Wikipedia talk:United States Education Program/Courses/Politics of Piracy (Kevin Gorman and Katie Gilmore)/Timeline/3

The statement that "the public deserves to get what it wants" can be problematic in copyright law. This may sound strange coming from someone who identifies herself as a socialist, but under a system in which arts are treated as commodities and artists are not supported by the public, artists need to be able to earn money from their work. I would like to emphasize that artists must benefit from ownership of their work, not publishers/studios/record labels etc. Our current copyright laws clearly benefit these industries at the expense of artists and the general public (no surprises here, seeing as Congress only operates when it is bought by the highest bidders). However, as Stallman points out, file sharing technology is developing faster than industry can shut it down. Artists have new opportunities to bypass publishers/studios/record labels etc. and release their work to the public directly, whether for free or cost. These industries are fighting a losing battle, and soon they will become extinct anyways. Legislation should definitely promote this demise of greedy middlemen and support artists and the public. The more impact the public has upon legislation, the closer we are to a society in which art is truly supported by the public, therefore a system in which the public gets what it wants. EHammid (talk) 02:32, 14 February 2012 (UTC)

It sounds like you're simply anti-business. Record labels can still play a valuable role in the development of music—as curators, in a sense. If you can imagine a world without record labels, it's easy to see that, over time, experts in what music would become most popular, and in the means to produce and market it, would eventually organize to provide their services in a unified way. No artist is forced to sign with a record label—rightly—but in most cases the benefits outweigh the disadvantages.

So I suppose the point I'm making here is that there are several connected issues at play here, and I think you've improperly combined them. The record labels do take a good portion of sales, leaving all but the most popular of artists with little in earnings. However, the free market allows artists to go around the record labels (it always has, and it's easier now than ever), mitigating the complaint. Artists choose labels because of the valuable services they provide. Another issue you raise is what you perceive as an unwillingness of people to pay for music. I would argue that people are very willing to pay for work, when it is reasonably priced and not limited with DRM and the like. Some of the best examples are Radiohead's release of In Rainbows, and Louis CK's release of his comedy video.

How should legislation promote the "demise of greedy middlemen?" Should record labels be outlawed? Short of that, what could legislation reasonably do?

Jwhite88 (talk) 08:00, 14 February 2012 (UTC)

Stallman suggests that the public "deserves to get what it wants." Do you think this is a good standard to use in developing copyright? If you do think so - how could we gauge the want of the public? If not - what would be a better metric?

While I do think this sentiment works as a standard for copyright law, the rhetoric Stallman uses here is problematic because it has no broad scope. The public might like it if the government gave them free cars, but that doesn't mean they deserve it. I think a stronger case could be made by making this standard more specific; perhaps Stallman should have said that the public "deserves information to be free and useable" instead. To respond to another comment made on this subject, while there are clear flaws in allowing the arts to be commodified and paid for privately, the idea of the government controlling art is no less frightening. Art has long been a form of expression for those seeking governmental reform or transformation or dissolution or what-have-you, and I wouldn't want to trust the government to provide for that kind of art. This would create to much room for censorship, and would undermine something that I see as being one of the most important functions of art. 67.169.112.131 (talk) 04:45, 14 February 2012 (UTC)lesldock

I'm certainly anti-business. Record labels have historically played a role of selecting and categorizing music from great talents, but they also sign contracts with artists who will sell well and not necessarily the wide variety of talented artists. The market has a tremendous influence over the type and quality of music that record labels sell. You can't play a 20 minute song on the radio. A long song without a distinct chorus is difficult to capture in a commercial. Government funded art would not necessarily mean censorship of art. It depends upon the political regime. If the people are in control of their collective funds, they can choose to support the kind of art that they want. The market provides not what the people think they want, but what their subconsciouses want. EHammid (talk) 19:13, 14 February 2012 (UTC)

Copyright, Copywrong (I bet I'm the first person to make that joke ever)

Oh wow, so I had no idea of the initial philosophy behind/intention of Copyright. It indeed certainly has become quite transformed since then. The difference between a bargain between content creators and society vs ownership is a pretty big one I think, and that the rhetoric of debates over copyright have definitely steered towards the latter. So what would these debates look like if we reorient back to the social bargain idea (btw, was this idea about copyright something that came out of the Enlightenment/were Enlightenment people talking about it?). It is hard to imagine that for me, actually. Additionally, I feel the internet and the exponential ease of proliferation of information and media have changed the landscape of these issues so dramatically, that in both concepts of Copyright they are difficult issues to deal with. I feel if we followed the idea from historical origins, there would be much less power over corporations and entities that are constantly up in arms and threatening lawsuits over these issues. The sheer power that these organizations hold would seem ridiculous when viewed that content is for the benefit of society. Yes, these entities would still be in the business for profit, but I think there would be less toleration (from society, political entities, and perhaps the courts) of this almost brute force over silly/minor copyright issues (like really, a professor being threatened over publishing things related to how a DVD works?!?) if we stuck to historical origins. Also, we may be less tolerant of publishers and middlemen in general reaping so much of the profit from media and content creation (as Evelyn said above, which I quite agree with). If we kept to viewing these issues in a social bargain mindset, then yes we would be trying to find the best way for society overall to benefit, and not just large entities which hold huge amounts of power over content distribution.

Now, in light of the internet and all the problems that has caused for Copyright debates. The internet has greatly facilitated consumption of content, from copyrighted to just amateur content, through legal and illegal means. But I think it also is obvious that the internet has facilitated the creation of content, and the ability to find content from new creators who may not be publishing/advertising through traditional means. This democratization of the internet can definitely be argued as a good for society, for both creators and consumers. It is really hard to think of the landscape of discussion over Copyright following historical implications. I am not familiar with enough of the issues surrounding Copyright (yet!), but I know that in both cases the Internet definitely raises new problems and poses tough questions for all sides of these issues. Charlotte (talk) 05:40, 14 February 2012 (UTC)

I don't think that its accurate to characterize Stallman's argument as an entitlement complex for the public. While he certainly does argue that the purpose of information- specifically the arts- should be in the interest of the "readers," his argument does not imply that the public deserves content to be free as in beer, or as in cars to use a well-tread metaphor. The comparison between open content and free cars is a gross mischaracterization of the public's stake in legislating copyright. A car is a material good, which is the end result of both materials and manufacturing costs, as well as "intellectual property" investments in design and engineering. Comparatively, a creative work, especially in the digital era, has almost no distribution or manufacturing cost after the product has been made, which immediately distinguishes it from a free car. No one is arguing that a "seller," for lack of a better term, should not be entitled to returns for their work. However, Stallman argues that these returns are meant to incentivise production for the greater public good, not capitalized upon to draw the most profit.

Stallman's "sentiment" is that current legislation of copyright has deviated from the social and historical contexts from which it was conceived. He argues that legislating copyright as a "balance of interests" between the users and the producers is flawed because it gives the "right" to the content producers to pursue their own interests at cost to the public in the name of "balance." The trend in copyright law has shown a very asymmetrical shift in power between these two parties, which runs contra to what the original purpose of these laws were in the first place.

Returning the purpose of the arts to the public good, as opposed to commercialization and exploitation, is not feeding an entitled public free give-aways. Stallman argues that legislation which attempts to limit the utility and mobility of such information has deviated from the principles of promoting public good which copyright law was designed to facilitate, and that the public deserves better.

Free media is not about free as in beer, but free as in utility. To use a car analogy, Stallman's argument is not analogous to asking why members of the public are not given free cars at no cost. It is about legislation that would limit the utility of, criminalize the modification of, control the maintenance of, and prohibit the resale of said car so that the interests of the automobile manufacturing sector can be protected.

The scope of this argument is to specifically identify the deviation from a copyright's intended purpose of incentivised production of content which benefits the public to a commercialized marketplace which limits public utility of content in order to maximize profits. The example of Napster is often viewed only through the lens of its economic impact- that users could have access to content on terms other than that of the music industry. There is a second aspect of Napster, in that it was part of a greater ecosystem of listeners and artists. I would argue that the public "deserves" access to this ecosystem. The introduction of digital technology has led to many distributed and experimental pricing methods. Not all of these experiments are profitable, and until a solution is reached it is very likely that the profits will be less than those imposed by the content industries. However, attempting to squelch the evolution of traditional pricing and distribution systems is not in the good of the public. What the public deserves is to have content adapt to their needs- not be told when, how, and at what cost their needs can be satisfied. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Lawnjocke (talk • contribs) 06:48, 14 February 2012 (UTC)

The Stationers Corporation

In the context of copyright laws that originated in the 18th c, we must consider the fact that the US Copyright Act was based on Britain’s 1710 The Statute of Anne, a law that freed authors of creative works from the mercy of monopoly holding publishers controlled first by the Stationers Company, and then the crown. Copyright law’s origins marked a great success for authors because they were able to reap the benefits of their work for the first 14 years after its publication, and then the works were freed to the public domain for the benefit of the rest of society. Berry and Stallman both point out however, that changes over the last 50 years to extend the duration to the lives of authors plus 70 years have come from the efforts of publishers who most often reap some benefit for the duration. How might the author of a creative work benefit from their protected work 70 years after their death? They obviously cannot, making the current copyright law most applicable to large publishing companies and corporations who have begun to greatly resemble the relationship of the 17th c publishing models that copyright law intended to escape from. Atavel (talk) 07:27, 14 February 2012 (UTC)Angelica Tavella

Historicism Meets Money

Berry and Stallman both suggest that copyright was historically intended as a limited bargain between society and those who create creative content, as a way to encourage the production of such works - and explicitly not as a form of ownership or as moral right. Assuming for now that Berry and Stallman are correct - how should the historical origins of copyright affect modern-day discussions of such?

Berry and Stallman's essays both present eloquent, cogent arguments about how the original intent of copyright - to "promote Science and the useful Arts - has been subverted by modern-day copyright law. From a theoretical standpoint, there's very little doubt that their arguments hold water - how exactly does a 170 year license on Jersey Shore for MTV help promote progress? What I think they miss, however, is that the world isn't theory. At the risk of sounding trite, America today is not America in 1700. I have the same issue with such a literal reading of the copyright clause as I do of Justices Scalia and Thomas' insistence on interpreting the Constitution as a fixed, non-alterable entity. The Founders may have been very smart guys, but I have my doubt they would have predicted atomic bombs, iPhones, or CCTVs.

Copyright in the age of digital technologies is and has to be fundamentally different from copyright in the past. Specifically, the cost of copying has literally dropped to zero. Copyright law should reflect this by protecting owners from theft and piracy. Now, are the current laws perfect? Not at all; they grant far too much power to the copyright holders. But nevertheless, arguments against this extension of copyright enforcement into the private domain should stem from present realities, not a document of the past. Modern-day discussions should be grounded firmly in the present. wawert (talk) Wawert (talk) 19:53, 14 February 2012 (UTC)

I agree that these documents and interpretations of ideas are and should be more fluid and changeable entities, versus strictly fixed definitions. But from the readings, I didn't rightly glean that this has been the case with Copyright. It seems to me that the historical origins of the idea of Copyright could very well still be applied today (though adjusted for our modern realities, such as the ease of reproducing work that comes from the digital age). However, as both authors explain, the idea of Copyright shifted from a trade-off between creators and consumers, towards giving more power to the publishers and those who own the copyrights. It didn't seem to me that the trend of giving more power reflected the adjustment to modern times, but rather this was a calculated move by publishers to obtain more political and economic gain. Charlotte (talk) 20:16, 14 February 2012 (UTC)

Desert vs. Want in Stallman's Argument

"Stallman suggests that the public "deserves to get what it wants." Do you think this is a good standard to use in developing copyright? If you do think so - how could we gauge the want of the public? If not - what would be a better metric?

The answer? Yes and no. Want or desire is never a good idea without evaluating the source of that fulfillment of want. For instance, if we evaluated whether to give a child of three a trip to Disneyland because she “deserved” it, we would necessarily look not only to the child’s good record of behavior but also to the funds necessary to facilitate that trip, its accommodations, costs, and the like. A parent with little incentive financially to do so would likely have to turn down such a big expense. Although perhaps a poor analogy from the perspective of value alone, the analogy perhaps holds true in terms of supply and demand – that is, it is potentially true from an economic standpoint. Without protection of intellectual property, and incentive to create and produce that intellectual property, we have little innovation. People are necessarily self-interested, as the famous philosopher John Stewart Mill would state, and that self-interest is what ultimately creates positive innovation and wealth in the lives of others in our free-market economy, for better or worse. Because of this function of the economy, we cannot simply base the creation of a law or order on desert, or even want. We must also evaluate the mechanisms that facilitate creation, or we would not have any at all to give!

Stallman does, however, bring attention to new solutions that would place greater access to intellectual property in the hands of the public, in ways such as “permit[ting] occasional private small-quantity noncommercial copying” that would not affect this incentivizing that copyright law seeks to promote. This is important because it is a balance that is key in supply and demand of intellectual property."

Rachelxsutton (talk) 23:16, 15 February 2012 (UTC)Rachelxsutton