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User:Scartol/sandbox2

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If you're looking for the funny fake userpage I once made, it's here.

Title(s) Location Description
Thing 01 Thing 02 Thing 03

Comments on Banquo

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  • The last part of "Source" feels out of place. Starting with "In any case, Shakespeare manages to separate Banquo from the King's murder...", these sentences seem more appropriate in the "Foil to Macbeth" section.
  • Sometimes King is capitalized and sometimes it's not; you should decide which way you want to go and standardize them. (Usually king is only capitalized when referring to a specific named king, as in King James I.)
  • The tenses sometimes move around. I've tried to align them all with the literary present (Banquo is merely setting aside his sword...), but you should take another look to be sure I didn't miss any.

Todo for WikiProject East Timor

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Portal:Asia Wikipedia:WikiProject Southeast Asia

Make these

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Stubs

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In need of work

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Occupation

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Make sure to include

  • Ford/Kissinger meeting with Suharto
  • Breakfast in Dili...
  • Moynihan's comments
  • Discussion of 200,000 number
  • B&L 49–51
  • 1999=Sandy Berger
  • Timor Gap

CIA on Komodo

  • Dunn 153 and 160; Taylor 58

US Govt on invasion

  • Budiardjo 8–13
  • R-H 87–95 and 112 (incl. Moynihan)

Australia's role

  • R-H 75–85
  • Dunn 196-197

Balzac

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Organizing La Comédie Humaine

  • Lawton 310
  • Oliver 164

For Le Chef-D'oeuvre inconnu: Image:Picasso qga.jpg

International involvement

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The United States, Australia, and other powerful governments supported Indonesia throughout its occupation of East Timor. As Joseph Nevins writes in A Not-So-Distant Horror: Mass Violence in East Timor: "The support that its powerful allies provided to Jakarta ensured that the United Nations ... would be impotent to reverse Indonesia's annexation and protext the human rights of the East Timorese from the time of the invasion until 1999."[1]

 
US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, along with President Gerald Ford, met with Indonesian President Suharto and gave "the green light" one day before the invasion.[2]

US involvement

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On 6 December 1975 – one day before the invasion – US President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger visited Jakarta and met with Suharto.[3] Ford told Suharto: "We understand the problem you have and the intentions you have."[3] Kissinger expressed a concern about perceptions of US involvement: "You appreciate that the use of US-made arms could create problems."[3] He also expressed a desire for Indonesian forces to wait until the US leaders had left the country: "We understand your problem and the need to move quickly but I am only saying that it would be better if it were done after we returned."[3] The CIA's senior operations officer in Jakarta at the time, C. Philip Liechty, said later: "Suharto was given the green light" for the invasion by the US.[2]

Kissinger's concern about the use of US arms derived from the fact that 90 percent of the Indonesian military's equipment at the time had been supplied by the United States.[4] Successive US administrations continued support and assistance to the Indonesian military, providing over a billion dollars of armaments over thirty years. In 1977, President Jimmy Carter increased annual arms sales from US$13 million to $112 million; between 1981–1986, Ronald Reagan presided over $500 million in arms sales to Indonesia, and the administration of George H. W. Bush conducted an average of $28 million in arms sales with Indonesia each year.[5] As he campaigned for the presidency, Bill Clinton declared that he was "very concerned about the situation in East Timor"; nevertheless, his administration approved sales of military equipment totaling one billion dollars.[6][7]

The United States was also instrumental in blocking effective action by the United Nations. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, the US Ambassador to the UN at the time, wrote later in his memoirs: "The Department of State desired that the United Nations prove utterly ineffective in whatever measures it undertook. This task was given to me, and I carried it forward with no inconsiderable success."[8] The role of the mass media in shaping US public opinion of Indonesia's invasion and occupation is covered in the Canadian documentary film, Manufacturing Consent: Noam Chomsky and the Media.

Australian involvement

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In September 1974, Australian Prime Minister Gough Whitlam met with Suharto and indicated that he would support Indonesia if it annexed East Timor.[9] Although Australia supported the first UN resolution condemning the invasion (due to public pressure), the new government of Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser quickly showed signs that it was untroubled by the occupation. One report indicates that Fraser expressed approval during a visit with Suharto in October 1976; military assistance from Australia doubled in the early years of Indonesia's rule over East Timor.[10] Australia abstained from the 1976 and 1977 UN General Assembly Resolutions, and by 1978 became the first – and only – government to officially recognize East Timor as a province of Indonesia.[11] In 1984, the Minister for Foreign Affairs Bill Hayden defended Australia's realpolitik position as a way to better advocate for the suffering people of East Timor, since independence was considered impossible. He referred to the situation as a "classic instance of the apparently straightforward moral choice having potentially catastrophic consequences for all concerned".[12]

 
Soon after recognizing the annexation of East Timor in 1978, Australia began negotiations with Indonesia to divide resources found in the Timor Gap.

In 1979 Australia and Indonesia began drafting a treaty to share resources in the Timor Gap. The treaty was signed in December 1989, with estimates ranging from one to seven billion barrels of oil to be secured.[13] This agreement, along with general economic partnership with Indonesia, is frequently cited as a crucial factor for the Australian government's position.[14] As an official from the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs said in 1974: "The plain fact is that there are only 700,000 Timorese; what we are really concerned about is our relationship with 130,000,000 Indonesians!"[15]

Given that nearly 60,000 East Timorese were killed as an indirect result of Australia making East Timor a battleground during the Pacific War[16] – some Australians believed their government owed a special debt to the former Portuguese colony. James Dunn, a senior Foreign Affairs adviser to the Australian Parliament before and during the occupation, condemned the government's position, saying later: "What had been of vital strategic value in 1941 was, in 1974, irrelevant and dispensable."[17] Paddy Kenneally, an Australian commando during World War II, lambasted his government in 1995 for its support of Indonesia:

How did a grateful Australian Government repay [the East Timorese] for their loyalty, aid and faithfulness to Australia's fighting men during a most crucial period in Australian history? From Whitlam in 1974 to Keating in 1995 Australian Governments have abandoned and betrayed the people of East Timor. Through our governments we have waded through a sea of Timorese blood, and climbed over a mountain of Timor's dead, to sign the Timor Gap Treaty for economic gain with Timor's invaders. That is how we repaid the people of East Timor.[18]

Other governments

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Britain sold dozens of BAE Hawk jets to Indonesia during the occupation, some of which were used in the "encirclement and annihilation" campaign.

Britain, Canada, Japan, and other nations supported Indonesia during the occupation of East Timor. In July 1975 the British Ambassador in Jakarta wrote to London's Foreign Office: "Certainly as seen from here, it is in Britain's interest that Indonesia should absorb the territory as soon and as unobtrusively as possible, and that if ... there is a row in the United Nations, we should keep our heads down and avoid taking sides against the Indonesian Government."[19] Britain abstained from all of the UN General Assembly resolutions relating to East Timor, and sold arms throughout the occupation. In 1978 Indonesia purchased eight BAE Hawk jets, which were used during the "encirclement and annihilation" campaign. Britain sold dozens of additional jets to Indonesia in the 1990s.[20]

Canada abstained from early General Assembly resolutions about East Timor, and opposed three. The Canadian government regularly sold weapons to Indonesia during the occupation, and in the 1990s approved over CDN$400 million in exports for spare weapons parts.[21] Japan voted against all eight General Assembly resolutions regarding East Timor.[22] Dunn describes the Japanese reaction to massacres in East Timor as one of "cynical indifference".[23]

The Indian government also supported Indonesia, likening the occupation – despite many differences – to its own seizure of Goa in 1961.[24] The members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), meanwhile, consistently voted against the General Assembly resolutions calling for self-determination in East Timor.[25] The government of Malaysia contacted UDT leaders in the summer of 1975 to inform them that Malaysia would not support an independent East Timor. Some reports also charged Malaysia with laundering weapons and F-86 Sabre jets for Indonesia.[26]

The government of Portugal distanced itself from the occupation, refusing to become involved in the process.[27] As the last governor of the colony said while exiled to the island of Atauro: "The position of Lisbon is one of almost complete abandonment."[28] Successive administrations in Portugal refused to pressure Indonesia or take firm positions on the issue. The exception was President Ramalho Eanes, elected in 1982, who championed the Timorese issue of self-determination. His government spoke out for action against Indonesia, and began to pressure Indonesia to end the occupation.[29] Due to domestic pressure, the Portuguese government continued pressing for improved conditions and renewed negotiations in the 1990s.[30]

  1. ^ Nevins, p. 69.
  2. ^ a b Pilger, John. "Blood on Our Hands" 25 January 1999. Online at johnpilger.com. Retrieved on 2 February 2008.
  3. ^ a b c d US Department of State. "Embassy Jakarta Telegram 1579 to Secretary State, 6 December 1975". Online at The National Security Archive. Retrieved on 2 November 2007. In his 2006 memoir, Alatas confirms Kissinger's concern over the use of US-made arms on p. 20.
  4. ^ Budiardjo and Liong, p. 9; Nevins, p. 51. On 28 June 1977, New Jersey Representative Helen S. Meyner told the House Subcommittee on International Organizations that she had been told by an Indonesian general with regard to ABRI use of US arms: "Of course, these are the only weapons that we have." See Krieger, p. 239.
  5. ^ Nevins, pp. 53–54.
  6. ^ Nevins, pp. 59–61.
  7. ^ Larsen, Suzie. "Human Rights Are Not an Issue". Mother Jones. Retrieved on 21 February 2008.
  8. ^ Quoted in Nevins, p. 72.
  9. ^ Dunn, pp. 61.
  10. ^ Jardine, p. 45.
  11. ^ Dunn (1996), p. 345; Jardine, pp. 46–47; Taylor (1991), p. 170.
  12. ^ Quoted in Chinkin, p. 277.
  13. ^ Aditjondro (1999), p. 25.
  14. ^ Nevins, pp. 62–64; Dunn (1996), pp. 348–349; Chinkin, p. 286; Taylor (1991), pp. 170–171; Kohen and Taylor, p. 107.
  15. ^ Quoted in Dunn (1996), p. 124.
  16. ^ Dunn (1996), pp. 19–22; Wesley-Smith, p. 85; Jardine, p. 22.
  17. ^ Dunn (1996), p. 120.
  18. ^ Quoted in Wesley-Smith, pp. 85–86.
  19. ^ Quoted in Budiardjo and Liong, p. 10.
  20. ^ Jardine, pp. 50–51.
  21. ^ Jardine, pp. 48–49.
  22. ^ Jardine, p. 49–50.
  23. ^ Dunn (1996), p. 311.
  24. ^ Dunn (1996), p. 312. The differences included a long-standing territorial claim by India to Goa; the absence of a decolonization program in Goa; and significant historic separations which existed in the case of East Timor, which did not hold true with regard to Goa.
  25. ^ Dunn, pp. 311–312.
  26. ^ Budiardjo and Liong, pp. 13–14.
  27. ^ Kohen and Taylor, pp. 108–111; Budiardjo and Liong, pp. 151–152.
  28. ^ Quoted in Taylor (1991), p. 171.
  29. ^ Taylor (1991), pp. 172–174.
  30. ^ Jardine, p. 67.
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