Talk:Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons/Archive 2

Archive 1

Archive 2

Archive 3

dual-use technology

In most contexts, dual-use technology means technology that has both civil and military applications. In the nuclear arena it has a different meaning. "Nuclear technology" refers to technology that has only nuclear applications, like reactors and uranium enrichment centrifuges. Nuclear-related dual-use technology refers to technology that has both nuclear and non-nuclear applications, such as zirconium (which can be used for nuclear fuel cladding or other purposes) and spin-forming machines (for making tubes such as centrifuge rotors). The Nuclear Suppliers Group has developed export control guidelines for both nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use goods. NPguy (talk) 03:29, 29 February 2008 (UTC)

Dates of violation

However, Iraq was cited by the IAEA and sanctioned by the UN Security Council for violating its NPT safeguards obligations; North Korea never came into compliance with its NPT safeguards agreement and was cited repeatedly for these violations,[6] and later withdrew from the NPT and tested a nuclear device; Iran violated its NPT safeguards obligations by pursuing a clandestine enrichment program for nearly two decades;[7][8] and Libya pursued a clandestine nuclear weapons program before abandoning it in December 2003.

Could someone please specify the different violation dates ? I'd like to know basically if the Islamic Republic of Iran has violated the treaty or if the Shah only did with the help of Europeans).

I also think that including countries, like the US, that violated the treaty by helping other countries to get access to nuclear weapons would be a good idea (article I). 217.70.191.95 (talk) —Preceding comment was added at 13:06, 14 April 2008 (UTC)

Iraq was found in non-compliance with its NPT safeguards agreement with the IAEA in 1991; North Korea in 1993, 1994 and 2003; Libya in 2004; Iran in 2005. These are technically not findings of non-compliance with the NPT, but they are tantamount to Article III violations. There is no formal international mechanism for drawing non-compliance conclusions about other parts of the NPT, and no country has been found in violation of Article I. There have been accusations that nuclear sharing arrangements within NATO violate Article I, but this is not a widely held view. Aside from that I don't believe there are any serious allegations of Article I violations by the United States or anyone else, though the State Department non-compliance report has relevant information on China. NPguy (talk) 01:45, 15 April 2008 (UTC)

Iran

I rewrote the opening paragraph which seemed oddly phrased, as well as not very encyclopedic;

Iran has signed the NPT, but as of 2006 is under suspicion from the United States of having violated the treaty through an active program to develop nuclear weapons. The International Atomic Energy Agency is investigating. Iran says it merely wants to develop nuclear energy. However, several European states, including the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, share the United States' suspicions about Iran's nuclear intentions, particularly after a series of statements by recently-elected President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who has declared that Israel should be "wiped off the map."

I hope my replacement para reads a bit better. I also sourced the Ahmadinejad quote, which is a little different.Felix-felix 13:02, 11 March 2006 (UTC)

I don't know; you reverted mine to something that was even more POV. Saying Iran is developing for civilian use is POV, especially when the normally Iran-friendly EU accuses them of developing for weapons and few countries try to defend Iran from this accusation (although some try to defend Iran from the consequences of its actions). I think it's fairer to say that Iran is developing nuclear technology, which it says is for power and which US/EU says are for weapons, along with why the US/EU makes this accusation (the rejected Russian offer, the technology used, statements of leaders on nuclear technology, the surplus of energy sources [oil]). (These reasons can of course be countered by Iran's refutations regarding them.) Likewise, saying that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad commented "about the state of Israel" is misleading and incomplete; there should instead be some indication of the most accurate translation of the statement in question. Someone should also probably add that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's statements are consistent with Iran's position on Israel, and not just some off-the-cuff blurb. If my language is too POV for your taste, it would be good of you to put the same facts in your own. I know it can't be Iran and weapons of mass destruction, but it should at least give a feel for what the concerns are. Calbaer 20:34, 25 August 2006 (UTC)

Sorry, I don't agree. The Iranians have declared that they are developing uranium enrichment for their civilian nuclear power program. No-one disbelieves this, but some have accused Iran of developing this to ALSO develop a nuclear weapons facility. Thus the edit that I reverted to is more accurate and factual and NPOV.It also adresses the fact that uranium enrichment is expressly allowed under the terms of the NPT, and that no evidence of a weapons program has been provided by the US or the UN.The sentence about Ahmadinejad's famously misquoted comment has not only been wikified (by you)to the appropriate article but also linked (by me) to an external newspiece about the different translations from the original Farsi,I think that this is sufficient. I don't really know what you mean by Iran's position on Israel-Iran has never threatened Israel militarily, nor indeed engaged in any aggressive military operations beyond it's own borders.You will notice that I changed your inclusion of the Russian offer of low grade uranium to make it less POV also.Felix-felix 12:48, 27 August 2006 (UTC)

I understand what you're saying. I am worried, however, that, as is, saying that the development of nuclear technology is for peaceful purposes may leave the impression that it is primarily or only for peaceful purposes. Anyway, I reworked some of the language in a way that hopefully addresses my concerns while not upsetting yours. Calbaer 17:44, 28 August 2006 (UTC)

I've removed 'was found highly enriched uranium, enriched beyond what is nessecary for nuclear power' which needs to be cited (if you're suggesting substantial amounts have been found, rather than microscopic traces)and replaced with 'have found no evidence of a nuclear weapons program'Felix-felix 14:47, 18 September 2006 (UTC)

-->"Iran remains under investigation by the International Atomic Energy Agency, which claims it has found solid evidence [14] of a nuclear weapons program". This is just wrong. The first incident in 2003 was verified by the IAEA to be highly enriched residue left over from before Iran acquired equipment from Pakistan. More recently, in late 2006, the IAEA has again found high enriched traces, and Iran has simply refused to answer from where these came from. The IAEA has never, however, claimed that this is "solid evidence" of a weapons program. According to Seymour Hersh's November 20, 2006 New Yorker article, even internal CIA reports have concluded that there is NO evidence of any sophisticated Iranian nuclear weapons program.

I've deleted the para on the non disclosure of Natanz-the citation is from a partisan non-primary source.Iran has not violated the NPT, and no-one has offered any evidence that it has.Felix-felix 07:29, 9 February 2007 (UTC)

Then read the NPT yourself. Keep reverting this and I'll call for arbitration. Take a little time and do a google search of "iran violated article III of the non-proliferation treaty", then read a few of the links. Let's see you demonstrate that all of those sources are wrong felix. Iran is a signatory to the NPT (fact), iran did not disclose their uranium enrichment (fact), iran was required under the NPT to have done so (fact - read the NPT). Here's a quote from http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/rm/32290.htm "It is clear now that for 18 years, while portraying itself as in full compliance with the NPT, Iran violated safeguards, engaged in deception and denial, and conducted undeclared, clandestine experiments in all sensitive aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle. Iran’s pattern of deception and denial continued even after the commencement of investigations by the IAEA; we believe it continues to this day. Iran grudgingly admits to facets of its sprawling secret nuclear program only when confronted with evidence that disproves its previous denials. In at least one instance, it delayed an inspection until it could “sanitize” the facility in order to conceal evidence of its unsafeguarded enrichment activities from the IAEA. Last year I spoke based on U.S. information. This year the IAEA has confirmed these facts."

Here's a quote from from lawyers from http://www.lcnp.org/disarmament/AU2006IranRemarks.htm "Based on Iran’s failure to declare nuclear activities and facilities over an extended period, the resolution made a finding of non-compliance in the “context of Article XII.C.”"

And finally, here's a quote from our state department, who are recognized professionals in this issue, NOT biased and therefore to be ignored http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/ask/60062.htm

"Stephen Rademaker: Terry, I'd be happy to answer that. Iran claims there is no "legal basis" for the IAEA Board to report Iran's safeguards noncompliance to the UN Security Council, and no evidence that they have violated the NPT. Iran is incorrect. The IAEA's nine written reports on Iran -- which are all available at the IAEA's website, and I encourage everyone to read them carefully -- document a two-decade history of Iran hiding sensitive nuclear work from the IAEA, work like uranium enrichment and plutonium separation, all of which it was legally obliged to report to the IAEA. But rather than report such work to the IAEA, Iran tried to hide it systematically for 20 years. The IAEA reported this in 2003 to the IAEA's Board of Governors, which last September adopted a resolution confirming that Iran was thus in noncompliance with its NPT safeguards obligations. The IAEA Statute is very clear that in such a situation where the Board is faced with such noncompliance, the Board is required to report that noncompliance to the UN Security Council. So there is actually a statutory obligation to report Iran to the UN Security Council, which we hope the Board tomorrow or Saturday will finally meet. That same safeguards noncompliance is also a clear violation of Article III of the NPT, which obliges non-nuclear weapons states members of the NPT to put their nuclear programs under IAEA safeguards. Iran clearly did not. The international community firmly agrees that Iran's long record of safeguards noncompliance violates Article III. The U.S. and many other countries also believe that there is enough evidence of Iran's nuclear weaponization efforts to conclude that Iran has also violated Article II of the NPT, an Article I mentioned a little bit earlier in response to L.D.'s question."

Of course, the 2005 declaration of non-compliance of the safeguards agreement for the civilian enrichment program. I've clarified and added a primary source citation. My bad.FelixFelix ^talk 09:33, 12 February 2007 (UTC)

Again, the IAEA ruling was that Iran was in non compliance with Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute, NOT the NPT -the two are different and can be see here: http://www.iaea.org/About/statute_text.html#A1.2 and here: http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/npt/text/npt2.htm That second quote is really quite misleading: there isn't an Article XII.C of the NPT as it only has 11 Articles.The second source also states that 'The IAEA states that it is not yet in a position to determine the presence or absence of additional undeclared nuclear materials or activities. The Iranian failure to declare various activities violated the Safeguards Agreement. But there is no finding of non-compliance in the sense of diversion of nuclear materials.'

While the third source cited alleges that Iran's violation of Article XII.C of the IAEA statute constitutes a violation of Article III of the NPT it does not cite the IAEA making this ruling (and the IAEA is the competent body here).To allege that Iran has violated the NPT, one must provide such a ruling from the competent body -the IAEA. State Department opinion is not sufficient since, while they may be experts, they are not competent (in the legal sense).All the IAEA has ruled, is that Iran was in non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement and that this constituted non-compliance in the context of Article II.C of the IAEA Statute -not the NPT.I have clarified this in the article.FelixFelix ^talk 10:48, 12 February 2007 (UTC)

Article III of the NPT requires Iran, as a non-nuclear weapon state party to the Treaty, to accept IAEA safeguards on "all [nuclear] fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere." In November 2003, IAEA Director General ElBaradei reported that "Iran has failed in a number of instances over an extended period of time to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement." This included "Failure on many occasions to co-operate to facilitate the implementation of safeguards, through concealment [emphasis added]" http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-75.pdf The facts to support a conclusion that Iran had deliberately violated its safeguards obligations were clear at that time. The delay between the reporting of those facts and the noncompliance finding by the IAEA Board of Governors in September 2005 was entirely political - to give time to the diplomatic initiative of France, Germany and the UK.

The IAEA is not formally charged with determining NPT compliance, so the fact that it has not done so is irrelevant. The parties to the treaty have that responsibility. For its part, the United States has concluded that Iran violated not only Article III (safeguards) but also Article II (by seeking and receiving assistance in its enrichment program) http://www.state.gov/t/vci/rls/rpt/51977.htm#chapter6. The United States concluded that the because the enrichment program was deliberately concealed and because it could not be justified by the requirements of Iran's nuclear power program, it must be part of a program to develop a nuclear weapons capability. Others may not share this conclusion about Article II, but few dispute the conclusion that Iran deliberately violated Article III for nearly two decades.

By the way, the IAEA did not find that Iran had violated Article XII.C of the Statute. Rather, acting under that Article, the Board found that Iran had violated its safeguards agreement (without citing any specific article of the safeguards agreement). NPguy 18:00, 10 March 2007 (UTC)

---

I Think it should be mentioned that the US and Iran had a nuclear weapons cooperation until 1979. MIT had an exchange program with Iranian engineers to train them in the use of nuclear technology. It was US policy that Iran have nuclear weapons - as long as they were friendly to the US. As kissinger himself has stated.

---

The above, unsigned comment gets a few things wrong. In the 1970s the U.S. and Shah-ruled Iran did not cooperate on nuclear weapons, but rather on civilian nuclear energy. In the mid-1970s, the Ford Administration was working to facilitate the sale of American-origin reactor and reprocessing sales to the Shah's government. But in October 1976, President Ford announced a major change in American nuclear policy, which, among many other things, suspending U.S. exports of enrichment and reprocessing technology. Ford's policy statement effectively stopped America's sale of reprocessing to the Shah's government. Although the Carter Administration made Ford's indefinitely extended Ford's suspension of U.S enrichment and reprocessing exports, Carter reportedly back-pedaled on this suspension and offered to allow the export of reprocessing technology to the Shah. The 1979 Islamic Revolution and the emergence Islamic Republic of Iran, though, led to the termination of any and all U.S.-Iranian nuclear cooperation. 71.166.165.144 21:56, 24 April 2007 (UTC)

For those arguing that Iran violated the NPT and putting that POV unchallenged into the article, I hope you are just as determined to incorporate the equally justified POV that the US has repeated violated the NPT, and the Bush administration is actively pursuing a violation of the NPT by passing nuclear technology to at least one non-NPT nation, India. And Bush has not acted to sanction Pakistan which certainly engaged in nuclear poliferation, but instead has provided aid to those who must have supported nuclear proliferation in some fashion. Mulp (talk) 16:08, 5 August 2008 (UTC)

The article does not say that Iran violated the NPT, but that it violated its NPT safeguards agreement. That's not POV but a fact, determined by the IAEA Board of Governors, the authoritative body in such matters. It's tantamount to an NPT violation, but there is no effecttive mechanism for adjudicating such claims.

By contrast, U.S. nuclear cooperation with India does not violate the NPT so long as it is done in accordance with the NPT, in particular the obligations in Article I not in any way to assist or encourage India to acquire nuclear weapons and in Article III.2 to require safeguards on nuclear exports to India. Please do not take this as a defense of the U.S.-India deal - which I think is a disaster: It undermines the NPT, but does not violate it. NPguy (talk) 03:23, 6 August 2008 (UTC)

Map requested

If someone has map making ability could make a map showing signatories, non-signatories, and former signatories, that would be awesome! —ScouterSig 19:24, 16 January 2008 (UTC)

The map at Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone shows this and more information... a NNPT signatories map would only show Israel, India, Pakistan, and possibly North Korea. --JWB (talk) 23:57, 16 January 2008 (UTC)

I created an NPT map, added it to the main page, and also created an article for list of signatories.--Allstar86 (talk) 23:35, 26 July 2008 (UTC)

Nations and Nuclear weapons	Parties to the non-proliferation treaty	Non NPT
NW states	5	4
NW-free zones	In force      Ratified      Signed
Non-NWS non-NWFZ	Ally of NWS (nuclear umbrella)      Suspected development      Other

What is the difference between ratification and accession? Does it carry any meaningful difference in treaty restrictions and obligations?

On the other hand, there is a huge difference between NPT NWS and non-NWS, and the map doesn't show that at all.

So far, it still seems to me that the NWFZ map (to right) would be better. --JWB (talk) 02:54, 27 July 2008 (UTC)

Some questions about your map Image:NPT Participation.svg: Are you considering Puerto Rico as part of the USA and Falklands as part of UK? And are there any gray areas other than those and Western Sahara? (or non-green areas other than those, NK, Israel, India, Pakistan, Taiwan, and ocean?) Actually, Western Sahara is under the control of Morocco which is a signatory, so there is a case for making it green as well. --JWB (talk) 03:13, 27 July 2008 (UTC)

Several comments:

• The new pabe should be called "Parties to the NPT," not "signatories. It is a list of countries that have not merely signed but have become legally bound by the treaty. This is an important terminological correction.

• There is no meaningful distinction between ratification and accession. Ratification refers to states that became Parties at the time the treaty entered into force (in 1970). Accession refers to states that did so afterwards.

• I recommend deleting the section on non-recognized states. This seems to refer only to Taiwan. I recommend adding an annotation that, while Taiwan has not undertaken any legal obligation not to acquire nuclear weapons, it has placed its nuclear program under comprehensive IAEA safeguards and is subject to the measures of the Additional Protocol, in order to verify that that its nuclear program is entirely for peaceful purposes.

• Responding to the question about Puerto Rico and the Falklands, they are territories of nuclear weapon states in the zone of the Treaty of Tlatelolco - the nuclear weapon free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean. I think there are also French territories in the Caribbean with the same status. I'm not sure how they should be represented on the map - they aren't states. NPguy (talk) 03:52, 27 July 2008 (UTC)

In reply to JWB: Thanks for all your questions and comments.

Ratification and accession carry no difference in treaty restrictions and obligations; I included it only to note those who signed onto it originally and those who acceded/succeeded to it later.

I agree there is a large difference between NPT NWS and non-NWS, but am not sure how, if at all, this could best be incorporated into the map. If you have some suggestions, please let me know.

While I think the NWFZ map that you authored is great, I don't think it's appropriate as the principal map for this article. Your map is perfect for an article on Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, where it appears, as it notes all the NWFZs in force, but this map is on the NPT alone, so with respect, I think a map entirely based on the NPT serves the article a bit better.

I did not color in Puerto Rico or the Falklands, nor any other territories besides Greenland (for Denmark) and New Caledonia (for France), only because I thought these were the only territories that are of any size that would actually show up on the map. The only gray area "(or non-green areas other than those, NK, Israel, India, Pakistan, Taiwan, and ocean)" other than Western Sahara are those small territories, and Palestine, which is another unrecognized state. Western Sahara is partially under the control of Morocco, but for Western Sahara as a whole, it is disputed so I think, much like the larger UN map, it should not be included. As to all the smaller territories, I'm not actually sure if it is appropriate to color them all. I assume the NPT applies to states' territories, but haven't actually seen a source for it. NPGuy noted that he wasn't sure how best to put these territories on the map as well, and I agree. Please let me know of any suggestions. Best, --Allstar86 (talk) 07:06, 28 July 2008 (UTC)

In reply to NPGuy:

I moved the list to "parties" as you suggested. See Talk:List of parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

While a bit awkward to have an entire section for just one state (much as it is for North Korea), I am not sure how best to replace the section. Taiwan did sign and ratify the treaty, and I think it's appropriate to note it in the same format. I didn't realize that Taiwan has no legal obligation not to acquire nuclear weapon. Was this implicit when it was kicked out of the UN? or when PRC China signed on the NPT or what? I don't know, so by all means let me know. And the article should certainly be corrected as appropriate. I put the "unrecognized state, abiding by treaty" as the key to Taiwan on the map, but if this is inaccurate, it should be changed too. Best, --Allstar86 (talk) 07:06, 28 July 2008 (UTC)

I've further altered the caption to a table so that the map is equally clear and suitable for NWFZ, NPT, and NWS. Let me know what you think and what else needs improvement.

Some links: Military of Puerto_Rico#Nuclear weapons in Puerto Rico, Britain took nuclear arms to Falklands War

Western Sahara is entirely under the control of Morocco; Mauritania controlled the southern part for only a couple of years. Moroccan control is indeed still disputed, particularly by the African Union where the WS government in exile is a member and Morocco withdrew, however since Morocco considers WS to have always been Moroccan territory, it is certainly applying the Moroccan adherence to NPT there. Maybe "disputed but applied" would be more accurate than "not a party".

Did Taiwan actually become a party to the treaty and if so was it formally kicked out? More detail on this would be interesting. If both ROC and PRC claim all Chinese territory or at least both claim Taiwan, and both agreed to NPT, one could make the case that it is territory of an NPT party in either case. --JWB (talk) 17:45, 28 July 2008 (UTC)

JWB--

Regarding your map, I just fixed the legend colors in the caption to match the colors in the map. Regardless of the caption, though, I don't think it's appropriate as the principal map for this article for the reason I already stated, but perhaps it could be included further down when discussing the NPT within the broader context of nuclear weapons law and NWFZs, though. As to recommendations for it, I think "Non-NWS non-NWFZ" and the other various acronyms get very confusing and the full information should be included where it can fit. As this map contains 8 colors, fitting it into a neat table may not be easy.

Thanks for the Puerto Rico and Falklands links. I think though, it is still a mystery (at least to me) as to how the NPT explicitly deals with states' territories and how it should be dealt with on the map. What do you think?

It is my understanding from reading the article, that Western Sahara is NOT entirely controlled by Morocco. 2/3 of it is, but 1/3 is controlled by the Polisario Front's Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. I think generally in the cases of disputed territories like this, it is general practice to not include it as a party in the map.

Taiwan indeed became a party to the treaty and ratified it. I don't know what happened to it after PRC China entered the UN and Taiwan was kicked out. I am hoping NPguy may be able to answer this question. I think its noted status as an unrecognized state (in the eyes of the UN and the NPT parties), but that it is nevertheless abiding by the treaty describes the issue reasonably well. As NPguy wrote in the list article, "Taiwan is not recognized as a sovereign state, but has accepted comprehensive IAEA safeguards and the measures of the Additional Protocol to verify that its nuclear program is entirely peaceful."

Best, --Allstar86 (talk) 01:17, 29 July 2008 (UTC)

Criticism

The newly added section on criticism of the NPT fails to meet wikipedia content standards. It is biased and generally lacks citations. Where references are cited, they either do not support the stated conclusion or they present opinion as fact. It is legitimate to criticize the treaty as discriminatory, but the double standard argument about Israel is incoherent. To cite NAM criticism that the NWS have made no tangible efforts on disarmament flies in the face of the major arms reductions since the end of the Cold War. Maybe it's not enough, but it's surely tangible. And the citation on Iran says that Iran cancelled the Bushehr project, not Iran's foreign suppliers. There's an italiziced quote: "basically they did whatever they wanted to do before the introduction of NPT and then devised it to prevent others from doing what they had themselves been doing before" without a reference. So I'm reverting again but I'm open to adding something more balanced. NPguy (talk) 01:01, 8 July 2008 (UTC)

The additional references do not support the assertions any more than the previous ones did. The only claim that seems substantiated is that France helped Israel's nuclear program in the 1960s, long before the NPT entered into force and even longer before France joined the treaty. NPguy (talk) 01:35, 9 July 2008 (UTC)

The sources satisfactorily confirm that some NWSs (UK and France) were engaged in acts of proliferation (to Israel) before introduction of the NPT, that german and European firms withdrew or refused to further coooperate in competion of Iranian project and that's part of what the Critisicm says. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Ivantheterrible1234 (talk • contribs) 15:02, 9 July 2008 (UTC)

The references support one assertion: that before the NPT went into force France and the UK supported Israel's nuclear program in ways that they could not have done under the NPT. How this is a criticism of the Treaty is beyond me. They do not support the claim that suppliers broke off commitments to support Iran. Rather, they state that Iran broke off the contracts and, many years later, those same suppliers refused to restart work. Again, how this is a criticism of the NPT remains a mystery.

The assertions about failures of disarmament remain unsupported, and the bias and lack of balance remains blatant.

There may be valid criticisms embedded in what you're saying, but simply reposting the same junk is not constructive. NPguy (talk) 02:21, 10 July 2008 (UTC)

Ivan, you may have some valid point to make here, but you are currently just edit warring. Admittedly, I think some of the deletions made by NPguy are debatable, but simply reverting them without explanation in the history or on the talk page doesn't help anyone. Not surprisingly, what really upset me was your reversion of my edits, which I was very careful about. One of them was simply a deletion of a statement that predicted the future, you have no excuse to revert that. Another was a deletion of a paragraph violating WP:OR. You tell me if this is objective writing:

Another case of a practiced double standard, is the demand by certain states for the complete cessation and dismantlement of the Iranian enrichment program. This would constitute to another double standard in a treaty already based on double standards, which may ridiculously be called triple standards!

Additionally, that statement is followed by a dependent clause presented as a sentence, so its deletion could be justified on the grounds of grammar. The first edit I made was, again, correcting grammar. You reverted that too. I will work with you if you want something specifically to be included, but that section was a mess for several reasons, and it needed to be gutted. AzureFury (talk) 15:55, 28 July 2008 (UTC)

AzureFury, soryy that reversions have upset you. These were not indeed mine, as I am a programmer and have written several bots specifically for wikipedia to watch my contributions (I am not sure if this violates Wikipedia rules). NPGuy kept removing Criticism so I set one of my bots on the NPT article to revert deletions. I found some of your edits justified but others, in my view, render the Criticism section entirely irrelevent and redundant. As for the above statement, of course permenantly depriving a signatory to NPT from its right to supervised and controlled enrichment, based on its political disposition, constitutes to setting a double standard even for the non-NWSs. We arrive at three categories:

1. NWSs who possess WMDs and who are willing to keep and develop them and not bound to disarm.
2. NWSs who have pledged not to pursue N-weapons and have been granted the right to pursue peaceful applications including safeguarded enrichment.
3. A new category of states, presently including only the [although oppressive and authoritative] Iranian regime, who are non-NWSs but are being prohibited from [even peaceful and strictly monitored] activities related to nuclear fuel cycle.

If these are not three sets of discriminatory rules (or triple standards) for world nations then you tell me what is it. There are similar arguments supporting other statements in Criticism, but I don't have time for this. I don't want to sound like a jerk but if NPGuy or others keep dismissing and deleting these arguments as"crap", then I will have no choice to leave my bots on this page indefinitely which might lead to its being freezed or something (and don't worry about me being blocked from editing, who knows, maybe LeninTheTerrible1234 will be born.). Ivantheterrible1234 (talk) 20:00, 28 July 2008 (UTC)

Glad you're finally joining the discussion, Ivan. Setting up an auto-revert bot is not constructive. You have observed that there's not much left after the criticism section is edited - that's because there wasn't much to salvage in the way you wrote the section. You want to say that the Treaty is discriminatory, and that's a fair criticism. But the examples you cited as "double standards" were not flaws of the treaty. How can acts before the treaty entered into force be emblematic of a double standard? Once the law changed it changed for everyone, but not retroactively.

It's hard for me to see how actions taken as enforcement measures against Iran for violating the NPT are indicative of a double standard. Iran pursued a clandestine enrichment program - which would give it the capability to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons - in violation of its NPT safeguards obligations. It's important to note that the NPT itself has no enforcement measures. So the enforcement measures in the UN Security Council were really outside the Treaty.

Finally, you have cited disparities in treatment of Israel and Iran. Israel is believed to have nuclear weapons, yet it is not sanctioned while Iran is. The underlying issue is that the NPT does not impose any obligations on states like Israel that choose not to sign. So Iran's lesser acts were in fact violations of its international legal obligations, while Israel's possession of nuclear weapons violates no law. The treaty is designed to provide incentives for states to become parties, for example:

• greater access to peaceful nuclear energy (provided the state complies with its nonproliferaiton obligations),
• greater security through the limited spread of nuclear weapons, and
• greater standing to press for nuclear disarmament.

The fact that these and other incentives have proven insufficient to get India, Israel and Pakistan to join the NPT - or to keep North Korea within the Treaty, is grounds for criticism. In NPT jargon it generally falls under the issue of "universality." As long as the treaty is not universal (i.e., as long as some states remain outside), it leads to disparities in treatment of parties and non-parties.

If you can agree to this, more nuanced approach to criticism of the NPT, that would be a start at drafting something better. NPguy (talk) 03:14, 29 July 2008 (UTC)

The fairness of the NPT and how it relates to Iran is hotly debated. To call it "a treaty of double-standards" as fact simply does not fit in Wikipedia. I appreciate your honesty about your conduct here, both using bots and and intent to use socket puppets. These admissions will make it that much easier to convince an admin to block your IP, so it won't matter how many accounts you create. Like I said, NPguy and I are both willing to work with you if there is some specific information that you want to include but the paragraph as it was simply could not last forever and it ultimately will not be included in its current state. AzureFury (talk) 06:18, 29 July 2008 (UTC)

AzureFury, also don't worry my IP being blocked. On the Internet identity is always attached which can be detached by those who know how. NWSs' pursuing of expansion of N-weapons is not something which predates NPT. US pressure on Russia (and other providers) to refrain from supplying peaceful nuclear technology to countries who are not known to violate NPT (except for unsupported US allegations) but are outside of West's camp is a direct violation of NPT. Also nobody can PERMENANTLY, as West demands from Iran, deprvide a signatory of NPT from safeguarded enrichment, although this is a dual use technology. Even if this is considered a loophole, it is still international law and everyone has to abide by. It should not be necessary for me to point out these to you. You should have thought and understood these yourself. As per IAEA board of governers' statement, Iran has NOT legally violated NPT, although it has not fully carried out the safeguards which is not technically part of NPT and this is official. So please don't keep claiming otherwise, like mainstream media (for idiots). For decades Israel was the only country with nuclear weapons outside of NPT (until India and Pakistan joined its ranks in 1990s), but there was no pressure on her to join NPT and behave responsibly and verifiably (and with India and Pakistan with her this became much more difficult). But there is considerable pressure on an NPT member (Iran) to ratify the additional treaty. If you don't see the political agendas hampering and overshadowing the global non-proliferation regime, I doubt you ever will see anything. The Criticism should have been written long ago by someone more into the matter and with more time. Also guess what, ivantheterrible1234 just got brothers! Ivantheterrible1234 (talk) 19:22, 29 July 2008 (UTC)

Ivan, what you've said shows that the US is being hypocritical, not that the NPT is a "treaty of double-standards." I've never disputed there are issues regarding US policy involving the NPT. This article, however, is not about the US. Your criticisms need to be about the NPT. If you want to reference criticisms of the US, that's fine too. However, this is not a forum for US bashing. Your criticisms need to be cited from a reliable source. Otherwise they are original research and not suitable for inclusion. Please refrain from personal attacks and assume editors here are editting in good faith. Most likely the issues you are citing have already been covered in a different (and more appropriately titled) article. We are not trying to censor these criticisms of US policy. We have several disputes with them, and if you address these, we can work towards inclusion:

• They are uncited, making them original research
• The language with which they are presented is not neutral
• They are actually criticisms of US foreign policy, not criticisms of the NPT

Please address these issues rather than simply edit warring, it demeans us all and detracts from the credibility of Wikipedia. AzureFury (talk) 14:54, 30 July 2008 (UTC)

AzureFury, I will not elaborate any further. I almost have faith in editors' good faith, but this is irrelevant. Criticism of NPT or any other text is structred in two layers. 1.The written document itself without any reference to real world behavior (NPT divides nations of the world into two categories based on status quo -> discriminatory) 2.The way its implementors, observors, supervisors and enforcers behave with regards to their obligations. Criticism of the US nuclear policy (which is the most signaficant player in enforcing the treaty by its special status as a.World superpower {lobbying and coercing others}, b.Security council permanent member, c.Wielding veto power d.Permenant member of IAEA board of governers e.NWS)falls under the second case; so it seems to be justified to be discussed here. When a key signatory of NPT (primarily, the US) which is also in charge of judging others' compliance (Security Council and IAEA BoGs) and enforcing possible penalties (SC) seeks to develop more N-weapons and bahaves doubly, I doubt anyone will disagree that its criticism is also a criticism of NPT (the way its proponents behave). Also, I seems you didn't read or at least appropriately considered my above comments. I will appriaciate any attemp on your part or others at writing (or re-writing) a more reference-supported and viable (not the way you edited Criticism) section. Ivantheterrible1234 (talk) 18:39, 30 July 2008 (UTC)

You are in favor of inclusion, I am opposed. Do not leave it to me to find the sources for what I see to be original research because I don't believe they exist. Like I said, NPguy and I will work with you if you have something more specific than "the treaty is a treaty of double-standards" to include.

With regards to your interpretation of the document itself, why would nearly every nation on earth sign the document if they considered it discriminatory? Seperating states into NPSes and NNPSes has not changed since the document's foundation. This is your opinion, do not try to insert it into the article. Note that the US' involvement with Iran is already heavily covered in the article on the Nuclear program of Iran. I would recommend linking to that, rather than restating what is already stated multiple times in that article, if you choose to rewrite. NPguy and I will not accept a simple revert. I believe the article is fine as is, so I leave it to you to rewrite the section if you wish something to be included. AzureFury (talk) 20:20, 30 July 2008 (UTC)

The problem, Ivan, is that you're not listening to what we're saying. We're offering to work on a setion on legitimate criticism of the treaty and its implementation. You are insisting on having it entirely your own way. I agree with you that this criticim can address not just how the treaty is written but also how it is implemented. However, most of the examples you have given are either erroneous or not connected to treaty implementation. NPguy (talk) 02:13, 31 July 2008 (UTC)

AzureFury, is this a serious question? "why would nearly every nation on earth sign the document if they considered it discriminatory?"!!! For the same reason they are ordinary members of the UN in which only Five are permanent members of SC with bonus veto power! Please just think for a minute before posting here. Everything based on status quo! It is disappointing that you (and likes of you) do not feel the need for criticism of the theory and practice of NPT. If you think my contribution is original research then you haven't heard half of the world. You haven't been paying attention to my comments. The way you and NPGuy keep reverting is not far from vandalism! You can not just say you are not interested in writing Criticism and keep rendering it useless and redandant. This is also written in good faith. I will collect a number of quotations from NAM leaders and commentators who basically say the same thing. This way Criticism will be plain facts as it just reflects what others have said. Will this be ok with you guys? Many other Criticism sections in other articles are written the same way. No more time! Ivantheterrible1234 (talk) 04:21, 1 August 2008 (UTC)

You are not listening to our repeated assertions that we are not trying to censor criticisms of the NPT. You apparently prefer to fill these talk pages with personal attacks rather than discuss the issue civily. If half of the world believes the NPT is discriminatory towards NNPS, it will not be hard to find a reliable source that says so. We welcome criticisms of the NPT, in theory and practice, as long as you connect each criticism to the NPT. For example, when reading about the US' dispute of Iran's nuclear enrichment, that is an issue with the US being hypocritical (as usual). You need more than that to say that the implementation of the NPT is completely disfunctional. One state behaving poorly in one instance is not enough to say that the entire treaty is useless and based on double-standards. I don't claim that this is the only instance of poor behavior of the US or other NPS, but you need to show that it is not the only instance. Add more examples of NPS's being hypocritical (preferrably more than just the US aswell). Observe that criticisms in other articles frequently attribute the criticisms to their source, whereas your edits claim them as fact or common knowledge.

I look forward to reading your new edit, if it is as well-sourced and neutral as I hope, we might be able to come to a consensus on the content of this section. AzureFury (talk) 09:29, 1 August 2008 (UTC)

I actually read the sources in the Criticisms section. There were legitimate concerns and verifiable information presented there that I thought were worthy of including in the section. I've expanded the section to include this information. Ivan, I hope this gives you some inspiration for your highly anticipated edit. AzureFury (talk) 11:23, 1 August 2008 (UTC)

For balance, I have added official NWS responses to the disarmament criticism. I don't regard it as particularly satisfactory to cite NAM criticisms and NWS rebuttals, both of which are inevitably slanted and not particularly informative. Better to cite some genuine scholarly analyses. Those are harder to find and vet for quality, but the result would be more informative and illuminating.

Responding to one of Ivan's complaints, I deliberately did not respond earlier to the back-and-forth on whether the NPT was discrimatory. Of course it is. NWS are treated differently from NNWS. But the NPT represents a balance of interests among the various groups of parties, and the overwhelming majority of NNWS have joined because, on balance, they see it in their interest to do so. NPguy (talk) 03:11, 2 August 2008 (UTC)

Treating different things differently is not discrimination. Only when the difference in treatment is unfair. It seems to me that the general idea of the NPT is to eliminate all nuclear weapons. Thus the NPS have to disarm and the NNPS have to not arm. I don't see how you can call the treaty unfair with this goal in mind. AzureFury (talk) 03:43, 2 August 2008 (UTC)

Treating similar things (in this case sovereign states) differently is almost the definition of discrimination. Discrimination is not necessarily unfair, particularly when states accept it voluntarily through their choices to join the treaty. In theory the NPT is supposed to phase out that discrimination through disarmament, but given the slow progress on disarmament countries see it as perpetuating discrimination and thus being unfair.

By the way, the terms in the NPT are NWS (nuclear weapon state) and NNWS (non-nuclear weapon state), not NPS and NNPS. NPguy (talk) 20:47, 2 August 2008 (UTC)

Dictionary.com defines discrimination as, "treatment or consideration of, or making a distinction in favor of or against, a person or thing based on the group, class, or category to which that person or thing belongs rather than on individual merit." So the question is whether or not the NPT favors NWP states. Seeing as how they had NW and NNWS did not, all you can do is require them to disarm. That they have not is not an issue with the NPT. It seems to me to be one of the most balanced documents ever written by the UN. AzureFury (talk) 08:22, 4 August 2008 (UTC)

Sentence in First Pillar

The section on the First Pillar of the NPT includes these two sentences:

NNWS parties also agree to accept safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to verify that they are not diverting nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (Article III). This is why the recently proposed U.S.-India nuclear energy deal has come under (legal) controversy as it threatens to undermine the global nuclear non-proliferation regime exploiting the loophole granted by the dual use nature of nuclear technology, as has the Russia-Iran uranium deal.

I don't see the connection here between the two sentences. I can see how they are related, but I don't see the cause and effect relationship. I agree that a mention of this deal is appopriate here, but something is missing in the way it has been implemented. Can we perhaps explain this better, or if not, just remove the second sentence and reference the Indo-US deal elsewhere? AzureFury (talk) 18:35, 29 July 2008 (UTC)

I agree with you. There is no link between the first sentence, which is a statement of what's in the treaty, and the second, which is incoherent. The problems with the India deal should be dealt with separately; the "Russia-Iran uranium deal" does not refer to any fact I know of. NPguy (talk) 01:44, 30 July 2008 (UTC)

I changed the page. Admittedly, I did not bother to find a source for my claim, it is included in the article which is linked. I don't think anyone will dispute that this is something people take issue about. AzureFury (talk) 17:02, 30 July 2008 (UTC)

RfC Criticisms of the NPT

NPguy and I believe that the edits pushed by Ivantheterrible1234 here violate WP:NPOV, WP:OR, and WP:CRYSTAL. We've explained these issues to Ivan but he has only responded with reversion, personal attacks, and threats of sock puppetry. I'd like some outside input to convince Ivan that we are not trying to be censors nor simply following the "mainstream media (for idiots)" but instead trying to keep Wikipedia encyclopedic. Thanks. AzureFury (talk) 03:15, 31 July 2008 (UTC)

It seems we've reached a compromise, so I'm deleting the RfC. My thanks to everyone who responded. AzureFury (talk) 12:48, 5 August 2008 (UTC)

Legal implications

As a non native speaker, the legal difference between the two following items is not very clear. Maybe someone could clarify this.

Signed and ratified

Acceded or succeeded

To ratify, accede, or succede are ways to become a party and therefore legally bound by the terms of a treaty. They are slightly different but have the same effect of bringing the treaty into force for the country in question. By itself, signing a treaty does not have this effect. In general, a state must then ratify the treaty in order for it to have legal effect. The legal implications are roughly as follows

• To sign indicates an intention to become a party to a treaty.
• To ratify is the step needed to become a party after signing treaty.
• To accede is to become a party to a treaty in a single step, without first signing it.
• To succede is to become a party as a newly independent state when the "parent" state was already a party. Thus, Russia succeeded to the NPT after the breakup of the Soviet Union.

I hope this helps. See Talk:List of parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty for further discussion. NPguy (talk) 00:33, 1 August 2008 (UTC)

Thanks.

Bunker Busters

I again removed the reference to the United States developing new types of bunker busting warheads. It isn't happening. If you want to address the issue of threats to use nuclear weapons, one alternative would be to add a criticism about security assurances. The NPT NWS have given "negative security assurances" to NPT NNWS - i.e. assurances that NWS will not use nuclear weapons against NNWS - but these assurances have caveats and have been criticized as inadequate. NPguy (talk) 20:54, 2 August 2008 (UTC)

Could you give me a reference supporting your claim that these weapons are no longer being developed, nor being talked about? AzureFury (talk) 21:37, 2 August 2008 (UTC)

I re-added the information but I made it much more specific, explaining that the development was considered in 2002. I also seperated that from the considerations to nuke Iran. I think this is relevant and should be kept to satisfy WP:PRESERVE. I recommend to maintain neutrality and factual accuracy that we ALSO add the information that it failed to pass in congress or whatever reason they are no longer being developed. AzureFury (talk) 01:04, 3 August 2008 (UTC)

Have you tried Google? The Wikipedia article Nuclear bunker buster notes that the Bush Administration stopped requesting funding for the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator in its fiscal year 2006 budget. Before that, the concept had received only small amounts of funding for paper studies. NPguy (talk) 21:58, 3 August 2008 (UTC)

I didn't know they were called "Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrators." Why search for hours when you knew exactly what to look for? >p I was considering re-adding the info about the implied threat against Iran and how it violates UN Resolution 984, but it's just an implied threat so that's debatable. I'm satisfied with the section as is, and seeing as Ivan hasn't said a word, I'm gonna guess he's either moved on to another article or also finds it acceptable. AzureFury 22:51, 3 August 2008 (UTC)

The NPT does not forbid the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons. However, the NPT NWS have given the aforementioned negative security assurances (NSAs) to NPT NNWS. This was partly in response to political pressures to conclude a legally binding NSA treaty, and partly to provide a clear incentive for NNWS to join the treaty. But as I noted, the assurances have caveats. That's why I think it would be reasonable to have a separate subsection under "criticism" about security assurances and related issues. The U.S. NSA reads

"The United States reaffirms that it will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on the United States, its territories, its armed forces or other troops, its allies, or on a State towards which it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by such a non-nuclear-weapon State in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State."

with the added caveat

"It is important that all parties to the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons fulfil their obligations under the Treaty. In that regard, consistent with generally recognised principles of international law, parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons must be in compliance with these undertakings in order to be eligible for any benefits of adherence to the Treaty."

The intent of this last caveat is clear: States like Iran that violate the NPT cannot count on this assurance. NPguy (talk) 02:56, 4 August 2008 (UTC)

Fair enough. AzureFury (talk) 05:01, 4 August 2008 (UTC)

You seem to be the expert here, if you want to add a subsection on the NSA stuff. >.> AzureFury (talk) 08:28, 4 August 2008 (UTC)

Article II

No source has been provided where Britan is explicitly making the accusation leveled, and in fact we can see the EU-3 "welcoming Iran’s commitment that, in accordance with Article II of the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, it does not and will not seek to acquire nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction" here. Statements on WP should be directly supported by sources.--208.111.26.71 (talk) 16:47, 10 August 2008 (UTC)

Alright, I finally googled it. I didn't find any accusations by Britain, but they do want Iran to halt enrichment, like the rest of the G8. I've found several sources saying "The US and others have accused Iran..." but they never specify who the others are. I'm deleting the Britain thing. AzureFury (talk) 00:21, 11 August 2008 (UTC)

Britain and many other countries have expressed a level of concern about the Iranian nuclear program, but the United States is one of the only countries to use the rhetoric as it has been worded. I'd be fine with similar language that is supported by sources, I'm just trying to help keep it accurate.--208.111.26.71 (talk) 01:03, 11 August 2008 (UTC)

U.S.-India Deal

The world's Nuclear Suppliers Group just approved the U.S. nuclear deal with India Delegates: 45-nation group OKs US-India nuke deal. Can someone knowledgeable discuss this, the implications regarding the NNPT, and if a U.S.-North Korea deal might be next? Simesa (talk) 14:07, 6 September 2008 (UTC)

India is a major power that developed nuclear weapons only slightly after China and France, and accommodating it is realistic. North Korea is not, and there is no incentive to offer a similar deal.

The interesting thing is that India is not simply joining the NPT as a nuclear weapons state. --JWB (talk) 17:30, 6 September 2008 (UTC)

The United States has said that India is a unique case, and that it does not support similar waivers for Israel or Pakistan, and certainly not for North Korea. The timing above is misleading. India tested a nuclear weapon 10 years after China and 14 years after France. Israel never openly tested or claimed to possess nuclear weapons, but is thought to have acquired nuclear weapons before the 1973 Yom Kippur war and before India's test. NPguy (talk) 01:15, 7 September 2008 (UTC)

ITALY

The President of Republic of Italy (F.Cossiga) and chief of Army has declared at the public media that Italy owns nukes built in France and UK. If YOU don't agree ask him, maybe he knows much more than you about it. Source RAINEWS 24. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 151.60.119.56 (talk) 09:59, 28 February 2009 (UTC)

This seems to be a reference to a new Italian joint investment with France's nuclear industry (FACTBOX-Italy and France cooperate on nuclear power). I didn't see anything about the UK. This really belongs in Nuclear energy policy, not here.

NO.It means that is written and not what is better for your mind.If you don't agree,don't comment my writings,but ask for it at RAINEWS 24 or to the President of Italian Republic (chief of Italian Army).

If you have a specific citation (RAINEWS 24 is not specific enough), add it. The problem with your post is not that I disagree. The problem is that the English is incomprehensible. INPguy (talk) 21:24, 1 March 2009 (UTC)

Rainews 24 is a public and very known trasmission of RAI(public italian television).In this trasmission the Italian President of Republic (Chief of Italian Army) DECLARED OFFICIALLY that Italy OWNS nukes (atomic bombs ) built in France and UK. My neighbour from Doncaster (UK) easily understood what i wrote. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 151.60.117.137 (talk) 18:18, 2 March 2009 (UTC)

I am quite sure that Italy does not OWN nuclear weapons. And I am skeptical that French or UK nuclear weapons are deployed in Italy (although U.S. nuclear weapons have been in the past). I am familiar with RAI. When I ask for a specific citation, I am asking for a date and transcript of what Cossiga reportedly said. Anyone can claim that RAI said one thing or another. An extraordinary and dubious claim demands a more specific citation. NPguy (talk) 22:17, 2 March 2009 (UTC)

I think my fellow countryman is referring to this issue: a few hundred U.S. nuclear weapons are kept in NATO bases in Europe, including Aviano and Ghedi in Italy. This may be considered a violation of the treaty, as Italy is a non-nuclear weapon state and it should not "receive, manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons". Mushroom (Talk) 23:02, 2 March 2009 (UTC)

I don't think that is what he means. He refers specifically to the UK and France, but as far as I know, neither participates in NATO nuclear sharing arrangements. In those arrangements, the United States retains control over the nuclear warheads while the other country owns the delivery system, which is intended to ensure compliance with the NPT. NPguy (talk) 02:03, 3 March 2009 (UTC)

I searched the RaiNews 24 website and I found the story our anonymous friend is talking about. Former President Francesco Cossiga says:

There are nuclear bombs in Italy, for example in Ghedi. They are of the U.S. Army, and maybe also British and French. In case of their use, the heads of the Italian State would also be involved.^[1]

Considering that Cossiga is 80 years old and probably not very lucid, that he was President almost 17 years ago, and that in the very same interview he says "In this country the President doesn't mean shit", I think we can consider the UK/French bombs possibility highly unlikely. Mushroom (Talk) 03:19, 3 March 2009 (UTC)

YOU are talking one another to be surer but you can't discover military secrets of countries.One guy talks of Aviano and Ghedi sharing nukes another says Italian President is stupid...the reality is that Treties are are pieces of paper.To be complete He confirmed what He said also the days after in other trasmissions (RAI).To be stupid is also repetitive!You don't accept to be unable to take under control some matters bigger than you.To be sure you should ask him or to RAI direction.Mr Mushrooms should be very careful to say "not lucid" to Him because he could be persecuted by Justice for order of Italian Presidency.So be quiet!BYE BYE! —Preceding unsigned comment added by 151.60.118.30 (talk) 17:48, 3 March 2009 (UTC)

According to the quote, Cossiga did not say Italy has nuclear weapons. He said the United States has (or had) nuclear weapons in Italy. I do not believe there were British or French nuclear weapons in Italy. NPguy (talk) 22:59, 3 March 2009 (UTC)

I said "probably not very lucid" because in the recent past Cossiga has made a series of weird declarations to the media. Like when he said, about peaceful school protests, that the police should "have no mercy" with the protesters, "hit them all and send them to the hospital", and "the sound of ambulances shall overcome that of police cars". Is that something a sane person would say? I don't think so. Furthermore, he does not seem to have a direct knowledge of the nationality of the bombs, as he said "maybe also British and French". Mushroom (Talk) 22:18, 4 March 2009 (UTC)

What you common person believe is unsignificant ,it's important what officially the President of Italian Republic said.You must value facts and not unsignificant personal opinions otherwise we write a Very Free Encyclopedia. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 151.60.117.49 (talk) 05:06, 4 March 2009 (UTC)

If he really said it, it shouldn't be difficult to find a source quoting him. We need to attribute facts in the article to sources besides Wiki editors. All content on Wikipedia is governmed by policies, such as WP:Verifiability, and WP:Reliable Sources. AzureFury (talk | contribs) 05:20, 4 March 2009 (UTC)

The source is here, but my point is that Cossiga is not a reliable source on this topic. And even if he were, he just said "maybe", so we can't know for sure if the UK/French bombs are there. Mushroom (Talk) 22:18, 4 March 2009 (UTC)

Voicing appreciation to the "unsigned IP" and to User:Mushroom for your apparent desire to contribute and verbalize your knowedge regarding Francesco Cossiga and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Peace, rkmlai (talk) 05:48, 4 March 2009 (UTC)

Thanks, although I think this whole discussion is quite pointless :) Mushroom (Talk) 22:18, 4 March 2009 (UTC)

The only sure thing is that you can't cancel His official words and the reality.The words of a President of Italian Republic that knows secrets much more than common people are much important than every Wikipedia talking.(source RAI).

The original contributor seems to think that what Cossiga said was important. I disagree. It appears to be both incorrect and unimportant. It doesn't matter who he used to be - he doesn't know what he's talking about. NPguy (talk) 04:21, 5 March 2009 (UTC)

NPguy is making a lot of sense if you ask me. Besides, don't a bunch of European countries have nukes in their territory under the control of the US as they are part of NATO? AzureFury (talk | contribs) 05:12, 5 March 2009 (UTC)

Your poor words are against the words of Italian President of Republic (and also former Prime Minister and Minister of Security).Don't be ridiculous and pathetic! —Preceding unsigned comment added by 151.60.118.98 (talk) 09:49, 5 March 2009 (UTC)

See WP:CIVIL and WP:Personal attacks. AzureFury (talk | contribs) 03:36, 6 March 2009 (UTC)

Don't try to set the problem in a personal matter. The TRUE MATTER here is what the Italian President of Republic officially said in public television.Instead of answer me here and call the mum to solve a real situation you should to reflect on this news.Bye!

This discussion is clearly a waste of time. I suggest we drop it. NPguy (talk) 03:30, 7 March 2009 (UTC)

It's waste time for somebody unable to face it.He can leaves.My father was in the Italian Air Force and i remember more than once he said same things.The official words of Italian President and Italian Military Secrets rest.You can go out.NO problem.The facts rest all the time.Nobody is able to rewind Italian President voice....

After this discussuion there are many many doubts abot the NPT respect all over the world.I think there are many military secrets that make these treaties similar to many good intentions and theories. —Preceding unsigned comment added by EU 100% (talk • contribs) 15:20, 9 March 2009 (UTC)

In fact Italy owns in the italian military arsenal of La Spezia Polaris A3.They're able to transport 3 nuclear warheads of 200 kt and they can be transported by ships.Italy than developed till 1980 (so after the NPT) another ballistic missile :The Alpha.Also today Italy has built a rocket (developed from the old Scout) able to transport waheads or to launch satellites:the Vega.Giosue' Campi (talk) 09:11, 28 June 2009 (UTC)

Criticism of criticism

This has to be the weakest criticism section I have ever seen. Nothing about double standards as they apply between developed nations and developing nations? Nothing about how a blind eye is given to Israel, while a thumb is put on Iran? Just plain weak. MPA146.235.130.52 (talk) 15:11, 4 April 2009 (UTC)

What do you mean by double standards between developed and developing nations? As far as I can tell there's a lot of rhetoric largely unsupported by fact. The "blind eye" to Israel is a reflection of the fact that Israel is not a party. The criticism might be that the treaty is not universal (also excluding India and Pakistan). But the difference in treatment of Israel and Iran is not arbitrary; it is based on their different status under the Treaty. Another criticism might be the lack of an effective enforcement mechanism against countries like Iran that violate their obligations or countries like North Korea that withdraw. Finally, the lack (or inadequacy) of progress on disarmament by the nuclear weapon states is a common criticism.

We could use this discussion to help draft a replacement for the current lame section. NPguy (talk) 21:29, 4 April 2009 (UTC)

Yeah I just added a bunch of citation needed tags, especially since that Nasser quote seems to be non-existent; the only records of it say "Nasser once said" or something to that effect. HaZaRd (talk) 03:49, 8 March 2010 (UTC)

One of the statements you tagged was sourced, but the info was in cite 75, not 73. The quote is not sourced, but I'm e-mail an author to see if he can supply us with a reliable source for the quote. AzureFury (talk | contribs) 05:23, 8 March 2010 (UTC)

North Korea and the violation or not of the NPT

I'm not convinced by the argument that North Korea violated the NPT on the basis of never having came into compliance with its Article III safeguards obligations, or at least think such a statement should be caveated.

In the 1994 U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework the U.S. agreed, and the IAEA accepted, that only after "a significant portion of the LWR [nuclear power station for DPRK] project" by KEDO was completed "the DPRK will come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA (INFCIRC/403), including taking all steps that may be deemed necessary by the IAEA, following consultations with the Agency with regard to verifying the accuracy and completeness of the DPRK's initial report on all nuclear material in the DPRK." The KEDO project never came anywhere near completion so this requirement never came to fruition. By this the U.S. and IAEA seem to be accepting that it was proper for North Korea to be within the NPT and not fully implement its safeguard agreement.

DPRK may have been in breach of safeguards (by having more than 1kg of undeclared separated plutonium from the initial reprocessing of Magnox spent fuel) from soon after signing on 10 April 1992 until the 1994 agreement was signed, but DPRK could argue it was in the initial phase of safeguards "to facilitate the implementation of the safeguards provided for in this Agreement" and still establishing "a system of accounting for and control". (For background see [2].) I've not looked at these arguments, but it seems like the 1994 agreement accepted whatever had happened between 1992 and 1994. This wasn't helped by the IAEA initially sending DPRK the wrong version of the safeguards agreement, which was not noticed for about a year, as I recall.

The situation does seem to me to be far from a clear violation of the NPT while DPRK was a party to it. I guess we should do a source hunt and comparison, though I have little spare time for this in the next few weeks. Rwendland (talk) 12:27, 27 May 2009 (UTC)

Article VI as interpreted by the ICJ

This reference ARTICLE VI OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY IS A PACTUM DE CONTRAHENDO AND HAS SERIOUS LEGAL OBLIGATION BY IMPLICATION gives a legal opinion from the International Court of Justice that appears to conflict somewhat with the interpretation in the article. I don't want to change an article of this importance unilaterally - so would others please comment first? Simesa (talk) 18:24, 20 April 2010 (UTC)

It's an interesting paper. I think the article addresses this perspective in the third paragraph of the disarmament pillar. The contrary point of view is in the second paragraph. It's worth noting that the consensus Final Document from the 2000 NPT Review Conference talks about "an unequivocal undertaking" to achieve the elimination of nuclear weapons as one of the thirteen agreed "practical steps" to achieve disarmament. It doesn't say that the NPT contains such an undertaking. NPguy (talk) 02:34, 21 April 2010 (UTC)

File:NPT Participation.svg

It seems hard to see the difference in the shade of green for smaller countries, and somehow gives a impression that that whole world except for Israel and India is nuclear-free. The similar color also makes it appear that whether or not the country is succeeding in the treaty is not important, as if it was not a sincere or solid treaty, but just some random label to feel good about.

I see absolutely no reason why we should not change the light green into another color such as yellow (Taiwan can be changed into pink or light green). 173.183.69.134 (talk) 04:57, 29 October 2010 (UTC)

I agree with you that the distinction between accession and ratification is insignificant. There are three main categories: nuclear-weapon states party to the NPT (United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France, China); non-nuclear-weapon states party to the NPT, and non-parties to the NPT (India, Israel, Pakistan, North Korea). I'm not sure how to address Taiwan, which is recognized as a state only by a small number of countries. NPguy (talk) 02:04, 30 October 2010 (UTC)

Space

Question: is the subject of weapons or nuclear material in space commented on at all by the treaty? Dlamblin (talk) 17:26, 14 December 2010 (UTC)

No. The Outer Space Treaty predates the NPT and bars nuclear weapons in space. NPguy (talk) 01:56, 15 December 2010 (UTC)

UK "independent" deterrent

The UK plans to upgrade its "independent" Trident system, considerably increasing its capacity and number of warheads. This stands to be a flagrant violation of the NPT, and this aspect should be mentioned in the article. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 149.170.192.137 (talk) 19:44, 2 August 2010 (UTC)

First, I don't believe the UK has any such plan. Second, I suggest you read Article VI of the NPT and explain this would be a violation of the NPT if it were true. NPguy (talk) 02:41, 3 August 2010 (UTC)

The UK have been looking into upgrading Trident. This is common knowledge and can be found quite easy if you use Google. There's even a page on Wikipedia about it. Whether or not they will be upgrading the capacity I'm not so sure on though. 94.196.219.163 (talk) 13:32, 18 May 2011 (UTC)

There is no UK plan to increase its number of warheads. NPguy (talk) 02:18, 19 May 2011 (UTC)

Notice of intent.

I found the text under the heading Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty#Second pillar: disarmament surprisingly biased. It starts as if is about to present one view (of several), but in the middle in some way changes to describing this point of view as the unambiguous truth. The second and the beginning of the third paragraph now runs thus:

The wording of the NPT's Article VI arguably imposes only a vague obligation on all NPT signatories to move in the general direction of nuclear and total disarmament, saying, "Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament."<ref>[http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc140.pdf]</ref> Under this interpretation, Article VI does not strictly require all signatories to actually conclude a disarmament treaty. Rather, it only requires them "to negotiate in good faith."<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0502/doc13.htm |title=U.S. Compliance With Article VI of the NPT |publisher=Acronym.org.uk |date= |accessdate=2010-11-25}}</ref> The International Court of Justice, in its Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, issued 8 July 1996, went beyond the text of Article VI in its unanimous conclusion that "There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control."<ref>[http://www.lcnp.org/wcourt/opinion.htm]</ref>

Some governments, especially non-nuclear-weapon states belonging to the Non-Aligned Movement, have interpreted Article VI's language as being anything but vague. ...

I checked the history, and found that the text was changed from a more neutral "Some think that... on the other hand, others think that..." kind of presentation here, in the single non-logged in edit ever from that IP. The edit was partially an improvement, since the clearly relevant interpretation of the second pillar obligations by the International Court of Justice was added to this section. However, it was added in the paragraph which otherwise presented a different point of view; it was presented as a clear extension of the true meaning of the treaty text (without sourcing this interpretation); and "On the other hand" was removed from the next paragraph, making the point of view described there to appear more as a fringe opinion than as the other opinion on equal footing with the first one.

My intention is to restore what I consider as a more neutral point of view, thus:

1. I revert the aforementioned edit.
2. I do add the reference to the ICJ decision, but in the "On the other hand" paragraph, after the text about "some countries", and introduced by a "Likewise, ". The phrase "went beyond the text of Article VI in its unanimous conclusion that" will be reformulated, e.g. as "interprets the text of Article VI as implying that".
3. I'm going to try to fix and wikify the references to the ICJ. In addition,
4. I plan to fix the "broken quotation" of the ICJ under the Criticism and response heading.

My main reason for not doing this directly is this: I see from the history and from this discussion page that the article has been subject to some debate and editing in various direction, which have lead to its present state. Mostly, the editing and discussion concerned the criticism section. Thus, although at least parts of the article were scrutinised by some of you, the changes by the IP have been left for nearly a year. If this is not an oversight, but rather because some of you approve of the present description,you should have the chance to explain why. In other words, I do not wish to risk inadvertently to start an edit war or infringe on a reached consensus.

Moreover, my redisposition would remove the claim that ICJ "went beyond the text" completely. Now, I read through the ICJ text provided by the link, and IMHO the intention of the court was exactly the opposite. In fact, they "turn down" some other demands, like declaring the use or threat of using nuclear weapons as against the international law, with the argument that the court only may pronounce their decision based on existing international law, which in turn isthe result either of treaty obligations or of an established world wide consensus; neither of which they find completely prohibits the use or threat of using nuclear powers. On the other hand, they argue that the treaty obligations undertaken by the nuclear powers, to negotiate a nuclear disarmament "in good faith", does include the obligation to bring the negotiatins to a conclusion. On some of the other points, there were dissenting opinions; but here they were unanimous in their interpretation of what the signatory nuclear powers actually have agreed to.

On the other hand, there is no obligation for everybody else to agree with the ICJ. I could well imagine that there are others than the anonymous IP who think that the ICJ (contrary to their own opinion) went beyond the text in their interpretation. If indeed e.g. some government representatives or academics have taken this stand, and it is possible to confirm this from a reliable source, then it would be good to include this re-interpretation of the ICJ advisory decision immediately after the quotation.

IMHO, all this really is suitable in the second pillar section, since it neither focuses on criticism of the agreement itself, nor on the compliance, but rather discusses the content of the "second pillar", and different opinions of what tme meaning of the text is. The article now treats the ICJ advisory decision in two places; but this is the more important of them, if we should choose to retain quotations in just one place. JoergenB (talk) 15:09, 3 November 2011 (UTC)

I have no objection to this approach. But I would like to see a slight note of skepticism on the ICJ opinion on the obligation to disarm, particularly in the context where states outside the NPT have nuclear weapons and some states party to the NPT have unresolved violations of their nonproliferation obligations. The Article VI disarmament obligations apply to all NPT parties, but NPT parties alone cannot achieve nuclear disarmament. I think this is the view of the NPT NWS, but they tend not to emphasize this point in public. But I did a quick web search and didn't find any analysis along these lines. NPguy (talk) 02:10, 5 November 2011 (UTC)

I agree that the existence of NWS's apart from treaty parties is a factual complication; more so to-day than in 1996, though. At the time of the ICJ decision, there was no "recognised" nuclear power outside the treaty parties (although I was and am fairly sure that Israel had nukes then, and that at least the US government was fully aware of this). The situation to-day is rather different. (However, as far as I recall, India "threatened" the powers with the possibility that it would develop its own atomic weapon system, if the established nuclear powers did not reach any agreement on when and how their disarmament should start.)

This is neither here or there, of course. If you mean that we should add notes on how the principally interested parties reacted to the ICJ decision, if we find it, I agree with you. I'm sure we also are in agreement that our own opinions are not very important for the article.

I've just noted, that we do have an article about this decision, namely, International Court of Justice advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons; it does contain a section on the UK reaction to the decision, but (as far as a quick glance showed me) on no others. In the UK response, as quoted in our article, they seem not to have questioned the decision, but rather to have interpreted it as having no impact on the further development of their single nuclear weapons system:

Renewal of the Trident system is fully consistent with our international obligations, including those on disarmament. ...

They actually refer to "obligations... on disarmament"; it would be rather interesting to know if the US ever has acknowledged an "obligation on disarmament", in those or similar words. I'll link to that article; but I refuse to use the full article title in the text:-).

So, I'll make a change according to the outline, hope that this improves the article somewhat, and expect that it will be further improved when further sources are found. JoergenB (talk) 14:28, 6 November 2011 (UTC)

npt-tv.net

• npt-tv.net: Linksearch en (insource) - meta - de - fr - simple - wikt:en - wikt:fr • Spamcheck • MER-C X-wiki • gs • Reports: Links on en - COIBot - COIBot-Local • Discussions: tracked - advanced - RSN • COIBot-Link, Local, & XWiki Reports - Wikipedia: en - fr - de • Google: search • meta • Domain: domaintools • AboutUs.com

I'd like to add the link to the external link list of the article on the NPT, since it provides a whole lot of information on current events and progress at the npt-conferences. I guess that once unblocked, the site can be used to enhance the article and be used as a reference-source. I can't figure out what "repeated spam by IPs and SPAs" actualy means. However, I don't see any reason why it should stay blocked. Jojona (talk) 10:16, 10 August 2012 (UTC)

Could the State of Palestine sign the treaty?

Should it be included in the article that it hasn't signed the treaty? [Soffredo] 21:39, 3 September 2013 (UTC)

I've not seen any sources which clarify this. If we can find sources which state that they are eligible to sign the treaty, then I agree that they should be added. But in the absence of such sources, I don't think they should be listed. Otherwise we get into the issue of whether we should list the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, Taiwan, etc. TDL (talk) 22:08, 3 September 2013 (UTC)

The four states listed as non-parties are members of the UN, as are all NPT Parties other than the Holy See. If we start adding List of states with limited recognition where will it end? NPguy (talk) 02:01, 4 September 2013 (UTC)

However, the State of Palestine is a UN observer like Vatican City, which has signed the treaty. [Soffredo] 11:40, 10 September 2013 (UTC)

My initial guess is that you are right Soffredo and that Palestine could join now. This is a complicated political area however and I prefer to see the position of the UN first; in other words: let's wait until Palestine signs/accedes to/ratifies one treaty open to "all states" of which the UN secretary-general is the depostary; otherwise our interpretation of the meaning of its non-member status is synthesis... L.tak (talk) 15:18, 11 September 2013 (UTC)

The complicating factor is that the depositary of the NPT isn't the UN, it is the USA, UK and Russia. So it isn't clear that what the UNSG decides must be followed by these states. Given that the USA and UK still don't recognize Palestine, they could refuse to allow them to accede vie them. Could Palestine accede via Russia, who does recognizes them? Perhaps, but the USA and UK could still refuse to acknowledge this (like they did when Ukraine and Belarus acceded to treaties via Russia before they became independent from the USSR). I think it really comes down to whether they are recognized by the depositaries. Presumably Kosovo has just as much of a chance to accede because they are also recognized by 2/3. TDL (talk) 17:12, 11 September 2013 (UTC) .

TDL, you are right; I was under the impression the UN was the depositary, but since that's not the case, it boils down to what the US/UK/RU will be doing indeed! L.tak (talk) 07:59, 12 September 2013 (UTC)

Number of Parties Present

Side bar says 189 parties are present, but introduction says 190 are present, not sure if mistake or something else. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 98.154.129.29 (talk) 19:04, 6 October 2013 (UTC)

North Korea joined, but later withdrew. I moved some stuff in the lead around to help clarify this. TDL (talk) 20:05, 6 October 2013 (UTC)

I put that back because it fit better where it was. Note that there is some ambiguity about North Korea's current status. The article should probably reflect this. NPguy (talk) 00:22, 7 October 2013 (UTC)

Yes, I'm aware that there is ambiguity over North Korea's status. This article already covers this in detail at Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapons#North_Korea. This is precisely why my wording was chosen very carefully: "A total of 190 parties have joined the Treaty, though North Korea, which acceded to the NPT in 1985 but never came into compliance, announced its withdrawal in 2003." This wording doesn't take a position on whether North Korea is still a party or not, leaving that complicated discussion until later in the article.

The wording you reverted to is extremely misleading as it completely ignores the ambiguity. The statement "A total of 190 parties have joined the Treaty" without any sort of qualification implies that there are are still 190 parties, which of course is up for debate. If we are going to give the number 190, we must explain where that number comes from (ie that it includes North Korea) and present the alternative viewpoint that North Korea is no longer a party (ie that there are arguably only 189 parties). Relegating that viewpoint to several paragraphs later is confusing (as evidence by this thread), misleading and not NPOV.

If you don't like my wording perhaps you could propose some alternative that addresses the legitimate issues raised rather than just reverting? TDL (talk) 00:59, 7 October 2013 (UTC)

The Ribbon International

The Ribbon International was invited by the United Nations exhibit committee, after several meetings, the committee requested an exhibit of Ribbons for the Conference being held in Geneva, Switzerland for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in 1990. (Susan Macafee (talk) 21:46, 23 June 2014 (UTC) — Preceding unsigned comment added by Susan Macafee (talk • contribs)

Hi, please provide a source for this on the talk page. It is my belief that this does not belong on this page, although if others disagree I would be happy to be shown to be wrong. Thanks, Benboy00 (talk) 23:31, 23 June 2014 (UTC)

Assuming this is true, an invitation by a UN exhibit committee does not make this noteworthy. NPguy (talk) 02:38, 24 June 2014 (UTC)

Nonsense on fissile materials and uranium mines

"“such as uranium mines and mills, from which terrorists could easily acquire fissile material”.[5] Dozens of nations remain potential "weak links" in the global defense against nuclear terrorism and tacitly ignore UN mandates on controls over fissile material at uranium mines. Niger, a major uranium exporter, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the source of uranium for the first atomic bomb, are "among the states falling short in complying with UN Security Council Resolution 1540"

Uranium mines and mills produce raw, natural uranium ore or oxide. Unenriched uranium ore or oxide _is not fissile material_. Look it up: fissile material. The idea that terrorists could get fissile material from mines/mills, much less "easily," is completely scientific incorrect, and goes against every other source you can find regarding the proliferation dangers of nuclear weapons.

To turn uranium ore/oxide into fissile material you have to either enrich it or put it into a nuclear reactor to turn it into plutonium, which then has to be chemically extracted from the spent nuclear fuel. Neither are "easy" tasks. There is an obvious reason that the NPT regulates enrichment technology and reactor technology and not uranium mines.

One can say that the NPT ought to regulate raw uranium resources, because that is a necessary prerequisite for a state developing nuclear weapons. But to imply that terrorists can acquire nuclear weapons because of the lack of regulation of uranium mines is ridiculous.

The book cited here is obviously pretty unreliable if this is what the guy actually thinks. --108.35.16.9 (talk) 16:13, 4 December 2014 (UTC)

Wording about enforcement

Comes 117.217.92.29 to add the italicized wording to the paragraph on Article VI:

Article VI: The states undertake to pursue "negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament", and towards a "Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international controland could not stop any agreed assistance until the country is found to be wrong.

I am not an expert on the treaty, nor do I have a copy handy, and so do not complain about the substance of the addition, if it is indeed correct in what it seems to say. There is a missing space at the beginning of the addition, and the addition is tortuously worded. To have the proper sense, the sentence it was added to probably would have to be reworked. The sense of the "and" is wrong, and probably should have been "but" (maybe). It leaves unanswered the questions "What assistance?" and "Which country?". If this is to be left in the paragraph, it needs more work than the editor was willing to give. Finally, it sounds like it is trying to make some veiled, unstated political point. SkoreKeep (talk) 15:28, 16 December 2014 (UTC)

Neither, but NPT?

Could someone clarify what this expression means? The options "nuclear weapons state", "nuclear weapon free state" and "nuclear sharing" seems to cover all possible options. What does the "neither" in "neither, but NPT" refer to? How can a NPT signatory both have, and not have nuclear weapons? Sapiocrat (talk) 22:36, 4 April 2015 (UTC)

I gather it is meant to refer to states that don't have nuclear weapons, but also have not declared themselves nuclear-weapon-free. But isn't being a signatory to the NPT effectively the latter? Sapiocrat (talk) 22:41, 4 April 2015 (UTC)

It is further noteworthy that the Nuclear-weapon-free zone page uses the term "NPT only", which I find to be less ambiguous. The Nuclear sharing page however uses the same expression as on this page. Sapiocrat (talk) 22:43, 4 April 2015 (UTC)

A better description would be "other NPT parties. A bigger problem is that the map uses the term "nuclear weapons states" to refer to all states that possess nuclear weapons. Under the NPT, the term "nuclear-weapon state" applies only to states that conducted nuclear tests before 1967. Other states may possess nuclear weapons, but they are not recognized by the NPT as "nuclear-weapon states." The map should probably be redone with a fifth category of NPT non-parties, in order to distinguish those states. The final line would then be "other NPT parties." Without those changes, this map is unsuited to this article and should be deleted. NPguy (talk) 16:13, 5 April 2015 (UTC)