Talk:Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons/Archive 1

Archive 1

Archive 2

Archive 3

US and NPT

Didn't the US never ratify the treaty?--iFaqeer 02:55, Sep 17, 2004 (UTC)

The US ratified the NPT on 5 March 1970. Interestingly, China and France appear to have only acceded to the treaty in 1992. Impi 11:07, 21 Jan 2005 (UTC)

You're probably thinking of the CTBT. srs 17:22, 8 May 2005 (UTC)

Right, the US Senate rejected the CTBT in October 1999, so that's probably what iFaqeer was thinking of. Impi 16:37, 9 May 2005 (UTC)

Headline text

IRAN AND USA

Dear Friends:

I have bet with my friend regarding the following?

Did Iran and US have any exchange of officials during the period 1980 and 2000?

What does ending diplomatic relations mean?Is there no visit of officials between the countries breaking diplomatic relations?I am sorry to be asking such a basic thing when I understand that this is normally the case.But my friend can not visualise this scenario?

I hope I'm not being mean here, but these discussion pages aren't meant friendship bickering, they're meant as a means to discuss the validity and the content of the article at hand; what should go in and what should stay out. Not to say that your questions aren't interesting, but this definatly has nothing to do with the article at hand. Regardless, why not look up the information on other more relevant articles. For example Diplomatic relations. WOW, look! The definition of diplomatic relations. By doing this, not only are you getting a better sense of what the Author was intending to convey, but also provides you a way of possibly finding a flaw in what the author did, maybe by over generalising, or using improper terminology.

(and btw, add 4 tildas at the end to put your signature down on the discussion page, just so I know who I'm talking to :P)

Arthur5005 20:00, 2 March 2006 (UTC)

disarmament provision

In the section on disarmament is says that "a preemptive-strike doctrine and otherwise threatening postures can be viewed as induction by non-NWS parties." Why is that? Whose legal interpretation in this judgment based on?

See what?

Anyone know what the "See..." at the end of the article is supposed to reference? 68.39.174.205 01:19, 26 Mar 2005 (UTC)

Taiwan and NPT

Should there be a mention somewhere about the ROC ratification the NNPT? Even though the U.N. no longer acknowledges the existence of the Taiwanese government, the ROC has stated that they will abide by the provisions of the treaty.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taiwan_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction --MGS 20:45, 2 May 2005 (UTC)

Sure, IMHO it's relevant info. Boud 14:25, 14 August 2005 (UTC)

Per country discussion in this article

Per country discussion of proliferation issues is duplicated in many articles:

• this article
• Nuclear proliferation, especially the Unsanctioned nuclear activity section
• List of countries with nuclear weapons
• Country_X and weapons of mass destruction series of articles
• Sometimes in more general nuclear programme articles like Iran's nuclear program
• Ancillary articles like Six-party talks, Nuclear weapons sharing

To reduce this I think this article should only discuss in detail per country issues where it has a direct bearing on the Treaty itself; mention the other countries and direct to another article, but no detailed discussion.

North Korea discussion should be kept, as it keeps leaving/rejoining the treaty, and that is relavant to the treaty. United States-NATO nuclear weapons sharing section has a direct bearing on the history and current inerpretation of the treaty, so should be kept. But the India, Pakistan, Israel, Iran sections should be cut back to something very brief, pointing at a main article.

Views? -- Rwendland 08:40, 29 September 2005 (UTC)

compulsory inspections?

What's the law around the inspections? For example, does the Treaty require nations to prove their innocence and allow inspectors in? Or instead is the onus effectively on other countries to prove that they are trying to develop nuclear weapons, not just nuclear power? Aaron McDaid (talk - contribs) 11:42, 6 February 2006 (UTC)

Small bit about the India and US deal

I hope it doesn't sound to much like news reporting, I added a small tidbit regarding the India/US deal. I figured it was relevant because it sets large precedent, and also in the sense that the US seems to be picking and choosing with countries and nuclear technology with complete disregard to the NPT, in otherwords, diminishing it's importance. Non of what I just said is on the page ;). (that's what discussion is for *phew*) and I think I added in a very unbiased manner, even leaning in the direction that I don't agree with. Arthur5005 20:07, 2 March 2006 (UTC)

Re: Angry Wikipedian about India

What was writen about the deal US/India after the small mention that it happened, and of course a link to a BBC article, which isn't horribly biased. Someone decided to add this:

"As per the recently clinched deal between India and the United States, fast breeder reactors are classified as for military purpose and India reserves the right to build more of them in future to build nuclear weapons. Also, the 'in perpetuity' clause of safeguards of the civilian reactors is considered discriminatory, as all the five nuclear weapon states have the right to redesignate their safeguarded civilian facilities as military ones.

The deal which received staunch opposition in US media, and responses ranging from jubiliation to suspicion in Indian media has found supporters in Mohamed ElBaradei, director of IAEA and Jacques Chirac, president of France. If anything, the nuclear deal exposes the problems that the NPT has, which allows certain states to have nuclear weapons (the group of five), some granted concessions or sold delivery systems (India, Israel, Pakistan), and sanctions imposed on a few (Iran, North Korea).

The glaring anamolies in NPT are aptly put in ElBaradei's words (in his Op-Ed Essay titled Saving Ourselves From Self-Destruction in the New York Times on February 12, 2004):

"We must abandon the unworkable notion that it is morally reprehensible for some countries to pursue weapons of mass destruction, yet morally acceptable for others to rely on them for security - and indeed to continue to refine their capacities and postulate plans for their use,"[1]

"

Not only does just sound like an opinion peice, it's ridden with english errors. I don't mind putting in a paragraph about how Indians feel about the NPT, obviously you feel strongly biases against it, understood, but point me to some decent literature please, and I promise to write a nicely balanced factual article in this "encyclopedia", not "opinion dictionary" Arthur5005 21:18, 3 March 2006 (UTC)

Problems with this page

I'm new to Wikipedia, so I'm not sure if this is just par for the course, but this page has a lot of problems that seem to reflect misunderstandings and political biases in various directions. A few examples:

The disarmament provision can be summarized as a commitment by all parties "to pursue negotiations in good faith" toward an end to the arms race, nuclear disarmament, and total and complete disarmement. The comment about first strike doctrines seem out of place. It raises questions about other provisions of the treaty, and the suggestion about violating article I by inducing other states to acquire nuclear weapons is -- at best -- a stretch.

The section on peaceful uses is even worse. The treaty does not grant any right to uranium enrichment, for example. Proposals to limit the spread of enrichment technology, both by strengthened export controls and by providing reliable fuel services so that states have no incentive to acquire enrichment capabilities for peaceful purposes, are fully consistent with the NPT and intended to strengthen it.

In addition, there is nothing about IAEA safeguards, which are a key element of the nonproliferation provisions. They provide for international verification that non-nuclear-weapon states are not diverting nuclear material from peaceful uses to weapons and (indirectly, through the IAEA Statute) provide a mechanism to respond to non-compliance with that key nonproliferation undertaking.

I've made a few corrections in the preamble and the number of treaty parties, but I wonder if it's really worth trying to fix this. Will the fixes last or will it just fall apart?

omg, plagiarism?

Question. As a university student, I've learned to take intellectual property issues seriously, so I am wondersing, is it Wikipedia that "stole" this article from Aljazeera, or did Aljazeera copy-paste the article to its website? Please reply. (http://www.aljazeera.com/me.asp?service_ID=10317)

aljazeera.com is not the same with .net and the famous arabic channel.

If you took the time to scroll to the end of the page you would have noted that it states wikipedia as the source. NeoXtremeX 06:00, 11 May 2006 (UTC)

Psychology and Mental Health are possibly being used to control and enforce the Treaty

Those former workers in the field of nuclear weapons are possibly followed and controlled all the rest of their lives after leaving the Nuclear Weapons field. Psychologists take no Oaths to do no harm. They have unrealistic powers to violate the right to liberty in the USA. Placed unsigned by Gmvoeth on August 21, 2006

Weasel Words in Article

The article says "In New York City, on May 11, 1995, the parties to the treaty decided by consensus to extend the treaty indefinitely and without conditions."

According to Douglas Chang's Book "Nuclear Showdown: North Korea Takes on the World" the permanent members of the UN Security Council the renegged on their promise to disarm in 1995. Whoever wrote the above uses Weasel Words to makes it sound like the a love-in. Silly me. I came to Wikipedia looking for another reference, but I found weasel words in its place.

It might have been written this way to fool MUN students who have this topic for some of their conferences. Nevertheless, you are correct on your point, and I would like to add that this is not very encyclopediatic, (however you spell it). Neil the Cellist 04:42, 21 November 2006 (UTC)

Russia's position on Iran and weapons of mass destruction

RIA Novosti, December 18, 2006 Simesa 19:27, 21 December 2006 (UTC)

Footnote number 10

Way too POV and the content does reflect what was said in the Source article.

Israel "unconfirmed"

Somebody removed "unconfirmed" before "nuclear power", where it refers to Israel in the introduction. The structure of the sentence doesn't make any sense now, as the idea seems to have been to distinguish between those nuclear states not in the NNPT that have admitted possession of nuclear weapons from those that haven't. I was thinking of making it "presumed nuclear power," as I recognize that Israel is "unconfirmed" only in the most formal sense. But this is a very sensitive issue. Thoughts? Kyle Cronan 20:38, 18 April 2007 (UTC)

"Presumed" works for me. Israel has had enough slips in it policy of nuclear ambiguity (or -- as Avner Cohen says -- "opacity") that everyone knows the real status. Since Vanunu, Israel's claims that it will not be the first country to introduce nuclear weapons makes one wonder what they mean by "introduce." Avner Cohen (in his book Israel and the Bomb) says that some time in the 1960s then Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Warnke asked then Israeli Ambassador to the United States Yitzhak Rabin what Israel meant by this wording. Warnke suggested that it meant something having nuclear weapons ready to assemble and use. Rabin disagreed, saying to "introduce" nuclear weapons you would at least have to test them. In that light, Israel's policy amounts to a combination of a no first use and a no first test policy. NPguy 00:55, 19 April 2007 (UTC)

The verbal contortions are pretty ridiculous. I was reading an article in the Jerusalem post recently, and was interested to learn that the euphemism that's used to refer to Israel's possession of nuclear weapons is apparently "Dimona", where the bombs are made. You'd think that a policy of official denial would at least preclude their using the possession of nuclear weapons as a rhetorical argument. Anyway, I made the change. Kyle Cronan 23:08, 19 April 2007 (UTC)

Need to add Iraq

Iraq also violated the NPT, multiple times and in multiple ways. I do know Saddam had a hidden uranium enrichment program, but I don't have the details or the time at the moment. I suggest somebody fill it in. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 75.212.108.54 (talk) 22:43, 8 February 2007 (UTC).

How many participants?

In the beginning of the text and in the chart on the right side I can find two different numbers of participants of the NPT. 188 and 187. Probably the latter one refers to the opting out of North Korea. Is that right? Philipp 212.191.80.152 23:28, 31 May 2006 (UTC)

The best number is probably 189. The number changes over time, as new nations come into existence. At present there are generally recognized 193 sovereign nations -- the 192 members of the United nations plus the Holy See. Three countries (India, Israel and Pakistan) have never signed; one (North Korea) acceded to the NPT in 1985 but withdrew in 2003. The two newest sovereign nations are Serbia and Montenegro, successor states to what was until 2006 the unified Republic of Serbia and Montenegro. Their status under the NPT has yet to be formalized, but as successor states to an NPT party they are expected to formalize their status as NPT parties. NPguy 16:40, 10 March 2007 (UTC)

If there are really only 3-4 nonsignatories, the article should state that explicitly and list them. This is more usable than simply listing 187 or so signatories. Can we have more confirmation of this? JWB 22:15, 1 May 2007 (UTC)

The UN web site [2] lists treaty status by country. Montenegro is listed as acceding to the NPT in 2006. That makes for three non-signatories (India, Israel and Pakistan) and one additional non-party (North Korea), which withdrew from the Treaty in 2003. So the treaty ias 189 parties and is the most widely accepted treaty of its type (arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation). Of treaties I am familiar with, only the UN Charter has more parties (192). NPguy 03:21, 2 May 2007 (UTC)

Israel and the Iranian problem

I find it peculiar that there is no discussion of the significance of Israel’s nuclear weaponry, which though unofficial has been supported by far more first hand evidence than North Korea’s self-promoting rhetoric.

I find this peculiar because, Israel in geo-political terms represents a major source of conflict in the Middle East, obviously with the Palestinians, but also with Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and most significantly - Iran.

Iran’s whole nuclear program is based from their own perspective of a militaristic strategy to maintain their sovereignty against Israel and America. The question begs an answer, if Israel has nukes and America and the UN do nothing, why is it different for Iran? This is how most people in the Middle East see the situation – that is – complete hypocrisy. Yet none of this is discussed on the main page, why not? This is the most immediate and significant issue in nuclear proliferation and global politics – this should be addressed.

Israel also refuses to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty – another interesting fact in itself – yet this too is not formally dealt with on the main page?

---

I find it "peculiar" that you don't seem to understand the history of the conflict, or the fact that palestine was british land, which was previously taken by force by the turks, the romans, etc etc. If the muslims wanted the land, they should have won the illegal war that they started, but they didn't. Your ignorant assumption that Iran is illegally pursuing a hidden nuclear weapons program only for their sovereignty makes me laugh. If Iran wanted nukes, they could simply withdrawl from the treaty. But they didn't, they broke it instead. Israel never signed the treay. Israel doesn't support terrorists. Israel isn't an unelected government. Israel has not publicly stated the desire to see Iran destroyed. People like you make me disregard wikipedia for historical or political knowledge, because wikipedia is so biased in those subjects.

Israel isn't a signatory of the NPT, and has a large arsenal of nukes. Iran is a signatory of the NPT, and has not violated the terms of the treaty-no matter how much any editors here might want it to have. 'Terrorism' (whatever that means) has nothing to do with the NPT. Relative democratic deficiencies of either the Iranian or Israeli governments (and there are plenty of both)is also irrelevant to the NPT. Please remember to sign your edits.Felix-felix 08:38, 8 February 2007 (UTC)

---

Iran is NOT in violation of the NPT? WHOA! So the fact that they didn't declare their 15 year old hidden uranium enrichment program is NOT a violation of the treaty? Perhaps you need to check your facts Felix. Israel is not in volation of the NPT, because they never signed it. Which is a lot better than the unelected muslim countries like Libya, Iraq, and Iran who DID sign it and decided to break it.

(signature)

NWS Violations

If I understand the treaty, Nuclear Weapon States were supposed to reduce and eliminate their nuclear arsenals. Yet the US specifically has developed new types of nukes. Likely so have other NWS.

Also isn't it a violation for a NWS to threaten a non-NWS with nukes? Didn't the US threaten Iraq with nukes before the 2003 invasion? I think a whole section should be written on NWS violations, especially if a section is written about Iran potentially violating the NPT in the future. Earth as one 05:27, 8 February 2006 (UTC)

• I agree. Not just the US but the UK, France, China and Russia have ignored the provision to disarm and this should be emphasised moe in the article. Guinnog 08:11, 8 February 2006 (UTC)

The treaty doesn't set a deadline for disarmament, so strictly speaking there may be no violation there. This seems to be about the strongest text in the Treaty that I've noticed so far:

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Stating that any power is in violation of the treaty would be incorrect. Discussing alleged violations accurately and NPOV may be difficult. Aaron McDaid (talk - contribs) 00:30, 9 February 2006 (UTC)

This is indeed the relevant bit. To my mind it is indisputable that no country has 'pursued negotiations in good faith...a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.'; if they had done, we would certainly have achieved that condition by now. I agree that making such a statement in the article would be controversial, but I think it is important that the article reflects this breach of the spirit and (arguably) the letter of the treaty. Guinnog 00:48, 9 February 2006 (UTC)

I would suggest while there are nuclear powers that are non signatories to the treaty, there won't be any expectation of significant disarmament for existing powers, clearly the first part of the paragraph quoted (halting the nuclear arms race) was achieved to an extent through SALT and SALT II. Whether there ever will be complete disarmament is another question, but I presume a realistic prerequisite is for all nations either nuclear or considered to have the means to become so would have to be party to the treaty first, which doesn't look likely to happen for now. Sfnhltb 05:16, 10 April 2006 (UTC)

The relevant piece, cited above, is Article VI of the NPT. The basic obligation is to "pursue negotiations in good faith" toward three goals. The first goal was the very immediate practical concern at the time the NPT sent into force (1970) of ending the nuclear arms race. The end of the Cold War essentially achieved this goal. The second is the challenging goal of nuclear disarmament. There has actually been significant progress toward that goal; nuclear arsenals today are less than a third of their peak levels and the trend continues downward But there are limits to how low the major powers will be willing to go so long as some states continue to expand their arsenals (China, India, Israel, North Korea and Pakistan) and at least one other seems bent on developing a nuclear weapon capability (Iran). It is hard to imagine getting all the way to zero without a fundamental transformation in international security. The third NPT disarmament goal is "general and complete disarmament," which seems like a noble but but essentially unrealistic aspiration. Another point to bear in mind is that Article VI is an obligation on all NPT parties, not just the nuclear weapon states. Thus, it is more than a little hypocritical for Iran to complain of the lack of progress on disarmament when its actions are partly responsible for that lack of progress. NPguy 17:04, 10 March 2007 (UTC)

I have to ask, even if it may seem outrageously obvious, what evidence is there that China, Iran and North Korea are expanding their arsenal? Given that you wrote this response in March, would you change your position now given that the intelligence community now publicly says that Iran may have suspended its weapons program in 2003, and the six-party talks seem to be progressing very well for North Korea? Jsw663 (talk) 14:32, 7 December 2007 (UTC)

I don't follow the open source literature in detail, so I don't have sources for the assertions about China; you might check the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. My understanding is that China is slowly modernizing and expanding its strategic missile forces, but its stockpile is likely to remain small.

North Korea has frozen its known plutonium production program, and I think we would know from open sources (including leaks) if there were indications North Korea was restarting that program. So I would take them off the list.

I have not modified my opinion about Iran. I was careful to say that Iran was seeking a "nuclear weapon capability," rather than "nuclear weapons." The greatest challenge Iran faces in achieving that capability is mastering enrichment. I am persuaded by arguments that Iran's enrichment program does not make economic sense as part of a civil program. Considering Iran's systematic efforts to hide its enrichment program, I conclude that the purpose of this program is to acquire the ability to produce highly enriched uranium for weapons. The recent National Intelligence Estimate says the enrichment program is continuing and will likely give Iran a weapons capability by 2015, and that Iran is seeking that capability. When it says the weapons program was halted it is referring only to weapons design and covert enrichment. The biggest change since 2002 is that Iran's formerly covert enrichment program is now open to IAEA safeguards. By the way, I am not persuaded by arguments that Iran has no need for nuclear power, and I don't see Bushehr as a significant proliferation problem. NPguy (talk) 03:07, 8 December 2007 (UTC)

Once again, thanks for your opinion. They are most enlightening for someone like myself who hasn't been keeping up with (open source) news lately. Jsw663 (talk) 18:27, 10 December 2007 (UTC)

US and India: International Legal Situation of US as Blatant NPT Violator

If this article is not to be pro-US propaganda there needs to be a major section analyzing whether the US is and has itself been in violation of the treaty -- while using the NPT vociferously against North Korea, Iran, etc.

Transfer of nuclear-assisting technology to Israel, failure to disarm itself, and now the strikingly blatant agreement to transfer technology to India -- anything else?

Focusing on this last issue, India, what is the actual international legal situation that the US will be in?

If the US is in obvious, non-debatable, violation of the treaty -- openly exporting to a non-NPT nation which is openly engaging in nuclear weapons production -- what enforcement mechanisms are supposed to come into force against the US under international law?

Is the US supposed to be suspended/evicted from the NPT treaty organization?

Are NPT members supposed to be banned from some/all technology transfers to the US?

"Dual-use technologies" like... say... chewing gum?

Is the US supposed to be subjected to crushing economic sanctions, no-fly zones, a low level bombing campaign, and finally regime change?  : |

Posted (without signature) by 75.7.5.252 on 21 December 2006

First, the U.S. will not be transferring weapons or enrichment technology to India and will be gaining oversight over India's civilian program. [3] This is a great deal for the world, and the IAEA gets to approve it first. Second, there is no evidence that the U.S. transferred weapons technology to Israel (France and Britain, yes - see Israel and weapons of mass destruction). Third, if you want regime change in the U.S., earn citizenship and vote. Simesa 18:22, 21 December 2006 (UTC)

President Bush's decision to seek full civil nuclear cooperation with India does not, by itself, violate the NPT. The Treaty allows nuclear exports to countries like India that are not parties to the NPT, so long as the exports take place are under safeguards by the IAEA to verify that they are not diverted for weapons use. What this nuclear cooperation would do is to undermine longstanding efforts, which the United States led, to further limit nuclear cooperation with countries that have nuclear programs outside of IAEA safeguards. President Bush made a huge concession to India, for which he received essentially nothing in return. He was gambling that improved U.S.-India relations would make it worth betting the crown jewels of our nonproliferation policy. Yet there is still hope that the nuclear establishment in India, so proud of its splendid isolation, will sink the deal. NPguy 17:19, 10 March 2007 (UTC)

Since much of the material used for building a civilian nuclear reactor is the same as that needed for a military one, the question will lie on the purpose of the deal, plus what the recipient party intends to do with the assistance it receives, and most importantly, whether this state can be trusted not to turn this assistance, after receiving it, into a military nuclear weapons manufacturing plant. But due to the uncertainty of what India will do with the US help it receives, it is arguable whether this deal violates the NPT.

Others have also argued that the deal violates the spirit of the NPT, since the NPT was created with the aim of eventual denuclearization by ALL states, including the current nuclear-weapon states (NWS or the 'P5'). Still others have accused the US of double standards - if this deal is 'legal', then what makes the Russia-Iran deal 'illegal'? In a way both deals can violate Article I of the NPT by 'encouraging' these states to develop nuclear weapons! Just because the US trusts India and not Iran doesn't make one situation legal and the other illegal; Russia may hold an opposite view. Nevertheless, committed nuclear non-proliferation groups have been highly displeased with these two deals as they see it as a product of self-interest rather than any commitment to the idealistic goal of CVID (i.e. denuclearization, or Complete, Verifiable, Irreversible Disarmament) of this planet's states. Hope this info helps. Jsw663 18:12, 29 March 2007 (UTC)

I think both the U.S.-India deal and the Russia-Iran deal are both bad for non-proliferation. Both create bad incentives, by rewarding countries that either stayed out of or violated the NPT. But as ill-advised as they may be, I don't think either is illegal. While there are similarities between military and civil nuclear programs, there are also differences. There are also legal barriers to bar Iran or India from misusing imported nuclear goods for weapons and verification measures to detect most violations of that legal constraint. NPguy 02:20, 30 March 2007 (UTC)

Peaceful Use

The section of this article dealint with peaceful uses of nuclear energy contains a number of misconceptions. For example, the Treaty does not grant a right to peceful use of nuclear energy. Rather, it recognizes a right of all sovereign states. For NPT parties, that right is conditioned by the Treaty on the state's compliance with Articles I and II, which contain the Treaty's basic nonproliferation obligations. Second, the Treaty recognizes a right to "use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes," not a right of access to specific nuclear technology such as enrichment. This is important for understanding the legal status of Iran's enrichment program and of international efforts to discourage the spread of enrichment technology by offering assurances of nuclear fuel supply.

Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.

NPguy 18:38, 10 March 2007 (UTC)

The quote is obviously not wrong as it is lifted straight out of Art IV:1, but your interpretation isn't quite correct there. I'll highlight the quote in question: "Nothing... as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop...".

This doesn't say that all sovereign states, even the non-NPT ones, have an 'inalienable right' to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. If so, there is no need for the treaty in the first place if it is just recognizing what already exists. The whole point of the treaty is to get states IN COMPLIANCE with the NPT, which is why non-nuclear states, in return for a pledge to remain nuclear weapons-free, will be granted help by the P5 nuclear states with regards to civilian nuclear energy (e.g. non-military nuclear reactors). Once again you don't seem to have understood this point, NPguy. After all, you still haven't pointed out any international law which grants all states the right to pursue nuclear energy for peaceful purposes even without the pledge they must give to the NPT. Once again, remember what you perceive as effective reality, and what is true under international law, can be very different. Jsw663 18:02, 29 March 2007 (UTC)

This is all wrong. An "inalienable" right is one that can't be taken away. The Declaration of Independence did not "grant" the inalienable right to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." By using the term "inalienable," Jefferson was asserting a basic human right. See my comments on the Six-Party Talks discussion page. NPguy 02:08, 30 March 2007 (UTC)

I've responded re the DPRK program on the six-party talks page. Art IV:1 clearly says inalienable right of parties to the treaty, not inalienable rights of all States, otherwise

• a) there is no need to say "parties to the treaty" rather than "States",
• b) there is no incentive / benefit for states to sign up to the NPT (if so how do you explain the 180+ states that did?),
• c) 'inalienable' under international law was not given by any American or any US document but rather by the legal systems of the world, esp. the older ones in Europe + UK, and international law is not affected by any domestic, or national, law such as the US',
• d) you are reinterpreting the purpose of the creation of the NPT in the first place, which was nuclear non-proliferation, not simply to reassert UN-given rights, and
• e) Respecting sovereignty to the degree you are advocating means that there is no purpose of creating a UNSC for decisions, since no action can ever be 'legally' taken, say, for intervention for various purposes including human rights. This is clearly false. Until you come up with a proper legal argument to challenge me via an actual UN law or case to support your stance, then I'm afraid what you say holds little water - I highly doubt I'd be wrong after so many years in this field but still am, of course, open to other editors' interpretations, esp. when supported by valid sources. Jsw663 07:37, 30 March 2007 (UTC)

You are mistaken in your belief that it is unlawful that non-parties to the NPT to have nuclear power. Witness the 1993 IAEA Safeguards Agreement for Pakistan to import an a Nuclear Power Station from China INFCIRC/418 in compliance with Artice III.2 of the NPT. Rwendland 10:25, 30 March 2007 (UTC)

Let me respond to jsw663 point by point:

a) The reason Article IV.1 refers to "parties to the Treaty" rather than "states" is that a treaty only expresses agreements and undertakings of its parties. It is silent on -- and as a matter of international it cannot afffect -- the rights and obligations of states that are not parties.

b) There are several incentives:

• moral standing / making a moral statement against nuclear weapons / nuclear proliferation
• access to nuclear cooperation (Article IV.2). Other policies outside the NPT strengthen this incentive. In particular, the Nuclear Suppliers Group agreed in 1992 not to engage in any nuclear cooperation with states with nuclear weapons programs. The damaging thing about the U.S.-India nuclear deal is that it undercuts this principle.
• security benefits from mutual confidence among non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) that other NNWS parties are committed to verifiably forgo nuclear weapons.
• leverage for nuclear disarmament on the part of nuclear weapon states.

c) "inalienable" rights by their nature are not "granted" but recognized as inherent in the nature of sovereign states. I believe that the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other sovereign states was first recognized formally in the Treaty of Westphalia. I think this was the 1648 treaty that ended the thirty years war that embroiled Europe in religious conflict between protestants and catholics.

d) I think you mistake my point. The NPT was clearly intended to stem nuclear proliferation. The purpose of Article IV.1 is not to create a right to peaceful nuclear energy but to recognize that right and at the same to limit that right by requiring it to be exercised only in conformity with the nonproliferation purposes of the Treaty.

e) I'm not sure what youre getting at, but the legitimacy of UN Security Council action is embodied in the UN Charter itself. States may surrender their autonomy voluntarily through treaties, such as the UN Charter. UN members have agreed to limit their autonomy in favor of the common benefit of having an organization that can respond to threats to international peace and security. Thus, as a UN member, Iran is obliged to accept the demand of the Security Council that it suspend its uranium enrichment program. NPguy 14:39, 30 March 2007 (UTC)

This is in effect a reply to both Rwedland + NPguy -

a) Agreed, but with a little caveat. In the case of nuclear non-proliferation, the NPT may be silent on the rights / restrictions it can impose on non-NPT states, but that doesn't necessarily mean that non-NPT parties can also be assumed to have been given the same unconditional rights as parties to the NPT. See later for more on this...

b) Absolutely agreed.

c) Regarding the history of the term and its recognition under national law, I agree. I am not even contesting on the nature of how 'inalienable' the right is for NPT members. I am questioning the 'inalineability' of such a right to non-NPT parties. Again, see below...

d) I also agree that the Treaty is recognizing the right of parties to the NPT, but it does not explicitly recognize an equal such right to non-NPT members. The right is not given unconditionally and equally to all parties to the UN, whether a NPT signatory or not. As you also pointed out, the NPT governs the extent of the right it recognizes non-P5 NPT states have. However, as you also say, it is silent on the existence of such rights / its limits for non-NPT states. If such a right was inalienable and given to all to an unlimited fashion, there would not need to be Rwedland's case about strict governance re the nuclear material transferred in the Pak-Chn deal. Why would states be willing to give up certain rights in exchange for nothing (most states are not affected in their decision-making by the mere 'morality' or recognition of international law), after all, or enter into treaties that voluntarily binds itself, unless there is something to be gained from it? Silence does NOT mean they recognize the same rights for non-NPT-signatories. Sure, you may quote the Pak-Chn, Irn-Rus, Ind-US deals as perfect examples as how such actions are in effect recognizing the same rights (hence a powerful argument against how the nuclear non-p. regime is failing) but this does not mean such rights are explicitly recognized to as full an extent (or at all?) for these states. I know you say that such rights do not need to be granted ('positive rights') by the NPT, nor are there explicit restrictions ('negative rights') concerning this inalienable rights by the UN Charter, but silence doesn't mean equal recognition either. In effect, we are having a debate of whether to stress the INALIENABLE RIGHTS of each party (your stance), or whether they are INALIENABLE RIGHTS OF ALL PARTIES OF THE TREATY (my stance). But due to an absence of confirmation either by law, the IAEA or the NPT explicitly on the rights of non-NPT signatories to be recognized under international law, I am not willing to make the further assumption or inference that that automatically implies the international law recognizes that these non-NPT signatory states also have an equal, inalienable right.

So what supports my stance? Curiously, Rwedland's case above. It never states an 'inalienable right' of Pakistan to develop their civilian nuclear energy in that deal. It places an infinite amount of restrictions on how such nuclear material is to be used and developed, and ONLY after the IAEA gave its express permission to exempt such a deal from certain Safeguards and Restrictions, etc (Section 6). Never once does it say that such a deal is granted automatically already under international law; it makes clear that this is an exceptional situation (that required IAEA approval). This means that the 'right' to civilian nuclear energy is never an 'inalienable right' at all (therefore there is no recognition of such a right either), but rather, that non-NPT states, when wanting to engage in civilian nuclear energy deals with NPT signatories, must be placed under similar heavy, NPT-like restrictions and must be granted approval by the IAEA.

e) This was in reply to your defense of the 'inalienable right' to pursue such deals under the laws of 'sovereign rights' and 'sovereignty'. I was merely replying that international law on 'sovereign rights' does NOT include the right to develop nuclear material / build nuc. reactors, etc. for civilian / peaceful purposes on its soil. I'm not saying there is a law preventing this either. As you said earlier, there is no law governing this. However, what I'm saying is that there is no law that recognizes the 'inalienable right' of any UN state to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes for non-NPT signatories either, that's all, since this is an inference / assumption.

The UNSC example was only to take your argument a step further; if you said 'sovereignty' allowed a state to do anything it wanted to within its territorial boundaries, then the UNSC would never be able to enforce most of its security decisions, which requires it to override national sovereignty to execute, such as human rights peacekeepers in Bosnia, Afghanistan, etc. The only time such 'sovereignty' can override a UNSC 'decision' is a case like Sudan, because China said it would threaten to veto such a decision. Since the US, UK and France desperately want their proposed Resolution to be carried out (rather than totally junked by a China veto), they would rather use China to put pressure on Sudan so that they (the three) can achieve the same effects it would have under a proper UNSCR. However, China interprets 'sovereignty' in this situation very strictly, just as the US does when protecting Israel, but this does not mean that the concept of sovereignty under international law is so strong that it bars UNSC decisions to override it in certain situations. Only the political agendas of the P5 can override this.

So in effect, we are not in total disagreement, but rather, on the different conceptions of the finer details. I'll reply re the DPRK material on the 6-party talks page. Jsw663 19:20, 30 March 2007 (UTC)

This is frustrating. We seem to be talking past one another. I think we have different conceptions of the word "right." jsw663 views rights as things that are granted; I view them as things that are inherent. I went into some detail on that point in another discussion -- probably the six-party talks page -- in relation to basic principles of international law. In my conception (which I think is consistent with those principles), rights have to do with the what a sovereign state may do on its own. A state therefore has no right to assistance from any other state. Much of the discussion above seems to deal with a "right" to nuclear cooperation. Certainly non-parties have no "right" to benefit from cooperation from NPT parties, but even among NPT parties I think it is incorrect to talk about the commitments to nuclear cooperation in terms of rights.

I suppose you could call this a libertarian approach to the inherent rights and freely undertaken obligations of sovereign states. I don't consider myself libertarian in general, but in international law it seems that I am.

The NPT is less a statement of rights than a contract. Each of the parties agrees to do -- or not do -- certain things in exchange for agreement by other parties to act similarly. Parties can complain that other parties are not living up to their obligations under the NPT and may seek redress, including through the UN Charter. I think we agree on the nature of the NPT bargain. Perhaps we are just disagreeing on whether to characterize the elements of that bargain as "rights."

More generally, I think talking about "rights" under the NPT leads to logical and rhetorical pitfalls that countries such as Iran can exploit. Iran asserts that the IAEA Board of Governors and the UN Security Council are violating its "rights." Nonsense. Iran agreed to limit its freedom of action -- its "rights," if you will -- when it joined the UN, ratified the NPT, and concluded a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Now, having entered into those agreements freely and having benefitted from nuclear cooperation that would not have been available otherwise, Iran has no legitimate basis to complain that its "rights" are being compromised when the Security Council demands that it suspend enrichment-related activities. Such consequences were inherent in the agreements Iran entered into freely.

So I propose that we not argue about rights. Rather, let us try to agree on the nature of commitments NPT parties have made to each other. NPguy 03:08, 18 April 2007 (UTC)

Sorry for taking so long to reply. I agree, more or less. But if the intelligence community now determines that Iran may have actually suspended its nuclear weapons program back in 2003, then does this make the US complaining about Russian assistance to Iran's Bushehr (right?) plant justifiable, or is there a difference here compared to, say, US assistance for India? Jsw663 (talk) 14:27, 7 December 2007 (UTC)

The United States stopped opposing Russia's supply of fuel for Bushehr several years ago, when Russia agreed to require that spent fuel be shipped back to Russia. The package offered by the P5 plus Germany included an assured fuel supply for Bushehr. I think the United States would have preferred that the Security Council sanctions require Russia to hold up fuel supply to Bushehr, but Russia would have vetoed such a resolution. Russia still has not yet shipped the fuel and appears to be slow-rolling. NPguy (talk) 03:16, 8 December 2007 (UTC)

Another subject of NNPT is available.

NNPT also refers to somthing related to computers (NNPT servers, NNPT forum etc.) I was looking for that kind of information and I found this.

If anyone know what it is, please add it. thanks :) DorTheScripter 17:29, 21 June 2007 (UTC)

explain how to understand the NPT

I've been trying to understand the NPT, and i'm quite confused. Reading wikipedia's page hasn't really helped. It would help if the following questions were answered :

1. It is mentioned in the NPT that nuclear research and development is to be supported by the parties of the treaty "within the framework of the IAEA safeguards system". What is the "safeguard system" used by the IAEA ? Is it the INFCIRC/153 (Corrected) ?

2. Do the safeguards vary from country to country ? As in, is there a standard safeguard system ? Or do different countries make different deals with the IAEA (to satisfy the NPT) ?

3. Is there any prohibition in the NPT that member countries can't trade nuclear knowledge with non member counties (even if it is only for peaceful purposes) ?

Thank you for your help--Nia TTH 16:42, 10 September 2007 (UTC)