they are using it; some sources use it pretty loosely. The idea that Egypt was not going to attack is not revisionism, but just one side of an argument, and probably the majority view.John Z (talk) 07:44, 31 May 2010 (UTC)

No one can know for sure what Egypt would have done, had things gone differently. One can only know what they did - threaten, expel peace-keepers, move forces, close the straits, and form a unified military command with their allies. In face of such acts, Israel's actions are most commonly characterized as "pre-emptive". Please read Jiujitsuguy's comment carefully - he's not saying that Egypt would have attacked, but that Israel's action was preemptive (the first is objective, the second depends on subjective perception). okedem (talk) 09:14, 31 May 2010 (UTC)

Professional historians are qualified to determine how likely an Egyptian attack was. They are also qualified to investigate if the Israeli government thought that an Egyprian attack was imminent. We should stay with what the historians say about the matter and not engage in original research. --Frederico1234 (talk) 11:32, 31 May 2010 (UTC)

What we should stay with is what the facts are, and the fact is that there is no conclusive evidence that Egypt had any intention whatsoever to attack Israel. None has been presented here, despite the extensive discussion. Whether the attack was "preemptive" or not is a SUBJECTIVE JUDGMENT, and as such, according to Wikipedia's policy, should not be included in a statement of fact without caveat.

On your first point of "likely" an Egyptian attack was, it is completely uncontroversial that the likelihood was low. That was the assessment of both U.S. and Israeli intelligence at that time, and prominent Israelis have since acknowledged that Egypt posed no serious threat, including Yitzhak Rabin, Menachem Begin, and Michael B. Oren.

On your second point, the question of whether the Israeli government "thought" an attack was imminent is irrelevant. That Israel may have perceived a threat does not mean there actually was a threat, and we are concerned here with the facts, not with perceptions. Moreover, it's a moot point anyways, as Israeli intelligence had assessed Egypt would not attack. JRHammond (talk) 01:37, 12 July 2010 (UTC)

Okedem – Fair enough; I’ll reply to the specific points you raised (again, your points in light, my replies in bold).

1. De Gaulle - according to the source, this was his position "As late as May 24"; the war started on June 5; De Gaulle couldn't possibly know everything about Arab actions and intentions even at that timepoint, but things were changing so quickly it doesn't matter. If after the events he said "it wasn't preemptive", that would be notable. The current quote isn't (for this discussion).

From Ian Buruma, writing in the New York Times in 2003: “Gen. Charles de Gaulle... warned (Israel) against going to war. As he put it to the Israeli foreign minister, Abba Eban: You will be considered the aggressor by the world, and by me.”

You state, correctly that although this was his position “as late as May 24”, the war itself did not begin until June 5. However, by May 24 Nasser had already moved troops into Sinai, ordered UN troops out and closed the Straits of Tiran. As these were the major justifications cited by Israel for its attack, what difference does it make to the significance we attach to De Gaulle’s statement that the bombardment of Egyptian airfields itself did not begin until June 5? Whether or not De Gaulle subsequently stated “it wasn’t pre-emptive”, I think it is obtuse not to recognise the significance of what he DID say.

Buruma, incidently was Foreign Editor of The Spectator and has been a Fellow at the Wissenschaftskolleg, Berlin, the Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington D.C., St. Antony's College, Oxford, and Remarque Institute, NYU. He was voted as one of the Top 100 Public Intellectuals by the Foreign Policy/Prospect magazines (May/June 2008).

2. Cattan: If you have access to the book, present the right quote in ref 22, and not the current one speaking to the general legality of preemption, and not whether it was preemption. With all due respect to Cattan, he is far from an impartial expert.

I do not have the book, but previous posters give the reference as Henry Cattan, The Palestine Question, p.106 Pre-emptive strike by Israel. The full quote is given as: “After the discovery of the true facts about Israel's aggression, Israel invoked two arguments to justify its launching the war. Its first argument was that it acted by way of a preventative strike which, in its view, is equivalent to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Such argument has no basis in fact or in law. In fact, Israel, as we have seen, created the crisis and attacked its neighbours.”

As far as his “impartiality” is concerned, I suppose his direct, high-level involvement in the politics of the time mean you’re right – he wasn’t “impartial”. Nevertheless, he was a highly-respected international jurist, academic, legal expert and author of frequently-cited books on the issue. His contribution to the argument is unarguably valid, relevant and notable.

3. Fisher - irrelevant; if we accept Israel's position that the closing of the straits was an act of war, then its subsequent actions were self defense following an attack, and the preemption claim becomes irrelevant. His quote isn't clear enough to understand if he rejects the general legality of a preemptive strike, or thinks this isn't one; this quote does not qualify the designation "preventative". I would think a better source could be obtained; letters to the editor are hardly appropriate.

Fisher questions the legality of “the preventive war which Israel launched”. Note his description of the attack – preventive, not pre-emptive (a distinction which, as noted above, is crucial). As Samuel Williston Professor of Law emeritus at Harvard Law School and a leading expert in international law, his designation of the strike as preventive rather than pre-emptive is highly relevant.

His letter to the New York Times was published a few days after Israel’s attack. It has subsequently been cited numerous times in academic and other texts (including Finkelstein, Image and Reality). Moreover, United Nations Secretary General U Thant subsequently cited Fisher’s letter, describing it as “a powerful statement” in defense of Egypt’s position (Finkelstein, p.138)

4. Quigley - again, then present the correct quote for this point. Quigley is a respected scholar, but does not represent the mainstream (you can especially see this in claims like that the British mandate for Palestine was a state, or claims to that effect. Interesting, but far from accepted).

I gave you the quote. It is: “Various Israeli officials said later, however, that 'Israel had not in fact anticipated an imminent attack by Egypt when it struck June 5'”. (Quigley, p164. The Case for Palestine: An International Law Perspective) This goes to the heart of the matter – if Israel did not anticipate an imminent attack, then their strike was not pre-emptive. Quigley is indeed a (highly) respected scholar, and his views on the issue at hand are both relevant and notable.

5. Hinnebusch - actually, I do expect every source to address the issue it's posted to. If this one doesn't directly address the preemption question (which depends on beliefs), it has no place here. The border between preemption and prevention is blurred, and the time-scales are unclear. Shlaim, Bailey - again, if it doesn't address the issue, it doesn't belong here. In any case, these things change extremely quickly. The quote is from the May 27 meeting, more than a week before the war. Things change.

Let me add an extended quote in relation to Johnson’s meeting with Eban in order to clarify these points: “President Johnson told Eban that even after instructing his ‘experts to assume all the facts that the Israelis had given them to be true’, it was still their ‘unanimous view that there is no Egyptian intention to make an imminent attack’ – a conclusion according to Eban, also reached by Israeli intelligence”. [emphasis added] (Finkelstein, Image and Reality, p.134]

To put this in context, the meeting took place AFTER the closure of the Strait, the expulsion of UN troops and the mobilisation of Egyptian troops. The relevant pieces were already in place, yet neither American nor Israeli intelligence believed an attack was imminent.

In a similar vein:

“Reporting from Cairo for the New York Times on the eve of Israel’s assault, James Reston observed that Egypt ‘does not want war and it is certainly not ready for war’”. (ibid p.134)

“Mossad chief Meir Amit (stated) ‘Egypt was not ready for a war’ and Nasser did not want a war’”. (ibid p.134)

“The Israeli-compiled Middle East Record stated that ‘most observers agree’ that Nasser did not intend to launch an attack ‘and that his pledges to U Thant and to the Great Powers not to start shooting should, therefore, be accepted at their face value’.” (ibid p.134)

“Yet it is generally agreed [that] Nasser was sincere when he later said that he had no intention of launching an attack against Israel; on the contrary as he said in his 23 July speech, he believed that ‘any attack on Israel would expose us to great dangers.”`` [emphasis added] (Cockburn and Cockburn, Dangerous Liaison, 1991, p.137)

6. Finkelstein - certainly, he has supporters. However, I'd prefer to consults actual experts, not unemployed commentators.

He has very prominent and respected supporters. Moreover I don’t think his worst enemy would deny he is an “expert” in this particular field, no matter how strongly they might disagree with his conclusions.

7. Begin - I say unclear, because the timescales are unknown; did not intend to attack within a few days? Weeks? Would additional forces prove it? And I have no idea how much information he was privy to at the time. He and his party was never trusted by Mapai people.

Begin’s (extended) statement is worth quoting: “We had three wars which we fought without an alternative. The first, the war of independence, which began on Nov. 30, 1947 and lasted until January 1949. What happened in that war, which we went off to fight with no alternative? Six thousand of our fighters were killed. We were then 650,000 Jews in Eretz Israel, and the number fallen amounted to about 1 percent of the Jewish population.

"The second war of no alternative was the Yom Kippur War and the war of attrition that preceded it. Our total casualties in that war of no alternative were 2,297 killed, 6,067 wounded. Together with the war of attrition—which was also a war of no alternative—2,659 killed, 7,251 wounded. The terrible total: almost 10,000 casualties.

"Our other wars were not without an alternative. In November 1956 we had a choice. The reason for going to war then was the need to destroy the fedayeen, who did not represent a danger to the existence of the state. Thus we went off to the Sinai campaign. At that time we conquered most of the Sinai Peninsula and reached Sharm el Sheikh. Actually, we accepted and submitted to an American dictate, mainly regarding the Gaza Strip (which Ben-Gurion called 'the liberated portion of the homeland'). John Foster Dulles, the then-secretary of state, promised Ben-Gurion that an Egyptian army would not return to Gaza. The Egyptian army did enter Gaza .... After 1957, Israel had to wait 10 full years for its flag to fly again over that liberated portion of the homeland.

"In June 1967, we again had a choice. The Egyptian army concentrations in the Sinai approaches do not prove that Nasser was really about to attack us. We must be honest with ourselves. We decided to attack him.”

When he made this frequently-quoted statement, he was Prime Minister of Israel, and certainly in full possession of all and any relevant information.

8. Chomsky - he's a linguist, not a historian or political scientist. It's lazy, because one should cite the actual source of these quotes, and surely we can find an actual expert to comment on them. A "threat of destruction" is not a requirement for justifying a preemptive strike. The high likelihood of an enemy attack is enough, even if such an attack won't completely destroy you (perhaps just kill thousands of soldiers and civilians).

Chomsky’s notability cannot seriously be argued. The fact that he first came to prominence as a linguist does not detract from the fact that he has written countless highly-respected books and papers on the Arab-Israeli conflict. “The Fateful Triangle” in particular is widely-regarded as a standard text and cites Begin’s famous quote (above) as evidence that the Israeli’s themselves did not consider the attack pre-emptive.

9. Rabin - suggests, but again - the line between preemptive and preventative is far from clear.

Just look at the quote: “I do not think Nasser wanted war. The two divisions he sent to The Sinai would not have been sufficient to launch an offensive war. He knew it and we knew it."

How clear can you get? He did not think Nasser wanted war. The divisions he sent to the Sinai would not have been sufficient. And – crucially – “He knew it and we knew it”. I repeat; Yitzhak Rabin was Israel’s Chief of Staff at the time of the attack, and went on to become Prime Minister.

10. Dayan - not directly relevant - doesn't belong here. We're not discussing anyone's mindset.

You said yourself (above) that on the question of pre-emption, it is Israel’s own beliefs which matter. To that extent I’d have thought the “mindset” of the Israelis is relevant (ie did they feel genuinely threatened and vulnerable or did they not? Dayan’s quote tends to support the latter view, given that they pursued aggressive tactics in order to expand into valuable agricultural land.)

11. Re BBC - I guess some have different tastes there.

Not sure what you mean by that. The fact is that BBC Panorama is using the phrase “Israel claimed the attack was pre-emptive” rather taking sides one way or the other.

I therefore disagree that all we have are “a few irrelevant quotes, an Egyptian government owned newspaper, and the opinions of the same old bunch who always seem to take the position that casts Israel in a bad light”.

As I wrote earlier, the article lead currently reads: “On June 5, 1967, Israel launched a preemptive attack on Egypt”. What we are explicitly saying is: “On June 5, 1967, Israel launched an attack on Egypt because it believed Egypt was about to attack it”.

My central question is this: Given that a real dispute exists over this crucial question, should Wikipedia baldly state that Israel did believe Egypt was about to attack? Wouldn’t it be far more encyclopedic to state: “On June 5, 1967, Israel launched what it claimed was (or 'described as') a pre-emptive attack on Egypt”? 82.12.113.64 (talk) 10:59, 31 May 2010 (UTC) 82.12.113.64 (talk) 11:03, 31 May 2010 (UTC)

1. De Gaulle - things that were said more than a week before the events are of little value for this question. Surely you can provide quotes from after it (I believe his position didn't change, but for the sake of good sourcing).
2. Cattan - then please insert the right quote into the article; and while his opinion may be notable, it doesn't by itself represent a more general opinion, being so partial.
3. Fisher - I've seen plenty of discussions about how to differentiate between preventative and preemptive, but sometimes those words are used interchangeably.
4. Quigley - I don't think you understood me - please insert that quote (the relevant one) into the article, replacing the currently irrelevant one.
5. Hinnebusch, American meeting - Judging the exact requirements for a preemptive strike is not our job, and that includes points about "imminent", which is not even a well defined word. Oh, and things changed every day, including the Israelis discovering the Egyptian plan to capture Eilat, which led to the plan's cancellation (following messages between the Americans and Soviets). By the way, not wanting war, doesn't mean you won't start a war. Often the sides are drawn into war for a variety of reasons (mistakes, miscalculations, bad intelligence, honor).
6. Finkelstein - then I don't think you've read what his critics say of him. Let's find someone who wasn't repeatedly fired from a wide variety of universities.
7. Begin - "do not prove", but that doesn't mean the threat wasn't real. Israel could have chosen to wait; perhaps Egypt wouldn't attack. But due to various reasons, mostly the the heavy economic cost of keeping the army mobilized (with all the reserve troops), it had to make a choice, or pay a very heavy price if Egypt would attack when the army wasn't at the ready. This doesn't not change the preemptive designation. Going by your standard, the only way to attack preemptively, would be after the other side has already attacked...
8. Chomsky - sorry, I don't care how many books he wrote. He is not an expert in this field.
9. Rabin - same as above (Hinnebusch). The Arabs made bad choices before. Find me a quote where he directly rejects the "preemptive" designation, not one that depends on your interpretation.
10. Dayan - so, they were trying to expand into the agricultural land of Sinai? We're not discussing the many border skirmishes between the parties here, but the war.
11. BBC - what I mean is that we have two different phrasings of this in two BBC sources, so I guess the website people have a different opinion from the Panorama people.

If such a huge variety of sources use the "preemptive" designation with no problem, I see no problem using it here. Whereas on the "preemptive" side we have mainstream, objective, sources, you present partisan sources, people who, in any matter, write against Israel. The balance is clear in this matter, unless you find other mainstream sources. okedem (talk) 18:24, 1 June 2010 (UTC)

On the one hand you say a “huge variety of sources use the ‘preemptive’ designation with no problem,” on the other you say that “preemptive” and “preventive” are sometimes used interchangeably. On the latter point you are correct. As I said earlier, it is common for mainstream media to discuss the possibility of a “preemptive” Israeli or US strike on Iran, for example, yet they clearly don’t believe an attack by Iran on Israel is imminent. Given the potential for confusion, why not write “The Israelis attacked Egypt because they believed Egypt was about to launch an attack on them”. That is, after all, what we are saying when we use the word “preemptive” and makes the statement much clearer. I suspect, however, that making the meaning explicit would expose the POV nature of such a bald, unqualified statement.

It is clear that a substantial body of respected opinion does not believe the attack was preemptive. The authors do not believe Israel thought an Egyptian attack was imminent. Moreover, their opinions are supported by explicit statements and admissions made after the events by leading Israeli figures, such as Prime Ministers Begin and Rabin.

To be clear: I am not suggesting that we say the attack was not preemptive. I am merely suggesting we write that the Israelis claim it was (or describe it as) preemptive. For Wikipedia to baldly state it was preemptive, despite substantial opposition to that view from notable, academically-respected sources, means we are endorsing a particular point of view. That goes against the core philosophy of the encyclopedia.

I would be interested to hear the views of other editors on the matter. Phersu (talk) 02:26, 2 June 2010 (UTC)

The lengthy and messy discussion over sources who argue the attack was not preemptive is completely irrelevant and should be deleted, inasmuch as it rests entirely on an ad hominem argument that has no place on this page.118.160.21.65 (talk) 02:31, 5 July 2010 (UTC)

Unqualified use of "preemptive"

Please do not revert this article to previous versions which push a particular POV on the "preemptive" issue. We should be making it more, not less neutralPhersu (talk) 19:47, 20 June 2010 (UTC)

It is neutral as both side's views are represented in a concise paragraph. Your phrasing is awkward and inaccurate.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 21:19, 20 June 2010 (UTC)

It is not neutral as the sentence "On June 5, 1967, Israel launched a preemptive attack on Egypt" presumes the one side is the correct view, notwithstanding the more nuanced sentences that follow, which contain proper caveats. 118.160.21.65 (talk) 02:58, 5 July 2010 (UTC)

Just a few more points on the issue of pre-emption. It is undisputed that Tiran Straits were closed by Egypt to Israeli shipping, that UN buffer forces were expelled by Egypt from Sinai, that Egypt deployed more than 100,000 soldiers and 1,000 tanks in Sinai, that Iraqi and Egyptian forces deployed in Jordan, that war rhetoric reached fever pitch in Arab countries to the point of hysteria and that the entire Arab world, led by Egypt mobilized for war. Consensus of mainstream sources agree that attack was pre-emptive in nature despite your revisionist WP:FRINGE sources. Nonetheless, the Arab perspective is still given deference in the lede.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 21:30, 20 June 2010 (UTC)

Most of this is irrelevant. The bottom line is that Israel fired the first shot. So the question is whether, if Israel hadn't done so, would it have suffered an attack by Egypt. Not even Israel believed that was going to occur. Bot U.S. and Israeli intelligence assessed Nasser would likely not do so. 118.160.21.65 (talk) 02:58, 5 July 2010 (UTC)

For Wikipedia to state, without qualification, that "Israel launched a preemptive war" is not neutral, given that a substantial body of academic opinion believes that the strike was not preemptive because a) An Egyptian attack on Israel was not imminent and b) The Israeli government did not believe an Egyptian attack was imminent. The sources for this point of view are numerous, notable and well-referenced. If you find the phrasing awkward, please fix it. If there are inaccuracies, please state - specifically - what they are.

Your points regarding the Tiran Straits, UN buffer forces etc are irrelevant. We aren't here to argue the case for one side or the other, merely to ensure that the article conforms to Wikipedia standards and is not POV.

The sources which disagree with the "preemptive" designation cannot be dismissed as fringe, as can be seen by a reading of the earlier discussions. Here are some more:

“The Israeli decision to strike was taken not for military reasons but rather to prevent a diplomatic solution which might have entailed disadvantages for the Israeli side” – Roland Popp, The Middle East Journal, March 22, 2006.

Ersun Kurtulus of Kent University, in “a critical assessment of the widespread conceptualization of the June 1967 War between Israel and its neighboring Arab states as a pre-emptive war” argues that “the circumstances surrounding the Six Day War did not fulfil some of these necessary conditions”. Kurtulus, Ersun, The Middle East Journal, March 22, 2007

“In short, Israel was not pre-empting an impending attack when it struck the first blow on June 5, 1967. Instead, it was launching a preventive war – a war aimed at affecting the balance of power over time. “ - Mearsheimer and Walt, The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy, p. 85

One of the leading proponents of the “preemptive” thesis, Michael Oren, acknowledges that the "non-preemptive" view has significant support among academics, even within Israel. Oren, who as well as being a historian is Israeli ambassador to the United States, writes: “According to this school, the Six Day War erupted not as a result of Arab belligerency but in reaction to socioeconomic factors within Israel, as a tactic by the nation’s leaders to distract attention from their failed domestic policies...”

He summarises their position as being “that Israel wanted the war, did little or nothing to avert it, or even instigated it.” ( see: http://www.azure.org.il/article.php?id=313 )

To be clear: Oren doesn’t agree with this interpretation (he very much disagrees with it) but neither does he try to minimise its significance. Indeed, he sees it as a continuation of work done by the “New Historians” of which he writes (regretfully) : “Published by leading academic presses and widely acclaimed by reviewers, the new historians’ radical interpretations have largely supplanted traditional Zionist histories.”Phersu (talk) 06:19, 21 June 2010 (UTC)

This article must strive to maintain a neutral point of view. There are numerous notable sources supporting the view that Israel's attack was preemptive, however there are also numerous notable sources supporting the opposite view, as is clear from the references given and information contained in the discussion above. Phersu (talk) 19:17, 21 June 2010 (UTC)

The consensus of mainstream sources concur that Israel’s strike was pre-emptive. For example Churchill notes that on May 26 Nasser addressed the leaders of the Pan-Arab Federation of Trade Unions and said that if war came “it will be total and the objective will be to destroy Israel. We feel confident that we can win and are ready now for war with Israel.” This was followed by an order from the Ministry of Religious Affairs that all Imams and preachers make “Jihad” the subject of their sermons, with the objective of whipping up war fever in Cairo. Churchill further notes that, “The great powers were alarmed by Nasser’s recklessness. He appeared to be losing his balance.” (Churchill, Randolph, S., Churchill, Winston S. Six Day War, Houghton Mifflen Co. (1967), p.46.)

According to Churchill Nasser himself initially may not have wanted a showdown but got carried away with events that he himself created. Citing Eban, Churchill notes that “Nasser was like a man who had gone to Monte Carlo with £100 and staked it at the roulette wheel. Each time his number came up he became more courageous – he felt that Fortune was smiling at him.” (Id p.49)

Churchill states that there were four developments that individually would have been of great concern to Israel but collectively proved to be existential threats. These were the closure of the Straits of Tiran, the deployment of 100,000 soldiers and 800 tanks in Sinai (after UNEF expulsion), the Jordanian-Egyptian military pact just days before the war and the deployment of Iraqi forces in Jordan. The confluence of these four developments left Israel with little choice but to act decisively and pre-emptively.

Churchill sums it up this way, “Israel....did not wait for her enemy to draw – she had seen the glint in Nasser’s eye.” (Id p. 75)

Incidentally, your sources are marginal at best. Finklestien is a failed academic who currently lectures on the Hezbollah/Hamas circuit. No one take him seriously either as an academic or historian. Same holds true for that linguist Chomsky whose views are extreme even for the extreme left. Quigley is hardly an objective observer/academic when it comes to his feelings about the foreign policies of western democracies. Throughout his "academic" career, he's promoted the hardcore pro-Soviet, pro-Third World viewpoint for every topic he has addressed. He is known as a virulently anti-West academic but saves most of his extreme vitriol for Israel. So it’s difficult to take these marginal, fringe sources seriously. On this basis I’m going to revert.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 16:15, 22 June 2010 (UTC)

Ad hominem arguments, entirely. 118.160.21.65 (talk) 02:58, 5 July 2010 (UTC)

You offer no evidence for your claim that "The consensus of mainstream sources concur that Israel's strike was pre-emptive". The quote from Nasser (Churchill) does not indicate Nasser was referring to a war resulting from an Egyptian attack, as opposed to a war resulting from an Israeli attack. Preachers making "jihad" the subject of their sermons also does not support your claim, as neither does it indicate Egypt was preparing for an offensive, rather than a defensive, war. Your third point is also moot. We are not questioning whether Nasser was being "reckless" or not; the question is whether he actually intended to attack Israel, and the documentary record is perfectly clear that the consensus is he was not. For instance, there was a consensus between U.S. and Israeli intelligence that the likelihood of an Egyptian first strike was low. Prominent Israelis have since acknowledged this fact, including Yitzhak Rabin, Menachem Begin, and Michael B. Oren.

You further rely on ad hominem arguments, appealing to the supposed prejudice of scholars you claim espouse a biased view. The use of this fallacy has no place on a Wikipedia talk page.

Finally, the standard of making judgments according to some wild notion of a "consensus" of OPINION is not a correct one. Judgments should be made according to the known facts, not known opinions. To illustrate my point, the consensus of mainstream sources from November 2002 to March 19, 2003, was that Iraq had WMD. Yet many of us in the alternative media were pointing out there was no actual credible EVIDENCE to support this this widespread CLAIM. Needless to say, we had it right, the "consensus of mainstream sources" had it wrong. Point being, your appeal to authority is a further fallacious argument. "Preemptive" is subjective and the sentence needs to be changed. JRHammond (talk) 02:40, 12 July 2010 (UTC)

You mention only three of the sources cited for the non-preemptive view – John Quigley, Norman Finkelstein and Noam Chomsky – and dismiss them all as “marginal” and “fringe”.

John B Quigley: Professor of Law at Ohio State University’s Moritz College of Law – one of the leading public law schools in the United States (US News and World Report rankings, 2010). He is an internationally-renowned scholar and winner of the University’s Alumni Award for Distinguished Teaching. His book “Palestine and Israel” was described as “a classic” by the Washington Report on Middle East Affairs.

Norman Finkelstein: Author of five books which have been translated into more than 40 foreign editions. His work has been praised by the world’s leading Holocaust historian, Raul Hilberg; prominent Israeli historian Avi Shlaim of Oxford University and leading international academic Edward Said, as well as ABC Middle East Correspondent Charles Glass (“Anyone interested in seeing justice brought to the Middle East must read ‘Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict’”), William Quandt of Foreign Affairs (“Required reading”), The London Review of Books (“A searing but scholarly indictment”) and The Middle East Journal ("... a thought-provoking work which calls into question many of the accepted 'truths' associated with the Israel-Palestine conflict.")

Noam Chomsky: Described by the BBC as “perhaps the most feted liberal intellectual in the world”. (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/newsnight/3732345.stm). He is indeed a linguist; he is also a philosopher and political theorist. In fact he has written substantially more political books than he has written books on linguistics. He was voted the “leading living public intellectual” in the 2005 Global Intellectuals Poll and is described as “one of the most influential left-wing critics of American foreign policy” by the Dictionary of Modern American Philosophers. According to the Arts and Humanities Citation Index, Chomsky is the most frequently-cited person alive, and one of the eight most frequently-cited authors of all time.

You and others may disagree with these scholars (and indeed the many other sources you didn’t mention) and you may not like their politics, but “marginal” and “fringe”? I don’t think so.

The Wikipedia policy on neutral point of view means we must not “endorse or oppose specific viewpoints”. Where we want to state opinions, we convert them into a fact “by attributing the opinion to someone”. And we must avoid “implying that any one of the opinions is correct”.

By baldly stating that “Israel launched a preemptive attack”, we imply that the preemptive theory is correct. Many notable, respected scholars disagree with the preemptive theory. We must therefore phrase it differently. Phersu (talk) 00:56, 23 June 2010 (UTC)

You've relied on marginal sources that espouse fringe and revisionist theories. Finklestien himself acknowledges that he has no contact with the mainstream and does not publish in mainstream publications [1]. Wikipedia is not a forum for failed academics and crackpot conspiracy theorists. I'm sure that if you look hard enough and overturn some large rocks, along with the creepy crawlers you'll also find those who believe that 9-11 was an "inside job" and that the CIA assassinated Kennedy. You've been provided with countless mainstream sources that state unequivocally that Israel's attack in the Six Day War was preemptive. This is the consensus view. There will always be marginal sources that take positions that are contrary to the mainstream. Sept 11, the Kennedy assassination and Roswell are just three examples where conspiracy loones have run amuck. It is certainly not appropriate to have these fringe opinions expressed prominently in the lede. Inclusion of these fringe sources diminishes the quality of Wikipedia as a mainstream encyclopedia. Below are just a few sources (found with ease) that state that Israel's attack exemplifies preemption. These are in addition to the countless ones that have already been provided and disregarded by you. I hope that this will put an end to this rediculous ferris wheel once and for all.

Ad hominem arguments. 118.160.21.65 (talk) 02:58, 5 July 2010 (UTC)

• Mark R. Amstutz writes that, "Preemptive attack is morally justified when three conditions are fulfilled: The existence of an intention to injure, the undertaking of military preparations that increase the level of danger, and the need to act immediately because of a higher degree of risk. Since these conditions were met in Israel’s Six Day War, Israel’s preemptive attack on Egypt on June 5, 1967 was a legitimate act of self-defense." International ethics: concepts, theories, and cases in global politics

Prove Egypt's "intention to injure"; that is to say, prove that Egypt would have attacked Israel had Israel not attacked Egypt first. Israel's own intelligence assessment was that Nasser would not attack. The use of the adjective "preemptive" is subjective and needs to be removed. 118.160.21.65 (talk) 02:58, 5 July 2010 (UTC)

• Henry Shue and David Rodin write that the Six Day War is, "A classic example of preemptive war." Preemption: military action and moral justification

An opinion. Thus irrelevant. "Preemptive" is subjective and needs to be removed. 118.160.21.65 (talk) 02:58, 5 July 2010 (UTC)

• Karl P. Mueller notes, "Classic examples of preemptive wars include the July Crisis of 1914 and the Six Day War of 1967 in which Israel preemptively attacked Egypt…" Striking first: preemptive and preventive attack in U.S. national security

More opinions. Thus irrelevant. "Preemptive" is subjective and needs to be removed. 118.160.21.65 (talk) 02:58, 5 July 2010 (UTC)

• Charles W. Kegley and Gregory A. Raymond note that, “The Six Day War between Israel and alliance of Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq was an example of preemption.” And, “It exemplifies preemption.” The Global Future: A Brief Introduction to World Politics--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 16:32, 23 June 2010 (UTC)

More opinions. Thus irrelevant. "Preemptive" is subjective and needs to be removed. 118.160.21.65 (talk) 02:58, 5 July 2010 (UTC)

I’ll address your points one by one, your words in bold:

“You've relied on marginal sources that espouse fringe and revisionist theories. Finklestien himself acknowledges that he has no contact with the mainstream and does not publish in mainstream publications.”

When you follow the link provided, Finkelstein also states: “It is also true that my name comes up quite a lot in articles in mainstream publications; my writings on a variety of subjects are quite frequently cited.”

I decided to check this via Google Scholar (a citations index for “scholarly literature” which includes most peer-reviewed online journals in Europe and the US) and found that Finkelstein's “Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Question”, from which I took my quotes, receives 116 academic citations. For comparison, of your four sources Amstutz gets 63, Mueller gets 12 and Shue and Rodin get 2. I was unable to return a result for Kegley and Raymond. I’m not making any great claims for this – it is clearly a very blunt instrument – but at the very least it shows that Finkelstein is a notable source and frequently cited by mainstream publications.

“Wikipedia is not a forum for failed academics and crackpot conspiracy theorists.”

You can repeat your personal opinion as often as you like, but that doesn’t change the fact that Noam Chomsky is:

• "Perhaps the most feted liberal intellectual in the world" (BBC).
• "The leading living public intellectual" according to the 2005 Global Intellectuals Poll.
• "One of the most influential left-wing critics of American foreign policy" according to the Dictionary of Modern American Philosophers.
• The most frequently-cited person alive according to the Arts and Humanities Citation Index.

“I'm sure that if you look hard enough and overturn some large rocks, along with the creepy crawlers you'll also find those who believe that 9-11 was an "inside job" and that the CIA assassinated Kennedy.”

I’m sure I will, but what does that have to do with the issue under discussion?

“You've been provided with countless mainstream sources that state unequivocally that Israel's attack in the Six Day War was preemptive. This is the consensus view. There will always be marginal sources that take positions that are contrary to the mainstream. Sept 11, the Kennedy assassination and Roswell are just three examples where conspiracy loones have run amuck. It is certainly not appropriate to have these fringe opinions expressed prominently in the lede. Inclusion of these fringe sources diminishes the quality of Wikipedia as a mainstream encyclopedia. Below are just a few sources (found with ease) that state that Israel's attack exemplifies preemption. These are in addition to the countless ones that have already been provided and disregarded by you. I hope that this will put an end to this rediculous ferris wheel once and for all.”

To repeat, for Israel’s strike to be preemptive (as opposed to preventive) it must have believed that an attack by Egypt was imminent. There are many notable academic sources who believe that to be true. There are also many notable academic sources who believe it is not true. In addition, we have the words of two Israeli Prime Ministers:

Yitzhak Rabin (who served as Israel’s Chief of General Staff during the War) stated: “"I do not believe that Nasser wanted war. The two divisions he sent into Sinai on May 14 would not have been enough to unleash an offensive against Israel. He knew it and we knew it."

Menachem Begin stated: “The Egyptian army concentrations in the Sinai approaches did not prove that Nasser was really about to attack us. We must be honest with ourselves. We decided to attack him."

I am sure you can find countless examples where “conspiracy loones have run amuck.” I suggest that this is, self-evidently, not one of those cases. To be clear, I am not arguing that Wikipedia should state that the attack was NOT preemptive. I am arguing that, as per Wikipedia policy on neutral point of view, we should not “endorse or oppose specific viewpoints” and should avoid “implying that any one of the opinions is correct”Phersu (talk) 21:31, 23 June 2010 (UTC)

I find Jiujitsuguy's extensive sourcing overwhelmingly convincing and conclusive. There is variety among the many sources, yet a clear consensus for use of "preemptive". Neutrality does not demand ditching this consensus because there are a small number of skeptics or detractors with opposing views, especially as the qualifications of some of those authors are highly questionable. To do so would likely violate WP:UNDUE. The existence of opposing views could perhaps be given more prominent—but brief—mention, but preemptive needs and deserves no qualification. Hertz1888 (talk) 03:32, 24 June 2010 (UTC)

You're entitled to your opinion, but nobody here is entitled to have the article assert the opinion you share with others asserted as a fact. Moreover, the you use argument to support your opinion cannot be taken seriously. Add Israeli intelligence to the "skeptics" and "detractors with opposing views" -- since their own intelligence assessment was that Nasser would not launch a first strike. The use of the adjective "Preemptive" is subjective and needs to be removed to maintain neutrality. JRHammond (talk) 02:40, 12 July 2010 (UTC)

And here's another (issued by the U.S. Department of State) for good measure.

• The United States has often walked a fine line between preemption and prevention. In fact there have only been a handful of clear-cut cases of military preemption by any states in the last 200 years. (Israeli preemption in the Six Day War of 1967 is perhaps the most cited example) U.S. National Security Strategy: a New Era U.S. Department of State (2002)--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 05:24, 24 June 2010 (UTC)

Yes, it's true that Israel's June 5 attack is perhaps the most cited example of a "preemptive" attack. Yet neither the author of the quote nor you offer any evidence to support that CLAIM. JRHammond (talk) 02:40, 12 July 2010 (UTC)

Once again it’s claimed that the qualifications of those opposing the preemptive view are “questionable”, and once again every argument made in response to this allegation is ignored.

I repeat, among the notable sources who explicitly reject the preemptive view are the world’s most frequently-cited academic (and “most feted liberal intellectual”) and two Israeli Prime Ministers.

In relation to WP:UNDUE, Wikipedia states: “The neutrality policy does not state, or imply, that we must ‘give equal validity’ to minority views such as pseudoscience, the claim that the Earth is flat, or the claim that the Apollo moon landings never occurred.” Are you seriously arguing that the non-preemptive view belongs in that category?

It seems your argument boils down to the following: More sources support the preemptive formulation than non-preemptive formulation and therefore Wikipedia should assume that the preemptive formulation is correct and present it, unqualified, as the truth. This is an extremely dangerous route to go down, and contrary to the spirit of Wikipedia.

I think there is a case for introducing a section to the article where the fundamental question of preemptive vs non-preemptive is specifically discussed, and the prevalence in reliable sources should certainly be considered in determining the proper weight given to each viewpoint, as per Wikipedia policy. However, on an issue such as this, where substantial disagreement among notable sources exists, we cannot take sides and present opinion as fact.

Finally, I’d like to add some quotes from another notable source in support of the non-preemptive argument. The publication is Mearsheimer and Walt’s international bestseller “The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy”:

• “The myth of Israel as victim is also reflected in the conventional wisdom about the 1967 war, which claims that Egypt and Syria are principally responsible for starting it... It is clear from the release of new documents about the war, however, that the Arabs did not intend to initiate a war against Israel in the late spring of 1967, much less try to destroy the Jewish state.” (John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt; The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy, Penguin Books, pp 84-85).

• “Avi Shlaim, a distinguished Isaeli ‘new historian’ writes, ‘There is general agreement among commentators that [Egyptian President] Nasser neither wanted nor planned to go to war with Israel’. (ibid p 85)

• “Serious diplomatic efforts were also under way to solve the crisis peacefully. Yet Israel chose to attack anyway, because its leaders ultimately preferred war to a peaceful resolution of the crisis. In particular, Israel’s military commanders wanted to inflict significant military defeats on their two main adversaries – Egypt and Syria – in order to strengthen Israeli deterrence over the long term... In short, Israel was not preempting an impending attack when it struck the first blow on June 5, 1967. Instead, it was launching a preventive war – a war aimed at affecting the balance of power over time.”(ibid p 85)

Note: Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Affairs at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, where he served as Academic Dean from 2002 to 2006. He ranked among the twenty “most influential academics in international relations” according to a biannual survey of international relations faculty by the Teaching, Research and International Policy (TRIP) Project. John J. Mearsheimer is the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science and the co-director of the Program on International Security Policy at the University of Chicago, where he has taught since 1982. He was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2003. Phersu (talk) 09:32, 24 June 2010 (UTC)

Walt and Mearsheimer's book is an error-riddled half-assed piece of work, not a serious study. They move effortlessly from one false claim to another, interspersed with logical idiocies, such as claiming that the very existence of a pro-Israel lobby shows that support of Israel is not in America's interest (to which Dershowitz, I believe, correctly replied that the existence of the AARP would then constitute proof that supporting the elderly is also not in America's interest). Walt and Mearsheimer's book was thoroughly analyzed and debunked; it was seriously criticized by a wide variety of people, including Benny Morris ("Like many pro-Arab propagandists at work today, Mearsheimer and Walt often cite my own books, sometimes quoting directly from them, in apparent corroboration of their arguments. Yet their work is a travesty of the history that I have studied and written for the past two decades. Their work is riddled with shoddiness and defiled by mendacity."), your so highly praised Chomsky (from the article about the book: "He finds that the authors "have a highly selective use of evidence (and much of the evidence is assertion)", ignore historical "world affairs", and blame the Lobby for issues that are not relevant.") and many others, see The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy#Criticism.

Let's, please, stick to serious sources, not a couple of people relying on newspapers and ignorance to form a conspiracy theory. (Bestseller status is, as I'm sure you understand, irrelevant - or is The Da Vinci Code also true?). okedem (talk) 12:21, 24 June 2010 (UTC)

Mearsheimer and Walt’s book was massively controversial. Some critics hated it, others praised it to the sky. What matters in the present context is notability, and on that question there can be no doubt. Both authors are extremely important academics of international standing (see the brief biography I provided). Writing in The New York Review of Books, Michael Massing declared, “Not since Foreign Affairs magazine published Samuel Huntington’s ‘The Clash of Civilizations’ in 1993 has an academic essay detonated with such force.” To say it isn’t a “serious” source is simply wrong. Phersu (talk) 14:03, 24 June 2010 (UTC)

No, it is not enough to be merely "notable". Notability alone is a good criterion for having an article about the subject (the book), not for using it as a source in other articles. To be considered a reliable source there are further requirements. In this case, we have a book full of errors and logical fallacies, extremely far from being accepted as high-quality work, advancing a theory unrelated to our discussion, written by people who didn't bother doing any actual historical research or interviews. If they say it, it's either their baseless conclusions, or a quote (often twisted and cherry-picked) from another source. Thus, there's no need or justification to use this book, when books by actual experts are readily available. okedem (talk) 14:39, 24 June 2010 (UTC)

Reviews of "The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy" by John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt:

“Ruthlessly realistic.” — William Grimes, The New York Times

“The argument they present is towering and clear and about time.” — Philip Weiss

"Mearsheimer and Walt (are) two of our most prestigious academicians, ranked fifth and twenty-second, respectively, in a survey of international relations scholars having the greatest impact in their field." - Jerry Slater

“Careful reasoning and meticulous documentation” – Publishers Weekly

"Not since Foreign Affairs magazine published Samuel Huntington’s ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’ in 1993 has an academic essay detonated with such force.” – Michael Massing, The New York Review of Books

"Deliberately and dispassionately Mr. Mearsheimer and Mr. Walt lay out (their) case... The writers stand on eminently defensible ground..." — William Grimes, The New York Times

"Mearsheimer and Walt have admirably and courageously helped to start a much-needed conversation on a controversial and combustible topic." - Walter Russell Mead, Foreign Affairs

"An error-riddled, half-assed piece of work." - Okedem.

I guess the point is that controversial books by top academics will always attract a variety of responses. Walt and Mearsheimer are leading scholars in the field of international relations. Their views are notable, serious and worthy of inclusion. Phersu (talk) 16:37, 24 June 2010 (UTC)

Phersu, you're not fooling anyone by logging in as an IP (82.12.113.64) contribs. It's called socking. Cut it out or you'll be reported.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 16:41, 24 June 2010 (UTC)

Of course, in that list of yours, you could have cited the people I presented (or linked to). Notability isn't the only criterion here. Whatever they claim is either false, or a repeat of a real historian, and in that case we can just cite the latter. okedem (talk) 16:48, 24 June 2010 (UTC)

Jiujitsuguy – If you check the revision history, you’ll see that as soon as I realised I hadn’t signed in, I immediately went back into the discussion page and added my name. I did this several minutes before your accusation of socking. Please remember to Assume Good Faith.Phersu (talk) 16:58, 24 June 2010 (UTC)

It's dificult to assume good faith when you have also edited under an IP here and here to circumvent 3R.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 17:10, 24 June 2010 (UTC)

Since you've already admitted to editing under different accounts, what other IPs have you been editing under?--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 17:14, 24 June 2010 (UTC)

Jiujitsuguy - I pointed out that as soon as I realised I wasn’t logged in I had gone back and added my name. I did this several minutes before you accused me of “socking” and attempting to fool people (check the time codes). Instead of having the grace to apologise, however, you then accused me of intentionally editing under IPs on previous occasions in order to circumvent 3RR. I can assure you this isn’t the case. I have forgotten to log in and sign my contributions on several occasions, but have never done so with the intention of fooling anyone. Moreover, having followed the links you provide it appears to me that 3RR wouldn’t have applied in any case, given that - as far as I can ascertain - I only reversed the actions of other editors on one occasion (a series of consecutive saved revert edits by one user with no intervening edits by another user counts as one revert, and reverting your own actions is not counted as reverts for the purposes of the three-revert rule).

I find your tone unnecessarily confrontational and would once again ask that you assume good faith.Phersu (talk) 00:35, 25 June 2010 (UTC)

Once-Okay. Twice-Maybe. Three times-just plain careless. But you've done it 17 times, over a relatively brief period, using the

above-referenced IP. That doesn't look good at all. People get banned for that sort of conduct.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 01:57, 25 June 2010 (UTC)

Jiujitsuguy – Having checked some more of the instances where I used an IP address I found the following:

On 28 May at 13.08 I made a contribution proposing that we qualify the word “preemptive”. I forgot to log in, and my contribution was signed with an IP address. Three minutes later (13.11) I logged in to correct this, and the IP address was replaced by my user name, Phersu.

On 31 May I made a series of eight edits within a period of 45 minutes. These edits were to a single reply to Okedem, which was itself within a series of (signed) discussions I had been having with that user. Moreover, I begin the reply by stating: “Fair enough, I’ll reply to the specific points. Again, your points in light, my replies in bold”. Given that I had previously signed my contributions as Phersu, does that sound like I’m trying to pretend I’m somebody else?

On 3 June and 6 June I made contributions to the Gaza Flotilla talk page. On both occasions I was providing links to relevant articles.

I refer you to Wikipedia’s policy on sock-puppetry, which states that: “a sockpuppet is defined as one using multiple accounts deceptively.” It also states: “One who has an account may sometimes forget or be too lazy to sign in some of the time, or may be unable to for technical reasons, and therefore make IP edits. This is not considered sock puppetry.”

I have never used an IP address deceptively or disruptively - facts which you could have established very easily had you bothered to check before making this serious accusation. Phersu (talk) 12:42, 25 June 2010 (UTC)

In discussing the unqualified use of the word preemptive, why hasn't anybody mentioned the undisputed fact that the United States, unarguably Israel's closest ally, explicitly rejected the imminence of war and refused to support Israel's war-mongering? I was shocked to see that this wasn't made clear in the recount of intelligence assessments, and thus added the information a few months back. Considering that this information stems from official US government sources, it's startling that it wasn't included from the very beginning. Then again, Mr. Oren conveniently brushes over that which impedes his narrative in his often-quoted tale of the war.

Rusk writes to Johnson, May 26: "As you know, the Israelis have told us their intelligence indicates that an Egyptian and Syrian attack is imminent. They have therefore requested a U.S. public statement of assurance and support to Israel against such aggression. Our intelligence does not confirm this Israeli estimate."[2] As a result, Johnson tells Eban that the UAR stands no chance whatsoever in a war against Israel, and therefore, the US refuses to lend its support. [3]

Does this sound like a country witnessing its closest ally poised on the brink of destruction? No, because as the record shows, the CIA was certain Nasser wouldn't dare make the move in the face of overwhelming Israeli military superiority. Shoplifter (talk) 13:48, 25 June 2010 (UTC)

Your rant and WP:OR vs "The Israeli first strike is… a clear case of legitimate anticipation." Michael Walzer, Just and unjust wars: a moral argument with historical illustrations and the dozens of other cited sources.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 14:10, 25 June 2010 (UTC)

Hey, I'm not a fan of US foreign policy either, but I wouldn't call a memo to the President, and a CIA analysis of the war, a "rant". You're citing a political journalist. I'm citing official US government sources, from which I quote whole-cloth. Who's doing original research? Do you deny that which was made clear in the memo? Shoplifter (talk) 14:41, 25 June 2010 (UTC)

An intelligence opinion from more than a week before the war is irrelevant to our discussion. Things change in a week. Even if this was in the day of the war, it still wouldn't be very important. American intelligence has been wrong before; it's not clairvoyant, you know. okedem (talk) 19:20, 25 June 2010 (UTC)

Yes, it's understandable that you would want to make intelligence assessments from before the war "irrelevant", since you are arguing the war was in fact preemptive, and since both U.S. and Israeli intelligence assessments prior to the war were that Egypt would not attack. I know that fact is inconvenient for your argument, but calling it "irrelevant" hardly makes it so.

Moreover, those assessments did not change in that week leading up to the war, or after. You suggest the U.S. intelligence assessment was wrong. On what basis? You have none. The assessment was indeed about as close to "clairvoyant" as the get. I would direct attention to this article on the CIA's website discussing that very point, entitled "Getting it Right". (https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol49no1/html_files/arab_israeli_war_1.html). JRHammond (talk) 02:40, 12 July 2010 (UTC)

I principally agree with both points you make (that things change, and that the US aren't omniscient), but they are redundant in their obviousness. Neither negate the fact that this was the US stance, according to the record. Whichever historical occurrence you seek to explain, you can always make a metaphysical argument to the point that nobody can explicate the exact circumstances at the time of the event. But it's impossible to write history that way. That is why we look at the historical sources, primarily the documentation of the main actors involved, if available. Here, the souce material is abundantly clear: the US disagreed with the Israeli intelligence, and refused to provide it with political support. And that remained true on the date of Israel's attack. Are you saying that the UAR increased their military capacity in the intermediate week? This was the core concern in the CIA analysis, which was definitive in saying that the Arabs stood zero chance in the face of Israel's military power. It's brutally dishonest to disregard that decisive fact in estimating the necessity (or rather, unnecessity) of the war. Which is what the CIA were saying, and what Rusk was saying to the President. Shoplifter (talk) 20:13, 25 June 2010 (UTC)

Evidence and testimony subsequently emerged suggesting that while the Israeli government and intelligence services had been saying one thing to the US in order to elicit support, what they actually believed was quite different.

• "The former Commander of the Air Force, General Ezer Weizmann, stated that there was ‘no threat of destruction’ but that the attack on Egypt, Jordan and Syria was nevertheless justified so that Israel could ‘exist according to the scale, spirit and quality she now embodies’” (Ha’aretz, March 29, 1972, as quoted in Chomsky’s “The Fateful Triangle, p.100)

• “Top Israeli military commanders made it clear not long after (the Six Day War) that Israel had faced no serious military threat and that a quick victory was anticipated with confidence – that the alleged threat to Israel’s existence was ‘a bluff’." (ibid p.28)

• "US President Johnson told Eban that even after instructing his ‘experts to assume all the facts that the Israelis had given them to be true’, it was still ‘their unanimous view that there is no Egyptian intention to make an imminent attack’ – a conclusion, according to (Israeli Foreign Minister) Eban, also reached by Israeli intelligence. (Abba Eban, Personal Witness, p. 389, as quoted in Finkelstein’s Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict).

• Mossad chief Meir Amit stated: “Egypt was not ready for a war; and Nasser did not want a war”. (New York Times, 4 June, 1967; as quoted in Image and Reality)

• Israeli military historian Martin van Creveld said that the IDF under Rabin was “at the peak of its preparedness”, “confident in its power” and “spoiling for a fight and willing to go to considerable lengths to provoke it”. (Van Creveld, Sword and the Olive, pp172, 176-7, as quoted in Image and Reality). Phersu (talk) 01:09, 26 June 2010 (UTC)

Even taking those claims at face value, they're irrelevant to the notion of "preemptive strike". Threat of destruction is not a criterion for this, and neither is the enemy's chance of winning. A preemptive strike is not only in cases when waiting for an enemy attack will mean terrible defeat.

And even if the UAR was militarily inferior - so what? Taking that to mean that they wouldn't have attacked is folly - believing all players are fully rational and have equal access to information. Players act irrationally. For his own political reasons, Nasser was beating the drums of war for a long time; in such cases leaders are often carried in the currents they created, even when it's not the rational thing to do. Sometimes they might start believing their own propaganda ("We'll destroy Israel!"). History is full of states and peoples launching foolish and hopeless wars; going by your logic, these shouldn't happen, but they do. okedem (talk) 17:26, 26 June 2010 (UTC)

I fail to see how quotes from prominent Israelis explicitly acknowledging that there was no serious threat of an Egyptian first-strike on Israel is "irrelevant". I know the fact that these acknowledgments occurred are inconvenient for your argument, but that does not make them "irrelevant".

You say, "And even if the UAR was militarily inferior - so what?" There is no "if". The UAR was militarily inferior. That's a fact, hardly controversial. So what? So it was unlikely -- as both U.S. and Israeli intelligence assessed at the time, and as prominent Israelis have since acknowledged (irrelevantly, apparently, in your estimate) -- that Egypt would attack. Such an occurrence had an extremely low likelihood of occurring.

You're essentially arguing that it was POSSIBLE Egypt might have attacked. But that is not the discussion we are having here. The question is not whether it might have been theoretically possible, but whether evidence from the documentary record can sustain the claim that Israel's attack was "preemptive", which is to say that there is proof Egypt intended to launch an attack on Israel. There is no such proof. Bottom line: The use of the adjective is subjective and must not be used in a statement of fact in a Wikipedia article. JRHammond (talk) 02:40, 12 July 2010 (UTC)

Now, we're boiling it down to the core issue, namely whether the historical record, as interpreted by different commentators, warrants the use of the word "preemptive". You're absolutely right in saying that people may act irrationally and against their best interest; the recent Gaza flotilla raid is an excellent example of this. But again, here at Wikipedia our goal is to channel the historical sources, as explained by the scholarly community, in order to write articles with as much veracity as possible. And as we can see from the copious debate in these talk pages, on the issue of using the word "preemptive" to describe the Israeli attack, there is simply not a scholarly consensus to make this claim in an encyclopaedia. That's why we've spotlighted numerous examples of events and documentation that is in opposition to this claim. The wording should be changed to reflect that Israel made the claim that their attack was preemptive, that some commentators agree with this, that others disagree, and that there is no consensus for either stance. This would present the opportunity for people of different convictions to document their view with solid reference material. Shoplifter (talk) 18:51, 26 June 2010 (UTC)

Not really. A variety of quotes were presented as supporting your viewpoint, when they really don't. A quote about whether Israel faced threat of destruction, for instance, is wholly irrelevant. So are the American intelligence estimates about Egyptian military strength, etc. Other sources were just of incredibly low quality, by people who know nothing of the subject. On the other hand, it seems Israel's case is cited as a classic pre-emptive strike wherever we look. It seems quite clear that the people contesting this point are a small (if vocal) minority, of the same group obsessively writing about Israel's misdeeds, true and imagined. okedem (talk) 20:44, 27 June 2010 (UTC)

Is Israeli's own intelligence assessment that Nasser would not make a first strike also "irrelevant"? The use of the adjective "preemptive" as describing the war is subjective and thus needs to be removed to maintain neutrality. 118.160.21.65 (talk) 02:58, 5 July 2010 (UTC)

The two of us obviously won't resolve the issue, but the information about the US intelligence assessment is just another piece to the historical puzzle which contradicts the suggestion of a preemptive strike. Any rational and intellectually honest person will accept that the Americans flat out rejection of the Israeli position is in direct opposition to the notion of a war born out of necessity. Your objections to certain quotations amounts to, it seems to me, nothing more than hairsplitting. (Signed by Shoplifter, from another computer) 213.132.112.86 (talk) 13:09, 28 June 2010 (UTC)

No, you're just evading here; I'm explained why the "threat of destruction" is a red-herring, and why US intelligence about the ability of the UAR to win a war is also irrelevant (the assumption of perfectly rational players). The only question partly relevant to our discussion would be the position of the US after the war, when most of the facts were known. okedem (talk) 06:27, 30 June 2010 (UTC)

I've explained to you, by ample documentation, that the record is unequivocal on the US's refusal to accept the diplomatic overtures by Israel, which were made, according to Mr. Oren, by "inflat[ing] the Egyptian threat...in order to extract a pledge [from] the President". Furthermore, as Mr. Quandt points out, the Israelis wanted for the Americans to commit to their assessment of the situation, and if they didn't, then the view of Israel was that it "would be free to act on its own". You are in fact the one using a red herring by requesting non-existent documentation. The CIA made their estimate of the situation, and unless you can document differing US intel which contradicts the CIA analysis, we are both obliged to accept this as their stance on the issue. As I wrote previously, this was the position taken by the US in the week before the war, and it was their position on the day of the attack. There is no indication that anything meaningful to the interpretation of whether preemption was a necessity changed in the intermediate week. And if it is true what Oren says, namely that Israel was knowingly deceiving their closest ally to make the option of war more palatable, it is beyond me how anyone could interpret that as anything else but seriously damning to Israel's claim of a preemptive strike. (Signed by Shoplifter, from another computer) 213.132.112.86 (talk) 08:58, 30 June 2010 (UTC)

Hello anonymous IP. Let's examine the sources. In support of the preemption viewpoint, we have the below listed six sources from acclaimed academics, historians and strategists that were found with relative ease.

• "The Israeli first strike is...a clear case of legitimate anticipation." Michael Walzer, Just and unjust wars: a moral argument with historical illustrations

• “The United States has often walked a fine line between preemption and prevention. In fact there have only been a handful of clear-cut cases of military preemption by any states in the last 200 years. (Israeli preemption in the Six Day War of 1967 is perhaps the most cited example)” U.S. National Security Strategy: a New Era U.S. Department of State (2002)

• The Six Day War is, "A classic example of preemptive war." Henry Shue, David Rodin Preemption: military action and moral justification

• "Classic examples of preemptive wars include the July Crisis of 1914 and the Six Day War of 1967 in which Israel preemptively attacked Egypt…" Karl P. Mueller Striking first: preemptive and preventive attack in U.S. national security

• “The Six Day War between Israel and alliance of Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq was an example of preemption.” And, “It exemplifies preemption.” Charles W. Kegley, Gregory A. Raymond The Global Future: A Brief Introduction to World Politics

• "Preemptive attack is morally justified when three conditions are fulfilled: The existence of an intention to injure, the undertaking of military preparations that increase the level of danger, and the need to act immediately because of a higher degree of risk. Since these conditions were met in Israel’s Six Day War, Israel’s preemptive attack on Egypt on June 5, 1967 was a legitimate act of self-defense.” Mark R. Amstutz International ethics: concepts, theories, and cases in global politics

In opposition to preemption we get the failed professor and Hamas apologist Finkelstein and his mentor, the hyper leftist linguist Chomsky. I think it's a no-brainer here.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 17:12, 30 June 2010 (UTC)

You're employing two fallacies: appeal to authority and ad hominem. That is all the response your argument requires. JRHammond (talk) 02:40, 12 July 2010 (UTC)

First of all, it's unnecessary to make snide comments about me using an "anonymous IP" when I've clearly stated that I'm the one who is writing. I doubt I'm alone in enjoying browsing Wikipedia during my coffee break at work.

• In regards to your summary of the situation, I find that it underlines what myself and Phersu among others have been saying all along: there is a divided scholarly outlook on whether the attack can be described as preemptive. You have listed six works which concludes that it was. Phersu, in his admirable effort, have noted no less than eight authors of considerable academic pedigree and stature who oppose this viewpoint. In addition, I find it unsettling that you disregard Chomsky (who is a Professor at MIT, and undoubtedly one of the leading voices on geopolitics in the world today) and Finkelstein (who has a doctorate from Princeton on a thesis on Zionism) merely because of your perception of their purported political views and allegiances. By the same token, it seems to me that a source originating with the U.S. Department of State should be intensely scrutinized by one who has such misgivings about political affiliations in relation to scholarly writing on this topic.

• Secondly, it should be noted that the sources compiled by Phersu are of a high quality, not only because of their clear and lucid interpretation of the facts (this is especially true for Fisher, Finkelstein and Quigley), but also because they have, in comparison to your list of writers, originated with more notable scholars. A quick walkthrough shows that only one of the writers you have listed has an article in Wikipedia, which, by comparison, is the case for no less than six authors in the list by Phersu. I'm not suggesting that this should be determinative in deciding which sources are of a higher quality, but it is one aspect to be considered.

• Thirdly, unlike the sources arguing in favor of describing the attack as preemptive, the opposing view comprises a number of original sources, including statements by such highly significant actors as De Gaulle, Begin, Dayan and Rabin, which, depending on your interpretation of their content, casts doubt over the claim of a preemptive strike, or refutes it in the affirmative. Whatever the case may be, they are of extremely valuable insight into the issue, and would be extensively noted in the case of a neutral lead which recognizes the differing viewpoints on this subject.

• Fourthly, I want to underscore my view on an issue in regards to the sources you have compiled. A professed historical act does not become more true because it is expressed forcefully by the author. In other words, saying that the attack was "a clear case of preemption" does not increase the veracity of that statement, as opposed to saying that "Nasser had no intention of striking first", which would equally counterbalance the former argument. Both are dependent on the documentation provided to back up the claim.

• In summation, I retain that the there is an irrefutably divided view among notable scholars on whether the attack was preemptive, and that this should be reflected in the lead. Shoplifter (talk) 19:47, 30 June 2010 (UTC)

End the debate on the use of "preemptive" and just revise it already!

Please don't break this comment (reply after). I first raised this issue, and would like to see it ended, as there really shouldn't be any controversy here. This sentence remains problematic:

"On June 5, 1967, Israel launched a preemptive attack on Egypt."

This NEEDS to be revised to meet Wikipedia's standard that all articles "must be written from a neutral point of view, representing fairly, proportionately, and as far as possible without bias". The above is clearly biased in favor of the pro-Israeli view. Suggest:

"On June 5, 1967, Israel launched an attack on Egypt."

I see no legitimate reason why anybody here could possibly have a problem with that wording. Nobody is asking that a pro-Arab view replace a pro-Israel one. The goal is neutrality, and this simple revision achives that for a sentence that, as it currently reads, merely parrots an Israeli claim. This sentence, as is, endorses the Israeli view, and thus unambiguously violates Wikipedia policy. The subsequent sentences in that paragraph sufficiently address the question of "preemption" fairly, noting both sides of the argument and presenting both views with neutrality, so it is a simple enough solution simply to remove that single adjective from this sentence.

A few points on the nature of this (rather pointless) debate:

1) The fact that this debate is taking place now, has taken place for so long, and has prompted so many threads on the topic on this talk page itself demonstrates that using the adjective "preemptive" to describe the '67 war is subjective.

2) The bottom line is any assertion that the attack was "preemptive" is not a proven fact, but a subjective judgment. To be "preemptive", an attack must be taken in order to prevent or mitigate the threat of an imminent attack from the other side. So the question here is whether Egypt indeed posed an "imminent" threat or not. The bottom line is that this cannot be proven. It has not been shown to be true beyond a reasonable doubt. In this case, not only is there little evidence for the claim, but the documentary record actually points to the contrary, that Nasser's positioning was defensive and he was not going to attack Israel. This is really uncontroversial, as the following points demonstrate.

3) The question is not whether Israel perceived Egypt to be a threat, but whether Egypt actually had intended to attack Israel had Israel not launched its attack first. Again, this claim is unproven. There are arguments both ways, but the following facts must be born in mind:

a) Israel's claims at the time that it was under peril from the threat of imminent destruction by the Arab armies were a bluff. Israel's own intelligence didn't believe this.

b) When Abba Eban took that false assessment to the Johnson administration, Richard Helms pointed out to the President that U.S. intelligence assessed that Israel would tromp the combined Arab forces in as little as two weeks -- one if Israel struck first with a surprise attack (which is what actually occurred, the CIA assessment having been very prescient). Johnson himself told Eban, "All of our intelligence people are unanimous that if the UAR attacks, you will whip hell out of them."

c) Helms also pointed out that U.S. intelligence judged that the kind of hyperbolic estimate of being the underdog offered Eban said came from Mossad was not "a serious estimate of the sort they would submit to their own high officials." This was correct.

d) The U.S. intelligence estimate, like Israel's, was that Nasser would not be so foolish as to make a first strike against so superior force as Israel was known (propagandist hyperbole aside) to be.

4) People arguing no change is needed in the above sentence cite Egypt's closure of the canal. This is irrelevant. The existence of blockade does not prove that Nasser was going to invade Israel.

5) People arguing no change is needed argue that Nasser's bellicose rhetoric is enough to prove Israel's attack was "preemptive". However, bellicose rhetoric is just that -- rhetoric -- and does not prove Egyptian intent to attack Israel.

6) Following from point 5, there is also an extensive (and messy) discussion about sources. The basic framework of this discussion is that there are certain sources who claim preemption, while other sources claim no preemption. A key argument in favor of no change here is that the sources (Chomsky, Finkelstein, et al) arguing the war was not actually "preemptive" are biased against Israel. This argument fails on two counts: (i) It assumes people who claim the war was "preemptive" are unbiased, and (ii) It is an ad hominem fallacy. This whole, lengthy discussion on sources, therefore, is totally irrelevant.

Again, the sole question here is: "Can it be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Egypt had intended to attack Israel had Israel not attacked Egypt first?" The answer to that question is clearly "No".

That is really uncontroversial. This debate needs to end and the text should be revised immediately. To further illustrate, here's a source I presume nobody here would argue is biased against Israel. Michael B. Oren, current Israeli Ambassador and author of "Six Days of War", widely considered the definitive account of the war: "By all reports Israel received from the Americans, and according to its own intelligence, Nasser had no interest in bloodshed..." Nasser would "have to be deranged" to attack Israel first, and any Egyptian decision to do so "could only come about if Nasser felt he had complete military superiority over the IDF, if Israel were caught up in a domestic crisis, and, most crucially, was isolated internationally–-a most unlikely confluence."

It should be emphasized Oren is offering the Israeli view here. So it can hardly be considered "biased". And Oren is not the only person beholden to the Israeli view once can cite to demonstrate the point.

Yitzhak Rabin, who would later become Prime Minister, told Le Monde the year following the ’67 war, “I do not think Nasser wanted war. The two divisions he sent to the Sinai would not have been sufficient to launch an offensive war. He knew it and we knew it.”

Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin acknowledged in a speech in 1982 that its war on Egypt in 1956 was a war of “choice” and that, “In June 1967 we again had a choice. The Egyptian army concentrations in the Sinai approaches do not prove that Nasser was really about to attack us. We must be honest with ourselves. We decided to attack him.”

I presume we can all agree that Rabin and Begin are not "anti-Israeli"?

FIX THIS WIKIPEDIA ENTRY ALREADY!!! What's the holdup? What's the problem? This really should hardly be a controversial revision. It is, however, a necessary one, by Wikipedia's own policy. JRHammond (talk) 05:39, 7 July 2010 (UTC)

Please await or seek consensus before changing the text. (Shouting is not the way to achieve consensus). Hertz1888 (talk) 01:35, 11 July 2010 (UTC)

Why does it take a "consensus" to have it read in a neutral and objective manner, but to it's okay to provide the subjective pro-Israeli description of its attack as "preemptive" without one? Nobody is arguing it should state as a fact that the attack was NOT preemptive. What is wrong with changing it to read objectively, without taking up one side or the other? According to Wikipedia policy, this MUST be changed. I will edit as per Wikipedia's policy when and how I please. JRHammond (talk) 11:22, 11 July 2010 (UTC)

Until consensus is achieved that the attack was "preemptive", I've edited the page so the sentence reads without that adjective. By your own standard, that is the only proper thing to do. And Wikipedia's policy requires it. Cheers. JRHammond (talk) 11:27, 11 July 2010 (UTC)

Consensus on lead, other articles

According to WP:Consensus, "Ideally a consensus decision would have the agreement of all interested editors, but sometimes this proves impossible to achieve, and a majority decision must be taken..." and "Consensus among a limited group of editors, at one place and time, cannot override community consensus on a wider scale."

Given the prerequisites, it is my interpretation that a consensus has been formed to the point that describing the Israeli attack as "preemptive" does not comport with WP:NPOV. I would add that I sympathize with Hertz1888, whom I want to commend for making a sensible argument despite holding a view in opposition to my own, in saying that consensus is a necessity and that this state of agreement has not been attained. I think that's a valid point of view, but as I said, I would respectfully disagree. I count seven to three editors in favor of qualification, and of equal importance, I believe that there is a stronger case made for this position, with less ad-hominem argumentation, as compared to the opposing view.

With that said, I want to make the argument in favor of re-writing, and re-sourcing, the lead (and possibly other segments of the text) to give equal weight to the opposing views on the issue of preemption. I believe that there is a wealth of valuable source material that should be taken into account for the improvement of the article as a whole. Given the extensive documentation that has been provided to augment both views in the course of this dicussion, it wouldn't be unjustified to start a new article that deals solely with the preemption debate. I think this would be to the benefit of all parties.

Secondly, I want to once again underscore the importance of the consensus reached being observed in all articles that deals with this issue. Here's a few pressing examples:

The article on Preemptive war currently reads: "The Israel Defense Forces, in light of Arab military buildups on its border, famously launched a devastating preemptive strike on Arab forces at the start of the Six Day War in 1967. Israel's preemptive strike of 1967 is perhaps the most cited example of preemption."

In History of the Arab-Israeli conflict: "The fighting in the Six-Day War of 1967 began with a strike by Israel, which many consider preemptive..."

In Arab-Israeli conflict: "In 1966-67, Egypt's leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser, began a pan-Arab campaign seeking unified support to conquer Israel and expel the Jews. Freshly armed with the latest in Soviet supplied planes, tanks, and other military stocks, Egypt felt, for the first time since 1948, that they were in a position to overrun Israel. Egyptian media began a relentless and supportive jingoist campaign whipping up a fervor of popular support for war. This enthusiasm spilled over to the other Arab capitals.

On May 30, 1967, Jordan entered into the mutual defense pact between Egypt and Syria. Egypt mobilized Sinai units, crossing UN lines (after having expelled the UN border monitors) and mobilized and massed on Israel's southern border. Likewise, armies in Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan also mobilized, encircling Israel for an imminent coordinated attack. In response, on June 5 Israel sent almost all of its planes on a preemptive mission into Egypt."

As I understand it, the consensus view is that the attack should be described in neutral terms, without giving undue weight to the Israeli nor the Arab viewpoint, and that what follows from this is that both positions have to be expounded on, and the respective explanations duly sourced. The above examples have a strong bent in favor of the Israeli viewpoint, not only in choice of terminology but also in the texts describing the surrounding circumstances, including several unsourced statements. Shoplifter (talk) 09:59, 12 July 2010 (UTC)

Yes, while the argument has been put forth that there is no "consensus" that the attack WASN'T "preemptive", that logic defeats itself; there is similarly no consensus that Israel's attack was "preemptive". Thus, according to Wikipedia policy -- the sentence asserting as a fact that it was so should remain as I have edited to read, without the adjective, reading neutrally and taking up neither one position nor the other. Jiujitsuguy undid my edit so it included "preemptive". I undid his undoing, and will continue to do so, so that this sentence reads neutrally, according to Wikipedia policy. JRHammond (talk) 15:48, 12 July 2010 (UTC)

I have edited the article by removing the subjective adjective "preemptive" from before "attack" in the sentence in question. Jiujitsuguy repeatedly undoes that edit, so that the "preemptive" remains. This is a violation of Wikipedia policy.

• To comply with Neutral Point of View, the sentence should assert as fact neither one position nor the other. Nobody is suggesting it should state as fact the war was NOT preemptive. There is no legitimate reason why having this sentence read neutrally should be objectionable.

• As Shoplifter has pointed out, according to Wikipedia policy, when no consensus can be reached, a majority decision must be taken. As everyone can see, a majority of editors agree that the sentence should be qualified. I believe a simple removal of the adjective is sufficient, as the rest of the paragraph address the matter with sufficient qualifications and caveats so as to remain neutral.

• I request editors to help watch the page to be sure no improper revision back to asserting as fact that the war was "preemptive" is made.

• I've explained my reason for editing out "preemptive" from the sentence, a decision both in accordance with NPOV policy and in line with the majority decision here (above). I request Jiujitsuguy to provide an explanation for why he has twice now reverted that edit, as required (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:REVEXP).JRHammond (talk) 02:24, 13 July 2010 (UTC)

Rebuttal

I did some research on the statements attributed to Menachem Begin in connection with the pre-emption aspect of the Six day War. However, what you conveniently omitted was his subsequent statement which read as follows: “(The Six Day-War) was a war of self-defense in the noblest sense of the term. The government of national unity then established decided unanimously: We will take the initiative and attack the enemy, drive him back, and thus assure the security of Israel and the future of the nation.”

In his speech, Begin argued that wars of self defense needn’t take place when genocide is imminent. He believed that Israel had the capability of absorbing the first blow but at a much greater cost in lives. Thus he argued that the war was indeed an act of self-defense in the classic definition.

You have deliberately taken Begin’s remarks out of context and that is disingenuous as well as misleading. But I am not surprised by this tactic as it is a tactic that has been employed time and again by another one of your “sources,” the propagandist and Hamas/Hezbollah supporter, Norman Finkelstein, a marginal figure of the extreme left and failed professor. A chief reason why he was thrown out of DePaul University was because of his tendency to make up quotes.[4]

I did a Google search of your collection of quotes supposedly made by Israeli leaders and it’s funny how the web forums that regurgitate them (such as “Jew Watch,” “The Socialist,” and “Radio Islam”) have but one thing in common – extreme, vile hatred of Israel. Such sources can hardly be considered reliable.

Essentially, an analysis of your sources reveals a cacophony of out-of-context quotes and propagandists of the extreme left whose dishonest works are riddled with bias from the prologue to the Epilogue.

The leading theorists on the concept of pre-emption, Professor Michael Walzer and noted scholar Abraham Sofaer cite similar criteria for justifying pre-emptive strikes and both agree that Israel’s attack on Egypt is a classic example of implementation of that doctrine.

The consensus view of mainstream sources concur that Israel’s strike was pre-emptive. For example Winston Churchill and Randolph Churchill note that on May 26 Nasser addressed the leaders of the Pan-Arab Federation of Trade Unions and said that if war came “it will be total and the objective will be to destroy Israel. We feel confident that we can win and are ready now for war with Israel.” This was followed by an order from the Ministry of Religious Affairs that all Imams and preachers make “Jihad” the subject of their sermons, with the objective of whipping up war fever in Cairo. They further note that, “The great powers were alarmed by Nasser’s recklessness. He appeared to be losing his balance.” (Churchill, Randolph, S., Churchill, Winston S. Six Day War, Houghton Mifflen Co. (1967), p.46.)

They posit that Nasser himself initially may not have wanted a showdown but got carried away with events that he himself created. Citing Abba Eban, they note that “Nasser was like a man who had gone to Monte Carlo with £100 and staked it at the roulette wheel. Each time his number came up he became more courageous – he felt that Fortune was smiling at him.” (Id p.49)

They state that there were four developments that individually would have been of great concern to Israel but collectively proved to be existential threats. These were the closure of the Straits of Tiran, the deployment of 100,000 soldiers and 800 tanks in Sinai (after UNEF expulsion), the Jordanian-Egyptian military pact just days before the war and the deployment of Iraqi forces in Jordan. The confluence of these four developments left Israel with little choice but to act decisively and pre-emptively. The authors sum it up this way, “Israel....did not wait for her enemy to draw – she had seen the glint in Nasser’s eye.” (Id p. 75)

Note the following additional sources:

• "The Israeli first strike is...a clear case of legitimate anticipation." Michael Walzer, Just and unjust wars: a moral argument with historical illustrations
• “The United States has often walked a fine line between preemption and prevention. In fact there have only been a handful of clear-cut cases of military preemption by any states in the last 200 years. (Israeli preemption in the Six Day War of 1967 is perhaps the most cited example)” U.S. National Security Strategy: a New Era U.S. Department of State (2002)
• The Six Day War is, "A classic example of preemptive war." Henry Shue, David Rodin Preemption: military action and moral justification
• "Classic examples of preemptive wars include the July Crisis of 1914 and the Six Day War of 1967 in which Israel preemptively attacked Egypt…" Karl P. Mueller Striking first: preemptive and preventive attack in U.S. national security
• “The Six Day War between Israel and alliance of Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq was an example of preemption.” And, “It exemplifies preemption.” Charles W. Kegley, Gregory A. Raymond The Global Future: A Brief Introduction to World Politics
• "Preemptive attack is morally justified when three conditions are fulfilled: The existence of an intention to injure, the undertaking of military preparations that increase the level of danger, and the need to act immediately because of a higher degree of risk. Since these conditions were met in Israel’s Six Day War, Israel’s preemptive attack on Egypt on June 5, 1967 was a legitimate act of self-defense.” Mark R. Amstutz International ethics: concepts, theories, and cases in global politics
• "The Six Day War of 1967 is another example of preemptive warfare. In June of that year, Israel initiated a preemptive strike against the United Arab Republic, which had been massing troops on its border areas in preparation for attack."PREEMPTIVE WARFARE – A VIABLE STRATEGIC OPTION Colonel David Bowman, United States Army National Guard and Professor Anna Waggener

Historian Michael Oren notes that recently declassified documents reveal a number of Arab countries had extensive plans to attack Israel several days before the Six Day War began. The Egyptian attack plan, "Operation Dawn" called for strategic bombings of major ports, airfields, cities and the Dimona nuclear reactor followed by an Arab invasion. He further notes that in the weeks leading up to June 5, Israel found itself surrounded by large armies in Syria, Jordan and Egypt. The combined military forces on these three fronts gave Israel a distinct disadvantage in all areas of military readiness. In sum, despite attempts at historical revisionism, the evidence is clear and incontrovertible. Israel acted preemptively to frustrate Arab plans. On this basis, I am reverting.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 17:27, 14 July 2010 (UTC)

Since I'm not the one targeted by this rebuttal, I will, of course, not preempt (no pun intended) the opportunity for the person who is to respond to it. I feel obliged however to point out that your comments on Mr. Finkelstein are, it seems to me, a textbook violation of WP:BLP, which endangers Wikipedia. I would strongly advise you to remove any defamatory language from your text. Shoplifter (talk) 18:10, 14 July 2010 (UTC)

I noticed that you added an article written by Alan Dershowitz in ostensible support of your remarks about Finkelstein. Dershowitz and Finkelstein have been involved in a protracted dispute, primarily in regards to the content of Dershowitz's book The Case for Israel. This debate was unfortunately very heated and comprised a great deal of ad hominem attacks. To use writings by Dershowitz in support of libelous claims about Finkelstein does not lessen the infringement of WP:BLP. Shoplifter (talk) 21:09, 14 July 2010 (UTC)

What is libelous is taking quotes out of context (like in the cited example of Menachem Begin) and attributing to them a meaning not intended by the authors. What is libelous is when Walt & Mearsheimer quote Benny Morris to advance their convoluted theories and those quotes and references are once again taken out of context and attribute to the author views that are actually contrary to what the cited author believes. Here's what Benny Morris had to say about Walt & Mearsheimer's work;

• "Like many pro-Arab propagandists at work today, Mearsheimer and Walt often cite my own books, sometimes quoting directly from them, in apparent corroboration of their arguments. Yet their work is a travesty of the history that I have studied and written for the past two decades. Their work is riddled with shoddiness and defiled by mendacity. Were "The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy" an actual person, I would have to say that he did not have a single honest bone in his body."And Now For Some Facts Benny Morris, The New Republic, 8 May 2006--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 00:59, 15 July 2010 (UTC)

Jiujitsuguy, you are not rebutting my charge of a WP:BLP violation. You are avoiding the issue by referring to other people and writings which are irrelevant to your statements about Finkelstein (a logical fallacy). I don't see what you seek to gain from this. Shoplifter (talk) 07:43, 15 July 2010 (UTC)

Jiujitsuguy, you are violating WP:SOAP. Wikipedia describes positions, it does not endorse positions. There are a number of very reliable sources, including Israeli and Zionist sources, which say that it was not a pre-emptive strike. Maybe you think that Menachem Begin's remarks prove the attack was defensive, but many legal scholars nonetheless cite the lack of imminent threat as proof that the attack was illegal. Those views have to be included in the article, and they have to be summarized in the lede. There is no support whatever in WP:UNDUE or WP:LEDE for advancing a single controversial viewpoint. harlan (talk) 06:07, 15 July 2010 (UTC)

Jiujitsuguy,

1) Menachem's statement is not taken "out of context". He acknowledged that "The Egyptian army concentrations in the Sinai approaches do not prove that Nasser was really about to attack us. We must be honest with ourselves. We decided to attack him". The fact that he went on to describe it as a war of "self-defense" does not negate the fact that he effectively acknowledge it was not a "preemptive" attack.

2) You engage in guilt-by-association and ad hominem arguments (re: Finkelstein, etc) yet again in an attempt to support your position. Employing such fallacious arguments is totally inappropriate for a Wikipedia talk page.

3) You repeatedly claim that the "consensus view" in the "mainstream" is that the attack was "preemptive". I don't agree, but this is irrelevant; it was also a consensus view in the mainstream in '02-'03 that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. Yet some of us who are capable of thinking and assessing information for ourselves were pointing out that there WAS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THIS CLAIM. The question here is not what this or that source CLAIMS. The question is what the actual evidence from the documentary record is. And in this case, the documentary record is perfectly clear in establishing the great unlikelihood that Nasser would have made a first-strike on Israel. This was the assessment of both U.S. and Israeli intelligence, and has subsequently been acknowledged by prominent Israelis, including Menachem Begin and Yitzhak Rabin (as noted above). The bottom line is that this is a subjective judgment and should be reflected as such in the article, as opposed to asserting as fact the pro-Israeli POV, which is a violation of Wikipedia policy.

4) You copy/paste comments you made citing Churchill, but neglect to address my counter-points. So I'll also copy/paste my response:

"The quote from Nasser (Churchill) does not indicate Nasser was referring to a war resulting from an Egyptian attack, as opposed to a war resulting from an Israeli attack. Preachers making "jihad" the subject of their sermons also does not support your claim, as neither does it indicate Egypt was preparing for an offensive, rather than a defensive, war. Your third point is also moot. We are not questioning whether Nasser was being "reckless" or not; the question is whether he actually intended to attack Israel, and the documentary record is perfectly clear that the consensus is he was not. For instance, there was a consensus between U.S. and Israeli intelligence that the likelihood of an Egyptian first strike was low. Prominent Israelis have since acknowledged this fact, including Yitzhak Rabin, Menachem Begin, and Michael B. Oren."

5) Citing Abba Eban hardly supports your position. It was Eban who went to the U.S. falsely claiming that the assessment of Israeli intelligence was that Israel was facing the threat of destruction. As DCI Helms told President Johnson, this was the kind of assessment the Israelis wouldn't submit to their own leadership, and was pure propaganda. And as Oren points out in his book, the actual Israeli assessment matched that of the U.S. -- that Israel's military was vastly superior to the combined Arab states' and that the likelihood of an Egyptian attack was extremely low.

6) You cite the closure of the straits of Tiran is irrelevant as evidence that the attack was "preemptive". But this is irrelevant. The closure does not demonstrate any intent on Egypt's part to launch a first-strike on Israel.

7) You cite the deployment of Egyptian forces in the Sinai to support your claim that the attack was "preemptive". Yet you continue to ignore the fact that the U.S. intelligence assessment was that these lines were defensive, that both U.S. and Israeli intelligence assessed there was almost no chance Nasser would strike first, and that prominent Israelis like Begin, Rabin, and Oren have acknowledged that this was so.

8) You cite Oren on "Operation Dawn". Yet as Norman Finkelstein has observed, Oren deliberately and demonstrably distorted the documentary record in his account (see, Finkelstein is a real scholar, contrary to your ad hominem arguments, and actually checks source documents):

"A major thrust of Oren's account suggests that Israel launched its strike in the face of an imminent and overwhelming Arab attack. Basing himself on a few self-serving postwar Egyptian memoirs, Oren gives over many pages to Operation Dawn, a preemptive strike allegedly planned for near the end of May by Nasser's powerful defense minister, 'Abd al-Hakim 'Amer, and said to be abruptly aborted by Nasser. Yet, even mainstream American and Israeli historians crediting Operation Dawn typically consign it to a footnote or a phrase, whereas Oren, citing the same Egyptian memoirs, turns this ephemeral and inconsequential alleged episode into a centerpiece of his history, thereby magnifying the threat Egypt posted. Fabricating a mammoth speculative edifice on an already flimsy evidentiary foundation, Oren professes to divine Nasser's subtle calculations for supporting Operation Dawn (pp. 95, 120), even after acknowledging that it is unclear whether 'Nasser even knew about the plan' (p. 92) Oren further observes that the 'Egyptian first strike' posed a 'potentially greater threat' to Jordan than an Israeli attack because an unsuccessful Egyptian offensive would be blamed on Jordan, undermining Hashemite rule, while a successful Egyptian offensive might 'continue onward to Amman.' 'The predicament, as defined by royal confidant Zayd al-Rifai,' Oren continues, 'was mind-boggling: "Even if Jordan did not participate in a war ... it would be blamed for the loss of the war and our turn would be next"' (p. 128; the ellipsis is Oren's). turning to the source Oren cites, we read that King Hussein feared an Israeli attack in the event of a regional war 'no matter what Jordan did.' To document Jordan's worry, the source quotes Rifai: 'Even if Jordan did not participate directly in a war that was started by Israel it would not only be destroyed by the Arab world and even blamed for the loss of the war but our turn would be next' (emphasis added). It would seem that the 'predicament' posed by an 'Egyptian first strike' to Jordan would not have been quite so 'mind-boggling' if Oren had not excised the phrase 'that was started by Israel.'" -- ("Abba Eban With Footnotes", Norman G. Finkelstein, Journal of Palestine Studies XXXII, no. 3 (Spring 2003), pages 74-89).

Finkelstein points out in a footnote that Israeli historian Benny Morris "altogether doubts its [Operation Dawn's] existence". He also notes:

"Even assuming an Egyptian attack was planned and leaving aside that the alleged plan was aborted well before 5 June, it could not have influence the Israeli decision to strike unless officials knew about it. Although circumstantial indications suggest that they might have known, it remains that both at the time and in his later memoirs Abba Eban emphatically dismissed all talk of a planned Egyptian attack as 'hypochondriac frivolities' and a 'cheap trick' designed to justify an Israeli attack, and neither British and U.S., nor, for that matter, Israeli intelligence could detect in late May any evidence of an imminent Egyptian attack."

(If you respond, please try to address Finkelstein's facts and arguments, rather than engaging in your usual ad hominem arguments, Jiujitsuguy.)

And just as Oren acknowledges that the Israeli intelligence assessment matched that of the U.S., he also acknowledges that, while Nasser's Military Intelligence Chief suggested attacking first so as not to lose their air force in an Israeli surprise attack (which, as Oren also notes, was then well in the planning), Nasser dismissed any suggestion of making the first strike: "Now it was Nasser's turn to object, stepping in to explain that Egypt could not risk alienating world opinion by assaulting Israel..."

Also, it should be noted as a simple logical fact, applying an equal standard, that had Egypt actually attacked first, it could easily be described as "preemptive" since Israel was IN FACT demonstrably, and admittedly (like I said, Oren himself documents it) been planning an attack on Egypt.

So let's end this debate already. Jiujitsuguy, nobody -- NOBODY -- is suggesting the article should state as fact that it WAS NOT "preemptive". Why do you object to the article simply taking up a NPOV and simply NOT asserting that it was?

There is absolutely no legitimate reason whatsoever to object to the edit I have made, and no legitimate reason whatsoever to undo that edit -- as you have done now 3 times.

I implore other editors to help me to keep this article within the bounds of Wikipedia policy on NPOV and verifiability by NOT having it state AS FACT that which is a subjective judgment open to interpretation and debate (as this talk page itself clearly demonstrates).

Also, the last time you undid my correction, you did so with the note that there was "no consensus" for it. Yet, as everyone here can see, there is also no consensus (on the contrary, most editors expressed being in favor of qualifying the sentence) that the attack was "preemptive", and so by your own logic the sentence should remain neutral, as I have made it.JRHammond (talk) 07:20, 15 July 2010 (UTC)

Do we need to qualify the statement "Israel launched a pre-emptive attack" in order to conform to NPOV?

The current Six-Day War article states that Israel's attack on Egypt was pre-emptive (ie Israel struck first because it believed an Egyptian attack was imminent). Some argue that this conforms with scholarly consensus and that the phrase "pre-emptive" should remain unqualified. Others argue that a substantial body of academic opinion believes the attack was not pre-emptive, (ie Israel did not genuinely believe an Egyptian attack was imminent) and that Wikipedia should qualify the phrase in order to conform to neutral point of view (eg "Israel SAID its attack was pre-emptive") Phersu (talk) 18:27, 1 July 2010 (UTC)

Qualify Which sources claim that Israel launched a pre-emptive attack? And which disagree? For something this controversial, we would violate NPOV by not qualifying the statement. Ngchen (talk) 00:44, 2 July 2010 (UTC)

Qualify this has been under almost constant discussion for a couple of years (see the archives). The authors who restore this narrative have no consensus, and are deliberately violating general sanctions that require the inclusion of the views of all the interested parties to the conflict. Published analysis from a number of reliable sources say that it was not a pre-emptive attack, e.g. the ASIL Presidential Commission report, Yoram Dinstein, etc. harlan (talk) 03:03, 2 July 2010 (UTC)

Qualify I believe I've documented my view sufficiently above, but I would like to add that, if the decision is reached to qualify, then this should be observed in all articles that dicusses the attack, for example Preemptive war. Shoplifter (talk) 08:48, 2 July 2010 (UTC)

Qualify I believe that there are relatively reliable sources on both sides; this isn't just one crank source arguing against overwhelming consensus. For those editors who feel sure that the attack was pre-emptive, would a couple of words qualifying the statement (ie. "Israel said the attack was pre-emptive") really be so painful?

Yes, what would be the problem of simply expressing "preemptive" as being subjective, as opposed to expressing it as a matter of fact? Just change the wording already. This very debate itself demonstrates the subjectivity of the use of that adjective to describe the war, so continuing it endlessly really is pointless. 118.160.21.65 (talk) 03:16, 5 July 2010 (UTC)

(I came here as an uninvolved editor, responding to the RfC). bobrayner (talk) 11:02, 2 July 2010 (UTC)

I along with Okedem, Hertz1888, Tzu Zha Men, Poliocretes, Brewcrewer, Cptnono and Ynhockey (each of whom have expressed views on the subject) oppose your POV push. More importantly, the sources cited for preemption far out way yours both in terms of quantity and quality. You can bring a thousand editors who express the view that the “peace loving Nazis” were attacked by the “aggressive Poles” during WWII but that does not make it so. You know you’re scraping the bottom of the barrel when you start relying on Norman Finkelstein and his mentor Noam Chomsky, each of whom come to the picture with soiled hands.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 14:14, 2 July 2010 (UTC)

Juujitsuguy, you're argument is entirely ad hominem. 118.160.21.65 (talk) 03:16, 5 July 2010 (UTC)

Jiujitsuguy, perhaps you missed the thrust of my argument; it wasn't about sheer numbers of editors at all.

Please let's not be so angry. Can't we try to discuss this calmly and stick to the subject? I understand that you feel strongly about this, but why would it be so bad to have a word or two qualifying the statement? It certainly would not be equivalent to arguing that peace-loving nazis were attacked by aggressive poles. I am an uninvolved editor and am not familiar with this article's traditions; perhaps angrily citing irrelevant fiction to invoke Godwin is considered a good way to prove your point around here, but it's not on other parts of wikipedia.

You may feel that the sources which disagree with you are tainted, but a substantial number of others think those sources are worth considering. Maybe or maybe not a majority, but enough to justify some compromise in wording to satisfy NPOV, I think.

bobrayner (talk) 12:55, 4 July 2010 (UTC)

Don't qualify. It would be unjustified and improper per the reasons I expressed here. Hertz1888 (talk) 15:13, 2 July 2010 (UTC)

In your view it is "improper" to have it read neutrally (that is, having it neither say the attack was preemptive, nor denying that this was so) in order for it to read according to the pro-Israeli POV. JRHammond (talk) 02:53, 12 July 2010 (UTC)

Jiujitsuguy, I'm the editor who put the POV tag on this article in the first place. I've did not rely on Norman Finkelstein and his mentor Noam Chomsky. I already went through a very long detailed discussion with YnHockey [5] about including the material from the ASIL, Vanderbuilt, Yoram Dinstein, et al. You guys are misusing the sources in your list, e.g. Antonio Cassese. Many of them consider anticipatory self defense to be legal, but not pre-emptive attacks or pre-emptive wars. Since your own sources make those distinctions, there isn't the slightest chance you are going to use the term pre-emptive attack and keep other editors from including material on that subject in the body of the article or fail to mention that fact in the lede. The general sanctions require that the views of all the interested parties are supposed to be included. This nonsense has gone on long enough.

For example, the President of the American Society of International Law created a Task Force on Terrorism in 2002. It published "The Myth of Preemptive Self-Defense", by Mary Ellen O’Connell. The report said that preemptive war must be distinguished from anticipatory self defense, and that any use of force in self-defense must respect the principles of necessity, proportionality, and cannot violate the jus cogens norm against unilateral use of force. O'Connell said that in the past commentators had defended Israel’s attack on Egypt on the grounds that it was anticipatory self-defense. She cited contrary evidence, like Rabin's remarks in the Le Monde interview, and said: "Israel stated that it had convincing intelligence that Egypt would attack and that Egyptian preparations were underway. We now know that the Israel acted on less than convincing evidence. Thus, the 1967 Arab-Israeli war does not provide an actual example of lawful anticipatory self-defense."[6]

In "Assessing Claims of a New Doctrine of Preemptive War Under the Doctrine of Sources", James Thuo Gathii says that many scholars and state officials do not support the notion that customary law permits the unilateral use of preemptive force without UN approval. He notes that State practice, opinio juris, and some legal scholars do distinguish between preemptive wars (which are illegal) and preemptive strikes under certain rare circumstances, i.e. anticipatory self-defense when a threat is imminent. He says 'there has yet to be a good case in which the very limited and contested notion of anticipatory self-defence met the Caroline test. The closest case that might have, but is now regarded as not having met the Caroline test, was Israel’s first strike against Egypt in the 1967. Few regarded it as a good example of a permissible anticipatory attack under the Caroline test, especially after it became clear following the attack that there was no overwhelming threat that justified the attack to ensure Israel’s survival. Many States criticized the attack, which made it clear that the attack would not serve as a precedent to legitimize “a general right of anticipatory self defense.”' see Osgoode Hall Law Journal, Vol. 43, No. 1, pp. 1-34, 2005 harlan (talk) 15:19, 2 July 2010 (UTC)

Qualify Neutral point of view is at the heart of Wikipedia. Phersu (talk) 18:16, 2 July 2010 (UTC)

Don't qualify - The sources presented to support the qualify viewpoint were, for the most part, either irrelevant (such as the claim that Israel would have won anyway), or sub-par, from failed academics (Finkelstein) or biased non-experts (e.g. Chomsky). The problem of bias was particularly evident, as it seems the people cited for this viewpoint are the same people who always write negatively about Israel in the context of the conflict, no matter the issue (Finkelstein, Chomsky, Quigley, Shlaim, etc). The sources for the "preemptive" formulation were of high quality, by persons not involved in the conflict. okedem (talk) 18:51, 3 July 2010 (UTC)

But this is ad hominem argumentation. The bottom line is that the use of the adjective "preemptive" to describe the war is subjective. It therefore needs to be removed or qualified. This simple suggestion should hardly be controversial. JRHammond (talk) 02:53, 12 July 2010 (UTC)

Okedem I'm pretty sure that your post violates WP:BLP by listing a number of well-known University professors and suggesting they are: "failed academics" (plural). BTW, Finklestein has an earned PhD from Princeton, is a bestselling author, and De Paul University described him as "as a prolific scholar and outstanding teacher." [7] Granting tenure is a guarantee of lifetime employment that involves financial, political, and extracurricular considerations that are not related to academic achievement. harlan (talk) 23:42, 3 July 2010 (UTC)

• Qualify. The sources we're discussing are not just Finkelstein and Chomsky, but also the New York Times, the commander of the Israeli air force and Begin. Per WP:NPOV, present both views and don't endorse either since there appears also to be WP:RS saying that the attack was pre-emptive. --Dailycare (talk) 17:05, 8 July 2010 (UTC)

• Qualify. Whether or not the war was "preemptive" is a subjective judgment open to interpretation. The article should read so as not to assert one way or the other whether the war was actually preemptive, but rather merely outline the opposing viewpoints. I've edited the text to read neutrally. JRHammond (talk) 02:53, 12 July 2010 (UTC)

• Qualify. This is a case where WP:NPOV is very clear and it is frustrating that it has taken so long to get to this point. The term "preemptive" implies that Egypt and/or the other Arab countries involved were about to attack Israel. To employ it as a statement of fact, without qualification, implies that it is accepted by all sides that this is the case when manifestly it is not. As several editors on this talk page have carefully documented, there are multiple notable participants, commentators, and researchers of the war who do not agree that such an attack was imminent. The objections of okedem, Hertz1988, and Jiujitsuguy to acknowledging the views of these notable individuals basically amount to this: they do not agree with them. Sanguinalis (talk) 01:37, 16 July 2010 (UTC)

I don't get it

I've been watching this edit warring for a while, and I just don't get it. Can those arguing that the attack was not preemptive explain why, in a very clear and concise manner? And would some in between wording stop the edit warring? I'm thinking something like: "On June 5, 1967, Israel launched what it described as a preemptive attack on Egypt." ← George ^talk 01:34, 15 July 2010 (UTC)

If you've been watching, then you know that there has always been an on-going objection to the use of the term pre-emptive strike in the lede. Every archive of this talk page has one or more lengthy discussions on that topic, which illustrates that there is no consensus that it properly reflects all the views of the interested parties to the conflict.

WP:PRACTICAL says Community discussion takes place on various pages: noticeboards such as at Administrators' noticeboard/Incidents; or pages such as Requests for comment and Requests for arbitration. These require collaborative effort and considered input from their participants to form a consensus and act appropriately upon the consensus. In determining consensus, consider the quality of the arguments, the history of how they came about, the objections of those who disagree, and existing documentation in the project namespace. The quality of an argument is more important than whether it comes from a minority or a majority. Editors decide outcomes during discussion, polls are regarded as structured discussions rather than votes. Both during polls and discussions, opinion has more weight when you provide a rationale; convince others of your views, and give them a chance to convince you. An argumentative approach rarely convinces others.

I put the POV tag on this article and I'm not edit warring. Jiujitsuguy is simply incorrect about "all the mainstream sources". Many legal experts and historians do not agree that it was a preemptive attack. For example, Yoram Dinstein (War Aggression, and Self-Defense, 3d ed. 2001) and Christine Gray (International Law and the Use of Force 2004) are two mainstream legal scholars who have said that Egypt initiated hostilities. As a consequence, they say the air strikes on 5 June 1967 were not legally a preemptive situation at all. They consider them to be either an intercept or counterattack. Their postulation addresses criticisms from the majority of scholars, who say that the Israeli attack was illegal based upon the "doctrine of necessity".

Mike Akehurst pointed out that, in the beginning, Israel itself had told the Security Council that the Arab armies had attacked her first. He asked "If this Israeli claim is false, why did Israeli tell a lie?" That viewpoint is contained in the very first citation in the "pre-emptive strike" footnote (see Quigley). The fact that Israel actually changed its story about the "pre-emptive attack" isn't summarized in the lede or mentioned in article.

Israel had shot down Syrian aircraft over Damascus, and had carried out a massive premeditated assault deep inside Jordanian territory that was condemned by the Security Council. Those facts were removed from the lede. Historians Michael Oren, Tom Segev, Moshe Shemesh, and a host of others say those events either led directly to the war or started it. They were certainly NOT "border clashes".

Here are some sources that were mentioned in previous discussions. The accounts published by the Israeli decision makers themselves, Israeli historians, and Israeli political scientists agree that the decision to go to war was made on the basis of the IDF's Doctrine of Deterrence, not upon the basis of defensive considerations. Israeli leaders felt that the IDF could not afford to back down. The offensive was launched to preserve the IDF's long-term deterrent capability.

• David Rodman said that since the early days of the State, Israeli military doctrine placed a premium on offensive, rather than defensive warfare. Military leaders felt that there was a better prospect of deterring the outbreak of hostilities if the IDF transferred fighting to enemy territory as soon as possible. That strategy also compensated for limited finances and the absence of alliance partners. see Between war and peace, editor Efraim Karsh, page 153

• Dan Kurzman said Rabin was not concerned with the Sinai build-up. see Soldier of peace, page 202

• Rabin said the IDF GHQ Intelligence assessment was that Israel was facing a repetition of Operation Rotem, and that Egypt would eventually withdraw. He characterized the Sinai troop build-up and the closure of the Straits as "humiliating pinpricks" that would render the IDF's long term deterrent capacity worthless. During the meeting in "the Pit", he and the other military leaders said they were afraid that it would appear that the government had lost confidence in the IDF, and that the significance of the closure of the Straits lay in the effect on Israel's deterrent capability. see The Rabin Memoirs, page 80-81; Israel in the Middle East: Documents and Readings on Society, Politics, and Foreign Relations, Pre-1948 to the Present, edited by Itamar Rabinovich, Jehuda Reinharz, pages 212-213; and Israel's Decision To Go To War, June 2, 1967, by Col. Ami Gluska

• Avner Yaniv said that IDF doctrine was based on the assumption of the inherent disability of Israel to win a decisive strategic battle and impose peace on the Arabs. The leadership felt that Israel could not subdue the Arabs. It could defend itself, cause the Arabs pain, and destroy their armies for a while, but they felt that solving the problem once and for all was beyond Israel's capacity. The IDF relied on a strategy of active conventional deterrence that emphasized punitive and demonstrative use of force and the accumulation of dissuasive power not through one military victory, but through a succession of quick decisive blows to Arab military power. see National security and democracy in Israel, page 90.

• Avi Shlaim said there is general agreement among commentators that Nasser neither wanted nor planned to go to war with Israel. He said the Israeli economy would survive the closure of the Straits, but the deterrent image of the IDF could not. see The Iron Wall, pages 236-237.

• Yagil Levy says that the tendency to use force and generate escalation in order to bring about counter-reaction by the Arabs, ruled out possible options to settle the crisis other than by war. Israel's doctrine of deterrence called for "flexible retaliation" designed to deter the Syrians or provoke them so that Israel could launch a full scale response. He said that Israel became trapped in its own formula of deterrence. see Trial and error: Israel's route from war to de-escalation, page 107

• Re'uven Pedatzur said that any erosion of Israeli deterrent power is an impediment to peace in the region. He said that Israeli deterrence is greatly dependent on the IDF's capability to inflict great and painful damage to the enemy -- "deterrence through punishment." and that in the absence of comprehensive peace in the Middle East, deterrence will remain the chief component in Israel's national defense doctrine. see Limits of Deterrence, Ha'aretz, 28 March 1995 p B1

• Uzi Benziman described Israel's doctrine of strategic deterrence and Ariel Sharon's role in launching cross-border attacks into Jordan or Egypt where his forces would strike targets and disappear. see for example Sharon: An Israeli Caesar, pages 42-44

• Greg Cashman said that in late May 1967, Egypt had complained that the false Soviet report caused them to send troops into the Sinai. see An Introduction to the Causes of War: Patterns of Interstate Conflict from World War I to Iraq, page 185

• The Egyptians had already provided categorical assurances to Israel through the US Secretary of State and the UN Secretary General that they did not intend to initiate hostilities, and that they were willing to make concessions to avoid a war. see Cashman; Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967, document 132; and paragragh 9 of the report to the Security Council from the Secretary General of the United Nations, S/7906, 26 May 1967.

• Christopher Gelpi says that the government of Egypt had let it be known that their tough statements were "mere words designed for public consumption." see The power of legitimacy: assessing the role of norms in crisis bargaining, page 141

There are many popular and quite different histories of the war, e.g. 1967: Israel, The War, and the Year That Transformed the Middle East, by Tom Segev; Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East, by Michael Oren; and Warriors for Jerusalem: The Six Days that Changed the Middle East, by Donald Neff. The article quotes Rabin, Begin, Dayan and many other leaders who said they didn't think that Nasser was going to attack; that he didn't want a war; or that the war had been avoidable. Why do we have to include the theory about a "preemptive attack" in the lede? It isn't very well supported by the contents of the article or the various accounts.

"Anticipatory Self-Defense" and Other Stories by Jeanne Woods and James Donovan, 14 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 487 (2005) [8] discussed the Six Day War and said that "The on-going occupation of the territory set aside for a Palestinian State suggests the motive was a quest for land and resources." harlan (talk) 05:31, 15 July 2010 (UTC)

Harlan, many of the sources that you cite actually support the view of preemption and other sources have been taken out of context and I will soon provide a point by point rebuttal. I would do so now but my time is limited and unfortunately, you provided no hyperlinks. Rest assured that a response will be forthcoming.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 06:04, 15 July 2010 (UTC)

That was somewhat clear, although not very concise harlan. Could you maybe sum up why the attack wasn't preemptive in one or two sentences? (I don't really care about the individual scholars and sources at this point, I'm just trying to grasp the big picture.) And keep in mind that whether or not someone was planning to actually attack Israel has no bearing on whether the attack was preemptive. All that matters is whether or not Israel thought that attacking first would preempt someone else attacking them. ← George ^talk 06:19, 15 July 2010 (UTC)

George, I didn't say the attack wasn't preemptive. Right now the lede says: "Israel said it had taken preemptive action because it believed an Egyptian attack was imminent." but it cites Quigley et al. who point out that Israel officially claimed that Egypt had attacked first, then changed its story to the preemptive strike version later-on. The article says that years afterward, many of the leaders involved in the decision making process said they didn't believe that Egypt was ready to attack, or that the war was unavoidable. Wikipedia is supposed to describe all of those published views without endorsing any of them in the lede.

The article also says "Egypt denied planning to attack Israel, saying the Israeli strike was not preemptive but an unwarranted and illegal act of aggression." You say "All that matters is whether or not Israel thought that attacking first would preempt someone else attacking them.", but do not provide a published source so that that viewpoint can be included. Apparently Egypt and a number of legal authorities differ with you on that particular topic. Wikipedia NPOV policy applies to the material about the casus belli. So, all significant views have to be represented and summarized fairly without endorsing controversial positions. harlan (talk) 08:21, 15 July 2010 (UTC)

First, to be clear, I'm not a lawyer, and I'm not even aware if there is a legal difference between a preemptive attack and a non-preemptive attack from the perspective of an international court. I'm merely talking about the use of 'preemptive' as an English word that means to take action before someone else has a chance to—regardless of whether or not that action is legal, justified, or imagined.

Working off my earlier suggestion, and based on (what I believe is) agreement among the editors here that at some point Israel claimed that the action was preemptive, what about a wording like "On June 5, 1967, Israel launched what it would later describe as a preemptive attack on Egypt"? We could go into more detail later in the article, but I don't like seeing editors edit warring over this word when I think there is probably agreement that Israel eventually described the attack as preemptive. Thoughts? ← George ^talk 08:39, 15 July 2010 (UTC)

It sounds like you are attempting to construct an unsourced narrative that favors one particular point of view. Why not just say Israel attacked and go into all of this, including the subsequent claim that it was preemptive, later-on in the article? harlan (talk) 08:51, 15 July 2010 (UTC)

Actually I'm just trying to help stop a silly edit war. Towards that end, I looked at what we agree on. Some sources say the attack was preemptive, some don't. Israel said they were attacked first, then said the attack was preemptive. That's a pretty big difference, or at least you seemed to indicate that there's some big legal difference, so it should be mentioned in the lead somehow, and I haven't seen any policy based arguments for why it shouldn't be (provided that it is properly framed as Israel's description at some point after the initial attack). ← George ^talk 09:06, 15 July 2010 (UTC)

Let me make an attempt at clariyfing the issue. I think there is a risk of not seeing the forest for all the trees because of the legal jargon involved. I believe the legal debate is important, but it's not necessary to solve the impasse as far as the formulation of an NPOV lede. The facts, it seems to me, are these: stating that "Israel launched a preemptive attack" implies that there is a historical consensus that Israel thought Egypt was going to attack, and therefore struck first to preempt the Egyptian attack. This is incorrect, as there are numerous notable scholars and commentators who reject this view, arguing that Israel did not believe Egypt would strike first. To conform with WP:NPOV, the facts should be stated objectively ("Israel launched an attack" seems to me to be the most appropriate formulation in this regard) and both views should then be examined and properly sourced in the article.

The debate in these talk pages has mainly revolved around whether the view that the strike was not preemptive is WP:Fringe and thus unworthy of consideration. I think that has been conclusively proven not to be the case, by harlan among others (who is, in my opinion, probably the most well versed editor on the legal issues to take part in this discussion). But you shouldn't take my word for it; look for yourself and make your own judgement. If you agree that there is a notable view among scholars that the attack was not preemptive, then stating that it was is in violation of WP:NPOV. I think it's as simple as that. Shoplifter (talk) 09:47, 15 July 2010 (UTC)

So I follow you until the last sentence, Shoplifter, and then I think we may disagree. If the view the the attack wasn't preemptive is notable, that does not mean that describing it as preemptive violated WP:NPOV. It only means we need to either explain both sides of the subject, or work around the issue. The first of those is pretty lengthy for a lead, but I think my suggestions achieved the second. Instead of saying that the attack was preemptive as fact (as the current wording does, which may violate NPOV), my suggestion simply states that Israel claimed that the attack was preemptive later on, which is something I think we all agree on. ← George ^talk 10:13, 15 July 2010 (UTC)

Yes, I apologize for being nebulous, and I understand your point in regards to WP:NPOV. What I meant to say was, since there is a sufficiently strong view among scholars that the attack was not preemptive, using that word in describing the attack would be in violation of WP:NPOV. That's why I prefer the, in my opinion, wholly objective wording ("Israel launched an attack"). If you eye through the debate, I believe you will find that it's closer to a 50-50 than a 90-10 situation among scholars on whether or not the attack was preemptive. The discussion has been one where the camp in opposition to using the word presents sources to this effect, and the camp in favor of using the word then attempts to refute the validity of these sources. I joined the debate, not aware of this situation, but only because I was very surprised to find that the US intel assessments (stemming from public government sources), which directly contradicts Israel's claim of an Egyptian attack being imminent, was not included in the article. I then came to recognize that those in favor of using the word has mainly been making ad hominem arguments about the political views of certain scholars (specifically Norman Finkelstein and Noam Chomsky) instead of rebutting the contents of the sources. I for one believe that whether or not Finkelstein "supports Hamas", or whether or not Benny Morris favors nuclear war against Iran, is of no relevance to the actual content of their respective writings on the topic. The scholarship must stand for itself; it should be examined objectively. Even so, the fact that some editors are piling up on the alleged political views of a few individuals instead of having a serious discussion about the source material seems to me to indicate an unwillingness to face the fact that there is a notable view on the issue that is in opposition to their own. Again, this is my interpretation of the talk page debate; look through the pages and see what you will find. Shoplifter (talk) 10:39, 15 July 2010 (UTC)

I think we're more or less in agreement. The debate over the term 'preemptive' was largely mishandled, questioning the "truthiness" of the label or the politics of the sources that did or didn't use it, when all that really matters is that we can verify who does and doesn't use the term. At any rate, hopefully we're making progress in that discussion. ← George ^talk 17:37, 15 July 2010 (UTC)

George, if you have been watching then you must have seen me repeatedly simply and concisely sum up the objections to the use of the adjective, such as in the section entitled "End the debate on the use of "preemptive" and just revise it already!". See also my rebuttal to Jiujitsuguy in the above section "Rebuttal", etc.

But more to the point, I agree with you a simple revision should be acceptable to all. I've edited to simply read "Israel launched an attack on Egypt" to comply with Wikipedia's NPOV policy, as that which follows sufficiently presents both views about "preemption" in a neutral manner. However, I think your suggestion "On June 5, 1967, Israel launched what it described as a preemptive attack on Egypt" is equally appropriate, and would have no objection to this wording whatsoever.

I suggest we take a vote on this wording. I favor it.JRHammond (talk) 07:25, 15 July 2010 (UTC)

One feature that a number of sources highlight is that, at first, Israel did not describe its military operations as a preemptive attack. harlan (talk) 08:42, 15 July 2010 (UTC)

George argued: "And keep in mind that whether or not someone was planning to actually attack Israel has no bearing on whether the attack was preemptive. All that matters is whether or not Israel thought that attacking first would preempt someone else attacking them."

That is incorrect. By definition, whether an attack was or was not actually "preemptive" depends not upon this or that PERCEPTION, but upon the actual facts and the evidence from the documentary record that an attack had actually been planned that it was necessary out of self-defense to "preempt".

Merriam Webster defines the verb to "preempt" as "to prevent from happening or taking place". Well, if there was not actually going to be an attack needing to be prevented, then there is not in fact "preemption" -- inaccurate perceptions to the contrary notwithstanding.

Moreover, even if we applied this fallacious logic, it would STILL be inappropriate to describe the attack as "preemptive", since Israeli intelligence at the time assessed that it was highly unlikely Nasser would be so foolish as to launch a first strike, and as has been repeatedly observed, numerous prominent Israelis have acknowledged this fact, and the fact that the "threat" of an imminent Egyptian attack had been hyped, such as by Abba Eban in his discussions with representatives from the Johnson Administration (as I've discussed above).

There is just no legitimate reason whatsoever to assert as fact that the war was "preemptive". This is a subjective judgment, unsustainable from a documentary record that in fact indicates just the opposite, that Nasser had no intention to attack, and thus violates Wikipedia policy on NPOV and Verifiability.

George suggested this wording: "On June 5, 1967, Israel launched what it would later describe as a preemptive attack on Egypt". George has also suggested: "On June 5, 1967, Israel launched what it described as a preemptive attack on Egypt", which I endorsed. However, I prefer the former over the latter, as Israel in fact immediately, at the time, claimed the attack was self-defense, lying to the international community and falsely claiming that Egypt had struck first (Harlan has alluded to this fact). It only later acknowledged that that wasn't true and changed its story with the claim that it was "preemptive", so this suggestion of George's would be more technically accurate. I have no objection to this wording. JRHammond (talk) 09:40, 15 July 2010 (UTC)

There's nothing in the Merriam Webster definition of prempt—to prevent from happening or taking place—that disagrees with what I said. Maybe it's easier if I use an example. Let's say that you seem me walking down a hallway towards a door. You then put a blockade in front of that door, preventing me from going through it. Now, for all you know, maybe I never intended to go through that door (you can't read my mind, nor see the future), but your belief was that I was heading for the door, so from your perspective the blockade was preemptive. And you would consider it preemptive regardless of if I had a legal right to go through the door or not. Now, let's say that despite the fact that I was walking in the direction of your door, I never actually intended to go through, and had planned on turning down another hallway all along. From my perspective, your blockade wasn't preemptive, because I knew my plans ahead of time and wouldn't consider your blockade as preventing me from going where I want to go, but you would still consider it preemptive because you didn't know my plans in advance, and were just going on what you observed me doing. Does that make sense?

Regarding the specific wordings, I'm waiting to see Jiujitsu's take on my suggestions, but thanks for being open to compromise. ← George ^talk 10:05, 15 July 2010 (UTC)

George, I'm in no way making a "compromise" by agreeing to your suggestion. ;) Since we are in agreement on a suggested revision, I might end it there, but I think it's important to clarify this issue over the definition of "preemption". The adjective comes from the verb "preempt", which I gave the definition for. You're argument is that it doesn't matter whether Egypt was really intending to attack, it only matters what Israeli perception was. But if Egypt was NOT really going to attack, it doesn't matter what Israel's perception was -- the attack was not, in fact, "preemptive". If there's nothing to prevent, there's no actual preemption. This is a rather basic logical fact, and not really debatable. In your analogy, you actually demonstrate the point, including caveats like (emphasis added), "...you would CONSIDER it preemptive...", "FROM MY PERSPECTIVE...", and "you would CONSIDER it preemptive". This goes to the whole point I've been making all along, which is that it is a subjective judgment. As such, stating it as FACT is a blatant violation of Wikipedia's NPOV policy. But we agree on a solution, so let's just go with that and move forward with it and get others on board so this "debate" can end. JRHammond (talk) 13:58, 15 July 2010 (UTC)

Yes, I think we're in agreement, and I used the perspective caveats quite intentionally. I concur that stating that the attack was preemptive as fact isn't a good idea (unless both sides are laid out), but describing it as the Israeli perspective is neutral and accurate, without taking any sides. Hopefully Jiujitsuguy agrees. ← George ^talk 17:22, 15 July 2010 (UTC)

The vast majority of mainstream sources agree that it was a preemptive attack. This is not a subjective Israeli view but an objective viewpoint by those who have studied the subject. By way of example, suppose I said "On December 7, 1941 the Japanese navy initiated an attack against Pearl Harbor that the U.S. described as a sneak attack." That would be wrong because it makes it seem as though this is an exclusively American position when in fact, it is almost a unanimous position. Let me illustrate with another example. Suppose I said "in 1939 German forces invaded Poland in an attack termed by Poland as an act of aggression." This would also be misleading as it is again, almost universally acknowledged that the German attack on Poland was an act of aggression. You will always find a few marginal, loose ends who will argue differently just as you'll find people who think that the United States was complicit in Sept 11 attacks. My point is the consensus of mainstream sources and the bulk of scholarly opinion concur that the attack of 1967 was preemptive and in fact, it is the most cited example of preemption. Harlan took many of his cited sources out of context and I am in the midst of preparing a thorough rebuttal. In fact, many of his sources support the view of preemption but he carefully avoided hyperlinks to frustrate ease of corroboration.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 18:05, 15 July 2010 (UTC)

Jiujitsuguy, you continue to restate your position without addressing the facts and arguments presented from the other side. You continually parrot that "The vast majority of mainstream sources agree that it was a preemptive attack", falsely implying that the view it was not so is a marginal one -- it is not -- and that the documentary record sustains the "preemptive" claim -- it does not.

You repeat yourself, but have yet to reasonably address the fact that both U.S. and Israeli intelligence assessed that Egypt would not attack, that Begin, Rabin, Oren, et al have acknowledged this unlikelihood, that Israeli first claimed Egypt had struck first only to acknowledge this was a lie and revise their claim to the "preemptive" one (which is actually the only "revisionist" account here), and so on. I rebutted your rebuttal point by point above, yet instead of addressing the facts and logic of my argument, you simply revert to repeating this same old tired line. This is wearying and inappropriate.

In 2002-3, the vast majority of mainstream sources claimed that Iraq had WMD. Yet I and others were pointing out that there was no EVIDENCE to support this CLAIM. The fact that most sources may claim something does not make it true. I would hope editors at Wikipedia would be able to scrutinize more carefully than this absurd standard allows for. How many times does the mainstream media need to fail the public and reveal its propagandist nature before people wake up and start questioning things and examining the evidence for themselves? Should Wikipedia simply parrot propaganda, or should it seek to be objective and present all viewpoints in a neutral and fair manner? Clearly, Wikipedia NPOV policy demands the latter. Why do you reject the NPOV standard? What is the problem with having this sentence read neutrally, rather than asserting either the one or the other side as absolute fact? There is no legitimate reason whatsoever to reject a neutral wording.

The issue here is not how many people make this claim vs. how many people make that claim. The issue here is the EVIDENCE. What evidence do those who claim "preemption" present to support that claim? Well, we've been over the evidence at length on this page, and the majority of editors agree this claim needs to be presented AS SUCH, rather than as a proven fact, to comply with NPOV and Verifiability.

You're own arguments consist primarily of two logical fallacies: appeal to authority and ad hominem. When you've been presented with sources contradicting your claim the attack was "preemptive", you have repeatedly responded not by demonstrating any errors in fact or logic on the part of those sources, but instead by employing ad hominem arguments. Such dishonest rhetorical devices have no place either in a serious discussion of historical facts or on a Wikipedia Talk page. Nor do they do anything to substantiate your claims or support your viewpoint. You'll have to actually address the facts presented and the logical syllogisms employed by those you disagree with if you want to present a convincing argument. JRHammond (talk) 03:35, 16 July 2010 (UTC)

"preemptive attack" needs to be qualified

In the third paragraph of this article, it states "On June 5, 1967, Israel launched a preemptive attack on Egypt." There is a reference to a footnote that contains many quotes from a wide variety of sources characterizing the Israeli attack by the adjective "preemptive". This is a subjective use of the adjective, and a qualification of it as such should be inserted into the article, particularly given that the following sentence states that "The Arab countries denied planning to attack Israel and asserted that Israel's strike was not preemptive but an unwarranted and illegal act of aggression" (emphasis added).

A reasonable alteration of the text of this article would read:

"On June 5, 1967 Israel launched an attack on Egypt it claims was an act of preemption against an imminent military threat from Egypt."

JRHammond (talk) 07:57, 31 January 2010 (UTC)

I agree, this would be better wording. Go ahead and change.BorisG (talk) 08:13, 31 January 2010 (UTC)

Pre-emption should be judged on the objective facts not subjective statements. It is a fact that Egypt closed the Tiran Straits, thus closing the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping. It is a fact that Egypt massed 100,000 or more soldiers on Israel's border. It is a fact that Egypt expelled U.N. Peacekeepers from Sinai thus depriving Israel of an important buffer. It is a fact that Syria and Jordan mobilized their respective armies and were joined by contingents from Iraq, among other Arab countries. It is a fact that anti-Israeli war rhetoric reached a fever pitch in Arab capitals just prior to commencement of hostilities. Judging by objective facts and not by revisionist post-war interviews, it is clear that the Arabs were bent on war. Therefore, the term pre-emption or "pre-emptive attack" is not only more appropriate, it is more accurate. Respectfully,--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 19:11, 5 February 2010 (UTC)

I have no doubts Arabs prepared for war. However I disagree with the statement "Pre-emption should be judged on the objective facts not subjective statements". In my dictionary, pre-emption is about motivation for the attack, and therefore is inherently subjective. Alas, maybe the very fact that it is inherently subjective means that the wording 'launched a pre-emptive attack' is ok, because all it means is that Israelis meant it as pre-emptive.BorisG (talk) 07:35, 7 February 2010 (UTC)

For an attack to be "preemptive", there must have been an imminent threat of attack from Egypt. But no imminent attack is evidenced, as acknowledged by two former Israeli prime ministers, Yitzhak Rabin and Menachem Begin, both of whom acknowledged that Nasser had not intended to actually initiate a first strike against Israel.

To say Israel's attack was "preemptive" is itself subjective. And I agree 100%, as I already indicated, that the use of this adjective to describe Israel's attack should therefore, for that very reason, be eliminated.

To address each evidence given that the attack was "preemptive":

1) Israel's closing of the straits was not a military attack. Israel's attack did not "preempt" the closing of the straits. So this example is totally irrelevant. Whether or not this action justified Israel's attack is also an irrelevant question for our purposes here. Even if we assume this justified Israel's attack, it doesn't make Israel's attack "preemptive".

2) Egyptian troop movements don't prove intent. A very persuasive argument can be made that Egypt's positioning was defensive, an argument supported by Rabin and Begin (as noted above), who both acknowledge that Nasser never intended a first strike. Both U.S. and Israeli intelligence prior to the war also assessed that it was unlikely Nasser would actually strike first. Israel had already attacked Samu. Israel was planning an attack on Syria and had already attempted to provoke Syrian belligerency in the Golan Heights, and Israeli leaders were making similarly belligerent remarks as Nasser had. Israel also moved troops to the border.

So by this same reasoning, had Egypt actually launched the first military attack, it was have been an act of "preemption". Unless we can accept that this was the case, the logic must be rejected.

3) There are numerous alternative explanations for the belligerent nature of Egyptian officals' statements, including attempting to deter an Israeli attack through rhetorical exaggeration of the Egyptian force of arms. As both U.S. and Israeli intelligence assessed prior to the war, Nasser wasn't going to attack -- but even if he did, Israel would win the war in two weeks. If Israel attacked first, it could win in one week, such was the great superiority of its arms.

Judging by the objective facts can only lead to the conclusion that the use of the adjective "preemptive" to describe the Israeli attack is a subjective one, and therefore inappropriate for a Wikipedia entry.--JRHammond (talk) 10:24, 10 February 2010 (UTC)

As for alternative explanations for Egypt's bellicose talk, it doesn't negate the fact that such talk reached a crescendo and as Michael Oren points out, carried with it a momentum from which there was no return. In addition, your analyses curiously omits the expulsion of U.N. peacekeepers from Sinai. What was Israel to discern from that move? Also, your claim that Israel was massing forces along the Syrian border is false. As Zeev Schiff and others well-regarded in the field note, this was a false Soviet claim designed to further ignite Arab (particularly Egyptian) passions and put them into a frenzy.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 17:51, 12 February 2010 (UTC)

"1) Israel's closing of the straits": I think you mean Egypt here? If so, could you please repair it? If so, you can delete my notice here.Mpvdm (talk) 14:16, 24 May 2010 (UTC)

The bottom line here is that there is no evidence Israel was under imminent threat of attack by Egypt. That is an interpretation of facts, not a fact itself. As a matter for debate, the use of the adjective "preemptive" here is subjective and should have a caveat included or be removed.JRHammond (talk) 10:58, 27 February 2010 (UTC)

We will never know if Nasser planned to attack first, or was just bluffing. But his behaviour was sufficiently threatening and aggressive for the Israelis to take the chance of an Egyptian attack seriously. The Israelis thus launched an attack to pre-empt the attack by the Egyptians. Thus the attack was preemptive. BorisG (talk) 16:06, 27 February 2010 (UTC)

"We will never know if Nasser planned to attack first . . . Thus the attack was preemptive." I think that pretty much speaks for itself. Your argument is a non sequitur. An attack is "preemptive" if it is an action taken against a real imminent threat. It is not "preemptive" if it is an action taken against only a perceived threat. The fact that you acknowledge whether Egypt actually presented an imminent threat or not is debatable is all anyone need to recognize that the use of the word "preemptive" is subjective, and thus should be removed or qualified.JRHammond (talk) 16:01, 29 March 2010 (UTC)

Interestingly, in 1973, when informed (rather late) of an imminent attack by Egypt and Syria, the Israeli government considered a pre-emptive attack, but decided against it, fearing international outcry. This resulted in heavy loss of life. I am sure if they launched a pre-emptive attack, we would have a similar debate over the nature of that attack.BorisG (talk) 16:06, 27 February 2010 (UTC)

Irrelevant.JRHammond (talk) 16:01, 29 March 2010 (UTC)

I'd note in addition the difference between a "preemptive" and a "preventive" attack. One could argue that Israel's attack on Egypt was "preventive". That at least might be debatable. But to say it was "preemptive", there's absolutely no evidence to support. To say it's "subjective" is actually a serious understatement, but it being subjective is enough that this needs to be revised on Wikipedia.JRHammond (talk) 16:01, 29 March 2010 (UTC)

It is obvious that the phrase "Israel launched a preemptive attack" is POV, and therefore out of place in Wikipedia. Paul kuiper NL (talk) 02:52, 1 May 2010 (UTC)

I agree (that presenting the Israeli attack as objectively preemptive is an indefensibly subjective value judgment, at least according to what seems to be the current state of historical scholarship on the set of events); it doesn't belong in its present form.Historian932 (talk) 01:10, 18 May 2010 (UTC)

"Pre-emptive" is a later formulation. The Israeli government maintained originally that Egypt had attacked Israel. You will still find this version in many books. Ian Pitchford (talk) 09:05, 18 May 2010 (UTC)

I disagree with those who argue that the Israeli attack was not "preemptive". They are attempting to impose their subjective view that the threat was not imminent enough to be called "preemptive." By JR Hammond's definition, there could be no such thing as a preemptive strike, because you can never know for sure if an attack is imminent until it starts to happen. The question is not whether an attack was actually imminent, but whether the person engaged in a the "preemptive" strike (in this case the Israelis) could reasonably have feared that one was imminent. My dictionary defines "preemptive" as "taken as a measure against something possible, anticipated, or feared; preventive; deterrent." By that definition, the Israeli attack objectively qualifies. The Egyptians had blockaded the Straights of Tiran, expelled the UN peacekeepers, and massed troops and tanks on the border. An Egyptian attack was certainly possible, very likely feared, and the Israeli first strike prevented any such attack from happening. The word is used correctly. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 167.102.231.183 (talk) 16:26, 18 May 2010 (UTC)

Your argument defeats itself, inasmuch as you acknowledge that the use of the adjective "preemptive" is subjective. You say arguing that the adj. should not be used as a factual assertion is "to impose their subjective view that the threat was not imminent enough to be called 'preemptive.'" But that's the whole point. Your imposing your subjective view that the threat was imminent enough to be called 'preemptive'. It's subjective. That's why it needs to be removed or a caveat included. 118.160.21.65 (talk) 02:14, 5 July 2010 (UTC)

According to a substantial body of mainstream historical opinion Israel did NOT believe Egypt was going to attack. It's therefore wrong for the article to baldly state that it was a pre-emptive strike; it should reflect the disagreement. The current formulation reflects badly on Wikipedia's reputation, especially on such an important and sensitive issue. 82.12.113.64 (talk) 17:35, 24 May 2010 (UTC)

Both U.S. and Israeli intelligence assessed that Egypt -- inasmuch as doing so would be suicidal -- would not attack. So even if one argues that for Israel to have perceived an 'imminent threat' (as opposed to there actually being such a threat) is enough for the use of "preemptive" as a factual assertion (which is a patently absurd argument to begin with), one can observe that it is still problematic. For neutrality, accuracy, and fairness, this needs to be removed or a caveat included. 118.160.21.65 (talk) 02:14, 5 July 2010 (UTC)

if history is the best judge of events, then let us see what happened in 1973 (the Yom Kippur War). israel was warned by America and other large powers NOT to initiate a pre-emptive strike. and so it did not. Egypt crossed the canal (Suez), started the war, and caught Israel waiting for instructions. the troops in the front line deployment were not ready for battle. israel lost many soldiers in the war, and many soldiers were taken prisoner. It was Ariel Sharon who turned the tide with his tank corps. in view of the utmost importance to air supremacy, israel took out the Egyptian airforce, thus enabling its groundforces to advance beyond israel's borders, a tactic that was imperative to protect its civilians. considering the above, clearly, had israel not taken out the enemy airforce on the ground, the result would have been catrastophical for the jewish state. therefore, the term "pre-emptive (defensive) strike" should stand, and not be subject to historiography. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 84.109.218.215 (talk) 18:57, 8 June 2010 (UTC)

Your comments are totally irrelevant to the discussion. 118.160.21.65 (talk) 02:14, 5 July 2010 (UTC)

As expressed by "popular" opinion, (majority of comments made on talkpage), the word preemptive itself is subjective. Even Bush claimed "preemptive" war against Iraq, which still had to develop technology, building nuclear and biological weapons, and also the missiles to deploy them, before making any attack. In 1967, we only know that the two sides were both hostile to each other, and went to war as a show of strength. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Atif.hussain (talk • contribs) 04:45, 9 June 2010 (UTC)

JRHammond, I think that those comments are directly related to the discussion. --Shuki (talk) 22:41, 14 July 2010 (UTC)

Shuki, please explain how events that occurred in 1973 are relevant for deciding whether an attack in 1967 was "preemptive" or not. On their face, your comments are irrelevant.JRHammond (talk) 06:22, 15 July 2010 (UTC)

There are more than enough reliable sources to name it as it was -preemptive strike against five well armed armies/countries. --Gilisa (talk) 21:19, 15 July 2010 (UTC)

Many sources claim it was "preemptive" -- yet what is the evidence for this? The evidence has been extensively discussed on this page, and is not strong enough to state as absolute fact that Egypt was planning to attack Israel and would have had Israel not attacked Egypt first -- on the contrary, the documentary record does not support the "preemptive" claim at all. JRHammond (talk) 13:19, 16 July 2010 (UTC)

Because, d'uh, very similar events were happening leading up to October1973, and Israel had the opportunity to launch a 2nd preemptive attack, but refrained. Not my opinion, but that of the vast majority of sources. And telling everyone their comments are irrelevant is quite not collaborative, and merely makes it seem that you are avoiding something. --Shuki (talk) 21:45, 15 July 2010 (UTC)

Shuki, I should hardly need to point out to you that events that occurred in 1973 have no bearing on whether or not an attack in 1967 was "preemptive". Duh! JRHammond (talk) 13:19, 16 July 2010 (UTC)

"Preemptive" edit war

• Good Granny, can you folks stop with the lame edit warring already? Just say "Some sources describe it as preemptive" and list the sources. Crap. This is lame. • Ling.Nut 14:09, 15 July 2010 (UTC)

Who do you mean by "you folks"? The only people who would argue with your suggested solution are those who insist that the war should be described as fact as "preemptive", such as Jiujitsuguy, who continually undoes my edit to make the paragraph read precisely along the lines you suggest and in compliance with Wikipedia's NPOV. Comments such as this don't help me to ensure that a reasonable solution remains implemented, without people like Jiujitsuguy undoing it to read in a biased manner. If you have something actually helpful to say, by all means, let's hear it. JRHammond (talk) 15:12, 15 July 2010 (UTC)

Ling.Nut is right. The edit war needs to stop. It just leads to bad feelings and heated discussions. I suggest noone edit the contested sentence until consensus has been reached, even if it means that the wrong version will stay for a while. --Frederico1234 (talk) 17:12, 15 July 2010 (UTC)

The vast majority of sources report that it was a pre-emptive war. If JRHammond wants to include the minority claim that it was not pre-emptive, I don't think anyone is preventing him. --Shuki (talk) 17:35, 15 July 2010 (UTC)

Frederico1234, your suggestion is absurd. Clearly, the only appropriate thing to do is to edit it to read in a neutral manner, neither asserting the one view nor the other as fact. Why should the lack of a consensus mean it should remain biased towards one side? If we cannot make it read neutrally (which is all anyone is asking for) without a consensus that the attack was not preemptive, why should it be allowed to remain stating stating as fact that it was preemptive without a consensus? You're applying an unfair and unequal standard that is totally absurd and inappropriate. Given the lack of consensus, I will continue to edit the page as necessary to ensure that it reads neutrally, in compliance with Wikipedia policy. JRHammond (talk) 03:49, 16 July 2010 (UTC)

Shuki, you should familiarize yourself with the discussion before giving us your opinion, so as not to make comments that are irrelevant. Nobody is arguing that here. That is not the issue (perhaps since the article already includes both views). You really should make at least some kind of effort to know what the point of the discussion actually is before trying to insert your two cents. Just a polite suggestion. JRHammond (talk) 03:49, 16 July 2010 (UTC)

IP 24.23.193.232 undid edit by Sanguinalis, which was done by the latter to make the sentence comply with WP:NPOV. In doing so, IP 24.23.193.232 commented "it is the majority viewpoint". Yet 24.23.193.232 included no caveat expressing that this was indeed a "viewpoint", as just acknowledged, as opposed to a fact. I thus undid the undoing by 24.23.193.232 so as to correct this blatant violation of WP:NPOV. JRHammond (talk) 04:54, 16 July 2010 (UTC)

24.23.193.232 offered a fairly reasonable alternative. Would prefer he/she discussed edit prior to making change. Edit was made to: "On June 5, 1967, Israel launched what was widely described as a preemptive attack on Egypt." I revised this slightly to: "On June 5, 1967, Israel launched what is widely described as a 'preemptive' attack on Egypt." Reason being this was not Israel's initial claim (they initially claimed -- falsely -- that Egypt had attacked first, so they responded in self-defense). Only after this pretext fell apart did they acknowledge Egypt had not attacked, and then they revised their claim to the claim of "preemption". Moreover, it's also more accurate to use the present tense since this is true today. Quotation marks around "preemptive" help emphasize this is a viewpoint and to show this is the term used in the works cited. JRHammond (talk) 08:04, 16 July 2010 (UTC)

I've rejigged the intro slightly - if we're going to say the attack is "widely described" as preemptive, then we have to add that the description is also widely disputed. I've also removed the line about Nasser's "war rhetoric and military posturing", which - in the way it was used - made it seem that Wikipedia was casting doubt on the truthfulness of his statement. Phersu (talk) 16:04, 16 July 2010 (UTC)

The page has been protected due to edit warring. The first sentence of the third paragraph currently reads:

On June 5, 1967, Israel launched what it subsequently described as a preemptive attack on Egypt.

I am content with that and would like others to weigh in whether they are also content with it or would like to see it changed and, if so, how and why. I'm sure we can all be reasonable and arrive at a reasonable solution without further edit warring.

Additionally, I have added some further information to that paragraph, specifically:

Initially, Israel falsely claimed at the U.N. Security Council that the Israeli attack had been in response to an attack by "Egyptian land and air forces".[31] Israel subsequently claimed it had taken preemptive action because it believed an Egyptian attack was imminent[24], despite the fact that its own intelligence assessment was that, given Israel's military superiority, such an attack was highly unlikely; an assessment shared by the U.S. intelligence community.[32]

If anyone has any objections to this, please state your reasons and discuss. I inserted this twice now, as Jiujitsuguy undid it the first time I inserted this. Yet he offered no legitimate reason for deleting this, such as that it contained factual errors. Please see the footnotes (31 and 32 are mine). You will all find that what I've written here is perfectly factual. So I don't see any reasons for objections, but if anyone has any, please air them so we can discuss in the interim, while the page is under protection from editing. JRHammond (talk) 01:33, 17 July 2010 (UTC)

A new problem is that the footnotes for the current phrasing does not reflect its content. The article says that Israel subsequently described the attack as preemptive, but the references in footnotes 25-30 reflects the view that it was, as is often said in those particular sources, "a clear case of preemption". I'm not suggesting to remove those sources from the article (although, as explained by Sanguinalis, the Walzer essay should probably not be included), but they are not corroborating the statement as it is currently formulated, and should therefore be noted somewhere else. Shoplifter (talk) 02:39, 17 July 2010 (UTC)

Yes, such issues are being discussed in the "Footnotes Mess" section. My immediate purpose here in this section is to preempt (pun intended) any further edit warring in the third paragraph. If anyone has any objections to the above portions of the article, please state them here. You have an opportunity to state your case now while the article is protected. Remaining silent now only to revert the text without discussion or explanation once the ban is lifted would be totally inappropriate, and contrary to Wikipedia guidelines. JRHammond (talk) 10:55, 17 July 2010 (UTC)

The footnotes mess

The long lists of sources cited in the "Israel launched" and "Egypt denied" sentences of the intro, while they contain many valuable references, have gotten out of hand and need to be broken up and distributed in different parts of the article. Specifically, we need to separate sources that purport to be factual narratives (like the BBC and Encarta articles) from sources that are clearly statements of opinion (like the Richard K. Betts essay). The latter should go in a different section of the article, one devoted to the debate since the war about its causes and legal basis. Also, everyone involved with this article should know that multiple sources for a single assertion can be stacked in a single footnote. There is no reason to have 7 footnotes on one sentence. And clearly argumentative essays, like the one by the philosopher Michael Walzer, should not be used to buttress a statement of fact that is not explicitly describing that opinion.

Ideally, the sentence about Egypt's position on how the war broke out should be supported only be statements from representatives of the Egyptian government itself. (The same goes for the other Arab countries, and Israel for that matter.) The collection of quotes from Mearsheimer, Walt, Quigley, Shlaim, and Chomsky, and the Rabin and Dayan quotations, these are important references, I'm glad people have found them, they belong somewhere in the article - but they are not themselves statements of the "Arab view". On the other hand, the statement from the Egypt State Information Service website is appropriate here, and I have added statements made by Egypt's representative to the UN Security Council on the day the war broke out. (By the way, the same UNSC document contains the false statement from Gideon Rafael that Israel was being attacked by Egypt.) The Security Council debates of June 1967 are an excellent source of information for what the "Arab" and "Israeli" points of view were at the time. The UNISPAL archive is a bit of a pain to deal with, but I encourage everyone to explore it as there is a lot there that can fill what's been a long-standing gap in this article. Sanguinalis (talk) 03:17, 16 July 2010 (UTC)

Good suggestions. On Egypt's own position from its own officials' position, this might be helpful:

"The President of Egypt, then known as the United Arab Republic (UAR), Gamal Abdel Nasser, later conveyed to U.S. President Lyndon Johnson that his troop buildup in the Sinai Peninsula prior to the war had been to defend against a feared Israeli attack.

"In a meeting with Nasser, Johnson's special envoy to the UAR, Robert B. Anderson, expressed U.S. puzzlement over why he had massed troops in the Sinai, to which Nasser replied, '"Whether you believe it or not, we were in fear of an attack from Israel. We had been informed that the Israelis were massing troops on the Syrian border with the idea of first attacking Syria, there they did not expect to meet great resistance, and then commence their attack on the UAR.'"

"Anderson then told Nasser 'that it was unfortunate the UAR had believed such reports, which were simply not in accordance with the facts', to which Nasser responded that his information had come from reliable sources (presumably referring to intelligence information passed along by the USSR).

" Nasser added that 'your own State Department called in my Ambassador to the U.S. in April or May and warned him that there were rumors that there might be a conflict between Israel and the UAR.'"

That's from an article of mine in the Palestine Chronicle: http://palestinechronicle.com/view_article_details.php?id=16105. The source is here: http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d500. The quotes from Nasser would seem appropriate, if someone wants to add them.

UNISPAL is a good suggested source. I've used it extensively. I've also been going through the State Departments Foreign Relations of the United States archives:

* http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v18

* http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19

* http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v20 —Preceding unsigned comment added by JRHammond (talk • contribs) 04:07, 16 July 2010 (UTC)

Yes, good suggestions. I've reflected upon the foonote mess myself, that's one of the reasons why I floated the idea of having an article devoted solely to the preemption debate. Perhaps it would be sufficient to add another subsection when dicussing the differing viewpoints, but there's quite a wealth of material to take into consideration. Shoplifter (talk) 08:08, 16 July 2010 (UTC)

I was about to clean up the refs, and had actually deleted one that was never cited in the body text, when I noticed the section was titled "Further reading". Me personally, I'd call the first section "Notes", put all full references in a second section called "References" and then put uncited books in a third called "Further reading". But y'all do whatever you like. Restore the Cristol ref if you prefer your current scheme... • Ling.Nut 18:18, 16 July 2010 (UTC)

I've just noticed, setting aside the interpretative disagreements, the article is in need of proof reading. There's aplenty of grammatic inconsistencies (such as they way dates are written). The writing of the footnotes could do with some revived stringency also. Shoplifter (talk) 03:07, 17 July 2010 (UTC)

Copy editing, footnotes, etc. Truce on the edit war, for this?

hey. I'll be happy to help with copy editing, footnotes, etc., whenever I have time (which unfortunately I seldom do, but I'll have some tomorrow)... Is the edit war only about the yes/no on the "preemptive" question? If so, can we get everyone to call a truce and work out your differences here on Talk (or on a new article, as suggested elsewhere, that only deals with that specific issue)? Thanks • Ling.Nut 14:10, 17 July 2010 (UTC)

Most of us have already worked it out -- quite some time ago, actually. It's long been decided by a majority of editors that the claim requires qualification, rather than being stated as fact. There's just one or two people (Jiujitsuguy) who disagree with the majority of editors and continually reverted the article back to the way it was so that it reads in violation of WP:NPOV. I don't know what procedures exist to prevent editors from edit warring like that, but that's the only remaining problem. JRHammond (talk) 05:26, 18 July 2010 (UTC)

UNEF, Occupation of DMZs, Combat Operations inside Jordan and Syria

The material from the Secretary-General's report to the Security Council regarding UNEF has been removed from the article on a number of occasions:

An unclassified report to the Security Council from the Secretary General of the United Nations, S/7906, 26 May 1967,[9] explained:

6. It may be relevant to note here that UNEF functioned exclusively on the United Arab Republic side of the Line in a zone from which the armed forces of the United Arab Republic had voluntarily stayed away for over ten years. It was this arrangement which allowed UNEF to function as a buffer and as a restraint on infiltration. When this arrangement lapsed United Arab Republic troops moved up to the Line as they had every right to do.

7. If UNEF had been deployed on both sides of the Line as originally envisaged in pursuance of the General Assembly resolution, its buffer function would not necessarily have ended. However, its presence on the Israel side of the Line has never been permitted. The fact that UNEF was not stationed on the Israel side of the Line was a recognition of the unquestioned sovereign right of Israel to withhold its consent for the stationing of the Force. The acquiescence in the request of the United Arab Republic for the withdrawal of the Force after ten and a half years on United Arab Republic soil was likewise a recognition of the sovereign authority of the United Arab Republic. In no official document relating to UNEF has there been any suggestion of a limitation of this sovereign authority'.... ...'President Nasser and Foreign Minister Riad assured me that the United Arab Republic would not initiate offensive action against Israel. Their general aim, as stated to me, was for a return to the conditions prevailing prior to 1956 and to full observance by both parties of the provisions of the General Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel.'

Occupation of the DMZ's and Combat Operations in Jordan and Syria

• Michael B. Oren's Six Days of War describes the catalysts that started the war (page 33 & etc.). His narrative begins with the massive raid that crossed the West Bank border in order to attack Samua. He says that it was the largest Israeli strike force that had been assembled since the 1956 war, and that it backfired. In the aftermath Palestinians rioted and called for King Hussein's overthrow; the UN condemned the raid and threatened to take action to prevent a repetition; and the US administration was appalled the Israel had destroyed its relationship with the only Arab leader with whom it enjoyed a modus vivendi.[10]
• The Government of Israel Yearbook 5728 (1967-68) starts its narrative of the Six Day War with a summary of events from 1966. It covers the 13 November raid on Samua and the condemnation of that raid by the UN Security Council. See for example page 7 [11]
• The British Cabinet published the declassified "Conclusion" it had reached at a meeting held on the 23rd of May, 1967. It said that "the present critical situation in the Middle East had developed from retaliatory action undertaken by Israel in Jordan because of terrorist [Al Fatah] attacks from both Jordan and Syria." See UK National Archives, CAB/128/42 (formerly CC (67) 31) [12]
• The FRUS reflects the fact that Special Assistants to President Johnson, Komer and Rostow, both blamed Israel for destabilizing the Jordanian government and putting it in an untenable position because of the raid on Samua. [13]
• Israel had complained about border clashes (which are mentioned in the lede). But, the FRUS and the Yearbook of the United Nations mention that Egypt and Syria had complained about the occupation by Israel of the DMZs and the liquidation of the rights of the indigenous Arab cultivators. Israel continued to cross the border to conduct strikes that killed Jordanians. Jordan and the Mixed Armistice Commission condemned Israeli authorities for crossing the Armistice Demarcation Line into the Latrun no-man's land and for ploughing areas situated in Jordan and in no-man's land in April of 1967 long after the Samua raid. See for example paragrapgh 2 of the introduction and etc. [14]
• Tom Segev's "1967" says Eshkol's Aide-de-Camp, General Yisrael Lior, wrote about the 7 April dogfight over Damascus saying "From my point of view, the Six Day War had begun. see 1967, page 212.

The occupation of the DMZs and the major combat operations conducted deep inside Syrian and Jordanian territory are not mentioned in the lede. Many reliable sources say they were the spark that ignited the war. harlan (talk) 14:43, 20 July 2010 (UTC)

Agree. It's a major oversight not to include any mention of Samu in the lede. Israel's mobilization is mentioned, but it states it was a response to the Egyptian buildup in Sinai. I'd like verification of the sources given. They're not online references, so I personally have no way to verify those. Perhaps if someone is near a library this might be possible? Or, alternatively, I would suggest further sources be given for this assertion. After all, the military buildup for Samu was described by Oren as "the largest Israeli strike force assembled since the 1956 war" (p. 33). So, again, I agree 100% it is a grievous oversight for the lede not to mention these very relevant facts. JRHammond (talk) 15:18, 20 July 2010 (UTC)

I've added links to Oren's Six Days of War at Google books and a link to a copy of the CAB Conclusion.

I'm probably stupid for getting involved in this conversation, but color me stupid. I have no horse in this race. With all due respect to those who lost their lives etc (and I mean that), I don't give a flying darn whether one POV or the other is correct... Eh, I'm not gonna jump to all the various threads; I'll just say here 1) I agree that Samu absolutely must be in lead 2) I have thoughts about the preemptive issue, but can't be arsed to expose myself to the resulting flames. Let's just say I strongly support an article that does NOT grant Wikipedia an editorial voice on the issue. Collect your BEST sources (the current artillery barrage approach is unwieldy and unprofessional, IMHO) and present sources that take both positions. Done. • Ling.Nut 15:34, 20 July 2010 (UTC)

editprotected

• {{editprotected}} Hi. We've had a number of new threads in a short time; I apologize for this newest. It's a little warm in here. Harlan said, "That sounds like you've been privately planning a replacement page during the period of sysop-imposed editing restrictions.". Yep, that's EXACTLY what I've done, see User:Ling.Nut/Sandbox. There are a very, very, very large number of changes. However, the changes are 99.99% copy editing. I fixed a very large number of broken links. I fixed a very large number of refs (and am nowhere near finished). Etc. I added exactly one phrase of content. Please, please consider adding my changes BEFORE changing anything else. If you guys start edit warring the moment.. the block is lifted, adding my changes will be a huge headache. I;m asking that my page in user space be moved en masse to the article, then replace all fair-use images and all templates etc...• Ling.Nut 16:14, 20 July 2010 (UTC)

• Looks like an unassailable benefaction to me. Great work. What is the one line of content that you added? Shoplifter (talk) 16:57, 20 July 2010 (UTC)

• "and later came to the conclusion that the genesis of the cable was Rabin's indecisive state of mind.". It's from the source, but if it is a deal-breaker then it can be rmvd. • Ling.Nut 17:04, 20 July 2010 (UTC)

Agreed. I, for one, won't make any edits until you've implemented your replacement. Hope others will also agree. Thanks for the hard work. JRHammond (talk) 01:33, 21 July 2010 (UTC)

This sounds rude, which isn't my intention, but is there any reason this can;t wait for the 20-odd hours left of the protection? At least that would allow more time for feedback on the changes. HJ Mitchell | Penny for your thoughts? 01:41, 21 July 2010 (UTC)

Under all normal circumstances, you would be correct, and I wouldn't even bother to EditProtect. But in this case we have edit warriors camped out over their keyboards, waiting to make massive changes. Etc. • Ling.Nut 02:14, 21 July 2010 (UTC)

Which still doesn't convince me that this change needs to be made through full protection. Also, if things are as extreme as you say they are, surely "your" version wouldn't "survive", for want of a better phrasing, once the protection expires? I'm going to bed now, so feel free to put the template back up- I'm sure if another admin gets to it before I return (which is far from guaranteed, I'm afraid), I trust they'll do what they think is best. HJ Mitchell | Penny for your thoughts? 03:35, 21 July 2010 (UTC)

But HJ Mitchell, Ling Nut's changes are, as already pointed out, not in substance, but format. I see no reason why the single place where a substantive change was made should constitute cause to not comply with Ling Nut's most reasonable request, and surely everybody can agree that the fixes to the format, including cleaning up the messiness of the footnotes, is a very positive development. Ling Nut is to be supported in this endeavor and congratulated for the hard work. Why the resistance? I see no reason for it. JRHammond (talk) 05:21, 21 July 2010 (UTC)

Let's just wait. I hereby give ANYONE permission to copy/paste my entire workpage to article space, if I'm not online. The only thing you'll need to remember is to replace all the fair use images (you can see which ones are missing here), and replace any templates that I removed from the top of the article. I don't think anything else is missing. Cheers! • Ling.Nut 07:35, 21 July 2010 (UTC)

It looks very good. Since I'm leaving for vacation, I once again want to point out the importance to any and all editors that other articles dicussing the attack must be changed to comport with the consensus reached. I've noted a few instances of these above, the central one being the Preemptive war article which is linked in the lead. Shoplifter (talk) 05:55, 22 July 2010 (UTC)

"Occupied Government House" starkly conflicting accounts

• Our account states that Jordainian forces occupied the Government House. However, in this source:

The United Nations Information System on the Question of Palestine (UNISPAL). 1347 Security Council MEETING : 5 June 1967. Provisional agenda.

... we have two statements. The first affirms the "occupied" account, but a footnote explicitly and reliably refutes it:

<large section of text snipped>

...Letter dated 29 May 1967 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/7910)

<large section of text snipped>

...United Nations Headquarters lost radio contact with UNTSO headquarters in Jerusalem at 0852 hours New York time, at which time Jordanian troops occupied Government House1/. This also means that United Nations Headquarters has lost direct contact with headquarters UNEF, whose messages are routed through UNTSO.

<large section of text snipped>

Footnote:

1/ In the interest of historical accuracy, it is to be noted that the report that Jordanian troops had "occupied" Government House was originally based on incomplete information owing to a communicaitons [sic] breakdown caused by the events in the Government House area. On the basis of a review of events and a checking with the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, it was later determined that the actual facts as regards the reported entry of Jordanian troops into Government House on 5 June 1967 were as follows: at approximately 1445 hours local time, three Jordanian soldiers entered Government House over the protest of UNTSO, but were persuaded by UNTSO staff to leave the building after about ten minutes.

• • Ling.Nut 07:03, 22 July 2010 (UTC)

Good observation and addition to the article. JRHammond (talk) 08:41, 22 July 2010 (UTC)

• This is a case where Odd Bull's book would be extremely useful... I have no access to it. • Ling.Nut 08:48, 22 July 2010 (UTC)

Mediation case

I just want to apprise everyone involved in this discussion that there now is a mediation case on the issue over at Wikipedia:Mediation Cabal/Cases/2010-07-11/Six-Day War

I wasn't the one who submitted it, and I didn't notice it until now. It seems that the support lent so far is somewhat sparse. I hope it will be helpful towards a resolution. Shoplifter (talk) 22:43, 15 July 2010 (UTC)

I submitted it. So far, it has not been helpful. I hope that situation changes. I don't know what is so difficult about just setting aside biases and having the article read neutrally, neither asserting the one view nor the other as absolute fact. I continue to fail to see any legitimate reason whatsoever that this article should not be made to comply with NPOV. Wikipedia policy demands it. I submitted it in the hopes that editors might help to ensure it remains neutral, but I've found no indication that those who replied have any interest in ensuring NPOV policy is adhered to in this case. JRHammond (talk) 03:54, 16 July 2010 (UTC)

I think your recent additions are wise, and a very good way to solve the dispute. The lead now recognizes that there is an extensive use of the word "preemptive" in works describing the attack, while at the same time underlining the (undisputed) circumstances which contradicts Israel's claim of preemption. I, personally, have reservations about the word "widely" being used to describe the proliferation of the term, as I think the record shows a more moderate scholarly distribution. Nonetheless, for the purpose of successful mediation, I think this is fair resolution. I have, however, one remaining objection to the current lead: there is a significant value judgement made in saying that Nasser was using "war rhetoric" (which was not mentioned earlier in the lead, and thus confuses the reader) and that his actions were seen as "military posturing". As noted in footnote 24, “... all US intelligence... had characterized Nasser's troops in the Sinai as "defensive in nature". Whether or not this was the case should be investigated in the article, but the current phrasing pre-empts such a discussion by the use of unusourced terminology. Basically, it says that Nasser was the aggressor, without qualification. This could easily be changed to read more neutrally, as in "while Nasser had amassed troops along the border, and made <insert comments as an example of rhetoric representative of what was said>, Egypt denied planning...". This seems to me to be the WP:NPOV way to do it. Your thoughts? Shoplifter (talk) 15:42, 16 July 2010 (UTC)

Agree. Although it seems someone has already edit out the "war rhetoric" bit. JRHammond (talk) 01:18, 17 July 2010 (UTC)

As the edit-warring behavior of a few editors continues, I've resubmitted for moderation, in order that Wikipedia policy may be enforced: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Mediation_Cabal/Cases/2010-07-25/Six-Day_War. JRHammond (talk) 08:11, 25 July 2010 (UTC)

intro

After all our discussions and much good and detailed work by editors, I see that we're now back to people reverting to earlier, less neutral versions of the intro. Please discuss proposed changes and seek consensus before making controversial changes to the article. Phersu (talk) 13:32, 23 July 2010 (UTC)

By "people" I see you mean Jiujitsuguy. I don't know the procedure, but it's high time we got together and made sure punitive action is taken against Jiujitsuguy if he continues this behavior. JRHammond (talk) 15:09, 23 July 2010 (UTC)

As I've mentioned before, I am looking into the issue. I will avoid sudden changes to the article, though I think it needs nontrivial changes. • Ling.Nut 06:32, 24 July 2010 (UTC)

I'm mostly interested in sports and tried to steer clear of the IP area because I have a life and have no intereset in getting dragged into the mud with petty disputes over symantics. But i've been watching this back and forth argument and I gotta say that the third para of lead, under JRHammond's version is now pretty biased and unencyclopedic and it also reads poorly, Eric--Ericsmeer (talk) 03:35, 25 July 2010 (UTC)

<rant>Flagged revisions now.</rant> I'm working on the article, but not posting to Wikipedia yet. • Ling.Nut 04:01, 25 July 2010 (UTC)

Ericsmeer, I reverted your changes as there is no consensus for them. Regarding the sentence "On June 5, 1967, Israel launched what is widely described as a preemptive attack on Egypt", please see the discussion here. Regarding the footnotes, please see this discussion. --Frederico1234 (talk) 06:31, 25 July 2010 (UTC)

Ericsmeer, you speak of "consensus", so let me fill you in: There is agreement among a majority of editors that asserting one POV with regard to Israel's attack being "preemptive" as fact violates WP:NPOV. So this majority of editors have agreed that both views should be presented, with Wikipedia not endorsing either. So your explanation that you reverted it because there is no "consensus" is fallacious. One simply need to observe the fact that there is no consensus that the article should endorse the pro-Israeli POV -- quite the contrary -- in order to demonstrate your error, and to illustrate your double-standard. JRHammond (talk) 08:01, 25 July 2010 (UTC)

There is no consensus to delete the fact that it is widely described as a preventive strike. This is well established as it is amply stated by numerous international authoritative sources. Your biased version argues in the lede with this popular view of long standing. This is quite inappropriate for Wikipedia's rules and standards and in no way enjoys the support of editors.

As a matter of fact, as reported in the New York Times, Nasser said in his resignation speech during the war: "Early in May, our friends in the Soviet Union delivered intelligence information of a calculated intention by Israel to invade Syria. Acting on this information, we mobilized our forces in Sinai. But then on May 26 he added the Soviet Ambassador in Cairo at 3:30 AM delivered an urgent message from the Soviet government strongly requesting that the UAR not open an attack." Do you think that Kosygin was concerned over Israel's security? He was rather troubled that Nasser was gaining prestige and creating internal difficulties that would force the pro-Soviet Syrian government to rejoin the UAR. 79.177.97.225 (talk) 06:12, 26 July 2010 (UTC)

You just acknowledged it is a "popular view". That's quite right. It's a "view", not a fact. Therefore, stating it as fact blatantly violates WP:NPOV. If you have objections, state your objections here first and seek consensus or majority support for changes, as per WP:TALK and the guidelines for resolving disputes such as with the edit warring on 3rd para. JRHammond (talk) 17:41, 26 July 2010 (UTC)

effects on US-Israel relationship

There should be something on the war's effects on the US-Israel relationship. Before 1967, the U.S. did support Israel in some ways, but the support was still kind of at arms length -- and the U.S. government was especially careful to avoid any appearance of a direct US-Israel military alliance. The war changed all that, and the previous U.S. reluctance to be seen to be too close to Israel vanished. Also, the general American opinion of the Arabs in "front-line" states declined precipitously, since the contrast between their grandiose bombastic bloodthirsty threats before the war (about how they would easily and effortlessly throw the Jews into the sea etc. etc.) and their overall rather pathetic combat performance during the war was not considered too impressive... AnonMoos (talk) 11:47, 26 July 2010 (UTC)

Of course the impact on the US relationship will be in there somewhere... eventually... thanks... • Ling.Nut 19:42, 26 July 2010 (UTC)

Following on the above suggestion, I would add that Johnson's renewal of arms shipments to Israel and some of the Arab states and the reasons for that decision should be discussed. JRHammond (talk) 08:13, 27 July 2010 (UTC)

Lameness

I see that the metaphor wars are continuing. That's unfortunate given the amount of effort people are clearly making on the talk page and elsewhere to improve the article, hammer out issues etc. Maybe the article needs protection again, I don't know, but what I will say is "On June 5, 1967, the powder keg exploded when "....we're not having powder kegs surely ?

Also, this may have been discussed and I missed it but is the Reiter quote below used in Note 4 the best there is from that paper ? It's intriguing as a quote but I want to know more. I don't have access to the entire article.

• "While he and I agree that World War I and the Six Day War are preemptive, we code six cases differently." Reiter, Dan. "Exploding the Powder Keg Myth: Preemptive Wars Almost Never Happen", International Security, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Autumn, 1995), pp. 5–34.

I mention it because in the same paper he also says the following which expands on it a bit and seems clearer. He may have said even more elsewhere. I can't tell.

• "Of all interstate wars since 1816, only three are preemptive: World War I, Chinese intervention in the Korean War, and the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Moreover, these cases indicate that the conditions hypothesized to lead to preemptive war, especially beliefs in the military advantages of attacking first and hostile images of the adversary, are associated with the occurrence of preemptive war only when they are present to a very high degree and when the attacker also has other motives for war.

Sean.hoyland - talk 13:01, 26 July 2010 (UTC)

• I'll look at Reiter... though perhaps eventually... Thanks! • Ling.Nut 19:45, 26 July 2010 (UTC)

My preliminary rewrite of the WP:LEAD is in my userspace

• My preliminary rewrite of the WP:LEAD is temporarily in my userspace at User:Ling.Nut/Sandbox. My main complaint with the current lead is that it.. really.. doesn't offer a bird's eye view; it gets way, way too bogged down in the minutiae of the "preemptive" debate from the very beginning. Those of us who are not preoccupied with whether or not the war was preemptive (I say that with sincerest apologies to all who hold strong personal beliefs on the subject, and sincerely ask your forgiveness if I have offended anyone) exit the lead feeling.. baffled by the sound and fury, and disappointed by the lack of clear summary.

Please do note:

1. As I said, it's preliminary. It ain't finished. For example, I need to tack on a reference or three (e.g., the bit about "preemptive" and "preventative" and "inadvertent" needs cites... I have them, just haven't finished yet...). Maybe other stuff too.
2. However, it's already kinda long. In theory there are still many more things that could be mentioned, but I'm reluctant to add any more info.
3. The whole "preemptive" issue is deferred until a later point in the article's body. Speaking frankly, I think much of the article needs to be rewritten.
4. This preliminary version severely disturbs the references in the article, creating a parade of red "cite error" warnings at the very bottom of the page. I left them unfixed. If people agree to copy this version to the article, it will also involve fixing many broken references.
5. Note the new image and caption in the infobox. That image of the soldiers by the wall will still be effective elsewhere in the article.

• That's all. Your input solicited.
• Mostly approve, as proposing editor. Forgive me for saying so, but it's much closer to the spirit of WP:LEAD than the current version. • Ling.Nut 18:56, 25 July 2010 (UTC)

Comment you are talking about Israeli warning about closing the Straits of Tiran, but you never mentioned it was closed. That's why this text should be added to the lead:

"In May 1967 President Nasser ordered the UN peacekeeping forces out of the Sinai Peninsula, including the Suez Canal area. Despite Israeli objections in the United Nations, the peacekeepers were withdrawn and the Egyptian army took up positions on the Israeli border, closing the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping. These actions were key factors in the Israeli decision to launch a pre-emptive attack on Egypt in June 1967, and to capture the Sinai Peninsula to the Suez Canal." --Mbz1 (talk) 19:15, 25 July 2010 (UTC)

• Oops.. I was doing that while you were doing this. Look again. Thanks... oh the text you want added is too long and forms conclusions about causation. Conclusions are for the body text... if at all.. • Ling.Nut 19:23, 25 July 2010 (UTC)

OK. How about taking the word "hawkish" out of description of Moshe Dayan.--Mbz1 (talk) 19:27, 25 July 2010 (UTC)

In order to shorten the lead, we could drop the mention of Moshe Dayan altogether. Others may disagree, but I don't see the appointment of Dayan as that critical for neither the eruption nor the outcome of the war. Regarding the decision to go to war, there were simply other hawks in the Israeli government either way (not to mention the pressure from the generals). As for his impact on the outcome of the war —as an example— he ordered the IDF to avoid capturing the Gaza Strip and the Suez canal, but the IDF did so anyway. --Frederico1234 (talk) 19:55, 25 July 2010 (UTC)

Mostly approve I think the choice to defer the preemtion-issue to the body of the text is a wise one. The issue is difficult to treat in a WP:NPOV manner, and additionally we really need to cut down on the length of the lead. The length is probably the biggest issue right now. --Frederico1234 (talk) 20:35, 25 July 2010 (UTC)

I've had a second look at your sandbox. Some suggestions about how to reduce the length of the lead:

• Possibly remove the Samu incident or mention it very briefly.
• The claim that Israel was "hoping for a resolution without war" is dubious and should be removed. There were various voices in the Israeli government, some hoping to avoid the war, some pressing for immediate action and then some arguing for first acquiring the green light from Washington before making the attack.
• Drop "purely" in the sentence that say that Israel made "purely defensive military adjustments", as it is disputable.

Other suggestions:

• Move the sentence "Israel officially stated in 1957 that it would consider any miltary act closing the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping as a justification for war" down so it immediately precedes the related sentence "Between 18 and 20 May Israel repeated to the leading maritime powers, including France and Britain, its statement that it considered any closing of the Straits as cassus [sic] belli."

And an addition:

• Extend the sentence "On 14 May Nasser sent the first of what was to be a steady stream of Egyptian soldiers into the Sinai Peninsula" by stating that Nasser most probably believed (erroneously) that an Israeli attack on Syria was imminent. I believe this is pretty important in order to understand his subsequent actions.--Frederico1234 (talk) 23:37, 25 July 2010 (UTC)

• IMO the statement like this one "These factors, along with "the sacred history of the terrain on which it was fought" and "the failure of the international order to bring about what Arabs considered a just solution to the conflict", are cited by militant groups and scholars alike as a significant spur to the growth of Islamism in the Arab world" should be confirmed with much more than one offline source. Otherwise I mostly approve the new lead.--Mbz1 (talk) 15:03, 29 July 2010 (UTC)
• That's three "Mostly Approves", if you count mine, or two if you don't. Thanks. I will of course track down more refs, in time... • Ling.Nut 15:21, 29 July 2010 (UTC)